

Problem 1. RSA Setup

1. For the decrytion in RSA, we have

$$m = C^d \bmod n = m^{ed} \bmod n$$

This equation exists when

$$ed \equiv 1 \bmod \varphi(n)$$

And this uses Euler's theorem, which requires n is coprime with m

2. Let $k = a\varphi(n)$, $a \in \mathbb{N}^*$

- (a) Given $\gcd(m, n) = 1$

$$\begin{aligned} m^k &\equiv (m^{\varphi(n)})^a \bmod n \\ &\equiv 1^a \bmod n \\ &\equiv 1 \bmod n \end{aligned}$$

Thus we have

$$m^k \equiv 1 \bmod p \quad \text{and} \quad m^k \equiv 1 \bmod q$$

- (b) Let $\gcd(m, n) = p$, so $\gcd(m/p, q) = 1$

$$\begin{aligned} m^{k+1} &\equiv p \left[\left(\frac{m}{p} \right)^{k+1} \bmod q \right] \bmod n \\ &\equiv p \left[\left(\frac{m}{p} \right)^{a(p-1)\varphi(q)+1} \bmod q \right] \bmod n \\ &\equiv p \cdot \frac{m}{p} \bmod n \\ &\equiv m \bmod n \end{aligned}$$

Thus we have

$$m^{k+1} \equiv m \bmod p \quad \text{and} \quad m^{k+1} \equiv m \bmod q$$

3. (a) Based on

$$ed \equiv 1 \bmod \varphi(n)$$

We know

$$ed = k + 1 \text{ where } k = a\varphi(n)$$

Since for arbitrary m , we have

$$m^{k+1} \equiv m \bmod p \quad \text{and} \quad m^{k+1} \equiv m \bmod q$$

Therefore

$$m^{ed} \equiv m \bmod n$$

- (b) It doesn't matter if m and n is coprime, we can always find that $m^{ed} \equiv m \pmod n$ as long as $m < n$. Therefore, it's not necessary for the condition $\gcd(m, n) = 1$.

Problem 2. RSA Decryption

Given $n = 11413$, we can find that $11413 = 101 \times 113$

Then we can find that $\varphi(n) = 112 \times 100 = 11200$

Knowing $e = 7467$ and $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$, we have

$$7467 \times 3 \equiv 1 \pmod{11200}$$

Therefore $d = 3$, then we can compute m using

$$m \equiv c^d \pmod n$$

$$m \equiv 5859^3 \pmod{11413}$$

$$m = 1415$$

Problem 3. Breaking RSA

1. Based on the encryption and decryption equations, we use

$$m = C^d \pmod n = m^{ed} \pmod n$$

When the d or e is small, the speed for encryption and decryption computation will be faster rather than some large number.

2. Wiener's attack uses the continued fraction method to expose the private key d when $d < \frac{1}{3}N^{\frac{1}{4}}$. The procedure follows as

$$\lambda(N) = \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1) = \frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{G} = \frac{\varphi(N)}{G} \text{ where } G = \gcd(p-1, q-1)$$

Since

$$ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\lambda(N)}$$

There exists an integer K , such that

$$ed = K\lambda(N) + 1$$

$$ed = \frac{K}{G}(p-1)(q-1) + 1$$

Defining $k = \frac{K}{\gcd(K, G)}$, $g = \frac{G}{\gcd(K, G)}$,

$$ed = \frac{k}{g}(p-1)(q-1) + 1$$

Dividing dpq ,

$$\frac{e}{pq} = \frac{k}{dg}(1 - \delta), \delta = \frac{p + q - 1 - \frac{g}{k}}{pq}$$

Since $\frac{e}{pq}$ is slightly smaller than $\frac{k}{dg}$, assuming $ed > pq$, we have

$$edg = k(p - 1)(q - 1) + g$$

$$\varphi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) = \frac{g(ed - 1)}{k}$$

Then we can use continued fractions to expand $\frac{e}{pq}$, and varify all convergent $\frac{g}{k}$

$$x^2 - ((pq - \varphi(pq)) + 1)x + pq = 0$$

The solutions for the above equation is just p and q , and thus we find the factorization.

3. There are mainly two techniques.

- (a) Choose large public key. Replace e by $e' = e + k\lambda(N)$ for large k , s.t $e' > N^{\frac{3}{2}}$, then Wiener's Attack cannot be applied even d is small.
- (b) Using CRT, choose d satisfies $d_p = d \bmod p - 1$ and $d_q = d \bmod q - 1$, then let

$$M_p \equiv C^{d_p} \text{ and } M_q \equiv C^{d_q}$$

Find M that

$$M \equiv M_p \bmod p \text{ and } M \equiv M_q \bmod q$$

Since $d \bmod \lambda(N)$ is large, Wiener's attack cannot be applied

4. Given $n = 317940011$ and $e = 77537081$, we first try to find continued fraction of $\frac{e}{n}$

```

1  #include <stdint>
2  #include <iostream>
3  #include <cmath>
4
5  using namespace std;
6
7  void continued_frac(uint64_t p, uint64_t q, double limit){
8      uint64_t h1 = 1, k1 = 0, h2 = 0, k2 = 1;
9      size_t i = 0;
10     while (q >= 1){
11         auto d = p / q;
12         auto h = d * h1 + h2;
13         auto k = d * k1 + k2;
14         if (k > limit){
15             break;
16         }
    }

