

# **AUTHORITARIANISM, TYPES, AND SURVIVAL**

*Comparative Politics*

Guillermo Toral

IE University

# Review on the bandits in Congo, state-building, and regression




See Reuters' recent reporting on mines and rebel groups in Congo at  
[www.reuters.com/investigations/inside-mine-that-feeds-tech-world-funds-congos-rebels-2025-08-13/](https://www.reuters.com/investigations/inside-mine-that-feeds-tech-world-funds-congos-rebels-2025-08-13/)

# Review on the bandits in Congo, state-building, and regression

## Rebel groups in eastern DR Congo

UN forces and the Congolese army are present in large towns

- ADF-NALU  
Ugandan-led Islamists
- APCLS  
Mai Mai group
- FDLR  
Mostly Hutu Rwandan rebels
- FRPI  
Based in gold-rich Ituri region
- M23  
Mostly Tutsi, said to be Rwandan-backed
- Rai Mutomboki  
Anti-FDLR group
- Sheka  
Mai Mai group
- UPCP  
Loose coalition of smaller nationalist groups
- Mai Mai groups  
Local forces claiming to act in self-defence
- Other armed groups



Source: Oxfam

\*An estimate of where armed groups were in November 2012 based on the best available information.  
The conflict is changing daily.






FIG. 2.—Locations of the support villages in the sample. Support villages with at least one coltan mine are marked with a cross. Support villages with at least one gold mine are marked with a diamond. Support villages with neither gold nor coltan mines are marked with a diamond. The economy of such municipalities is based on cash crops—coffee, cacao, beans—less prevalent minerals in the sample (cassiterite and tungsten), or, for a small sample, subsistence agriculture (Kalehe). Airplanes indicate local airstrips.

# Review on the bandits in Congo, state-building, and regression



# Review on the bandits in Congo, state-building, and regression

TABLE 1  
EXPLAINING THE RISE OF TAXES ON PRODUCTION, STATIONARY BANDITS, AND PROTECTION

VARIABLES	MUNICIPALITY ATTACKED (1)	MINE					VILLAGE		
		Customs Tax (2)	Entry Fees (3)	Stationary Bandit (4)	Security Service (5)	Extensive-Margin Index (6)	Stationary Bandit (7)	Security Service (8)	Extensive-Margin Index (9)
Coltan <sub>t</sub> × $p_{ct}$	.15*** (.03)	.06** (.02)	.01 (.02)	.07*** (.03)	.06** (.02)	.16*** (.06)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.02)	.07 (.05)
Gold <sub>t</sub> × $p_{gt}$	−.02 (.03)	−.04 (.02)	−.04* (.03)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.10 (.07)	.12*** (.04)	.15*** (.04)	.33*** (.08)
Observations	4,158	4,046	4,052	3,991	4,032	3,903	4,302	4,302	4,302
R <sup>2</sup>	.39	.59	.69	.60	.62	.65	.50	.42	.50

NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses. This table presents the results from specification 1, using as dependent variables the extensive-margin outcomes. Column 1 uses as dependent variable whether the municipality was attacked in a given year (in any of its mines or its support village, by any actor). Columns 2–6 show the outcomes at the production site (mine), and cols. 7–9 those at the support village corresponding to the mine. Column 2 uses a dummy indicating whether an armed actor imposed customs taxation on mining output at the exit of the mine (enforced through a roadblock). Column 3 uses a dummy indicating whether an armed actor imposed an entry fee to work at the mine (enforced through a roadblock). Column 4 uses a dummy indicating whether an armed actor had established a monopoly of violence at the mine. Column 5 uses a dummy indicating whether an armed actor provided a security service at the mine. Column 6 uses the extensive-margin index at the mine as dependent variable. The extensive-margin index at the mine is constructed as the mean of customs taxation, entry fees, stationary bandit, and security service, normalized to mean zero and standard deviation of one. Column 7 uses instead a dummy indicating whether an armed actor had established a monopoly of violence at the support village corresponding to the mine. Column 8 uses a dummy indicating whether an armed actor provided a security service at the support village corresponding to the mine. Column 9 uses the extensive-margin index at the support village as dependent variable. The extensive-margin index at the support village is constructed as the mean of stationary bandit and security service at the village, normalized to mean zero and standard deviation of one. There are 239 municipalities in the sample, broken down into 239 support villages and their 411 corresponding mining sites. The mine × year-level data are collapsed at the municipality/year level. All columns include year- and municipality-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the municipality to account for autocorrelation in the dependent variable, the mineral endowments (which are time invariant), and the mineral price. Appendix sec. E describes 13 robustness checks. The results are presented in tables F.2, F.5, and F.6 and figs. F.4–F.8. Table F.7 and fig. F.9 show the effect of the price shocks on the composition of stationary bandits. Table F.8 shows the results excluding the FARDC, and table F.9 shows the results including only the FARDC.

\*  $p < .1$ .

\*\*  $p < .05$ .

\*\*\*  $p < .01$ .

# What are we covering today?

- What is authoritarianism?

# What are we covering today?

- What is authoritarianism?
- How can we classify authoritarian regimes?

# What are we covering today?

- What is authoritarianism?
- How can we classify authoritarian regimes?
- What are the key factors for authoritarian survival?

# What are we covering today?

- What is authoritarianism?
- How can we classify authoritarian regimes?
- What are the key factors for authoritarian survival?
- Exercise: Simulating authoritarian governance


## What is authoritarianism?

# Political regimes around the world

## Political regime, 2023

Based on the classification<sup>1</sup> by Lührmann et al. (2018) and the estimates by V-Dem<sup>2</sup>'s experts.

