Antanas Mockus: The Prohibition of Fireworks in Bogotá

Antanas Mockus, the newly elected Mayor of Bogotá, Colombia, returned to his office late on the evening of December 8, 1995. It was the *Noche de las Velitas*[a] – the beginning of Christmas celebrations in Colombia and the first night of the season that personal fireworks were widely used. Mayor Mockus was not in a celebratory mood. He had just visited Simone Bolivar Hospital to see an eight-year-old boy, two of whose fingers were severely burned by fireworks. Mockus was overtaken by guilt. The previous year's fireworks injured 204 people in Bogotá, but this instance was different. He felt a moral weight linked to the specificity of this one, burned child. Mockus believed that his own action – allowing the sale of fireworks – led to this child's current condition.

On his way to City Hall, he had called the representatives of fireworks vendors to his office. Having heard through the media about what happened, they were already headed to see the Mayor. The future of their business was at stake. A few weeks before, after lengthy consultations with his cabinet, Mockus had reached a compromise decision. He would not fully prohibit the sale and use of fireworks, but would limit the sale to adults and require that vendors educate their customers about proper use. He then declared that if a single child were injured as a result of fireworks, all such sales would be prohibited in Bogotá.[1] The media reiterated the message. But it now appeared that vendor education was not enough. Overtaken by the emotion of the situation, Antanas Mockus felt more eloquent and persuasive. He knew that he would now enforce a prohibition on the use of all fireworks, but that this process would be delicate. As he went into the meeting with the fireworks merchants, he thought about next steps.

Had he paid the "price of pedagogical optimism," as he termed it, or would the sight of the first injured child create the public understanding necessary for the prohibition to be effective? Upon enforcing the prohibition, how could his administration deal with the merchants, especially considering that they had already stocked up on their seasonal fireworks supply? He also needed to consider the widespread cultural use of fireworks during the Christmas season. Might it be possible to create substitutes for fireworks that would resonate with the public? Finally, how would the prohibition be

[a] The Night of the Little Candles.

This case was written by Inessa Lurye, HKS MPP 2012, for Archon Fung, Ford Foundation Professor of Democracy and Citizenship at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. HKS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. HKS790

enforced, particularly the punishment for those who transgressed the law? Decisions needed to be made quickly.

Bogotá's First Independent Mayor

Less than a year earlier, Antanas Mockus first entered political office. A professor, who had taken the helm of the National University of Colombia in 1991, he had no prior interest in running for elected office. His research focused on the relationship between law, morality and culture, the alignment of which, he believed, would lead to effective social regulation (see Exhibit 1). He was also interested in education – its role in perpetuating social inequality and its positive ability to help align cultural norms with morality and law.

It was not his research, but his actions, that catapulted Mockus into the national spotlight in 1993. Addressing a crowd of student protestors at the National University, he was unable to appease the group with words. Instead, he proceeded to "moon" the crowd.[b2] This unexpected action, which was captured by news cameras and subsequently televised, forced Mockus' resignation as the university's president. The video and ensuing television appearances, however, endeared him with Bogotá's public. They believed that someone able to moon a crowd was an "anti-politician" who would not have anything to hide.[3] Simultaneously, the perception of corruption and cronyism in Bogotá's existing government was overwhelming. Citizens were disillusioned with disingenuous public officials who acted on their own self-interests.

Mockus' increasing public persona led to several appeals by a former M-19 guerrilla leader turned politician, Gustavo Petro, encouraging him to run for Mayor. Mockus decided to run, believing that a mayor has wide latitude to lead an educational and culturally transformative process of change. Many of Bogotá's problems, he believed, were rooted in culture – the disrespect and misuse of public resources, the disregard for public laws and the mistreatment of fellow citizens. He wanted to translate and adapt knowledge produced in academia into language intelligible to the broader public. Bogotá, plagued by low levels of basic public services, crime and political corruption, was an ideal educational laboratory of five million people.

Mockus mounted a low-budget campaign, headquartered in the home of his mother and well covered by the media. Importantly, he ran as an independent – without party affiliation. As other politicians recognized his increasing popularity, he refused their funds and endorsements. This independent stance was made possible by Colombia's recent constitutional reforms, which allowed non-party affiliated mayoral candidates to run upon attaining a sufficient number of signatures.[4] Garnering approximately 66% of the vote, Mayor Mockus entered office on January 1, 1995.[5]

[b] To "moon" is to expose one's buttocks to (someone) in order to insult or amuse them.

