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COLLEGE OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Super Clumsy Title

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1 Introduction

Anecdotes like this one illustrate how states are born in the world of nation-states as we know it since the Westphalian peace of 1648.

1.1 The Puzzle

But although this episode in American history nears its 250th anniversary, the behavior of actors aspiring to become states has not much changed since then.

1.1.1 Research Question

Purely → rationalist and structuralist explanations are still prevalent, but conflict scholars now increasingly argue that there is a link between compliance with international norms of statehood and the behavior of certain non-state actors: Just like Franklin on behalf of the Second Continental Congress, rebel groups that wish to secede from an existing nation-state to determine their own destiny mimic states' behavior in the international system and towards the domestic population in order to garner recognition and material support.

Overview Moreover, the study of rebel behavior has become more relevant since the end of the cold war, replacing great power competition as one of the main fields of research in security and conflict studies.

Small Overview This development has also been furthered by more precise data to study civil wars at both the dyadic and individual level.

Moreover, the study of rebel behavior has become more relevant since the end of the cold war, replacing great power competition as one of the main fields of research in security and conflict studies.

In this article, I thus pose the question of whether the behavioral phenomenon of secessionism in civil war can be extended to rebels' treatment of civilians in civil war.

Specifically, I argue that secessionist rebels are responsible for fewer civilian deaths than nonsecessionist rebels in civil war.

Furthermore, I hypothesize that this effect remains stable or increases when these groups control territory.

To test these hypotheses, I use data from Stewart and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).

The statistical results support my first hypothesis: Secessionist rebels are responsible for significantly fewer civilian fatalities than nonsecessionist rebels.

However, I could not find statistically significant support for my second hypothesis.

The variable CIVILIAN DEATHS is taken from the UCDP and has a negative binominal distribution.


- Moreover, the study of rebel behavior has become more relevant since the end of the cold war, replacing great power competition as one of the main fields of research in security and conflict studies
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Nevertheless, the results highlight the power of strategic choices and influence the international community can have on local actors, see equation (1).

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 \tag{1}$$

The literature on civil war has witnessed a steady growth throughout the last decades, as & - # shows.

Figure 1: Boxplots of the main variables



This section gives an overview of the state of research on rebel organizations' behavior in civil war, these groups' relationship with states, and finally a relatively recent finding in the field: the distinct behavior of secessionist rebels in Figure 1.

Table 1: Regression Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	womleg_2015
libpct_m	1.146*** (0.215)
Constant	1.524 (4.329)
Observations	50
R ²	0.371
Adjusted R ²	0.358
Residual Std. Error	5.616 (df = 48)
F Statistic	28.280*** (df = 1; 48)
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

While this can be attributed to the pivot in security studies from great power competition to intrastate conflict, it has also been furthered by the accumulation of more precise data and refinement of methods, see Table.

Purely rationalist and structuralist explanations Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) are still prevalent like Berman and Laitin (2008) argue, but conflict scholars now increasingly argue that there is a link between compliance with international norms of statehood and the behavior of certain non-state actors (Stewart 2018; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Fazal and Poast 2019): Just like Franklin on behalf of the Second Continental Congress (Coggins 2011, 433–435), rebel groups that wish to secede from an existing nation-state to determine their own destiny mimic states' behavior in the international system and towards the domestic population in order to garner recognition and material support.

2 References

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