Our World  
in Data



Data source: V-Dem (2024)

[OurWorldinData.org/democracy](https://OurWorldinData.org/democracy) | CC BY

Note: The Chart tab uses numeric values, ranging from 0 for closed autocracies to 3 for liberal democracies.


1. **Regimes of the World's regime classification:** Closed autocracy: citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections. Electoral autocracy: citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair. Electoral democracy: citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections. Liberal democracy: electoral democracy and citizens enjoy individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts. [Read more](#) in our article: The 'Regimes of the World' data: how do researchers measure democracy?

2. **V-Dem:** The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project publishes data and research on democracy and human rights. It relies on evaluations by around 3,500 country experts and supplementary work by its own researchers to assess political institutions and the protection of rights. The project is managed by the V-Dem Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. Learn more: Democracy data: how do researchers measure democracy? The 'Varieties of Democracy' data: how do researchers measure democracy? The 'Varieties of Democracy' data: how do researchers measure human rights?

# Political regimes across history

## Countries that are democracies and autocracies, World

Political regimes based on the classification<sup>1</sup> by Lührmann et al. (2018) and the estimates by V-Dem<sup>2</sup>'s experts.



Data source: V-Dem (2024)

OurWorldinData.org/democracy | CC BY

Note: The share of closed autocracies increases a lot in 1900 because V-Dem covers many more countries since then, often colonies.

1. Regimes of the World's regime classification: Closed autocracy: citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections. Electoral autocracy: citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair. Electoral democracy: citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections. Liberal democracy: electoral democracy and citizens enjoy individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts. [Read more](#) in our article: The 'Regimes of the World' data: how do researchers measure democracy?


2. V-Dem: The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project publishes data and research on democracy and human rights. It relies on evaluations by around 3,500 country experts and supplementary work by its own researchers to assess political institutions and the protection of rights. The project is managed by the V-Dem Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. Learn more: Democracy data: how do researchers measure democracy? The 'Varieties of Democracy' data: how do researchers measure democracy? The 'Varieties of Democracy' data: how do researchers measure human rights?

# People living in political regimes across history

Many more people live in democracies now than 200 years ago

Political regimes are based on the classification<sup>1</sup> by Lührmann et al. (2018) and the estimates by V-Dem<sup>2</sup>'s experts.  
8 billion

OurWorld  
In Data



Data source: V-Dem (2024); Population based on various sources (2023)

OurWorldInData.org/democracy | CC BY

1. Regimes of the World's regime classification: Closed autocracy: citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections. Electoral autocracy: citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair. Electoral democracy: citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections. Liberal democracy: electoral democracy and citizens enjoy individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts. [Read more](#) in our article: The 'Regimes of the World' data: how do researchers measure democracy?

2. V-Dem: The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project publishes data and research on democracy and human rights. It relies on evaluations by around 3,500 country experts and supplementary work by its own researchers to assess political institutions and the protection of rights. The project is managed by the V-Dem Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. Learn more: Democracy data: how do researchers measure democracy? The 'Varieties of Democracy' data: how do researchers measure democracy? The 'Varieties of Democracy' data: how do researchers measure human rights?

# State-building and authoritarianism: Hobbes



- In Hobbes' theory of the state, the ruler is an absolutist sovereign

# State-building and authoritarianism: Hobbes



- In Hobbes' theory of the state, the ruler is an absolutist sovereign
- In his view, the ruler holds power on his own

# State-building and authoritarianism: Hobbes




- In Hobbes' theory of the state, the ruler is an absolutist sovereign
- In his view, the ruler holds power on his own
- The ruler's authority is unconstrained

# State-building and authoritarianism: Hobbes




- In Hobbes' theory of the state, the ruler is an absolutist sovereign
- In his view, the ruler holds power on his own
- The ruler's authority is unconstrained
- There is full security (except in the international arena)

# State-building and authoritarianism: Tilly




- For Tilly, states develop authoritarian or at least violent

# State-building and authoritarianism: Tilly




- For Tilly, states develop authoritarian or at least violent
- Limited government, concessions, and public service delivery emerge out of processes of state-building

# State-building and authoritarianism: Tilly




- For Tilly, states develop authoritarian or at least violent
- Limited government, concessions, and public service delivery emerge out of processes of state-building
- Rulers' self-interest (and in particular they need for extraction and self-preservation) drives those processes

# State-building and authoritarianism: Olson




- For Olson, anarchy or the absence of the state can be seen as **roving bandits** doing uncoordinated and competitive theft. Anarchy destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits.

# State-building and authoritarianism: Olson




- For Olson, anarchy or the absence of the state can be seen as **roving bandits** doing uncoordinated and competitive theft. Anarchy destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits.
- Olson sees dictatorship as a **stationary bandit**: a ruler who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. It is in the dictator's self interest to provide peaceful order and public goods to increase production.

# State-building and authoritarianism: Bates




- Bates sees political order as an equilibrium in which rulers (aka “specialists in violence”) choose to protect the creation of wealth rather than prey upon it, and when private citizens choose to set weapons aside and to devote their time to production (and leisure)

# State-building and authoritarianism: Bates



- Bates sees political order as an equilibrium in which rulers (aka “specialists in violence”) choose to protect the creation of wealth rather than prey upon it, and when private citizens choose to set weapons aside and to devote their time to production (and leisure)
- State failure correlates with ethnic diversity, natural resources, democratization, and poverty – because they affect the calculations of the ruler

# State-building and authoritarianism: Bates



Payoffs on the equilibrium path

.....

