

# Solving Continuous Games With Oracle Algorithms

Tomáš Kasl

## Domain

- Adversarial games
- for two players
- zero sum
- action spaces are continuums

## Nash Equilibrium

- a stable state
- none of the players have a reason to deviate
- (from the adopted strategy)

## Solving NE

- solved for games with finite action spaces
- create matrix  $M$  as utilities of every pair of actions
- Linear program:

*maximize*  $x_0$

s.t.  $M^T \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{1}x_0 \geq \mathbf{0}$

$\sum_{j \in A} x_j = 1$

$\mathbf{x} \geq 0$

## Infinite Games


- LP no longer applicable (cannot enumerate actions)
- $\rightarrow$  What else, then?
- settle for  $\epsilon$ -NE instead
- iterative algorithms based on *oracles*
- *oracles*:
  - *bestResponse oracle*: picks from the whole continuum
  - *value oracle*: the LP from previous slide, solves a subgame with finite action spaces

## Algorithms


- **Fictitious Play**: the original one. Play *bestResponse* against the average of opponent's history
- **Double Oracle**: Proven by FEL ČVUT (2021) to converge to  $\epsilon$ -NE (much faster than FP)
- **Expected Regret Minimization**: Generalization of online learning into two-player setting, proposed 2023



## Convergence Comparison




- Rosenbrock:  $u(x, y) = (1-x)^2 + 100(y-x^2)^2$






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



- Townsend:  $u(x, y) = -[\cos((x-0.1)y)]^2 - x \sin(3x+y)$



## Testing Claims for ERM

Assume that ERM Algorithm runs for  $T$  iterations. Then, the number of oracle calls is bounded by  $O(T/\epsilon^2 \cdot \log(T/\epsilon^2))$ .



## Problem with the magic constant $C$

- Tested on the the Rosenbrock function

