A Non-Interactive Shuffle Argument With Low Trust Assumptions

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Abstract. A shuffle argument is a cryptographic primitive for proving correct behaviour of mix-networks without leaking any private information. Several recent constructions of non-interactive shuffle arguments avoid the random oracle model but require the public key to be trusted. We augment the most efficient argument by Fauzi et al. [Asiacrypt 2017] with a distributed key generation protocol that assures soundness of the argument if at least one party in the protocol is honest and additionally provide a key verification algorithm which guarantees zero-knowledge even if all the parties are malicious. Furthermore, we simplify their construction and improve the security by using weaker assumptions, while retaining roughly the same level of efficiency.

Keywords: Subversion security, non-interactive zero-knowledge, shuffle, secure multi-party computation

1 Introduction

Due to convenience for voters and lower election costs, internet voting (i-voting) is becoming an increasingly popular alternative to paper-based voting. In fact, some countries have already provided i-voting solutions in regional (e.g., Australia, Switzerland) or even national (e.g., Estonia) elections. While i-voting has many benefits, the opposing requirements of election transparency and voter's privacy are not easy to guarantee in the digital setting.

One common to tool to improve voter's privacy is the mix-network [**?**]. Essentially, a mix-network can be thought of as a digital analogue to ballot-box shaking in paper-based voting. During the voting phase encrypted votes are sent to a *bulletin board*, a secure append-only storage system. After the voting phase ends, the ciphertexts are sequentially processed by a mix-network consisting of multiple independent servers, called mixers. Each mixer receives the ciphertexts from the previous mixer (or, in the case of the first mixer, from the bulletin board) and sends *shuffled* (permuted and rerandomized) ciphertext to the next mixer. Finally, only the output of the last mixer is decrypted. Assuming that at least one mixer is honest, it will be impossible to associate the decrypted votes to the voters that gave the original ciphertexts.

However, observe that a malicious mixer could easily switch out the ciphertexts and thus break the integrity of the election outcome. This can be avoided by requiring each mixer to provide a proof that the shuffling was done correctly. Additionally, to still maintain voters' privacy, this proof should not reveal any information about the permutation or ciphertext randomizers used in the shuffle. This can be achieved with a *zero-knowledge (ZK) shuffle argument.*

Many efficient interactive arguments [?,?,?,?] are known for shuffling, but interaction is not preferable in practice. For instance, we might want to audit elections months after it occurred, but mixers storing the private information might not be available anymore. Hence a better solution would be a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) argument, where the prover outputs a single message which can be later verified by anyone. Most interactive shuffle arguments can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [?], but this only guarantees security in the random oracle model (ROM) and there are known cases where the resulting argument is insecure [?,?,?].

As an alternative, the *Common Reference String (CRS)* model assumes a trusted party that samples a public string from some predefined distribution and provides it to both the prover and the verifier. In recent years several NIZK shuffle arguments have been proposed in this model [?,?,?,?,?,?] that do not need ROM [1]. The most practical proposal among these is the construction of Fauzi et al. [?], which throughout the text we refer to as FLSZ – it has comparable efficiency to interactive arguments and uses a standard ElGamal cryptosystem. However, a drawback of the CRS model is that it is unclear who should produce the CRS in practice. Sampling the CRS incorrectly, or even just leaking some side information (e.g., the simulation trapdoor), typically breaks the security of the argument. Several works have tried to alleviate this issue.

The *Bare Public Key (BPK)* model [?] requires significantly less trust than the CRS model. It removes the CRS and only requires the verifier to register a public key in a publicly accessible file before the protocol has started. A malicious verifier may choose the public key in any way she likes. However, BPK model NIZK with a standard auxiliary input ZK property can be cast as a two round ZK protocol, which is known to be impossible [?]. On the positive side, Wee [?] has shown that BPK model NIZK is possible with respect to a weaker non-uniform ZK. More recently, [?] shows that NIZK with a related notion called no-auxiliary-string non-black-box ZK is also possible.

From a different perspective, Ben-Sasson et al. [?] proposed a secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol for CRS generation to distribute trust requirements. Essentially it is a distributed key generation (DKG) protocol that is secure if at least one party is honest. However, that protocol requires the ROM and only works for CRS-s with a very specific structure. Hence, it cannot be used as a black box, say, for the FLSZ argument. Subsequently, Abdolmaleki et

[1] Even most of the interactive shuffle arguments require a CRS, but typically they have a less complicated structure and a uniformly random string usually suffices.

al. [?], proposed a UC-secure variant of the Ben-Sasson et al.'s protocol which avoids the ROM by using a DL-extractable UC-commitment [?].

A series of results [?,?,?] have shown that CRS-based NIZK arguments can satisfy *subversion-ZK (Sub-ZK)*. That is, the argument's ZK property holds even if the CRS is generated by an untrusted party. In particular, it has been shown [?,?] that many existing *succinct non-interactice arguments of knowledge (SNARKs)* can be enhanced with a CRS verification algorithm CV, such that if $\mathsf{CV}(\mathsf{crs})$ accepts, then the proof will not leak any information. So far there is no general transformation which would give Sub-ZK property to any NIZK argument and each new argument needs to be studied separately. Finally, recent work by Abdolmaleki et al. [?] establishes a straightforward connection between Sub-ZK NIZK in the CRS model and BPK NIZK. Namely, a Sub-ZK NIZK can be transformed to a BPK NIZK (with no-auxiliary-input non-black-box ZK) where the verifier uses the CRS as her public key. This is also the direction we take in this paper as the BPK model is a more established and better understood notion.

Our Contribution. We propose a new shuffle argument that we call a *transparent* FLSZ (tFLSZ) which builds upon the result of [?] by significantly reducing the trust requirements, using weaker security assumptions, and also has a somewhat less complex structure.

FLSZ contains four subarguments: (i) a unit vector argument for showing that a committed message is a unit vector, i.e., a binary vector with exactly one 1, (ii) a permutation matrix argument for showing that n committed vectors form a permutation matrix, (iii) a same-message argument for showing that two committed vectors are equal, and (iv) a consistency argument for showing that ciphertexts are shuffled according to the committed permutation matrix. However, in their case (i) the unit vector argument is not sound unless one also provides a related same-message argument and (ii) the consistency argument is only culpably sound, that is, soundness only holds against adversaries that can provide a witness of their cheating.

In tFLSZ, we combine the unit vector argument and the same-message argument into a new unit vector argument and prove its knowledge-soundness in the *algebraic group model (AGM)* [?] which is a weaker model compared to the generic bilinear group model (GBGM) used in [?]. Roughly speaking, in the GBGM an adversary is only allowed to perform group operations using an oracle which hides the actual structure of the group elements. On the other hand, the AGM allows the adversary to freely use the actual representation of elements in the group. Therefore security proofs in the AGM are usually reductions to some known assumption rather than unconditional proofs as in the GBGM. We show that knowledge-soundness of our new unit vector argument can be reduced to a quite standard q-type assumption in the algebraic group model.

The permutation argument is proven knowledge sound assuming that the commitment scheme is binding and the unit vector argument is knowledge sound. This again is a much weaker assumption compared to [?], where the authors prove a similar result but in the GBGM. Finally, we completely skip the consistency argument and directly prove that the shuffle argument is sound given that the permutation argument is knowledge sound and that a variant of the *Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman (KerMDH)* assumption holds. We call this variant GapKerMDH and prove that in the AGM it also reduces to the previously mentioned q-type assumption. The GapKerMDH assumption is a weaker assumption compared to the auxiliary-input KerMDH assumption used in [?] for their consistency argument. Interestingly, after simplifying the structure, the unit vector argument is the only subargument which depends on the AGM; the rest of the protocol is based on falsifiable assumptions [?].

Secondly (and perhaps more importantly), we apply the efficient DKG protocol of Abdolmaleki et al. [?] which takes us from setting of completely trusting the setup generator to a setting where we need to trust only one out of k parties in DKG. This however turns out to be non-trivial. We start by observing that the CRS of FLSZ is outside of the class of *verification-friendly* CRS-s that the DKG protocol can generate. Hence, in addition to simplifying the structure of FLSZ we also modify the CRS and make it verification-friendly, which mostly involves adding some well-chosen elements to the CRS. These additional elements are not needed for the honest prover or verifier, but are available to dishonest parties. Hence, the CRS size in practice stays the same, but the security proofs must now consider a more powerful adversary.

As mentioned, the DKG protocol guarantees security (soundness and zero-knowledge) if at least one honest party participated. We take it one step further and prove that the protocol is also secure in the BPK model, following the ideas of [?]. Namely, we construct a public key verification algorithm V that the prover runs before outputting an argument. If V is satisfied, then zero-knowledge holds even if the public key was generated by a single malicious party, or equivalently, if all of the parties in the DKG protocol colluded. However, if V rejects the key, then the prover simply declines to output anything.

In Table ?? we compare efficiency and assumptions of the state-of-the-art non-interactive shuffle arguments. The argument by Groth [?] has the best efficiency, but requires ROM and a trusted random string[2]. It is also worth to mention the argument by Bayer and Groth [?] which has sublinear communication, but otherwise has the same drawbacks as [?]. The argument of González and Rálfols [?] (and the slight improvement in [?]) is based solely on falsifiable assumptions, but requires a quadratic size CRS which is not efficient enough for many applications. Similarly, Faonio et al. [?] use falsifiable assumptions but requires pairings for all operations, making it inefficient. The Fauzi et al. [?] construction can be seen as a compromise between [?] and [?]: efficiency is only slightly worse than [?], does

[2] Namely, [?] requires a commitment key for the extended Pedersen commitment which could be obtained from a uniformly random string

not require ROM, but some subarguments are proven in the GBGM. Our work retains almost the same efficiency as [?] by only adding n elements to the CRS (we do not count elements solely needed by the DKG), but we make a major reduction in the trust requirements for the setup phase and also prove security under weaker assumptions.

In summary, our new NIZK shuffle argument has the following properties:

1. Soundness holds assuming at least one honest party participated in the distributed key generation protocol and zero-knowledge holds even if all the parties were malicious.
2. Compared to the most-efficient shuffle argument without ROM [?]:
   (a) We simplify the structure of the argument.
   (b) We improve the security assumptions and isolate the unit vector argument as the only subargument which requires AGM.
   (c) The efficiency of the argument remains essentially the same.

Table 1. Comparison of state-of-the-art shuffles. Exp. stands for exponentations, pair. for pairings, and n for the number of input ciphertexts. Constant terms are neglected, shuffling is included to prover's efficiency, and shuffled ciphertexts to proof size.

	Prover efficiency	**Verifier efficiency**	**Decryption efficiency**	**Proof size**	**CRS size**	**Reference string**	**Assumptions**
[?]	$8n$ exp.	$6n$ exp.	n exp.	$3n \times_p 2n \times \mathbb{G}$	$n \times \mathbb{G}$	Uniform	ROM, DDH
[?]	$13n$ exp.	$13n$ pair.	n exp.	$4n \times \mathbb{G}_1$ $2n \times \mathbb{G}_2$	$(n^2+24n) \times \mathbb{G}_1, 23n \times \mathbb{G}_2$	Structured	Falsifiable
[?]	$11n$ exp.	$7n$ exp., $3n$ pair.	n exp.	$4n \times \mathbb{G}_1$ $3n \times \mathbb{G}_2$	$4n \times \mathbb{G}_1$, $n \times \mathbb{G}_2$	Structured	GBGM
[?]	$20n+$ exp., $4n$ pair.	? exp., $22n$ pair.	$2n$ exp., $46n$ pair.	$4n \times \mathbb{G}_1$, $4n \times \mathbb{G}_2$, $4n \times \mathbb{G}_T$	?	Structured	Falsifiable
This work	$11n$ exp.	$7n$ exp., $3n$ pair.	n exp.	$4n \times \mathbb{G}_1$ $3n \times \mathbb{G}_2$	$5n \times \mathbb{G}_1$, $n \times \mathbb{G}_2$	Verifiable	AGM

2 Preliminaries

Let denote the security parameter. We write $f() \approx_0$, if a function f is negligible in . PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time. We write $(a, b) \leftarrow (\|)(x)$ if algorithms and on the same input x and random tape r output $a \leftarrow (x; r)$ and $b \leftarrow (x; r)$. By $\mathsf{RND}()$ we denote the random tape of and by $\mathsf{Range}((x))$ the set of all possible outputs of given input x.

We write xA if x is sampled uniformly randomly from the set A. By default $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_i)_{i=1}^n \in A^n$ is a column vector and $\mathbf{1}_n := (1)_{i=1}^n$, $\mathbf{0}_n := (0)_{i=1}^n$. A set of permutations on n elements is denoted by $\mathbb{S}_n$. A matrix $\boldsymbol{A} \in 0,1^{n\times n}$ is a permutation matrix of the permutation $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}_n$ when $A_{i,j} = 1$ iff $\sigma(i) = j$. We call $\boldsymbol{a}$ a unit vector if it contains exactly one 1 and all other positions are 0. Let $_p$ be a finite field of prime order p and $_p^* :=_p \setminus 1$. For vectors $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in_p^n$, $\boldsymbol{x} \circ \boldsymbol{y}$ denotes the entry-wise product. We use the bracket notation where $[x]$ denotes the group element with discrete logarithm x. We consider additive groups, thus $[a] + [b] = [a + b]$. We denote $[1\,..\,n] := 1, \ldots, n$.

Bilinear Pairing. A bilinear group generator $\mathsf{BGen}()$ outputs a tuple $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2, \bullet)$ such that (i) p is a prime of length $\Theta()$, (ii) for $k \in 1, 2$, $\mathbb{G}_k$ is an additive group of order p with a generator $\mathcal{P}_k$, and (iii) $\bullet$ is a map $\mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$. We set $\mathcal{P}_T := \mathcal{P}_1 \bullet \mathcal{P}_2$ and use the bracket notation by defining $[a]_k := a \cdot \mathcal{P}_k$, for $k \in 1, 2, T$. We require that

- $[a]_1 \bullet [b]_2 = [ab]_T$ for all $a, b \in_p$ (*bilinearity*),
- $\mathcal{P}_T \neq [0]_T$ (*non-degeneracy*), and
- $\bullet$ is efficiently computable.

In the following we use *asymmetric* bilinear groups where there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between $\mathbb{G}_1$ and $\mathbb{G}_2$. For the state of the art in pairing constructions see [**?**].

Bracket notation extends naturally to matrices and vectors, e.g., we may write $[\boldsymbol{A}]_1 \bullet [\boldsymbol{B}]_2 = [\boldsymbol{I}]_1 \bullet (\boldsymbol{A}[\boldsymbol{B}]_2) = [\boldsymbol{I}]_1 \bullet [\boldsymbol{AB}]_2$ for $\boldsymbol{A} \in_p^{n\times m}$, $\boldsymbol{B} \in_p^{m\times k}$, and identity matrix $\boldsymbol{I} \in_p^{n\times n}$. Occasionally we write $[a]_z$ for $z \in \{1, 2\}$ and use $\bar{z} := 3 - z$ to denote the number of the other non-target group. Then $[a]_z \bullet [b]_{\bar{z}}$ would mean $[a]_1 \bullet [b]_2$ for $z = 1$ and $[b]_1 \bullet [a]_2$ for $z = 2$.