Payoffs from defection and subsequent punishment

- - -

For Bates, political order thus depends on the interplay between level of public revenues, the rewards from predation, and the ruler's rate of discount

# How can we define authoritarian regimes?

- “Regimes that have no turnover in power of the executive”(Lindstaet 2020)

## How can we define authoritarian regimes?

- “Regimes that have no turnover in power of the executive”(Lindstaet 2020)
- Neither anarchy (as in Olson’s roving bandit) nor democracy

## How can we define authoritarian regimes?

- “Regimes that have no turnover in power of the executive”(Lindstaet 2020)
- Neither anarchy (as in Olson’s roving bandit) nor democracy
- Olson’s stationary bandit

## How can we define authoritarian regimes?

- “Regimes that have no turnover in power of the executive”(Lindstaet 2020)
- Neither anarchy (as in Olson’s roving bandit) nor democracy
- Olson’s stationary bandit
- Absence of free and fair elections in which multiple parties compete for office

## How can we define authoritarian regimes?

- “Regimes that have no turnover in power of the executive”(Lindstaet 2020)
- Neither anarchy (as in Olson’s roving bandit) nor democracy
- Olson’s stationary bandit
- Absence of free and fair elections in which multiple parties compete for office
- Absence of elections and no key freedoms (e.g., freedom of expression, of association)

## How can we define authoritarian regimes?

- “Regimes that have no turnover in power of the executive”(Lindstaet 2020)
- Neither anarchy (as in Olson’s roving bandit) nor democracy
- Olson’s stationary bandit
- Absence of free and fair elections in which multiple parties compete for office
- Absence of elections and no key freedoms (e.g., freedom of expression, of association)
- “No independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key actors and violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts” (Svolik 2012)

## Key limitations of existing definitions

- Definition by opposition to democracy

## Key limitations of existing definitions

- Definition by opposition to democracy
- More defined attributes only in the subcategories

## Key limitations of existing definitions

- Definition by opposition to democracy
- More defined attributes only in the subcategories
- Proliferation of typologies

## Key limitations of existing definitions

- Definition by opposition to democracy
- More defined attributes only in the subcategories
- Proliferation of typologies
- Excessive focus on elections?

## Key limitations of existing definitions

- Definition by opposition to democracy
- More defined attributes only in the subcategories
- Proliferation of typologies
- Excessive focus on elections?
- Excessive focus on state-level authoritarianism

## How can we classify authoritarian regimes?

# Typologies of authoritarian rule

- **Totalitarian** vs not totalitarian

# Typologies of authoritarian rule

- **Totalitarian** vs not totalitarian
- **Personalist** vs **single-party** vs **military** vs **monarchical** authoritarianism

# Typologies of authoritarian rule

- **Totalitarian** vs not totalitarian
- **Personalist** vs **single-party** vs **military** vs **monarchical** authoritarianism
- **Closed vs electoral** authoritarian regimes (hybrid, or competitive)

# Typologies of authoritarian rule

- **Totalitarian** vs not totalitarian
- **Personalist** vs **single-party** vs **military** vs **monarchical** authoritarianism
- **Closed vs electoral** authoritarian regimes (hybrid, or competitive)
- **More vs less competitive** authoritarian regimes

# Typologies of authoritarian rule

State–Society Relations in Different Political Regimes			
	Democracy	Non-Democracy	
Key Characteristic		Authoritarianism	Totalitarianism
<b>Use of ideological indoctrination</b>	None	Limited	Extensive
<b>Extent of coercive mobilization</b>	None	Limited or minimal; <i>de-mobilization</i> emphasized	Extensive
<b>Degree of Social or political pluralism permitted</b>	Extensive	Limited	None
<b>Examples</b>	Canada, Japan, Israel	Brazil (1964–1985), Mexico (1929–2000), Greece (1967–1974), Egypt (1952–2011)	USSR (1917–1991), Nazi Germany (1933–1945), Italy (1922–1943), North Korea

# Typologies of authoritarian rule

Table 6.2 Forms of authoritarian rule

Type	Features	Examples
Absolute monarchy	A ruling sovereign exerts control, with other members of the royal family in key political and military posts.	Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
Personal rule	The presidency dominates government and the media, with opponents kept off-guard and the opposition marginalized.	Several former Soviet republics (including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan), and sub-Saharan African states (including Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe)
Ruling parties	Rule by a single party, often combined with a strong president.	Many African states and remaining communist states
Military government	Government by the military, often ruling through a junta comprising the leaders of each branch of the armed forces.	Many African, Asian, and Latin American countries in the decades following World War II. Less common today
Theocracy	A rare form of rule in which religious leaders govern directly.	Iran


# How do different types of dictatorships fare in terms of survival and performance?

**Replacement of Dictators by Type**

Type of Current Dictator	Type of Successor				
	Monarch	Military	Civilian	Democrat	Total
Monarch	11	6	4	1	22
Military	0	89	38	52	179
Civilian	2	53	103	29	187
Total	13	148	145	82	388


Note: Excludes dictators who died of natural causes while in office or who were still in office as of 1996.

# Selectorate theory




- Size of the selectorate (S)

# Selectorate theory



- Size of the selectorate (S)
- Size of the winning coalition (W)

# Selectorate theory




- Size of the selectorate (S)
- Size of the winning coalition (W)
- The ratio W/S - the loyalty norm

# Selectorate theory, applied to types of dictatorships

Characteristics of the Selectorate in Non-Democratic Regimes					
Type of Non-Democracy	Size	Membership Criteria	Rules for Leadership Selection	Relationship between Leader and Selectorate	Examples as of 2011
Monarchy	Ruler's family	Family relationship	Family descent	Institutionalized, limited reciprocal accountability	Saudi Arabia, Brunei
Single-Party Regime	Variable	Party membership; rise through ranks	Determined by party rules	Institutionalized reciprocal accountability	Cuba, China, Vietnam
Military Regime	Typically limited to high officer corps	Military member; rise through ranks	Determined by military high command	Institutionalized reciprocal accountability	Myanmar, Fiji, Mauritania
Oligarchy	Small	Informal	Unclear and informal	Informal reciprocal accountability	1990s Russia
Theocracy	Variable	Member of a religious order; rise through the ranks	Variable	Variable	Vatican City, Iran
Personalistic Regime	Limited to ruler's cronies	Leader hand-picks	Unclear and Informal	Reciprocal accountability, but unclear and unstable	Libya (until 2011), Burkina Faso, Belarus

