



# **Sniffing**

## **I Workshop GRIS**

**Guilherme Iria**

# Definição

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***“Farejar”***

***Registro de informações que alcançam uma interface de rede.***

# Aplicações

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- ➔ Detectar ataques de flood e/ou negação de serviço
- ➔ Detectar tráfego anômalo ou não permitido e também...
- ➔ Capturar dados sigilosos

# Modo Promísquo

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**Recepção de todos os pacotes que trafegam pelo mesmo segmento de rede do receptor, não importando o destino do pacote.**

# Dispositivos

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## Hub

Replica os dados recebidos em uma porta para TODAS as demais.

Ambiente altamente suscetível ao sniffing

# Dispositivos

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## Switch

- Encaminha os dados para a porta com a máquina de destino
- Máquinas mapeadas em uma tabela.  
[*Endereço físico X Porta do switch*]
- Ambiente que dificulta o sniffing, porém não o impossibilita

## Roteadores

- Trabalha na camada 3 do modelo OSI.
  - Tabelas de roteamento
  - Conecta pelo menos 2 redes
- Transfere os pacotes baseando-se em endereços IP's

# O Protocolo ARP

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- Traduz IP's em MAC address
- Requisição feita por *broadcast*
- *Cache* ARP



# Port Mirroring

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- Espelhamento do tráfego

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# MAC *flooding*

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**Memória limitada  
+ Muitas respostas ARP forjadas**

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**Problemas**

# ARP spoofing

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Técnica “Man in the middle”

Máquina do atacante:


I. Forja pacotes de resposta ARP

II. Analisa tráfego

III. Repassa os dados para destinatário real


# ARP spoofing

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


# ARP spoofing

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# ARP spoofing



# Ferramentas

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- TCPDump
- Wireshark
- Suíte Dsniff
  - dsniff - senhas
  - arpspoof – arpspoofing
  - macof – mac flooding
  - urlsnarf – pedidos http
  - tcpkill – fecha conexão tcp
  - sshmitm – logins e senhas por ssh
  - webmitm – logins e senhas http/https
  - webspay – exibe navegação da vítima em tempo real

# Ferramentas

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- Ettercap
  - Coleta automaticamente senhas de variados protocolos
  - Captura logins e senhas de SSHv1
  - Intercepta sessões de https (certificado falso)
  - Procura por outros sniffers na rede



# Filtros

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
- *[Expressão]*
  - *seleciona que pacotes serão aceitos na captura*
  - *aceita pacotes onde [expressão] for verdadeira*
  - *palavras reservadas e seus tipos :*
    - *Tipo: host, net, port, ...*
    - *Protocolo: ether, ip, tcp, udp, arp, rarp, ...*
    - *Direção: src, dst, src and dst, src or dst, ...*
    - *Operadores lógicos: and, or, not.*

# Filtros

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- exemplos:
  - `tcpdump -ni eth0 'arp net 192.164'`  
aceita pacotes arp somente da rede 192.164.0.0
  - `tcpdump -ni eth0 'src net 10.10.10.0/24 and dst host 192.168.0.1 and dst port 80'`  
só aceita pacotes da rede 10.10.10.0/24 que vão para 192.168.0.1 na porta 80

# Ettercap



```
Shell - Konsole <3>
bt ~ # ettercap -Tzq //21,22,80,443

ettercap NG-0.7.3 copyright 2001-2004 ALOR & NaGA

Listening on eth0... (Ethernet)

eth0 ->      YY:YY:YY:YY:YY:YY      XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX      255.255.224.0

SSL dissection needs a valid 'redir_command_on' script in the etter.conf file
Privileges dropped to UID 65534 GID 65534...

 28 plugins
 39 protocol dissectors
 53 ports monitored
7587 mac vendor fingerprint
1698 tcp OS fingerprint
2183 known services

Starting Unified sniffing...

Text only Interface activated...
Hit 'h' for inline help
```

