# Solving Continuous Games With Oracle Algorithms

Tomáš Kasl

#### **Domain**

- Adversarial games
- for two players
- zero sum
- action spaces are continuums

## Nash Equilibrium

- a stable state
- none of the players have a reason to deviate
- (from the adopted strategy)

### Solving NE

- solved for games with finite action spaces
- Linear program:
- $maximizex_0$
- s.t.  $M^T x 1x_0 \ge 0$
- $\sum_{j \in A_{max}} x_j = 1$
- $x \ge 0$

#### **Infinite Games**

- LP no longer applicable (cannot enumerate actions)
- $\rightarrow$  What else, then?
- settle  $\epsilon-\text{NE}$  instead
- ullet iterative algorithms based on oracles
- $\bullet$  oracles:
  - bestResponse oracle: picks from the whole continuum
  - value oracle: the LP from previous slide, solves a subgame with finite action spaces

### **Algorithms**

- Fictitious Play: the original one. Play bestResponse against the average of opponnent' history
- Double Oracle: Proved by FEL ČVUT (2021) to converge to  $\epsilon-NE$  (much faster than FP)
- Expected Regret Minimization: Generalization of online learning into two-player setting, proposed 2023