Lagrange basis. Let $\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_{n+1}$ be distinct points in $_p$. For $i \in [1\,..\,n+1]$, the i-th Lagrange basis polynomial is defined as $\ell_i(X) := \prod_{j\neq i} \frac{X-\omega_j}{\omega_i-\omega_j}$. Hence, it is the unique degree n polynomial such that $\ell_i(\omega_i) = 1$ and $\ell_i(\omega_j) = 0$ for all $j \neq i$. As the name suggests, $\{\ell_i(X)\}_{i=1}^{n+1}$ is a basis for $\{f \in_p [X] : \deg(f) \leq n\}$.

Encryption scheme. A public key encryption scheme is a triple of PPT algorithms $(,,)$ such that

- $()$ outputs a public key and a secret key pair $(_{\mathsf{e}}, _{\mathsf{e}})$.
- $_{\mathsf{e}}(m; r)$ outputs a ciphertext c encrypting the message m with randomness r under the public key $_{\mathsf{e}}$.
- $_{\mathsf{e}}(c)$ outputs the decryption of the ciphertext c using the secret key $_{\mathsf{e}}$.

We require that $_{\mathsf{e}}(_{\mathsf{e}}(m; r)) = m$ for every message m and randomizer r. Intuitively, an encryption scheme is *IND-CPA*-secure if no PPT adversary can distinguish between the ciphertext distributions of any two messages.

We use the ElGamal encryption scheme over a group $\mathbb{G}_2$ defined as follows. The algorithm $()$ samples $_{\mathsf{e}p}$ and outputs $(_{\mathsf{e}} := [1, _{\mathsf{e}}]_2, _{\mathsf{e}})$. An encryption of a message $[m]_2$ is $_{\mathsf{e}}([m]_2; r) := [0, m]_2 + r \cdot _{\mathsf{e}}$ where r_p. A ciphertext $[\boldsymbol{c}]_2 = [c_1, c_2]_2$ is decrypted by computing $_{\mathsf{e}}([\boldsymbol{c}]_2) := [c_2]_2 - _{\mathsf{e}} \cdot [c_1]_2$. ElGamal is IND-CPA-secure if the DDH assumption holds in group $\mathbb{G}_2$. ElGamal is also *blindable*, meaning that $_{\mathsf{e}}([m]\,; r) +_{\mathsf{e}} ([0]\,, r') =_{\mathsf{e}} ([m]\,, r + r')$ and, assuming that r'_p, no PPT adversary can distinguish if $_{\mathsf{e}}([m]\,; r)$ and $_{\mathsf{e}}([m]\,; r + r')$ encrypt the same message or not.

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge. Let $\mathcal{R} = (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ be a relation such that $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}} = \mathsf{x} : \exists \mathsf{w}\ (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathcal{R}$ is an language where w is a witness for x. Following [?], we define a NIZK argument in the BPK model as follows.

A NIZK argument Ψ in the BPK model for relation $\mathcal{R}$ is a tuple efficient algorithms $(, \mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{td}}, \mathsf{K}_{,}\mathsf{V}_{,,},)$, where

- $()$ is a deterministic algorithm that outputs a setup parameter .
- $\mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{td}}()$ is a PPT algorithm that on input outputs a trapdoor td.
- $\mathsf{K}_{(}, \mathsf{td})$ is a deterministic algorithm that on input and $\mathsf{td} \in \mathsf{Range}(\mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{td}}())$ outputs a public key .
- $\mathsf{V}_{(,)}$ is a PPT algorithm that on input and a public key outputs 0 (key is malformed) or 1 (key is well-formed).
- $(, , \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ is a PPT algorithm that given a setup parameter , public key , and $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathcal{R}$, outputs an argument π.
- $(, , \mathsf{x}, \pi)$ is a PPT algorithm that on input a setup parameter , public key , statement x, and argument π, outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
- $(, , \mathsf{td}, \mathsf{x})$ is a PPT algorithm that on input a setup parameter , public key , trapdoor td, and $\mathsf{x} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}}$ outputs a simulated argument π.

For the sake of brevity, we sometimes use the algorithm $\mathsf{K}() := \mathsf{K}_{(}, \mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{td}}())$. By a *NIZK argument in the CRS model* we mean a tuple $(, \mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{td}}, \mathsf{K}_{,}, ,)$ of the above algorithms (i.e. all except V).

Completeness simply requires that an honestly generated key and argument are respectively accepted by V and . We give the definition for the BPK model. The definition for the CRS model neglects the condition $\mathsf{V}_{(,)} = 1$.

Definition 1. *The argument Ψ in BPK model is* perfectly complete *if for all , and $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathcal{R}$, the following probability is 1,*

$$\Pr\left[\leftarrow (), \leftarrow \mathsf{K}() : \mathsf{V}_{(,)} = 1 \wedge (, , \mathsf{x}, (, , \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})) = 1\right].$$

Soundness guarantees that a malicious prover cannot create a valid argument for a false statement. Definitions match in the BPK model and the CRS model.

Definition 2. *The argument Ψ is* sound *if for any PPT adversary ,*

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{l} \leftarrow (), (, \mathsf{td}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}(), (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \leftarrow (,) : \\ \mathsf{x} \notin \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}} \wedge (, , \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1 \end{array}\right] \approx_0 .$$

Knowledge-soundness strengthens the previous definition by requiring that the prover "knows" the witness, i.e., there exists an extractor that outputs the witness given the code and random coins of the adversary.

Definition 3. *The argument Ψ is* knowledge-sound *if for any PPT adversary , there exists a PPT extractor , such that*

$$\Pr\left[\begin{matrix}\leftarrow (), (, \mathsf{td}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}(), ((\mathsf{x}, \pi), \mathsf{w}) \leftarrow (\|)(,) : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathcal{R} \wedge (, , \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1\end{matrix}\right] \approx_0 .$$

Lastly, zero-knowledge guarantees that the argument leaks no information besides that $\mathsf{x} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}}$ by giving an algorithm which, given a trapdoor, can create a valid argument for any $\mathsf{x} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}}$ without knowing the corresponding witness.

Definition 4. *An argument Ψ in the CRS model is* perfectly zero-knowledge, *if for any adversary , and any $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathcal{R}$, $\varepsilon_0 \approx_{\varepsilon\ 1}$, where*

$$\varepsilon_b := \Pr\left[\begin{matrix}\leftarrow (), (\mathsf{crs}, \mathsf{td}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}(), \textbf{if } b = 0 \textbf{ then } \pi \leftarrow (, \mathsf{crs}, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \\ \textbf{else } \pi \leftarrow (, \mathsf{crs}, \mathsf{td}, \mathsf{x}) \textbf{ fi} : (, \mathsf{crs}, \pi) = 1\end{matrix}\right].$$

In the BPK model we use the *no-auxiliary-string non-black-box zero-knowledge* definition of from [**?**] (as mentioned, NIZK is impossible with the standard BPK ZK definition). Essentially the prover first runs a public key verification algorithm V to check well-formedness of the key and only then outputs a proof. Compared to the previous definition, we require that there exists an extractor that extracts a trapdoor for any well-formed given access to adversary's random coins. Intuitively this guarantees that the key generator knows the trapdoor and thus could generate the proof himself using the simulator.

Definition 5 ([?]). *The argument Ψ in BPK model is* statistically no-auxiliary-string non-black-box zero-knowledge *(nn-ZK), if for any PPT subverter X exists a PPT extractor x, s.t., for any (stateful) adversary , $\varepsilon_0 \approx_{\varepsilon\ 1}$, where*

$$\varepsilon_b := \Pr\left[\begin{matrix}\leftarrow (), (, \mathsf{aux}_{\mathsf{X}} \| \mathsf{td}) \leftarrow (\mathsf{X} \| \mathsf{x})(), (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \leftarrow (\mathsf{aux}_{\mathsf{X}}), \\ \textbf{if } b = 0 \textbf{ then } \pi \leftarrow (, , \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \textbf{ else } \pi \leftarrow (, , \mathsf{td}, \mathsf{x}) \textbf{ fi} : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathcal{R} \wedge \mathsf{V}_{(},) = 1 \wedge (\pi) = 1\end{matrix}\right].$$

Here $\mathsf{aux}_{\mathsf{X}}$ is whatever information X wishes to send to .

Assumptions. In AGM reductions we use q-PDL, a q-type version of discrete logarithm assumption. We also require the KerMDH computational assumption, and the BDH-KE knowledge assumption. The definitions are as follows.

Definition 6 (q-PDL [?]). *The q-Power Discrete Logarithm assumption holds for* BGen *if for any PPT ,*

$$\Pr[\leftarrow \mathsf{BGen}(), z_p, z' \leftarrow (, [(z^i)_{i=1}^q]_1, [(z^i)_{i=1}^q]_2) : z = z'] \approx_0 .$$

Definition 7 (KerMDH [?]). *Let $\mathcal{D}_{\ell,k}$ be a distribution over $_p^{\ell\times k}$. The $\mathcal{D}_{\ell,k}$-KerMDH assumption holds for* BGen *and $z \in \{1,2\}$ if for any PPT ,*

$$\Pr[\leftarrow \mathsf{BGen}(), \boldsymbol{M}\mathcal{D}_{\ell,k}, [\boldsymbol{c}]_{\bar{z}} \leftarrow (, [\boldsymbol{M}]_z) : \boldsymbol{c} \neq \boldsymbol{0} \wedge \boldsymbol{c}^\top \boldsymbol{M} = \boldsymbol{0}] \approx_0 .$$

Definition 8 (BDH-KE [?]). *We say that* BGen *is BDH-KE secure if for any PPT adversary there exists a PPT extractor , such that*

$$\Pr\left[\leftarrow \mathsf{BGen}(), ([\alpha]_1, [\alpha']_2 \| \beta) \leftarrow (\|)() : \alpha = \alpha' \wedge \beta \neq \alpha \right] \approx_0 .$$

Commitment Scheme. A commitment scheme is a tuple of efficient algorithms $(, \mathsf{Com})$ such that

- $()$ outputs a commitment key ck.
- $\mathsf{Com}_{\mathsf{ck}}(m; r)$ outputs a commitment c given a message m and randomness r.

Typically a commitment scheme should satisfy at least the following properties. (i) *(perfectly) hiding*: the distribution $\mathsf{Com}_{\mathsf{ck}}(m; r)$ (over r_p) is the same for any message m; (ii) *(computationally) binding*: it is infeasible for an adversary to find (m_1, r_1) and (m_2, r_2) s.t. $\mathsf{Com}_{\mathsf{ck}}(m_1; r_1) = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathsf{ck}}(m_2; r_2)$ and $m_1 \neq m_2$.

Polynomial Commitment Scheme. For polynomials $T_i(X_1, \ldots, X_k)_{i=1}^{n+1} \in_p [X_1, \ldots, X_k]$ we define a $(T_i)_{i=1}^{n+1}$-*commitment scheme* as follows:

- $()$ picks $\boldsymbol{\chi}_p^k$ and returns a commitment key $\mathsf{ck} \leftarrow \left[(T_i(\boldsymbol{\chi}))_{i=1}^{n+1}\right]_z$.
- $\mathsf{Com}_{\mathsf{ck}}((a_1, \ldots, a_n); r)$ returns a commitment $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i [T_i(\boldsymbol{\chi})]_1 + r[T_{n+1}(\boldsymbol{\chi})]_1$.

Clearly, this commitment is perfectly hiding when r_p and $T_{n+1}(\boldsymbol{\chi}) \neq 0$. Assuming that $T_{i\,i=1}^{n+1}$ is a linearly independent set, it is also computationally binding under a suitably chosen KerMDH assumption, cf. [?, Theorem 1].

DL-Extractable Commitment Scheme. The DKG protocol of [?] requires a UC-secure *Discrete Logarithm Extractable* (DL-extractable) commitment scheme as defined in [?]. Commitment messages in DL-extractable commitments are field elements x (discrete logarithms), but commitments can be opened to $[x]_z$ thus still leaving the x itself private. However, since in the UC-model commiting to x is equivalent to giving it to an ideal functionality, then the committer has know x, that is, the discrete logarithm x can be extracted from the commitment given a secret key. For a formal definition and a construction we refer the reader to from [?].

Algebraic Group Model. Recently Fuchsbauer et al. [?] introduced the algebraic group model (AGM) that lies between the standard and the generic group model. In the AGM, an adversary that returns a group element $[x]_z$ is required to provide a linear representation of $[x]_z$ relative to all previously received group elements. That is, if received as input group elements $[\boldsymbol{y}]_z$ then she must submit along with $[x]_k$ a representation $\boldsymbol{z}$ such that $[x]_z = \boldsymbol{z}^\top [\boldsymbol{y}]_z$. Using techniques similar to [?, Theorem 7.2] we prove knowledge-soundness of the unit vector argument under the PDL assumption in the AGM.

2.1 FLSZ Shuffle Argument

We give a brief overview of the FLSZ shuffle argument for the shuffle relation

$$\mathcal{R}_n^{sh} := \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} (\cdot, \mathsf{e}, [(\boldsymbol{c}'_i)_{i=1}^n]_2, [(\boldsymbol{c}_i)_{i=1}^n]_2), (\sigma, \boldsymbol{t})) \mid \sigma \in \mathbb{S}_n \wedge \boldsymbol{t} \in_p^n \wedge \\ (\forall i \in [1\,..\,n] : [\boldsymbol{c}'_i]_2 = [\boldsymbol{c}_{\sigma(i)}]_2 +_{\mathsf{e}} ([0]_2; t_i)) \end{pmatrix} \right\} .$$

Firstly, they use a $((P_i(X))_{i=1}^n, X_\varrho)$-commitment scheme to commit to columns of a permutation matrix. Polynomials are defined as $P_i(X) := 2\ell_i(X) + \ell_{n+1}(X)$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$ so as to satisfy the following lemma (for proof see Appendix ??).

Lemma 1. *Let* $P_0(X) := \ell_{n+1}(X) - 1$ *and* $Q_i(X) := (P_i(X) + P_0(X))^2 - 1$ *for* $i \in [1\,..\,n]$. *If* $(\sum_{i=1}^n a_i P_i(X) + P_0(X))^2 - 1 \in \mathsf{Span}\{Q_i(X)\}_{i=1}^n$ *and* $n < p - 1$, *then* $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ *is a unit vector.*

Given the above property, they propose a *unit vector argument* to show that the prover could open each commitment to a unit vector. Moreover, they enhance it to a *permuation matrix argument* by observing that n unit vectors form a permutation matrix exactly when their sum is $\mathbf{1}_n$. Next, they would like to show that the committed permutation matrix was used to shuffle the ciphertexts. However, due to some technical challenges they are unable to use the same commitment key. Instead they commit once more to the columns of the permutation matrix, but this time with a $((\hat{P}_i(X))_{i=1}^n, X_{\hat{\varrho}})$-commitment where $\hat{P}_i(X) := X^{(i+1)(n+1)}$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$. They propose a *same-message argument* to show that both types of commitments can be opened to the same matrix. Finally, a *consistency argument* proves that the committed permutation was used to shuffle the ciphertexts.

The unit vector argument, the permutation matrix argument, and the same-message argument are proven to be knowledge-sound in the GBGM. However, soundness of the unit vector argument depends on the soundness of the same-message argument. The consistency argument is culpably sound[3] under an application specific variation of the KerMDH assumption. The shuffle argument itself is sound assuming that other arguments are secure and assuming that commitments are binding. Zero-knowledge of the shuffle argument is perfect.

