PirateShip: Distributed Consensus for (mostly) Trusted Execution Environments

Shubham Mishra, Amaury Chamayou, Natacha Crooks, Heidi Howard, Markus Kuppe

Context: Distributed Trust Ledgers

Signal

sigstore



HYPERLEDGER INDY

SPLINTER

Hiero

Consensus Protocols

Crash Fault Tolerance (CFT)



- Must Trust your replicas:
  - Crash,
  - But strictly follow protocol.

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)



- Replicas not trusted to follow protocol:
  - Arbitrary/malicious behaviour (for at most 1/3rd of nodes)

Why not just use BFT, always?



Why?

- f more nodes.



- More phases! (at least 1 more than CFT protocols)





- Crypto overhead:
  - Signatures
  - MACs

Is there a workaround?

Can we STOP malicious behavior from happening?!

Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)

arm
TRUSTZONE

TEEs to rescue



- Integrity
  - Attestation proves to the operator that the code running in each replica is the intended one.
- Confidentiality
  - Hardware protected keys.

Can get away with using cheap CFT protocols! (with some mods)

Are we done?

SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Pre
Enclave Execution Control

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Faults in Our Bus: Novel Bus Fault Attack to Break ARM TrustZone

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FORESHADOW: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Ki
Transient Out-of-Order Execution

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Mark Silberstein[2], Thomas F. Wenisch[3], Yuval Yarom[4], and Raoul

[1]imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, [2]Technion, [3]University of Michigan, [4]Universi

WESEE: Using Malicious #VC Interrupts to Break AMD SEV-SNP

Benedict Schlüter Supraja Sridhara Andrin Bertschi Shweta Shinde

One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fau
AMD's Secure Encrypt

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SEVered: Subverting AMD's Virtual Machine Encryption

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What is a realistic model for TEE faults?



CFT OK!

What is a realistic model for TEE faults?



CFT still OK!

What is a realistic model for TEE faults?



ALL nodes affected!
Even BFT can’t handle this

Platform Fault Tolerance: The better model



Timeline of a TEE platform failure



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

PirateShip goals

- **Security:** Gracefully handle malicious TEEs/platforms.
  - Quickly check/reconcile logs.
  - Seamless; no external intervention.

- **Performance:** Keep overheads wrt CFT as low as possible.

Performance vs Security

Crash Commit
for lower latency

Byz Commit
for better security



Key Idea:

Embedding asynchronous BFT logic inside CFT protocol
without sending extra messages

How?

Key Insight:

CFT and BFT protocols are not THAT different!





How?

- Pipelining
- Hash-chaining
- Asynchronous vote counting

Initial Results



Conclusion

- We present the notion of Platform Fault Tolerance to better model TEE-based distributed ledgers.
- We presented PirateShip, a new consensus protocol for TEEs that exhibits CFT-like performance but asynchronously provides BFT guarantees.

Thank you!

Questions?

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