

L7: Authentication



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Overview

- ❑ Basics
- ❑ Passwords
 - Storage
 - Selection
 - Breaking them
- ❑ Other methods
- ❑ Multiple methods

Authentication

- Binding of identity to subject
 - Identity is that of external entity (e.g, your username)
 - Subject is computer entity (e.g., process)

Establishing Identity

- ❑ One or more of the following
 - What entity knows (*e.g.*, password)
 - What entity has (*e.g.*, badge, smart card)
 - What entity is (*e.g.*, fingerprints, retinal characteristics)
 - Where entity is (*e.g.*, in front of a particular terminal)

Authentication System

- Consisting of 5 components (A, C, F, L, S)
 - A authentication information that proves identity
 - C complementary information stored on computer and used to validate authentication information
 - F complementation function
 - $f: A \rightarrow C$
 - L authentication functions that prove identity
 - $l: A \times C \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$
 - S selection functions enabling entity to create or alter information in A or C

Example: Cleartext password

- ❑ Password system, with passwords stored on line in cleartext
 - A set of strings making up passwords
 - $C = A$
 - F singleton set of identity function $\{ I \}$
 - L single equality test function $\{ eq \}$
 - S function to set/change password

Example: Encrypted password

- ❑ Password system, with passwords stored on line in an encrypted form
 - A set of strings making up passwords
 - C set of strings making up encrypted passwords
 - F set of encryption or hash functions that computes an encrypted password from a password
 - L set of test functions that takes a password, computes an encrypted password, and check if it is equal to a stored one
 - S function to set/change password

Passwords

- ❑ Sequence of characters
 - Examples: 10 digits, a string of letters, *etc.*
 - Generated randomly, by user, by computer with user input
- ❑ Sequence of words
 - Examples: pass-phrases

Storage

- ❑ Store as cleartext
 - If password file compromised, *all* passwords revealed
- ❑ Encipher file
 - Need to have decipherment, encipherment keys in memory
 - Reduces to previous problem
- ❑ Store one-way hash of password
 - If file read, attacker must still guess passwords or invert the hash

Example: Linux/UNIX

- ❑ Linux/UNIX system *standard* hash function
 - Hashes password into a character string using a hash function
- ❑ As authentication system:
 - $A = \{ \text{strings of 8 chars or less} \}$
 - $C = \{ 2 \text{ char hash id} \mid 11 \text{ char hash} \}$
 - $F = \{ 4096 \text{ versions of modified DES} \}$
 - $L = \{ \text{login, su, ...} \}$
 - $S = \{ \text{passwd, nispasswd, passwd+, ...} \}$
- ❑ Latest Linux/Unit have enhancements

Example: Linux/UNIX

❑ Read manual pages

man 1 passwd

man 5 passwd

man 3 crypt

Anatomy of Attacking

□ Goal

- find $a \in A$ such that:
 - For some $f \in F$, $f(a) = c \in C$
 - c is associated with entity

□ Two ways to determine whether a meets these requirements:

- Dictionary attack type 1: direct approach, as above, compute $f(a)$
- Dictionary attack type 2: Indirect approach, as $l(a)$ succeeds iff $f(a) = c \in C$ for some c associated with an entity, compute $l(a)$

Preventing Attacks

□ How to prevent this:

- Hide one of a , f , or c
 - Prevents obvious attack from above
 - Example: UNIX/Linux shadow password files
 - Hides c 's
- Block access to all $l \in L$ or result of $l(a)$
 - Prevents attacker from knowing if guess succeeded
 - Example: preventing *any* logins to an account from a network
 - Prevents knowing results of l (or accessing l)

Exercise L7-1: Linux Shadow Passwords

- ❑ In Linux, read manual page
man 5 shadow
- ❑ Examine two files
 - /etc/passwd
 - /etc/shadow
 - Answer the questions in the context of the description in slide 13.
 - ❑ Who can read from and write to /etc/passwd?
 - ❑ Who can read from and write to /etc/shadow?

Exercise L7-2: Linux Login Failure

- ❑ In Linux, log out
- ❑ When log back in, enter a wrong password intentionally
- ❑ Describe what you observe in the context of the description in slide 13.