# Ettercap

```
Shell - Konsole
bt ~ # ftp ftp.openbsd.org
Connected to opensbd.sunsite.ualberta.ca.
220-
220-      Welcome to SunSITE Alberta
220-
220-      at the University of Alberta, in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
220-
220-All connections to and transfers from this server are logged. If
220-you do not like this policy, please disconnect now.
220-
220-You may want to grab the index file called "ls-lR.gz" in /pub.  It is
220-updated nightly with the contents of the ftp tree.
220-
220-      If you have any questions, hints, or requests, please email
220-
220-      sunsite@sunsite.ualberta.ca
220-
220
Name (ftp.openbsd.org:root): anonymous
331 Who are you impersonating today?
Password:
230-
230-      Welcome to Sunsite Alberta
230- Login Successful.
230 Your data rate unrestricted
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> █
```

# Ettercap

```
Shell - Konsole <3>

ettercap NG-0.7.3 copyright 2001-2004 ALOR & NaGA

Listening on eth0... (Ethernet)

eth0 -> 255.255.224.0

SSL dissection needs a valid 'redir_command_on' script in the etter.conf file
Privileges dropped to UID 65534 GID 65534...

28 plugins
39 protocol dissectors
53 ports monitored
7587 mac vendor fingerprint
1698 tcp OS fingerprint
2183 known services

Starting Unified sniffing...

Text only Interface activated...
Hit 'h' for inline help

FTP : 129.128.5.191:21 -> USER: anonymous PASS: z3_ru3l4@yahoo.com.br
█
```

# Login http

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# Login http

---

```
bt / # tcpdump -n -s0 -w /dump.cap not port 53 and not arp
```

opções: -n : não traduz IP por consulta dns  
-s[num]: captura pacotes com [num] bytes. Padrão é 68  
-w [arquivo] : salva em arquivo binário



# Login http

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of an HTTP login attempt. The filter is set to 'http'. The packet list shows several HTTP requests and responses. The selected packet is packet 6, which is a 302 redirect response from 87.86.92.85 to 64.154.81.197. The packet details pane shows the following structure:

- Frame 6 (218 bytes on wire, 218 bytes captured)
- Ethernet II, Src:
- Internet Protocol, Src:
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36640 (36640), Dst Port: http (80), Seq: 500, Ack: 1, Len: 152
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  - Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n
  - Content-Length: 81
  - \r\n
  - Line-based text data: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    - ReturnURL=%2Findex.asp&UserName=Jason\_Voorhees&Password=OndeTahMinhaFaca&x=16&y=6

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII:

```
0000 .0..z..0 07l...E.
0010 ....@.@. ...%.WV
0020 \U. .P.g .w.....
0030 00 b7 8a 54 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 05 e2 47 02 bc ...T....G..
```

The status bar at the bottom indicates the file is 'mnt/sda1/dump.cap' (334 KB) and the capture is at 00:00:12. The system clock shows 22:42.



# Scan

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
- Analise alguns dados de log de um IDS e responda:
  - O que está acontecendo na rede ?
  - Quem está envolvido ?
  - O que conseguiu ?

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# Scan

No. ▾	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.0.9	192.168.0.99	ICMP	Echo (ping) request
2	0.000078	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	ICMP	Echo (ping) reply
3	0.000044	192.168.0.9	192.168.0.99	TCP	52218 > http [ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=2048 Len=0
4	0.000119	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	http > 52218 [RST] Seq=0 Len=0
5	10.346091	192.168.0.9	192.168.0.99	TCP	52198 > 52156 [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0
6	10.346199	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	52156 > 52198 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
7	10.346137	192.168.0.9	192.168.0.99	TCP	52198 > 28494 [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0
8	10.346235	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	28494 > 52198 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
9	10.346167	192.168.0.9	192.168.0.99	TCP	52198 > 11179 [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0
10	10.346246	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	11179 > 52198 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
11	10.346193	192.168.0.9	192.168.0.99	TCP	52198 > 11796 [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0
12	10.346274	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	11796 > 52198 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
13	10.346228	192.168.0.9	192.168.0.99	TCP	52198 > 44101 [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0
14	10.346297	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	44101 > 52198 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0

