Disarming the Threat to Feminist Identification: An Application of Personal Construct Theory to Measurement and Intervention

Bonnie Moradi[1], Annelise Martin[1,2], and Melanie E. Brewster[1,3]

Abstract

Many individuals endorse feminist values but do not identify as feminist. The present set of studies tests the concept of threat, grounded in G. A. Kelly's personal construct theory of personality, as a potential factor in feminist nonidentification. Study 1 introduces the theoretically grounded *Feminist Threat Index* and evaluates its psychometric properties with data from 91 undergraduate students. In this study, feminist threat scores yielded acceptable evidence of convergent and discriminant validity and of test–retest reliability. Study 2 evaluates a theoretically grounded intervention designed to reduce level of feminist threat and increase degree of feminist identification by enabling students to interact with a diverse panel of feminists. In this study, a mixed between–within subjects design was employed to compare pre- and postintervention change in continuous threat and feminist identification scores across intervention ($n = 52$) and comparison ($n = 63$) groups. As expected, the intervention reduced level of threat and increased degree of feminist identification significantly in the intervention group, whereas these scores remained unchanged in the comparison group. These studies offer researchers, educators, and activists a promising approach for assessing and reducing the threat to feminist identification.

Keywords

feminism, self-concept, identity formation, gender identity, threat, measurement, intervention, stereotypes

A paradox facing feminist scholars and activists is that many people agree with feminist values and goals but do not identify as feminist (e.g., Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004). Much of the research aiming to understand this paradox has focused on factors such as level of feminist consciousness and views of feminists and the feminist movement as contributors to feminist identification and nonidentification (e.g., Liss, Hoffner, & Crawford, 2000; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004). But, findings from a few studies point to self-concept dissonance as an important but largely underexamined factor in the paradox of feminist nonidentification. More specifically, despite neutral to positive views of feminist values and of feminists on average, respondents tend to view the identity of "feminist" to be dissonant from their own self-concept (e.g., Liss et al., 2000; Suter & Toller, 2006; Twenge & Zucker, 1999).

The present set of two studies builds on these findings regarding self and feminist dissonance using Kelly's (1955/1991a, 1955/1991b) personal construct theory to (a) offer a theoretically grounded framework and operationalization of the dissonance between self and feminist identity and (b) to test a theoretically grounded intervention for reducing such dissonance, and thereby increasing degree of feminist identification. Given that feminist identification is a key correlate of feminist collective action (e.g., Yoder, Tobias, & Snell, 2011; Zucker, 2004) and is also associated with some psychosocial benefits at the individual level (e.g., Eisele & Stake, 2008; Hurt et al., 2007), a better understanding of feminist identification and the development of strategies to promote such identification can have both collective and individual benefits that are important to feminist social action and to a feminist psychology of women.

Feminist Identification Matters

The issue of feminist identification is not trivial. From a social movement perspective, public identification as feminist serves to demonstrate popular support for the movement.

[1] Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
[2] College of Social Work, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
[3] Department of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:
Bonnie Moradi, Department of Psychology, University of Florida, P.O. Box 112250, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA
Email: moradib@ufl.edu

Also, beyond the endorsement of feminist values, feminist identification may be an important marker of commitment to social change. For example, those who avoid the feminist label, even if they endorse some feminist values, are found to be more similar to nonfeminists than to feminist self-labelers in holding status quo maintaining ideologies such as social dominance orientation, meritocracy beliefs, and hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Such status quo maintaining ideologies may impede nonlabelers' support of feminist social change efforts. In fact, feminist identification is associated uniquely with past or intended feminist collective action after controlling for feminist attitudes (e.g., Eisele & Stake, 2008; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004). Feminist identification is also associated with some psychosocial benefits at the individual level, including college women's and men's greater self-efficacy and with women's coping with sexism and rejection of body objectifying attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Eisele & Stake, 2008; Hurt et al., 2007; Klonis, Endo, Crosby, & Worell, 1997; Leaper & Arias, 2011). Thus, understanding feminist identification and nonidentification is relevant to a feminist psychology of women in terms of the field's feminist social action aims and its commitments to women's individual health and well-being.

I'm Not a Feminist, but. . . .

Despite the potential importance of feminist identification, there is a paradox that many individuals espouse feminist values but deny feminist identification, as typified in the statement ''I'm not a feminist, but . . .'' followed by agreement with specific feminist values (e.g., Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004). A frequently posited explanation for this paradox is that stereotypes about feminists impede feminist identification (e.g., Leaper & Arias, 2011; Roy, Weibust, & Miller, 2007; Williams & Wittig, 1997). Indeed, feminist identification—measured dichotomously, on a single low to high continuum, or with multi-item continuous measures—has been shown to be associated with more positive evaluations of feminists (e.g., Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Duncan, 2010; Henderson-King & Stewart, 1994; Liss, O'Connor, Morosky, & Crawford, 2001; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Williams & Wittig, 1997). Furthermore, evaluations of feminists were found to mediate the association between exposure to feminist ideology (e.g., through readings, courses, relationships) and degree of feminist identification (Reid & Purcell, 2004).

It is noteworthy, however, that data regarding the qualitative content and magnitude of respondents' views of feminists reflect, on average, neutral to positive views. For example, when asked to describe feminists, respondents provide many positive characteristics including independent, logical, knowledgeable, responsible, beautiful, intelligent, and good (e.g., Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Suter & Toller, 2006). Similarly, average scores for women's and

men's evaluations of feminists on a host of attributes hover in the neutral to positive range (e.g., Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). In one experimental study, exposure to positive stereotypes about feminists promoted feminist identification, whereas exposure to negative stereotypes did not reduce feminist identification relative to that in a control group (Roy et al., 2007). This is not to say that negative views of feminists do not exist; in fact, negative views have emerged in more subtle measures of implicit attitudes (e.g., Goldberg, Gottesdiener, & Abramson, 1975; Jenen, Winquist, Arkkelin, & Schuster, 2009) and in respondents' beliefs about how *others* view feminists (Ramsey et al., 2007; Suter & Toller, 2006). But, these studies did not examine links of implicit attitudes with feminist identification directly or found no difference between feminist identifiers and nonidentifiers' beliefs about how others view feminists (Ramsey et al., 2007). Importantly, the preponderance of studies suggests that although feminist identifiers tend to express more affirmative views about feminists than do nonfeminists, neither group, on average, expresses particularly negative views of feminists (e.g., Liss et al., 2000; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004).

