Can providing information to politicians
reduce hiring irregularities and increase bureaucratic effectiveness?
A field experiment on within-government accountability in Brazil[*]

Pre-Analysis Plan

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Abstract

Does the provision of information about local bureaucracies to the politicians who oversee them decrease irregularities and improve bureaucratic effectiveness? Information interventions are appealing because of their solid microeconomic foundations and their relatively low costs. However, recent experimental studies of information campaigns aimed at fostering vertical accountability (between voters and politicians) have found mixed results. Providing information to politicians directly could be more powerful, given politicians' direct responsibility for allocating and managing resources. Information may be particularly effective when provided by auditing institutions, given politicians' susceptibility to sanctions by these horizontal accountability actors. In this study, I partner with the audit court of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte to experimentally study the effects of informing local politicians (both in government and in the opposition) about irregularities and performance in the bureaucracies they oversee. Outcomes will be measured using administrative monthly payroll data, administrative school and clinic results data, and original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians. The results are expected to contribute to both academic and policy debates about the dynamics of within-government accountability.

Contents

1 Introduction

Governments around the world have the potential to foster human development by facilitating access to universalistic, well-functioning education and healthcare services, supporting economic development, and ensuring public safety and stability. Despite significant progress in schooling, healthcare, and poverty indicators, important challenges remain across the developing world. Leakages in the management of public funds, limits to political competition, and clientelistic exchanges have consistently been associated to development failures. In this context, both researchers and policymakers are increasingly turning to governance interventions to understand and foster economic and human development. With strong foundations on microeconomic theory, and fostered by advancements in information technology, transparency initiatives have been implemented around the world to foster accountability between government and citizens. A common approach has been to provide information to citizens in order to decrease information asymmetries, improve political selection, and/or foster coordination. Nonetheless, recent experimental studies of this kind of interventions have found mixed results of citizen information campaigns on electoral accountability, with effects sometimes going in unexpected directions, or depending on mediators like coordination, expectations, and priors.[1]

In this context of increasing awareness about the challenges for vertical accountability, researchers and donors are exploring venues of horizontal accountability, i.e. accountability between governments and oversight bodies such as auditing institutions, prosecutors, and courts. Some experiments have shown that auditing institutions can decrease rent extraction of local governments.[2]

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[1]Boas et al. (2018) for example find in an experiment in Brazil that voters do punish local incumbents whose accounts had been rejected by the audit court in a vignette experiment, but not when it comes to real voting behavior. Adida et al. (2016) find that informing voters in Benin about the performance of their legislators led them to *punish* good performers, rather than rewarding them, unless the information was disseminated in a way that increased its salience and facilitated voter coordination. Relatedly, Adida et al. (2017) find that ethnicity moderates the effect of information on electoral accountability: voters reward good performers only if they are co-ethnics, and punish bad performers only if they are non-co-ethnics. Arias et al. (2017) find that randomized revelations of malfeasance by mayors in Mexico *increased* support for the incumbent party, which the authors attribute to pre-treatment low prior beliefs among many voters. In a similar vein, Gottlieb (2016) finds in an experiment in Mali that raising voters' expectations of government makes them more likely to hold politicians accountable. Finally, Buntaine et al. (2018) find that Ugandan voters who receive information about local councilors irregularities punish bad performers only when they are running for lower-level positions.

[2]For example, Avis et al. (2017) exploit Brazil's randomized audits and find that these audits reduce corruption in subsequent years. Zamboni and Litschig (2018) present results of a field experiment in that same setting and show that increasing the risk of audit reduced corruption in procurement. The effectiveness of audits however may depend on institutional arrangements like their strength or timing. Bobonis et al. (2016) find that in Puerto Rico audits decrease corruption only when they are scheduled before elections, and De la O and García (2015) find that federal audits (but not state audits) lead to changes in subsequent municipal spending.

Powerful audits are however costly and hard to scale up. Information interventions, on the other hand, are significantly cheaper but also have the potential to increase perceptions of accountability pressure, decrease information asymmetries, and foster accountability behaviors among politicians. Unlike citizens, elites may be particularly responsive to information given their positions of direct responsibility, in at least two ways. First, in contexts with adequate institutions of horizontal accountability,[3] they can be punished for malfeasance on the grounds of electoral, civil and even penal law (e.g. loss of their position, payment of fines, and imprisonment, respectively). Second, political elites have the tools to directly affect governance outcomes, be it through resource allocation or management decisions. An emerging literature has started to use experiments to examine the effects of providing information to politicians on governance. For example, Raffler (2017) provided Ugandan politicians with information and training on their oversight responsibilities, and found positive effects on oversight among local politicians in subcounties that were not aligned with the central government. In Peru, Lagunes (2017) examined the effect of sending letters to municipal governments announcing monitoring of civil works projects by state and non-state actors, and found significant decreases in project costs.

This project contributes to the emerging experimental literature on the dynamics of within-government accountability. In partnership with the audit court of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte, I will randomly assign municipalities to a treatment group where local politicians (both in government and in the opposition) receive a scorecard highlighting bureaucratic irregularities, bureaucratic performance, and politicians' responsibilities in bureaucratic oversight. I hypothesize that the treatment will increase accountability inputs (knowledge, self-efficacy, and perceptions of accountability pressure among politicians), accountability outputs (accountability pressures between the executive and the legislative and between the executive and the bureaucracy, as well as political constraints on patronage), and accountability outcomes (compliance with hiring rules and bureaucratic performance). Outcomes will be measured through detailed administrative data (monthly payroll data, school and clinic performance data), and through original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians. By measuring not only whether the intervention decreases hiring irregularities and improves bureaucratic performance, but also whether (and under what circumstances) it changes accountability inputs and outputs among politicians, the study is expected to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of within-government accountability.

The experiment can also generate valuable contributions for policy making, both in Rio Grande

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[3]As notably argued by O'Donnell (1998), the effectiveness of horizontal accountability institutions requires them to be both authorized and willing to act, as well as to operate within a network of of accountability agencies.

do Norte and elsewhere. Horizontal accountability institutions around the world have increasing access to detailed, administrative data about what governments do, including data on hiring and procurement decisions. These institutions however often lack evidence-based guidance on how to leverage this data to fulfill their mission as accountability actors.[4] This experiment will test a low-cost intervention that is realistic and easily scalable in Rio Grande do Norte, other Brazilian states, and abroad. If the intervention has an effect, estimates of treatment effects at the individual and municipality levels, lessons learned from qualitative data, and cost-benefit analyses will provide useful guidance for future information and accountability campaigns. To ensure that the experiment's lessons are useful for policy, its design is based on continuous dialogue with the field partner, Rio Grande do Norte's state audit court (*Tribunal de Contas do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte*, TCE-RN). TCE-RN is a highly capable institution with an interest in developing evidence-based strategies for guiding their work in overseeing and auditing government institutions in the state. The design is also based on over 100 in-depth interviews I have done across 6 Brazilian states – including Rio Grande do Norte – with municipal bureaucrats, municipal politicians, and state prosecutors in charge of overseeing municipal governments.

The rest of the pre-analysis plan is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical setting, with particular attention to municipal governance institutions in Brazil and the specifics of Rio Grande do Norte. Section 3 discusses the experiment's research design, providing details about the treatment (what information will be delivered, to whom, when, and how), the randomization procedure (based on pairwise matching), and the sampling strategy. Section 4 presents the experiment's theory of change and the corresponding hypotheses. After briefly discussing the data in Section 5, I present the estimation strategy in Section 6, discussing issues of inference, multiple testing, and power. Sections 7 and 8 discuss potential challenges to the experiment's internal and external validity. Section 9 briefly reviews ethical considerations. Section 10 concludes with the timeline for the finalization of the design and the implementation of the experiment.

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[4]For example, the state audit court in Rio Grande do Norte and other accountability institutions in Brazil are often divided between responding to particularistic demands (e.g. a report that one mayor is misusing funds of one small program, or that someone who was eligible to receive a service was denied access to it), and implementing more general, data-driven initiatives. Clearly they are both important, but general, data-driven initiatives (which have the potential to yield much larger efficiency gains) often suffer because they lack political support and a strong empirical base.

2 Context

Brazil is a large, highly decentralized, middle-income country where local governance is particularly critical for development, given municipal governments' responsibility in the provision of public services. In fact, despite some convergence of less-developed regions (like Northeastern states), there remains wide variation in development outcomes, even among municipalities with similar levels of income, as shown in Figure 1. The coexistence of formally equivalent government structures across the country with wide variation in outcomes, and the availability of rich, micro-level datasets make Brazil a suitable context for studying within-government accountability.

Figure 1: Brazilian municipalities vary widely in their success at keeping children alive and educating them

Data are from UNDP's 2010 Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil, available on http://atlasbrasil.org.br/.

2.1 Local governance in Brazil

Brazil's 1988 constitution established a three-level federal system and gave significant fiscal autonomy to municipal governments. Among other things, municipalities are responsible for providing primary education and healthcare, two areas in which they are obliged to spend at least 40% of their revenue, as well as primary social assistance.[5] To achieve those goals, municipalities hire large numbers of bureaucrats – in fact, they spend in average about 60% of their income in salaries.

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[5]Municipal governments, however, depend heavily on inter-governmental transfers and raise only a small fraction of the revenue they spend (Arretche, 2004).

Municipalities can hire bureaucrats essentially under three types of contracts: civil service positions (tenured positions for which candidates muss pass a competitive examination), temporary positions (one-year positions which are supposed to be assigned after some selection process but are often assigned ad hoc), and positions of trust (for which politicians have most discretion). As per the constitution, civil service hiring must be the default for any permanent staffing needs, such as teachers or doctors, but in practice this varies widely. A number of clear legal requirements are also commonly violated across the country, including the limit on personnel expenses (which are not supposed to go over 54% for the executive), the need to do some selection procedure also for temporary hires, and the ban on any person holding more than 2 government jobs. In general, observers have long noted the prevalence of patronage in municipal bureaucracies in Brazil, something that recent research has shown as well (Akhtari et al., 2018; Colonnelli et al., 2018; Toral, 2018).

Elections take place every four years, with municipal elections taking place two years before/after state and federal ones.[6] Municipal elections consist of simultaneous elections for a mayor (who is elected through a majoritarian system) and for a number of city councilors that depends on the municipality's population (and who are elected though a proportional, open-list system).[7] Mayors, who appoint a set of non-elected secretaries, need to build and sustain a base in the legislative chamber in order to pass legislation (including the yearly budget law) and to avoid being impeached.[8] This produces local dynamics of what has been conceptualized, at the federal level, as "coalitional presidentialism" (Abranches, 1988; Power, 2010). While little is known about the dynamics of legislative-executive relations at the local level, my fieldwork suggests there is wide variation in the extent to which mayors have control over (or the support of) the chamber. Still, city councilors generally have considerable leverage in the allocation of patronage positions in the municipal bureaucracy (which is frequently discussed openly by the secretaries I interview).

Brazil has a rich environment of horizontal accountability institutions (O'Donnell, 1998), including state audit courts and powerful and autonomous state prosecutor offices. These institutions, which have become increasingly powerful over time (Praça and Taylor, 2014), act on strong legal

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[6]The next state and federal elections will take place in October this year, while municipal elections are scheduled for October 2020.

[7]The number of city councilors to be elected in each municipality is regulated by a municipal law, subject to limits established by the federal constitution. For municipalities in Rio Grande do Norte, the *maximum* number of city councilors established by the constitution ranges from 9 to 29.

[8]Passing legislation usually requires a simple or absolute majority, while an impeachment requires a qualified majority of two thirds of the chamber. City councilors also play a key role in the review process of municipal accounts – if the state audit court rejects the accounts, these can still be approved with the vote in favor of two thirds of the chamber.

bases, which allow for judges to terminate political mandates, to impose strict fines, and even to imprison malfeasant politicians. State audit courts, which are in charge of overseeing accounts of municipal and state governments, play an important role in this system of horizontal accountability. State audit courts are in charge of reviewing municipal (and state) government accounts,[9] and can conduct audits, impose sanctions (like fines), suspend bidding processes, and report any malfeasance they detect to state prosecutors, who could take politicians to court. Researchers have documented that state audit courts in Brazil have varying degrees of dependency on the executive (Melo et al., 2009). While the appointment system of state audit court councilors (Hidalgo et al., 2016) and more informal links between councilors and politicians (Sakai and Paiva, 2016) limit the independence of these institutions from state governments, the fact that they are increasingly large and professionalized bureaucracies, and that they combine their legal competencies with softer actions like media outreach, trainings, and data collection and dissemination makes them generally powerful actors particularly with respect to governments of small and medium-sized municipalities.

2.2   Rio Grande do Norte

The experiment will take place in Rio Grande do Norte (RN), a state at the heart of the Northeastern region. The Northeast is Brazil's poorest region, and has historically been characterized by inferior development outcomes, corruption, and clientelistic politics, particularly in the allocation of public jobs (Leal, 1948). I chose RN largely due to the state audit court's willingness to partner for an academic study, and to its access to monthly payroll data of all municipal governments in the state. RN is also convenient in that its relatively small size limits the costs of implementing an in-person survey.[10] Rio Grande do Norte has 167 municipalities, of which only 3 have more than 200,000 inhabitants – the rest are quite small, with between 1,600 and 81,000 inhabitants, and a median population below 10,000. In average these municipalities have one third of their population living in rural areas, which generally depend either on subsistence agriculture or agricultural work for large companies.

Municipalities in RN exhibit wide variation across a range of socioeconomic and political

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[9]If the municipal accounts are rejected by the state audit court, and the rejection is not overcome by a qualified majority of the municipal chamber, the mayor becomes ineligible for running in any election for the following eight years.

[10]While implementing the experiment in a larger state (such as Bahia, which has over 400 municipalities) would provide more statistical power and make it possible to test several treatment arms, the costs of implementing a survey in such a setting would exceed my budget.

Figure 2: Location of the field experiment

(a) Brazil
(in grey, the Northeast region; in blue, the state of
Rio Grande do Norte)

(b) Rio Grande do Norte
(colors correspond to the logged population of each
municipality)

variables, as illustrated in Figure 3. Like much of the Northeast, municipalities in RN generally have less people and are poorer when compared to municipalities in the whole of Brazil. Partly as a result of these two facts, municipalities in RN tend to have a larger share of the population hired as municipal employees. These municipalities generally lag behind in human development outcomes such as infant mortality rates, student learning, and student passing rates. Despite persistent challenges of clientelism, elections are generally competitive.

Like all states, Rio Grande do Norte has its own state audit court (*Tribunal de Contas do Estado de Rio Grande do Norte*, TCE-RN), which currently has 436 staff (including the constitutionally mandated 7 councilors) and got in the 2017 budget law 0.7% of the state's budget (over 90 million Brazilian reais, or about USD28 million). TCE-RN's self-declared mission is "to exercise external control, guiding and supervising the use of public resources, to the benefit of society". To achieve that mission, it aims at (i) "curbing the occurrence of fraud and the diversion of public resources"; (ii) "contributing to the improvement of performance and transparency in public management"; and (iii) "increasing the effectiveness of external control actions." This experiment aims at helping TCE-RN achieve all of these targets (TCE-RN, 2018).[11]

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[11]Specifically, the experiment contributes to two key strategic areas of TCE-RN's strategic map, namely improving

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Figure 3: Statistics for municipalities in Rio Grande do Norte (continues, blue line), compared to all municipalities in Brazil (dashed, black line)

Data are from IBGE (Brazil's official statistics institute) and the Ministry of Education

3 Research design

3.1 Treatment

The treatment will consist of a municipal bureaucracy scorecard sent to the following government actors in a randomly selected half of the municipalities:

- Politicians in the executive branch: the mayor and some of the secretaries appointed by them, namely the secretary of finance, the secretary of management,[12] the secretary of education,

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results-based management and widening the use and effectiveness of information technologies.