# Scan




# Scan

155987	1602.084879	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	ICMP	Echo (ping) request
155988	1602.084912	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	ICMP	Echo (ping) request
155989	1602.084941	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	ICMP	Echo (ping) request
155990	1602.084976	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	ICMP	Echo (ping) request
155991	1602.085026	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35984 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=3072 Len=0
155992	1602.085031	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35984 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=3072 Len=0
155995	1602.085111	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35984 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=3072 Len=0
156008	1612.404870	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > qbikgdp [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156009	1612.404914	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > qbikgdp [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156012	1612.404992	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > qbikgdp [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156013	1612.405153	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > gridgen-elmd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156014	1612.405159	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > gridgen-elmd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156017	1612.405236	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > gridgen-elmd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156018	1612.405269	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > dca [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156019	1612.405291	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > dca [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156022	1612.405363	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > dca [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156023	1612.405415	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > 6008 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156024	1612.405431	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > 6008 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156027	1612.405514	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > 6008 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156028	1612.405567	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > ncube-lm [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156029	1612.405597	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > ncube-lm [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156032	1612.405662	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > ncube-lm [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156033	1612.405715	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > urd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156034	1612.405729	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > urd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156037	1612.405812	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > urd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156038	1612.405856	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > nest-protocol [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156039	1612.405871	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > nest-protocol [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156042	1612.405925	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > nest-protocol [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156043	1612.405979	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > qotd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156044	1612.406007	192.168.0.254	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > qotd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
156047	1612.406067	192.168.0.199	192.168.0.99	TCP	35964 > qotd [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0

# Scan


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The image shows a screenshot of the 'Wireshark: Protocol Hierarchy Statistics' window. The window has a dark blue title bar with the Wireshark logo and standard window controls. Below the title bar is a table with eight columns: Protocol, % Packets, Packets, Bytes, Mbit/s, End Packets, End Bytes, and End Mbit/s. The table lists the protocol hierarchy for the captured data. The 'Frame' protocol is expanded, showing 'Ethernet' and 'Internet Protocol'. 'Internet Protocol' is further expanded, showing 'Internet Control Message Protocol' and 'Transmission Control Protocol'. The 'Transmission Control Protocol' row is highlighted in blue.

Protocol	% Packets	Packets	Bytes	Mbit/s	End Packets	End Bytes	End Mbit/s
▼ Frame	100.00%	4732	283920	0.038	0	0	0.000
▼ Ethernet	100.00%	4732	283920	0.038	0	0	0.000
▼ Internet Protocol	100.00%	4732	283920	0.038	0	0	0.000
Internet Control Message Protocol	0.08%	4	240	0.000	4	240	0.000
Transmission Control Protocol	99.92%	4728	283680	0.038	4728	283680	0.038

# Scan




# Scan

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
8332	158.126037	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	22 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
8686	162.118460	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	22 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
9610	168.118458	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	22 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
0890	180.118458	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	22 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
3772	204.318458	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	22 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
8876	252.518458	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	22 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
1061	680.600481	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	111 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
1643	684.598460	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	111 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
2313	690.598459	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	111 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
3653	702.598458	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	111 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
5062	716.351779	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	32768 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
5086	716.669146	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	32768 > 52199 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
5494	720.348460	192.168.0.99	192.168.0.9	TCP	32768 > 52198 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460

# Scan





# Scan



# Scan

---

- Repostas:
  - O que está acontecendo?  
r: PortScan, status de portas.
  - Quem está envolvido?  
r: máquina 192.168.0.9, as outras máquinas foram usadas como chamarizes para esconder o endereço real do atacante
  - O que conseguiu?  
r: Portas abertas : 22, 53, 80, 443, 32768

# Proteção

---

Substituir Hubs por switches

Uso de protocolos/soluções que usam criptografia

SSH

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)

OpenPGP

S/MIME

Arpwatch

MAC Binding

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# Referências

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- <http://www.honeynet.org/>
- <http://www.guiadohardware.net/>
- <http://www.tcpdump.org>
- <http://www.wikipedia.org/>

e para não perder o costume:

- <http://www.google.com>
- Man pages

# Obrigado !!!

---

Já chegou ao fim????  
sniff... sniff... sniff

Até a próxima....

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