Table 1: Summary Statistics, Large Sample

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	6,782	1,996.677	12.254	1,975	2,017
log GDP per capita	6,159	7.756	1.624	4.175	11.689
GDP Growth Rate	6,102	3.638	6.511	-64.047	149.973
Debt to GDP Ratio	2,755	51.595	33.692	1.600	289.845
Change in Debt to GDP Ratio	2,572	0.656	10.619	-169.543	94.091
Budget Deficit	2,172	-2.404	6.731	-131.000	43.700
Polity	6,163	0.580	0.363	0.000	1.000
Freedom House	6,549	0.524	0.337	0.000	1.000
Unified Democracy Score	5,861	0.063	0.977	-2.039	2.263
State Failure	6,244	0.022	0.145	0	1
Parliamentary Representation	6,635	0.312	0.463	0	1
Control All Houses	5,552	0.572	0.495	0	1
Legislative Index of Election Competitiveness	6,631	0.758	0.346	0.000	1.000
Plurality Representation	5,085	0.545	0.496	0.000	1.000

 ${\bf Table~2:~Summary~Statistics,~Small~Sample}$

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	1,219	1,996.695	11.534	1,975	2,015
log GDP per capita	1,201	9.692	0.906	7.005	11.689
GDP Growth Rate	1,214	2.589	3.485	-21.258	26.264
Debt to GDP Ratio	1,086	60.589	34.552	4.638	219.274
Change in Debt to GDP Ratio	1,053	1.431	6.242	-43.868	56.314
Deficit	1,104	-2.856	4.353	-32.129	18.696
Polity	1,137	0.984	0.040	0.650	1.000
Freedom House	1,195	0.957	0.081	0.250	1.000
Unified Democracy Score	1,117	1.481	0.434	-0.087	2.263
State Failure	1,137	0.000	0.000	0	0
Parliamentary System	1,218	0.844	0.363	0	1
Control All Houses	1,205	0.243	0.429	0	1
Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness	1,213	6.981	0.276	1.000	7.000
Plurality Representation	1,210	0.275	0.447	0	1
EU Member	1,219	0.505	0.500	0	1
Capital Account Openness	1,101	0.745	0.316	0.000	1.000
Openness Trade	1,185	87.266	55.607	15.478	374.148
Population 15 to 64	1,158	0.665	0.020	0.582	0.721
Populatio > 65	1,158	0.142	0.026	0.079	0.251

Table 3: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Economic Growth on Polity Measure of Democracy

			Large Sample, 1975-2017	2, 1975-2017		
	STO		Annual GDP Growth Fixed Effects	P Growth ffects		IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Previous GDP Growth	0.380***	0.317*** (0.051)	0.302***	0.345***	0.326*** (0.034)	0.319***
Polity Score	-0.617^{**} (0.277)	1.123^{***} (0.393)	0.839* (0.438)	0.751^* (0.426)	0.880** (0.430)	0.602 (1.648)
log GDP per capita				-0.101 (0.297)	-0.325 (0.312)	-0.305 (0.357)
State Failure					-7.581^{***} (1.843)	-7.629*** (1.830)
Constant	2.642*** (0.299)					
Country dummy?	No	Yes No	Yes Ves	Yes Ves	Yes Ves	Yes
Observations	5,574	5,574	5,574	5,495	5,495	5,486
$ m R^2$	0.150	0.104	0.093	0.118	0.137	0.134
Adjusted R ²	0.150	0.078	090.0	0.085	0.104	0.101
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	; ***p<0.01				

Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is annual GDP growth rate. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 4: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Economic Growth on Freedom House Measure of Democracy

			Large Sample, 1975-2017	2, 1975-2017		
	STO		Annual GDP Growth Fixed Effects	P Growth flects		IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Previous GDP Growth	0.368***	0.303***	0.290***	0.327***	0.311*** (0.038)	0.297***
Freedom House Score	$-0.609* \\ (0.362)$	1.815^{***} (0.663)	1.533** (0.672)	1.441^{**} (0.654)	$1.038* \\ (0.587)$	0.294 (2.233)
log GDP per capita				-0.388 (0.300)	-0.599* (0.317)	-0.452 (0.316)
State Failure					-6.825*** (1.905)	-6.948*** (2.010)
Constant	2.675*** (0.366)					
Country dummy?	No	Yes No	Yes Ves	Yes Ves	Yes Ves	Yes
Observations	5,750	5,750	5,750	5,673	5,444	5,428
$ m R^2$ Adjusted $ m R^2$	$0.141 \\ 0.140$	0.097	$0.087 \\ 0.054$	$0.109 \\ 0.076$	$0.124 \\ 0.091$	$0.117 \\ 0.084$
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	; *** p<0.01				

Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is annual GDP growth rate. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 5: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Debt Accumulation on Polity Measure of Democracy

				Large Sample, 1975-2017	1975-2017	
'	SIO		Change in Debt-	Debt-GDP R	Change in Debt-GDP Ratio from Last Year	Λ1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Polity Score	1.141 (0.905)	9.534^* (5.034)	6.910 (4.838)	7.373 (5.156)	7.590 (4.723)	-6.242 (19.326)
log GDP per capita				0.156 (2.020)	0.332 (1.853)	0.885 (1.714)
State Failure					26.442^* (14.153)	26.275^* (14.838)
Constant	-0.337 (0.814)					
Country dummy? Year dummy?	No No	Yes No	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
Observations \mathbb{R}^2	$2,264 \\ 0.001$	$2,264 \\ 0.006$	2,264 0.003	2,262 0.003	2,262 0.034	2,259 0.023
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.0004	-0.054	-0.078	-0.078	-0.046	-0.057

Note: * p<0.1; *

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is the change in debt-GDP ratio 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, from last year. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel,

Table 6: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Debt Accumulation on Freedom House Measure of Democracy

			I	Large Sample, 1975-2017	1975-2017	
	STO		Change in Debt- Fixed Effects	Debt-GDP Reflects	Change in Debt-GDP Ratio from Last Year Fixed Effects	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Freedom House Score	1.033 (0.634)	4.735 (4.471)	4.223 (4.289)	3.124 (4.374)	4.837 (4.303)	-8.766 (27.047)
log GDP per capita				0.534 (1.843)	0.518 (1.821)	0.911 (1.697)
State Failure					26.485^{*} (14.369)	25.385* (13.731)
Constant	-0.111 (0.542)					
Country dummy? Year dummy? Observations R ² Adjusted R ²	No No No 2,491 0.0005	Yes No 2,491 0.001 -0.057	Yes Yes $2,491$ 0.001 -0.076	Yes Yes 2,379 0.001 -0.080	Yes Yes 2,249 0.031 -0.050	Yes Yes 2,246 0.024 -0.057

Note: *1

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is the change in debt-GDP ratio from last year. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix

Table 7: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Budget Deficit on Polity Measure of Democracy

			Lar	Large Sample, 1975-2017	917	
			A_1	Annual Budget Deficit	cit	
	STO		Fixe	Fixed Effects		IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Polity Score	-3.607** (1.707)	-4.783 (5.520)	-5.798 (4.926)	-5.034^{**} (2.494)	-5.447^{**} (2.649)	0.942 (5.000)
log GDP per capita				2.559*** (0.751)	2.553*** (0.742)	1.995** (0.860)
State Failure					-3.146^* (1.605)	-2.395 (1.921)
Constant	0.629 (1.530)					
Country dummy? Year dummy?	No No	Yes No	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
Observations	1,934	1,934	1,934	1,927	1,927	1,925
$ m R^2$	0.020	0.003	0.005	0.019	0.022	0.011
Adjusted R ²	0.019	-0.057	-0.080	-0.066	-0.063	-0.075
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<(*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	[on in column	1. Fixed effects (o ui suoissatons J.K.	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV

deficit. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1. regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is governemnt annual budget Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6,

Table 8: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Budget Deficit on Freedom House Measure of Democracy

			Lar	Large Sample, 1975-2017	2017	
	210		Ar	Annual Budget Deficit	cit	IN.
	OLS	(Tellects	į	۸۱ (۵)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Freedom House Score	-0.333 (1.504)	7.257^{**} (3.169)	4.135 (3.248)	-0.999 (2.789)	-1.496 (2.818)	0.672 (6.976)
log GDP per capita				2.285*** (0.741)	2.164*** (0.734)	1.997** (0.886)
State Failure					-2.480 (1.932)	-2.165 (2.108)
Constant	-2.119* (1.261)					
Country dummy?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummy?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,090	2,090	2,090	1,972	1,909	1,907
R^2	0.0002	0.007	0.002	0.013	0.014	0.013
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	-0.0003	-0.050	-0.077	-0.070	-0.072	-0.073
Note:	*p<0.1; **p< Cross-section regression wir clustered by and year dun deficit. Covar	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Cross-sectional OLS regressi regression with legislative ele clustered by country are rep and year dummies are includeficit. Covariates are added deficit. For detailed data defin	on in column sction competi orted in paren led in regression in regressions itions and soun itions and soun	1. Fixed effects (tiveness as instructheses. Country ons 3 to 6. Depers 4 through 6. Barces, see table for	OLS regressions in cment in column 6. It was are included ident variable is goves as sample is an unlasse sample statistics	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is government annual budget deficit. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 9: Fixed Effects Results on Politcal Institutions, Large Sample