Citizen Culture

The politically connected quickly understood that negotiations and bribes for jobs and government contracts, previously ingratiated in Bogotá's government, would not occur. A full stop on back-office negotiations set a new tone for the administration, but fostered increased opposition from parts of the City Council. Mockus wanted no political appointments through connections; appointees were tested on the merits of their qualifications. A handful of top appointees – from the Secretary of Government, Alicia Silva, to Director of the Institute of Culture, Paul Bromberg – were Mockus' colleagues at the National University. They comprised a senior team that did not represent any particular political interests but was full of academics, researchers, and members of cultural institutions.

Quickly, the administration was caught off guard, having only a few weeks to draft the City's Development Plan. Once composed, the plan aimed to "Educate the City." It centered on creating a Citizen Culture (*Cultura Ciudadana*), described as the "…sum of habits, behaviors, actions and minimum common rules that generate a sense of belonging, facilitate harmony among citizens, and lead to respect for shared property and heritage and the recognition of citizens' rights and duties."[6]

This initiative attempted to align citizen behavior with the rule of law through education and positive peer influence (see Exhibit 2). To further these goals, Mockus established and Paul Bromberg headed the Observatory of Urban Culture, a part of the Institute of Culture. It aimed to study urban socialization and analyze cultural initiatives undertaken in Bogotá. Mockus charged Bromberg, an engineer by training, with designing innovations related to citizenship culture. The administration's focus was playful, characterized by active idea generation and a willingness to try and fail at multiple games and artistic efforts that educated the public.

Many of the administration's most creative initiatives began at the Institute of Culture, such as a program, launched in March 1995, to control Bogotá's traffic and jaywalking. Mockus tried multiple transit games. Meanwhile, Bromberg was exploring alternative ideas. During a casual dinner conversation, Bromberg's father-in-law suggested the use of mimes to control traffic. Bromberg and his team of artists ran with the idea. They identified twenty congested and unruly intersections, contracted for the painting of zebra crossings at these intersections and hired twenty trained mimes. Then, on an afternoon in March, the mimes first descended onto the targeted intersections, teaching and gently mocking jaywalkers and cars to encourage compliance with traffic rules.[7] Though Mockus was initially worried about this approach, he quickly saw and then supported its benefits. As the effort continued, a flurry of press, positive public response, and, most importantly, behavior change followed.

Carrot Christmas

Though unruly traffic was an initial concern, violence was not at the forefront of the administration's agenda until six months into Mockus' term. Data on city operations was scant. Various agencies could

not agree on the number of yearly homicides in Bogotá. Mockus requested a reconciled monthly reporting of key data; when data on traffic accidents, gun violence and later fireworks injuries was compiled, it became central to the Mayor's agenda. On an average day in Bogotá approximately eleven people were killed in homicides and four in traffic accidents. The homicide rate had grown from 20 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 1980 to 80.9 deaths in 1993. Traffic fatalities were also on the rise, exceeding 1,300 annually (see Exhibit 3). Across the board, the number of deaths and injuries spiked during the Christmas season.

Mockus created a Security Council, focused on violence; the Council quickly took up the correlated issues of violence, drinking, and traffic accidents. A significant number of traffic accidents occurred after late-night drinking. Meanwhile, the police became preoccupied with the intoxicated and thus became distracted from larger-scale violence. Observing this pattern, the police chief asked Mockus to close establishments that sold alcohol at 1 AM and to prohibit sales until 6 AM, the timeframe of most alcohol-related incidents. Before Mockus acted, the Mayor engaged the public. The months of October and November 1995 were filled with public discussions and education on the risks and consequences of excessive alcohol consumption. These included creative efforts at citizen self-regulation with campaigns such as "turn in your keys," "the designated driver," and "knowing before drinking, responsible use of alcohol."[8]

Even the naming of the impending prohibition was an educational and cultural matter – the title needed to be catchy and easy to understand. After lengthy discussions, the members of Mockus' senior team determined that the upcoming prohibition would be playfully called *zanahorio*, meaning carrot. In Spanish it is a play-on-words, a nickname of a person who is well behaved, upright and healthy. With education underway, Mockus intended to implement the "Carrot Law" in late December in the hopes of making the upcoming Christmas season more civil and safer – a Carrot Christmas (*Navidad Zanahoria*).