# Predictions from selectorate theory on performance of political regimes



# What kind of theory is selectorate theory?

- **Institutionalism:** focus on how formal or informal institutions shape outcomes and behavior

# What kind of theory is selectorate theory?

- **Institutionalism**: focus on how formal or informal institutions shape outcomes and behavior
- **Interests**: focus on individuals' strategic calculations (for maximizing utility) and their aggregation

# What kind of theory is selectorate theory?

- **Institutionalism**: focus on how formal or informal institutions shape outcomes and behavior
- **Interests**: focus on individuals' strategic calculations (for maximizing utility) and their aggregation
- **Ideas**: focus on how ideas, ideologies and culture shape behavior and outcomes

# What kind of theory is selectorate theory?

- **Institutionalism**: focus on how formal or informal institutions shape outcomes and behavior
- **Interests**: focus on individuals' strategic calculations (for maximizing utility) and their aggregation
- **Ideas**: focus on how ideas, ideologies and culture shape behavior and outcomes
- **Individuals**: focus on how specific people and in particular leaders shape outcomes

# What kind of theory is selectorate theory?

- **Institutionalism**: focus on how formal or informal institutions shape outcomes and behavior
- **Interests**: focus on individuals' strategic calculations (for maximizing utility) and their aggregation
- **Ideas**: focus on how ideas, ideologies and culture shape behavior and outcomes
- **Individuals**: focus on how specific people and in particular leaders shape outcomes
- **International environment**: focus on how global pressures shape domestic politics

What are the key factors for authoritarian survival?

# Data on authoritarian survival




FIGURE 1.1. Nonconstitutional exits from office of authoritarian leaders, 1946–2008.  
Note: Percentages refer to a category's share of all nonconstitutional exists. Exits of interim leaders are not included. Unambiguous determination of exit was not possible for thirteen leaders.

# The problem of authoritarian control

- **Think-pair-share:** *Would you rather be a dictator who represses or one who coopts?*

# The problem of authoritarian control

- **Think-pair-share:** *Would you rather be a dictator who represses or one who coopts?*
- Dictators face threats from the population over which they rule

# The problem of authoritarian control

- **Think-pair-share:** *Would you rather be a dictator who represses or one who coopts?*
- Dictators face threats from the population over which they rule
- Two key tools at the disposal of the regime: repression and cooptation

# The problem of authoritarian control

- **Think-pair-share:** *Would you rather be a dictator who represses or one who coopts?*
- Dictators face threats from the population over which they rule
- Two key tools at the disposal of the regime: repression and cooptation
- Cooptation can take place through handouts (rents, jobs) or through institutions

# The problem of authoritarian control

- **Think-pair-share:** *Would you rather be a dictator who represses or one who coopts?*
- Dictators face threats from the population over which they rule
- Two key tools at the disposal of the regime: repression and cooptation
- Cooptation can take place through handouts (rents, jobs) or through institutions
- Repression is a double-edged sword because it empowers the security forces

# The guardianship dilemma

- A military strong enough to protect the regime against mass unrest and foreign threats is also strong enough to overthrow it through coup

## The guardianship dilemma

- A military strong enough to protect the regime against mass unrest and foreign threats is also strong enough to overthrow it through coup
- Military leaders can use this leverage to demand rents and policy concessions

## The guardianship dilemma

- A military strong enough to protect the regime against mass unrest and foreign threats is also strong enough to overthrow it through coup
- Military leaders can use this leverage to demand rents and policy concessions
- How can dictators address this dilemma?

# Rebel regimes are better at solving the guardianship dilemma



# Rebel regimes are better at solving the guardianship dilemma

From a study on dictatorships in Africa, available at  
[www.guillermotoral.com/cp/meng.pdf](http://www.guillermotoral.com/cp/meng.pdf)

TABLE 2. Authoritarian Regime Breakdown

	DV: Authoritarian regime breakdown							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0481*** (0.00918)	-0.0477*** (0.0110)	-0.0574*** (0.0113)	-0.0528*** (0.0115)	-0.0448*** (0.00970)	-0.0459*** (0.0124)	-0.0511*** (0.0131)	-0.0395*** (0.0147)
Col. liberation regime								
Civil war winner					-0.0540*** (0.0110)	-0.0515*** (0.0121)	-0.0679*** (0.0125)	-0.0737*** (0.0129)
In(GDP p.c.)	0.00203 (0.00516)		-0.0151** (0.00592)		0.00193 (0.00524)			-0.0184** (0.00736)
In(GDP p.c.) growth	-0.0885** (0.0363)		-0.0828** (0.0376)		-0.0877** (0.0363)			-0.0767** (0.0378)
In(oil & gas income p.c.)	-0.000192 (0.000718)		0.000463 (0.000722)		-0.000197 (0.000719)			0.000575 (0.000744)
In(population)		0.00878** (0.00432)	0.0205*** (0.00496)			0.00839* (0.00438)	0.0223*** (0.00534)	
Ethnic frac.		-0.00972 (0.0248)	-0.00798 (0.0240)			-0.00545 (0.0265)	0.00168 (0.0267)	
Religious frac.		0.0112 (0.0194)	-0.00419 (0.0208)			0.0132 (0.0196)	-0.00368 (0.0210)	
British colony		-0.00220 (0.0132)	0.00100 (0.0132)			-0.00376 (0.0134)	-0.00168 (0.0132)	
French colony		0.00884 (0.0103)	0.00303 (0.0110)			0.00740 (0.0107)	-0.00109 (0.0118)	
Portuguese colony		-0.00157 (0.0145)	-0.0108 (0.0166)			-0.00710 (0.0151)	-0.0244 (0.0193)	
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.048
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Note: Table 2 presents linear regression estimates with standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last regime change and cubic splines. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