Thus, a vexing question remains: Why do people deny feminist identification when they espouse feminist values and do not express negative views of feminists? Early speculation by Williams and Wittig (1997) points to an underexamined possibility: feminist nonidentification serves to protect individuals from a felt dissonance between how they see themselves and how they see a feminist. Indeed, digging a bit deeper into available studies suggests that participants tend to view feminists as different from themselves (even if how they see a feminist is not particularly negative or value discordant). For example, Berryman-Fink and Verderber's (1985) early study of evaluations of feminists and Twenge and Zucker's (1999) follow-up to that study both included two semantic differential items that distill the overall evaluation of feminists: ''good–bad'' and ''negative–positive.'' On both of these items, and in both samples, the average rating for ''feminist'' was slightly more positive than the neutral point of the continuum. However, Twenge and Zucker (1999) also included the item ''like me–not like me'' and found that, despite the slightly positive average rating of feminists on the two aforementioned items, the sample average on this item slightly favored the ''not like me'' end of the continuum. Thus, the sample averages indicated a view of feminists that was slightly positive in valence and also slightly dissonant from the self.

In a more recent study, Liss et al. (2000) asked college women to rate their own espousal of various feminist philosophies (e.g., liberal, radical, socialist feminism) as well as their view of where a typical feminist would fall on these philosophies. As expected, participants who considered themselves to be feminists expressed stronger feminist views than those who did not consider themselves to be feminists. Importantly, however, relative to feminist identifiers,

nonfeminists rated the views of a typical feminist as more dissimilar from their own; thus, there was greater dissonance for nonfeminists than for feminist identifiers. Finally, qualitative studies such as Suter and Toller's (2006) research with college women and men suggest that participants who did not identify as feminist did not do so in part because they felt that the label feminist was discordant from aspects of their self-concept. In Suter and Toller's (2006) study, sources of discordance included participants' religious identity and their planned identities involving marriage, motherhood, and nonemployment. Taken together, findings of these studies suggest that Williams and Wittig's (1997) self-concept dissonance hypothesis warrants further attention in understanding feminist nonidentification. Kelly's (1955/1991a, 1955/1991b) personal construct theory, and the concept of threat within this theory, provides a framework for understanding and reducing such dissonance and consequently promoting feminist identification.

Personal Construct Theory and the Concept of Threat

Personal construct theory is a theory of personality and human behavior grounded in the idea that individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are a result of how they construe experiences. Kelly labeled these experiences *constructs*, and constructs can apply to other people, objects, events, and the self. Constructs that are especially important are considered core constructs, and the self is considered a core construct. Constructs are formed by contrasting elements along opposite poles such that at least two elements are similar to one another and different from a third element. For example, apple and orange would be perceived as like each other and different from pencil along the constructs of edible or fruit. New experiences are integrated into existing constructs or result in the revision of those constructs. However, "threat" occurs when a new construct or experience is perceived to result in imminent intolerable change to existing core constructs, such as the self (Kelly, 1955/1991a, 1955/1991b). As such, individuals may distance themselves from and reject threatening constructs.

Applied to understanding feminist nonidentification, threat would be experienced when feminist identity is perceived to contrast from self-construal in unwanted and intolerable ways, akin to the dissonance that Williams and Wittig (1997) described. For example, if a person considers being assertive as a desirable characteristic, views herself or himself as assertive and construes feminists as assertive, then integrating feminist identity into the self-concept would not induce threat on this dimension. On the other hand, if the individual considers being assertive as undesirable and incongruent with her or his good self and construes feminists as assertive, then integrating feminist identity into the self-concept would be threatening because it would change the self in an intolerable way. Thus, personal construct theory's concept of threat takes into account individual differences

in construal of self and feminist identity, as well as the valence and discrepancy of these constructs.

Previous applications of the concept of threat to understanding social identities have focused on lesbian or gay identity. Specifically, studies focusing on the level of threat induced by lesbian or gay identity linked such threat with disidentification manifested as expression of antilesbian or gay attitudes among heterosexual individuals (Moradi, van den Berg, & Epting, 2006) and as expression of internalized homophobia and lower preference for same-sex sexual orientation among lesbian and gay individuals (Moradi, van den Berg, & Epting, 2009). Similarly, on the basis of the propositions of personal construct theory, the level of threat induced by feminist identity, or feminist threat for short, would be expected to be associated with lower degree of feminist identification. Furthermore, interventions that reduce level of feminist threat would be expected to also promote degree of feminist identification. We designed two studies to test these propositions. In Study 1, we operationalized feminist threat and tested its association with degree of feminist identification. In Study 2, we designed and evaluated an intervention, grounded in personal construct theory, to reduce feminist threat and also tested whether such a reduction would be associated with an increase in degree of feminist identification.

Study 1

The purposes of Study 1 were to introduce the Feminist Threat Index (FTI) as a measure of feminist threat grounded in personal construct theory and to offer psychometric data regarding the use of this measure. The FTI parallels prior operationalizations of the concept of threat as applied to attitudes toward lesbian and gay individuals, toward identifying as lesbian or gay, and toward the experience of death (Burke, 1997; Krieger, Epting, & Leitner, 1974; Leitner & Cado, 1982; Moradi et al., 2006, 2009). As support for convergent validity, we expected FTI scores to correlate negatively with affirmative evaluations of feminists, affirmative attitudes toward feminism, affirmative exposure to feminists, and feminist self-identification. As support for discriminant validity, we expected FTI scores to correlate negligibly with social desirability. As support for reliability, we expected FTI scores to yield a 2-week test–retest reliability coefficient greater than .70.

Method

Participants

Data from 91 undergraduate students from a large U.S. Southeastern university were analyzed in our study. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 34 ($M = 21.87$, $SD = 2.87$, $Mdn = 21.00$). Most participants identified as women (71; 78%), and smaller proportions identified as men (17; 19%) or transgender (1; 1%). Roughly, half the participants

identified as White/Caucasian (48; 53%) and the remaining half identified as African American (18; 20%), Hispanic/Latina/o (16; 18%), Asian American/Pacific Islander (4; 4%), multiracial (2; 2%), or other race/ethnicities (1; 1%). In terms of sexual orientation, most participants identified as exclusively heterosexual (71; 78%), and smaller proportions identified as mostly heterosexual (10; 11%), bisexual (3; 3%), exclusively homosexual (3; 3%), or mostly homosexual (1; 1%). Nearly, half the sample identified as middle class (44; 48%), whereas the remaining half identified as upper middle class (24; 26%), working class (15; 17%), upper class (3; 3%), and lower class (3; 3%).

Procedure and Materials

Participants were recruited from two undergraduate courses, Sociology of Gender ($n = 55$), an upper-level sociology course, and Personal Growth ($n = 36$) a 200-level psychology course. Although the courses differed in level, neither had prerequisites and therefore both were open to students at all levels. Written informed consent notified participants of institutional review board (IRB) approval for the study and indicated that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw their consent at any time. Signed informed consent forms were kept separate from completed surveys to retain anonymity of responses. After giving their informed consent, participants completed a survey packet during class (instruments in the order presented below) and received extra course credit for their participation. To gather test–retest data, the classes were visited approximately 2 weeks after the initial data collection, and 54 of the original participants participated in this readministration of the survey. Surveys were matched by a private code selected by each participant and recorded on their surveys. Thus, the sample size for convergent and discriminant validity analyses was 91; for test–retest analyses, 54.