				La	Large Sample, 1975-2017	5-2017			
	An	Annual GDP Growth	h	Chan	Change in Debt-GDP Ratio	Ratio		Annual Budget Deficit	Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)
Parliamentary System	-0.057 (0.190)	0.010 (0.195)	0.100 (0.435)	0.429 (0.338)	0.904** (0.374)	3.903*** (1.254)	-1.221* (0.716)	-0.973 (0.766)	-2.254 (1.535)
Plurality Representation	0.001 (0.232)	-0.014 (0.225)	-0.493 (0.425)	0.328 (0.463)	0.421 (0.462)	1.538 (1.945)	0.612 (0.679)	0.678 (0.661)	0.922 (1.103)
Control All Houses	0.042 (0.206)	0.034 (0.200)	-0.452^{**} (0.225)	-0.343 (0.486)	-0.280 (0.477)	-1.094 (0.908)	-0.169 (0.592)	-0.303 (0.586)	-0.174 (0.430)
log GDP per capita	-0.250^{***} (0.060)	-0.281^{***} (0.061)	-0.854 (0.780)	0.417^{**} (0.186)	0.411^{**} (0.163)	0.290 (1.307)	0.432 (0.339)	0.382 (0.350)	1.386* (0.776)
State Failure	-5.343*** (1.243)	-5.531*** (1.123)	-5.940*** (1.326)	11.886 (7.807)	12.064 (7.919)	23.687* (12.455)	-0.164 (0.887)	-0.398 (0.882)	-0.319 (0.528)
Constant	4.318*** (0.524)			-3.396** (1.689)			-5.836** (2.788)		
Previous GDP Growth?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Year dummy? Country dummy?	No No	$\frac{Yes}{No}$	Yes Yes	No No	$\frac{Yes}{No}$	Yes Yes	No No	$\frac{Yes}{No}$	Yes Yes
Observations	4,172	4,172	4,172	2,054	2,054	2,054	1,745	1,745	1,745
$ m R^2$ Adjusted $ m R^2$	$0.192 \\ 0.191$	$0.195 \\ 0.186$	$0.109 \\ 0.067$	0.014 0.011	0.017 -0.006	0.025 -0.058	0.016 0.014	0.014 -0.013	0.012 -0.076
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.0	; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01							

"p<0.1; "p<0.05; ""p<0.01 regression in column 1, 4, and 7. Fixed effects OLS regressions in the other columns. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Year dummies are included in regressions 2-3, 5-6, and 8-9, and country dummies are included in regressions 3, 6, and 9. Dependent variables are annual GDP growth rate, change in debt-GDP ratio, and annual budget deficit. Regression 1-3 include lagged GDP growth rate as endogenous variable. Covariates are added in all regressions. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 10: Fixed Effects Results on Politcal Institutions, Small Sample

