

Logic first approach to both nonmonotonic and monotonic entailment considerations:

“There should be a way back: conclusions reached in the simpler context, where the unessential is forgotten, should be applicable to the original, more complicated, context. Controlled forgetting, such as we have in abstraction, is certainly a major characteristic of mathematical rationality, and an embodiment of it is found in the concept of adjunction”

“The symbolic [13] and distributional [36] theories of meaning are somewhat orthogonal with competing pros and cons: the former is compositional but only qualitative, the latter is non-compositional but quantitative.”

recall the “arbitrary substitution of expression” approach to logicity. this is captured by the lambda calculus of course

can I RECOVER a lambda calculus as the limiting behaviour of the nonmonotonic space?

“. You can define a notion of “Hopf object” in arbitrary symmetric monoidal categories, where you also need to specify the existence of a co-product map. It’s a matter of taste, but I think this general definition should actually be called “group object”, so that Hopf algebras would be group objects in the category of vector spaces. The basic observation is that in a cartesian category, every object have a unique coalgebra structure given by the “diagonal” map so this part of the structure is forced in that case, so that those definitions are compatible.”

Relevance can be seen as non-monotonicity of the inference connector of the system. Linear logic is relevant, in that the provability of  $\vdash A \multimap B$  does not imply the provability of  $\vdash X \otimes A \multimap B$ . Relevance is a sort of inner non-monotonicity of the logic.

On the other side, what people call non-monotonic logics are systems where the provability itself of the system is not monotone: adding a new element to the set of formulas changes the set of provable formulas. It is a form of meta non-monotonicity, because it concerns provability and not the connector of inference. Linear logic is monotone: you can add whatever you want to the set of formulas, and any new axiom or inference rule to the system, but if you had a proof of the sequent  $\Gamma \vdash M : A$  before, you will still have it now, for you have not changed the other inference rules of the sequent calculus.

As far as I know, (real) non-monotonic logics are hard to put down in a sequent calculus form enjoying cut-elimination, or any other type of proof system with an equivalent notion of terminating proof-reduction. This is why the tradition categorical semantic approaches hardly would work for them.

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, A \vdash \Delta} \quad (\text{Weakening L})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, A} \quad (\text{Weakening R})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, A \quad A, \Gamma' \vdash \Delta'}{\Gamma, \Gamma' \vdash \Delta, \Delta'} \quad (\text{Cut})$$

“This way, the forgetting of the forgetful functor is controlled. Some conclusions we may reach by reasoning in B can be transferred back to A.”