[3] Culpable soundness is a weaker form of soundness where an adversary additionally provides a witness of his cheating.

3 Distributed Key Generation Protocol

Prastudy: 19.09: Rewrote since summary is not in the first subsection, but the next one.

We apply the UC-secure DKG protocol of Abdolmaleki et al. [?] [4] in the public key generation of our shuffle argument. Importantly for us, this protocol avoids the random oracle model (unlike, e.g., [?]) and due to UC-security it will not affect soundness or zero-knowledge properties of the argument. Of course, any general MPC protocol can be used as a DKG, but since we require potentially a large number of parties (for example, each mixers in the mix-network) and evaluated circuits have a large multiplicative depth, then specialized protocols will perform much better. See [?] for further discussion on efficiency difference.

3.1 Verification-Friendly Public Key

Although the DKG protocols of [?] and [?] are efficient, they are not general MPC protocols and can only generate certain kinds of keys. Namely, they require key computation to be represented as a circuit that comes from some special class ($\mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{S}}$, described below) and is evaluated on uniformly random field inputs. Although limited, the protocols are still sufficient for generating public keys for many pairing-based arguments or, as we see in this paper, for their slightly modified versions. Compared to [?] we give a more direct, but equivalent, description of such keys which we call here *verification-friendly*.

We say that an argument Ψ has a *verification-friendly public key* if (i) output $\mathsf{td} = (\chi_i)_{i=1}^n$ of $\mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{td}}()$ is distributed uniformly randomly over $(\overset{*}{p})^n$, and (ii) $\mathsf{K}_{(}, \mathsf{td}) = (\mathsf{td})$ where is a circuit from a class $\mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{S}}_{,n}$. Any circuit $\in \mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{S}}_{,n}$ takes as input $\mathsf{td} = (\chi_i)_{i=1}^n \in (\overset{*}{p})^n$ and contains two types of gates:

- *multiplication-division (multdiv)* gate $\mathsf{MD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}([x]_z)$ outputs $[(\chi_i/\chi_j)x]_z$, where $z \in \{1,2\}$ and $[x]_z$ is a gate input.
- *linear combination (lincomb)* gate $\mathsf{LC}_{\boldsymbol{c}}([\boldsymbol{y}]_z)$ outputs $\left[\sum_{i=1}^t c_i y_i\right]_z$, where $z \in \{1,2\}$, $\boldsymbol{c} \in \overset{t}{p}$ is a constant, and $[\boldsymbol{y}]_z \in \mathbb{G}_z^t$ is a gate input.

Gates in the circuit are partitioned into interleaved layers $C_1, L_1, \ldots, C_d, L_d$ where each C_i contains only multdiv gates and L_i contains only lincomb gates. Furthermore satisfies the following conditions:

1. Inputs of gates in C_i or L_i can be either constants or outputs of the gates on the current or lower layers of the circuit.
2. Output of each gate is also output of the circuit .

[4] Abdolmaleki et al. call it a CRS generation protocol.

$\mathsf{mpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}([x]_z)$:
1. Set $\mathsf{cert}_0 \leftarrow [x]_z$.
2. For $r = 1, \ldots, k$: Party $_r$ broadcasts $\mathsf{cert}_r \leftarrow (\chi_{i,r}/\chi_{j,r}) \cdot \mathsf{cert}_{r-1}$.
3. Output cert_k.

$\mathsf{VmpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}([x]_z, (\mathsf{cert}_r)_{r=1}^k, [(\chi_{j,r})_{r=1}^k, (\chi_{i,r})_{r=1}^k]_{\tilde{z}})$:
1. Set $\mathsf{cert}_0 \leftarrow [x]_z$.
2. For $r = 1, \ldots, k$: check that $\mathsf{cert}_r \bullet [\chi_{j,r}]_{\tilde{z}} = \mathsf{cert}_{r-1} \bullet [\chi_{i,r}]_{\tilde{z}}$.
3. If all checks pass output 1 and otherwise output 0.

Fig. 1. Multi-party protocol $\mathsf{mpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}$ and its transcript verifier $\mathsf{VmpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}$

3. Layer C_1 always contains gates $\mathsf{MD}_{\chi_i,1}([1]_z)$ for all $i \in [1\,..\,n]$, $z \in \{1,2\}$. Therefore, $[(\chi_i)_{i=1}^n]_1$ and $[(\chi_i)_{i=1}^n]_2$ are always outputs of the circuit.

3.2 DKG Protocol for Verification-Friendly Keys

We describe the DKG protocol of [**?**] where the parties collectively evaluate a $\mathcal{C}_{,n}^{\mathsf{S}}$-circuit to generate a verification-friendly public key. The protocol retains soundness and zero-knowledge of the argument given that at least one party in the protocol is honest and malicious parties are non-halting. We note that with a suitable key verification algorithm it is possible to achieve zero-knowledge even if all the parties are malicious.

Let $_1, \ldots, _k$ be the parties running the DKG protocol. Each party $_r$ samples shares $(\chi_{j,r})_{j=1}^n \in (_p^*)^n$ which allows to define trapdoor elements as $\chi_j := \prod_{r=1}^k \chi_{j,r}$ for $j \in [1\,..\,n]$. This definition guarantees that if all $\chi_{j,r} \in _p^*$ and at least one of them is picked independently and uniformly randomly, then χ_j is uniformly random in $_p^*$. For ease of description we set $\chi_0 := 1$ and similarly $\chi_{0,r} := 1$ for $r \in [1\,..\,k]$.

The protocol starts with a commitment round where all the parties commit to their shares $\chi_{i,r}$ with a UC-secure DL-extractable commitment scheme. This is followed by an opening round where each $_i$ reveals $[\chi_{i,r}]_1, [\chi_{i,r}]_2$. Since the commitment scheme is UC-secure, then it is also non-malleable and thus guarantees that the adversary chooses her shares independently of the shares of the honest parties. Next, the parties start to evaluate the circuit layer-by-layer. For evaluating a single multdiv gate $\mathsf{MD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}([x]_z) = [(\chi_i/\chi_j)x]_z$ where $i, j \in [0\,..\,n]$, parties run the $\mathsf{mpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}([x]_z)$ protocol given in **??**. Assuming that $[x]_z$ is public, $_1$ broadcasts $(\chi_{i,1}/\chi_{j,1})\,[a]_z$ and each subsequent party $_r$ multiplies $\chi_{i,r}/\chi_{j,r}$ to the output of her predecessor $_{r-1}$. If all the parties follow the protocol, then the output of $_k$ is $\mathsf{cert}_k = (\chi_{i,1} \cdot \ldots \cdot \chi_{i,k})/(\chi_{j,1} \cdot \ldots \cdot \chi_{j,k})\,[a]_z = (\chi_i/\chi_j)\,[a]_z$. Computation of each party can be verified with pairings by using the algorithm $\mathsf{VmpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}$ in **??**. Any linear combination gate $\mathsf{LC}_{\boldsymbol{c}}([\boldsymbol{x}]_z)$ can be computed locally by each party by simply evaluating the expression $\sum_{i=1}^t c_i\,[a_i]_z$.

Commitment: Each party $_r$ picks $\chi_{1,r}, \ldots, \chi_{n,r} \overset{*}{_p}$ and broadcasts DL-extractable commitments of the values.
Opening: Once all the commitments are received, $_r$ broadcasts openings together with $[(\chi_{i,r})_{i=1}^{n}]_1$ and $[(\chi_{i,r})_{i=1}^{n}]_2$. Each party verifies the openings and aborts if the verification failed.
Layer computation: For a multi-division layer C_i containing a gate $\mathsf{MD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}([a]_z)$, parties run the protocol $\mathsf{mpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}([a]_z)$ and verify the computation with the algorithm $\mathsf{VmpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}$. All the gates in C_i can be evaluated in parallel. Linear combination layers L_i are locally evaluated by each party.
Output: Output of the protocol is the output of all the evaluated gates.

Fig. 2. Distributed key generation protocol for a circuit $= (C_1, L_1, \ldots, C_d, L_d)$

Let us make a slight restriction for now that mult-div gates on the same layer do not depend on each other. Then each multi-division layer C_i can be evaluated by running in parallel multiple instances of the mpcMD protocol. More precisely, the computation begins with the party $_1$ doing its part of computation in mpcMD for each mult-div gate in C_i. Then, given the output produced by $_1$, the party $_2$ does her part of the computation for each gate in the layer C_i and so on. Hence, a single multdiv layer can be evaluated in k rounds since every party needs to contribute to the output of the previous party just once. After each multi-division layer, the parties verify the computation by running the algorithm $\mathsf{VmpcMD}_{\chi_i,\chi_j}$ for each gate. If the checks pass, the parties locally evaluate gates on layer L_i and proceed to computing the next layer C_{i+1}. Full details are given in **??**.

We refer the reader to [**?**] for the more general protocol where k rounds can be achieved even if the gates on the same layer depend on each other. That version of the DKG is also used for our shuffle argument, but for this we provide an explicit description in Appendix **??**. It is important to note that Abdolmaleki et al. showed that if at least one party in the DKG is honest, then it UC-realises the CRS ideal functionality[5].

4 Transparent Shuffle Argument

The DKG protocol requires the public key to be verification-friendly. In particular, we need to guarantee the following properties:

- Each trapdoor $\iota \in \mathsf{td}$ has to be sampled uniformly at random from $\overset{*}{_p}$ and the public key has to contain both $[\iota]_1$ and $[\iota]_2$.
- The public key has to be computable by interleaved multi-division and linear combination circuit layers and the output of each gate has to be part of the public key. For example, given that $[a]_1, [b]_1, [c]_1, [d]_1$ are part of the public

[5] Essentially the CRS functionality samples a public key in the beginning and returns it to anyone that queries.

$\mathsf{K}_{\mathsf{td}}()$: Return $\mathsf{td} = (\chi, \theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho) \leftarrow_r (\overset{*}{p})^5$.

$\mathsf{K}_{(}, n, \mathsf{td})$: Let $\boldsymbol{P} = (P_i(\chi))_{i=1}^n$, $\hat{\boldsymbol{P}} = (\hat{P}_i(\theta))_{i=1}^n$, $\boldsymbol{Q} = ((P_i(\chi) + P_0(\chi))^2 - 1)_{i=1}^n$.

$$_{uv} \leftarrow \begin{pmatrix} [1,\ P_0(\chi),\ \boldsymbol{P},\ \varrho,\ \boldsymbol{Q}/\varrho,\ \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{P}_i,\ \beta^2\varrho,\ \beta\hat{\beta},\ \beta^2\boldsymbol{P} + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1, \\ [1,\ P_0(\chi),\ \boldsymbol{P},\ \varrho,\ \beta^2,\ \beta\hat{\beta}]_2,\ [1]_T \end{pmatrix},$$

$$_{pkv} \leftarrow \begin{pmatrix} [\beta,\ \hat{\beta},\ (\theta^{2i-1})_{i=1}^n]_1, \\ [\chi, \theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}]_2 \end{pmatrix},\ _{vf} \leftarrow \left([(\chi^i)_{i=1}^{2n},\ (\beta\chi^i, \hat{\beta}\theta^{2i})_{i=1}^n, \beta\varrho]_1, [(\chi^i)_{i=2}^n]_2 \right)$$

Return $\leftarrow ([\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_{1,uv,pkv,vf})$.

$(, (_{\mathsf{e}},), [\boldsymbol{C}]_2 = [(\boldsymbol{c}_i)_{i=1}^n]_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^{n\times 2}, (\sigma \in \mathbb{S}_n, \boldsymbol{t} \in_p^n))$:

1. For $i = 1$ to $n-1$: $\hat{r}_{ip}$; $[\hat{a}_i]_1 \leftarrow [\hat{P}_{\sigma^{-1}(i)}]_1 + \hat{r}_i[1]_1$.
2. $\pi_{per} \leftarrow_{per} (, , [(\hat{a}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1, (\sigma, (\hat{r}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}))$. // Permutation argument
3. $\hat{r}_n \leftarrow -\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \hat{r}_i$; $\hat{r} \leftarrow_{r\ p}$; $[s]_1 \leftarrow \boldsymbol{t}^\top[\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1 + \hat{r}[1]_1$.
4. For $i = 1$ to n: $[\boldsymbol{t}'_i]_2 \leftarrow t_i \cdot _{\mathsf{e}}$.
5. $[\boldsymbol{N}]_2 \leftarrow \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}^\top[\boldsymbol{C}]_2 + \hat{r} \cdot _{\mathsf{e}}$. // Online
6. $[\boldsymbol{C}']_2 \leftarrow ([\boldsymbol{c}_{\sigma(i)}]_2 + [\boldsymbol{t}'_i]_2)_{i=1}^n$. // Shuffling, online
7. Return $\left([\boldsymbol{C}']_2, \pi_{sh} \leftarrow ([(\hat{a}_j)_{j=1}^{n-1}, s]_1, [\boldsymbol{N}]_2, \pi_{per})\right)$.

$(, (_{\mathsf{e}},), ([\boldsymbol{C}]_2, [\boldsymbol{C}']_2), \pi_{sh})$:

1. Parse $\pi_{sh} = ([(\hat{a}_j)_{j=1}^{n-1}, s]_1, [\boldsymbol{N}]_2, \pi_{per})$; set $[\hat{a}_n]_1 \leftarrow [\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1$.
2. Check $_{per}(, , [(\hat{a}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1, \pi_{per}) = 1$.
3. Check $[\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{C}']_2 - [\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{C}]_2 = [s]_1 \bullet _{\mathsf{e}} - [1]_1 \bullet [\boldsymbol{N}]_2$.

Fig. 3. tFLSZ argument

key, it is not possible to have $[ab+cd]_1$ in the public key without also revealing some intermediate gate outputs like $[ab]_1$ and $[cd]_1$.

In this section we modify the FLSZ argument and construct a new transparent shuffle argument tFLSZ which has a verification-friendly public key. Besides making the argument verification-friendly, we also simplify the construction: (i) we combine the unit vector argument and the same-message argument of tFLSZ into a single argument, (ii) we skip the consistency argument and directly construct a shuffle argument from the permutation argument, and (iii) we observe that one of the trapdoors, $\hat{\varrho}$, can be set to 1 without affecting security. Full description of the new argument is given in Fig. **??**. Nevertheless, we introduce the construction step-by-step in the following.

Let us take the public key of FLSZ in **??** as a starting point and observe which modifications need to be introduced to make it verification-friendly.

- Firstly, we need to add all the trapdoor elements to both groups which means adding $[\chi, \beta, \hat{\beta}]_1$ and $[\chi]_2$ to the public key.