FTI. The FTI mirrored prior studies' assessments of the concept of threat as applied to attitudes toward lesbian and gay individuals, identifying as lesbian or gay, and the experience of death (Burke, 1997; Krieger et al., 1974; Leitner & Cado, 1982; Moradi et al., 2006, 2009). Following this prior research, the FTI consists of 30 bipolar constructs or personal characteristics found by Burke (1995) to be the most common personal constructs elicited from 160 participants using the Role Construct Repertory Test (Landfield, 1971). Participants respond to the set of 30 bipolar constructs (see Table 1) on three consecutive pages. On the first page, we provided the following instructions: "Below is a list of bipolar dimensions. For each dimension please circle the side with which you see yourself more closely associated. For example, do you associate yourself more with the term 'successful' or

Table 1. Feminist Threat Index Items and Item-level Threat Frequencies for Sample 1

	Threat frequency	
Construct pair	*n*	%
successful .... unsuccessful	5	5.5
selfish .... unselfish	22	24.2
hard-working .... lazy	2	2.2
positive .... negative	17	18.7
unfriendly .... friendly	15	16.5
beautiful .... ugly	12	13.2
open-minded .... close-minded	20	22.0
quiet .... talkative	16	17.6
fun .... boring	8	8.8
shy .... outgoing	4	4.4
aggressive .... calm	41	45.1
happy .... unhappy	19	20.9
uncaring .... caring	4	4.4
serious .... care-free	23	25.3
not understanding .... understanding	12	13.2
pleasant .... uptight	34	37.4
intelligent .... unintelligent	1	1.1
mean .... nice	19	20.9
helpful .... unhelpful	6	6.6
conservative .... liberal	23	25.3
religious .... nonreligious	22	24.2
untrustworthy .... trustworthy	4	4.4
stubborn .... submissive	14	15.4
motivated .... unmotivated	1	1.1
lazy .... energetic	3	3.3
generous .... not generous	8	8.8
warm .... cold	23	25.3
tense .... calm	26	28.6
educated .... uneducated	0	100.0
not confident .... confident	3	3.3

'unsuccessful'?" Responses to this first page establish participants' construal of the actual self. On the second page, the instructions were modified to "For each dimension below please circle the side with which you would prefer to see yourself more closely associated. For example, would you prefer to see yourself associated with the term 'successful' or 'unsuccessful'?" Responses to this page reflect participants' construal of the ideal self which established a valence for each construct for each individual. On the third page, the instructions were modified to "For each dimension below please circle the side which most closely describes you if you were a feminist. For example, if you were a feminist, would you associate yourself more with the term 'successful' or 'unsuccessful'?" Responses to this page establish participants' construal of the self as feminist. A threat score was calculated by counting the number of times a person's actual self-matched their ideal self but differed from their feminist self. For example, if a participant circled successful for her or his current self and ideal self, but circled unsuccessful for her or his feminist self, one point would be added to her or his threat score.

This process was repeated for each of the 30 constructs, resulting in FTI scores that can range from 0 to 30, with higher scores indicating greater levels of feminist threat. (This scoring can be achieved via recode and compute syntax in SPSS [Statistical Package for Social Sciences], and example syntax is available from the first author upon request.)

Evaluation of feminists. We used the General Evaluation subscale of the Evaluations and Stereotypes of Feminists scale (Twenge & Zucker, 1999) to measure individuals' judgments about feminists. Participants respond to the question "What is a feminist?" by rating 43 semantic-differential items on a 7-point scale, with low ratings (1) anchoring the negative evaluation pole and high ratings (7) anchoring the positive evaluation pole of the word pair. One item from this subscale (like me–not like me) was not included in the scoring because of its conceptual overlap with feminist threat and potential for inflating observed correlations with FTI scores. Thus, the General Evaluation subscale scores in the present study were based on the remaining 42 items, such as "illogical–logical" and "uncaring–caring." Appropriate items were reverse coded, and item ratings were averaged to obtain a subscale score where higher scores reflected more affirmative evaluations of feminists. Twenge and Zucker (1999) reported a Cronbach's α of .95 for the General Evaluation items. In terms of validity, General Evaluation subscale scores were shown to correlate positively with scores on the Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Women's Movement (ATWF) scale and the Attitudes Toward Women scale (Twenge & Zucker, 1999).

Attitudes toward feminism. To measure these attitudes, we used the ATFW (Fassinger, 1994). The ATFW consists of 10 items that are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Sample items include: "There are better ways for women to fight for equality than through the women's movement" (reversed scored) and "Feminist principles should be adopted everywhere." Appropriate items were reverse coded, and item ratings were averaged, with higher scores reflecting more affirmative attitudes toward feminism. In the present study, minor modifications were made to 3 items to improve their clarity and applicability to respondents and to eliminate double barreled content.[1] Fassinger (1994) reported a Cronbach's α of .89 for ATFW items. In terms of validity, ATFW scores were correlated positively with egalitarian attitudes toward women and toward gender roles (Fassinger, 1994).

Degree of feminist identification. We assessed degree of feminist identification by asking participants to choose the best self-description from five options adapted from Liss et al. (2001): "I do not consider myself a feminist at all," "I agree with some of the objectives of the feminist movement but tend to be more traditional," "I agree with many of the objectives of the feminist movement but do not consider myself a feminist," "I agree with most of the objectives of the feminist movement and generally do consider myself a feminist," or "I am a committed feminist," coded on a 1–5 scale, reflecting our aim to measure a continuum of low to high feminist identification.

Exposure to feminists. We included three questions designed to tease apart affirmativeness of exposure to feminists from mere exposure to feminists. Specifically, participants were first asked if they personally knew anyone who identified as feminist (yes or no). If they did know someone who identified as a feminist, they then were asked to report how warmly they felt toward that person on a scale of 0 (*coldest*) to 100 (*warmest*). The first question assessed mere exposure to feminists; the second, the perceived valence or affirmativeness of that exposure. As an additional assessment of potential exposure to feminists and feminism, participants were asked how many courses related to women or feminism they had taken; they were asked to list the title of each course as a memory and self-verification tool.

Impression management. We used the 20-item Impression Management (IM) subscale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). Items were rated on a 7-point continuum from 1 (*not true*) to 7 (*very true*). Appropriate items were reverse coded, and item ratings were averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater levels of IM. Cronbach's αs for IM items have ranged from .75 to .86 in prior studies (Paulhus, 1991), and IM scores demonstrated convergent validity through positive correlations with scores on social desirability indicators from well-established personality measures (Paulhus, 1991).

