
# Macroeconomics, PhD core Lecture #6-7

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
### Lecture Road Map

- Heterogeneity and consumption distribution.
- ► Gorman aggregation.
- Variance of consumption.

### Facts:



### Facts:



- ▶ Is the one sector growth model consistent with some degree of heterogeneity across households?
- Under some conditions, one can show that heterogeneity in initial wealth, effective labor (i.e. human capital) and (limited) differences in utility do not affect equilibrium.
- ▶ Why? because "averages" of the economy with heterogeneity are identical to those of the representative agent economy.
- ► The basic ideas go back to the work of Gorman on aggregation.

#### Household

- Individual utility:  $u_i(c) = \frac{(c+\theta_i)^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta}$ ,  $\eta > 0$  and  $\theta_i$  can be either positive or negative.
- N households, each characterized by a vector  $(\theta_i, a_i, e_i)$  where  $a_i$  are assets and  $e_i$  endowment of labor.
- Household Problem

$$\max_{\{c_{ti},a_{it+1}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} u_i(c_{it})$$

subject to

$$c_{it} + a_{it+1} \le w_t e_i + R_t a_{it}$$
  $t=0,1,...$ 

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \beta^T u_i'(c_{iT}) a_{iT+1} = 0$$

Present Value Budget constraint

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}q_tc_{it}\leq\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}q_tw_te_i+q_0a_{i0}$$
 where  $q_t\equiv\Pi_{j=0}^tR_j^{-1}$ 

► The representative firm solves,

$$\max_{c_t, x_t} c_t + p_{kt} x_t - w_t e_t - r_t k_t$$

subject to

$$c_t + x_t = F(k_t, e_t)$$

Aggregate law of motion for capital

$$k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) k_t + x_t$$

#### Notation

- Let N the number of households in the economy
- ► For any variable  $z_{it}$ , let  $z_t = N^{-1} \sum z_{it}$ ; i.e. the population average.
- Population moments: for any variables  $z_{it}$  and  $b_{it}$  let

$$var(z_t) \equiv \sigma(z_t) \equiv N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (z_{it} - z_t)^2$$

$$cov(z_t, b_t) \equiv \sigma(z_t, b_t) \equiv N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (z_{it} - z_t) (b_{it} - b_t)$$

Also

$$\theta \equiv N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \theta_i$$

and

$$a_t \equiv N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^N a_{it}$$
  $e \equiv N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^N e_i$ 

### **Definition**

A competitive equilibrium is a collection of price sequences

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 \begin{bmatrix} \{q_t, w_t, r_t, R_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \}, \text{ an allocation} \\ [\{x_t, k_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}, \{c_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}, i=1,...,N] \text{ and a sequence of asset holdings} \\ \{a_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}, i=1,...,N \text{ such that,}
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- a) Given the equilibrium prices, the allocation and the sequence of asset maximizes utility
- b) Given the equilibrium prices, the allocation maximizes profits
- c) The allocation is feasible: market clearing + aggregate law of motion for capital
- d)  $a_0 = k_0 > 0$  is given

**Claim** average quantities corresponding to a competitive equilibrium also solve the following planner's problem

$$\max_{\{c_{t}, x_{t}, k_{t+1}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \frac{(c_{t} + \theta)^{1-\eta}}{1 - \eta}$$

subject to

$$c_t + x_t \le F(k_t, e_t)$$
$$k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) k_t + x_t$$

**Averages** 

### Proof.

Assume an interior solution (not necessary). The first order condition for the planner's problem is just

$$(c_t + \theta)^{-\eta} = \beta (c_{t+1} + \theta)^{-\eta} [1 - \delta + F_k(k_{t+1}, e_{t+1})]$$

Euler Equation for family i

$$(c_{it} + \theta_i)^{-\eta} = \beta (c_{it+1} + \theta_i)^{-\eta} R_{t+1}$$

But  $R_{t+1} = [1 - \delta + F_k(k_{t+1}, e_{t+1})]$  which implies

$$(c_{it} + \theta_i) = \beta^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} (c_{it+1} + \theta_i) [1 - \delta + F_k(k_{t+1}, e_{t+1})]^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}$$

. . .

### Proof.

Averaging

$$N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (c_{it} + \theta_i) = N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (c_{it+1} + \theta_i) \beta^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \left[ 1 - \delta + F_k(k_{t+1}, e_{t+1}) \right]^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}$$

$$(c_t + \theta) = \beta^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} (c_{t+1} + \theta) [1 - \delta + F_k(k_{t+1}, e_{t+1})]^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}$$

- ► Thus, all economies that share the same aggregate  $\theta$ ,  $k_0$ , e will display the same aggregate behavior, independently of the distribution a, e,  $\theta$ .
- Cross sectional pattern of consumption and wealth is quite different across economies, but aggregate behavior is the same.