$\mathsf{K}(,n)$: Generate random $\mathsf{td} = (\chi, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho, \hat{\varrho}, \mathsf{e}) \leftarrow_r (^*_p)^6$. Denote $\boldsymbol{P} = (P_i(\chi))_{i=1}^n$, $P_0 = P_0(\chi)$, and $\hat{\boldsymbol{P}} = (\hat{P}_i(\chi))_{i=1}^n$, $\boldsymbol{Q} = ((P_i + P_0)^2 - 1)_{i=1}^n$. Let

$$\mathsf{crs}_{sm} \leftarrow \left([\beta\boldsymbol{P} + \hat{\beta}\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}, \beta\varrho, \hat{\beta}\hat{\varrho}]_1, [\beta, \hat{\beta}]_2\right), \quad \mathsf{crs}_{con} \leftarrow [\,{}^{\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}}_{\hat{\varrho}}\,]_1 \;, \mathsf{e} = [1, \mathsf{e}]_2$$
$$\mathsf{crs}_{pm} \leftarrow \left([1, P_0, \boldsymbol{Q}/\varrho, \textstyle\sum_{i=1}^n P_i, \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{P}_i]_1, [P_0, \sum_{i=1}^n P_i]_2, [1]_T\right) .$$

Set $\mathsf{crs} \leftarrow \left(\mathsf{e}, [\,{}^{\boldsymbol{P}}_{\varrho}\,]_1, [\,{}^{\boldsymbol{P}}_{\varrho}\,]_2, \mathsf{crs}_{sm}, \mathsf{crs}_{pm}, \mathsf{crs}_{con}\right)$. Return $(\mathsf{crs}, \mathsf{td})$.

Fig. 4. CRS generation algorithm of FLSZ

- To evaluate polynomials $P_i(X)$ at point χ we add powers of χ in both groups to the public key. Since P_i is at most degree n, it suffices to include elements $[(\chi^i)_{i=1}^n]_1$ and $[(\chi^i)_{i=1}^n]_2$. However, since $(P_i(X) + P_0(X))^2 - 1$ has at most degree $2n$, we additionally add $[(\chi^i)_{i=n+1}^{2n}]_1$.
- Polynomials $\hat{P}_i$ have a degree $(i+1)(n+1)$, requiring, for the sake of verification friendliness, to include elements $[(\chi^i)_{i=1}^{(n+1)^2}]_1$ which would cause quadratic overhead. We avoid this by redefining the polynomials $\hat{P}_i$ and evaluating them at a new random point θ. The first idea would be to set $\hat{P}_i(X_\theta) = X_\theta^i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ and add $[(\theta^i)_{i=1}^n]_1$ and $[\theta]_2$ to the public key. However, the $((\hat{P}_i(X_\theta))_{i=1}^n, 1)$-commitment scheme would not be binding since the KerMDH assumption does not hold for $[\boldsymbol{M}]_1 = [\hat{P}_1(X_\theta), \ldots, \hat{P}_n(X_\theta), 1]_1$, as the adversary can output $[\boldsymbol{c}]_2 = [\theta, -1, 0, \ldots, 0]_2$ such that $\boldsymbol{M}\boldsymbol{c}^\top = \boldsymbol{0}$ and $\boldsymbol{c} \neq \boldsymbol{0}$. Instead we set $\hat{P}_i(X_\theta) = X_\theta^{2i}$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$ and include $[(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1$ and $[\theta]_2$ to the public key. Now the commitment scheme is binding under a slight variation of the standard KerMDH assumption, which we prove in **??** to reduce to PDL assumption in the algebraic group model.

Another challenge is computing crs_{sm} since it contains elements $[\beta P_i + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$. It is not possible to reveal $[\beta P_i]_1$ and $[\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$ since this breaks knowledge-soundness of the same-message argument. We propose a new argument to overcome this.

New Unit Vector Argument. We combine the same-message argument and unit vector argument from FLSZ to a new unit vector argument which is a proof of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_n^{uv} := \{\left([\hat{a}]_1, (I \in [1\,..\,n], \hat{r})\right) \mid \hat{a} = \hat{P}_I + \hat{r}\}$. The new argument in Fig. **??** has two advantages: (i) it has a verification-friendly public key, and (ii) the unit vector argument of FLSZ is sound only if we give a corresponding proof for the same-message argument; the new argument avoids this dependency. On a high level, the verification equation in Step **??** of $_{uv}$ and the proof element $[d]_1$ in Fig. **??** correspond to a variation of the same-message argument in FLSZ and shows that $[\hat{a}]_1$ and $[a]_1$ commit to the same message $\boldsymbol{m}$ respectively with the $((\hat{P}_i(X))_{i=1}^n, 1)$-commitment and the $((P_i(X))_{i=1}^n, X_\varrho)$-commitment. The verification equation in Step **??** of $_{uv}$ and elements $[b]_2$ and $[e]_1$ in Fig. **??** use the result of **??** to show that $[a]_1$ commits to a unit vector. This part is identical to the unit vector argument in FLSZ.

$\mathsf{K}_{uv}(,n)$: Return $(,\mathsf{td}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}(,n)$ from Fig. ??.

$_{uv}(,,[\hat{a}]_1),(I,\hat{r}))$:

1. $r_p,\ [r']_1 \leftarrow r[\varrho]_1,\ [d]_1 \leftarrow [\beta^2 P_I + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_I]_1 + r[\beta^2\varrho]_1 + \hat{r}[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1$.
2. $[a]_1 \leftarrow [P_I]_1 + [r']_1,\ [b]_2 \leftarrow [P_I]_2 + r[\varrho]_2$.
3. $[e]_1 \leftarrow r \cdot (2([a]_1 + [P_0]_1) - [r']_1) + [\big((P_I + P_0)^2 - 1\big)/\varrho]_1$.
4. Return $\pi_{uv} \leftarrow ([d]_1, [a]_1, [b]_2, [e]_1)$.

$_{uv}(,,[\hat{a}]_1,\pi_{uv})$:

1. Parse $\pi_{uv} = ([d]_1, [a]_1, [b]_2, [e]_1)$ and pick α_p.
2. Check $[d]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [a,\hat{a}]_1 \bullet [\beta^2, \beta\hat{\beta}]_2^\top$.
3. Check $([a]_1 + \alpha[1]_1 + [P_0]_1) \bullet ([b]_2 - \alpha[1]_2 + [P_0]_2) = [e]_1 \bullet [\varrho]_2 + (1-\alpha^2)[1]_T$.

Fig. 5. New unit vector argument

The main differences in the new argument are the public key elements for showing that $[\hat{a}]_1$ and $[a]_1$ commit to the same message. Simply revealing elements $[\beta P_i, \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$ would be sufficient for verification-friendliness, but would also break the knowledge-soundness property. This is since the same-message argument of FLSZ precisely relies on $[\beta P_i(\chi) + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i(\theta)]_1$ being the only $\mathbb{G}_1$ elements in the span of $\{[\beta\chi^i + \hat{\beta}\theta^j]_1\}_{i,j}$ that are available to the adversary. Instead, we essentially substitute $[\beta P_i + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$ with $[\beta^2 P_i + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$ (and other related elements accordingly), and equivalently use the fact that those are the only $\mathbb{G}_1$ elements in the span of $\{[\beta^2\chi^i + \beta\hat{\beta}\theta^j]_1\}_{i,j}$ available to the adversary. This change is significant since the latter elements can be computed with the DKG protocol without revealing $[\beta^2 P_i]_1$ and $[\beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$:

(i) compute $[\beta\chi^i]_1$ and $[\hat{\beta}\theta^{2i}]_1 = [\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$ to obtain $[\beta P_i + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$;
(ii) compute $[\beta^2 P_i + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1 = \mathsf{MD}_{\beta,1}([\beta P_i + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1)$;
(iii) similarly, from elements $[\beta, \beta\varrho, \hat{\beta}]_1$ compute $[\beta^2\varrho]_1$ and $[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1$.

Additionally, in $\mathbb{G}_2$ we reveal $[\beta^2]_2$ and $[\beta\hat{\beta}]_2$. We prove in Appendix ?? that these changes retain security.

Permutation Argument. The permutation argument is a proof of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{per} = \left\{ ([\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1, (\sigma, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}})) \mid \sigma \in \mathbb{S}_n \wedge \textstyle\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{r}_i = 0 \wedge (\forall i \in [1\,..\,n] : \hat{a}_i = \hat{P}_{\sigma^{-1}(i)} + \hat{r}_i) \right\}.$$

We show that this relation is fulfilled the same way as previous NIZK shuffle arguments. Firstly, the prover gives a unit vector argument for each of the commitments $[\hat{a}_i]_1$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n-1]$. Next, we make an observation that only if those commitments are to distinct values $\hat{P}_i$, is $[\hat{a}_n]_1 := [\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1$ a unit vector. Hence, by giving a unit vector argument also for $[\hat{a}_n]_1$, where $[\hat{a}_n]_1$ is explicitly computed by the verifier, we have proven the relation. Condition $\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{r}_i = 0$ in $\mathcal{R}_{per}$ comes from the way that $[\hat{a}_n]_1$ is computed. The protocol is given in Fig. ??.

$\mathsf{K}_{per}(,n)$: Return $(,\mathsf{td}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}(,n)$ from Fig. **??**.
$_{per}(,,[(\hat{a}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1,(\sigma \in \mathbb{S}_n,(\hat{r}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}))$:
1. $\hat{r}_n \leftarrow -\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}\hat{r}_i$, $[\hat{a}_n]_1 \leftarrow [\sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1$.
2. For $i \in [1\,..\,n]$: $\pi_{uv:i} \leftarrow_{uv} (,,[\hat{a}_i]_1,(\sigma^{-1}(i),\hat{r}_i))$.
3. Return $\pi_{per} \leftarrow (\pi_{uv:i})_{i=1}^{n}$.

$_{per}(,,[(\hat{a}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1,\pi_{per})$:
1. Parse $\pi_{per} = (\pi_{uv:i})_{i=1}^{n}$ and set $[\hat{a}_n]_1 \leftarrow [\sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1$.
2. For $i \in [1\,..\,n]$: check $_{uv}(,,[\hat{a}_i]_1,\pi_{uv:i}) = 1$.

Fig. 6. Permutation argument

Shuffle Argument. Finally, we prove that ciphertexts were shuffled according to the permutation σ committed in $[\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1$. This is essentially equivalent to the consistency argument in FLSZ. Intuitively, we check that $\sum_{i=1}^{n}[\hat{P}_i]_1 \bullet [m'_i]_2 = \sum_{i=1}^{n}[\hat{P}_{\sigma^{-1}(i)}]_1 \bullet [m_i]_2$ (see Step **??** for the actual equation) which guarantees that $\sum_{i=1}^{n}[\hat{P}_i]_1 \bullet ([m'_i]_2 - [m_{\sigma(i)}]_2) = [0]_T$. If $[m'_i]_2 \neq [m_{\sigma(i)}]_2$ for some i, then the adversary can find a non-zero element in the kernel of $[\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1$ and thus break the KerMDH assumption. Of course, the actual messages m_i are encrypted and the verifier knows only a commitment to σ. We balance this in the equation by allowing the prover to produce elements $[s]_1$ and $[\boldsymbol{N}]_2$ which cancels the randomness in the ciphertexts and the commitments.

Verification-Friendliness of tFLSZ. After making all of the above modifications we end up with a public key as presented in Fig. **??**. There are two new subkeys: $_{pkv}$ which contains some elements later required by the V algorithm (used by prover to guarantee nn-ZK), and $_{vf}$ which is a by-product of making the public key verification-friendly. After the public key generation protocol has finished the elements in $_{vf}$ can be disregarded. It is now simple to verify that the public key is verification-friendly. For sake of completeness, we present it as a series of multiplication-division and linear combination layers in **??** of Appendix **??**. Hence, the DKG protocol described in **??** can be applied. For the sake of completeness, we provide an explicit description of the DKG protocol in Appendix **??**.

For better modularity we treat the encryption key $_{\mathsf{e}}$ separately from the argument's public key. However, we assume it to be correctly generated by some secure DKG protocol, such as the one by Gennaro et al. [**?**].

Theorem 1 ([?]). *If* tFLSZ *has completeness, soundness, and computational zero-knowledge in the CRS model, then it has completeness, soundness, and computational zero-knowledge if adversary corrupts all but one party in the DKG protocol.*

5 Security in the CRS Model

In this section we establish that tFLSZ is secure in the CRS model, where the CRS is the public key generated by a trusted party. The quite standard proofs of Theorem ?? and Theorem ?? are given in Appendix ?? and ??.

Theorem 2 (Security of unit vector argument). *The unit vector argument in the CRS model (see Fig. ??) has perfect completeness and perfect zero knowledge. If $(3n-1)$-PDL assumption holds, then it has computational knowledge soundness in AGM.*

Theorem 3 (Security of permutation argument). *The permutation argument in the CRS model (see ??) is perfectly complete and perfectly zero-knowledge. If the unit vector argument is knowledge-sound and $((\hat{P}_i(X))_{i=1}^n, 1)$-commitment is binding, then the permutation argument is also knowledge-sound.*

We prove soundness of the shuffle argument under a weaker assumption compared to [?]. The assumption, called the GapKerMDH assumption, is novel, but we show in ?? that it reduces to PDL assumption in AGM. More precisely, since the KerMDH assumption is not secure for $M = (1, \theta, \ldots, \theta^n) \in_p^{n\times 1}$ if the adversary is given both $[M]_1$ and even just $[\theta]_2$, then a slightly modified assumption is required. We still give the same information to the adversary, but require that the output is in the kernel of a certain $M' \subset M$ that contains periodic gaps.

Definition 9. *n-GapKerMDH assumption holds for* BGen *if for any PPT ,*

$$\Pr\left[\begin{matrix} \leftarrow \mathsf{BGen}(), \theta_p^*, [\boldsymbol{v}]_2 \leftarrow (, [(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1, [\theta]_2) : \\ \boldsymbol{v}^\top \cdot (\theta^{2i})_{i=0}^n = 0 \wedge \boldsymbol{v} \neq \mathbf{0}_{n+1} \end{matrix}\right] \approx_0 .$$

Theorem 4. *If $(2n)$-PDL assumption holds, then n-GapKerMDH assumption holds in AGM.*

Theorem 5 (Security of shuffle argument). tFLSZ *is perfectly complete and perfectly zero-knowledge in the CRS model. If the permutation argument is knowledge-sound and the n-GapKerMDH assumption holds, then* tFLSZ *is sound.*

Proof. Perfect completeness. Can be straightforwardly verified by substituting an honest proof to the verification equations.

Perfect zero-knowledge. We show that the simulator in ?? outputs an argument that has the same distribution as an argument output by an honest prover. In both cases $[(a_i)_{i=1}^n]_1$, $[(\hat{a}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1$, and $[s]_1$ are uniformly randomly and independently distributed group elements. Moreover, both honest and simulated arguments have $b_i = a_i$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$ and $[\hat{a}_n]_1 = \sum_{i=1}^n [\hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} [\hat{a}_i]_1$. Elements $[\boldsymbol{d}]_1$, $[\boldsymbol{e}]_1$, $[\boldsymbol{N}]_2$ are now uniquely fixed by the verification equation and

the elements mentioned before. It is straightforward to check that the simulated argument satisfies the verification equations. Thus distributions are equal.

Soundness. Let $_{sh}$ be a PPT adversary that breaks soundness of the shuffle argument with probability ε_{sh}. Let $_{per}$ be the adversary $_{sh}$ restricted only to output $([(\hat{a}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1, \pi_{per})$ and $_{per}$ be an arbitrary extractor such that $_{per}$ breaks knowledge soundness of the permutation argument with probability ε_{per}.