Results

Preliminary Analyses

A series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated that sample means for the Sociology of Gender course and the Personal Growth course did not differ significantly on feminist threat, evaluations of feminists, attitudes toward feminism, feminist self-identification, and feelings toward feminist acquaintances. As would be expected, however, the two classes differed on the number of women's studies courses taken, $F(1, 89) = 22.62$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .20$, with students in the Sociology of Gender course reporting more women's studies courses ($M = 1.95$, $SD = 2.04$) relative to students in the Personal Growth course ($M = .28$, $SD = .61$). Also, a chi-square test indicated that students in the two classes differed on whether they had feminist acquaintances, $\chi^2(1, N = 91) = 8.42$, $p < .01$, with 75% of Sociology of Gender students compared to 44% of Personal Growth students reporting that they personally knew someone who identified as a feminist. Taken together, these findings suggested that students in the two courses did not differ on the primary variables of interest (i.e., feminist threat, evaluations of feminists,

Table 2. Sample Intercorrelations, Cronbach's αs, and Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5[a]	6[b]	7	M	SD	α
1. Threat	—							4.47	4.34	.78[c]
2. Affirmative evaluation of feminists	−.55**	—						4.46	0.65	.94
3. Affirmative attitudes toward feminism	−.55**	.63**	—					3.61	0.63	.86
4. Number of women's studies courses	−.01	.08	.31**	—				1.29	1.82	—
5. Report of feminist acquaintances[a]	−.02	−.06	.08	.24*	—			—	—	—
6. Affirmative feelings toward feminist acquaintances[b]	−.52**	.34**	.51**	.09	—	—		73.63	24.03	—
7. Feminist self-identification	−.42**	.34**	.64**	.44**	.27*	.36**	—	2.90	0.99	—
8. Impression management	−.01	.16	−.00	.02	−.14	−.04	.08	3.84	0.84	.78

Note. [a]Point-biserial correlations with "Do you personally know anyone who identifies as a feminist?" 0 (*No*); 1 (*Yes*).
[b]Correlations involving the 57 individuals who reported that they personally knew a feminist.
[c]Value reflects 2-week test–retest reliability coefficient.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

attitudes toward feminism, feminist self-identification, and feelings toward feminist acquaintances) and that course or instructor effects did not need to be controlled in the tests of hypotheses involving these variables.[2]

FTI item-level frequencies, which demonstrate the constructs that induced threat most and least frequently in the sample, are presented in Table 1. The constructs that induced threat most frequently in the sample (e.g., aggressive–calm) were the constructs on which the largest proportions of participants felt that their self-concept departed from their construal of a feminist in undesirable ways. The constructs that induced threat least frequently (e.g., educated–uneducated) were the constructs on which the smallest proportions of participants felt that their self-concept departed from their construal of a feminist in undesirable ways. It is important to keep in mind that, across these constructs, the construct pole viewed as undesirable (e.g., conservative or liberal) was individually defined as reflected in each participant's construal of the ideal self.

Tests of Hypotheses

Descriptive statistics, Cronbach's αs, and intercorrelations for the variables of interest are summarized in Table 2. In support of convergent validity, FTI scores were correlated negatively with affirmative evaluations of feminists, affirmative attitudes toward feminism, affirmative exposure to feminists, and feminist self-identification; all of these correlations approximated medium effect sizes. Importantly, although FTI scores were correlated with affirmative exposure to feminists, they were not correlated significantly with indicators of mere exposure to feminists and feminism (i.e., whether or not participants had feminist acquaintances and number of women's studies courses taken).

Regarding discriminant validity, FTI scores were uncorrelated with impression management. Finally, FTI scores of the 54 individuals who participated in both administrations indicated acceptable 2-week test–retest reliability (r = .78, p < .01). Furthermore, a paired samples *t* test revealed that this

sample's FTI means for Time 1 and Time 2 were not significantly different from one another, *t*(53) = .56, *p* = .58. Thus, across the two assessments, the relative ranking of participants along FTI scores (i.e., test–retest reliability correlation coefficient) and the average magnitude of FTI scores (i.e., FTI mean) were consistent. Overall then, the results of Study 1 support the psychometric soundness of the FTI as a measure of feminist threat.

Study 2

Personal construct theory indicates that threat can be reduced by changing construal of the threatening construct, the self, or both in order to reduce the discrepancy between the two constructs. Given the difficulty of changing the self (a core construct), modifying one's construal of a feminist seems a theoretically appropriate target for intervention. Specifically, changing the narrow construal of feminist identity through exposure to a broader and more inclusive construal could both reduce feminist threat and increase degree of feminist self-identification. In personal construct theory terms, such an intervention increases the range of convenience and permeability of the threatening construct (i.e., the extent to which it can accommodate other constructs), allowing feminist identity to accommodate a broader range of self-construal.

It is important to note that exposure-based techniques are not unique to a personal construct theory framework. For instance, increases in feminist identification from pre- to post–women's studies courses are often conceptualized to result from increases in feminist consciousness, presumably through exposure to feminist learning and analysis (e.g., Eisele & Stake, 2008; Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999). As well, in the broader prejudice-reduction literature, intergroup contact theory is a frequently used framework for guiding exposure-based techniques (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). One distinction between personal construct theory and these other conceptualizations is that personal construct theory provides grounding for honing the exposure technique to

a simple and focused target–creating a broader construal of the threatening construct so that it can accommodate a wider range of positive self-concepts. This expansion may be particularly useful relative to contact theory interventions which have been critiqued for requiring difficult to attain conditions that impede their real-world applicability (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005).

Thus, on the basis of personal construct theory, in our second study, we used exposure to a diverse group of feminists as an approach to broadening students' construal of feminist, and we tested whether such exposure would reduce level of feminist threat and increase degree of feminist identification. Specifically, within the context of a psychology of women class, students interacted with a group of self-identified feminists who reflected diversity along age, gender, race/ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and life experiences. Pre- to postintervention change in level of feminist threat and degree of feminist identification in students in the psychology of women class that received the intervention was compared to pre- to postclass change in students in a psychology of personality class that served as the quasi-experimental comparison group and did not receive the intervention. As such, we used a between- and within-subjects mixed design to assess potential differences between psychology of women and psychology of personality students. We hypothesized that level of feminist threat would decrease and that degree of feminist identification would increase from pre- to postintervention in the intervention group but remain unchanged in the comparison group. Furthermore, as additional evidence of convergent validity, we expected that FTI scores would correlate negatively with affirmative attitudes toward feminists and toward feminism, replicating our findings from Study 1.