[12]Municipal secretaries of management (*secretários de administração*) are in charge of managing the municipality's human resources.

the secretary of healthcare, and the secretary of social assistance.[13]

- Politicians in the legislative branch: all city councilors, including those in the mayor's coalition and those in the opposition.

The scorecard will be an A3-sized poster printed in color in high-quality paper, such that it outstands among the many government letters that public officials receive, and that officials can hang it in their offices.[14] It will have the state audit court's logo, and will be accompanied by a letter signed by the court's president. The scorecard will contain the following municipality-specific data, presented in easy-to-understand graphs.

- Descriptive statistics of the local bureaucracy. These will include the number of municipal employees and the amounts spent in their salaries, disaggregating them by contract type (tenured, temporary, positions of trust, and other). These graphs will leverage monthly payroll data submitted to TCE-RN by municipal governments every month. The scorecard will also mention the share of the municipality's revenue that was spent in salaries in 2016, leveraging TCE-RN data.[15]

- Performance statistics of the municipal government. This will include key statistics about the municipal systems of basic healthcare and basic education, leveraging administrative data from the federal Ministries of Education and Healthcare. It will also include municipality-level performance statistics from TCE-RN's Municipal Management Effectiveness Index (IEGM[16]), which assesses the municipal government's effectiveness overall and in 7 policy areas: education, healthcare, management, finances, environment, urban planning, and transparency.[17]

The scorecard will include reminders about the most important legal constraints in hiring (e.g. prevalence of civil service hiring for permanent staffing needs, the general prohibition of anybody holding more than one government job, the limited circumstances in which workers can be hired under temporary contracts or positions of trust, and the limit on the share of municipal revenue

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[13]If any municipality in the treatment group lacks any of these secretariats (which is rare), the information will be sent to the secretary in charge of that policy area.

[14]The scorecard and the survey instruments were piloted in municipalities in Minas Gerais and Ceará.

[15]Unfortunately the more recent data made available by the Secretary of the Treasure does not report data for a large share of municipalities in Brazil and in RN.

[16]https://iegm.tce.rn.gov.br/

[17]The November scorecard will include data of the 2016 IEGM, while the December one will include data from the 2017 IEGM, which is scheduled to be published in early December.

that can be spent on personnel). The scorecard will also emphasize politicians' responsibility in ensuring compliance with the law and in making sure that the municipality's investment in salaries leads to better public services for all. Finally, the accompanying letter will make it clear what other actors are receiving the information in order to foster common knowledge. The scorecards will be sent twice: in early November and in late December.[18] This will ensure that politicians receive the information in a timely manner, close to but ahead of the moment when many hiring decisions are made.[19] Appendix 1 includes a sample scorecard.

3.2   Randomization

Of the 167 municipalities in Rio Grande do Norte, 4 have to be excluded from the experimental sample because they do not submit payroll data to the state audit court. To use a pairwise randomization strategy I need an even number of municipalities, so I further exclude the state capital – Natal – which is in many ways different from all the other municipalities in the state (four times larger than the second largest, a much richer information environment, and way more complex governance structures than in typical municipalities of the interior).

The 162 municipalities that compose the experimental sample are randomly assigned to a treatment condition (where politicians will receive the scorecard) or a control condition (where politicians will receive nothing).[20] In order to increase statistical power, which is a concern given the small sample size, randomization follows a paired matched design (also called pairwise randomized design). Pairs are created using the machine learning algorithm described in Barrios (2014), which is optimal in that it minimizes the mean squared error of the difference in means between treated and control units. In essence, this algorithm follows four simple steps. First, I used ten-fold cross-validated LASSO (the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) to generate a prediction function where the dependent variable is a baseline measure of my primary outcome (the share of municipal employees who are tenured). Second, I used predicted values of the outcome from the sparse conditional expectation function generated with LASSO in order to rank municipalities.

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[18]The first delivery will be done by registered mail, the second delivery in December may be done online depending on the budget.

[19]Municipal governments generally end temporary contracts in December, and start them again in the beginning of the following year (in education generally in February or March when the school year begins; in healthcare and other sectors generally in January).

[20]Note that politicians in all municipalities in the state regularly receive information and requests from TCE-RN, and thus an additional placebo is not necessary.

Next, I created pairs following that rank, such that the first two municipalities form a pair, the next two form another pair, etc. Finally, I randomly assigned treatment within pairs using a random number generator in R. Observable pre-treatment characteristics of municipalities in treatment and control groups are well balanced.[21]

3.3 Sampling

Rio Grande do Norte has 167 municipalities. The state capital Natal and 4 municipalities that report no payroll data are excluded from the experimental sample. The remaining 162 municipalities are assigned half to treatment and half to control. All municipalities -including Natal- will be sent the online survey of politicians. On the other hand, the largest 17 municipalities in the state (which had as of the 2010 census more than 30,000 inhabitants) will be excluded from the sampling frame for the field survey of bureaucrats, for two main reasons. First, because of their size including them in the sampling frame would heavily increase the cost of the survey. Second, including them in the sampling frame would expose enumerators to the serious security challenges typical of large urban areas of the Northeast.[22] Of the remaining 150 small and medium-sized municipalities, a random sample will be selected for the survey of bureaucrats – between 100 and 140 municipalities are expected to be included in the final sample, depending on the implementation in the field.

All politicians listed in Section 3.1, in both treatment and control municipalities, will be sent the politician survey. These surveys will be sent by TCE-RN through their online accountability system – this may induce demand effects but should improve response rates. As for bureaucrats, a random subset of the pairs will be sampled for a field survey. Within each sampled municipality, I will include in the sample for the survey of bureaucrats all or part of the schools, basic healthcare clinics,[23] and basic social assistance centers[24] managed by the municipal government located in the urban area. For municipalities with up to 8 units (about 3/4 of the municipalities in the sampling

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[21]Examining differences between treatment and control municipalities along 45 covariates (of which only 7 are in the LASSO-generated sparse conditional expectation function used to generate pairs), using both difference-in-means and Kolgomorov-Smirnov tests, the lowest p-value is 0.068.

[22]Note, for example, that the state capital Natal is the city with the fourth highest murder rate in the world (see ranking at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cities_by_murder_rate; and recent reporting by El País at https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/03/16/politica/1521236714_432763.html). Mossoró and Parnamirim, the second and third largest cities in the state, are also among the most dangerous cities in the state. 3 of the other 4 largest cities in the state are in the metropolitan area of Natal.

[23]*Unidades básicas de saúde*, i.e.clinics that provide primary healthcare

[24]*Centros de Referência da Assistência Social*, the centers that provide first-entry access to the social assistance system.

frame), all units will be included in the sample. For the largest municipalities, a random sample will be selected. The managers of these units (namely, school directors, clinic managers, and CRAS coordinators) will be surveyed by teams of enumerators who will be trained to that purpose.

Schools, clinics and social assistance centers in rural areas will be excluded from the sampling frame, for three main reasons. First, rural schools and clinics are often staffed for a limited number of days and hours per week. Second, the directors of rural schools very often work at the municipality's urban center, and tend to direct several schools at once. Third, rural areas in the Northeast are logistically hard to reach – they are often accessible only through dirt roads with limited or no GPS service, unmapped on GPS services like Waze or Google Maps. Therefore, including rural areas in the sampling frame would heavily increase the time and budget required for the survey, and may raise security issues for enumerators. While there are many schools and clinics in rural areas, most of the population lives in urban areas and is thus served by urban schools and clinics.[25]

4   Hypotheses

Figure 4 visually represents the experiment's theory of change and synthesizes the hypotheses. At the highest level, I hypothesize that the randomized scorecard improves what I call accountability inputs among politicians (i.e. knowledge, perceived accountability pressure, and self-efficacy); these in turn lead to changes in what I call accountability outputs (i.e. politicians' behaviors vis-a-vis each other and the bureaucracy); and finally that these improve accountability outcomes (i.e. development goods). Figure 4 thus represents the whole hypothesized chain linking treatment to outcomes, making explicit my hypothesized mechanisms.

Separating both in theory and measurement these different accountability inputs and outputs is useful in at least two ways. First, measuring treatment effects on these intermediate variables will be helpful to empirically address the mechanisms behind potential treatment effects on accountability outcomes. For example, say the intervention decreased irregularities in hiring, but we found no treatment effect in any of the accountability inputs and outputs except knowledge about compliance among legislators and legislators' accountability pressure. In that case, the evidence would push me to interpret the treatment effect as working through a reduction of information asymmetries between

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[25]For example, while over 55% of the 2,415 municipal schools in Rio Grande do Norte are in rural areas, they concentrate less than 27% of municipal student enrollments in basic education.

legislative and executive politicians, and an increase in accountability dynamics between them. Second, measuring treatment effects on different accountability inputs (knowledge, perceptions of accountability pressure, and self-efficacy) will give us a sense of the constraints in within-government accountability that can be eased through this type of intervention. In both cases, measuring the effect of treatment in these accountability inputs and outputs will provide insight into how the experiment worked (or why it did not), as well as guidance for future policy and research.

Below each hypothesis, this section details what survey items will be used to test it. In general, hypotheses 1 through 9 will be tested through the surveys of bureaucrats and politicians. Each of them will have a number of survey items associated to them, and an index will be built using principal component analysis to test each hypothesis. Hypotheses 10 and 11 will be tested using administrative data, using different variables for each of them, and thus applying a multiple testing correction. More details on hypothesis testing and corrections are included in Section 6.

4.1   Increases in accountability inputs

H1: Sending the scorecard improves politicians' knowledge about the formal rules that hiring decisions need to follow. The scorecard will highlight some of the most important formal rules in hiring and increase their salience, so I expect it will increase knowledge among officials. The key assumption here is that politicians do not know these rules already. In my interviews I have found knowledge about rules is mixed.

- *In what cases is it legal to hire workers under a temporary contract? (Mark all that apply)*

- *In what cases is it legal to hire workers under a position of trust [cargo comissionado]? (Mark all that apply)*

- *What is the maximum share of its income that the executive municipal government can spend on personnel?*

Figure 4: The experiment's theory of change

H2: Sending the scorecard improves politicians' knowledge about the municipality's compliance with formal rules on hiring. The scorecard will also contain specific information on how the municipality performs with respect to those rules, so knowledge about compliance should also increase. Here the assumption is that politicians lack this knowledge, which is probably more true for legislators than for secretaries.

- *What percent of its revenue does the municipal government spend on personnel?*

- *What is the proportion of the municipality's workers who are hired under a temporary contract?*

- *What is the proportion of the municipality's workers who are hired under a position of trust?*

H3: Sending the scorecard improves politicians' knowledge about the performance of the municipality's bureaucracy. In a similar vein, I expect the scorecard to increase knowledge about the performance of the local bureaucracy. Again I expect the effect to be stronger among city councilors (who are less exposed to bureaucratic management and the reporting mechanisms imposed by the federal government).

- *What score did the municipality receive in the primary school quality index IDEB, as per the results published in September?*

- *Did the municipality reach its target for the primary school quality index IDEB, as per the results published in September?*

- *What score did the municipality get in TCE-RN's municipal management quality index (IEGM)?*

For all these knowledge questions it is likely that some politicians will not respond. The survey instrument encourages them to give an approximate answer, even if they do not know the exact figure. To deal with potential missing data, I will use as outcomes both politician answers and whether they decide to respond even if it is with an approximate answer.

H4: Sending the scorecard increases politicians' perceptions of accountability pressure from the state audit court, TCE-RN. The scorecard is expected not only to provide information but also to increase subjective feelings of accountability pressures from the state audit court, since the state audit court can impose penalties for irregularities detected.

- *"I trust TCE-RN" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)*

- *"TCE-RN is concerned with improving municipal management" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)*

- *"TCE-RN knows the reality of this municipality" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)*

- *"TCE-RN has a positive influence the management of this municipality" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)*

- *"TCE-RN detects irregularities that take place in the management of this municipality" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)*

H5: Sending the scorecard increases politicians' sense of self-efficacy in the control of irregularities in hiring. The scorecard will highlight politicians' responsibilities in shaping the local bureaucracy's compliance, and hence I expect it to increase their sense of self-efficacy, especially among city councilors. By self-efficacy I refer to politicians' beliefs that they are responsible for and capable of controlling irregularities in hiring.

- *Rank the following actors according to who is most responsible in controlling irregularities in hiring: mayor, secretaries, city councilors, bureaucrats, citizens, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the state audit court.*

H6: Sending the scorecard increases politicians' sense of self-efficacy in overseeing the bureaucracy and fostering its performance. The scorecard will also highlight politicians' responsibilities in fostering the performance of the municipal bureaucracy, and hence I expect it to increase their sense of self-efficacy in this respect.

- *Rank the following actors according to who is most responsible for improving the quality of public services: mayor, secretaries, city councilors, bureaucrats, citizens, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the state audit court.*

4.2   Increases in accountability outputs

If the treatment increases accountability inputs (knowledge, self-efficacy, and perceived accountability pressure) I hypothesize it will increase – to a lesser extent – accountability outputs or behaviors among politicians.

H7: Sending the scorecard improves politicians' understanding that the use of bureaucratic appointments as patronage should be limited. I expect the treatment to improve attitudes about the use of patronage in municipal bureaucracies.

- Conjoint experiment where respondents see pairs of hypothetical municipal employees, with attributes randomly varied. To test this hypothesis, I will look at the average marginal component effect of an employee having political connections on it being chosen as more likely to be appointed for a position of street level management (such as school director or clinic manager).

H8: Sending the scorecard increases legislators' accountability pressure on the executive. By informing and empowering legislators, who usually operate in environments with less information, I expect the treatment will foster the accountability pressure of city councilors on the executive.

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met with a city councilor?* (for politicians in the executive)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met with a city councilor?* (for bureaucrats)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you been contacted by a city councilor?* (for bureaucrats)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met with a secretary?* (for politicians in the legislative)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met with the mayor?* (for politicians in the legislative)

- *"City councilors are well informed about the reality of public services in your municipality" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)* (for politicians in the executive and bureaucrats)

- *"City councilors work to improve public services for the all" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)* (for politicians in the executive and bureaucrats)

- *"City councilors make inquiries about the state of public services int he municipality" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)*

H9: Sending the scorecard increases the accountability pressure of politicians in the executive (the mayor and secretaries) on the bureaucracy. I hypothesize the treatment will increase monitoring and oversight of the bureaucracy by the political leadership.

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you visited a municipal school?* (for politicians in the executive)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you visited a municipal clinic?* (for politicians in the executive)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you visited a municipal social assistance center?* (for politicians in the executive)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met with secretaries?* (for the mayor only). The idea here is that the mayor may choose to put pressure on the bureaucracy via their secretaries.