Later, the administration planned for pushback from bar owners and the difficulties of tactically enforcing the impending prohibition. They began putting together a team – composed of police and security officials, senior cabinet members, the Mayor and on occasion the media, which would descend upon Bogotá nightly to close down non-compliant bars once the prohibition took effect.

Fireworks

After diving into the traffic and homicide statistics, data on fireworks injuries emerged. During a cabinet meeting, the Secretary of Health, Beatriz Londoño, shared the statistics of deaths and injuries due to the non-professional use of fireworks. Injuries spiked during the winter holidays. As Alicia Silva, the Secretary of Government, described:

> This was a matter that had remained unnoticed in Bogotá, a yearly tragedy to which the citizenry had grown accustomed to, or simply did not notice, where hundreds of children were burned, mutilated, and even killed. During Christmas of 1993, for example, there were 262 cases of burns due to fireworks, and in the end-of-year festivities of 1994 that number was 204.[9]

Faced with this data, Beatriz Londoño, wanted to prohibit the use of fireworks. However, the cabinet was divided. Skeptical members believed that "it would be impossible to put an end to a centuries-long tradition held throughout Colombia."[10] Others argued for citizen education. The livelihood of fireworks merchants, frequently seasonal workers at the lower end of the economic spectrum, was an issue. There was concern that these workers would need to find alternative income sources.

During these conversations, Mockus, thought back to an incident that summer. He had visited a block of houses, which were destroyed by an explosion caused by clandestine fireworks production. Two individuals were killed, but unlike the rituals following deaths, their coffins were hidden from him. Mockus was surprised by how the fireworks manufacturers feared that he would shut down their businesses and how they appeared "more preoccupied with the continuity of their business than the two lives that were lost."[11] Now the issue of fireworks had resurfaced.

Even though the Mayor, the Secretary of Health, and the Secretary of Culture were leaning towards prohibition, there was too much internal discord. In a personally uncharacteristic move, Mockus created a small commission, which included the Secretaries of Health and Education and the Director of the Institute of Culture, among others. The group was charged with making a final recommendation on fireworks, but after weeks of discussion and analysis it was unable to reach an agreement.

The cultural critique against the prohibition of fireworks defended fireworks as a part of Colombia's culture and identity. Fireworks were associated with celebratory occasions; for some children the ability to shoot off personal fireworks was a rite of passage. These fireworks were a natural symbol of celebration and could not be easily changed. As Mockus recalled: "Culture is not water or playdough, it is not something that you can just manipulate at will."[12] Prohibiting personal fireworks would require not only legal but also cultural change.

For others, the prohibition was a moral issue. Innocent children suffered as a result of the explosion of fireworks. Some commission members believed that there was a moral trade-off "between the momentary joy felt by a thousand people burning fireworks and the suffering of a burnt child."**[13]** It was necessary for the public to understand this moral choice and in that context choose prohibition.

Moreover, the Secretary of Education, José Luis Villaveces, pushed for a pedagogical approach. This approach would involve teaching the public how to use fireworks more securely and outside the reach of children.

An Integrative Approach

Considering the various options, Mockus decided on an integrative, compromise approach. Fireworks would continue to be sold, remaining part of the cultural celebrations, but there would be a parallel goal of ending the deaths and injuries that they caused. Zones where pyrotechnics could be sold would be maintained. However, the administration placed most of the pedagogical burden of firework safety on the vendors, who were asked not to sell them to children and to educate the buyers.

Simultaneously, Mockus told the media that with the first burned child, all fireworks sales would stop.[14] The vendors could even create a moral pressure on the buyers – if a child is hurt, they would lose their jobs. Mockus believed that this approach would be an opportunity to learn about the dangers and impact of fireworks on children, vendors and society. More broadly:

> …reducing the risk of violent events was not solely a technical or judicial matter, but a communicative and pedagogic process to make manifest the objectives of the law, promote questioning on collective and individual behaviors, and encourage self-regulation and mutual citizen regulation.[15]

Mockus reflected, "In advance you do not know the risk that you are taking. An objective third party could have said – just a pedagogical approach will not work, you are too optimistic."[16] Nonetheless, the administration simultaneously drafted a decree that would take effect if a child were to be burned (see Exhibit 4).