Method

Participants

Data from 115 undergraduate students from a large U.S. Southeastern university were used in our study. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 45 ($M = 20.88$, $SD = 3.30$, $Mdn = 21.00$). A majority of the sample identified as women (90; 78%) and some identified as men (22; 19%). Most of the sample identified as White/Caucasian (77; 67%) and the remaining participants identified as Hispanic/Latina/o (21; 18%), African American/Black (4; 4%), Asian American/Pacific Islander (4; 4%), other race/ethnicities (3; 3%), or multiracial (1; 1%). In terms of sexual orientation, most of the sample identified as exclusively heterosexual (99; 86%) and smaller proportions identified as mostly heterosexual (7; 6%), exclusively homosexual (3; 3%), bisexual (2; 2%), or mostly homosexual (1; 1%). About half the sample identified as middle class (53; 46%), whereas the remaining half identified as upper middle class (36; 31%), working class (18; 16%), upper class (1; 1%), and lower class (1; 1%).

Materials

Students in the intervention and comparison groups completed the following four instruments at pre- and posttest. Pre- and postsurveys were matched by a private code selected by each participant and recorded on their surveys; participants' identities were not connected with the surveys or codes. Parallel to Study 1, participants completed, in the following order, the FTI, the General Evaluation subscale of the Evaluations and Stereotypes of Feminists scale (Twenge & Zucker, 1999), the ATFW (Fassinger, 1994), and our measure of feminist identification adapted from Liss et al. (2001).

Procedure

Participants were recruited from a psychology of women course ($n = 52$) and a psychology of personality course ($n = 63$). Both courses were 300-level courses with the same prerequisite; both courses were taught by the same instructor (first author) in order to reduce instructor effects in evaluating pre- to postintervention change. Written informed consent notified participants that the study was approved by IRB, that their participation was voluntary, and that they could withdraw their consent at any time. To protect anonymity of responses and to reduce feelings of obligation to participate, participants were not asked to sign the informed consent forms; they were informed that their completion of the survey constituted their informed consent. Participants earned extra credit for their participation in the study but also had the alternative option to earn extra credit by creating a poster on a woman in psychology (in the psychology of women course) or a theory of personality (in the psychology of personality course) if they chose not to participate (none of the students chose this alternative). In both classes, administration of the pretest measures occurred at the beginning of a class period during the first third of the semester. Administration of the posttest measures occurred after the intervention in the intervention group and after the lecture (described below) in the comparison group.

The intervention occurred in the psychology of women course and was comprised of exposure to a diverse panel through an interpersonal discovery game. Specifically, six individuals who self-identified as feminist served on the panel; they represented diversity along gender (women and men), racial/ethnic background (African American, European American, Latina American, Turkish), age (young adult, midlife, older adult), religion (Christian, Muslim, not identified religiously), sexual orientation (heterosexual and sexual minority), and life experiences (single, partnered, parent, graduate student, faculty). Students in the class were not informed of the feminist identification of the panel members and were instructed to play "20 questions" (i.e., pose 20 questions of their choosing to the panel) to discover who was a feminist on the panel. At the end of the 20-questions game, students were asked to share who they thought was a feminist

Table 3. Full Sample Intercorrelations, Cronbach's αs, and Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Variables

Variable	1	2	3	M	SD	α
1. Threat						
Pretest	—			5.20	4.56	—
Posttest	—			3.64	4.26	—
2. Feminist self-identification						
Pretest	−.48**	—		2.62	0.85	—
Posttest	−.49**	—		2.76	0.84	—
3. Affirmative evaluations of feminists						
Pretest	−.57**	.60**	—	4.33	0.66	.94
Posttest	−.53**	.56**	—	4.42	0.67	.95
4. Affirmative attitudes toward feminism						
Pretest	−.51**	.72**	.76**	3.48	0.65	.89
Posttest	−.53**	.71**	.72**	3.56	0.65	.89

Note. For each variable, correlations between pretest variables are reported in the first row and correlations between posttest variables are reported in the second row.
** $p < .001$.

on the panel. After students' guesses were tallied, all panel members revealed that they identified as a feminist. This disclosure was followed by a discussion processing the students' reactions and the assumptions about feminists that were embedded in their questions. Following this discussion, panel members described their own definition of feminism and how they came to identify as a feminist. Thus, the 20-questions game and subsequent discussion revealed students' assumptions about feminists (as reflected in their questions) and exposed them to the range of feminist identities and self-definitions represented on the diverse panel.

Students in the psychology of personality course comprised the comparison group and did not receive this intervention. Instead, they were exposed to a lecture on a theory of personality given by the same instructor as the intervention class; the lecture included opportunities for discussion and student questions and comments.

Results

Pre- and posttest descriptive statistics, Cronbach's αs, and intercorrelations for the variables of interest are summarized in Table 3. To test the intervention, two mixed between–within subjects ANOVAs were conducted to compare the intervention and comparison groups on pre- to postintervention levels of feminist threat and feminist identification. In these analyses, the between-subjects factor was intervention exposure, with psychology of women participants serving as the quasi-experimental group exposed to the panel of feminists and the psychology of personality participants serving as the comparison group. The within-subjects factor was pre- and posttest occasion.

The first ANOVA focusing on change in feminist threat scores yielded a significant within-subjects main effect for pre- to posttest change, $F(1, 110) = 36.18$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .25$, and a significant between-subjects main effect for class, $F(1, 110) = 9.46$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$, qualified by a significant

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Interaction Effects for Threat and Feminist Identification

Group	Pretest		Posttest	
	M	SD	M	SD
Threat				
Intervention group	4.60ₐ	4.44	1.68_b	2.24
Comparison group	5.71ₐ	4.70	5.23ₐ	4.82
Feminist self-identification				
Intervention group	2.76ₐ	0.91	3.09_b	0.85
Comparison group	2.50ₐ	0.78	2.52ₐ	0.76

Note. Means with different subscripts across both rows and columns within the same dependent variable are significantly different at $p < .001$.

interaction effect, $F(1, 110) = 18.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$. Means and standard deviations for all comparisons are reported in Table 4. Pairwise comparisons to probe the interaction effect revealed that the two classes did not differ significantly in mean threat scores at pretest, $F(1, 110) = 1.62$, $p = .21$, but that the mean posttest threat score for the intervention group was significantly lower than that for the comparison group, $F(1, 110) = 23.04$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$. Furthermore, pre- to posttest threat scores did not change in the comparison group, $F(1, 110) = 1.64$, $p = .20$, but did decrease significantly in the intervention group $F(1, 110) = 48.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$. Thus, whereas the intervention and comparison groups were comparable in feminist threat scores at pretest, as hypothesized, feminist threat scores decreased from pre- to posttest for the intervention group and remained stable for the comparison group.

The second ANOVA focusing on change in feminist self-identification yielded parallel results. Specifically, this analysis yielded a significant within-subjects main effect for pre- to posttest change, $F(1, 105) = 17.61$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$, and a significant between-subjects main effect for class, $F(1, 105) = 7.15$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, qualified by a significant interaction effect, $F(1, 105) = 14.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$.

