L4: Basic Cryptography III

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Acknowledgement

- Many slides are from or are revised from the slides of the author of the textbook
  - Matt Bishop, Introduction to Computer Security, Addison-Wesley Professional, October, 2004, ISBN-13: 978-0-321-24774-5. Introduction to Computer Security @ VSU's Safari Book Online subscription
  - http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/book/book-intro/slides/

Overview

- Classical Cryptography
  - Caesar cipher
  - Vigènere cipher
  - DES
  - AES
- Public Key Cryptography
  - Diffie-Hellman
  - RSA
- Cryptographic Checksums
  - HMAC



Public Key Cryptography

- Two keys
  - *Private key* known only to individual
  - *Public key* available to anyone
    - Public key, private key inverses
- Idea
  - Confidentiality
    - Encipher using public key, decipher using private key
  - Integrity/authentication
    - Encipher using private key, decipher using public key

Requirements

- It must be computationally easy to encipher or decipher a message given the appropriate key
- It must be computationally infeasible to derive the private key from the public key
- It must be computationally infeasible to determine the private key from a chosen plaintext attack

RSA

- Exponentiation cipher
- Relies on the difficulty of determining the number of numbers relatively prime to a large integer *n*

Background

- Totient function $\phi(n)$
  - Number of positive integers less than *n* and relatively prime to *n*
    - *Relatively prime* means with no factors in common with *n*
- Example: $\phi(10) = 4$
  - 1, 3, 7, 9 are relatively prime to 10
- Example: $\phi(21) = 12$
  - 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20 are relatively prime to 21

Algorithm

- Choose two large prime numbers *p, q*
  - Let $n = pq$; then $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
  - Choose $e < n$ such that e is relatively prime to $\phi(n)$.
  - Compute d such that $ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$
- Public key: (e, n); private key: d
- For confidentiality
  - Encipher: $c = m^e \bmod n$
  - Decipher: $m = c^d \bmod n$
- For integrity/authentication
  - Encipher: $c = m^d \bmod n$
  - Decipher: $m = c^e \bmod n$

Example: Confidentiality

- Take $p = 7$, $q = 11$, so $n = 77$ and $\phi(n) = 60$
- Alice chooses $e = 17$, making $d = 53$
- Bob wants to send Alice secret message HELLO (07 04 11 11 14)
  - $07^{17} \bmod 77 = 28$
  - $04^{17} \bmod 77 = 16$
  - $11^{17} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $11^{17} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $14^{17} \bmod 77 = 42$
- Bob sends 28 16 44 44 42

Example

- Alice receives 28 16 44 44 42
- Alice uses private key, d = 53, to decrypt message:
  - $28^{53} \bmod 77 = 07$
  - $16^{53} \bmod 77 = 04$
  - $44^{53} \bmod 77 = 11$
  - $44^{53} \bmod 77 = 11$
  - $42^{53} \bmod 77 = 14$
- Alice translates message to letters to read HELLO
  - No one else could read it, as only Alice knows her private key and that is needed for decryption

Exercise L4-1

- Take $p = 3$, $q = 5$ and use RSA to encrypt the following message to achieve confidentiality

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Example: Integrity/Authentication

- Take $p = 7$, $q = 11$, so $n = 77$ and $\phi(n) = 60$
- Alice chooses $e = 17$, making $d = 53$
- Alice wants to send Bob message HELLO (07 04 11 11 14) so Bob knows it is what Alice sent (no changes in transit, and authenticated)
  - $07^{53} \bmod 77 = 35$
  - $04^{53} \bmod 77 = 09$
  - $11^{53} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $11^{53} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $14^{53} \bmod 77 = 49$
- Alice sends 35 09 44 44 49

Example

- Bob receives 35 09 44 44 49
- Bob uses Alice's public key, $e = 17$, $n = 77$, to decrypt message:
  - $35^{17} \bmod 77 = 07$
  - $09^{17} \bmod 77 = 04$
  - $44^{17} \bmod 77 = 11$
  - $44^{17} \bmod 77 = 11$
  - $49^{17} \bmod 77 = 14$
- Bob translates message to letters to read HELLO
  - Alice sent it as only she knows her private key, so no one else could have enciphered it
  - If (enciphered) message's blocks (letters) altered in transit, would not decrypt properly

Exercise L4-2

- Take $p = 3$, $q = 5$ and use RSA to encrypt the following message to achieve Integrity/Authentication

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Example: Both

- Alice wants to send Bob message HELLO both enciphered and authenticated (integrity-checked)
  - Alice's keys: public (17, 77); private: 53
  - Bob's keys: public: (37, 77); private: 13
- Alice enciphers HELLO (07 04 11 11 14):
  - $(07^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 07$
  - $(04^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 37$
  - $(11^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $(11^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $(14^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 14$
- Alice sends 07 37 44 44 14

Analysis on Example: Security Services (1)

