

GREGORY DANNAY

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EDUCATION

PhD in Economics , European University Institute (Florence) <i>Supervisors:</i> Laurent Mathevet and Giacomo Calzolari	<i>2021 - Present</i>
Visiting Scholar , Sciences Po (Paris) <i>Host:</i> Eduardo Perez-Richet	<i>Fall 2024</i>
MRs in Economics , European University Institute (Florence)	<i>2021 - 2022</i>
MSc in Economics , Sciences Po (Paris) <i>Gap year:</i> Ecole 42 Coding School, Specialization in Algorithmic	<i>2016 - 2019</i>
Bachelor in Economics , Université de Lorraine (Nancy)	<i>2013 - 2017</i>
Bachelor in Political Sciences , Sciences Po (Nancy) <i>Exchange Program:</i> Stockholm School of Economics	<i>2013 - 2016</i>

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Information Economics, Industrial Organization, Mechanism Design

WORKING PAPER

Optimal Price Discrimination in a Competitive Market

"In a duopoly model, one firm commits to an information structure that determines how much it learns about consumers' preferences before engaging in price discrimination. I show that the optimal structure pools together consumers from different parts of the market, so that the informed firm cannot distinguish its own consumers from those of its rival. The information structure creates two consumer groups, interpreted as each firm's natural turf, in a credible, incentive-compatible way. By committing to such a structure, the informed firm limits its ability to target rival customers, thereby softening price competition. Anticipating weaker competition on its own turf, the uninformed firm sets a higher price, allowing the dominant firm to extract a larger surplus from its own consumers. Relative to standard benchmark regimes, the informational advantage increases the informed firm's profit, reduces individual consumer surplus, and may reduce the rival's profit. The effect on total surplus is ambiguous: efficiency gains from serving consumers who would otherwise be excluded in the absence of additional information may outweigh the losses from inefficient poaching."

WORK IN PROGRESS

AI and Goal Misalignment

Transparency in Scoring Mechanisms

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

PhD level - European University Institute

Microeconomics 3, TA to Zeinab Aboutaleb	<i>2026</i>
Microeconomics 1, TA to Zvika Neeman	<i>2025</i>
Microeconomics 3, TA to Zeinab Aboutaleb	<i>2025</i>
Microeconomics 1, TA to Laurent Mathevet	<i>2023</i>
Microeconomics 1, TA to Laurent Mathevet	<i>2022</i>

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT

Research Assistant to Thomas Chaney and Johannes Boehm, Sciences Po (Paris)	<i>2020 - 2021</i>
Research Assistant to Maria Guadalupe and Alexandra Roulet, INSEAD (Paris)	<i>2019 - 2020</i>
Research Assistant to Alfred Galichon, Sciences Po (Paris)	<i>February-June 2018</i>

OTHER SKILLS

Languages:

English (Fluent), French (Native), German (Native), Spanish (Intermediate), Italian (Basic)

Programmings Skills:

Python, Julia, R, C, C++, Stata, Latex