#### Consumption Distribution

- Implications for "consumption mobility" and cross sectional dispersion of consumption?
- ► FOC of the household (PV version of the budget constraint)

$$(c_{it} + \theta_i)^{-\eta} = \lambda_i \frac{q_t}{\beta^t}$$

or

$$c_{it} + \theta_i = \left(\lambda_i \frac{q_t}{\beta^t}\right)^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} \tag{1}$$

lacktriangle Use this expression in the budget constraint to solve for  $\lambda_i$ 

$$\lambda_i^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t \left(\frac{q_t}{\beta^t}\right)^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} = e_i \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t w_t + \theta_i \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t + q_0 a_{i0}$$

For any sequence  $\mathbf{z} \equiv \{z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , let  $v(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{q}) \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t z_t$  be the value of the sequence  $\mathbf{z}$  at prices  $\mathbf{q}$ .

#### Consumption Distribution

ightharpoonup Solve for  $\lambda_i$ 

$$\lambda_i^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} v(\left(\frac{\mathbf{q}}{\beta}\right)^{\frac{-1}{\eta}}, \mathbf{q}) = e_i v(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{q}) + \theta_i v(\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{q}) + q_0 a_{i0}$$

Let  $\phi_t \equiv \frac{q_t}{\beta^t}$ , and  $\phi_0 \equiv 1$  (i.e. without loss of generality we assume  $q_0=1$ ). It follows,

$$\lambda_i^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} = \frac{e_i v(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{q}) + \theta_i v(\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{q}) + a_{i0}}{v(\phi^{\frac{-1}{\eta}}, \mathbf{q})}$$

Use this multiplier in the FOC of the household (??)

$$c_{it} = \frac{e_i v(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{q}) + \theta_i v(\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{q}) + a_{i0}}{v(\phi^{\frac{-1}{\eta}}, \mathbf{q})} \phi^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta_i$$

Note that consumption for each household is a **linear** function of  $e_i$ ,  $\theta_i$ ,  $a_{i0}$ 



▶ Let M<sub>i</sub>

$$M_i \equiv m_e e_i + m_\theta \theta_i + m_a a_{i0}$$

where

$$m_{\mathsf{e}} = rac{v(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{q})}{v(\phi^{rac{-1}{\eta}}, \mathbf{q})}, \quad m_{\theta} = rac{v(\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{q})}{v(\phi^{rac{-1}{\eta}}, \mathbf{q})}, \quad m_{\mathsf{a}} = rac{1}{v(\phi^{rac{-1}{\eta}}, \mathbf{q})}$$

► Also, let *M* 

$$M \equiv m_e e + m_\theta \theta + m_a a_0$$

[M is  $M_i$  evaluated at the average vector  $(e, \theta, a_0)$ ]

▶ M is the economy wide population average of  $M_i$  too (why? linearity!)

#### Consumption Distribution

 $\triangleright$  Write the optimal consumption schedule in terms of  $M_i$ .

$$c_{it} = M_i \phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta_i$$

while the aggregate per capita consumption is

$$c_t = M\phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta$$

- Key features:
  - All individuals face the same prices
  - Aggregate demand functions are independent of the distribution of  $(e_i, \theta_i, a_{i0})$
  - A sufficient (and it turns out necessary condition as well) is that the Engel curves be affine.

(If this is still not clear to you I would recommend you check out Gorman and Engel curves in Mas-Collel Winston and Greene)



► Household's *i* relative consumption

$$c_{it}^R = \frac{c_{it}}{c_t}$$

- ▶ Claim: The long run distribution of consumption is non-degenerate. [It's not true that as  $t \to \infty$ ,  $c_{it}^R = 1$ ]
- ▶ What do we know?
  - From the analysis of the growth model, we know that c<sub>t</sub> converges monotonically to c\*
  - ▶ If  $k_0 < k^*$ , the sequence  $c_t$  is monotonically increasing.
  - $\blacktriangleright \left(\frac{q_t}{\beta^t}\right)^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} = \phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} \to \phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} > 0 \text{ as } t \to \infty, \text{ for some } \phi^*$
  - $c_i^{R*} = rac{M_i \phi^* rac{-1}{\eta} heta_i}{M \phi^* rac{-1}{\eta} heta}$  which is in general different from 1.