# Rebel regimes are better at solving the guardianship dilemma

From a study on dictatorships in Africa, available at  
[www.guillermotoral.com/cp/meng.pdf](http://www.guillermotoral.com/cp/meng.pdf)

TABLE 3. Successful Coups

	DV: Successful coup							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0284*** (0.00702)	-0.0216*** (0.00710)	-0.0308*** (0.00771)	-0.0279*** (0.00770)	-0.0261*** (0.00797)	-0.0215** (0.00886)	-0.0320*** (0.00955)	-0.0248** (0.0111)
Col. liberation regime								
Civil war winner					-0.0329*** (0.00764)	-0.0219*** (0.00751)	-0.0290*** (0.00815)	-0.0325*** (0.00893)
In(GDP p.c.)	0.000666 (0.00376)			-0.00728* (0.00408)	0.000657 (0.00388)			-0.00811 (0.00524)
In(GDP p.c.) growth	-0.0513* (0.0294)			-0.0487 (0.0302)	-0.0512* (0.0295)			-0.0474 (0.0305)
In(oil & gas income p.c.)	-0.000499 (0.000490)			-0.000282 (0.000520)	-0.000499 (0.000490)			-0.000259 (0.000522)
In(population)	0.00491 (0.00310)	0.0116*** (0.00374)			0.00499 (0.00314)			0.0121*** (0.00416)
Ethnic frac.	-0.0183 (0.0179)	-0.0186 (0.0169)			-0.0191 (0.0188)			-0.0164 (0.0190)
Religious frac.	0.0101 (0.0164)	0.000907 (0.0175)			0.00971 (0.0167)			0.000962 (0.0176)
British colony	-0.00260 (0.0107)	-0.00267 (0.0111)			-0.00229 (0.0107)			-0.00333 (0.0113)
French colony	0.00739 (0.00822)	0.00493 (0.00820)			0.00767 (0.00829)			0.00391 (0.00868)
Portuguese colony	0.00528 (0.0180)	0.00120 (0.0189)			0.00631 (0.0186)			-0.00198 (0.0207)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.038	0.038	0.040	0.011	0.038	0.038	0.040
Time controls?	YES							
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Note: Table 3 presents linear regression estimates with country-clustered standard error estimates in parentheses. Every column controls for years since the last successful coup and cubic splines.  
\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .


# Rebel regimes are better at solving the guardianship dilemma

From a study on dictatorships in Africa, available at  
[www.guillermotoral.com/cp/meng.pdf](http://www.guillermotoral.com/cp/meng.pdf)

TABLE 4. Minister of Defense Appointments

	DV: Defense minister same							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.315*** (0.0574)	0.252*** (0.0599)	0.206*** (0.0608)	0.206*** (0.0646)	0.320*** (0.0707)	0.280*** (0.0657)	0.259*** (0.0631)	0.278*** (0.0761)
Col. liberation regime					0.306*** (0.0812)	0.200** (0.0826)	0.122 (0.0841)	0.0994 (0.0848)
Civil war winner								
In(GDP p.c.)	0.0119 (0.0231)		0.00849 (0.0365)		0.0101 (0.0236)		-0.0119 (0.0392)	
In(GDP p.c.) growth	0.121 (0.0888)		0.156* (0.0849)		0.130 (0.0909)		0.188** (0.0861)	
In(oil & gas income p.c.)	-0.00140 (0.00270)		-0.00300 (0.00254)		-0.00154 (0.00273)		-0.00244 (0.00245)	
In(population)		0.0287 (0.0254)	0.0274 (0.0347)			0.0254 (0.0251)	0.0395 (0.0347)	
Ethnic frac.		0.187 (0.153)	0.190 (0.152)			0.227 (0.155)	0.249 (0.151)	
Religious frac.		0.0461 (0.139)	0.0470 (0.126)			0.0600 (0.140)	0.0431 (0.129)	
British colony		-0.147 (0.0902)	-0.159* (0.0857)			-0.164* (0.0907)	-0.177** (0.0843)	
French colony		-0.0443 (0.0921)	-0.0375 (0.0884)			-0.0587 (0.0926)	-0.0625 (0.0862)	
Portuguese colony		0.151 (0.125)	0.157 (0.123)			0.104 (0.143)	0.0813 (0.150)	
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
R <sup>2</sup>	0.074	0.124	0.158	0.161	0.074	0.125	0.161	0.165
Guillermo	Total FE?	CN	comparative politics	YES	YES	4. Authoritarianism, types and survey	YES	YES

# Should we worry about the threats to causal inference?



# The power-sharing dilemma

- Broadening elite incorporation mitigates prospects for outsider rebellions (by either elites excluded from power or the masses), but it raises the risk of insider coups

# The power-sharing dilemma

- Broadening elite incorporation mitigates prospects for outsider rebellions (by either elites excluded from power or the masses), but it raises the risk of insider coups
- The distribution of rents is not enough to solve this dilemma.  
Why?

## The power-sharing dilemma

- Broadening elite incorporation mitigates prospects for outsider rebellions (by either elites excluded from power or the masses), but it raises the risk of insider coups
- The distribution of rents is not enough to solve this dilemma.  
Why?
- Because dictators cannot credibly commit to sustain rents.