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met with the mayor?* (for secretaries only)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met the secretary in your area?* (for bureaucrats only)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met with technicians from the secretariat of your area?* (for bureaucrats only)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you met the mayor?* (for bureaucrats only)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you been contacted by the mayor?* (for bureaucrats only)

- *How many times in the past 3 months have you been contacted by the secretary in your area?* (for bureaucrats only)

- *"The mayor and [education / healthcare / social assistance] professionals have the same priorities in relation to [the schools / the clinics / the social assistance centers]" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)* (for bureaucrats only)

- *"The secretary of [education / healthcare / social assistance] knows the reality of this [school / clinic / social assistance center]" (agreement on a 1-4 scale)* (for bureaucrats only)

- *"The secretariat of [education / healthcare / social assistance] holds this [school / clinic / social assistance center] accountable for its results"* (agreement on a 1-4 scale) (for bureaucrats only)

4.3 Increases in accountability outcomes

Last, I hypothesize the treatment will increase development outcomes, in two areas – decreases in hiring irregularities (which is my primary outcome) and increases in bureaucratic effectiveness (effects which I expect to be weaker and to take longer to show in the data – I think of these as downstream outcomes). My prior is that the experiment will have weak or no effects in accountability outcomes, since the treatment is relatively weak, the experiment has a small sample size, and these outcomes are harder to influence.

H10: Sending the scorecard decreases hiring irregularities. Through some or all of the causal chains hypothesized above, I hypothesize the scorecard decreases hiring irregularities, as measured through administrative payroll data:

- Percent of municipal employees who are not tenured. This is the experiment's main outcome, which was used in the pairing algorithm. To examine the drivers of any potential treatment effects, I will also look at the following variables that can be seen as components of the share of non-tenured employees:

    - Percent of municipal employees under temporary contracts.
    - Percent of municipal employees in positions of trust.
    - Logged total number of municipal employees.

- Logged total amount spent in salaries.

- Share of municipal income spent in personnel.

- Number of municipal employees who have more than one or two positions in the public sector.

H11: Sending the scorecard improves bureaucratic performance. These are some measurable downstream outcomes that the experiment might impact.

- Municipal primary school average grade (Portuguese and Mathematics), as measured by the Ministry of Education's IDEB in late 2019 (data to be released in 2020).

- Municipal primary school average passing rate, as measured by the Ministry of Education's IDEB in late 2019 (data to be released in 2020).

- Number of pre-natal check-ups, as measured by the Ministry of Healthcare's SIAB during the first semester of 2019 (possibly not released til 2020).

- Number of healthcare home visits, as measured by the Ministry of Healthcare's SIAB during the first semester of 2019 (possibly not released til 2020).

- Number of families who benefit from the social assistance program PAIF during August 2019 (data released in 2020), as measured by the Ministry of Social Development's Social Assistance Census.

4.4   Heterogeneous treatment effects

With only 162 municipalities in the experimental sample, the experiment is severely under-powered to examine heterogeneity in treatment effects at the municipality level – interactions would have to be very significant for the experiment to be able to pick them up. I hypothesize nonetheless some potential sources of heterogeneity which may have a large effect.

H12: Increases in accountability outputs and outcomes are particularly likely where the mayor has a low level of support in the legislature. Mayors who lack a strong support basis in the chamber are arguably more vulnerable and hence more sensitive to manipulations of accountability inputs. The level of support in the legislature will be measured with the average perception about politicians of the share of legislators who support the mayor. The hypothesis will be tested by interacting the treatment indicator with an indicator for whether that level of support is below the state-wide median.

H13: Increases in accountability outputs and outcomes are particularly likely where the mayor is in their first term and is thus eligible for re-election. Mayors who are eligible for re-election are arguably more responsive to increases in accountability inputs. The hypothesis will be tested by interacting the treatment indicator with an indicator for whether the mayor is in their first term.

H14: Increases in accountability outputs and outcomes are particularly likely where the share of municipal employees is lower (below the median). Municipal governments that have less employees under tenured contracts have more room for maneuver to decrease patronage and cut personnel expenses. They may also be more able to put pressure onto the bureaucracy to increase performance. This hypothesis will be tested by interacting the treatment indicator with an indicator for whether the share of tenured employees (at baseline) is below the state-wide median.

On the other hand, some individual-level heterogeneity might be detected at the individual level.

H15: Increases in accountability inputs are larger among legislators. I hypothesize city councilors to be more sensitive to the information treatment given their lower baseline levels of information, and self-efficacy.

H16: Increases in accountability inputs are larger among opposition legislators. I hypothesize opposition city councilors (those who do not declare supporting the mayor) to be more sensitive to the information treatment given their even lower baseline levels of information. I will test this hypothesis by interacting

H17: Increases in accountability pressure on bureaucrats are larger among those who have closer ties to the executive. I hypothesize municipal governments will put more accountability pressure on bureaucrats that have closer ties to politicl leadership (mayor, secretaries).

5   Data

5.1   Outcome data

The experiment will examine several kinds of outcomes: informational and attitudinal outcomes (measured through individual-level surveys of bureaucrats and politicians); the size, distribution, and compliance of local bureaucracies (measured through payroll data); and the performance of local bureaucracies.

5.1.1 Administrative data

Statistics about the local bureaucracy (numbers and types of contracts, expenses on personnel) will come from monthly, administrative payroll data on all municipal contracts submitted every month by municipal governments to TCE-RN. While this data is currently not made publicly available, TCE-RN is planning to make it available on their website by the end of 2018, and will provide me access to the data for the purposes of the experiment. The data thus allow for testing effects at multiple points in time. Since temporary contracts tend to be renewed between January and February, my preferred specification will use data for March, a month that is close enough to treatment but allows for potential treatment effects to kick in through the hiring decisions of the first few months of the year. If need be, monthly payroll data can be complemented with yearly, identified administrative data on the universe of municipal employees at the contract level, which I have access to through an agreement with the Ministry of Labor. Statistics about the performance of local bureaucracies will be obtained from administrative records maintained by the federal government. These data are generally updated on a yearly basis, so these outcomes (on which I expect the experiment will have little or no effect) will only be analyzed months after the intervention.

5.1.2 Survey data

I will conduct surveys of bureaucrats and politicians to collect data on the accountability inputs and outputs represented in Figure 4. I will implement, with a team of enumerators, a field survey of bureaucrats in mid-level management positions (namely, school directors and clinic managers). With TCE-RN, I will also implement an online survey of mayors, secretaries and city councilors in all municipalities in the state. In order to boost response rates, politician surveys will be delivered through TCE-RN's official portal, through which they maintain communication with executive and legislative branches of all municipalities in the state.[26] Besides items that will aim to measure the accountability inputs and outputs in my theory, the surveys will also ask basic questions about respondents' demographics and professional experience, including partisanship, experience in their post, appointment mode (for bureaucrats). The survey questionnaires are included in the Appendix.[27]

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[26]The system allows to use pop-up alerts to remind officials or any pending tasks. If response rates are low, there is the possibility of calling politicians' offices to remind them of the survey.

[27]Additionally, I am working on a potential survey of state prosecutors throughout the state, mostly related to another project. If the survey is confirmed, I will include one or several items in the survey to measure the number

5.2   Covariates

Pre-treatment covariates used in the LASSO regression for pairing municipalities come from multiple sources, including the Supreme Electoral Court, the official statistics institute IBGE, UNDP, and the Ministries of Finance, Education, Healthcare, and Social Development. I also used baseline analyses of the payroll data obtained each month by TCE-RN.

5.3   Qualitative data

During the weeks in which the surveys will be fielded by teams of enumerators, I will conduct in-depth, semi-structured interviews with politicians and bureaucrats in randomly selected pairs of municipalities (i.e. both in the treatment and control group). These interviews will provide qualitative data on the mechanisms of the intervention, from who actually received the information and how it was processed within the office of a politician, to how it was interpreted, and to what kind of dynamics it led to. In-depth interviews will also provide insight into how within-accountability dynamics work absent of treatment, with an eye to complementing the quantitative data.

6   Estimation and inference

The experiment will collect both municipality-level and individual-level data, from administrative and survey sources. Some of the experiment's outcome variables (those corresponding to the accountability outcomes as defined in Section 4) are inherently municipal. Others however are individual-level variables that can either be aggregated up to be analyzed at the level of the municipality, or analyzed at the individual level, which has advantages to examine individual sources of heterogeneity in treatment effects.

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of government malfeasance reports prosecutors received in each municipality. If possible I will measure how many of these reports were related to personnel issues. The underlying hypothesis here is that the scorecard can increase the willingness and ability of different stakeholders (especially but not exclusively opposition city councilors) to resort to the prosecutor's office.

6.1 Municipality-level analyses

My estimand of interest is the average treatment effect, or difference between expected potential outcomes of municipalities under treatment and under control: $\tau = \mathbb{E}[Y_{m,1}] - \mathbb{E}[Y_{m,0}]$. Since treatment assignment will be randomized and is thus independent of potential outcomes, the average within-pair difference in observed outcomes is an unbiased estimator of the average treatment effect. Since paired matched designs are in essence a block designed where blocks are composed of two units (one of which is randomly assigned to treatment), I will estimate the average treatment effect regressing the outcome data at the municipality level on a treatment indicator and a set of pair dummies:

$$Y_m = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \alpha_j \mathbf{I}[j = m] + \beta D_m + \varepsilon_m \tag{1}$$

where Y_m is the outcome of interest for municipality m, $\sum_{j=1}^{J} \alpha_j \mathbf{I}[j = m]$ is the set of J pair dummies (one of which acts as the intercept), D_m is the treatment indicator for municipality m, and ε_m is an i.i.d error term. Since treatment D_m is randomly assigned, $\hat{\beta}$ as estimated with OLS is an unbiased and efficient estimator for τ.[28] For models where the dependent variable Y_m comes from administrative data and for which I have time-series, I will include as a control a baseline measure of the dependent variable, demeaned and interacted with treatment, such that Equation 1 becomes $Y_m = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \alpha_j \mathbf{I}[j = m] + \beta D_m + \theta(\tilde{Y}_m - \bar{\tilde{Y}}_m) + \gamma(\tilde{Y}_m - \bar{\tilde{Y}}_m)D_m + \varepsilon_m$, where $\tilde{Y}_m$ is the baseline measure of outcome Y for municipality m. With this estimating strategy I seek to increase power, which could be lower using a first-differenced design (McKenzie, 2012).

For inference about the null hypothesis of no average treatment effect, I will use homoskedastic standard errors, which are equivalent to heteroskedastic standard errors in the context of paired randomized experiments, as shown by Barrios (2014).[29] I will also test the sharp null of no effect for all pairs ($Y_{j,1} = Y_{j,0} \forall j$) using randomization inference. To do so, I will derive the full schedule of potential randomizations (under the pairwise randomized design, and without changing the pairs

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[28]The traditional approach to analyzing paired randomized experiments, which is better aligned with the design but actually produces equivalent estimates, would be to examine the difference between the outcome of the treated and the outcome of the non-treated municipality within each pair j, $\hat{\tau}_j$. The pair thus becomes the unit of analysis. The average treatment effect , $\hat{\tau}$, would then be estimated taking the average of J within-pair differences in outcomes, where $\hat{\tau}_j = Y_{j,1} - Y_{j,0}$ and $\hat{\tau} = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \hat{\tau}_j$, or regressing $\hat{\tau}_j$ on a constant.

[29]In the pair-based approach, the variance is estimated using the normalized sample variances of the within-pair differences (Imbens and Rubin, 2015, 227): $\hat{\mathbf{V}}(\hat{\tau}) = \frac{4}{N(N-2)} \sum_{j=1}^{J} (\hat{\tau}_j - \hat{\tau})^2$. Barrios (2014) shows that this is equivalent to the homoskedastic variance from running OLS on Equation 1.

that will be determined before the actual randomization, as discussed in Section 3.2) and simulate the average treatment effect under all of them to derive the sharp null distribution of $\hat{\tau}$. I will report p-values for both classical and sharp null hypotheses, but given the experiment's small sample size I will give priority to p-values from randomization inference. Finally, one-tailed t-tests will be used for testing hypotheses 1-6, since these are most clearly one-directional.[30]

6.2 Individual-level analyses

For survey outcome data, which will be used to test hypotheses 1 through 9, I will analyze data aggregated at the level of the municipality as well as at the individual level. When I aggregate data up, I will simply regress sample averages as in Equation 1, weighting municipality-level observations by the number of survey respondents in each. The main advantage of this approach is that it keeps analysis aligned with the randomization procedure. Analyzing survey data at the individual level, on the other hand, allows for examinations of heterogenous treatment effects by individual-level covariates. To do so I will simply use an individual-level regression where I interact the treatment indicator with K demeaned mediators:

$$Y_{im} = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \alpha_j \mathbf{I}[j=m] + \beta D_m + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left[\theta_k (X_{im}^k - \bar{X}^k) + \gamma_k (X_{im}^k - \bar{X}^k) D_m \right] + \varepsilon_{im} \qquad (2)$$

Where γ_k represents the effect of treatment D_m on individual-level outcome Y_{im} when the individual-level mediator X_{im}^k is present. In these individual-level regressions, I will use cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level, since the individual level data has clustering in both the design and sampling (Abadie et al., 2017).

6.3 Conjoint experiment

Partly to test hypothesis 7, namely that treatment fosters the view that patronage appointments should be limited, I embed a conjoint experiment in the politician survey. Conjoint experiments

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[30]It is hard to imagine a scenario where the information decreases knowledge, self-efficacy, and perceptions of accountability pressure from TCE-RN.

allow researchers to non-parametrically identify and estimate the causal effect of several variables simultaneously while limiting social desirability bias (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Respondents will see four sets of two hypothetical profiles of municipal employees, with randomly assigned attributes in six dimensions (appointment mode, political connections, education, experience, gender, and union membership). For each pair, respondents will be asked which one they believe will work longer hours if needed; will have better performance; will be more likely to stay in their post; will be more likely to implement changes requested by the local government; will have a better communication with the local government; and will be more likely to be appointed for a street level management position (e.g. school director, clinic manager). It is answers for this last question that will be used to test hypothesis 7.

Hainmueller et al. (2014) show that, with randomly assigned attributes and assuming that potential outcomes take on the same value when the hypothetical profiles for the same choice task have the same attributes and that the ordering of profiles has no effect, we can estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for each attribute's value using linear regression. In essence, the AMCE is the effect of a hypothetical employee having a given characteristic on them being chosen, averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes. To estimate the AMCE of different attributes I use the following equation for each task:

$$Y_{ijk} = \alpha + \boldsymbol{\beta W}_{ijkl} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \tag{3}$$

Where Y_{ijk} is the choice expressed by respondent i for profile j in the choice task k (i.e. whether that given employee will be more likely to be appointed for a street level management position); W_{ijkl} is the vector of dummy variables for the l levels of each attribute in profile j (omitting a baseline category in each attribute); and ε_{ijk} is a standard error clustered at the respondent level to account for the dependencies between the choices each respondent makes. $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$ nonparametrically identifies the average marginal component effect for each of the attributes and their values on a hypothetical director being chosen for a given task in the sample. To test hypothesis 7, I include in W_{ijkl} an interaction term between the political connections variable and a treatment dummy.