We construct an adversary $_{gap}$ against n-GapKerMDH assumption that on input $(, [(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1, [\theta]_2)$ proceeds as follows:

1. Sample $\chi, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho \leftarrow (^*_p)^4$ and $_{\mathsf{ep}}$. Set $_{\mathsf{e}} \leftarrow [1, _{\mathsf{e}}]$.
2. Compute using $[(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1$, $[\theta]_2$, and $\chi, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho$. In particular, notice that $[\beta P_i(\chi) + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i(\theta)]_1 = (\beta P_i(\chi)) \cdot [1]_1 + \hat{\beta} \cdot [\theta^{2i}]_1$ and $[\hat{\beta}\theta^{2i}]_1 = \hat{\beta} \cdot [\theta^{2i}]_1$.
3. Sample $r_{sh}\mathsf{RND}(_{sh})$ and run $([\boldsymbol{C}, \boldsymbol{C}']_2, \pi_{sh}) \leftarrow_{sh} (, (_{\mathsf{e}},); r_{sh})$.
4. If $(, (_{\mathsf{e}},), ([\boldsymbol{C}]_2, [\boldsymbol{C}']_2), \pi_{sh}) \neq 1$, then abort.
5. Parse $\pi_{sh} = ([(\hat{a}_j)_{j=1}^{n-1}]_1, \pi_{per}, \pi_{con}))$ and set $[\hat{a}_n]_1 \leftarrow [\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1$.
6. Run $(\sigma, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}) \leftarrow_{per} (, ; r_{sh})$.
7. If $([\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1, (\sigma, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}})) \notin \mathcal{R}_{per}$, then abort.
8. Set $\boldsymbol{A} \in \{0,1\}^{n \times n}$ such that $A_{i,j} = 1$ iff $\sigma^{-1}(i) = j$.
9. Set $[\boldsymbol{m}]_2 \leftarrow_{_{\mathsf{e}}} ([\boldsymbol{C}]_2)$, $[\boldsymbol{m}']_2 \leftarrow_{_{\mathsf{e}}} ([\boldsymbol{C}']_2)$, and $[z]_2 \leftarrow_{_{\mathsf{e}}} ([\boldsymbol{N}]_2)$.
10. Return $[\boldsymbol{v}]_2 \leftarrow \begin{pmatrix} [\boldsymbol{m}']_2 - \boldsymbol{A}[\boldsymbol{m}]_2 \\ [z]_2 - \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}^\top [\boldsymbol{m}]_2 \end{pmatrix}$.

Let us analyse the success probability of $_{gap}$. Let X be the event that $_{sh}$ wins, i.e., there is no abort on step **??** and for any permutation matrix $\boldsymbol{P}$, we have $[\boldsymbol{m}']_2 \neq \boldsymbol{P}[\boldsymbol{m}]_2$. Let Y be the event that $_{per}$ wins, i.e, $([\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1, (\sigma, \hat{\boldsymbol{r}})) \notin \mathcal{R}_{per}$. Firstly, let us consider the case that X happens and Y does not happen. Then in particular: (i) $_{sh}$ does not abort, (ii) $\boldsymbol{A}$ is a permutation matrix that satisfies $[\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1 = \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{A} \\ \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}^\top \end{smallmatrix}\right)^\top [\begin{smallmatrix} \hat{\boldsymbol{P}} \\ 1 \end{smallmatrix}]_1$, (iii) $[\boldsymbol{m}']_2 \neq \boldsymbol{A}[\boldsymbol{m}]_2$, and (iv) the verification equation $[\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{C}']_2 - [\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{C}]_2 = [s]_1 \bullet_{\mathsf{e}} - [1]_1 \bullet [\boldsymbol{N}]_2$ is satisfied. By decrypting the ciphertexts in the last equation, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
[0]_T &= [\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{m}']_2 - [\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{m}]_2 + [1]_1 \bullet [z]_2 \\
&= [\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{m}']_2 - [\begin{smallmatrix} \hat{\boldsymbol{P}} \\ 1 \end{smallmatrix}]_1^\top \left(\begin{smallmatrix} \boldsymbol{A} \\ \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}^\top \end{smallmatrix}\right) \bullet [\boldsymbol{m}]_2 + [1]_1 \bullet [z]_2 \\
&= [\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{m}' - \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{m}]_2 + [1]_1 \bullet [z - \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}^\top \boldsymbol{m}]_2 \\
&= [\begin{smallmatrix} \hat{\boldsymbol{P}} \\ 1 \end{smallmatrix}]_1^\top \bullet \begin{pmatrix} [\boldsymbol{m}']_2 - \boldsymbol{A}[\boldsymbol{m}]_2 \\ [z]_2 - \hat{\boldsymbol{r}}^\top [\boldsymbol{m}]_2 \end{pmatrix} = [\begin{smallmatrix} \hat{\boldsymbol{P}} \\ 1 \end{smallmatrix}]_1^\top \bullet [\boldsymbol{v}]_2.
\end{aligned}$$

Since $[\boldsymbol{m}']_2 \neq \boldsymbol{A}[\boldsymbol{m}]_2$, then $[\boldsymbol{v}]_2 \neq [\boldsymbol{0}_{n+1}]_2$ is a solution to the n-GapKerMDH problem. Finally, we can express the success probability of $_{sh}$ as follows:

$$\varepsilon_{sh} = \Pr[X] = \Pr[X \wedge Y] + \Pr[X \wedge \neg Y] \leq \Pr[Y] + \Pr[X \wedge \neg Y] \leq \varepsilon_{per} + \varepsilon_{gap}.$$

Since there exists an extractor $_{per}$ such that $\varepsilon_{per} \approx_0$, it follows that $\varepsilon_{sh} \leq \varepsilon_{per} + \varepsilon_{gap} \approx_0$. □

$(, (\mathsf{e},), \mathsf{td}, ([\boldsymbol{C}]_2, [\boldsymbol{C'}]_2))$:

1. For $i = 1$ to $n-1$: // commits to the identity permutation
   (a) $r_i, \hat{r}_{ip}$;
   (b) $[a_i]_1 \leftarrow [P_i]_1 + r_i[\varrho]_1$; $[b_i]_2 \leftarrow [P_i]_2 + r_i[\varrho]_2$; $[\hat{a}_i]_1 \leftarrow [\hat{P}_i]_1 + \hat{r}_i[1]_1$;
2. r_{np}; $\hat{r}_n \leftarrow -\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \hat{r}_i$;
3. $[a_n]_1 \leftarrow [P_n]_1 + r_n[\varrho]_1$; $[b_n]_2 \leftarrow [P_n]_2 + r_n[\varrho]_2$; $[\hat{a}_n]_1 \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^{n}[\hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1$;
4. For $i = 1$ to n:
   (a) $[d_i]_1 \leftarrow [\beta^2 P_i + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1 + r_i[\beta^2\varrho]_1 + \hat{r}_i[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1$;
   (b) $[e_i]_1 \leftarrow r_i \cdot (2([a_i]_1 + [P_0]_1) - r_i[\varrho]_1) + [Q_i/\varrho]_1$;
5. $\hat{r}_p$; $[s]_1 \leftarrow \mathbf{0}^\top[\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1 + \hat{r}[1]_1$; $[\boldsymbol{N}]_2 \leftarrow (\hat{\boldsymbol{P}} + \hat{\boldsymbol{r}})[\boldsymbol{C}]_2 - \hat{\boldsymbol{P}}[\boldsymbol{C'}]_2 + \hat{r} \cdot {}_{\mathsf{e}}$;
6. $\pi_{per} \leftarrow ([\boldsymbol{d}]_1, [\boldsymbol{a}]_1, [\boldsymbol{b}]_2, [\boldsymbol{e}]_1)$;
7. Return $\pi_{sh} \leftarrow ([(\hat{a}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1}, s]_1, [\boldsymbol{N}]_2, \pi_{per})$.

Fig. 7. Simulator of tFLSZ

$\mathsf{V}_{(,)}$:

1. Check that can be parsed as in Fig. **??** and that each element belongs to the correct group.
2. Check that $[\varrho]_1 \neq [0]_1$.
3. Check that $[\iota]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [1]_1 \bullet [\iota]_2$ for $\iota \in \{\chi, \theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho\}$.
4. Check that $[1]_T = [1]_1 \bullet [1]_2$.
5. For $i = 2$ to $2n$: check that $[\theta^i]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\theta^{i-1}]_1 \bullet [\theta]_2$. // Note that $\hat{P}_i = \theta^{2i}$
6. Check that $[1]_1 \bullet [\beta^2]_2 = [\beta]_1 \bullet [\beta]_2$.
7. Check that $[\beta^2\varrho]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\varrho]_1 \bullet [\beta^2]_2$.
8. Check that $[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\beta]_1 \bullet [\hat{\beta}]_2$.
9. Check that $[1]_1 \bullet [\beta\hat{\beta}]_2 = [\beta\hat{\beta}]_1 \bullet [1]_2$.
10. Check that $[1]_1 \bullet [P_0]_2 = [P_0]_1 \bullet [1]_2$.
11. For $i = 1$ to n: check that
    (a) $[1]_1 \bullet [P_i]_2 = [P_i]_1 \bullet [1]_2$,
    (b) $[\beta^2 P_i + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [P_i]_1 \bullet [\beta^2]_2 + [\hat{P}_i]_1 \bullet [\beta\hat{\beta}]_2$,
    (c) $[((P_i + P_0)^2 - 1)/\varrho]_1 \bullet [\varrho]_2 = ([P_i + P_0]_1 \bullet [P_i + P_0]_2) - [1]_T$.

Fig. 8. The V algorithm of tFLSZ. For ease of presentation, the algorithm is described as if the public key was already well-formed.

6 Zero-Knowledge in the BPK Model

We augment the prover in the BPK model with a key verification algorithm V in **??** such that she outputs a proof only if the verification passes. Then we prove that tFLSZ is nn-ZK in the BPK model with respect to the V algorithm. Firstly, we show that each subverter that creates a valid public key (one that is accepted by V) will know the trapdoors. Let $[\mathsf{td}']_1$ denote the vector in that is supposedly $[\chi, \theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho]_1$.

Lemma 2. *Consider* V *in* ?? *and suppose the BDH-KE assumption holds. Then, for any PPT subverter* X*, there exist a PPT extractor* χ *such that,*

$$(, \mathsf{aux}_{\mathsf{X}} \| \mathsf{td}) \leftarrow (\mathsf{X} \| \chi)() : \mathsf{V}_{(,)} = 1 \wedge [\mathsf{td}]_1 \neq [\mathsf{td}']_1 \subset \approx_0 .$$

Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 4 in [?]. If $\mathsf{V}_{(,)} = 1$, then: (i) Since Step ?? in V is satisfied, there exist elements $[\mathsf{td}']_1 = [\chi', \theta', \beta', \hat{\beta}', \varrho']_1$ and $[\mathsf{td}'']_2 = [\chi'', \theta'', \beta'', \hat{\beta}'', \varrho'']_2$ in that supposedly correspond to trapdoor elements. (ii) By Step ?? $[\iota']_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [1]_1 \bullet [\iota'']_2$ and therefore $\iota' = \iota''$, for $\iota \in \{\chi, \theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho\}$. According to BDH-KE, there exists an extractor $_\iota$ that outputs ι' with overwhelming probability on the same random coins as X. Therefore, we can construct $\chi(r)$ by simply returning $(_\iota(r))_{\iota \in \mathsf{td}}$. □

Theorem 6. *If BDH-KE assumption holds, then* tFLSZ *has statistical nn-ZK.*

Proof. From ??, we know that for any PPT X, there exists an extractor χ that with overwhelming probability outputs the trapdoor td given that $\mathsf{V}_{(,)} = 1$. Let us show that if $\mathsf{V}_{(,)} = 1$ and the extractor outputs the correct td, then $(, \mathsf{e}, , \theta, \mathsf{x})$ and $(, \mathsf{e}, , \mathsf{x}; \mathsf{w})$ have the same distribution for any $\mathsf{x} = ([\boldsymbol{C}]_2, [\boldsymbol{C}']_2)$, $\mathsf{w} = (\sigma, \boldsymbol{t})$ in $\mathcal{R}_n^{sh}$.

We analyse each element of the proof independently.

1. For $i \in [1 \,..\, n-1]$, $\hat{a}_i$ is chosen independently and uniformly randomly in both distributions since $\hat{r}_i$ is picked uniformly at random. Moreover, in both distributions $\hat{a}_n = t_{sum} - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \hat{a}_i$ where t_{sum} equals $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{P}_i$ in the honest case. Hence, $\hat{a}_n$ also has the same distribution.
2. Since Step ?? in V is satisfied, then ϱ is non-zero. By similar reasoning as in the previous step, a_i is independently and uniformly randomly chosen for $i \in [1 \,..\, n]$ in both distributions.
3. Given that Step ?? and Step ?? are satisfied in V, then $a_i = b_i$ for $i \in [1 \,..\, n]$ in both distributions.
4. Given that Steps ??, ??, ?? ??, ?? are satisfied, then the elements $[\beta^2 \varrho]_1$, $[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1$, and $[\beta^2 P_i + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$, for $i \in [1 \,..\, n]$, are well-formed (with respect to a possibly malformed values P_i and $\hat{P}_i$). This is sufficient to show that $d_i = \beta^2 a_i + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{a}_i$ for $i \in [1 \,..\, n]$ in both distributions. Hence, d_i is uniquely determined by β, $\hat{\beta}$, a_i and $\hat{a}_i$.
5. Given that Steps ??, ?? and ?? are satisfied, then $[((P_i + P_0)^2 - 1)/\varrho]_1$ is well-formed (again, with respect to a possibly malformed P_i and P_0). Given this, we can verify that $e_i = ((a_i + P_0)^2 - 1)/\varrho$ in both distributions.
6. In both distributions, s is independently and uniformly randomly chosen since $\hat{r}$ is picked uniformly at random.
7. Step ?? in V guarantees that $\hat{P}_i = \theta^{2i}$ for $i \in [1 \,..\, n]$. In that case an honestly generated proof will always satisfy the verification equation on Step ?? in ??. Given that $\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}$, s and are fixed, then there is a unique value of $\boldsymbol{N}$ which satisfies that equation, and the simulator picks that exact value $\boldsymbol{N}$.

Hence the output of the simulator and the prover have the same distribution. Thus tFLSZ is nn-ZK. □

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Appendix

A Proof of Lemma ??

Proof. Let us denote $T(X) := (\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i P_i(X) + P_0(X))^2 - 1$. Firstly, let us observe that for $0 \leq j \leq n$, $T(w_j) = (\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i P_i(\omega_j) + P_0(\omega_j))^2 - 1 = (\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i(2\ell_i(\omega_j) + \ell_{n+1}(\omega_j)) + \ell_{n+1}(\omega_j) - 1)^2 - 1 = (2a_j - 1)^2 - 1 = 4a_j^2 - 4a_j = 4a_j(a_j - 1)$. On the other hand, $Q_i(\omega_j) = (P_i(\omega_j) + P_0(\omega_j))^2 - 1 = 0$ for $j \in [1\,..\,n]$. Therefore, $T(X) \in \mathsf{Span}\{Q_i(X)\}_{i=1}^{n}$ implies that $T(\omega_j) = 4a_j(a_j - 1) = 0$. Giving us that $a_j \in \{0, 1\}$ for $j \in [1\,..\,n]$.