## The power-sharing dilemma

- Broadening elite incorporation mitigates prospects for outsider rebellions (by either elites excluded from power or the masses), but it raises the risk of insider coups
- The distribution of rents is not enough to solve this dilemma. Why?
- Because dictators cannot credibly commit to sustain rents.
- How can dictators address this dilemma?

## Authoritarian survival conditional on legislatures




FIGURE 4.4. Nonconstitutional-leader exits from office in dictatorships with and without legislatures, 1946–2008. Note: Exits of interim leaders are not included. Unambiguous determination of exit was not possible for 13 leaders.

# Authoritarian legislatures




FIGURE 2.6. Legislative selection in dictatorships, 1946–2008. Note: Overall distribution of individual categories in parentheses.

# Authoritarian parties





FIGURE 2.4. Restrictions on political parties in dictatorships, 1946–2008. Note: Overall distribution of individual categories in parentheses.

# Other institutions of authoritarian power-sharing



# Why do dictatorships often have formal and (sometimes) competitive institutions?

- Institutions such as parties and legislatures help authoritarian regimes **address the power-sharing dilemma**

# Why do dictatorships often have formal and (sometimes) competitive institutions?

- Institutions such as parties and legislatures help authoritarian regimes **address the power-sharing dilemma**
- Central to the solution is **information**: these institutions provide members of the support coalition information about the regime and enable them to influence decisions

# Why do dictatorships often have formal and (sometimes) competitive institutions?

- Institutions such as parties and legislatures help authoritarian regimes **address the power-sharing dilemma**
- Central to the solution is **information**: these institutions provide members of the support coalition information about the regime and enable them to influence decisions
- Another key aspect is **credible commitments**: these institutions may enable members of the support coalition to hold the ruler accountable

# The power-sharing dilemma

- Power-sharing is **a double-edged sword** because of the countervailing **commitment and threat-enhancing effects**

# The power-sharing dilemma

- Power-sharing is **a double-edged sword** because of the countervailing **commitment and threat-enhancing effects**
- Under what conditions is power sharing more likely to emerge and to last?

# The power-sharing dilemma

- Power-sharing is **a double-edged sword** because of the countervailing **commitment and threat-enhancing effects**
- Under what conditions is power sharing more likely to emerge and to last?
  - Challenger credibility

# The power-sharing dilemma

- Power-sharing is **a double-edged sword** because of the countervailing **commitment and threat-enhancing effects**
- Under what conditions is power sharing more likely to emerge and to last?
  - Challenger credibility
  - Challenger willingness to accept the deal and to not act against the ruler

# The power-sharing dilemma

- Power-sharing is **a double-edged sword** because of the countervailing **commitment and threat-enhancing effects**
- Under what conditions is power sharing more likely to emerge and to last?
  - Challenger credibility
  - Challenger willingness to accept the deal and to not act against the ruler
  - Ruler willingness to accept the constraints and lost rents

## The power-sharing dilemma

- Power-sharing is **a double-edged sword** because of the countervailing **commitment and threat-enhancing effects**
- Under what conditions is power sharing more likely to emerge and to last?
  - Challenger credibility
  - Challenger willingness to accept the deal and to not act against the ruler
  - Ruler willingness to accept the constraints and lost rents
- However, there are costs too. By incorporating some of the opposition into government, or allowing them to participate in rents, **members of the winning coalition may feel disgruntled**

# The costs of power sharing

From a study on electoral candidates in Russia, available at  
[www.guillermotoral.com/cp/szakonyi.pdf](http://www.guillermotoral.com/cp/szakonyi.pdf)

TABLE 1. Individual Determinants of Defection

	Dependent variable: Defected (0/1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	0.006 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.010)
Age (log)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.024)	-0.025 (0.023)
Ran on SMD ballot	0.042** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.009)	0.112*** (0.021)	0.097*** (0.021)
Currently in office	-0.085*** (0.018)	-0.085*** (0.018)	-0.078*** (0.018)	
Firm director (self-described)	0.018** (0.007)			
Private firm director (with SPARK data)		0.019** (0.009)	0.021** (0.010)	
SOE Director (with SPARK data)		-0.014 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.018)	
SMD vote share			-0.137*** (0.040)	-0.171*** (0.038)
Ran on closed PR list			-0.016 (0.012)	-0.036*** (0.011)
Low ranked on closed PR list			0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Won seat as independent previously			0.030*** (0.010)	0.022** (0.011)
Government employee				-0.025** (0.010)
Private sector employee				-0.033* (0.019)
Social organization employee				-0.006 (0.015)
Political party employee				-0.055** (0.027)
Professional regional legislator				-0.010 (0.012)
Unemployed				0.110* (0.058)
Repeat election year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,291	4,291	4,163	4,162

\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . This table examines individual-level covariates. Firm Director (self-described) is a dummy for whether the candidates indicated they were part of a private firm's upper management; Private Firm Director and SOE Director add further information from the SPARK database. The reference category for the three firm-related variables is all other non-businessperson candidates. Likewise, the reference category for the occupation dummies is all businesspeople. All models use OLS with repeat election year and region fixed effects and cluster standard errors on region and year.

# The costs of power sharing

From a study on electoral candidates in Russia, available at  
[www.guillermotoral.com/cp/szakonyi.pdf](http://www.guillermotoral.com/cp/szakonyi.pdf)

**FIGURE 2. Individual-Level Substantive Effects**




Figure presents the predicted probability of defection based on different values of the predictors shown in bold. The model used to generate the probabilities comes from column 3, **Table 1**. All other predictors are held at their means.