6.4 Multiple testing corrections

Since I will test multiple variables to test for each of the hypotheses listed in Section 4, the experiment faces a multiple testing problem. I address this issue with two strategies. First, for survey

data, which I use to test hypotheses 1 through 9, I will generate one index for each hypothesis by applying principal component analysis to each set of survey items corresponding to one hypothesis (e.g. knowledge about rules). This serves two purposes. First, it reduces the noise-to-signal ratio in my measures of the outcomes, thus increasing the power of my tests. Second, it aggregates multiple variables into a single one, eliminating the need for multiple testing corrections. Generating an index for each of these hypotheses is also sensible since I do not have a priori reasons to expect some survey items to respond differentially to treatment than others (say a question about knowledge about the legal limit on personnel expenses, versus a question about knowledge on the cases where the law permits temporary hiring). I will verify the unidimensionality of each of these sets of variables using Horn's parallel analysis (Horn, 1965; Hayton et al., 2004).[31]

Second, for administrative outcome data, which I use to test hypotheses 10 and 11, I will not aggregate different variables into an index and instead correct for multiple testing for each of the hypothesis-specific set of tests. In particular, I will use the Westfall-Young bootstrapping procedure for controlling the family-wise Type I error rate (Westfall and Young, 1993). I choose this procedure over others (such as the Bonferroni correction) because of its known benefits in terms of efficiency and robustness to dependency among tests and to non-normal distributions.

6.5   Power calculations

With a sample of 162 municipalities, statistical power is an obvious challenge. Calculating power, in this scenario where the sample size is given and there is no clustering of units, is important not in order to guide decision making but to better interpret a potential null result. I use the mean and standard deviation of baseline data for my primary outcome (share of municipal employees who are not tenured): $\mu = 0.369, \sigma = 0.204$. I present results from power calculations running simulations under two extreme scenarios: complete randomization and quite successful pairing in terms of being able to rank observations by their potential outcomes, which is an optimal pairing strategy, as shown by Barrios (2014).

For the baseline scenario of complete randomization, in each simulation I generated generated potential outcomes under control ($Y_{m,0}$) by drawing 162 observations from a random normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation as my baseline variable. I then generated

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[31]If a group of variables belonging in the same hypothesis proves not to be unidimensional, variables that have a negative loading on the first component may be dropped.

potential outcomes under treatment by adding a hypothesized treatment effect τ ranging from 0.004 to 0.1 ($Y_{m,1} = Y_{m,0} + \tau$). Next, I assigned treatment under complete randomization and produced observed outcomes. Then I regressed observed outcomes on a treatment indicator, and then stored the p-value. The average of those p-values below $\alpha = 0.05$ gives a measure of the experiment's power for that given effect size. For the scenario of pairwise randomization, I ranked observations according to their potential outcome under control, and then added some random noise (from a normal distribution with $\mu = 0$ and $\sigma = 0.04$, or 20% of the baseline variable's variance). This is to approximate a procedure where I would pair municipalities according to the predicted value of a conditional expectation function of the outcome (Barrios, 2014). I then randomly assigned one observation within each pair to treatment and the other one to control, and produced observed outcomes. Finally, I regressed the observed outcomes on a treatment indicator as well as pair dummies, and stored the share of p-values below α. Simulation results are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Power calculations under scenarios of complete and pairwise randomization

Following these simulations, using complete randomization I would only reach the conventional power of 0.8 at considerable effect sizes (of about 0.45 standard deviations). With the pairing algorithm I described above, power improves significantly. In this scenario, the difference-in-means estimator would reach the power of 0.8 for effect sizes of about 0.1 standard deviations. The predictive function I will use may not perform as well in terms of predicting the rank of observations' potential outcomes, so the experiment's power line may lie somewhere in between the two curves on Figure 5.

7 Potential challenges to internal validity

This section discusses potential challenges to the validity of the experiment, including the extent to which they are likely to emerge, how they will be assessed, and how they will be addressed.

7.1 Non-excludability of treatment

Estimating the average treatment effect without bias requires us to assume that the randomized treatment assignment affects outcomes only through the treatment.[32] This exclusion restriction would be violated if the randomized assignment of municipalities into treatment or control put in motion mechanisms other than the treatment. This might happen for example if actors within the state audit court, consciously or unconsciously, differentially adapted their auditing or other management decisions in response to municipalities' random assignment and adapted audit. Another violation might emerge if politicians in treated municipalities knew they were being part of an experiment and adapted their own management decisions or survey responses to that fact.

I will use several strategies to prevent violations to the excludability assumption. First, experimental subjects (municipal governments, including politicians and bureaucrats) will be blinded to their participation in the experiment. The TCE-RN deals regularly with municipal governments sending them information, materials, and requests, so the delivery of scorecards is not expected to make municipal politicians suspect that they are part of an experiment. Second, I am also exploring with the partner strategies of blinding TCE-RN personnel to the random assignment. Third, enumerators will be blinded to random assignment (although they will be made aware of the existence of the RCT and its details, in order to increase their understanding of the survey effort and boost their commitment to the project). Fourth and last, all measurement procedures will be done in parallel and following the same procedures for both treated and untreated municipal governments – the surveys will be implemented at the same time and through the same channels, and both administrative and survey data will be analyzed altogether using the same code.[33]

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[32] More formally, this means we are assuming that the potential outcomes of unit i when it receives treatment and when it does not (i.e. when $d = 1$ and $d = 0$) are the same regardless of whether unit i was assigned to the treatment or the control group (i.e., when $z = 1$ and $z = 0$): $Y_i(z = 1, d) = Y_i(z = 0, d)$.

[33] I expect to pre-register the code for analyzing administrative data.

7.2   Imperfect compliance

Estimating the average treatment effect also requires that municipalities assigned to treatment are effectively treated, and those assigned to control are de facto excluded from treatment. Since the intervention here is simple, municipality-specific, and one-directional, imperfect compliance is unlikely. There could however emerge one scenario of one-sided noncompliance, where some municipalities assigned to treatment are actually not sent the scorecards due to a logistical failure of the mailing system. This is however quite unlikely, and measures will be taken to maximize the chances of delivery of the information, including the use of registered mail and the reinforcement of the treatment in late December.

7.3   Attritition

A third potential challenge to the experiment's validity would be attrition, i.e. the lack of outcome data for some experimental units. Accountability outcomes (bureaucratic irregularities and performance) will be measured through administrative data that is regularly collected either by the state audit court, the state government, or the federal government. As such, all municipalities be them in the treatment or control, will have outcome data for those variables. As for survey data, several complications may arise that lead to attrition of individual respondents. On the side of bureaucrats, some sampled bureaucrats may refuse to participate in the survey (because of mistrust, lack of time, or because of higher-level pressures not to participate in the study). There is also the possibility that sampled bureaucrats are not present at the time when enumerators go to their school / clinic. Enumerators will be instructed to note why the person was not present, to attempt to reach them again later that same day and if still unsuccessful substitute the school/clinic with the first one in a back-up sample. Finally, not all municipalities in the state will be covered by the field survey due to budget constraints.

Response rates may be a more serious issue among politicians, but it is reasonable not to expect treatment to affect response rates. Moreover, TCE-RN's system of reminders and pop-up alerts should help boost rates In any case, I will monitor response rates among bureaucrats and politicians during the implementation of the surveys, to identify potential issues of survey implementation and attrition and to implement additional strategies to reach survey participants if need be.

7.4 Interference between units

The identification of the average treatment effects requires us to assume that the potential outcomes of municipality m do not depend on the treatment assignment of any other municipality m'. Violations to this assumption of no spillovers would emerge if for example politicians in a treated municipality get in touch with the politicians of another municipality (say one in the control group) and by telling them about the scorecard the former increase the perception of accountability pressure from the court among the latter.

I do not expect interference between units because municipalities in Brazil, particularly in the interior, are relatively isolated units. Brazil's federal structure provides municipal governments with significant autonomy, and management decisions on all areas from fiscal to hiring or political decisions are taken autonomously by municipal managers. Municipal governments of course act within legal constraints imposed by the federal and state governments, especially in fiscal, procurement, and hiring decisions. Politicians and mid-level managers in the bureaucracy (school directors, clinic managers, etc.) usually work in a single municipality. While they may be in touch with actors in neighboring municipalities, my sense from fieldwork is that there are no intense exchanges between municipalities. Moreover, the treatment contains municipality-specific information, these contacts are rare and it is unlikely that Moreover, the treatment contains municipality-specific information,

8 Potential challenges to external validity

The experiment's external validity has two main potential challenges, namely the representativeness of the treatment and that of the sample. The treatment is being designed such that, on the one hand it is as strong as possible (given the limits to statistical power stemming from a small sample) while at the same time remaining realistic. TCE-RN and other state audit courts (as well as horizontal accountability institutions in general, in Brazil and abroad) regularly get in touch with local politicians and expose them to information and persuasion campaigns. In that sense, the treatment is not in essence different from what these horizontal accountability institutions already do. Some details of the intervention are perhaps less common, such as sending the information to a large number of politicians at the same time (including those in the legislative branch of the municipal government) and delivering it in the format of a highly-visual scorecard printed in color and high-quality paper. These details can easily be adopted for future interventions, were the

experiment to show significant treatment effects and qualitative evidence to suggest they made a difference.

A second challenge to external validity is related to the representativeness of the sample. The experimental sample consists of all municipalities in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, with the exception of the capital. This is however not a random nor representative sample of all of the municipalities in the country or of localities in other low-capacity settings, and in that sense the findings of the experiment may not travel to other contexts with different socioeconomic features or within-government accountability dynamics. Municipalities in RN are however sufficiently varied for the findings to be relevant to researchers and policymakers working in other low- or middle-income contexts with somewhat similar governance institutions.

9 Ethical considerations

The study is undergoing review by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects at MIT. In the paragraphs below, I discuss potential ethical concerns related to the experiment, and argue why the intervention involves no more than minimal risk for subjects. In this discussion of the ethical implications of the experiment, I go beyond the core principles of the Common Rule and engage with recent discussions about the ethics of political science experiments, as articulated by Desposato (2015) and Humphreys (2015).

Informed consent. Human subjects in the experiment are the public officials who will receive the scorecards – namely, mayors and city councilors, who are elected, and secretaries, who are appointed by mayors. The experiment will not seek their informed consent for two main reasons. First, making them aware that their receiving the scorecard is part of an experimental study would severely jeopardize the validity of the experiment, since they would most likely disregard the information. Second, politicians constantly receive information from multiple government agencies, including the state audit court. With regards to the surveys which will be used to measure some of the experiment's outcomes, survey respondents (mayors, city councilors, secretaries, and bureaucratic managers) will go through standard informed consent procedures before deciding to participate in the survey.

Deception. Human subjects in the experiment – public officials of municipalities in the treatment group – will not be deceived. They will receive information that reflects real, up-to-date, high-

quality administrative data, and data sources will be included. The sources of the data are all publicly available government data, and the municipality's own payroll data which they submit monthly to TCE-RN (which is about to roll out a program where they make that data public on their website).

Researcher involvement. The state audit court of Rio Grande do Norte regularly sends municipal politicians information and persuasion campaigns to try and constrain corruption, foster compliance, and increase efficiency in the use of public funds. Nonentheless, the court lacks a rigorous empirical base for understanding whether and how these campaigns influence municipal finances and governance. The information campaign in the experiment differs from other campaigns in three main aspects, as a result of the my involvement. First, this campaign introduces an experimental design, where a random half instead of all the municipalities in the state will be exposed to this campaign. Second, the content and format of the campaign will be designed joining data from multiple sources (including publicly available administrative data, and payroll data submitted by the municipalities to the court) to create scorecards that will be printed in high-quality, color posters instead of usual black and white letters. Third, the campaign will be accompanied by surveys of bureaucrats and politicians to better understand the effects of the information.

Risks. The experiment is merely an information campaign, leveraging information that is already public or known to politicians. This makes the intervention very weak by design. To the extent that the intervention does have an effect, it is expected to be positive, by decreasing irregularities in hiring, freeing up municipal government resources, improving local governance, and fostering the performance of the local bureaucracy. Municipal elections will happen almost two years after the intervention (in October of 2020), and state and federal elections will happen two years later (in October of 2022). Therefore, the intervention is very unlikely to affect elections. I foresee three potential adverse effects for some individuals. In all three cases, net benefits for citizens in the municipality are likely to outweigh the potential adverse effects for some politicians or bureaucrats.

- Some municipal employees could perhaps see their jobs (contract, conditions, etc.) impacted by the intervention, if it makes treated politicians in the executive change their hiring decisions. This is unlikely, but because of the design of the scorecard the jobs that are most likely to be affected are those that were created as patronage or clientelistic positions – in that sense, while that particular individual may be negatively affected as a result of the intervention, the municipality as a whole would benefit through a more efficient use of resources.

- By providing information to city councilors (that is, politicians outside the executive government), and potentially increasing their knowledge, self efficacy and capacity to exercise their accountability role vis-à-vis the municipal government, the intervention could intensify accountability pressures among the legislative and the executive, and/or between politicians in power and in the opposition. Again a mere information campaign leveraging information that is already public or known to politicians is unlikely to have more than weak effects. But to the extent the intervention does intensify accountability pressures from the legislative on the executive (which may bring costs to politicians in the executive), most theories in political science predict these pressures to have a positive effect on local governance, government performance, and citizen welfare.

- Finally, both the intervention itself and the surveys may take time away from bureaucrats and politicians that they would better invest in other tasks like serving citizens. Surveys are however designed to take little time (15 minutes for politicians and 30 for bureaucrats). More importantly, these time investments are expected to yield

Beneficience. Beyond the intervention's expected benefits and the strategies described above to minimize risks, the study includes a number of actions that are expected to benefit the state where the experiment is being implemented. First, I will deliver a one or two-day training to bureaucrats of TCE-RN and other horizontal accountability institutions on the theory and practice of social experiments, and how it can be leveraged for improving the work they do. If treatment effects and the learning experience is beneficial, this is expected to be the first of many experiments implemented by the state audit court to widen the evidence base for their accountability work. Second, I will present the results to TCE-RN through an in-person seminar and a policy-oriented report in Portuguese, so they can use the results internally to orient their work as well as to launch discussions on their influence over local governance. Third and last, the project will train about 20 enumerators who are students or recent graduates of the local federal university, and provide them with skills and experience in surveys that can later be leveraged for other local research projects.

Anonymity of the survey data. All survey data will be kept confidential and stored in secured hard drives. Only aggregate results will be published, and no piece of information that can identify respondents will be made publicly available.

10 Implementation timeline

Implementation will go through the following milestones:

- Sending of scorecards to politicians in treatment municipalities: November 13-15

- Training of survey enumerators: November 19-23

- Field survey of bureaucrats: November 26-December 21

- Online survey of politicians: November 26-December 21

- Distribution of second copy of the scorecard: December 17-21

Appendix 1: Sample municipality scorecard (size A3)

TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DO ESTADO
RIO GRANDE DO NORTE

GESTÃO DE PESSOAL E DESEMPENHO MUNICIPAL
CONFIRA OS DADOS DE ACARI

TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DO ESTADO
RIO GRANDE DO NORTE

O TCE-RN disponibiliza o presente painel como forma de contribuir para avaliações sobre a composição do quadro de pessoal do município e os resultados alcançados na gestão.

O QUADRO DE PESSOAL MUNICIPAL
Fonte dos dados: Folha de pagamento de março de 2018 (SIAI DP)

A Prefeitura Municipal de Acari conta com 460 servidores, dos quais 75% são concursados.