Finally, $T(\omega_{n+1}) = (\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i(2 \cdot 0 + 1) + (1 - 1))^2 - 1 = (\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i)^2 - 1$. Similarly as before $Q_i(\omega_{n+1}) = 0$. Therefore $T(w_{n+1}) = 0$, implies that $(\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i)^2 - 1 = (\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i - 1)(\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i + 1) = 0$. Then, either $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i = -1 = p - 1$ or $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i = 1$. First case is impossible since $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and $n < p - 1$. Second case implies that exactly one a_j is 1 and all others are 0. Hence, $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ is a unit vector. □

Input: $(\chi, \theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho) \in (^*_p)^5$.
Layer C_1:
1. For $\iota \in \{\beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho\}$, $z \in \{1,2\}$: $[\iota]_z \leftarrow \iota\,[1]_z$.
2. For $i = 1$ to $2n$: $[\chi^i]_1 \leftarrow \chi[\chi^{i-1}]_1$, $[\theta^i]_1 \leftarrow \theta[\theta^{i-1}]_1$.
3. Set $[\theta]_2 \leftarrow \theta[1]_2$ and denote $[\hat{P}_i]_1 = [\theta^{2i}]_1$ for $i = 1$ to n.
4. For $i = 1$ to n: $[\chi^i]_2 \leftarrow \chi[\chi^{i-1}]_2$, $[\beta\chi^i]_1 \leftarrow \beta[\chi^i]_1$, $[\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1 \leftarrow \hat{\beta}[\hat{P}_i]_1$.
5. $[\beta^2]_2 \leftarrow \beta[\beta]_2$, $[\beta\varrho]_1 \leftarrow \beta[\varrho]_1$, $[\beta^2\varrho]_1 \leftarrow \beta[\beta\varrho]_1$, $[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1 \leftarrow \beta[\hat{\beta}]_1$, $[\beta\hat{\beta}]_2 \leftarrow \beta[\hat{\beta}]_2$.

Layer L_1:
1. Compute $[(\ell_i(\chi),\ \beta\ell_i(\chi),\ \ell_i(\chi)^2)_{i=1}^{n+1}]_1$, $[(\ell_i(\chi))_{i=1}^{n+1}]_2$, $[(\ell_i(\chi)\cdot\ell_{n+1}(\chi))_{i=1}^{n}]_1$ from $[(\chi^i)_{i=0}^{2n}]_1$, $[(\beta\chi^i)_{i=0}^{n}]_1$, and $[(\chi^i)_{i=0}^{n}]_2$ as shown in Appendix **??**.
2. $[P_0]_1 \leftarrow [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1 - [1]_1$, $[P_0]_2 \leftarrow [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_2 - [1]_2$.
3. For $i = 1$ to n:
   (a) $[P_i]_1 \leftarrow 2[\ell_i(\chi)]_1 + [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1$, $[P_i]_2 \leftarrow 2[\ell_i(\chi)]_2 + [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_2$
   (b) $[Q_i]_1 \leftarrow 4[\ell_i(\chi)^2]_1 + 4[\ell_{n+1}(\chi)^2]_1 + 8[\ell_i(\chi)\cdot\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1 - 4[\ell_i(\chi)]_1 - 4[\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1$.
   (c) $[\beta P_i + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1 \leftarrow 2[\beta\ell_i(\chi)]_1 + [\beta\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1 + [\hat{\beta}\theta^{2i}]_1$.
4. $[\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{P}_i]_1 \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}[\hat{P}_i]_1$.

Layer C_2: For $i = 1$ to n: $[Q_i/\varrho]_1 \leftarrow [Q_i]_1/\varrho$, $[\beta^2 P_i + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1 \leftarrow \beta[\beta P_i + \hat{\beta}\hat{P}_i]_1$.

Fig. 9. Public key computation as a circuit

B Public Key as Verification-Friendly Circuit

We express the public key of tFLSZ as a circuit of interleaved multi-divisonin and linear combination layers **??**. This confirms that the public key is verification-friendly and thus can be generated by the distributed key generation algorithm of [**?**].

C Computing Lagrange Polynomials

The circuit in **??** requires computing the Lagrange basis $\left[(\ell_i(\chi))_{i=1}^{n+1}\right]_z$ for $z \in \{1,2\}$ from $\left[(\chi^i)_{i=0}^{n}\right]_z$, $[(\beta\ell_i(\chi))_{i=1}^{n+1}]_1$ from $[(\beta\chi^i)_{i=0}^{n}]_1$, and also products of the basis $[(\ell_i(\chi)^2)_{i=1}^{n+1}]_1$ and $[(\ell_i(\chi)\cdot\ell_{n+1}(\chi))_{i=1}^{n}]_1$ from $[(\chi^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1$. The naive way is to compute each of the elements as a linear combination of $\left[1, \chi, \chi^2, \dots\right]_z$ (or $[\beta, \beta\chi, \beta\chi^2, \dots]_1$). However, this would require $\Theta(n)$ scalar multiplications for each element and thus $\Theta(n^2)$ scalar multiplications for all elements. We recall here the standard FFT-based approaches to improve the efficiency to $\Theta(n \log n)$ scalar multiplications. For this we need to set the points $\omega_1, \dots, \omega_{n+1}$ in the definition of Lagrange polynomials as $(n+1)$-th roots of unity.

C.1 Finding a Primitive Root of Unity

In order to compute the Lagrange basis $[\ell(\chi)_i]_1$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n+1]$ efficiently, we need to find the $(n+1)$-th primitive root of unity modulo p. This exists if

and only if $(n+1) \mid (p-1)$. SNARK-friendly elliptic curves such as BLS12-381 have $p-1$ divisible by a large power of 2, hence we may restrict $n+1$ to a power of 2. For example, if we expect 1 million voters, then we can take $n+1 = 2^{20} = 1,048,576$. Excessive positions in the shuffle can be filled with ciphertexts encrypting some special symbol which can be detected and removed during the decryption phase.

Given the above restriction, the $(n+1)$-th primitive root of unity modulo p can be computed as $\omega := g^{(p-1)/(n+1)}$ where g is a generator (primitive element) of the multiplicative group $^*_p$. The generator itself can be found by picking randomly g^*_p and testing that for all prime factors q of $p-1$ satisfy $g^{(p-1)/q} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$. This can be repeated until the property holds which will eventually happen since the multiplicative group of any finite field has a generator. Now we can define $\omega_i := \omega^i$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n+1]$.

C.2 Multi-point Evaluation

Our strategy for computing the Lagrange basis and the related elements is similar to the one proposed by Bowe et al. [?]. We define a polynomial (actually several polynomials) f such that $[f(\omega^i)]_z$ is the element we would like to compute and then apply an efficient FFT-based multi-point evaluation algorithm. However, let us first recall the following characterization of Lagrange basis.

Theorem 7 ([?]). *For $i \in [1\,..\,n+1]$, $\ell_i(X) = \frac{1}{n+1} \cdot \sum_{j=0}^{n} \frac{1}{\omega^{ij}} X^j$.*

Let us define polynomials $f_1(Y) := \sum_{j=0}^{n} \frac{\chi^j}{n+1} Y^j$ and $f_2(Y) := \sum_{j=0}^{n} \frac{\beta\chi^j}{n+1} Y^j$. We may observe that based on the theorem above, $f_1(\omega^{-i}) = \ell_i(\chi)$ and $f_2(\omega^{-i}) = \beta\ell_i(\chi)$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n+1]$.

Next, considering that $\omega^{n+1} = 1$, we may express

$$\ell_i(X)^2 = \frac{1}{(n+1)^2} \sum_{s=0}^{n} \sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{1}{\omega^{i(s+t)}} X^{s+t} = \frac{1}{(n+1)^2} \sum_{j=0}^{2n} \frac{j+1}{\omega^{ij}} X^j, \text{ and}$$

$$\ell_i(X)\ell_{n+1}(X) = \frac{1}{(n+1)^2} \sum_{s=0}^{n} \sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{1}{\omega^{is}} \frac{1}{\omega^{(n+1)t}} X^{s+t} = \frac{1}{(n+1)^2} \sum_{s=0}^{n} Z_s(X) \frac{1}{\omega^{is}},$$

where $Z_s(X) = \sum_{t=0}^{n} X^{s+t}$. Following a similar approach as before, let us define $f_3(Y) := \sum_{j=0}^{2n} \frac{(j+1)\chi^j}{(n+1)^2} Y^j$ and $f_4(Y) := \sum_{j=0}^{n} \frac{Z_j(\chi)}{(n+1)^2} Y^j$. Then $f_3(\omega^{-i}) = \ell_i^2(\chi)$ and $f_4(\omega^{-i}) = \ell_i(\chi)\ell_{n+1}(\chi)$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n+1]$. Now we are equipped to evaluate all of the Lagrange basis related elements in the public key by using a standard FFT-based multi-point evaluation algorithm in **??** which due to the master theorem for divide-and-conquer recurrences takes only $\Theta(n \log n)$ scalar multiplications. The only deviation from the text-book version is that coefficients of

$\mathsf{PolyEval}(, [(a_i)_{i=0}^n]_z, \omega, n)$: $//n+1$ is a power of 2
1. If $n = 1$: Return $\left([a_0]_z + \omega [a_1]_z, [a_0]_z + \omega^2 [a_1]_z \right)$
2. $n' \leftarrow (n+1)/2$
3. $[\boldsymbol{u}]_z \leftarrow \mathsf{PolyEval}(, [(a_{2i})_{i=0}^{n'-1}]_z, \omega^2, n'-1)$
4. $[\boldsymbol{v}]_z \leftarrow \mathsf{PolyEval}(, [(a_{2i+1})_{i=0}^{n'-1}]_z, \omega^2, n'-1)$
5. For $i \in [1 \,..\, n']$: $[w_i]_z \leftarrow [u_i]_z + \omega^i [v_i]_z$
6. For $i \in [n'+1 \,..\, n+1]$: $[w_i]_z \leftarrow [u_{i-n'}]_z + \omega^i [v_{i-n'}]_z$
7. Return $[\boldsymbol{w}]_z$

Fig. 10. Efficient multi-point evaluation of $[f(X)]_z = [\sum_{j=0}^n a_i X^j]_z$ at points $X = \omega^i$ for $i \in [1 \,..\, n+1]$.

the polynomials are group elements and variables of the polynomials are field elements. Let us compute $[Z_s(\chi)]_1$ for $j \in [0 \,..\, n]$ with the following recursive procedure which takes just $\theta(n)$ additions. First, we compute $[Z_0(\chi)]_1 = [\sum_{t=0}^n \chi^t]_1$ and then we may observe that $[Z_{s+1}(\chi)]_1 = [Z_s(\chi)]_1 + [\chi^{s+n+1}]_1 - [\chi^s]_1$ which allows us to recursively compute all the rest of the values. Now, considering that $\omega^{-i} = \omega^{n+1-i}$, we can compute

$$
\begin{aligned}
[(\ell_{n+1-j}(\chi))_{j=0}^n]_1 &\leftarrow \mathsf{PolyEval}(, \left([\chi^j]_1/(n+1)\right)_{j=0}^n, \omega, n),\\
[\beta(\ell_{n+1-j}(\chi))_{j=0}^n]_1 &\leftarrow \mathsf{PolyEval}(, \left([\beta\chi^j]_1/(n+1)\right)_{j=0}^n, \omega, n),\\
[(\ell_{n+1-j}(\chi))_{j=0}^n]_2 &\leftarrow \mathsf{PolyEval}(, \left([\chi^j]_2/(n+1)\right)_{j=0}^n, \omega, n),\\
[(\ell_{n+1-j}(\chi) \cdot \ell_{n+1}(\chi))_{j=0}^n]_1 &\leftarrow \mathsf{PolyEval}(, \left([Z_j(\chi)]_1/(n+1)^2\right)_{j=0}^n, \omega, n),\\
[(w_j)_{j=1}^{2n+1}]_1 &\leftarrow \mathsf{PolyEval}(, \left((j+1)[\chi^j]_1/(n+1)^2\right)_{j=0}^n, \omega, 2n),
\end{aligned}
$$

Janno 18.9: Last one seems suspicious since n' would be fractional. **Prastudy 19.09:** Agree, the algorithm only works for $2n+1$ instead of $2n$. Not sure the values match up though. where $w_{n+1-i} = \ell_i(\chi)^2$ for $i \in [1 \,..\, n+1]$. Therefore, all of the those elements can be computed with just $\Theta(n \log n)$ scalar multiplications.

D DKG Protocol for tFLSZ

For concreteness we provide in ?? the complete DKG protocol for tFLSZ. The protocol here is an instantiation of the general protocol by Abdolmaleki et al. [?] which UC-securely realises the CRS functionality for any verification-friendly CRS. We assume to have access to a secure append-only storage system that we call a *bulletin board (BB)* (blockchain or more generally any secure broadcast protocol as was suggested by Abdolmaleki et al. will be suitable) and to any DL-extractable commitment $\mathsf{dlCom}_{\mathsf{ck}}$. We note that DL-extractable commitment of [?] is an interactive protocol and therefore each pair of parties should run it. For simplicity we represent it in the figure as a non-interactive commitment.

Protocol starts with each party picking trapdoor shares and submitting a commitment of it to the bulletin board. Once all parties have submitted the commit-



Fig. 11. DKG Protocol for tFLSZ

ment starts the open phase where parties open their commitments to group elements (since this is DL-extractable commitment). Point of these first to phases is to guarantee that shares are picked independently. This is followed by two phases of public key generation described respectively in Fig. ?? and Fig. ??. Each of the phases takes N_p rounds where N_p is the number of parties in the DKG protocol. A key generation phase $k \in \{1, 2\}$ contains:

$\mathsf{Setup}_k()$: Publicly computable function which for $k = 1$ initiates the public key with all 1s and for $k = 2$ evaluates those linear combination gates of layer L_1 (as described in ??) that are required by the subsequent layer C_2 as an input.

$\mathsf{Update}_k(,\binom{(i-1)}{k}, \mathsf{td}_i)$: On an input the public key $\binom{(i)}{k}$ of the previous party and trapdoor shares td_i of the current party, updates elements corresponding to multdiv layer C_k with shares td_i by multiplying.

$\mathsf{UpdateVer}_k(\binom{(i-1)}{k},\binom{(i)}{k}, ([\mathsf{td}_i]_1, [\mathsf{td}_i]_2))$: Verifies that the $_i$ computed Update_k correctly with respect to his shares td_i.

$\mathsf{Finalize}(\binom{(\mathrm{N}_p)}{1},\binom{(\mathrm{N}_p)}{2})$: Takes as an input the last output $\binom{(\mathrm{N}_p)}{1}$ of phase 1 and the last output $\binom{(\mathrm{N}_p)}{2}$ of phase 2, that is, the outputs of party $_{\mathrm{N}_p}$, computes the remaining linear combination gates of layer L_1, and composes everything to a well-formed public key .

$\mathsf{Setup}_1()$: Return $_1 \leftarrow \left([1,\ldots,1]_1,[1,\ldots,1]_2\right) \in \mathbb{G}_1^{6n+6} \times \mathbb{G}_2^{n+6}$.

