'Does Transparency Improve Legislator Performance?'

Philipp Denter, Luis Martínez, Nicolas Motz & Carlos Sanz

Discussant comments

Guillermo Toral (IE University)

Contributions

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- Leverages a nation-wide scandal with differential "dosing" across legislators to examine the effects of corruption revelations on a chain of legislator survival and performance
- Great data on the characteristics, behavior, and performance of legislators before and after 1) the scandal, and 2) an election
- Potential for theoretical innovation here, since this seems a case of non-electoral accountability (although probably mediated elites' expectation of electoral accountability in an upcoming legislative election)

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Smaller suggestions

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- But then new questions arise that it would be great if you could address theoretically and empirically:
 - Why more punishment among Conservatives than Labour?
 - Who within each party was more likely to be "purged"?
 - What happened in the smaller parties? (Lib-Dems particularly relevant given their push for reform at the time)

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 - Let theory drive those tests

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- Include placebo tests (different periods, different treatments)