Means and standard deviations for all comparisons are reported in Table 4. Pairwise comparisons to probe the interaction effect revealed that the two classes did not differ significantly in degree of feminist identification at pretest, $F(1, 105) = 2.42, p = .12$, but that posttest feminist identification scores for the intervention group were significantly higher than those for the comparison group, $F(1, 105) = 13.38, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .11$. Furthermore, pre- to posttest feminist identification scores did not change in the comparison group, $F(1, 105) = 0.09, p = .77$, but increased significantly in the intervention group, $F(1, 105) = 27.66, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .21$.

Thus, consistent with our hypotheses, threat scores were similar between groups at pretest, were unchanged from pre- to posttest in the comparison group, and were reduced from pre- to posttest in the intervention group. Similarly, in support of our hypotheses, feminist identification scores were similar between groups at pretest, were unchanged from pre- to posttest in the comparison group, and increased from pre- to posttest in the intervention group. Notably, effect sizes for the interaction effect and the significant follow-up comparisons were generally in the large range (Sink & Stroh, 2006), supporting the effectiveness of the theoretically grounded intervention in reducing level of feminist threat and in increasing degree of feminist identification.

Finally, to replicate the convergent validity tests of Study 1, relations of feminist threat scores with evaluations of feminists and attitudes toward feminism were examined at pre- and posttest. These correlations are presented in Table 2. Consistent with our hypotheses, threat scores were correlated negatively with affirmative evaluations of feminists and with affirmative attitudes toward feminism at both pretest and posttest; the magnitude of these correlations was in the medium range. These findings replicated the results of Study 1 and support the convergent validity of FTI scores.

General Discussion

Prior research has revealed the paradox that some individuals agree with feminist values but choose not to identify as feminists. Grounded in Kelly's (1995/1991a, 1955/1991b) personal construct theory, the present set of studies operationalized and evaluated the concept of threat as a potential factor in feminist identification. Results of Study 1 offered evidence of validity and reliability for data produced by the FTI. Results of Study 2 replicated validity evidence from Study 1 and also provided support for the effectiveness of a personal construct theory-grounded intervention in reducing level of feminist threat and increasing degree of feminist identification.

On the basis of personal construct theory, feminist threat reflects the extent to which individuals' construal of being a feminist is incongruent with their construal of positive self-concept, such that the integration of a feminist identity would cause imminent intolerable change in their self-

concept. This concept of threat and its operationalization using the FTI introduced in Study 1 help address the hypothesis that self-concept dissonance may be a factor in impeding feminist identification (Williams & Wittig, 1997). Indeed, consistent with this hypothesis and with the tenets of personal construct theory, validity evidence garnered in Study 1 indicated that greater FTI scores were associated with lower degree of feminist identification.

Additional validity and reliability evidence was also gathered for FTI scores. Specifically, in Study 1, the short-term stability of FTI scores was demonstrated with a 2-week test–retest reliability coefficient of .78. Furthermore, discriminant validity evidence was documented in the nonsignificant correlation of FTI scores with IM. In terms of convergent validity, FTI scores were linked with more negative evaluations of feminists, more negative attitudes toward feminism, and more negative feelings toward feminist acquaintances. By contrast, FTI scores were not correlated with indicators of mere exposure to feminism or feminists (e.g., having a feminist acquaintance or the number of women's studies courses taken); thus, affirmative exposure, rather than mere exposure, was associated with threat scores. Study 2 yielded further support for convergent validity because greater feminist threat was again associated with more negative evaluations of feminists and more negative attitudes toward feminism. The magnitude of convergent validity coefficients in Study 1 and Study 2 were in the medium effect size range. It is important to note that these relations were observed within the context of the sample averages indicating neutral to positive views of feminism and feminists, as found in prior studies (e.g., Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Liss et al., 2000; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Zucker, 2004).

The reliability and validity evidence reported in Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that the FTI may be a useful tool for operationalizing self-concept dissonance associated with feminist identity in future research. One important benefit of assessing feminist threat is that this construct, as operationalized by the FTI, takes into account individual differences in the construal of self and feminist identity, as well as in the valence and discrepancy of these constructs. This additional information may be advantageous over existing measures of evaluations of feminists because these prior measures apply a universal valence for each item across participants. Although assumptions about a universal valence may be fairly safe in some cases, such assumptions may be more tenuous in other instances.

For example, in the items good–bad or negative–positive from the popular general evaluation subscale of the Evaluations and Stereotypes of Feminists scale (Twenge & Zucker, 1999), the valence of each anchor is fairly self-evident. But, a universal valence becomes more unclear for the General Evaluation items such as masculine–not masculine, hairy legs–shaved legs, not angry–angry, feminine–not feminine, and

traditional–not traditional. Similarly, items such as plain–sexy, not concerned with appearance–very concerned with appearance, and radical–traditional are included in the Evaluations of Feminists measure (Reid & Purcell, 2004) employed in some studies. It is evident that the more desirable pole for each of these items might vary across individuals; in a sexist social context, some respondents may view some poles, such as anger, resistance to dominant beauty standards, and nontraditionality, as appropriate and desirable characteristics. Thus, such measures assess their intended construct of the social desirability of how feminists are viewed, but they may obscure individual differences in respondents' personal valences. These individual differences may be an important source of dissonance (or consonance) between self-concept and feminist identity. The FTI is designed to incorporate precisely these individual differences.

Grounded in the tenets of personal construct theory, Study 2 evaluated the effectiveness of an intervention designed to reduce level of feminist threat and increase degree of feminist identification. The theoretical basis for this intervention was that exposure to a diverse panel of feminists and an activity that encouraged participants to draw out this diversity (i.e., playing 20 questions to find out who was a feminist on the panel) could expand the range of participants' construal of feminist. This greater range in the construal of feminist identity could allow for greater accommodation of diverse self-concepts. The results of Study 2 supported the effectiveness of the intervention in reducing level of feminist threat and increasing degree of feminist identification in the intervention group, compared to null effects in the comparison group. Thus, the findings of our study suggest that exposing students to a variety of feminists may begin to broaden student's concept of feminists. This breadth of the construct of feminist many foster the sense that among the many different formulations of feminist, some might be quite compatible with participants' positive self-construal. Consequently, feminist identity would be less threatening and necessitate minimal (and/or tolerable) change to the self-concept.

Of course, these changes may not be exclusive to our intervention and other interventions that exploit the same principles as those in our study may be worth evaluating in future research (e.g., having individuals of various backgrounds wearing t-shirts that say *this is what a feminist looks like*, viewing and discussing videos such as http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YA13GNT8Mc). From a personal construct theory perspective, the key to threat-reducing interventions would be expanding the range of convenience and permeability of the construct feminist—that is, designing interventions that function to expose participants to a diverse range of feminists and consequently expand their construal of this construct. We hope that the FTI offers a useful tool for testing the effectiveness of a variety of interventions that reduce level of feminist threat and increase degree of feminist identification.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our results must be interpreted in light of a number of limitations. First, as with much of the prior research on feminist identification (e.g., Liss et al., 2000; Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004), the present samples were comprised mostly of White heterosexual college women. Although the educational college setting creates an appealing and convenient context for interventions to reduce feminist threat and increase feminist identification, it is important to evaluate the replicability of the present findings outside the college setting and with other populations including those that represent various gender identities, age cohorts, racial/ethnic backgrounds, sexual orientations, and socioeconomic backgrounds.