# The costs of power sharing

From a study on electoral candidates in Russia, available at  
[www.guillermotoral.com/cp/szakonyi.pdf](http://www.guillermotoral.com/cp/szakonyi.pdf)

FIGURE 3. Regional-Level Substantive Effects




Figure presents the predicted probability of defection based on different values of the predictors shown in bold. The model used to generate the probabilities comes from column 4, Table 2. A High level for the UR Leadership Share variable indicates that no positions were shared with the opposition (90th percentile), while the Low level indicates that 64% of positions were given to UR deputies (10th percentile). The Ethnic Minority Executive categories take a yes/no, while the low and high categories for UR vote share and UR firm profitability are set at the 10th and 90th percentiles. All other predictors are held at their means.

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- To build legitimacy

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- To build legitimacy
  - External: make foreign actors happier

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**

- External: make foreign actors happier
- Internal: signal to the population prospects of change

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- To build legitimacy
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- To deter & minimize challenges from within

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- **To deter & minimize challenges from within**
  - Share the spoils with groups with power

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- **To deter & minimize challenges from within**
  - Share the spoils with groups with power
  - (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- **To deter & minimize challenges from within**
  - Share the spoils with groups with power
  - (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal
- **To weaken challengers**

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- **To deter & minimize challenges from within**
  - Share the spoils with groups with power
  - (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal
- **To weaken challengers**
  - By setting the rules of the game, divide structures of contestation

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- **To deter & minimize challenges from within**
  - Share the spoils with groups with power
  - (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal
- **To weaken challengers**
  - By setting the rules of the game, divide structures of contestation
  - By allowing some to play, foster fragmentation & competition

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- **To deter & minimize challenges from within**
  - Share the spoils with groups with power
  - (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal
- **To weaken challengers**
  - By setting the rules of the game, divide structures of contestation
  - By allowing some to play, foster fragmentation & competition
- **To gather precious information**

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- **To build legitimacy**
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- **To deter & minimize challenges from within**
  - Share the spoils with groups with power
  - (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal
- **To weaken challengers**
  - By setting the rules of the game, divide structures of contestation
  - By allowing some to play, foster fragmentation & competition
- **To gather precious information**
  - Identify the loyal and the disloyal

# Why do dictators often organize elections?

- To build legitimacy
  - External: make foreign actors happier
  - Internal: signal to the population prospects of change
- To deter & minimize challenges from within
  - Share the spoils with groups with power
  - (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal
- To weaken challengers
  - By setting the rules of the game, divide structures of contestation
  - By allowing some to play, foster fragmentation & competition
- To gather precious information
  - Identify the loyal and the disloyal
  - Measure competence and support for local party cadres

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**
  - Production and enforcement of order

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**
  - Production and enforcement of order
  - For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime
- **Extractive capacity:**
  - Production and relations between the state and producers

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

- Production and relations between the state and producers
- For example, income tax (vs trade tax)

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

- Production and relations between the state and producers
- For example, income tax (vs trade tax)

- **Coordination capacity:**

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

- Production and relations between the state and producers
- For example, income tax (vs trade tax)

- **Coordination capacity:**

- Ability to organize for collective action

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

- Production and relations between the state and producers
- For example, income tax (vs trade tax)

- **Coordination capacity:**

- Ability to organize for collective action
- For example, unified market with secure property rights

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

- Production and relations between the state and producers
- For example, income tax (vs trade tax)

- **Coordination capacity:**

- Ability to organize for collective action
- For example, unified market with secure property rights

- **Compliance capacity:**

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

- Production and relations between the state and producers
- For example, income tax (vs trade tax)

- **Coordination capacity:**

- Ability to organize for collective action
- For example, unified market with secure property rights

- **Compliance capacity:**

- Actors' acceptance and co-production of order

# Back to state capacity: Does authoritarianism provide an advantage or a disadvantage?

- **Coercive capacity:**

- Production and enforcement of order
- For example, peace for day-to-day business, effective court system deterring crime

- **Extractive capacity:**

- Production and relations between the state and producers
- For example, income tax (vs trade tax)

- **Coordination capacity:**

- Ability to organize for collective action
- For example, unified market with secure property rights

- **Compliance capacity:**

- Actors' acceptance and co-production of order
- For example, successful vaccination campaign

## Graded group exercise: Simulating authoritarian governance

# The goal

- We will be simulating the **strategic behavior of different actors** in a context of authoritarian governance

## The goal

- We will be simulating the **strategic behavior of different actors** in a context of authoritarian governance
- Each group will be in the shoes of one key actor (e.g., dictator, military, opposition party) and will have to **advance a strategy to boost the survival of the regime or its demise**

## The goal

- We will be simulating the **strategic behavior of different actors** in a context of authoritarian governance
- Each group will be in the shoes of one key actor (e.g., dictator, military, opposition party) and will have to **advance a strategy to boost the survival of the regime or its demise**
- Grades will depend on groups' success at creatively applying the concepts, theories, and evidence from today's readings and sessions in their proposal

## The goal

- We will be simulating the **strategic behavior of different actors** in a context of authoritarian governance
- Each group will be in the shoes of one key actor (e.g., dictator, military, opposition party) and will have to **advance a strategy to boost the survival of the regime or its demise**
- Grades will depend on groups' success at creatively applying the concepts, theories, and evidence from today's readings and sessions in their proposal
- **The deliverable is a 1-page proposal + justification**

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party
- Legislature with some meaningful representation of the opposition

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party
- Legislature with some meaningful representation of the opposition
- Military with a history of coups

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party
- Legislature with some meaningful representation of the opposition
- Military with a history of coups
- Opposition movement is fragmented

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party
- Legislature with some meaningful representation of the opposition
- Military with a history of coups
- Opposition movement is fragmented
- Foreign actors divided

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party
- Legislature with some meaningful representation of the opposition
- Military with a history of coups
- Opposition movement is fragmented
- Foreign actors divided
  - Some democratic governments push for democracy