Servidores por tipo de vínculo

- 347 Concursados
- 7 Outros
- 33 Cargos comissionados
- 73 Temporários

Acari gasta cerca de R$866.958 por mês em salários. Em 2016, Acari gastou 56,79% da receita do executivo em pessoal, sendo que o limite máximo estabelecido por lei é 54% e o limite prudencial é 51,3%.

Gasto mensal em salários por tipo de vínculo

Salários em milhares de reais (eixo Y: 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600)
Eixo X: Concursados, Temporários, Cargos comissionados, Outros

É responsabilidade do Prefeito/a e dos Secretários e Vereadores desenvolver ações e acompanhá-las para que as contratações de pessoal se ajustem às regras (veja quadro vermelho).

O ESTADO DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA NO MUNICÍPIO
Fonte de dados: Ministério da Educação (IDEB)

Na avaliação do governo federal para 2017, o Ensino Fundamental 1 (anos 1 a 5) nas escolas municipais de Acari teve uma nota de 6,6 pontos no Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (IDEB), que junta dados de aprendizado e aprovação. A meta para esse período era de 6,2 pontos. Das 4 escolas municipais do Ensino Fundamental 1 com dados para o IDEB de 2017, 3 atingiram a sua meta.

Evolução da nota do Ensino Fundamental 1 no IDEB

- Nota
- Meta

Nota / meta do IDEB no EF1 (eixo Y: 4.5, 5.0, 5.5, 6.0, 6.5)
Ano (eixo X: 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021)

O ESTADO DA SAÚDE BÁSICA NO MUNICÍPIO
Fonte dos dados: Ministério da Saúde (SINASC)

As mulheres gestantes devem receber no mínimo 7 consultas de pré-natal, segundo as indicações do Ministério da Saúde. Segundo os dados mais recentes, mais de 50% das crianças de Acari nasceram de mães com menos de 7 consultas de pré-natal. Segundo dados do último censo, a cada 1.000 crianças nascidas vivas em Acari cerca de 21 morrem antes de atingir 1 ano de idade.

Confira o desempenho das Unidades Básicas da Saúde, por área:

Unidades Básicas da Saúde (UBS) por desempenho

Número de UBS (eixo Y: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8)
Eixo X: Estrutura, Equipamentos, Medicamentos

- Muito acima da média
- Acima da média
- Na média ou abaixo

É responsabilidade do Prefeito/a e dos Secretários e Vereadores desenvolver ações e acompanhá-las para que o gasto em salários contribua a serviços públicos de qualidade.

A QUALIDADE DA GESTÃO MUNICIPAL
Fonte dos dados: Tribunal de Contas do Estado do RN (IEGM)

O Tribunal de Contas do Estado mede a qualidade da gestão dos municípios por meio do Índice de Efetividade da Gestão Municipal (IEGM). Segundo os dados de 2016, Acari tem um desempenho de 0,57, comparado com o desempenho médio dos municípios do estado que é 0,49.

Qualidade da gestão por área

Índice de qualidade da gestão (eixo Y: 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0)
Eixo X: Gestão municipal, Educação, Saúde, Planejamento, Gestão fiscal, Meio ambiente, Proteção cidadãos, Tecnologia informação

- Baixo nível de adequação
- Em fase de adequação
- Efetiva
- Muito efetiva
- Altamente efetiva

Cabe aos agentes públicos assegurar que os recursos do município (incluindo os servidores, que constituem a principal despesa) sejam bem geridos e repercutam em melhores serviços públicos e melhores indicadores de desenvolvimento humano e de gestão. Acompanhar o cumprimento das normas e fiscalizar a Administração são deveres básicos de todo agente público.

PRINCIPAIS NORMAS DE CONTRATAÇÃO DE PESSOAL

- O gasto com pessoal deve ficar dentro do limite legal, 54% da receita corrente líquida do executivo municipal.
- O concurso público deve ser o modo prioritário de contratação.
- Quando excepcional interesse público justifique a contratação temporária, deve-se, sempre que possível, realizar um processo seletivo.
- Cargos em comissão destinam-se apenas a atribuições de direção, chefia e assessoramento.
- O acúmulo de cargos no setor público é proibido, exceto havendo compatibilidade de horários para dois cargos de professores ou profissionais de saúde

É responsabilidade dos agentes públicos municipais aprimorar a gestão em todas as áreas, e assim transformar salários em melhores condições de vida para os cidadãos.

Appendix 2: Survey instruments

The survey instrument of politicians can be found here.

The survey instrument for street level managers can be found here. This sample is for school directors – survey instruments for clinic managers and social assistance center coordinators are equivalent, but adapting questions to their policy area.

Questionnaires of politicians and bureaucrats, in both Portuguese and English, are also included at the end of this file, for reference.

Appendix 3: Additional figures

Figure 6: Municipalities in the treatment group (in blue), in the control group (in white), and excluded from the experimental sample (in grey)


Figure 7: Largest 17 municipalities, excluded from the sampling frame for the survey of street level bureaucrats

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Português   ⬍

Informação sobre a pesquisa

Bem-vindo(a) ao levantamento sobre gestão pública municipal. Este levantamento está sendo conduzido pelo Tribunal de Contas do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte (TCE-RN) em colaboração com um pesquisador do Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), nos Estados Unidos, quem analisará os dados e os apresentará ao Tribunal. O objetivo do levantamento é compreender melhor os desafios enfrentados pelos gestores municipais no Rio Grande do Norte. Leva aproximadamente 15 minutos para completar o questionário. As conclusões do levantamento poderão ser publicadas em artigos e/ou livros acadêmicos. Suas respostas serão completamente confidenciais. Sob nenhuma circunstância será publicada qualquer informação que possa vir a identificá-lo/a.

Caraterísticas pessoais, incluindo experiência na gestão

Que cargo público o(a) Senhor(a) ocupa?

◯ Prefeito(a)

◯ Secretário(a)

○ Vereador(a)

○ [   ] Outro:

O(a) Senhor(a) é Presidente da Câmara de Vereadores?

○ Sim

○ Não

O(a) Senhor(a) é Secretário(a) de que área(s)? Marque todas as que correspondam

☐ Educação

☐ Saúde

☐ Assistência Social

☐ Administração

☐ Finanças

☐ Meio ambiente

☐ Planejamento

☐ Esporte e lazer

☐ Obras públicas

☐ Comunicação

☐ Governo

☐ Transporte

☐ Cultura

☐ Agricultura

☐ ⬚ Outra (por gentileza especificar):

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O(a) Senhor(a) ocupa esse cargo em que município?

⬚ ▲▼

No total, o(a) Senhor(a) tem quantos anos de experiência como Prefeito(a), Secretário(a) e/ou Vereador(a) neste município ou em outros municípios?

⬚ ▲▼

Antes de ocupar o cargo que ocupa atualmente, o(a) Senhor(a) trabalhou como funcionário municipal (em qualquer município)?

○ Sim

○ Não

Que tipo de cargo o(a) Senhor(a) desempenhou como funcionário municipal? Marque todos os que correspondam.

○ Profissional da educação

○ Profissional da saúde

○ Profissional da assistência social

○ [   ] Outro (por gentileza especificar):

O(a) Senhor(a) está filiado(a) a algum partido político?

○ Sim

○ Nao

Qual o nome do partido ao qual o(a) Senhor(a) está filiado(a)?

[   ]

Selecione seu sexo

◯ Homem

◯ Mulher

Qual é o nível de educação do(a) Senhor(a)?

◯ Nenhum

◯ Ensino fundamental incompleto

◯ Ensino fundamental completo

◯ Ensino médio incompleto

◯ Ensino médio completo

◯ Técnico incompleto

◯ Técnico completo

◯ Superior incompleto

◯ Superior completo

◯ Pós-graduação

◯ Mestrado

◯ Doutorado

Qual é a sua idade?

[▲▼]

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Conhecimento sobre compliance com regras

As próximas duas perguntas são de caráter mais técnico. Não é necessário que as suas respostas sejam exatas. Responda no melhor do seu conhecimento e, se não sabe, pode deixar sem responder.

Que porcentagem aproximada dos funcionários neste município são contratados (temporários)? Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

Que porcentagem aproximada dos funcionários neste município são cargos comissionados? Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

Que porcentagem aproximada da receita do município é gasta com despesas de pessoal? Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

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Eficácia

Como o(a) Senhor(a) ranquearia a seguinte lista de atores, de acordo com a responsabilidade que eles têm no controle das irregularidades na contratação de pessoal? Coloque acima de tudo o que mais responsabilidade tem, e o último o que menos responsabilidade tem, sempre segundo a sua opinião. Para mover um ator para acima ou para abaixo, basta com clicar e arrastar até a posição desejada.

Os(as) servidores(as)

Os cidadãos

O Ministério Público

O Tribunal de Contas do Estado

Os(as) Vereadores(as)

O(a) Prefeito

Os(as) Secretários(as)

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Como o(a) Senhor(a) ranquearia essa mesma lista de atores, agora de acordo com a responsabilidade que eles têm na melhoria dos serviços públicos municipais (tais como saúde e educação)? Coloque acima de tudo o que mais responsabilidade tem, e o último o que menos responsabilidade tem, sempre segundo a sua opinião. Para mover um ator para acima ou para abaixo, basta com clicar e arrastar até a posição desejada.

O Tribunal de Contas do Estado

O(a) Prefeito

Os(as) servidores(as)

Os(as) Vereadores(as)

Os(as) Secretários(as)

O Ministério Público

Os cidadãos

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Como o(a) Senhor(a) ranquearia as seguintes áreas, de acordo com a importância que segunda a sua opinião elas têm para o eleitor do seu município na hora de decidir o voto? Coloque acima a área que você acha é mais importante para os votantes, e embaixo a área que você acha é menos importante, sempre segundo a sua opinião. Para mover um ator para acima ou para abaixo, basta com clicar e arrastar até a posição desejada.

Segurança

Saúde

Empregos na prefeitura

Educação

Assistência social

Luta contra a corrupção

Economia no geral

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Reuniões, visitas, atitudes

Pensando nos últimos 3 meses, quantas vezes aproximadamente o(a) Senhor(a) visitou...?

Número aproximado de visitas feitas nos últimos 3 meses

... uma escola municipal?

Número aproximado de visitas feitas nos últimos 3 meses

... uma unidade básica de saúde (UBS) municipal?

... um centro de referência da assistência social (CRAS) municipal?

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Pensando também nos últimos 3 meses, quantas vezes aproximadamente o(a) Senhor(a) manteve reuniões com cada um desses atores?

Número aproximado de reuniões nos últimos 3 meses

... um(a) coordenador(a) de centro de referência de assistência social municipal?

... um(a) gerente de unidade básica de saúde municipal?

... o(a) Secretário(a) de saúde?

Número aproximado de reuniões nos últimos 3 meses

... o(a) Secretário(a) de administração?

... um(a) Promotor(a) do Ministério Público?

... o(a) Secretário(a) de finanças?

... o Governador?

... o Secretário de educação?

... um(a) Vereador(a)?

... o(a) Prefeito(a)?

... o(a) Secretário(a) de assistência social?

... um(a) diretor de escola municipal?

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Quanto o(a) Senhor(a) concorda com as seguintes afirmações?

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
O Tribunal de Contas do Estado se preocupa com melhorar a gestão municipal	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Ministério Público conhece a realidade deste município	◯	◯	◯	◯
Os vereadores conhecem a realidade dos serviços públicos do município	◯	◯	◯	◯
Os vereadores trabalham para melhorar os serviços públicos para toda a população	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Ministério Público detecta as irregularidades que acontecem na gestão deste município	◯	◯	◯	◯
Os vereadores fazem investigações sobre o estado dos serviços públicos do município	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Tribunal de Contas do Estado detecta as irregularidades que acontecem na gestão deste município	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Ministério Público tem influenciado positivamente a gestão deste município	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Tribunal de Contas do Estado tem influenciado positivamente a gestão deste município	◯	◯	◯	◯
Eu tenho confiança no Ministério Público	◯	◯	◯	◯

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
O Tribunal de Contas do Estado conhece a realidade deste município	○	○	○	○
Eu tenho confiança no(a) Tribunal de Contas do Estado	○	○	○	○

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Vereadores, desempenho do município

Quantos Vereadores tem a Câmara Municipal do seu município?

```

```

Quantos dos Vereadores na Câmara são da base do(a) Prefeito(a) hoje em dia?

E quantos dos Vereadores na Câmara eram da base do(a) Prefeito(a) no começo da gestão, em janeiro de 2017?

No geral, o(a) Senhor(a) se considera parte da base do(a) Prefeito(a)

○ Sim

○ Não

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Experimento de conjoint

A continuação o(a) Senhor(a) vai ver uma série de comparações de dois perfis imaginários de servidores municipais. Tome um tempo para olhar as caraterísticas dos servidores em cada um dos quesitos. Para cada comparação desses servidores imaginários, o(a) Senhor(a) terá de responder uma série de perguntas, escolhendo um dos dois servidores imaginários. As escolhas são totalmente subjetivas, não tem resposta certa ou resposta errada. Escolha segundo a sua opinião, e lembre que as suas escolhas podem variar de uma pergunta para outra.

Rodada 1 de 4

	Servidor A	**Servidor B**
Formacao	Graduação	Pós-graduação
Sexo	Mulher	Mulher
Atividade sindical	Não participa de nenhum sindicato	Participa de um sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	10 anos	10 anos
Tipo de contrato	Contratação temporária	Contratação temporária
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Servidor A	Servidor B
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de trabalhar além do expediente quando for necessário?	◯	◯
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria melhor desempenho na sua área de atuação?	◯	◯

	Servidor A	Servidor B
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a 2 anos?	◯	◯
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chance de implementar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	◯	◯
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Prefeitura?	◯	◯
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de ser nomeado para um posto de gestão (e.g. diretor de escola ou gerente de posto de saúde)?	◯	◯

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Rodada 2 de 4

	Servidor A	**Servidor B**
Formacao	Graduação	Graduação
Sexo	Mulher	Mulher
Atividade sindical	Não participa de nenhum sindicato	Participa de um sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	3 anos	10 anos
Tipo de contrato	Contratação temporária	Contratação temporária
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Servidor A	Servidor B
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de trabalhar além do expediente quando for necessário?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria melhor desempenho na sua área de atuação?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a 2 anos?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chance de implementar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Prefeitura?	○	○

	Servidor A	Servidor B
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de ser nomeado para um posto de gestão (e.g. diretor de escola ou gerente de posto de saúde)?	◯	◯

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Rodada 3 de 4

	Servidor A	**Servidor B**
Formacao	Pós-graduação	Graduação
Sexo	Mulher	Mulher
Atividade sindical	Não participa de nenhum sindicato	Participa de um sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	3 anos	3 anos
Tipo de contrato	Concurso público	Concurso público
Vinculos politicos	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Servidor A	Servidor B

	Servidor A	Servidor B
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de trabalhar além do expediente quando for necessário?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria melhor desempenho na sua área de atuação?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a 2 anos?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chance de implementar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Prefeitura?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de ser nomeado para um posto de gestão (e.g. diretor de escola ou gerente de posto de saúde)?	○	○

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Rodada 4 de 4

	Servidor A	**Servidor B**
Formacao	Pós-graduação	Graduação
Sexo	Mulher	Homem
Atividade sindical	Não participa de nenhum sindicato	Não participa de nenhum sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	3 anos	3 anos
Tipo de contrato	Concurso público	Concurso público
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura
	Servidor A	Servidor B
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de trabalhar além do expediente quando for necessário?	◯	◯
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria melhor desempenho na sua área de atuação?	◯	◯
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a 2 anos?	◯	◯

	Servidor A	Servidor B
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chance de implementar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Prefeitura?	○	○
Qual destes servidores o(a) Senhor(a) acha teria mais chances de ser nomeado para um posto de gestão (e.g. diretor de escola ou gerente de posto de saúde)?	○	○

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Conhecimento sobre regras

As seguintes perguntas são de caráter mais técnico. Não se preocupe se não souber a resposta exata. Responda no melhor do seu conhecimento e, se não souber a resposta, pode deixar em branco.