- Confidentiality
  - *Only* the owner of the private key *knows* the private key, so text enciphered with public key cannot be read by anyone except the owner of the private key
- Authentication
  - *Only* the owner of the private key *knows* the private key, so text enciphered with private key must have been generated by the owner

Analysis on Example: Security Services (2)

- Integrity
  - Enciphered letters cannot be changed undetectably without knowing private key
- Non-Repudiation
  - Message enciphered with private key came from someone who knew it

Analysis on Example: Warnings

- Encipher message in blocks should be considerably larger than the examples above
  - If 1 character per block, RSA can be broken using statistical attacks (as in classical cryptosystems)
  - Attacker cannot alter letters, but can rearrange them and alter message meaning
    - Example: reverse enciphered message of text ON to get NO

Cryptographic Checksums

- Mathematical function to generate a set of *k* bits from a set of *n* bits (where $k \leq n$).
  - *k* is smaller then *n* except in unusual circumstances
- Example
  - ASCII parity bit
    - ASCII has 7 bits; 8th bit is “parity”
    - Even parity: even number of 1 bits
    - Odd parity: odd number of 1 bits

Example Use

- Bob receives “10111101” as bits.
- Sender is using *even* parity
  - Bob counts 6 1-bits and 6 is *even*; no error detected in the character received, assume the received character is correct
  - Note: could still be garbled, but 2 or more bits would need to have been changed to preserve parity
- Sender is using *odd* parity
  - Bob counts 6 of 1-bits. Since 6 is *even*, so character was not received correctly

Cryptographic Checksum

- Strong hash function or strong one-way function
- Cryptographic checksum h: $A \rightarrow B$:

1. For any $x \in A$, $h(x)$ is easy to compute
2. For any $y \in B$, it is computationally infeasible to find $x \in A$ such that $h(x) = y$
3. It is computationally infeasible to find two inputs x, $x' \in A$ such that $x \neq x'$ and $h(x) = h(x')$

Collisions

- If $x \neq x'$ and $h(x) = h(x')$, x and x' are a *collision*
- Pigeonhole principle: if there are n containers for n+1 objects, then at least one container will have 2 objects in it.
- Application: if there are 32 files and 8 possible cryptographic checksum values, at least one value corresponds to at least 4 files

Collision Requirement

3. It is computationally infeasible to find two inputs x, $x' \in A$ such that $x \neq x'$ and $h(x) = h(x')$

Or

4. Given any $x \in A$, it is computationally infeasible to find another $x' \in A$ such that $x \neq x'$ and $h(x) = h(x')$

- Subtle difference between the one: it is considerably harder to find x' meeting the conditions in property 4 than it is to find a pair x and x' meeting the conditions in property 3

Keyless or Keyed Checksum

- Keyless cryptographic checksum
  - Requires no cryptographic key
  - Example
    - MD5 (and MD4), SHA-1 (and SHA-2, SHA-3), HAVAL, and Snefru
- Keyed cryptographic checksum
  - Requires cryptographic key
  - Example
    - DES in chaining mode: encipher message, use last *n* bits. Requires a key to encipher, so it is a keyed cryptographic checksum.

Known Attacks

- MD4 and MD5
  - Dobbertin's attack (1996)
- Snefru
  - Differential cryptanalysis if 4 rounds or less are used (Biham and Shamir, 1993)
- SHA-0, SHA-1, and SHA-2
  - Chabaud and Joux 's attack on SHA-0 (1998)
  - Wang, Yin, and Yu's attack on SHA-1 (2005)
  - Khovratovich, Rechberger and Savelieva's attack on SHA-2 (2011)

HMAC

- Make keyed cryptographic checksums from keyless cryptographic checksums
- *h*: keyless cryptographic checksum function
  - Input: blocks of *b* bytes
  - Output: blocks of *l* bytes
  - *k′*: cryptographic key of length *b* bytes
  - If short, pad with 0 bytes; if long, hash to length *b*
  - *ipad* is 00110110 repeated *b* times
  - *opad* is 01011100 repeated *b* times
- HMAC-*h*(*k*, *m*) = *h*(*k′* ⊕ *opad* || *h*(*k′* ⊕ *ipad* || *m*))
  - ⊕ exclusive or, || concatenation

Strength of HMAC

- Strength of HMAC depends on the strength of the hash function h (Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk, 1996)

Exercise L4-3

- In a Linux system, create a checksum for a file and use it to check whether the file is modified after the checksum is created.
- Examine how it may be used by surveying a few file downloading sites,
  - e.g., the Fedora Linux project

http://mirror.pnl.gov/fedora/linux/releases/24/Workstation/x86_64/iso/

Summary

- Two main types of cryptosystems: classical and public key
- Classical cryptosystems encipher and decipher using the same key
  - Or one key is easily derived from the other
- Public key cryptosystems encipher and decipher using different keys
  - Computationally infeasible to derive one from the other
- Cryptographic checksums provide a check on integrity