DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Principles and Paradigms
Second Edition
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Chapter 9
Security

Security Threats, Policies, and Mechanisms

Types of security threats to consider:

- Interception
- Interruption
- Modification
- Fabrication

Example: The Globus Security Architecture (1)

- 1. The environment consists of multiple administrative domains.
- 2. Local operations are subject to a local domain security policy only.
- Global operations require the initiator to be known in each domain where the operation is carried out.

Example: The Globus Security Architecture (2)

- 4. Operations between entities in different domains require mutual authentication.
- 5. Global authentication replaces local authentication.
- 6. Controlling access to resources is subject to local security only.
- 7. Users can delegate rights to processes.
- 8. A group of processes in the same domain can share credentials.

Example: The Globus Security Architecture (2)





Figure 9-1. The Globus security architecture.



Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e. (c) 2007

Focus of Control (1)

Data is protected against wrong or invalid operations State Object Invocation Method (a)

Figure 9-2. Three approaches for protection against security threats. (a) Protection against invalid operations

Focus of Control (2)

Data is protected against unauthorized invocations




Figure 9-2. Three approaches for protection against security threats. (b) Protection against unauthorized invocations.

Focus of Control (3)




Figure 9-2. Three approaches for protection against security threats. (c) Protection against unauthorized users.

Layering of Security Mechanisms (1)




Figure 9-3. The logical organization of a distributed system into several layers.

Layering of Security Mechanisms (2)




Figure 9-4. Several sites connected through a wide-area backbone service (Switched Multi-megabit Data Services).

Distribution of Security Mechanisms




Figure 9-5. The principle of RISSC (Reduced Interfaces for Secure Systems Components) as applied to secure distributed systems.

Authentication Based on a Shared Secret Key (1)




Figure 9-12. Authentication based on a shared secret key.

Authentication Based on a Shared Secret Key (2)




Figure 9-13. Authentication based on a shared secret key, but using three instead of five messages.

Authentication Based on a Shared Secret Key (3)




Figure 9-14. The reflection attack.

Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (1)




Figure 9-15. The principle of using a KDC.

Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (2)




Figure 9-16. Using a ticket and letting Alice set up a connection to Bob.

Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (3)




Figure 9-17. The Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol.

Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (4)




Figure 9-18. Protection against malicious reuse of a previously generated session key in the Needham-Schroeder protocol.

Authentication Using Public-Key Cryptography




Figure 9-19. Mutual authentication in a public-key cryptosystem.

Digital Signatures (1)




Figure 9-20. Digital signing a message using public-key cryptography.

Digital Signatures (2)




Figure 9-21. Digitally signing a message using a message digest.

Secure Replicated Servers




Figure 9-22. Sharing a secret signature in a group of replicated servers.

Example: Kerberos (1)




Figure 9-23. Authentication in Kerberos.

Example: Kerberos (2)




Figure 9-24. Setting up a secure channel in Kerberos.

General Issues in Access Control




Figure 9-25. General model of controlling access to objects.

Access Control Matrix (1)




Figure 9-26. Comparison between ACLs and capabilities for protecting objects. (a) Using an ACL.

Access Control Matrix (2)




Figure 9-26. Comparison between ACLs and capabilities for protecting objects. (b) Using capabilities.

Protection Domains




Figure 9-27. The hierarchical organization of protection domains as groups of users.

Firewalls




Figure 9-28. A common implementation of a firewall.