				Sm	Small Sample, 1975-2015	2015			
	Ann	Annual GDP Growth		Chang	Change in Debt-GDP Ratio	Satio Satio	A	Annual Budget Deficit	icit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)
Parliamentary System	0.009 (0.205)	-0.127 (0.213)	0.507 (0.713)	0.128 (0.364)	0.498 (0.439)	1.314** (0.609)	0.246 (1.139)	0.207 (1.170)	-2.984^{**} (1.331)
Plurality Representation	0.342^{***} (0.125)	0.411^{***} (0.112)	-0.399** (0.185)	0.426 (0.667)	0.099 (0.699)	2.129** (1.066)	-1.381 (1.388)	-1.264 (1.415)	2.057*** (0.669)
Control All Houses	-0.335^{**} (0.135)	-0.395*** (0.119)	-0.316^{**} (0.161)	-0.706 (0.717)	-0.284 (0.600)	-0.848 (0.655)	-0.689 (0.635)	-0.998^{*} (0.565)	-0.282 (0.570)
EU Member	-0.207 (0.161)	-0.132 (0.120)	-0.197 (0.236)	0.872 (0.638)	0.600 (0.519)	-0.225 (0.781)	-3.201^{***} (1.232)	-3.009** (1.174)	-1.493** (0.611)
log GDP per capita	-0.627^{***} (0.121)	-0.357^{**} (0.148)	-0.853^{*} (0.484)	0.351 (0.425)	-0.135 (0.581)	-1.611 (1.338)	1.169 (0.813)	1.563^{*} (0.917)	2.933** (1.322)
State Failure	0.773** (0.318)	0.237 (0.345)	-0.085 (0.364)	-1.008 (1.055)	0.199 (1.269)	-0.132 (2.142)	2.589* (1.372)	1.984 (1.571)	$\frac{1.905}{(1.417)}$
Capital Account Openness	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008***	0.027*** (0.005)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.046** (0.020)	0.010 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.018 (0.023)
Openness Trade	-2.001 (3.945)	-2.478 (3.467)	7.131 (6.951)	9.741 (13.652)	17.509 (14.130)	46.058 (32.572)	-19.131 (22.625)	-18.688 (23.852)	-5.495 (22.479)
Population 15-64	-10.435*** (2.875)	-6.522^{**} (2.996)	-3.184 (4.516)	12.745 (14.883)	-0.592 (19.415)	10.664 (28.947)	2.098 (20.456)	7.417 (25.206)	-35.983 (27.211)
Population >65	9.340*** (2.739)			-8.831 (8.547)			-2.654 (12.104)		
Previous GDP Growth?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Year dummy? Country dummy?	No No	Yes No	Yes Yes	No No	Yes No	Yes Yes	No No	Yes No	Yes Yes
Observations R^2 Admeted R^2	934 0.254 0.246	934 0.270 0.230	934 0.193 0.121	888 0.021 0.011	888 0.022 0.033	888 0.024 -0.068	929 0.188 0.180	929 0.216 0.174	929 0.110 0.030
adjusted it	0.520	007:0	0.121	0.011	660.0	0000	007:0	* IT:0	00000

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, 4, and 7. Fixed effects OLS regressions in the other columns. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parenthleses. Year dummies are included in regressions 3, 5, and 9, Dependent variables are amund GDP growth rate, change in debt-GDP ratio, and annual budget deficit. Regression 1-3 include lagged GDP growth rate as endogenous variable. Covariates are added in all regressions. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2015. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 11: Fixed Effects Results on Political Institutions, including Interaction Terms

				Lar	Large Sample, 1975-2017	017			
	An	Annual GDP Growth	-	Chang	Change in Debt-GDP Ratio	atio	A	Annual Budget Deficit	icit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(-)	(8)	(6)
Parliamentary System	1.118* (0.626)	1.244** (0.589)	0.486 (1.039)	3.052* (1.732)	3.226** (1.586)	12.259*** (3.189)	-2.002 (3.818)	-2.218 (3.830)	-5.601* (3.219)
Plurality Representation	-0.513 (0.650)	-0.563 (0.635)	-0.922 (0.618)	-2.437* (1.475)	-2.018 (1.484)	-6.045* (3.195)	2.893 (2.225)	2.988 (2.198)	4.151 (3.231)
Control All Houses	0.340 (0.626)	0.418 (0.610)	-1.058** (0.458)	0.731 (1.285)	0.680 (1.310)	0.637 (2.061)	1.269 (1.556)	1.252 (1.493)	2.433 (2.947)
DEM*Parliamentary System	-1.345** (0.634)	-1.400** (0.605)	-0.740 (0.989)	-2.956 (1.851)	-2.622 (1.673)	-8.618*** (2.834)	0.938 (3.901)	1.360 (3.936)	3.079 (2.596)
DEM*Plurality Representation	0.680 (0.625)	0.715 (0.615)	0.753 (0.615)	3.204^{**} (1.459)	2.823^* (1.462)	9.144*** (3.230)	-2.738 (2.290)	-2.752 (2.246)	-3.411 (3.083)
DEM*Control All Houses	-0.415 (0.665)	-0.553 (0.655)	0.814^* (0.463)	-1.328 (1.395)	-1.190 (1.427)	-2.054 (2.315)	-1.971 (1.609)	-2.086 (1.540)	-2.832 (3.098)
log GDP per capita	-0.245*** (0.059)	-0.269*** (0.059)	-0.684 (0.825)	0.407** (0.177)	0.402*** (0.154)	0.316 (1.268)	0.632** (0.305)	0.575* (0.317)	2.062** (1.019)
State Failure	-5.423^{***} (1.420)	-5.614^{***} (1.312)	-5.923*** (1.396)	13.409* (7.445)	13.415* (7.575)	27.202^{**} (11.855)	-1.488 (1.962)	-1.683 (1.916)	-2.301 (1.905)
Constant	4.349*** (0.509)			-3.116* (1.612)			-7.749*** (2.424)		
Previous GDP Growth?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Year dummy?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country dummy?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations R ²	$\frac{4,172}{0.194}$	4,172	4,172 0.119	2,054 0.018	2,054	2,054	1,745	1,745 0.056	1,745
$\stackrel{\sim}{\text{Adjusted R}^2}$	0.192	0.188	0.070	0.014	-0.004	-0.049	0.050	0.028	-0.055
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	; *** p<0.01		8					