An Incident that Triggers the Decree

Bogotá's Christmas celebrations began around December 7th and 8th with the celebration of the *Noche de las Velitas,* which in Catholic tradition honors the Virgin Mary. Candles and lanterns adorned the city and fireworks lit up the sky. But, as the celebrations got underway, a young boy burned two fingers with fireworks. Mockus immediately visited the hospital and looking into the boy's eyes sensed a personal, moral responsibility. In some way, he had let this happen. This child was a sacrifice, whose pain he hoped to use constructively – to educate the citizens of Bogotá and promote understanding and compliance with the upcoming decree.

As Mockus left the burn unit of Simone Bolivar Hospital, he knew that prohibition was imminent during the current Carrot Christmas. The drafted decree prohibited the sale, storage and handling of all pyrotechnic products in Bogotá, even those used in theatrical performances (in an attempt to not send a confusing public message). It would be an attempt to actualize Mockus' philosophy – aligning law with morality and culture. As the decree's signatory, Alicia Silva recalled:

> The decree that restricted the use of fireworks in the District was a great effort to harmonize legal, moral and cultural regulations. The law had to be changed (in this case, the decree on the use of fireworks) and the cultural practice to burn fireworks with no restrictions, in order to defend the moral imperative of protecting the physical integrity and the lives of minors.[17]

Mockus hoped that the boy's injury, would activate a sense of morality and force the citizens of Bogotá to ask: are we "willing to tolerate the physical harm done to children to continue with a tradition of dangerous celebration, or even, in order to protect the commercial interests of the fireworks salesmen."[18] Would this child's injury lead to greater social understanding and a shift in public opinion on this issue? Importantly, he wondered if the administration's educational approach would help citizens understand and comply with the prohibition.

Next Steps

The Carrot Christmas, *Navidad Zanahoria*, was certainly shaping up to be a test for Mockus' Citizen Culture program. Between the planned early closing of establishments that sold alcohol and the impending fireworks ban, he thought about how he would face angry constituencies. As the media shared the news of the boy's injury, Mockus returned to City Hall to meet with both large and small fireworks vendors. He had to discuss and legitimate the decree. The vendors were willing to make more concessions, such as agreeing to a more thorough educational campaign, but they were unprepared for a prohibition.

For many fireworks vendors, their entire families were involved in the business. Mockus second-guessed himself. If he had only taken the advice of the Secretary of Health earlier in the year and prohibited sales then, these vendors would not have stocked up on supplies for the entire holiday season – their prime selling period. Now, the decree would leave them with a significant unsellable inventory. With that sense of responsibility and wanting to control any potential black market, Mockus entered the meeting with the vendors. He immediately asked them to provide an inventory of the fireworks stock. What should be done with this data? Should the vendors be compensated by the City and if so, how?

Might there be opportunities for these merchants to sell alternative holiday products for their own economic benefit or as culturally viable substitutes for fireworks? In continuing the meeting at City Hall, Mockus proposed that the group sell alterative humorous gadgets, maybe lipstick for men. "You do not just want to destroy our profession, you want to make all of us gay," retorted one merchant.[19] Mockus wondered – would the path of substitute fireworks products be fruitful? What types of products would work in the Bogotá context? Perhaps the Institute of Culture should get involved.

Then, Mockus considered, what would be a fair and educational way to punish those who transgressed the upcoming decree – especially parents who allow their children to use illegal fireworks?

As the night grew longer, Mockus felt the emotional presence of the burn victim he had just seen. Would his story, the decree and any subsequent actions by the administration change the statistics in Bogotá? Last year, the Christmas season coincided with 204 fireworks injuries – including 127 children who were burned and five children who were killed. What would this Carrot Christmas season bring?

Exhibit 1: Three Regulatory Systems

A summary of the three regulatory systems central to Mockus' philosophy and the main reasons to obey each.

	Legal norms	**Moral norms**	**Social norms**
Description	Admiration for the law	Self-gratification of conscience	Social admiration and recognition
Reason to obey	Fear of legal sanction	Fear of guilt	Fear of shame and social rejection

Source: Antanas Mockus, *Articulo Logoros*, Trans., Bogotá, pp. 16-17.

