

Gretchen Sileo

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Temple University	Philadelphia, PA
<i>Assistant Professor of Economics</i>	2023–Present

EDUCATION

Georgetown University	Washington, DC
<i>Ph.D. Economics</i>	2017–2023
<i>M.A. Economics</i>	
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute	Troy, NY
<i>M.S. Applied Mathematics</i>	2010–2014
<i>B.S. Mathematics and Psychology, Minor in Economics</i>	

WORKS IN PROGRESS

Proactive and Reactive Infrastructure Investment

Maintaining infrastructure requires investment. Faced with uncertain quality degradation, managers choose to invest proactively to prevent failure or reactively to address problems. Using a new dataset on drinking water systems, I estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of infrastructure investment. Simulations indicate that tightening regulations without financial support increases failures and raises costs. Reactive projects enable timely intervention as systems approach noncompliance, reducing disparities stemming from income and size. Efficiently restoring compliance for all systems requires expanded proactive investment to maintain quality and an even greater increase in reactive funds to address unexpected failures.

Phoning Home: The Procurement of Telecommunications for Incarcerated Individuals in the United States

with Marleen Mara and Nathan Miller

Incarcerated individuals in the U.S. purchase goods and services from monopoly vendors selected by their correctional authority. We study telecommunications services, which have come under bipartisan scrutiny due to the high prices inmates pay for phone calls. Prospective providers are evaluated on their technical capabilities, the prices they would charge, and the “commission” they would pay the correctional authority. Using data from public records requests, we estimate a first-score auction model with evaluation uncertainty and multi-dimensional bidder heterogeneity. Our results indicate that reducing the role of commissions in procurement lowers prices, whereas increasing competition among providers mainly raises commission payments. Moreover, recently promulgated federal regulation that bans commissions and caps prices likely preserves providers’ profitability.

Technology and Market Power: The United States Cement Industry, 1974–2019

with Nathan Miller, Matthew Osborne, and Gloria Sheu
(Reject and Resubmit at *American Economic Review*)

We examine the evolution of market power in the cement industry over more than four decades using a structural model of procurement. The model matches aggregated outcomes in the data, and implies transportation costs, shipping distances, and demand elasticities that are consistent with external sources. Evaluating county-level outcomes throughout the contiguous United States, we find that market concentration and markups increase but that prices do not rise. We attribute these patterns to a technological innovation—the precalciner kiln—that lowered variable costs, increased plant-level capacities and economies of scale, and contributed to an industry shakeout in which many plants closed.

Entry and Competition in the U.S. Paid Plasma Industry

with Peter Jaworski and Kaitlyn Wilson

The Dynamics of Emissions Pricing and Technology Adoption

with Sarah Armitage, Nathan Miller, and Matthew Osborne

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Temple University <i>Instructor</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• ECON-3536 – Economics of American Industry• ECON-3503 – Introduction to Econometrics	Philadelphia, PA 2023-Present
Georgetown University <i>Teaching Assistant</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• ECON-433 – Public Sector Economics• PEKO-201 – Analytical Tools for Political Economics	Washington, DC 2018–2023

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Georgetown University <i>Research Assistant to Professor Nathan Miller</i> <i>Research Assistant to Professor Dan Cao</i>	Washington, DC 2019–2021 2018
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division <i>Graduate Economics Intern</i>	Washington, DC 2019
Deloitte & Touche LLP <i>Senior Consultant, Business Risk</i> <i>Consultant, Business Risk</i>	Boston, MA 2016 2014–2016

HONORS AND AWARDS

Georgetown University 26th Razin Prize, Best Graduate Student Paper	2023
Georgetown University Summer Dissertation Fellowship	2020
Georgetown University Graduate School Fellowship	2017–2018
Deloitte Outstanding Performance Award	2015
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Summa Cum Laude	2014
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Founders Award for Excellence	2013

SEMINARS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

2025	<i>NYU - Stern; International Industrial Organization Conference; University of Florida</i>
2023	<i>Southern Economic Association; Women in Empirical Microeconomics Conference; Seminar in Water Economics onLLine; International Industrial Organization Conference; The Ohio State University; Temple University; University of Wisconsin-Madison; Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Arizona State University; U.S. Department of Justice; U.S. Department of Transportation — Office of the Inspector General; Federal Trade Commission; Center for Naval Analyses; Charles River Associates</i>
2022	<i>Southern Economic Association</i>

ADVISING AND DISSERTATION COMMITTEES

Temple University <i>Luke Mafrika (PhD committee), Penn State Abington</i>	2023
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Temple University <i>Economics Seminar Committee</i> <i>Search Committee</i>	2023-Present 2024-2025
Referee <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Water Resources and Economics</i>	