Em qual o quais dos seguintes cenários é permitido contratar um funcionário com contrato temporário? Marque todos os que correspondam. Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

- ☐ Limites orçamentários
- ☐ Período eleitoral
- ☐ Conflito sindical
- ☐ Excepcional interesse público

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Para qual ou quais das seguintes tarefas é permitido contratar um funcionário como cargo comissionado? Marque todos os que correspondam. Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

- ☐ Direção
- ☐ Campanha eleitoral
- ☐ Assessoria

☐ Chefia

☐ Apoio

☐ Necessidades urgentes

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Qual é o porcentagem máximo da receita do município que pode ser gasta com pessoal? Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

[ ]

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Em que mês do último ano do mandato do(a) Prefeito(a) começa o período em que é proibido aumentar as despesas com pessoal?

[⬍]

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Desempenho do município

O IDEB é o Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica, um índice publicado pelo governo federal a cada dois anos medindo a qualidade do ensino, numa escala de 0 a 10.

Qual foi a nota deste município para o IDEB dos anos iniciais em 2017, a qual foi divulgada em setembro deste ano? Não precisa indicar a nota exata, pode ser a nota aproximada. Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

[   ]

O município atingiu a meta para o IDEB dos anos iniciais?

○ Sim, o município atingiu a meta

○ Não, o município não atingiu a meta

○ Não sei dizer

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O Índice de Efetividade da Gestão Municipal (IEGM) é o índice que publica o Tribunal de Contas do Estado todos os anos medindo a qualidade da gestão municipal, numa escala de 0 a 1.

Qual foi a nota do seu município no IEGM de 2016, o qual foi divulgado o ano passado? Se não souber uma resposta aproximada, pode deixar em branco.

[   ]

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Conclusão

A pesquisa acaba aqui. Muito obrigado de novo pela sua participação. Se tiver qualquer comentário, pode inseri-lo aqui:

Powered by Qualtrics

English (US) ⬍

Informação sobre a pesquisa

Welcome to the survey about municipal public management. This survey is being conducted by the State Audit Court of Rio Grande do Norte (TCE-RN) in collaboration with a researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in the United States, who will analyze the data and present them to the Court. The goal of the survey is to better understand the challenges that municipal politicians in Rio Grande do Norte face in public management. It takes approximately 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The conclusions of the survey may be published in academic articles and/or books. Your responses are completely confidential. Under no circumstance will any information that may identify you be published.

Caraterísticas pessoais, incluindo experiência na gestão

What position do you hold?

◯ Mayor

◯ Secretary

◯ City Councilor

○ [   ] Other:

Are you the President of the City Council?

○ Yes

○ No

What areas are you the Secretary for? Mark all that apply

☐ Education

☐ Healthcare

☐ Social assistance

☐ Administration

☐ Finance

☐ Environment

☐ Planning

☐ Sport and pleasure

☐ Public works

☐ Communication

☐ Government

☐ Transportation

☐ Culture

☐ Agriculture

☐ ☐ Cultura

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In what municipality do you occupy this position?

[▲▼]

In total, how many years of experience do you have as Mayor, Secretary, and/or City Councilor in this or in other municipalities?

[▲▼]

Before holding the position you currently hold, did you work as a municipal employee?

◯ Yes (specify the position):

◯ No

What kind of position did you hold as a municipal employee? Mark all that apply

◯ Education professional

◯ Healthcare professional

◯ Social assistance professional

◯ [   ] Other (please specify):

Are you a member of any political party?

◯ Yes

◯ No

What is the name of the party that you are a member of?

[   ]

Select your gender

◯ Man

◯ Woman

What is your education level?

◯ None

◯ Incomplete basic education

◯ Complete basic education

◯ Incomplete high school

◯ Complete high school

◯ Incomplete community college

◯ Complete community college

◯ Incomplete bachelors degree

◯ Complete bachelors degree

◯ Masters / PhD / graduate degree

◯ Mestrado

◯ Doutorado

How old are you?

[▲▼]

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Conhecimento sobre compliance com regras

The following two questions are more technical. It is not necessary that your answers be exact. Answer to the best of your knowledge and, if you do not know the answer, you can leave it empty.

What is the approximate share of municipal employees that are temporary? If you do not know an approximate answer, you can leave it blank.

<div style="border:1px solid #888; height:80px;"></div>

What is the approximate share of municipal employees that are positions of trust? If you do not know an approximate answer, you can leave it blank.

<div style="border:1px solid #888; height:80px;"></div>

What approximate percentage of the municipality's income is spent on personnel? If you do not know an approximate answer, you can leave it blank.

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Eficácia

How would you rank the following list of stakeholders, according to the responsibility they have in controlling irregularities in the hiring of personnel? Place on top the one you think is most responsible for controlling irregularities in hiring, and in the bottom the one who you think is least responsible. To move an actor up or down, you can just click and drag it to the desired position.

Citizens

The mayor

The state audit court

The city councilors

The public prosecutor's office

Municipal employees

The secretaries

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How would you rank that same list of actors, now according to the responsibility they have in improving public services (such as healthcare and education)? Place on top the one you think is most responsible for improving the quality of municipal public services (such as healthcare and education), and in the bottom the one who you think is least responsible, always according to your opinion

The State Audit Court

The Mayor

The Secretaries

The City Councilors

Citizens

The Public Prosecutor's Office

Municipal employees

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How would you rank the following areas, according to the importance you think they have for voters in your municipality when they decide their vote? Place on top the area that you think is most important for voters, and in the bottom the one you think is least important for them, always according to your opinion.

Jobs in the municipal government

Education

Security

Social assistance

Healthcare

Economy in general

Fight against corruption

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Reuniões, visitas, atitudes

Thinking of the last 3 months, how many times approximately did you visit...?

Number of visits done in the last 3 months

... a municipal social assistance reference center?

... a municipal basic healthcare unit?

... a municipal school?

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Thinking about the last 3 months, how many times approximately did you meet with each of these actors?

Number of meetings in the last 3 months

... the Secretary of Healthcare?

... the Secretary of Finance?

... a Prosecutor from the Public Prosecutors' Office?

... the Mayor?

... the Governor?

... a City Councilor?

... the Secretary of Administration?

... a manager of a municipal basic healthcare unit?

... the Secretary of Education?

... a director of a municipal school?

Number of meetings in the last 3 months

... a coordinator of a municipal social assistance reference center?

... the Secretary of Social Assistance?

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To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
"I trust the State Audit court"	◯	◯	◯	◯
"The State Audit Court is concerned with improving municipal management"	◯	◯	◯	◯
"The State Audit Court knows the reality of this municipality"	◯	◯	◯	◯
"City councilors work to improve public services for the whole population"	◯	◯	◯	◯

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
"I trust the Public Prosecutor's Office"	○	○	○	○
"The Public Prosecutor's Office has had a positive influence on municipal education"	○	○	○	○
"City councilors make investigations about the state of public services in the municipality"	○	○	○	○
"The State Audit Court has had a positive influence on municipal management"	○	○	○	○
"City councilors know the reality of social services in the municipality"	○	○	○	○
O Tribunal de Contas do Estado detecta as irregularidades que acontecem na gestão deste município	○	○	○	○
"The Public Prosecutor's Office knows the reality of this municipality"	○	○	○	○
O Ministério Público detecta as irregularidades que acontecem na gestão deste município	○	○	○	○

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Vereadores, desempenho do município

How many City Councilors are there in the Municipal Chamber of your municipality?

How many of the City Councilors in the Chamber support the Mayor, as of today?

How many of the City Councilors in the Chamber supported the Mayor at the beginning of their mandate, in January of 2017?

In general, do you consider yourself part of the Mayor's coalition in the Chamber?

○ Yes

○ No

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Experimento de conjoint

Now you will see a series of comparisons of two imaginary profiles of municipal employees. Take some time to look at the characteristics of each employee for each of the sections. For each comparison of imaginary employees, you will have to answer some questions by choosing one of the two imaginary employees. Choices are completely subjective, there are no right or wrong answers. Choose following your opinion, and remember that your choice can vary from one question to the next.

Round 1 of 4

	Worker A	**Worker B**

	Graduação	Pós-graduação
Formacao	Graduação	Pós-graduação
Sexo	Mulher	Mulher
Atividade sindical	Participa de um sindicato	Não participa de nenhum sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	10 anos	10 anos
Tipo de contrato	Concurso público	Contratação temporária
Vinculos politicos	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Worker A	Worker B
Which one of these workers do you think would be more likely to work beyond the hours in their contract, when needed?	○	○
Which one of these workers do you think would have better performance in their area?	○	○
Which one of these workers do you think would have more chances to stay in their post 2 years from now?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the municipal government?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would have a better communication with the municipal government?	○	○

	Worker A	Worker B
Which of these workers do you think would be more likely to be appointed for a management position in the municipality (e.g. school director, or manager of a healthcare clinic)?	○	○

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Round 2 of 4

	Worker A	**Worker B**
Formacao	Pós-graduação	Graduação
Sexo	Homem	Mulher
Atividade sindical	Participa de um sindicato	Não participa de nenhum sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	10 anos	3 anos
Tipo de contrato	Concurso público	Contratação temporária
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Worker A	Worker B

	Worker A	Worker B
Which one of these workers do you think would be more likely to work beyond the hours in their contract, when needed?	○	○
Which one of these workers do you think would have better performance in their area?	○	○
Which one of these workers do you think would have more chances to stay in their post 2 years from now?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the municipal government?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would have a better communication with the municipal government?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would be more likely to be appointed for a management position in the municipality (e.g. school director, or manager of a healthcare clinic)?	○	○

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Round 3 of 4

	Worker A	**Worker B**
Formacao	Pós-graduação	Graduação
Sexo	Mulher	Mulher
Atividade sindical	Participa de um sindicato	Não participa de nenhum sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	10 anos	3 anos
Tipo de contrato	Contratação temporária	Concurso público
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Worker A	Worker B
Which one of these workers do you think would be more likely to work beyond the hours in their contract, when needed?	◯	◯
Which one of these workers do you think would have better performance in their area?	◯	◯
Which one of these workers do you think would have more chances to stay in their post 2 years from now?	◯	◯

	Worker A	Worker B
Which of these workers do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the municipal government?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would have a better communication with the municipal government?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would be more likely to be appointed for a management position in the municipality (e.g. school director, or manager of a healthcare clinic)?	○	○

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Round 4 of 4

	Worker A	**Worker B**
Formacao	Graduação	Pós-graduação
Sexo	Mulher	Homem

Atividade sindical	Não participa de nenhum sindicato	Participa de um sindicato
Experiencia como funcionario	10 anos	10 anos
Tipo de contrato	Concurso público	Concurso público
Vinculos politicos	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura
	Worker A	Worker B
Which one of these workers do you think would be more likely to work beyond the hours in their contract, when needed?	○	○
Which one of these workers do you think would have better performance in their area?	○	○
Which one of these workers do you think would have more chances to stay in their post 2 years from now?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the municipal government?	○	○
Which of these workers do you think would have a better communication with the municipal government?	○	○

	Worker A	Worker B
Which of these workers do you think would be more likely to be appointed for a management position in the municipality (e.g. school director, or manager of a healthcare clinic)?	○	○

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Conhecimento sobre regras

The following questions are also more technical. Do not worry if you do not know the exact answer. Answer to the best of your knowledge and, if you do not know the answer, you can leave it blank.

In which of the following cases is it allowed to hire a municipal worker under a temporary contract? Mark all that apply. If you do not know an approximate answer, you can leave it blank.

☐ Budgetary limits

☐ Union conflict

☐ Exceptional public interest

☐ Electoral period

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For which of the following tasks is it allowed to hire a municipal worker under a position of trust? Mark all that apply. If you do not know an approximate answer, you can leave it blank.

☐ Support

☐ Leadership

☐ Direction

☐ Urgent needs

☐ Advisory

☐ Electoral campaign

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What is the maximum share of the municipality's income that may be spent in personnel? If you do not know an approximate answer, you can leave it blank.

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What month during the last year of the Mayor's mandate does the period in which it is forbidden to increase personnel expenses start?

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Desempenho do município

IDEB is the Basic Education Development Index, an index published by the federal government every two years measuring the quality of teaching, on a 0 to 10 scale.

What was the grade this municipality got for primary education IDEB for 2017, which was published in September this year? You do not need to enter the exact grade, it can be an approximation. If you do not know the answer, you can leave it blank.

Did the municipality reach its IDEB target for primary school?

○ Yes, the municipality reached its target

○ No, the municipality did not reach its target

○ I do not know

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The Municipal Management Effectiveness Index (IEGM) is the index published by the State Audit Court every year measuring the quality of municipal management on a 0 to 1 scale.

What was the grade of your municipality in the 2016 IEGM, which was published last year? If you do not know an approximate answer, you can leave it blank.

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Conclusão

The survey ends here. Thanks again for your participation. If you have any comments, you can insert them here:

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Português ▲▼

1. Identificação do município e a escola

[SELECIONE O MUNICÍPIO]

▲▼

[SELECIONE A UNIDADE]

[QUANTAS VISITAS VOCÊ TEVE QUE FAZER À UNIDADE PARA CONSEGUIR FALAR COM O GESTOR?]

▲▼

[SEXO DO GESTOR]

◯ Mulher

◯ Homem

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2. Consentimento informado

[ENTREGAR FOLHA DE INFORMAÇÕES]
Olá, meu nome é [SEU NOME E SOBRENOME] e estou fazendo uma pesquisa acadêmica para o Instituto Tecnológico de Massachusetts (MIT), nos Estados Unidos. Esta é a minha identificação [MOSTRE A IDENTIFICAÇÃO]. O objetivo desta pesquisa universitária e entender os desafios na gestão das escolas, das UBS e dos CRAS dos municípios do Rio Grande do Norte. A sua participação é voluntária. Se você decidir participar, levará aproximadamente entre 20 e 30 minutos para completar o questionário. Você pode optar por terminar sua participação a qualquer momento. Suas respostas serão totalmente confidenciais e guardadas em arquivos seguros. Sob nenhuma circunstância será publicada qualquer informação que possa vir a identificá-lo(a). Os resultados da pesquisa serão publicados em artigos e/ou livros acadêmicos. Na folha que eu lhe di você pode ver estas informações sobre a pesquisa, assim como os contatos do pesquisador principal e do comité de ética que autorizou a pesquisa. De novo, gostaria de enfatizar que a pesquisa é puramente acadêmica, financiada por uma universidade, e não fazemos parte de nenhum governo ou partido político. Deseja participar da pesquisa?

[SE O GESTOR RESPONDE QUE NÃO, TENTE ENTENDER POR QUE E LEMBRE A PESSOA QUE A PESQUISA É PURAMENTE ACADÊMICA E CONFIDENCIAL, E LEVA SÓ UNS 20 MINUTOS.]