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party
- Legislature with some meaningful representation of the opposition
- Military with a history of coups
- Opposition movement is fragmented
- Foreign actors divided
  - Some democratic governments push for democracy
  - Major authoritarian powers support the regime

## Hypothetical scenario: Republic of Z

- Personalist authoritarian regime – took power 15 years ago
- Medium oil revenues
- Party system with a hegemonic, ruling party
- Legislature with some meaningful representation of the opposition
- Military with a history of coups
- Opposition movement is fragmented
- Foreign actors divided
  - Some democratic governments push for democracy
  - Major authoritarian powers support the regime
  - Backsliding governments more ambivalent

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature
- Military leaders

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature
- Military leaders
- Leaders of the secret police

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature
- Military leaders
- Leaders of the secret police
- Civil society opposition leaders

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature
- Military leaders
- Leaders of the secret police
- Civil society opposition leaders
- Armed opposition group

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature
- Military leaders
- Leaders of the secret police
- Civil society opposition leaders
- Armed opposition group
- Foreign pro-democracy power

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature
- Military leaders
- Leaders of the secret police
- Civil society opposition leaders
- Armed opposition group
- Foreign pro-democracy power
- Foreign pro-regime power

## Key actors

- Dictator and his inner circle
- Ruling party
- Second largest party in the legislature
- Military leaders
- Leaders of the secret police
- Civil society opposition leaders
- Armed opposition group
- Foreign pro-democracy power
- Foreign pro-regime power
- Key oligarchs / business elites

# Challenge

- Each group will choose one actor in Republic of Z

# Challenge

- Each group will choose one actor in Republic of Z
- In groups, discuss and organize a proposal for how to boost the regime's survival or its dismissal

## Challenge

- Each group will choose one actor in Republic of Z
- In groups, discuss and organize a proposal for how to boost the regime's survival or its dismissal
- Write a 1-page (single spaced) memo with your proposal and justification

## Challenge

- Each group will choose one actor in Republic of Z
- In groups, discuss and organize a proposal for how to boost the regime's survival or its dismissal
- Write a 1-page (single spaced) memo with your proposal and justification
- Make sure you connect your proposal to some of the concepts, theories, and evidence covered in the readings and in today's sessions

## Challenge

- Each group will choose one actor in Republic of Z
- In groups, discuss and organize a proposal for how to boost the regime's survival or its dismissal
- Write a 1-page (single spaced) memo with your proposal and justification
- Make sure you connect your proposal to some of the concepts, theories, and evidence covered in the readings and in today's sessions
- Submit the PDF file on Blackboard

# Wrap-up

# Taking stock of what we saw today

- What is authoritarianism?

## Taking stock of what we saw today

- What is authoritarianism?
- How can we classify authoritarian regimes?

## Taking stock of what we saw today

- What is authoritarianism?
- How can we classify authoritarian regimes?
- What are the key factors for authoritarian survival?

## Taking stock of what we saw today

- What is authoritarianism?
- How can we classify authoritarian regimes?
- What are the key factors for authoritarian survival?
- Exercise: How can democratization in Russia be promoted?

## Some of the key insights from today's session

- While there is no universally accepted definition of authoritarianism, the absence of free and fair elections is not a defining feature

## Some of the key insights from today's session

- While there is no universally accepted definition of authoritarianism, the absence of free and fair elections is not a defining feature
- Dictatorships can instead be characterized by the absence of independent authority and the role of violence for arbitrating conflicts

## Some of the key insights from today's session

- While there is no universally accepted definition of authoritarianism, the absence of free and fair elections is not a defining feature
- Dictatorships can instead be characterized by the absence of independent authority and the role of violence for arbitrating conflicts
- Counter to a Hobbesian view of authoritarianism, no dictator rules on his own – they all depend on support coalitions

## Some of the key insights from today's session

- While there is no universally accepted definition of authoritarianism, the absence of free and fair elections is not a defining feature
- Dictatorships can instead be characterized by the absence of independent authority and the role of violence for arbitrating conflicts
- Counter to a Hobbesian view of authoritarianism, no dictator rules on his own – they all depend on support coalitions
- All dictatorships face the two fundamental problems of authoritarian rule: the problem of authoritarian power-sharing and the problem of authoritarian control.

## Next steps

- Next we will be continue discussing political regimes with a focus on **democracy**:

## Next steps

- Next we will be continue discussing political regimes with a focus on **democracy**:
  - *How should we define -and measure- democracy?*

## Next steps

- Next we will be continue discussing political regimes with a focus on **democracy**:
  - *How should we define -and measure- democracy?*
  - *How does democracy emerge?*

## Next steps

- Next we will be continue discussing political regimes with a focus on **democracy**:
  - *How should we define -and measure- democracy?*
  - *How does democracy emerge?*
  - *What causes democratic backsliding?*

## Next steps

- Next we will be continue discussing political regimes with a focus on **democracy**:
  - *How should we define -and measure- democracy?*
  - *How does democracy emerge?*
  - *What causes democratic backsliding?*
- **Do the readings** and come prepared for a potential quiz:

## Next steps

- Next we will be continue discussing political regimes with a focus on **democracy**:
  - *How should we define -and measure- democracy?*
  - *How does democracy emerge?*
  - *What causes democratic backsliding?*
- **Do the readings** and come prepared for a potential quiz:
  - *Comparative politics – chapter 5*

## Next steps

- Next we will be continue discussing political regimes with a focus on **democracy**:
  - *How should we define -and measure- democracy?*
  - *How does democracy emerge?*
  - *What causes democratic backsliding?*
- **Do the readings** and come prepared for a potential quiz:
  - *Comparative politics* – chapter 5
  - *Foundations of comparative politics* – chapter 7