Exhibit 2: Goals of the Citizen Culture Initiative

The four objectives of the Citizen Culture initiative, central to Bogotá's Development Plan, were:

1. To increase compliance with rules of co-existence.
2. To increase the capacity of some citizens to encourage others towards peaceful compliance with rules.
3. To increase the capacity for agreement and peaceful resolution of conflicts between citizens.
4. To increase citizens' communications skills (expression, interpretation) through art, culture, recreation and sport.

Source: Antanas Mockus, "Co-existence as Harmonization of Law, Morality and Culture," *Prospects, XXXII,* no. 1. March 2002, p. 24.

Exhibit 3: Traffic Fatalities in Bogotá, 1991 - 1995



Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses.

Exhibit 4: Decree 791 Prohibiting Fireworks

ACT 791 OF 1995
(December 10)

Repealed by Decree 738 of 1999

By which the sale of pyrotechnics, fireworks and balloons, and the use of these products in the Capital District of Santa Fe of Bogota. D.C. is prohibited

The Mayor of Santa Fe of Bogota, D.C.,

Using his legal powers, in particular those which the Decrees 1355 of 1970 and 522 of 1971 conferred in the agreement 18 of 1989.

CONSIDERING

That it is the duty of the State authorities take the necessary measures to protect the rights of citizens, particularly minors.

That the Constitution enshrines the life, physical integrity and health as fundamental rights of children, which prevail over the rights of others.

That the May 18, 1989 Agreement, Article 62 et seq, authorizes the Mayor to set the times, places and general conditions for the sale of gunpowder and fireworks and to establish the security conditions and authorize the burning of flares, volcanoes, flying and other fireworks in public places.

That Article 93 of Agreement 18 of 1989 empowers the Mayor to adopt the measures he/she considers essential to prevent fires.

That if production, distribution and use of pyrotechnics, fireworks and balloons, endangers the life, physical integrity and health of citizens, especially minors, it is necessary to ban their sale and use in general.

View District Decree 120 of 1996, Decree 381 of 1998, and State Council Verdict 3881 of 1999.

DECREES

FIRST ARTICLE: the sale, storage, handling and use of pyrotechnics, fireworks and balloons, in Santa Fe de Bogota DC is totally prohibited.

Declared VOID by the State Council verdict 3881 of 1999.

SECOND ARTICLE:

Anyone who sells pyrotechnics, fireworks or balloons will incur temporary retention up to twenty-four (24) hours and confiscation of the proceeds. If such sale is made in commercial establishments of any kind, such as in open

enclosures, sheds or any shops in the Capital District, an immediate closure of seven (7) days will be imposed by the police authority.

Underlined text declared VOID by the verdict of the State Council 3881 of 1999.

The same penalty will be incurred by anyone who stores these items, except with permission of the competent authority to produce them.

See the Judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of C / brand. 7242 of 1998.

THIRD ARTICLE: whoever handles or uses pyrotechnics, fireworks or balloons shall be liable to forfeiture of proceeds, as well as temporary retention up to four (24) hours Underlined text declared VOID by the verdict of the State Council 3881 of 1999.

See the Judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of C / brand. 7242, 1998.

FOURTH ARTICLE: If the offender to the provisions of this decree is a minor, he/she will forfeit the product and will be driven and placed at the disposition of a family advocate who will determine the protection measures adopted in accordance with Decree 2737 of 1989.

The legal representatives of the juvenile offender, who find who is responsible for the act or neglect of the behavior, will impose temporary retention up to twenty-four (24) hours Underlined text declared VOID by the failure by the State Council, 1999 3881 .

See the Judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of C / brand. 7242, 1998.

FIFTH ARTICLE: Anyone who owns pyrotechnics or fireworks because he/she has produced or acquired them for sale may report them to the Secretary of State, for subsequent delivery to the authorities, over a period of time between December thirteenth (13) and fifteenth (15) of 1995 (1995).

The date, method and place of delivery shall be defined by the Office for the Prevention and Emergency Response.

FIRST PARAGRAPH: Whoever is relying on the provisions established in this Article, within the dates outlined above, will be entitled to financial compensation limited by the district administration, through the procedure of the Mayor for such a purpose, and may be included in job retraining programs that seek access to alternative economic activities that will advance the Popular Sales Fund of the District.