```

```

17         cout << " k = " << h << ", d = " << k << endl;
18
19         h2 = h1;
20         h1 = h;
21         k2 = k1;
22         k1 = k;
23
24         d = p % q;
25         p = q;
26         q = d;
27     }
28 }
29
30 int main(){
31     uint64_t n = 317940011;
32     uint64_t e = 77537081;
33     double limit = pow(n, 0.25)/3;
34     continued_frac(e, n, limit);
35
36     return 0;

```

The applicable values for Wiener's attack are following

```

1   k = 0, d = 1
2   k = 1, d = 4
3   k = 9, d = 37
4   k = 10, d = 41

```

Then we need to verify $\phi(n)$ such that $(n - \phi(n) + 1)^2 - 4n$ is a square and thus we have solutions for p, q . We find that when $k_0 = 10$, $d = 41$,

$$\phi(n) = \frac{ed - 1}{k} = 317902032$$

$$(n - \phi(n) + 1)^2 - 4n = 170720356 = 13066^2$$

$$p = \frac{37980 + 13066}{2} = 25523, \text{ and } q = \frac{37980 - 13066}{2} = 12457$$

Therefore,

$$n = 317940011 = 25523 \times 12457$$

Problem 4. Programming

Source code is uploaded. Please see README.

Problem 5. Simple questions

1. For CCA, if we are given a ciphertext c which encrypts a message m , then we can choose $c' \equiv c \cdot 2^e \pmod n$, when the owner decrypt the c' use d , he'll get $(2m)^e \pmod n$ since $c = m^e$.
2. No. The hard problem to solve in RSA is a factorization problem. As long as n could be factorized, it's simple to derive d , and the decryption procedure is the same regarding multiple layers of encryption.
3. For $n = 642401$, knowing $516107^2 \equiv 7 \pmod n$ and $187722^2 \equiv 4 \cdot 7 \pmod n$. We have

$$4 \cdot 516107^2 \equiv 4 \cdot 7 \pmod n$$

Then minus two equations, we have

$$4 \cdot 516107^2 - 187722^2 \equiv 0 \pmod n$$

$$(2 \cdot 516107 - 187722)(2 \cdot 516107 + 187722) \equiv 0 \pmod n$$

$$1219936 \cdot 844492 \equiv 0 \pmod n$$

$$2^5 \times 38123 \cdot 2^2 \times 2123649 \equiv 0 \pmod n$$

$$2^5 \times 67 \times 569 \cdot 2^2 \times 11 \times 171 \times 1129 \equiv 0 \pmod n$$

Since 642401 must be the product of the factors list above, we can find that

$$n = 642401 = 569 \times 1129$$

4. Consider $n = p \cdot q \cdot r$, where p, q, r are large prime numbers, then

$$\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)(r-1)$$

As with textbook RSA encryption and decryption method, we should have

$$ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$$

$$c^d \equiv m^{ed} \equiv m^{\varphi(n)+1} \equiv m \pmod n$$

Since we have three prime factors for n , the length for each prime factor is smaller, and it's much easier to factorize n , which lower the security of the RSA.

5. 97 is a prime, and $(97-1) = 96 = 2^5 \times 3$, then $q = 2$ or 3 .
Thus generator x should satisfy

$$x^{32} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{97} \quad \text{and} \quad x^{48} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{97}$$

We find 5 satisfies all requirements, thus the smallest generator of $U(\mathbb{Z}/97\mathbb{Z})$ is 5.

6. (a) 137 is a prime, and $101 - 1 = 100 = 2^2 \times 5^2$, thus $q = 2$ or 5 .

$$\begin{aligned} 2^{100/2} &\equiv (2^{10})^5 \pmod{101} \\ &\equiv 14^5 \pmod{101} \\ &\equiv 100 \pmod{101} \\ 2^{100/5} &\equiv (2^{10})^2 \pmod{101} \\ &\equiv 14^2 \pmod{101} \\ &\equiv 95 \pmod{101} \end{aligned}$$

Since $2^{50} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{101}$ and $2^{20} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{101}$, 2 is a generator of G .