Dictionary Attacks

- ❑ Trial-and-error from a list of potential passwords
 - *Off-line*: know f and c 's, and repeatedly try different guesses $g \in A$ until the list is done or passwords guessed
 - ❑ Examples: *crack*, *john-the-ripper*
 - *On-line*: have access to functions in L and try guesses g until some $l(g)$ succeeds
 - ❑ Examples: trying to log in by guessing a password

Using Time

□ Anderson's formula:

- P probability of guessing a password in specified period of time
- G number of guesses tested in 1 time unit
- T number of time units
- N number of possible passwords ($|A|$)
- Then $P \geq TG/N$

Example: Determine Password Length

□ Goal

- Passwords drawn from a 96-char alphabet
- Can test 10^4 guesses per second
- Probability of a success to be 0.5 over a 365 day period
- What is minimum password length?

□ Solution

- $N \geq TG/P = (365 \times 24 \times 60 \times 60) \times 10^4 / 0.5 = 6.31 \times 10^{11}$
- Choose s such that $\sum_{j=0}^s 96^j \geq N \geq 6.31 \times 10^{11}$
- So $s \geq 6$, meaning passwords must be at least 6 chars long

Assumptions in Anderson's Formula

- ❑ Time required to test a password is a constant
 - This is reasonable
- ❑ All passwords are equally likely to be selected
 - However, this can be remotely different from reality

Password Selection

- ❑ Random selection
 - Any password from A equally likely to be selected
- ❑ Pronounceable passwords
- ❑ User selection of passwords

Pronounceable Passwords

- ❑ Generate phonemes randomly
 - Phoneme is unit of sound, eg. *cv*, *vc*, *cvc*, *vcv*
 - Examples: *helgo*ret, *juttel*on are; *przbqx*dfl, *zxrptg*lfn are not
- ❑ Problem: too few
- ❑ Solution: key crunching
 - Run long key through hash function and convert to printable sequence
 - Use this sequence as password

User Selection

- ❑ Problem: people pick easy to guess passwords
 - Based on account names, user names, computer names, place names
 - Dictionary words (also reversed, odd capitalizations, control characters, “elite-speak”, conjugations or declensions, swear words, Torah/Bible/Koran/... words)
 - Too short, digits only, letters only
 - License plates, acronyms, social security numbers
 - Personal characteristics or foibles (pet names, nicknames, job characteristics, *etc.*)

Picking Good Passwords

- ❑ “LIMm*2^Ap”
 - Names of members of 2 families
- ❑ “OoHeO/FSK”
 - Second letter of each word of length 4 or more in third line of third verse of Star-Spangled Banner, followed by “/”, followed by author’s initials
- ❑ What’s good here may be bad there
 - “DMC/MHmh” bad at Dartmouth (“Dartmouth Medical Center/Mary Hitchcock memorial hospital”), ok here
- ❑ Why are these now bad passwords? ☹

Proactive Password Checking

- ❑ Analyze proposed password for “goodness”
 - Always invoked
 - Can detect, reject bad passwords for an appropriate definition of “bad”
 - Discriminate on per-user, per-site basis
 - Needs to do pattern matching on words
 - Needs to execute subprograms and use results
 - ❑ Spell checker, for example
 - Easy to set up and integrate into password selection system

Example: OPUS

- ❑ Goal: check passwords against large dictionaries quickly
 - Run each word of dictionary through k different hash functions h_1, \dots, h_k producing values less than n
 - Set bits h_1, \dots, h_k in OPUS dictionary
 - To check new proposed word, generate bit vector and see if *all* corresponding bits set
 - ❑ If so, word is in one of the dictionaries to some degree of probability
 - ❑ If not, it is not in the dictionaries

Example: *passwd+*

- ❑ Provides little language to describe proactive checking
 - `test length("$p") < 6`
 - ❑ If password under 6 characters, reject it
 - `test infile("/usr/dict/words", "$p")`
 - ❑ If password in file `/usr/dict/words`, reject it
 - `test !inprog("spell", "$p", "$p")`
 - ❑ If password not in the output from program `spell`, given the password as input, reject it (because it's a properly spelled word)