For example, there is evidence that feminist identification is more prevalent among women than among men and among the second wave of feminism cohort than among other cohorts (e.g., McCabe, 2005; Schnittker, Freese, & Powell, 2003). The small proportion of men and of transgender individuals in our samples and our focus on college students precluded meaningful analyses of gender or cohort group effects. But, examination of feminist threat and feminist identification in groups beyond college women remains important. There is also much discussion but mixed evidence regarding Women of Color's endorsement of feminist identification relative to that of White women (e.g., McCabe, 2005; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997; Schnittker et al., 2003), with the reasoning that, despite Women of Color's instrumental roles in the feminist movement, for some Women of Color, the legacy of feminism as a movement that prioritizes White women's concerns over issues of racism may continue to shape construal of a feminist identity (e.g., Bowman et al., 2001; Kesselman, 1999). Future adaptation of the FTI to assess dimensions that may be salient to broader populations' construal of dissonance between feminist identity and self-concept (e.g., dimensions of identity and sociopolitical ideology related to ability status, ethnicity, gender, race, sexual orientation, social class) could be useful for understanding individual differences in the sources of feminist threat and identification across populations.

Another limitation is that the relatively low average of threat scores in the present sample may attenuate the observed relations of feminist threat with other variables. However, it is also important to note that when the threat paradigm was applied in similar fashion in prior studies of social identity, notably lower levels of threat emerged than that in the present study (e.g., Moradi et al., 2006, 2009). For example, the average levels of feminist threat in the present samples were about double the average level of threat regarding lesbian and gay identity in a prior sample of college women and men who identified as "exclusively" or "mostly" heterosexual ($M = 2.43$, $SD = 3.38$; Moradi et al., 2006). Thus, relative to prior research on threat and social identities, the distribution of feminist threat scores in

the present sample reflected a higher average and greater variability. Although this comparison alleviates some concern about range restriction in the samples' feminist threat scores, it does raise concern about the relative level of threat induced by feminist identity, which further underscores the need for threat-reducing interventions.

Issues of quasi-experimental control are also important to consider in interpreting the present findings regarding the intervention's effectiveness. A number of steps were taken in Study 2 to reduce external confounds, but some considerations are important to highlight. For example, a between- and within-subjects design was used to mitigate potential differences between students in the intervention group (psychology of women) and the comparison group (psychology of personality). In fact, pretest differences were not observed between the two groups in levels of feminist threat or feminist identification. Nevertheless, it may be important to examine whether the effectiveness of the intervention is influenced—either magnified or dampened—in the context of exposure to women's studies content. Furthermore, potential instructor effects were reduced using the same instructor in both groups, and the inclusion of some interactive discussion in the psychology of personality class may have helped to evaluate the impact of the intervention above and beyond the mere interactivity of the intervention. Still, the intervention may have been more engaging than the lecture in the comparison condition. Although engaging the audience is a strength in real-world implementation of an intervention, it is possible that feeling engaged may have influenced participants' willingness to identify as feminist. Thus, although there were strengths to the quasi-experimental design of our study, these limitations in experimental control are important to consider. Given that we did not assign students randomly to the intervention or comparison group, the role of potential confounds associated with selection bias cannot be ruled out completely.

Finally, the evidence of intervention effectiveness garnered in the present study was restricted to immediate follow-up. Longer follow-up periods in future research could elucidate the stability of change in feminist threat and feminist identification over time. Evidence of longer term effectiveness could also facilitate research on whether shifts in feminist threat and feminist identification result in changes in the previously observed correlates of feminist identification, including feminist social action, self-efficacy, and coping with sexism (e.g., Eisele & Stake, 2008; Hurt et al., 2007; Klonis et al., 1997; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004). Such research could be helpful in establishing the direction of causality and temporal precedence between feminist identification and its posited collective and individual benefits.

Conclusion

We provide simple and potentially engaging approaches for assessing level of feminist threat, reducing such threat, and

increasing degree of feminist identification. As such, the present results can offer a theoretically grounded and empirically supported basis for scholars' and activists' efforts to understand and increase feminist identification. Such efforts are particularly important to a feminist psychology of women, given that feminist identification is associated with indicators of individual psychological functioning as well as with commitment to feminist action (e.g., Eisele & Stake, 2008; Hurt et al., 2007; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004).

Notes

1. The item "I am overjoyed that women's liberation is finally happening in this country" was modified to "I would be overjoyed if women's liberation gained more strength in this country;" the item "More people would favor the women's movement if they knew more about it" was modified to "People would favor women's liberation more if they knew more about it;" and the item "The leaders of the women's movement may be extreme, but they have the right idea" was modified to "The leaders of the women's movement have the right idea."
2. We considered, but we did not conduct, gender group comparisons because our gender subsamples (women, men, transgender individuals) were highly unbalanced making the results of any gender group comparisons difficult to interpret (significant or nonsignificant differences between groups would be of questionable reliability). This concern would be compounded when gender was crossed with the two classes in Study 1 or with the intervention or comparison group in Study 2. Thus, rather than introduce analyses that at the outset, we believe, would yield results of questionable reliability and generalizability, we discuss this issue explicitly in the limitations and future directions section of our article.

References

Berryman-Fink, C., & Verderber, K. S. (1985). Attributions of the term feminist: A factor analytic development of a measuring instrument. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *9*, 51–64. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.1985.tb00860.x

Bowman, S. L., Rasheed, S., Ferris, J., Thompson, D. A., McRae, M., & Weitzman, L. (2001). Interface of feminism and

multiculturalism: Where are the women of color? In J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas, L. A. Suzuki, & C. M. Alexander (Eds.), *Handbook of multicultural counseling* (2nd ed., pp. 779–798). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Breen, A., & Karpinski, A. (2008). What's in a name? Two approaches to evaluating the label feminist. *Sex Roles*, *58*, 299–310. doi:10.1007/s11199-007-9317-y

Burke, T. M. (1995). The effect of gay male sex role adherence on others' homosexual stress and attitudes toward gay men. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering*, *57*, 6635.