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, 4, and 7. Fixed effects OLS regressions in the other columns. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Year dummies are included in regressions 23, 5, and 8-9, and country dummies are included in regressions 3, 6, and 9. Dependent variables are annual GDP growth rate, change in debt-GDP ratio, and annual budget deficit. Regression 1-3 include lagged GDP growth rate as endogenous variable. Covariates are added in all regressions. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2015. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 12: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Economic Growth on Unified Democracy Scores

			Large Sample, 1975-2017	9, 1975-2017		
	\$10		Annual GDP Growth Fixed Effects	P Growth		2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Previous GDP Growth	0.362***	0.291*** (0.058)	0.060)	0.314*** (0.039)	0.296***	0.282***
Unified Democracy Scores	-0.270^{**} (0.110)	0.739^{***} (0.227)	$0.548** \\ (0.235)$	0.514^{**} (0.230)	0.513** (0.227)	0.409 (0.856)
log GDP per capita				-0.262 (0.296)	-0.486 (0.337)	-0.311 (0.342)
State Failure					-7.568*** (2.141)	-7.619^{***} (2.149)
Constant	2.436*** (0.239)					
Country dummy?	No	Yes No	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes
Observations	5,223	5,223	5,223	5,143	4,951	4,938
$ m R^2$	0.138	0.090	0.080	0.100	0.117	0.111
Adjusted R ²	0.138	0.060	0.043	0.063	0.080	0.075
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	; ***p<0.01				

Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is annual GDP growth rate. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 13: Fixed Effects Results on Political Institutions, with Interaction Term from Freedom House

				La	Large Sample, 1975-2017	72-2017			
	An	Annual GDP Growth	-	Change	Change in Debt-GDP Ratio	Ratio		Annual Budget Deficit	eficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)
Parliamentary System	0.458 (0.294)	0.438 (0.296)	-0.241 (0.577)	0.884 (0.738)	1.000 (0.713)	4.502 (2.807)	-1.334 (1.296)	-1.286 (1.300)	-2.029 (2.479)
Plurality Representation	-0.266 (0.332)	-0.285 (0.321)	-0.457 (0.431)	-0.022 (0.798)	0.014 (0.782)	0.924 (2.731)	1.918^* (0.985)	2.103** (0.970)	2.963** (1.431)
Control All Houses	0.082 (0.296)	0.094 (0.288)	-0.920^{***} (0.290)	-0.469 (0.737)	-0.396 (0.669)	-0.118 (1.644)	1.043 (0.953)	1.153 (0.913)	-1.107 (1.051)
DEM*Parliamentary System	-0.979^{***} (0.352)	-0.876** (0.369)	0.454 (0.547)	-0.753 (0.922)	-0.195 (0.848)	-0.448 (2.745)	0.309 (1.552)	0.198 (1.609)	-0.338 (1.929)
DEM*Plurality Representation	0.501 (0.340)	0.527 (0.332)	-0.543 (0.468)	0.598 (0.949)	0.726 (0.898)	1.161 (3.145)	-1.944 (1.236)	-2.102* (1.214)	-2.202* (1.259)
DEM*Control All Houses	-0.255 (0.368)	-0.323 (0.371)	0.957** (0.374)	0.172 (0.986)	0.197 (0.932)	-1.521 (1.780)	-2.088* (1.148)	-2.445^{**} (1.085)	$\frac{1.022}{(1.138)}$
log GDP per capita	-0.194^{***} (0.073)	-0.220*** (0.078)	-0.886 (0.801)	0.420** (0.205)	0.352** (0.179)	0.258 (1.308)	0.789** (0.332)	0.801** (0.367)	1.534^{*} (0.823)
State Failure	-5.364^{***} (1.291)	-5.499*** (1.169)	-6.034^{***} (1.294)	12.049 (7.768)	12.153 (7.864)	23.819* (12.537)	-0.373 (0.979)	-0.369 (0.977)	-0.312 (0.534)
Constant	4.043*** (0.601)			-3.295* (1.837)			-9.283*** (2.693)		
Previous GDP Growth?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Year dummy?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country dummy?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	4,107	4,107	4,107	2,037	2,037	2,037	1,727	1,727	1,727
$ m R^2$ Adjusted $ m R^2$	0.196 0.194	0.199	0.113 0.070	0.014 0.010	0.017 -0.007	0.026 -0.060	0.047 0.042	0.053 0.025	0.013 -0.076
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	5; ***p<0.01		8					