◯ SIM, deseja participar da pesquisa

◯ NÃO, não deseja participar da pesquisa

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[QUE MOTIVOS VOCÊ CONSIDERA QUE LEVARAM O GESTOR A NÃO PARTICIPAREM DA PESQUISA]

Falta de tempo

☐

Outros (especificar):

☐

Desconfiança (indicar que tipo)

☐

Obrigado pela sua participação. Se a qualquer momento durante a pesquisa qualquer coisa não estiver clara, por favor não hesite em me perguntar.

3. Experiência na educação e na escola

Primeiramente vou lhe fazer algumas perguntas básicas sobre a sua experiência na educação e nesta escola.

Que cargo você ocupa na escola? [NÃO LER OPÇÕES]

◯ Diretor(a)

◯ Diretor(a) adjunto(a) ou Vice-diretor(a)

◯ Coordenador(a) pedagógico(a)

◯ [   ] Outro:

Há quantos anos que você ocupa esse cargo nesta escola?

[⬍]

No total, você tem quantos anos de experiência como diretor(a) desta ou outras escolas?

[▲▼]

E no total, você tem quantos anos de experiência como professional da educação, nesta ou outras escolas?

[▲▼]

Você assumiu a direção desta escola por que meio? Por exemplo, indicação, eleição, concurso... [NÃO LER AS OPÇÕES, MARCAR AS QUE O GESTOR MENCIONE]

☐ Concurso público　　　　　　　　☐ Processo seletivo

Eleição　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Outro

☐　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　☐ [   ]

☐ Indicação

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Você aprovou o concurso de diretor(a) há quantos anos?

[▲▼]

Você foi indicado(a) por quem? [NÃO LER AS OPÇÕES, MARCAR AS QUE O GESTOR MENCIONE]

☐ Prefeito(a)

☐ Técnicos do gabinete do(a) Prefeito(a)

☐ Secretário(a) de educação

☐ Técnicos da Secretaria de educação

Vereador(a)

Outros atores:

☐

☐ [   ]

Há quantos anos foi indicado(a) pela última vez?

[▲▼]

Que proporção aproximada dos votos você recebeu na eleição?

Quem tinha direito de participar na eleição? [NÃO LER OPÇÕES, MARCAR AS QUE O GESTOR MENCIONE]

☐ Professores

☐ Trabalhadores da escola

Pais e mães

☐

Outros:

☐

☐ Alunos

Desses atores que tinham direito de voto, qual você acha teve maior impacto no resultado da eleição?

Professores	Pais e mães	Alunos	Trabalhadores	Outros
○	○	○	○	○

Há quantos anos você foi eleito(a) pela última vez?

☐ ▲▼

Quantas horas por semana trabalha como diretor(a) desta escola?

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4. Caraterísticas pessoais

Você mora neste município?

○ Sim

○ Não

Qual é o seu nível de educação? [NÃO LER OPÇÕES]

○ Nenhum   ○ Técnico completo

○ Ensino fundamental incompleto   ○ Superior incompleto

○ Ensino fundamental completo   ○ Superior completo

○ Ensino médio incompleto   ○ Pós-graduação - Especialização

○ Ensino médio completo   ○ Pós-graduação - Mestrado

○ Técnico incompleto   ○ Pós-graduação - Doutorado

Qual é a sua idade?

[▲▼]

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Efficácia

[ENTREGAR CARTÃO COM OPÇÕES "NADA - POUCO - MAIS OU MENOS - MUITO"] Neste cartão você pode ver quatro opções de resposta: nada, pouco, mais ou menos, e muito. Eu vou falar uma série de atores, e gostaria que você me falasse quanto você acha que eles são responsáveis pela melhoria da educação

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
O Ministério Público	○	○	○	○

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
O(a) Prefeito(a)	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Tribunal de Contas do Estado	◯	◯	◯	◯
Os(as) servidores(as)	◯	◯	◯	◯
Os(as) Vereadores(as)	◯	◯	◯	◯
O(a) Secretário(a) de educação	◯	◯	◯	◯
Os cidadãos	◯	◯	◯	◯

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[ENTREGAR CARTÃO DE ATORES] Como você ranquearia essa mesma lista de atores, de acordo com a responsabilidade deles na melhoria da educação? Primeiro o que mais responsabilidade tem, e o último o que menos responsabilidade tem, sempre segundo a sua opinião.

Os(as) servidores(as)

Os cidadãos

O Ministério Público

O(a) Secretário(a) de educação

O Tribunal de Contas do Estado

Os(as) Vereadores(as)

O(a) Prefeito

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5. Conexões e percepções dos políticos municipais

Pensando nos últimos 3 meses, quantas vezes aproximadamente você manteve reuniões com cada um dos seguintes atores? [LER UM A UM]

Número de reuniões nos últimos 3 meses

... pais e responsáveis
dos alunos?

... um(a) Promotor(a)
do Ministério Público?

Número de reuniões nos últimos 3 meses

... o(a) Secretário(a) municipal de educação?

... professores da sua escola?

... algum(a) Vereador(a)?

... o(a) Prefeito(a)?

... técnicos da Secretaria municipal de educação?

E, pensando também nos últimos 3 meses, quantas vezes aproximadamente você foi procurado(a) (por exemplo por email, telefone, e/ou Whatsapp) por cada um dos seguintes atores? [LER UM A UM]

Número de contatos recebidos nos últimos 3 meses

... um(a) Promotor(a) do Ministério Público?

... o(a) Secretário(a) municipal de educação?

... o(a) Prefeito(a)?

... algum(a) Vereador(a)?

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Agora vou ler uma série de afirmações e gostaria que você me falasse quanto você concorda com dada uma delas. [ENTREGAR CARTÃO COM OPÇÕES "NADA - POUCO - MAIS OU MENOS - MUITO"]

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
Eu tenho confiança no(a) Prefeito(a)	○	○	○	○
A Secretaria de educação cobra dos resultados desta escola	○	○	○	○
O Ministério Público tem influenciado positivamente a educação municipal	○	○	○	○
Os vereadores trabalham para melhorar a educação para toda a população	○	○	○	○
Os vereadores conhecem a realidade das escolas	○	○	○	○
A Secretaria de educação nos ajuda a melhorar o desempenho da escola	○	○	○	○
O(a) Secretário(a) de educação conhece a realidade desta escola	○	○	○	○

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
Eu tenho confiança no(a) Secretário(a) de educação	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Prefeito(a) se preocupa em melhorar a qualidade das escolas	◯	◯	◯	◯
O(a) Prefeito(a) e os profissionais da educação têm as mesmas preocupações em relação às escolas	◯	◯	◯	◯
O Tribunal de Contas do Estado tem influenciado positivamente a educação municipal	◯	◯	◯	◯

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Quão próximo(a) você se sente de cada um dos seguintes atores?

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
O(a) Presidente de Câmara de Vereadores	◯	◯	◯	◯

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
O(a) Promotor(a) do Ministério Público	○	○	○	○
O(a) Secretário(a) de educação	○	○	○	○
O(a) Prefeito(a)	○	○	○	○

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6. Experimento de conjoint

Agora eu vou lhe mostrar uma série de comparações de dois perfis imaginários de diretores de escola municipal. Tome um tempo para olhar as caraterísticas dos diretores em cada um dos quesitos. Para cada comparação desses diretores imaginários, eu vou lhe fazer uma série de perguntas, nas quais você terá que escolher qual dos dois diretores imaginários é melhor. Você não precisa me falar por que escolhe o diretor A ou o diretor B, e a sua escolha pode ser diferente para cada pergunta.

[ASEGURE-SE DE QUE O GESTOR ENTENDE COMO FUNCIONA O CONJOINT. A CADA RODADA, REVISE EM VOZ ALTA COM O GESTOR AS CARATERÍSTICAS DOS DOIS PERFIS. DEIXE O GESTOR OBSERVAR OS PERFIS NO TABLET POR ENQUANTO VOCÊ FAZ AS PERGUNTAS. ANOTE AS RESPOSTAS DO GESTOR NO PAPEL PARA DEPOIS COPIÁ-LAS NO TABLET AO FINAL DE CADA RODADA]

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Rodada 1 de 4

	Diretor A	**Diretor B**
Relacao com os professores	Fraca relação com os professores	Boa relação com os professores
Formacao	Licenciatura	Licenciatura
Experiencia como diretor	10 anos	3 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola foi atingida	Meta da escola foi atingida
Selecao	Eleição pela comunidade	Concurso
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Diretor A	Diretor B
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria formar uma melhor equipe de professores na escola?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria uma reforma para a escola?	◯	◯

	Diretor A	Diretor B
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria melhores resultados no aprendizado dos alunos?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a dois anos?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chance de aplicar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Secretaria de educação?	◯	◯

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Rodada 2 de 4

	Diretor A	**Diretor B**

Relacao com os professores	Boa relação com os professores	Fraca relação com os professores
Formacao	Licenciatura	Licenciatura
Experiencia como diretor	3 anos	10 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola foi atingida	Meta da escola não foi atingida
Selecao	Eleição pela comunidade	Concurso
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Diretor A	Diretor B
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria formar uma melhor equipe de professores na escola?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria uma reforma para a escola?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria melhores resultados no aprendizado dos alunos?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a dois anos?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chance de aplicar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	◯	◯
Qual destes diretores você acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Secretaria de educação?	◯	◯

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Rodada 3 de 4

	Diretor A	**Diretor B**
Relacao com os professores	Boa relação com os professores	Boa relação com os professores
Formacao	Mestrado	Licenciatura
Experiencia como diretor	10 anos	3 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola não foi atingida	Meta da escola não foi atingida
Selecao	Concurso	Concurso
Vinculos politicos	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Diretor A	Diretor B
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria formar uma melhor equipe de professores na escola?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria uma reforma para a escola?	○	○

	Diretor A	Diretor B
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria melhores resultados no aprendizado dos alunos?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a dois anos?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chance de aplicar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Secretaria de educação?	○	○

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Rodada 4 de 4

Diretor A	**Diretor B**

Relacao com os professores	Boa relação com os professores	Boa relação com os professores
Formacao	Licenciatura	Licenciatura
Experiencia como diretor	10 anos	10 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola não foi atingida	Meta da escola foi atingida
Selecao	Eleição pela comunidade	Eleição pela comunidade
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Diretor A	Diretor B
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria formar uma melhor equipe de professores na escola?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria uma reforma para a escola?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha conseguiria melhores resultados no aprendizado dos alunos?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chances de permanecerem no cargo daqui a dois anos?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha teria mais chance de aplicar mudanças solicitadas pela Prefeitura?	○	○
Qual destes diretores você acha teria uma melhor comunicação com a Secretaria de educação?	○	○

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7. Atividade política

[ENTREGAR CARTÃO COM OPÇÕES "NADA - POUCO - MAIS OU MENOS - MUITO"] No geral, você acha que os vínculos políticos influenciam...

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
... a contratação de professores temporários?	◯	◯	◯	◯
... a convocação de professores concursados?	◯	◯	◯	◯
... a seleção de diretores de escola?	◯	◯	◯	◯

Você está filiado(a) a algum sindicato? [NÃO LER OPÇÕES]

◯ Sim

○ Nao

○ Prefiro não informar

Você está filiado(a) a algum partido político? [NÃO LER OPÇÕES]

○ Sim

○ Nao

○ Prefiro não informar

Você já pensou em se candidatar para vereador(a) ou prefeito(a)?

○ Sim

○ Nao

Você já trabalhou para alguma campanha eleitoral neste município?

○ Sim

○ Nao

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Poderia me indicar o nome do partido ao qual você está filiado(a)?

8. Esta escola

Que etapas de ensino são oferecidas nesta escola?

☐ Ensino infantil

☐ Ensino fundamental 1 (anos iniciais)

☐ Ensino fundamental 2 (anos finais)

☐ Ensino médio

☐ Educação de jovens e adultos

[ENTREGAR CARTÃO COM OPÇÕES "NADA – POUCO – MAIS OU MENOS – MUITO"] No geral, quanto tem mudado o quadro de pessoal desta escola nos últimos dois anos?

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito	Não aplica

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito	Não aplica
Professores concursados	○	○	○	○	○
Professores contratados	○	○	○	○	○
Pessoal de apoio	○	○	○	○	○

Você saberia me indicar qual foi a nota desta escola para o IDEB dos anos iniciais de 2017, que foi divulgada em setembro deste ano? [SE NÃO SABE, PERGUNTAR SE SABE UMA NOTA APROXIMADA; SE NÃO SABE, ESCREVER "0"]

Você saberia me indicar qual era a meta ou nota esperada no IDEB dos anos iniciais para esta escola nesse mesmo ano? [SE NÃO SABE, PERGUNTAR SE SABE UMA META APROXIMADA; SE NÃO SABE, ESCREVER "0"]

Você saberia me indicar qual foi a nota desta escola para o IDEB dos anos finais em 2017, a qual foi divulgada em setembro deste ano? [SE NÃO SABE, PERGUNTAR SE SABE UMA NOTA APROXIMADA; SE NÃO SABE, ESCREVER "0"]

E você saberia me indicar qual era a meta ou nota esperada no IDEB dos anos iniciais para esta escola nesse mesmo ano? [SE NÃO SABE, PERGUNTAR SE SABE UMA META APROXIMADA; SE NÃO SABE, ESCREVER "0"]

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9. Integridade e compromisso com o serviço público

[ENTREGAR CARTÃO COM OPÇÕES "NADA – POUCO – MAIS OU MENOS – MUITO"] Já para terminar, quanto você concorda com as seguintes afirmações?

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
Para mim é difícil me interessar sobre o que acontece neste município	○	○	○	○
Eu contribuo com este município sem esperar retorno	○	○	○	○
Servir ao bem-estar da comunidade é muito importante para mim	○	○	○	○
Eu gostaria que os políticos fizessem o que é melhor para o município, mesmo que isso fosse de encontro aos meus interesses individuais	○	○	○	○
O dever de um funcionário público de servir à comunidade deve vir sempre antes do que a lealdade aos superiores	○	○	○	○
Eu considero o serviço à comunidade o meu dever cívico	○	○	○	○
Pegar um objeto sem a permissão do dono não tem problema desde que você devolva	○	○	○	○
Não tem problema exagerar um pouco na hora de elaborar um currículo	○	○	○	○
As pessoas não deveriam sofrer as consequências por fazer algo incorreto que lhe foi pedido por um superior	○	○	○	○

	Nada	Pouco	Mais ou menos	Muito
Não é errado fazer algo técnicamente incorreto quando todas as pessoas também o fazem	◯	◯	◯	◯

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10. Conclusão

A pesquisa acaba aqui. Muito obrigado de novo pela sua participação, as suas respostas são confidencias. Você tem algum comentário ou pergunta sobre a pesquisa?

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11. OBSERVAÇÕES

AS SEGUINTES PERGUNTAS NÃO SÃO PARA O GESTOR RESPONDER. SÃO PARA O ENTREVISTADOR AVALIAR COMO FOI A ENTREVISTA.

QUANTO VOCÊ CONCORDA COM CADA UMA DAS SEGUINTES AFIRMAÇÕES?