Burke, T. M. (1997). Assessing homosexual stress. *Journal of Homosexuality*, *33*, 83–99. doi:10.1300/J082v33n02_05

Dixon, J., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2005). Beyond the optimal contact strategy: A reality check for the contact hypothesis. *American Psychologist*, *60*, 697–711. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.7.697

Duncan, L. E. (2010). Women's relationship to feminism: Effects of generation and feminist self-labeling. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *34*, 498–507. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.2010. 01599.x

Eisele, H., & Stake, J. (2008). The differential relationship of feminist attitudes and feminist identity to self-efficacy. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *32*, 233–244. doi:10.1111/j. 1471-6402. 2008.00432.x

Fassinger, R. E. (1994). Development and testing of the attitudes toward feminism and the women's movement (FWM) scale. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *18*, 389–402. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.1994.tb00462.x

Goldberg, P. A., Gottesdiener, M., & Abramson, P. R. (1975). Another put down of women? Perceived attractiveness as a function of support of the feminist movement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *32*, 113–115. doi:10.1037/h0076851

Henderson-King, D. H., & Stewart, A. J. (1994). Women or feminists? Assessing women's group consciousness. *Sex Roles*, *31*, 505–516. doi:10.1007/BF01544276

Henderson-King, D. H., & Stewart, A. J. (1999). Educational experiences and shifts in group consciousness: Studying women. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *25*, 390–399. doi:10.1177/0146167299025003010

Hurt, M., Nelson, J., Turner, D., Haines, M., Ramsey, L., Erchull, M., & Liss, M. (2007). Feminism: What is it good for? Feminine norms and objectification as the link between feminist identity and clinically relevant outcomes. *Sex Roles*, *57*, 355–363. doi:10.1007/s11199-007-9272-7

Jenen, J., Winquist, J., Arkkelin, D., & Schuster, K. (2009). Implicit attitudes towards feminism. *Sex Roles*, *60*, 14–20. doi:10.1007/s11199-008-9514-3

Kelly, G. A. (1991a). *The psychology of personal constructs: A theory of personality* (Vol. 1). London, England: Routledge (Original work published 1955).

Kelly, G. A. (1991b). *The psychology of personal constructs: Clinical diagnosis and personality* (Vol. 2). New York, NY: Routledge (Original work published 1955).

Kesselman, A. (1999). A history of the feminist movements in the U. S. In A. Kesselman, L. D. McNair, & N. Schniedewind, (Eds.), *Women: Images and realities, a multicultural anthology* (2nd ed., pp. 480–484). Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.

Klonis, S., Endo, J., Crosby, F., & Worell, J. (1997). Feminism as a life raft. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *21*, 333–345. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.1997.tb00117.x

Krieger, S. R., Epting, F. R., & Leitner, L. M. (1974). Personal constructs, threat and attitudes toward death. *Journal of Death and Dying*, *5*, 299–310. doi:10.2190/WCDW-PNPQ-0ERV-RNM7

Landfield, A. W. (1971). *Personal construct systems in psychotherapy*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Leaper, C., & Arias, D. (2011). College women's feminist identity: A multidimensional analysis with implications for coping with sexism. *Sex Roles*, *64*, 475–490. doi:10.1007/s11199-011-9936-1

Leitner, L. M., & Cado, S. (1982). Personal constructs and homosexual stress. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *43*, 869–872. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.43.4.869

Liss, M., Hoffner, C., & Crawford, M. (2000). What do feminists believe? *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *24*, 279–284. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.2000.tb00210.x

Liss, M., O'Connor, C., Morosky, E., & Crawford, M. (2001). What makes a feminist? Predictors and correlates of feminist social identity in college women. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *25*, 124–133. doi:10.1111/1471-6402.00014

McCabe, J. (2005). What's in a label? The relationship between feminist self-identification and "feminist" attitudes among U. S. women and men. *Gender and Society*, *19*, 480–505.

Moradi, B., van den Berg, J. J., & Epting, F. R. (2006). Intrapersonal and interpersonal manifestations of antilesbian and gay prejudice: An application of personal construct theory. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *53*, 57–66. doi:10.1037/0022-0167.53.1.57

Moradi, B., van den Berg, J. J., & Epting, F. R. (2009). Threat and guilt aspects of internalized antilesbian and gay prejudice: An application of personal construct theory. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *56*, 119–131. doi:10.1037/a0014571

Myaskovsky, L., & Wittig, M. A. (1997). Predictors of feminist social identity among college women. *Sex Roles*, *37*, 861–883. doi:10.1007/BF02936344

Nelson, J., Liss, M., Erchull, M., Hurt, M., Ramsey, L., Turner, D., . . . Haines, M. (2008). Identity in action: Predictors of feminist self-identification and collective action. *Sex Roles*, *58*, 721–728. doi:10.1007/s11199-007-9384-0

Paulhus, D. L. (1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), *Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes* (pp.17–59). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *90*, 751–783. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751

Ramsey, L., Haines, M., Hurt, M., Nelson, J., Turner, D., Liss, M., . . . Erchull, M. (2007). Thinking of others: Feminist identification and the perception of others' beliefs. *Sex Roles*, *56*, 611–616. doi:10.1007/s11199-007-9205-5

Reid, A., & Purcell, N. (2004). Pathways to feminist identification. *Sex Roles*, *50*, 759–769. doi:10.1023/B: SERS.0000029095.40767.3c

Roy, R. E., Weibust, K. S., & Miller, C. T. (2007). Effects of stereotypes about feminists on feminist self-identification. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *31*, 146–156. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.2007.00348.x

Schnittker, J., Freese, J., & Powell, B. (2003). Who are feminists and what do they believe? The role of generations. *American Sociological Review*, *86*, 607–622.

Sink, C. A., & Stroh, H. R. (2006). Practical significance: The use of effect sizes in school counseling research. *Professional School Counseling*, *9*, 401–411.

Suter, E., & Toller, P. (2006). Gender role and feminism revisited: A follow-up study. *Sex Roles*, *55*, 135–146. doi:10.1007/s11199-006-9065-4

Twenge, J. M., & Zucker, A. (1999). What is a feminist? Evaluations and stereotypes in closed- and open-ended responses. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *23*, 591–605. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.1999.tb00383.x

Williams, R., & Wittig, M. A. (1997). "I'm not a feminist, but ": Factors contributing to the discrepancy between pro-feminist orientation and feminist social identity. *Sex Roles*, *37*, 885–904. doi:10.1007/BF02936345

Yoder, J., Tobias, A., & Snell, A. (2011). When declaring "I am a feminist" matters: Labeling is linked to activism. *Sex Roles*, *64*, 9–18. doi:10.1007/s11199-010-9890-3

Zucker, A. N. (2004). Disavowing social identities: What it means when women say, "I'm not a feminist, but". *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *28*, 423–435. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.2004.00159.x

Zucker, A. N., & Bay-Cheng, L. Y. (2010). Minding the gap between feminist identity and attitudes: The behavioral and ideological divide between feminists and non-labelers. *Journal of Personality*, *78*, 1895–1924. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00673