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, 4, and 7. Fixed effects OLS regressions in the other columns. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Year dummies are included in regressions 23, 5-6, and 8-9, and country dummies are included in regressions 3, 6, and 9. Dependent variables are annual GDP growth rate, change in debt-GDP ratio, and annual budget deficit. Regression 1-3 include lagged GDP growth rate as endogenous variable. Covariates are added in all regressions. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2015. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.

Table 14: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Debt Accumulation on Unified Democracy Scores

			Larg	Large Sample, 1975-2017	5-2017	
	STO		Change in Debt-GDI Fixed Effects	ot-GDP Ratio	Change in Debt-GDP Ratio from Last Year Fixed Effects	VI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Unified Democracy Scores	0.953***	2.245* (1.338)	1.955 (1.383)	2.071 (1.525)	1.650 (1.326)	-13.207 (12.059)
log GDP per capita				-1.238 (2.494)	-0.834 (2.370)	0.827 (2.190)
State Failure					34.835* (17.805)	35.636^* (19.428)
Constant	-0.479 (0.401)					
Country dummy? Year dummy? Observations R ² Adjusted R ²	No No 1,909 0.006 0.005	Yes No 1,909 0.002	Yes Yes 1,909 0.001	Yes Yes $1,909$ 0.002 -0.098	Yes Yes $1,802$ 0.046 -0.053	Yes Yes $1,801$ 0.014 0.088
Adjusted K ²	0.00	-0.07	-0.098	-0.098	-0.053	-0.088

.p<0.

Note:

Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is the change in debt-GDP ratio clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, from last year. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix 'p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Fixed Effects Results Regressing Budget Deficit on Unified Democracy Scores

			Lar	Large Sample, 1975-2017	2017	
	STO		Ar Fixe	Annual Budget Deficit Fixed Effects	icit	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)
Unified Democracy Scores	-1.062^{**} (0.525)	0.347 (0.839)	-0.369 (0.885)	-1.595* (0.819)	-1.558* (0.818)	(3.193)
log GDP per capita				3.276*** (0.885)	2.990*** (0.838)	2.165 (1.467)
State Failure					-3.830 (2.524)	-3.700 (2.879)
Constant	-1.021^* (0.553)					
Country dummy?	No	$V_{ ho s}$	$V_{ m ho s}$	V_{es}	$V_{ m os}$	$V_{ ho s}$
Year dummy?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,551	1,551	1,551	1,550	1,494	1,494
$ m R^2$	0.028	0.0004	0.0004	0.031	0.031	0.011
$\overline{ m Adjusted~R^2}$	0.028	-0.078	-0.107	-0.074	-0.077	-0.099
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0 Cross-sectional regression with clustered by command year dumm deficit. Covaria	.05; ***p<0.07 l OLS regression legislative elountry are repaires are inclusted attes are addedited attes are addedited data definition.	ion in column ection competi oorted in paren ded in regressic d in regressions	1. Fixed effects tiveness as instructheses. Country ons 3 to 6. Deper 3 4 through 6. B ces, see table for	OLS regressions in cument in column 6. dummies are include indent variable is gove ase sample is an unla descriptive statistics	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2 to 5, and IV regression with legislative election competitiveness as instrument in column 6. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included in regressions 2 to 6, and year dummies are included in regressions 3 to 6. Dependent variable is government annual budget deficit. Covariates are added in regressions 4 through 6. Base sample is an unbalanced panel, 1975 to 2017. For detailed data definitions and sources, see table for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 1.