Salting

- ❑ Goal: slow dictionary attacks
- ❑ Method: perturb hash function so that:
 - Parameter controls *which* hash function is used
 - Parameter differs for each password
 - So given n password hashes, and therefore n salts, need to hash guess n

Example: Salted Passwords

❑ Vanilla UNIX method

- Use DES to encipher 0 message with password as key; iterate 25 times
- Perturb E table in DES in one of 4096 ways
 - ❑ 12 bit salt flips entries 1–11 with entries 25–36

❑ Alternate methods

- Use salt as first part of input to hash function

Exercise L7-2: Examine Linux Password Salt

- ❑ Read manual page

`man 5 crypt`

- ❑ Examine `/etc/passwd`

What are the salt used in the passwords?

Guessing Through Authentication Function L


- ❑ Cannot prevent these
 - Otherwise, legitimate users cannot log in
- ❑ Make them slow
 - Backoff
 - Disconnection
 - Disabling
 - ❑ Be very careful with administrative accounts!
 - Jailing
 - ❑ Allow in, but restrict activities

Password Aging

- ❑ Force users to change passwords after some time has expired
 - How do you force users not to re-use passwords?
 - ❑ Record previous passwords
 - ❑ Block changes for a period of time
 - Give users time to think of good passwords
 - ❑ Don't force them to change before they can log in
 - ❑ Warn them of expiration days in advance

Challenge-Response

- User, system share a secret function f (in practice, f is a known function with unknown parameters, such as a cryptographic key)



Pass Algorithms

- ❑ Challenge-response with the function f itself a secret
 - Example:
 - ❑ Challenge is a random string of characters such as “abcdefg”, “ageksido”
 - ❑ Response is some function of that string such as “bdf”, “gkip”
 - Can alter algorithm based on ancillary information
 - ❑ Network connection is as above, dial-up might require “aceg”, “aesd”
 - Usually used in conjunction with fixed, reusable password

One-Time Passwords

- ❑ Password that can be used exactly *once*
 - After use, it is immediately invalidated
- ❑ Challenge-response mechanism
 - Challenge is number of authentications; response is password for that particular number
- ❑ Problems
 - Synchronization of user, system
 - Generation of good random passwords
 - Password distribution problem

Example One-Time Passwords: S/Key

- ❑ One-time password scheme based on idea of Lamport
- ❑ h one-way hash function (MD5 or SHA-1, for example)
- ❑ User chooses initial seed k
- ❑ System calculates:

$$h(k) = k_1, h(k_1) = k_2, \dots, h(k_{n-1}) = k_n$$

- ❑ Passwords are reverse order:

$$p_1 = k_n, p_2 = k_{n-1}, \dots, p_{n-1} = k_2, p_n = k_1$$

S/Key Protocol

System stores maximum number of authentications n , number of next authentication i , last correctly supplied password p_{i-1} .

$user \xrightarrow{\{ name \}} system$

$user \xleftarrow{\{ i \}} system$

$user \xrightarrow{\{ p_i \}} system$

System computes $h(p_i) = h(k_{n-i+1}) = k_{n-i} = p_{i-1}$. If match with what is stored, system replaces p_{i-1} with p_i and increments i .

Hardware Support

❑ Token-based

- Used to compute response to challenge
 - ❑ May encipher or hash challenge
 - ❑ May require PIN from user

❑ Temporally-based

- Every minute (or so) different number shown
 - ❑ Computer knows what number to expect when
- User enters number and fixed password

Challenge-Response and Dictionary Attacks

- ❑ Same as for fixed passwords
 - Attacker knows challenge r and response $f(r)$; if f encryption function, can try different keys
 - ❑ May only need to know *form* of response; attacker can tell if guess correct by looking to see if deciphered object is of right form
 - ❑ Example: Kerberos Version 4 used DES, but keys had 20 bits of randomness; Purdue attackers guessed keys quickly because deciphered tickets had a fixed set of bits in some locations