	NADA	POUCO	MAIS OU MENOS	MUITO
O GESTOR FOI AMÁVEL DURANTE A PESQUISA	◯	◯	◯	◯
O GESTOR PRESTOU ATENÇÃO DURANTE A PESQUISA	◯	◯	◯	◯
O GESTOR ENTENDEU O CONJOINT	◯	◯	◯	◯
O GESTOR REFLEXIONOU ANTES DE DAR AS SUAS RESPOSTAS AO CONJOINT	◯	◯	◯	◯
O GESTOR ESTAVA CONFORTÁVEL DURANTE A ENTREVISTA	◯	◯	◯	◯

TINHA MAIS ALGUÉM PRESENTE DURANTE A ENTREVISTA?

○ [_____] SIM

○ NÃO

SE SURGIU ALGUM PROBLEMA OU QUALQUER DINÂMICA QUE VOCÊ ACHA RELEVANTE, RELATE AQUI:

[text box]

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English (US) ⏷

1. Identificação do município e a escola

[SELECT THE MUNICIPALITY]

⏷

[SELECT THE UNIT]

[HOW MANY TIMES DID YOU HAVE TO VISIT THIS UNIT IN ORDER TO TALK WITH THE MANAGER?]

⏷

[GENDER OF THE MANAGER]

○ Woman

○ Man

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2. Consentimento informado

[HAND OUT INFORMATION SHEET]
Hi, my name is [ENUMERATOR NAME] and I am doing an academic survey for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in the United States. This is my identification [SHOW YOUR ID BADGE]. The goal of this university survey is to understand the challenges for managing schools, basic healthcare units, and social assistance centers in the municipalities in Rio Grande do Norte. Your participation is voluntary. If you decide to participate, it will take approximately between 20 and 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. You can choose to end your participation at any moment. Your responses will be completely confidential, and stored in secure files. Under no circumstance will any information that could identify you be published. The results of the survey will be published in academic articles and/or books. In the sheet I handed you you can see this information, as well as the contact details of the principal investigator and the ethics committee that authorized the survey. Once again, I would like to emphasize that the survey is purely academic, it is financed by a university, and we are not linked to any government or political party. Do you wish to participate in the survey?

[IF THE MANAGER SAYS NO, TRY TO UNDERSTAND WHY AND REMIND THEM THAT THE SURVEY IS PURELY ACADEMIC AND CONFIDENTIAL, AND WILL TAKE ONLY 20-30 MINUTES. IF THEY STILL CHOOSE NOT TO PARTICIPATE, RECORD THEIR RESPONSE AND THANK THEM.]

◯ YES, they wish to participate in the survey

◯ NO, they do not wish to participate in the survey

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[WHAT REASONS DO YOU THINK MADE THE MANAGER REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SURVEY?]

Lack of time

☐

Outros (especificar):

☐ [_____]

Mistrust (indicate what type)

☐ [_____]

Thank you for your participation. If at any time during the survey anything is not clear, please do not doubt to point it out for me to repeat or clarify.

3. Experiência na educação e na escola

First I will ask you some basic questions about your experience in the education sector and in this school.

What is your position in this school?

○ Director

○ Assistant director or Vice-director

○ Pedagogic coordinator

○ [   ] Other:

In total, how many years of experience do you have in that position in this school?

[▲▼]

In total, how many years of experience do you have as director in this or other schools?

[⬍]

In total, how many years of experience do you have as an education professional, in this or other schools?

[⬍]

How did you reach the direction of this school? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS, MARK ALL THOSE THE RESPONDENT MENTIONS]

☐ Public civil service exam   ☐ Selection process

☐ Election   Other
                                               ☐ [   ]

☐ Appointment

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How many years ago did you pass the civil service exam for director?

[Dropdown ▲▼]

Who appointed you? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS, MARK ALL THOSE MENTIONED BY THE RESPONDENT]

☐ Mayor

☐ Secretary of education

☐ City councilor

☐ Technicians from the mayor's office

☐ Technicians from the Secretariat of education

☐ Other actors:

[text box]

How many years ago were you appointed last?

[Dropdown ▲▼]

What was approximately your vote share in the election?

Who was allowed to vote in the election? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS, MARK THOSE THE MANAGER MENTIONS]

☐ Teachers   ☐ School staff

   Parents   Others:

☐   ☐

☐ Students

Of those actors who were allowed to vote, which one do you think had the largest influence on the election result?

Teachers   Parents   Students   School staff   Others

○   ○   ○   ○   ○

How many years ago were you elected last?

[⬍]

How many hours a week do you work as director of this school?

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4. Caraterísticas pessoais

Do you live in this municipality?

○ Yes

○ No

What is your education level? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]

○ None   ○ Complete community college

○ Incomplete basic education   ○ Incomplete bachelors degree

○ Complete basic education   ○ Complete bachelors degree

○   Incomplete high school

○   Complete high school

○   Incomplete community college

○   Graduate - Specialization

○   Graduate - Masters

○   Graduate - PhD

How old are you?

[▲▼]

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Eficácia

[HAND OUT SHEET WITH OPTIONS "NOT AT ALL - A LITTLE - QUITE - A LOT"]
In this sheet you can see four response options: not at all, a little, quite, and a lot. I am
going to read a number of stakeholders, and I would like you to tell me how much do you
think each of them is responsible for improving education.

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
The Public Prosecutor's Office	○	○	○	○

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
The City Councilors	○	○	○	○
The mayor	○	○	○	○
Municipal employees	○	○	○	○
The Secretary of education	○	○	○	○
Citizens	○	○	○	○
The State Audit Court	○	○	○	○

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[HAND OUT SHEET WITH ACTORS] How would you rank that same list of stakeholders, according to their responsibility in improving education? Place first the one that has most responsibility, and last the one that has less responsibility, always following your opinion.

The Mayor

The Secretary of education

The City Councilors

The State Audit Court

Citizens

The Public Prosecutor's Office

Municipal employees

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5. Conexões e percepções dos políticos municipais

Thinking about the last 3 months, how many times approximately did you meet with each of these actors? [READ ONE BY ONE]

Number of meetings in the last 3 months

... teachers at your
school?

... parents of students?

... a City Councilor?

... the municipal
Secretary of education?

Number of meetings in the last 3 months

... technicians from the
municipal Secretariat of
education?

... the Mayor?

... a Prosecutor from the
Public Prosecutors'
Office?

And again thinking of the last 3 months, how many times approximately were you contacted (e.g. by email, telephone or Whatsapp) by each of the following actors actors? [READ ONE BY ONE]

Number of contacts received in the last 3 months

... a Prosecutor from the
Public Prosecutor's
Office?

... a City Councilor?

... the Mayor?

... the municipal
Secretary of education?

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[HAND OUT SHEET WITH OPTIONS "NOT AT ALL – A LITTLE – QUITE – A LOT"]
Now I will read a number of statements and I would like you to tell me how much you agree with each of them.

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
"The mayor is concerned with improving the quality of schools"	○	○	○	○
"The Secretary of education knows the reality of this school"	○	○	○	○
"The secretariat of education helps us improve the school's performance"	○	○	○	○
"I trust the Secretary of education"	○	○	○	○
"The Public Prosecutor's Office has had a positive influence on municipal education"	○	○	○	○
"I trust the mayor"	○	○	○	○
"The mayor and education professionals have the same priorities for schools"	○	○	○	○
"The state's audit court has had a positive influence on municipal education"	○	○	○	○
"City councilors work to improve education for all"	○	○	○	○

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
"City councilors know the reality of the schools"	○	○	○	○
"The Secretariat of education holds this school accountable for its results"	○	○	○	○

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How close do you feel to each of the following actors?

	Not at all	A little	Quite	Very
The President of City Council	○	○	○	○
The Mayor	○	○	○	○
The Secretary of Education	○	○	○	○
The Prosecutor from the Public Prosecutor's Office	○	○	○	○

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6. Experimento de conjoint

Now I will show you a series of comparisons of two imaginary profiles of municipal school directors. Take some time to look at the characteristics of each director for each of the sections. For each comparison of directors, I will ask you a number of questions, in which you will have to choose which one of the two directors is best. You don't need to tell me why you choose director A or director B, and your choice can vary from one question to the next.

[MAKE SURE THE MANAGER UNDERSTANDS HOW THE CONJOINT WORKS. IN EACH ROUND, REVIEW OUT LOUD WITH THEM THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO PROFILES. ALLOW THE MANAGER TO OBSERVE THE PROFILES ON THE TABLET WHILE YOU ASK THE QUESTIONS. WRITE DOWN THEIR ANSWERS ON THE CONJOINT SHEET IN ORDER TO COPY THEM ONTO THE TABLET AT THE END OF EACH ROUND.]

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Round 1 of 4

	Director A	Director B
Relacao com os professores	Boa relação com os professores	Boa relação com os professores
Formacao	Mestrado	Licenciatura
Experiencia como diretor	3 anos	3 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola foi atingida	Meta da escola foi atingida
Selecao	Indicação política	Concurso
Vinculos politicos	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Director A	Director B
Which one of these directors do you thin could keep a better team of teachers in the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would obtain a reform for the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would achieve better student learning rates?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would have more chances to stay in their post in 2 years?	○	○

	Director A	Director B
Which of these directors do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the city government?	○	○
Which of these directors do you think would have a better communication with the Secretariat of education?	○	○

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Round 2 of 4

	Director A	**Director B**
Relacao com os professores	Boa relação com os professores	Boa relação com os professores
Formacao	Mestrado	Mestrado
Experiencia como diretor	10 anos	3 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola foi atingida	Meta da escola não foi atingida
Selecao	Indicação política	Concurso
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na	Tem vínculos políticos na

prefeitura

prefeitura

Director A

Director B

	Director A	Director B
Which one of these directors do you thin could keep a better team of teachers in the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would obtain a reform for the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would achieve better student learning rates?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would have more chances to stay in their post in 2 years?	○	○
Which of these directors do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the city government?	○	○
Which of these directors do you think would have a better communication with the Secretariat of education?	○	○

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Round 3 of 4

	Director A	Director B
Relacao com os professores	Boa relação com os professores	Boa relação com os professores
Formacao	Licenciatura	Licenciatura
Experiencia como diretor	10 anos	10 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola não foi atingida	Meta da escola não foi atingida
Selecao	Concurso	Eleição pela comunidade
Vinculos politicos	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Director A	Director B
Which one of these directors do you thin could keep a better team of teachers in the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would obtain a reform for the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would achieve better student learning rates?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would have more chances to stay in their post in 2 years?	○	○

	Director A	Director B
Which of these directors do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the city government?	◯	◯
Which of these directors do you think would have a better communication with the Secretariat of education?	◯	◯

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Round 4 of 4

	Director A	**Director B**
Relacao com os professores	Boa relação com os professores	Boa relação com os professores
Formacao	Licenciatura	Licenciatura
Experiencia como diretor	10 anos	3 anos
Desempenho no IDEB	Meta da escola foi atingida	Meta da escola não foi atingida
Selecao	Indicação política	Eleição pela comunidade
Vinculos politicos	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura	Não tem vínculos políticos na prefeitura

	Director A	Director B
Which one of these directors do you thin could keep a better team of teachers in the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would obtain a reform for the school?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would achieve better student learning rates?	○	○
Which one of these directors do you think would have more chances to stay in their post in 2 years?	○	○
Which of these directors do you think would have more chances of implementing changes requested by the city government?	○	○
Which of these directors do you think would have a better communication with the Secretariat of education?	○	○

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7. Atividade política

[HAND OUT SHEET WITH OPTIONS "NOT AT ALL – A LITTLE – QUITE – A LOT]
Do you think political connections influence...

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
... the selection of contract teachers?	○	○	○	○
... the selection of tenured teachers?	○	○	○	○
... the selection of school directors?	○	○	○	○

Are you a member of a trade union? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]

○ Yes

○ No

○ I would rather not tell

Are you a member of any political party? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]

○ Yes

○ No

◯ I would rather not tell

Have you ever thought of running for city councilor or mayor?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Have you ever worked for an electoral campaign in this municipality?

◯ Yes

◯ No

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What is the name of the party that you are a member of?

8. Esta escola

What education levels are offered at this school?

☐ Pre-school   ☐ High school

☐ Primary school   ☐ Adults education

☐ Middle school

[HAND OUT SHEET WITH OPTIONS "NOT AT ALL - A LITTLE - QUITE - A LOT"]
In general, how much has the team at this school changed over the past two years?

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot	Not applicable
Tenured teachers	○	○	○	○	○
Contract teachers	○	○	○	○	○
Support staff	○	○	○	○	○

Would you be able to tell me what was the grade this school got for primary school IDEB for 2017, which was published in September this year? [IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ASK IF THEY KNOW AN APPROXIMATE GRADE; IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ENTER "0"]

And would you be able to tell me what the target or expected grade was for the primary school IDEB in this school? [IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ASK IF THEY KNOW AN APPROXIMATE TARGET; IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ENTER "0"]

Would you be able to tell me what was the grade this school got for middle school IDEB for 2017, which was published in September this year?
 [IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ASK IF THEY KNOW AN APPROXIMATE TARGET; IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ENTER "0"]

And would you be able to tell me what was the target or expected grade in the middle school IDEB for this school?
 [IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ASK IF THEY KNOW AN APPROXIMATE TARGET; IF THEY DO NOT KNOW, ENTER "0"]

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9. Integridade e compromisso com o serviço público

[HAND OUT SHEET WITH OPTIONS "NOT AT ALL – A LITTLE – QUITE – A LOT"]
And to finalize, how much do you agree with the following statements?

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
For me it is difficult to be interested in what happens in this municipality	○	○	○	○
I contribute to this municipality without expecting a return	○	○	○	○
Serving the well-being of the community is very important for me	○	○	○	○
I would like politicians to do what is best for the municipality, even if that went against my own interests	○	○	○	○

	Not at all	A little	Quite	A lot
A public employee's duty to serve the community must always come before their loyalty to superiors	○	○	○	○
I consider service to the community to be my civic duty	○	○	○	○
Taking an object without the owner's permission is OK if you are going to return it	○	○	○	○
It is not a problem to exaggerate one's resumé a little bit	○	○	○	○
People should not suffer the consequences for doing something that a superior authority told them to do	○	○	○	○
People are not guilty of doing something that is technically wrong if everybody around them does the same thing	○	○	○	○

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10. Conclusão

This is the end of the survey. Thank you so much again for your participation, your responses are confidential. Do you have any questions about the survey?

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11. OBSERVAÇÕES

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE NOT FOR THE MANAGER TO RESPOND, THEY ARE FOR THE INTERVIEWER TO ASSESS HOW THE INTERVIEW WENT.

[HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE WITH EACH OF THESE STATEMENTS?]

	NOT AT ALL	A LITTLE	QUITE	A LOT
THE MANAGER WAS NICE DURING THE SURVEY	○	○	○	○

	NOT AT ALL	A LITTLE	QUITE	A LOT
THE MANAGER PAID ATTENTION DURING THE SURVEY	○	○	○	○
THE MANAGER UNDERSTOOD THE CONJOINT	○	○	○	○
THE MANAGER REFLECTED BEFORE GIVING THEIR RESPONSES TO THE CONJOINT	○	○	○	○
THE MANAGER WAS COMFORTABLE DURING THE INTERVIEW	○	○	○	○

WAS THERE ANYBODY ELSE PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW?

○ [   ] YES

○ NO

IF THERE WAS ANY PROBLEM OR ANY DYNAMIC THAT YOU BELIEVE IS RELEVANT, PLEASE RELATE IT HERE:

[   ]

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