- (b) Given $\log_2 3 = 69$, knowing $\log_2 2 = 1$

$$\begin{aligned} \log_2 24 &= \log_2(3 \times 2^3) \\ &= \log_2 3 + 3 \log_2 2 \\ &= 69 + 3 = 72 \end{aligned}$$

- (c) Given $\log_2 5 = 24$

$$\begin{aligned} \log_2 24 &= \log_2 125 \\ &= 3 \log_2 5 \\ &= 3 \times 24 = 72 \end{aligned}$$

7. Knowing $3^6 \equiv 44 \pmod{137}$, and $3^{10} \equiv 2 \pmod{137}$, since $(137 - 1) = 136 = 2^3 \times 17$, $q = 2$ or 17 .

$$\begin{aligned} 3^{136/2} &\equiv 3^5 \cdot (3^7)^9 \pmod{137} \\ &\equiv 243 \cdot (-5)^9 \pmod{137} \\ &\equiv 106 \cdot 12^3 \pmod{137} \\ &\equiv 106 \cdot 7 \cdot 12 \pmod{137} \\ &\equiv 136 \pmod{137} \\ 3^{136/17} &\equiv 3^8 \pmod{137} \\ &\equiv 3 \cdot -5 \pmod{137} \\ &\equiv 122 \pmod{137} \end{aligned}$$

Since $3^{68} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{137}$ and $3^8 \not\equiv 1 \pmod{137}$, 3 is a generator of $U(\mathbb{Z}/137\mathbb{Z})$. Since

$$\log_3 11 = \log_3 44 - 2 \log_3 2 = -14$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned} 3^{-14} &\equiv 11 \pmod{137} \\ 3^{136} &\equiv 1 \pmod{137} \end{aligned}$$

Thus $x = 122$.

8. (a) $6^5 = 7776 \equiv 10 \pmod{11}$, thus $6^5 = 10$ in $U(Z/11Z)$
 (b) 11 is a prime, and $(11 - 1) = 10 = 2 \times 5$, $q = 2$ and 5

$$2^{10/2} \equiv 10 \pmod{11}$$

$$2^{10/5} \equiv 4 \pmod{11}$$

Since $2^5 \not\equiv 1 \pmod{11}$ and $2^2 \not\equiv 1 \pmod{11}$, 2 is a generator of G .

- (c) Given $2^x \equiv 6 \pmod{11}$, using $6^5 = 10 \pmod{11}$, we have

$$(2^x)^5 \equiv 6^5 \pmod{11}$$

$$(2^5)^x \equiv 10 \pmod{11}$$

$$(-1)^x \equiv -1 \pmod{11}$$

Thus we find that x should be odd.

Problem 6. DLP

1. Given $3^x \equiv 2 \pmod{65537}$, we know $2^{16} = 65536$

$$3^{16x} = 2^{16} \equiv -1 \pmod{65537}$$

$$3^{32x} \equiv 1 \pmod{65537}$$

Since we know 3 is generator for $U(Z/65537Z)$, we have

$$3^{65536} \equiv 1 \pmod{65537}$$

Thus $65536 \mid 32x$, we have $2048 \mid x$.

Since $65536 \nmid 16x$, we have $4096 \nmid x$.

2. Given $2048 \mid x$ and $4096 \nmid x$, let $x = 2048k$, where k must be odd. Since $0 \leq k < \text{ord}_U(3) = 32$, k should be less than 32, therefore there are 16 possible choices.

To determine x , first we determine two boundary values

$$3^{2048 \cdot 1} \equiv -8 \pmod{65537}$$

$$3^{2048 \cdot 31} \equiv 8192 \pmod{65537}$$

And then we find that $2 = 8192/(-8)^4$, thus

$$3^{2048 \cdot (31-4)} \equiv 2 \pmod{65537}$$

Therefore $x = 2048 \cdot 27 = 55296$.

3. Yes. According to Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, assume $x = 2^0 + x_1 2^1 + \cdots + x_{15} 2^{15}$, since $x \mid 2048$ and $x \nmid 4096$, we can simply as

$$x = 2^{11} + x_{12} 2^{12} + x_{13} 2^{13} + x_{14} 2^{14} + x_{15} 2^{15}$$

To find x_{12} , we have

$$\begin{aligned} 3^{2^{11}} \cdot 3^{2^{11}(x_{12} 2^{12} + x_{13} 2^{13} + x_{14} 2^{14} + x_{15} 2^{15})} &\equiv 2 \pmod{n} \\ 3^{2^{11}(x_{12} 2^{12} + x_{13} 2^{13} + x_{14} 2^{14} + x_{15} 2^{15})} &\equiv 2 \cdot 3^{-2^{11}} \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv 2 \cdot (-2^3)^{-1} \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv 2^{14} \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

Applying Fermat's little theorem, we have

$$(3^{2^{11}(x_{12} 2^{12} + x_{13} 2^{13} + x_{14} 2^{14} + x_{15} 2^{15})})^8 \equiv (2^{14})^8 \equiv -1 \pmod{65537}$$

$$(3^{2^{15}})^{x_{12}} = (-1)^{x_{12}} = -1 \pmod{65537}$$

$$x_{12} = 1$$

Similarly, we find $x_{13} = 0, x_{14} = 1, x_{15} = 1$

Thus, $x = 2^{11} + 2^{12} + 2^{14} + 2^{15} = 55296$.

4. Because 65537 is a special prime that can be expressed as $p^k + 1$, where $p = 2$ and $k = 16$. In order to find x value for this type of numbers, we just need to find a generator α . Since $c^{2^k} \equiv p^{2^k} \equiv 1 \pmod{p^k + 1}$, we have $p^k/2k$ divides x while p^k/k not. According to problem 2, there are only k possible choices left for x , which is not secure under a cryptography context.