Encrypted Key Exchange

- ❑ Defeats off-line dictionary attacks
- ❑ Idea: random challenges enciphered, so attacker cannot verify correct decipherment of challenge
- ❑ Assume Alice, Bob share secret password s
- ❑ In what follows, Alice needs to generate a random public key p and a corresponding private key q
- ❑ Also, k is a randomly generated session key, and R_A and R_B are random challenges

EKE Protocol

Alice $\xrightarrow{\text{Alice} \parallel E_s(p)}$ Bob

Alice $\xleftarrow{E_s(E_p(k))}$ Bob

Now Alice, Bob share a randomly generated
secret session key k

Alice $\xrightarrow{E_k(R_A)}$ Bob

Alice $\xleftarrow{E_k(R_A R_B)}$ Bob

Alice $\xrightarrow{E_k(R_B)}$ Bob

Biometrics

- ❑ Automated measurement of biological, behavioral features that identify a person
 - Fingerprints: optical or electrical techniques
 - ❑ Maps fingerprint into a graph, then compares with database
 - ❑ Measurements imprecise, so approximate matching algorithms used
 - Voices: speaker verification or recognition
 - ❑ Verification: uses statistical techniques to test hypothesis that speaker is who is claimed (speaker dependent)
 - ❑ Recognition: checks content of answers (speaker independent)

Other Characteristics

❑ Can use several other characteristics

- Eyes: patterns in irises unique
 - ❑ Measure patterns, determine if differences are random; or correlate images using statistical tests
- Faces: image, or specific characteristics like distance from nose to chin
 - ❑ Lighting, view of face, other noise can hinder this
- Keystroke dynamics: believed to be unique
 - ❑ Keystroke intervals, pressure, duration of stroke, where key is struck
 - ❑ Statistical tests used

Cautions

❑ These can be fooled!

- Assumes biometric device accurate *in the environment it is being used in!*
- Transmission of data to validator is tamperproof, correct

Location

- ❑ If you know where user is, validate identity by seeing if person is where the user is
 - Requires special-purpose hardware to locate user
 - ❑ GPS (global positioning system) device gives location signature of entity
 - ❑ Host uses LSS (location signature sensor) to get signature for entity

Multiple Methods

- ❑ Example: “where you are” also requires entity to have LSS and GPS, so also “what you have”
- ❑ Can assign different methods to different tasks
 - As users perform more and more sensitive tasks, must authenticate in more and more ways (presumably, more stringently) File describes authentication required
 - ❑ Also includes controls on access (time of day, *etc.*), resources, and requests to change passwords
 - Pluggable Authentication Modules in Linux

PAM in Linux

- ❑ Idea: when program needs to authenticate, it checks central repository for methods to use
- ❑ Library call: *pam_authenticate*
 - Accesses file with name of program in */etc/pam_d*
- ❑ Modules do authentication checking
 - *sufficient*: succeed if module succeeds
 - *required*: fail if module fails, but all required modules executed before reporting failure
 - *requisite*: like *required*, but don't check all modules
 - *optional*: invoke only if all previous modules fail

Example PAM File

```
auth sufficient /usr/lib/pam_ftp.so
auth required   /usr/lib/pam_unix_auth.so use_first_pass
auth required   /usr/lib/pam_listfile.so onerr=succeed \
                item=user sense=deny file=/etc/ftpusers
```

For ftp:

1. If user “anonymous”, return okay; if not, set PAM_AUTHTOK to password, PAM_RUSER to name, and fail
2. Now check that password in PAM_AUTHTOK belongs to that of user in PAM_RUSER; if not, fail
3. Now see if user in PAM_RUSER named in /etc/ftpusers; if so, fail; if error or not found, succeed

Exercise L7-3: Examine PAM in a Linux system

- ❑ Read manual page
 - man 7 pam
 - man 8 pam_unix
 - man 8 pam_tally2
- ❑ Examine /etc/pam.d/login
- ❑ Configure the system so that it locks a user account after 4 failed logins
 - **Create a new user to test this (otherwise, you may be locked out)**

Summary

- ❑ Authentication is not cryptography
 - You have to consider system components
- ❑ Passwords are here to stay
 - They provide a basis for most forms of authentication
- ❑ Protocols are important
 - They can make masquerading harder
- ❑ Authentication methods can be combined
 - Example: PAM