

# **Can Scorecards Boost Horizontal Accountability?**

## **Experimental Evidence from Brazil**

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  - Can information from oversight institutions influence policymaking? If so, through what mechanisms?

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  - Political decision-making subject to **a complex web of rules, constraints, and accountability actors**

# Research Design

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  - **When?** In November 2018 and January 2019

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- **Reminders about the key rules about hiring**
- **Messages about politicians' responsibility** in ensuring compliance and boosting bureaucratic performance

# Sample scorecard



TRIBUNAL DE  
CONTAS DO  
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## GESTÃO DE PESSOAL E DESEMPENHO MUNICIPAL CONFIRA OS DADOS DE ACARI



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O TCE-RN disponibiliza o presente painel como forma de contribuir para avaliações sobre a composição do quadro de pessoal do município e os resultados alcançados na gestão.

### O QUADRO DE PESSOAL MUNICIPAL

Fonte dos dados: Folha de pagamento de março de 2018 (SIAJ DP)


A Prefeitura Municipal de Acari conta com 460 servidores, dos quais 75% são concursados.

Servidores por tipo de vínculo



Acari gasta cerca de R\$866.958 por mês em salários. Em 2016, Acari gastou 56,79% da receita do executivo em pessoal, sendo que o limite máximo estabelecido por lei é 54% e o limite prudencial é 51,3%.

Gasto mensal em salários por tipo de vínculo




É responsabilidade do Prefeito/a e dos Secretários e Vereadores desenvolver ações e acompanhá-las para que as contratações de pessoal se ajustem às regras (veja quadro vermelho).

### O ESTADO DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA NO MUNICÍPIO

Fonte dos dados: Ministério da Educação (IDEB)

Na avaliação do governo federal para 2017, o Ensino Fundamental 1 (anos 1 a 5) nas escolas municipais de Acari teve uma nota de 6,6 pontos no Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (IDEB), que junta dados de aprendizagem e aprovação. A meta para esse período era de 6,2 pontos. Das 4 escolas municipais do Ensino Fundamental 1 com dados para o IDEB de 2017, 3 atingiram a sua meta.

Evolução da nota do Ensino Fundamental 1 no IDEB




### O ESTADO DA SAÚDE BÁSICA NO MUNICÍPIO

Fonte dos dados: Ministério da Saúde (SINASC)

As mulheres gestantes devem receber no mínimo 7 consultas de pré-natal, segundo as indicações do Ministério da Saúde. Segundo os dados mais recentes, mais de 50% das crianças de Acari nasceram de mães com menos de 7 consultas de pré-natal. Segundo dados do último censo, a cada 1.000 crianças nascidas vivas em Acari cerca de 21 morrem antes de atingir 1 ano de idade.

Confira o desempenho das Unidades Básicas da Saúde, por área:

Unidades Básicas da Saúde (UBS) por desempenho




É responsabilidade do Prefeito/a e dos Secretários e Vereadores desenvolver ações e acompanhá-las para que o gasto em salários contribua a serviços públicos de qualidade.

### A QUALIDADE DA GESTÃO MUNICIPAL

Fonte dos dados: Tribunal de Contas do Estado do RN (IEGM)

O Tribunal de Contas do Estado mede a qualidade da gestão dos municípios por meio do Índice de Efetividade da Gestão Municipal (IEGM). Segundo os dados de 2017, Acari tem um desempenho de 0,53, comparado com o desempenho médio dos municípios do estado que é 0,51.

Qualidade da gestão por área



Cabe aos agentes públicos assegurar que os recursos do município (incluindo os servidores, que constituem a principal despesa) sejam bem geridos e repercutam em melhores serviços públicos e melhores indicadores de desenvolvimento humano e de gestão. Acompanhar o cumprimento das normas e fiscalizar a Administração são deveres básicos de todo agente público.

### PRINCIPAIS NORMAS DE CONTRATAÇÃO DE PESSOAL

- O gasto com pessoal deve ficar dentro do limite legal, 54% da receita corrente líquida do executivo municipal.
- O concurso público deve ser o modo prioritário de contratação.
- Quando excepcional interesse público justifique a contratação temporária, deve-se, sempre que possível, realizar um processo seletivo.
- Cargos em comissão destinam-se apenas a atribuições de direção, chefia e assessoramento.
- O acúmulo de cargos no setor público é proibido, exceto havendo compatibilidade de horários para dois cargos de professores ou profissionais de saúde.

É responsabilidade dos agentes públicos municipais aprimorar a gestão em todas as áreas, e assim transformar salários em melhores condições de vida para os cidadãos.

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

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

# Results

# No significant changes in civil service hiring




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# No significant changes in size of the payroll





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# Improvements in public services: Healthcare



*7+ prenatal check-ups, which is the standard established by the Ministry of Healthcare, is the key metric highlighted in the scorecard.*

# Improvements in public services: Education



*IDEB score and distance to target, following Ministry of Education standards, are the key metrics highlighted in the scorecard. Results correspond to primary schools (focus of the scorecard) - no results for middle schools.*

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
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
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- Executive's accountability pressure on the bureaucracy

# Increases in knowledge about rules



*PCA index aggregates responses in the 3 items below (following PAP).*

# Changes in perceptions of the Audit Court



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# Conclusions



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  - **Increases in politicians' knowledge about rules**
  - **Changes in perceptions of the Audit Court** – but in a counterintuitive direction

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- We need to be careful with **potential undesirable effects**
- Ultimately, **we need more research about how politicians interpret these kinds of interventions** and how they respond to them