For the purposes referred to in this paragraph priority will be considered based on the factor of number of items reported and delivered, and those who first report and deliver the goods will be favored.

Both compensation and retraining programs are limited by the resources available to the District for this purpose.

For purposes of inclusion in retraining programs, the applicant must meet the following requirements:

a. Fill out the complaint form of ownership and commitment to deliver fireworks and pyrotechnics, created by the Office for Prevention and Emergency Response.

b. Make delivery of all goods reported in the locations and dates indicated by the Mayor in due course.

c. Express desire to benefit from the retraining program and attend meetings and activities developed for this purpose.

SECOND PARAGRAPH: All pyrotechnics and fireworks containing white phosphorus are excluded from the provisions of this Article.

SIXTH ARTICLE: Those who have purchased fireworks or pyrotechnic articles for personal or family use can disable them in events organized by local municipalities before the December twenty-third (23) of 1995 (1995) or deliver them to the Local Municipality Civil Defense before December twenty-third (23) of 1995 (1995).

SEVENTH ARTICLE: NULLITY DECREED. This empowers local mayors and the district commander and deputy commander to meet and punish offenses under this Decree. State Council Verdict 3881 of 1999.

PARAGRAPH: The penalties imposed herein shall be subject to criminal action as may be appropriate and in accordance with the procedure established by law enforcement standards.

EIGHTH ARTICLE: This decree rules from the date of publication and repeals provisions that are contrary.

PUBLISHED AND ENFORCED
Given in Santa Fe of Bogotá D.C., on December 10 of 1995.
ANTANAS MOCKUS SIVICKAS,
Mayor.
ALICIA EUGENIA SILVA,
Secretary of the Government.

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE DISTRICT RECORD NUMBER 1079 FROM JANUARY 2 OF 1996

Source: Decree 791 Prohibiting Fireworks, http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=1972#HojaVida.

Notes

[1] Antanas Mockus. Personal Interview. 17 August 2011.
[2] Paul Bromberg. Personal Interview. 9 August 2011.
[3] Alicia Silva. Personal Interview. 12 August 2011.
[4] Paul Bromberg, *Instituciones y Personalidades en el Gobierno de las Ciudades, Una Approximation Semi – Testimonial al Caso de Bogotá,* Instituto de Estudios Urbanos y Escuela de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

[5] Alicia Silva, *Bogotá, from Construction to Decay 1995-2007*, Trans. 1998, Bogotá, p. 21.

[6] Ricardo Montezuma, "The Transformation of Bogota Colombia, 1995-2000: Investing in Citizenship and Urban Mobility," *Urban Global Development Magazine*, Vol. 1, Issue 1, May 2005.

[7] Antanas Mockus et al., *Cultura Ciudadana en Bogota: Neuvas Perspective*, 2008, p. 199.

[8] Alicia Silva, *Bogotá, from Construction to Decay 1995-2007*, Trans. 1998, Bogotá, p. 34.

[9] Alicia Silva, *Bogotá, from Construction to Decay 1995-2007*, Trans. 1998, Bogotá, p. 32.

[10] Alicia Silva, *Bogotá, from Construction to Decay 1995-2007*, Trans. 1998, Bogotá, p. 34.

[11] Antanas Mockus. Personal Interview. 17 August 2011.

[12] Antanas Mockus. Personal Interview. 17 August 2011.

[13] Antanas Mockus, *Articulo Logoros*, Trans., Bogotá, pp. 17-18.

[14] "The Gunpowder Is for Looking but Not Touching," *El Tiempo*, November 21, 1995, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-459994. "Carrot or Stick," *Semana*, December 25, 1995, http://www.semana.com/nacion/zanahoria-garrote/43556-3.aspxx.

[15] Alicia Silva, *Bogotá, from Construction to Decay 1995-2007*, Trans. 1998, Bogotá, p. 26.

[16] Antanas Mockus. Personal Interview. 17 August 2011.

[17] Alicia Silva, *Bogotá, from Construction to Decay 1995-2007*, Trans. 1998, Bogotá, p. 34.

[18] Alicia Silva, *Bogotá, from Construction to Decay 1995-2007*, Trans. 1998, Bogotá, p. 34.

[19] Antanas Mockus. Personal Interview. 17 August 2011.