▶ When do we observe  $c_i^{R*} < 1$ 

$$c_{i}^{R*} < 1 \leftrightarrow M_{i} \phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta_{i} < M \phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta \leftrightarrow \phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} [m_{e}(e_{i} - e) + m_{a}(a_{i0} - a_{0})] < (\theta_{i} - \theta) \left(1 - \phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} m_{e}(e_{i} - e) + m_{a}(a_{i0} - a_{0})\right)$$

- Comparative Statics
  - Impact of initial wealth: (assume  $\theta_i = \theta$ ) higher  $e_i$  or  $a_{i0}$  higher  $c_i^{R*}$
  - Impact of minimum consumption (assume  $e_i = e$  and  $a_{i0} = a_0$ ): since  $1 \phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} m_{\theta} < 0$  the household with lower minimum consumption: lower  $\theta_i$  (since  $c_{it} = M_i \phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} \theta_i$ ) has higher  $c_i^{R*}$ .

Second moments (painful algebra)

- Notice that  $\sigma^2(c_i^*) = \sigma^2(c_i^{R*}) \left[ M \phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} \theta \right]^2$
- Note that even if we have two economies A and B such that  $\sigma_A^2(e) = \sigma_B^2(e)$  and  $\sigma_A^2(a_0) = \sigma_B^2(a_0)$ ; differences in covariances matter for variance in consumption.
- A positive covariance between any two of the elements that determine household's type  $(e_i, \theta_i, a_{i0})$  increases long run variance in consumption.
- ➤ What do you think about the statement: "controlling for initial wealth inequality, all countries display the same amount of consumption inequality"?

▶ One can rewrite consumption as

$$c_{it} = \frac{M_i}{M}c_t + \frac{M_i}{M}\theta - \theta_i$$

Special case in which  $e_i = e$  and  $a_{i0} = a_0$ . Individual consumption is

$$c_{it} = \widetilde{m}\phi_t^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} + \left(m_{\theta}\phi_t^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} - 1\right)\theta_i$$

where  $\widetilde{m} \equiv m_e e + m_a a_0$ .

- Suppose that at  $t = \hat{t} c_{it} = c_t$  for all i.
- Since

$$c_{it}-c_{t}=\left(m_{ heta}\phi_{t}^{-rac{1}{\eta}}-1
ight)\left( heta_{i}- heta
ight)$$

and  $\phi_0^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}=1$  and  $m_{ heta}-1>0$ . It follows that if  $heta_i< heta$ 

$$c_{it} \gtrsim c_t \Leftrightarrow t \lessapprox \widehat{t}$$

► Go back to the expression for the variance of consumption

$$\sigma^{2}(c_{i}^{R*}) = \frac{1}{\left[M\phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta\right]^{2}} \left\{\phi^{*\frac{-2}{\eta}} \left[m_{e}^{2}\sigma^{2}(e) + m_{a}^{2}\sigma^{2}(a_{0})\right] + \left(\phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}}m_{\theta} - 1\right)^{2}\sigma^{2}(\theta) + \right.$$

$$\left. + 2\phi^{*\frac{-1}{\eta}} \left[m_{e}m_{a}\sigma(e, a_{0}) + \right.$$

$$\left. + \left(m_{\theta} - 1\right) \left(m_{e}\sigma(e, \theta) + m_{a}\sigma(\theta, a)\right)\right]\right\}$$

In the previous case we assumed,  $\sigma^2(e) = \sigma^2(a_0) = \sigma(e,a_0) = \sigma(e,\theta) = \sigma(\theta,a_0) \rightarrow \\ \sigma^2(c_i^{R*}) = 0 \Leftrightarrow m_\theta \phi_t^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} - 1 = 0$ 

Suppose there is only initial wealth inequality, i.e.  $e_i = e$  and  $\theta_i = \theta$ .

$$\sigma^2(c_{it}^R) = \frac{\phi_t^{\frac{-2}{\eta}} m_a^2 \sigma^2(a_0)}{\left[M\phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta\right]^2}$$

Thus

$$\frac{\partial \sigma(c_{it}^R)}{\partial t} = -\theta \frac{m_a \sigma(a_0)}{\left[M\phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}} - \theta\right]^2} \frac{\partial \phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}}}{\partial t} > 0$$

where 
$$\frac{\partial \phi_t^{\frac{-1}{\eta}}}{\partial t} < 0$$