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- The paper tests the argument through an impressive in-person survey of 1,200 bureaucrats in Jharkhand (India), and a partnership with an organization of journalists
- The paper puts emotions at the center of bureaucratic behavior refreshing when most of the literature focuses on incentives and strategic calculations.

Points for discussion

Theory

Unpacking the video treatment

Putting the treatment effect estimates in context

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- Yet it seems that the effects you find in responsiveness are at least partly driven by officials' fear of being held accountable by their superiors.
- "Reputational concerns" to me suggests something more about professional norms or ethos, but what the data show seems more related to top-down accountability.
- Perhaps revise the theory to accommodate this "sandwich accountability" – from below and above?

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 highlights the problem of one or a few people, and therefore a more
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 - Alternatively, perhaps the citizen video works better because it
 highlights the problem of one or a few people, and therefore a more
 manageable problem, compared to the official stats video that shows a
 more intractable problem.
- The citizen video shows the biggest treatment effects yet these
 officials are constantly exposed to the real-life version of this:
 face-to-face claim-making by citizens.

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- Do you see stronger effects where senior officials would be more able and/or willing to exercise pressure over bureaucrats?
- Do you see stronger effects for officials or positions who would be more amenable to empathize (perhaps because they're less in contact with citizens' claims)?
- Can you articulate more theoretically, and show empirically, that these responses are driven by emotion?

Smaller comments

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- The work of Tara Slough on the biases of bureaucratic accountability from below may be useful to engage with.