$\mathsf{Update}_1(,_1,(\chi_u,\theta_u,\beta_u,\hat{\beta}_u,\varrho_u))$:

1. Parse $_1 = \begin{pmatrix} [\beta,\hat{\beta},\varrho,\beta\varrho,\beta^2\varrho,\beta\hat{\beta},(\chi^i,\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n},(\beta\chi^i,\gamma\theta^{2i})_{i=1}^{n}]_1 \\ [\theta,\beta,\hat{\beta},\varrho,\beta^2,\beta\hat{\beta},(\chi^i)_{i=1}^{n}]_2 \end{pmatrix}$.
2. Return
$$\tilde{}_1 \leftarrow \begin{pmatrix} \beta_u[\beta]_1,\hat{\beta}_u[\hat{\beta}]_1,\varrho_u[\varrho]_1,(\beta_u\varrho_u)[\beta\varrho]_1,((\beta_u^2\varrho_u)[\beta^2\varrho]_1,(\beta_u\hat{\beta}_u)[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1, \\ \left(\chi_u^i[\chi^i]_1,\theta_u^i[\theta^i]_1\right)_{i=1}^{2n},\left((\beta_u\chi_u^i)[\beta\chi^i]_1,(\hat{\beta}_u\theta_u^{2i})[\hat{\beta}\theta^{2i}]_1\right)_{i=1}^{n} \\ \theta_u[\theta]_2,\beta_u[\beta]_2,\hat{\beta}_u[\hat{\beta}]_2,\varrho_u[\varrho]_2,\beta_u^2[\beta^2]_2,\beta_u\hat{\beta}_u[\beta\hat{\beta}]_2,(\chi_u^i[\chi^i]_2)_{i=1}^{n} \end{pmatrix}.$$

$\mathsf{UpdateVer}_1(,_1,\tilde{}_1,\pi_{\tilde{1}})$:

1. Parse $_1,\tilde{}_1$ as above.
2. Parse $\pi_{\tilde{1}}$ as $([\chi_u,\theta_u,\beta_u,\hat{\beta}_u,\varrho_u]_1,[\chi_u,\theta_u,\beta_u,\hat{\beta}_u,\varrho_u]_2)$.
3. For $\iota \in \{\chi,\theta,\beta,\hat{\beta},\varrho\}$: check
   (a) $[\iota\iota_u]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\iota]_1 \bullet [\iota_u]_2$,
   (b) $[1]_1 \bullet [\iota\tilde{\iota}]_2 = [\iota\tilde{\iota}]_1 \bullet [1]_2$.
4. Check $[\beta_u\varrho_u\beta\varrho]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\beta_u\beta]_1 \bullet [\varrho_u\varrho]_2$.
5. Check $[\beta_u^2\varrho_u\beta^2\varrho]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\beta_u\varrho_u\beta\varrho]_1 \bullet [\beta_u\beta]_2$.
6. Check $[\beta_u\hat{\beta}_u\beta\hat{\beta}]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\beta_u\hat{\beta}_u]_1 \bullet [\beta\hat{\beta}]_2$.
7. Check $[1]_1 \bullet [\beta_u\hat{\beta}_u\beta\hat{\beta}]_2 = [\beta_u\hat{\beta}_u]_1 \bullet [\beta\hat{\beta}]_2$.
8. Check $[1]_1 \bullet [\beta_u^2\beta^2]_2 = [\beta_u\beta]_1 \bullet [\beta_u\beta]_2$.
9. For $i = 2$ to $2n$: check
   (a) $[\chi_u^i\chi^i]_1 \bullet [1]_1 = [\chi_u^{i-1}\chi^{i-1}]_1 \bullet [\chi_u\chi]_2$,
   (b) $[\theta_u^i\theta^i]_1 \bullet [1]_1 = [\theta_u^{i-1}\theta^{i-1}]_1 \bullet [\theta_u\theta]_2$,
10. For $i = 2$ to n: check
   (a) $[\beta_u\chi_u^i\beta\chi^i]_1 \bullet [1]_1 = [\chi_u^i\chi^i]_1 \bullet [\beta_u\beta]_2$,
   (b) $[\hat{\beta}_u\theta_u^{2i}\hat{\beta}\theta^{2i}]_1 \bullet [1]_1 = [\theta_u^{2i}\theta^{2i}]_1 \bullet [\hat{\beta}_u\hat{\beta}]_2$,
   (c) $[1]_1 \bullet [\chi_u^i\chi_u^i]_2 = [\chi_u^i\chi^i]_1 \bullet [1]_2$.

Fig. 12. Phase 1 algorithms for DKG

Finally, each party in the protocol runs the verification phase which outputs the key and verifies that all parties followed the protocol.

E Security Proof of Unit Vector Argument

Theorem 8. *The unit vector argument (see ??) in the CRS model has perfect completeness and perfect zero knowledge respect to the simulator in ??.*

Proof. Perfect completeness. This is easy to verify by plugging honestly generated values to the verification equations. From the right hand side of the equation in step ?? of ?? we can derive $[a,\hat{a}]_1 \bullet [\beta^2,\beta\hat{\beta}]_2^\top = [\beta^2 P_I + \beta^2 r\varrho + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_I + \beta\hat{\beta}\hat{r}]_T = [d]_1 \bullet [1]_2$. On the left hand side of the equation in step ?? of ??, considering

$\mathsf{Setup}_2(,_1)$:
1. Parse $_1$ as in Step ?? of Update_1.
2. Compute $[\ell_i(\chi)]_1$, $[\beta\ell_i(\chi)]_1$, $[\ell_i(\chi)^2]_1$, $[\ell_i(\chi)\cdot\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1$ for $i\in[1\,..\,n+1]$ as a linear combination of $[(\chi^i)_{i=0}^{2n}]_1$ and $[(\beta\chi^i)_{i=0}^{n}]_1$. (see Appendix ??).
3. For $i=1$ to n:
   (a) $[Q_i]_1 \leftarrow 4[\ell_i(\chi)^2]_1 + 4[\ell_{n+1}(\chi)^2]_1 + 8[\ell_i(\chi)\cdot\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1 - 4[\ell_i(\chi)]_1 - 4[\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1$.
   (b) $[\beta P_i + \hat\beta\hat P_i]_1 \leftarrow 2[\beta\ell_i(\chi)]_1 + [\beta\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1 + [\hat\beta\theta^{2i}]_1$
4. Return $_2 \leftarrow [\boldsymbol{Q}, \beta\boldsymbol{P} + \hat\beta\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1$.

$\mathsf{Update}_2(,_2,(\beta_u,\varrho_u))$:
1. Parse $_2 = [\boldsymbol{Q}/\varrho',\ \beta'(\beta\boldsymbol{P}+\hat\beta\hat{\boldsymbol{P}})]_1$.
2. Return $\widetilde{}_2 \leftarrow \big((1/\varrho_u)[\boldsymbol{Q}/\varrho']_1,\ \beta_u[\beta'(\beta\boldsymbol{P}+\hat\beta\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1\big)$.

$\mathsf{UpdateVer}_2(,_2,\widetilde{}_2,\pi_{\widetilde{}_2})$:
1. Parse $_2,\widetilde{}_2$ as above and $\pi_{\widetilde{}_2}$ as $[\varrho_u,\beta_u]_2$.
2. Check $[\beta_u\beta'(\beta\boldsymbol{P}+\hat\beta\hat P)]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [\beta'(\beta\boldsymbol{P}+\hat\beta\hat P)]_1 \bullet [\beta_u]_2$.
3. Check $[\boldsymbol{Q}/(\varrho'\varrho_u)]_1 \bullet [\varrho_u]_2 = [\boldsymbol{Q}/\varrho']_1 \bullet [1]_2$.

$\mathsf{Finalize}(_1,_2)$:
1. Parse $_1$ as in Update_1 and $_2$ as $[\boldsymbol{Q}/\varrho, \beta^2\boldsymbol{P}+\beta\hat\beta\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1$.
2. Compute $[\ell_i(\chi)]_1$, $[\ell_i(\chi)]_2$ for $i\in[1\,..\,n+1]$ as a linear combination of $[(\chi^i)_{i=0}^n]_1$ and $[(\chi^i)_{i=0}^n]_2$. (see Appendix ??).
3. $[P_0]_1 \leftarrow [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1 - [1]_1$, $[P_0]_2 \leftarrow [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_2 - [1]_2$.
4. For $i=1$ to n: $[P_i]_1 \leftarrow 2[\ell_i(\chi)]_1 + [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_1$, $[P_i]_2 \leftarrow 2[\ell_i(\chi)]_2 + [\ell_{n+1}(\chi)]_2$
5. $_{uv} \leftarrow \begin{pmatrix} [1,\ P_0,\ \boldsymbol{P},\ \varrho,\ \boldsymbol{Q}/\varrho,\ \sum_{i=1}^n \hat P_i,\ \beta^2\varrho,\ \beta\hat\beta,\ \beta^2\boldsymbol{P}+\beta\hat\beta\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1, \\ [1,\ P_0,\ \boldsymbol{P},\ \varrho,\ \beta^2,\ \beta\hat\beta]_2,\ [1]_1\bullet[1]_2 \end{pmatrix}$.
6. $_{pkv} \leftarrow \big([(\theta^{2i-1})_{i=1}^n,\ (\ell_i(\chi))_{i=1}^{n+1},\ \beta,\ \hat\beta,\ (\chi^i)_{i=1}^{n+1}]_1,\ [\chi,\theta,\beta,\hat\beta]_2\big)$.
7. Return $([\hat{\boldsymbol{P}}]_1,_{uv},_{pkv})$. //Note that $_{vf}$ is never used

Fig. 13. Phase 2 algorithms for DKG

$_{uv}(,,(\beta,\hat\beta),[\hat a]_1)$
1. $r_p,\ [a]_1 \leftarrow [P_1]_1 + r[\varrho]_1,\ [b]_2 \leftarrow [P_1]_2 + r[\varrho]_2$.
2. $[e]_1 \leftarrow r\cdot(2([a]_1+[P_0]_1) - r[\varrho]_1) + [\big((P_1+P_0)^2-1\big)/\varrho]_1$.
3. $[d]_1 \leftarrow \beta^2[a]_1 + \beta\hat\beta[\hat a]_1$.
4. Return $([d]_1,[a]_1,[b]_2,[e]_1)$.

Fig. 14. Simulator of unit vector argument

that $a=b$, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
[(a+P_0)^2-\alpha^2]_T &= [(P_I+r\varrho+P_0)^2-\alpha^2]_T \\
&= [(P_I+P_0)^2 + 2r(P_I+P_0)\varrho + (r\varrho)^2 - \alpha^2]_T \\
&= [(P_I+P_0)^2 + r(2(P_I+P_0)\varrho + r\varrho^2) - \alpha^2 + (1-1)]_T \\
&= [r(2(P_I+P_0)\varrho + r\varrho^2) + ((P_I+P_0)^2-1) + (1-\alpha^2)]_T \\
&= \varrho[r(2(P_I+P_0)+r\varrho) + ((P_I+P_0)^2-1)/\varrho]_T + [(1-\alpha^2)]_T \\
&= \varrho[r(2(a+P_0)-r\varrho) + ((P_I+P_0)^2-1)/\varrho]_T + [(1-\alpha^2)]_T \\
&= [e]_1 \bullet [\varrho]_2 + (1-\alpha^2)[1]_T.
\end{aligned}$$

Perfect zero-knowledge. Let $([\hat{a}]_1,(I,\hat{r}))\in\mathcal{R}_{uv}$ and $(,\mathsf{td})\leftarrow\mathsf{K}_{uv}(,n)$. We show that ${}_{uv}(,,[\hat{a}]_1,(I,\hat{r}))$ and ${}_{uv}(,(\beta,\hat{\beta}),[\hat{a}]_1)$ are identical distributions. In both cases $[a]_1$ is a uniformly random group element and $[b]_2=[a]_2$. Given that the latter are fixed, there is exactly one possible value of $[e]_1$ that would satisfy the verification equation on Step **??** of ${}_{uv}$ and ${}_{uv}$ picks that value. Finally, since honest $[d]_1=[\beta^2P_I+\beta\hat{\beta}\hat{P}_I]_1+r[\beta^2\varrho]_1+\hat{r}[\beta\hat{\beta}]_1=[\beta^2(P_I+r\varrho)+\beta\hat{\beta}(\hat{P}_I+\hat{r})]_1$, then $[a,\hat{a}]_1$ and $(\beta,\hat{\beta})$ uniquely determine $[d]_1$, namely, ${}_{uv}$ picks it as $[d]_1=\beta^2[a]_1+\beta\hat{\beta}[\hat{a}]_1$. □

In the rest of this section we follow the ideas from [**?**, Section 7] and prove the following result.

Theorem 9. *If $(3n-1)$-PDL assumption holds, then unit vector argument has computational knowledge-soundness in AGM.*

We define a notion of *idealised verification*, where the verification equation holds true for polynomials (with trapdoor elements as variables) rather than for polynomials evaluation only (*real verification*, for concrete trapdoor elements). We show that no element outside the language (i.e. a non-unit vector) can pass that idealised verification and if an adversary manages to pass the real verification but no ideal one, she can be used to break $(3n-1)$-PDL assumption.

E.1 Idealised Verification

In the idealised verification the unit vector argument verification equations described in Step **??** of **??** hold for polynomials. That is, instead of concrete 5 group elements (an instance x and proof $\pi=([a,d,e]_1,[b]_2)$), the adversary submits 5 polynomials $Z(\boldsymbol{X})$ (corresponding to the instance x), and $A(\boldsymbol{X})$, $B(\boldsymbol{X})$, $D(\boldsymbol{X})$, $E(\boldsymbol{X})$ (constituting to the proof elements), such that the verification equations hold as polynomials:

$$D(\boldsymbol{X})-A(\boldsymbol{X})X_\beta^2-Z(\boldsymbol{X})X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}}^2, \tag{1}$$

$$(A(\boldsymbol{X})+P_0(X))(B(\boldsymbol{X})+P_0(X))-X_\varrho C(\boldsymbol{X})-1+X_\alpha(B(\boldsymbol{X})-A(\boldsymbol{X}))=0\ . \tag{2}$$

The adversary does not have full freedom in designing the polynomials but can create them as affine combinations of CRS elements. In [**?**] such an adversary is called *affine* and an explaination is given why considering such limited adversaries is actualy enough. Thus, the polynomials $A(\boldsymbol{X}),D(\boldsymbol{X})$ and $E(\boldsymbol{X})$ are of form $G(\boldsymbol{X})$, cf. Eq. **??**, and $B(\boldsymbol{X})$ of form $H(\boldsymbol{X})$, cf. Eq. **??**, where $\boldsymbol{X}=(X,X_\theta,X_\beta,X_{\hat{\beta}},X_\varrho,X_{\mathsf{e}})$ denotes the formal variables corresponding to the trapdoor td.

$$G(\boldsymbol{X}) := \sum_{\iota \in S_1} G_\iota \cdot M(\boldsymbol{X}, \iota) + g_1(X) + \tilde{g}(X) + g_Q(X)/X_\varrho + g_\theta(X_\theta) + \tag{3}$$
$$+ g_{sm}(\boldsymbol{X}) + X_\beta \cdot g_2(X) + X_{\hat{\beta}} \cdot \hat{g}(X_\theta)$$
$$H(\boldsymbol{X}) := \sum_{\iota \in S_2} H_\iota \cdot M(\boldsymbol{X}, \iota) + h(X) \tag{4}$$

where

- $M(\boldsymbol{X}, \iota)$ is the monomial $X^{i_1} X_\theta^{i_2} X_\beta^{i_3} X_{\hat{\beta}}^{i_4} X_\varrho^{i_5} X_{\mathsf{e}}^{i_6}$ for a symbolic value $\iota = \chi^{i_1} \theta^{i_2} \beta^{i_3} \hat{\beta}^{i_4} \varrho^{i_5} {}_{\mathsf{e}}{}^{i_6}$.
- $S_1 = \{\beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho, \beta\varrho, \beta^2\varrho, \beta\hat{\beta}\}$ and $S_2 = \{\theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho, \mathsf{e}, \beta^2, \beta\hat{\beta}\}$.
- $G_\iota, H_\iota \in_p$, $g_1, g_2, h \in \mathsf{Span}(\{X^i\}_{i=0}^n)$, $\tilde{g} \in \mathsf{Span}(\{X^i\}_{i=n+1}^{2n})$, $g_Q \in \mathsf{Span}(\{(P_i(X) + P_0(X))^2 - 1\}_{i=1}^n)$, $\hat{g} \in \mathsf{Span}(\{\hat{P}_i(X_\theta)\}_{i=1}^n)$, $g_\theta \in \mathsf{Span}(\{X_\theta^i\})_{i=1}^{2n})$, $g_{sm} \in \mathsf{Span}(\{X_\beta^2 P_i(X) + X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} \hat{P}_i(X_\theta)\}_{i=1}^n)$.

We show that if that is the case, then the unit vector argument holds.

Suppose that a PPT adversary given outputs an instance polynomial $Z(\boldsymbol{X})$ and the corresponding proof polynomials $A(\boldsymbol{X}), B(\boldsymbol{X}), D(\boldsymbol{X}), E(\boldsymbol{X})$.

Since all random variables in $\boldsymbol{X}$ are independent and from verification equation **??** follows that

$$T_1(\boldsymbol{X}) := (A(\boldsymbol{X}) + P_0(X))(B(\boldsymbol{X}) + P_0(X)) - X_\varrho \cdot C(\boldsymbol{X}) - 1 = 0\,, \text{ and}$$
$$T_2(\boldsymbol{X}) := B(\boldsymbol{X}) - A(\boldsymbol{X}) = 0\,.$$

It follows that $A(\boldsymbol{X}) = B(\boldsymbol{X}) = \sum_{\iota \in \{\theta, \beta, \hat{\beta}, \varrho\}} A_\iota X_\iota + A_{\beta\hat{\beta}} X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} + a_1(X)$. Now $T_1(\boldsymbol{X}) = (A(\boldsymbol{X}) + P_0(X))^2 - X_\varrho \cdot C(\boldsymbol{X}) - 1 = 0$. We may observe that in $T_1(\boldsymbol{X})$ coefficients of monomials X_θ^2, X_β^2, $X_{\hat{\beta}}^2$, $X_\beta^2 X_{\hat{\beta}}^2$ are respectively $A_\delta^2 = 0$, $A_\beta^2 = 0$, $A_{\hat{\beta}}^2 = 0$, $A_{\beta\hat{\beta}}^2 = 0$. Therefore we can simplify $A(\boldsymbol{X}) = a_1(X) + A_\varrho X_\varrho = \sum_{i=0}^n A_i P_i(X) + A_\varrho X_\varrho$. Moreover, let us denote $\boldsymbol{X}' = (X_\theta, X_\beta, X_{\hat{\beta}}, X_\varrho, X_{\mathsf{e}})$. Then the constant value in $T_1(\boldsymbol{X}')$ is

$$(\sum_{i=0}^n A_i P_i(X) + P_0(X))^2 - 1 - c_Q(X) = 0\ . \tag{5}$$

Let us now turn to the Eq. **??** that guarantees $X_\beta^2 \cdot A(\boldsymbol{X}) + X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} \cdot Z(\boldsymbol{X}) - D(\boldsymbol{X}) = 0$. We multiply it by X_ϱ to remove the possible division in $Z(\boldsymbol{X})$ and $D(\boldsymbol{X})$, then

$$X_\beta^2 \cdot (X_\varrho A(\boldsymbol{X})) + X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} \cdot (X_\varrho Z(\boldsymbol{X})) - X_\varrho D(\boldsymbol{X}) = 0. \tag{6}$$

All the non-zero monomials of $X_\varrho D(\boldsymbol{X})$ must contain X_β^2 or $X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}}$, hence $X_\varrho D(\boldsymbol{X}) = D_{\beta^2\varrho} X_\beta^2 X_\varrho^2 + D_{\beta\hat{\beta}} X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} X_\varrho + X_\varrho \cdot d_{sm}(\boldsymbol{X})$ where $d_{sm}(\boldsymbol{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^n D_i \cdot (X_\beta^2 P_i(X) + X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} \hat{P}_i(X_\theta))$. Additionally, let us consider that $X_\varrho X_\beta^2 \cdot A(\boldsymbol{X}) =$

$\sum_{i=0}^{n} A_i P_i(X) X_\varrho X_\beta^2 + A_\varrho X_\varrho^2 X_\beta^2$. Hence $X_\varrho X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} Z(\boldsymbol{X})$ can only contain monomials present in $X_\varrho X_\beta^2 \cdot A(\boldsymbol{X})$ or $X_\varrho D(\boldsymbol{X})$ that are divisible by $X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}}$ i.e., $Z(\boldsymbol{X}) = Z_0 X^0 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} Z_i \hat{P}_i(X_\theta)$. Then substituting into Eq. ?? we get that that

$$A_0 P_0(X) X_\varrho X_\beta^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (A_i - D_i) P_i(X) X_\varrho X_\beta^2 + (A_\varrho - D_{\beta^2\varrho}) X_\beta^2 X_\varrho^2 + (Z_0 - D_{\beta\hat{\beta}}) X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} X_\varrho + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (Z_i - D_i) \hat{P}_i(X_\theta) X_\beta X_{\hat{\beta}} X_\varrho = 0.$$

Since the above monomials are linearly independent, then $A_0 = 0$, $A_i = D_i = Z_i$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$, $A_\varrho = D_{\beta^2\varrho}$, and $Z_0 = D_{\beta\hat{\beta}}$. Now $A(\boldsymbol{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i P_i(X) + A_\varrho X_\varrho$ and then from ?? we get also $(\sum_{i=i}^{n} a_i P_i(X) + P_0(X))^2 - 1 = c_Q(X)$ which together with ?? implies that $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ is a unit vector. Considering that $A_i = Z_i$, we can extract I and Z_0 such that $[\hat{a}]_1 = [\hat{P}_I + Z_0]_1$.

E.2 Security Against Algebraic Adversaries

We show the security against algebraic adversaries by contradiction. That is, we assume an adversary breaks the knowledge soundness, i.e. she provides an instance and corresponding valid proof such that no extractor can get the witness from them. However, as shown in ??, if the verification equations hold as polynomials (cf. Eq. ?? and ??), then the extractor can always obtain the correct witness. Thus, it must be the case that verification equations as defined in ?? accept, but only as polynomial evaluations at trapdoor td, not as polynomials (at least one of two verification equation polynomials is non-zero). Using this distinction we construct an adversary which uses to break $(3n-1)$-PDL assumption.

First of all, we define algebraic adversaries:

Definition 10 (Algebraic adversary). *Let $[\boldsymbol{x_1}]_1, [\boldsymbol{x_2}]_2$ be vectors of group elements. We call an adversary* algebraic *if on input $[\boldsymbol{x_1}]_1, [\boldsymbol{x_2}]_2$ it returns $[\boldsymbol{y_1}]_1, [\boldsymbol{y_2}]_1, \boldsymbol{Z_1}, \boldsymbol{Z_2}$ such that $[\boldsymbol{y}_1]_1 = \boldsymbol{Z_1} \cdot [\boldsymbol{x_1}]_1$ and $[\boldsymbol{y}_2]_2 = \boldsymbol{Z_2} \cdot [\boldsymbol{x_2}]_1$ for some matrices $\boldsymbol{Z}_1, \boldsymbol{Z}_2$ over $_p$.*

Intuitively, we call an adversary algebraic if for each output group element she also outputs a linear representation in the input group elements. Algebraic adversary is stronger than generic group model adversary since sees the bit-level structure of the group elements. However, this also means that proofs in AGM are reductions to assumptions rather than unconditional proofs like in the generic group model.

Assume that an algebraic adversary breaks the soundness of the unit vector argument. Then there exists an adversary that breaks $(3n-1)$-PDL assumption and proceeds as follows.

$_{per}(,,(\beta,\hat{\beta}),[(\hat{a})_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1)$: Set $[\hat{a}_n]_1 \leftarrow [\sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1$, compute $\pi_{uv:i} \leftarrow_{uv} (,[\hat{a}_i]_1,(\beta,\hat{\beta}))$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$, and return $\pi_{per} \leftarrow (\pi_{uv:i})_{i=1}^{n}$.

Fig. 15. Simulator of permutation argument

First, gets as input two vectors of group elements $[(z^i)_{i=0}^{3n-1}]_1, [(z^i)_{i=0}^{3n-1}]_2$. Second, she sets

$$\chi = r_1 z + s_1\,, \qquad \tau = r_2 z + s_2\,, \qquad \beta = r_3 z + s_3\,,$$
$$\hat{\beta} = r_4 z + s_4\,, \qquad \varrho = r_5 z + s_5$$

for some randomly picked $\{r_i, s_i\}_{i=1}^{5}$, and builds a CRS for the unit vector argument that will be provided for . Since the adversary is algebraic she returns elements $[\hat{a}]_1$, $[a]_1$, $[d]_1$, $[e]_1$, $[b]_2$ as her instance and proof along with vectors $\{\boldsymbol{z}_\iota\}_{\iota\in\hat{a},a,b,d,e}$ – their representation as the combination of the CRS elements.

Let R_1 and R_2 be the verification equations. Since, the adversary picked s_i, r_i on her own, knows all coefficients of R_1 and R_2 as polynomials in Z – a formal variable corresponding to z. Degree of R_1, R_2 is upper-bounded by the highest degree of the CRS element from $\mathbb{G}_1$, $2n-1$, plus the highest degree of the CRS element from $\mathbb{G}_2$, n, thus $\deg(R_i)$ is at most $3n-1$. Let $R \in \{R_1, R_2\}$ be the equation that holds for the concrete z, i.e. $R(z) = 0$ but does not hold as a polynomial in Z, i.e. $R(Z) \neq 0$. Then can factor R and find z', such that $R(z') = 0$. With probability at least $1/(3n-1))$ holds $z = z'$.

With this we have proven the result in **??**.

F Security Proof of Permutation Argument

Proof. Perfect completeness. Observe that $[\hat{a}_n]_1 = [\sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{a}_i]_1 = [\sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i]_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}[\hat{P}_{\sigma^{-1}(i)} + \hat{r}_i]_1 = [\hat{P}_{\sigma^{-1}(n)} + \hat{r}_n]_1$. Therefore, completeness follows from completeness of the unit vector argument.

Perfect zero knowledge. Observe that $_{per}$ and $_{per}$ compute $[\hat{a}_n]_1$ the same way and the proof is just n unit vector arguments which we have already shown to have perfect zero-knowledge.

Knowledge-soundness. Let $_{per}$ be a PPT adversary against knowledge-soundness. According to the unit vector argument, for each $i \in [1\,..\,n]$, there exists an extractor $_{uv:i}$ such that $\left(([(\hat{a})_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1, \pi_{per}) \| (I_i, \hat{r}_i)\right) \leftarrow (_{per} \| _{uv:i})(,)$ where the probability that $_{per}(,[(\hat{a})_{i=1}^{n-1}]_1, \pi_{per}) = 1$ and $\hat{a}_i \neq \hat{P}_{I_i} + \hat{r}_i$ is negligible. Hence, if verification accepts, with overwhelming probability $\hat{a}_i = \hat{P}_{I_i} + \hat{r}_i$. On the other hand $\hat{a}_n = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i - \sum_{j=1}^{n-1}\hat{a}_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i - \sum_{j=1}^{n-1}\left(\hat{P}_{I_j} + \hat{r}_j\right)$. Considering that $\hat{P}_{I_j}$ for $j \in [1\,..\,n-1]$ might not be distinct, we can express $\hat{a}_n = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\hat{P}_i - \sum_{j=1}^{n} k_j\hat{P}_j +$

$(-\sum_{i=j}^{n-1} \hat{r}_j) = \sum_{i=1}^{n}(1-k_i)\hat{P}_i + (-\sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \hat{r}_j)$ where $k_i \in [0\,..\,n-1]$. Since also $\hat{a}_n = \hat{P}_{I_n} + \hat{r}_n$, we must have $(1-k_i) = 0$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n] \setminus \{I_n\}$, $k_{I_n} = 0$, and $\hat{r}_n = -\sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \hat{r}_j$ since otherwise $(1-k_1, \ldots, 1-k_n, -\sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \hat{r}_j)$ and $(\boldsymbol{e}_{\boldsymbol{I_n}}, \hat{r}_n)$, where $\boldsymbol{e}_{\boldsymbol{I_n}}$ is the I_n-th unit vector, are different openings for the commitment $[\hat{a}_n]_1$. It follows that $P_{I_1}, \ldots, P_{I_n}$ are distinct, so we can find a unique permutation $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}_n$ such that $P_{I_i} = P_{\sigma^{-1}(i)}$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$. The extractor $_{per}$, that runs $_{uv:i}$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n]$, outputs $(\sigma, (\hat{r}_i)_{i=1}^{n-1})$ found such way. □

G Security Proof of GapKerMDH

Proof. Let be an algebraic PPT adversary that breaks n-GapKerMDH assumption with probability ε_{gap}. More precisely, gets as an input $(, [(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1, [\theta]_2)$ for θ_p, and outputs a non-zero $[\boldsymbol{v}]_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^{n+1}$ and its linear representation $\boldsymbol{U} \in_p^{(n+1)\times 2}$ (that is $[\boldsymbol{v}]_2 = \boldsymbol{U} \cdot [1, \theta]_2^\top$) such that $\sum_{i=0}^{n} \theta^{2i} \cdot v_{i+1} = 0$.

We construct a PPT adversary that breaks $(2n)$-PDL assumption using . First, gets as an input $(, [(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1, [(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_2)$ and runs $(, [(\theta^i)_{i=1}^{2n}]_1, [\theta]_2)$ to get the output $[\boldsymbol{v}]_2$ and $\boldsymbol{U}$. Let us define polynomials $V_i(X_\theta) := U_{i,1} + U_{i,2} \cdot X_\theta$ for $i \in [1\,..\,n+1]$ which in particular satisfies $V_i(\theta) = v_i$. Similarly for the expression $\sum_{i=0}^{n} \theta^{2i} \cdot v_{i+1}$ we define a polynomial $V(X_\theta) := \sum_{i=0}^{n} X_\theta^{2i} \cdot V_{i+1}(X_\theta)$ such that if wins then $V(\theta) = 0$. Adversary will abort if either outputs an incorrect representation U or loses the n-GapKerMDH game. Otherwise finds roots of $V(X_\theta)$ (can be done efficiently), and returns the one which matches $[\theta]_1$.

Finding roots of $V(X_\theta)$ is only possible if $V(X_\theta)$ is a non-zero polynomial, but it is easy to see that this is always the case if wins. We may express

$$V(X_\theta) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} X_\theta^{2i} \cdot (U_{i+1,1} + U_{i+1,2} \cdot X_\theta) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} U_{i+1,1} X_\theta^{2i} + \sum_{i=0}^{n} U_{i+1,2} \cdot X_\theta^{2i+1}.$$

So if $V(X_\theta) = 0$ then $\boldsymbol{U} = 0$ and therefore $\boldsymbol{v} = 0$ which contradicts winning. It follows that can break $(2n)$-PDL assumption with probability ε_{gap}. □