

# PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

*Comparative Politics*

Guillermo Toral

IE University

# What we are covering today

- Midterm debrief and next steps

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- What are political parties, and how do they matter?

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- What are political parties, and how do they matter?
- What are party systems and where do they come from?
- Describing party systems: morphology and dynamics

## Midterm debrief and next steps

## Midterm grades are up

- Grades are posted – you should be able to see your grade, your answers, and correct answers on Blackboard.


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- Justifications for the correct answers can be found in the slides, handouts, and readings.


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- Justifications for the correct answers can be found in the slides, handouts, and readings.
- If you think a question was incorrectly graded, or otherwise unfair, email me by November 6 with a written justification on the question and I'll consider regrading the question for all.


# Distribution of midterm grades



# Distribution of preliminary overall grades



# Distribution of midterm and overall grades



# Correlates of midterm performance

```
Call:  
lm(formula = midterm_grade ~ quiz_average + attendance + as.factor(group),  
    data = g)  
  
Residuals:  
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-47.462 -8.579  1.569  11.331 31.904  
  
Coefficients:  
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 39.15429  10.04607  3.897 0.000156 ***  
quiz_average  0.13081   0.06822  1.917 0.057430 .  
attendance    0.26776   0.12983  2.062 0.041200 *  
as.factor(group)B -2.62963   3.18825 -0.825 0.411026  
as.factor(group)C -4.53154   3.27266 -1.385 0.168564  
---  
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
  
Residual standard error: 15.03 on 128 degrees of freedom  
    (2 observations deleted due to missingness)  
Multiple R-squared:  0.1262,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.09888  
F-statistic: 4.621 on 4 and 128 DF,  p-value: 0.001617
```

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- Start working on your research design – worth as much as the midterm

Back to the high-level view of the course

# **During the first half of the semester, we have examined states, political regimes, and varieties of representation**

1. Introductions
- 2-3. Approach and method of comparative politics
- 4-5. The nature, formation, and development of states
- 6-7. Authoritarianism
- 8-9. Democracy
- 10-11. Parliamentarism and presidentialism
- 12-13. Elections and electoral systems

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- 12-13. Elections and electoral systems
14. Review session
15. Midterm exam

# **During the second half of the semester, we will focus on political actors operating within those political systems**

16-17. Parties and party systems

18-19. Voters and political behavior

20-21. Subnational authorities

22-23. Courts

24-25. Interest groups and social movements

26-27. Bureaucrats

28-29. Review session and mock final exam (December 4 or 5)

**30.** Final exam (December 18)

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- See more detailed guidelines on Blackboard

# What are political parties, and how do they matter?

# Definitions of political party

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- “An institutionalized coalition of elites to capture and use political office” (John Aldrich)

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- Historically, political parties are seen with mistrust or cynicism
- Parties are often seen as a source of corruption, artificial divisions, inefficiencies, or “noise”
- Trends in societal dealignment of parties and the “unfreezing” of party systems reinforce those old ideas

# Across democracies, less people identify with parties

318  D. GARZIA ET AL.





Figure 1. Percentage of party identifiers in Western Europe, 1961–2018.

# What would democracy without parties look like?

# What does democracy without parties look like?



Palau National Congress Olbiil era Kelulau	
11th Olbil Era Kelulau	
Type	Bicameral
Houses	Senate House of Delegates
History	
Founded	First Government Est. 1955 Gained Independence on 1 October 1994
Leadership	
President of the Senate	Hokkons Baules, Independent
Speaker of the House	Sabino Anastacio, Independent
Chief of Staff	Landisang Kotaro



# What does democracy without parties look like?

Party Politics

Article

## How democracy functions without parties: The Republic of Palau

Party Politics

2016, Vol. 22(1) 27–36

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DOI: 10.1177/1354068813509524

ppq.sagepub.com



**Wouter P Veenendaal**

Leiden University, The Netherlands

### Abstract

Whereas the belief that political parties are necessary elements of democracy is widespread in political science, it is in fact empirically false. Six small Pacific island democracies function without parties, and several explanations for the absence of parties in these countries have been developed. In the present article, an interview-based qualitative analysis of one of these six democracies without parties – the Republic of Palau – is offered in order to examine why parties are absent here, and how the Palauan democracy functions without parties. The findings of this case study indicate that both size and culture contribute to the non-existence of parties in Palau, and that the role of parties is in many ways fulfilled by clan structures. In several respects the absence of parties is found to undermine the functioning of Palauan democracy, whereas respondents paradoxically indicate that non-elected traditional leadership contributes positively to the performance of democracy in Palau.


### Keywords

Clan relations, democracy, Palau, political parties, smallness, traditional leadership

# What does democracy without parties look like?

Nebraska	
State	
	
Flag	Seal
<p>Nickname: The Cornhusker State Motto: Equality before the law Anthem: "Beautiful Nebraska"</p>	
 0:50	
	
Map of the United States with Nebraska highlighted	
Country	United States
Before statehood	Nebraska Territory
Admitted to the Union	March 1, 1867 (37th)

Nebraska Legislature	
	
Type	Unicameral
Term limits	2 consecutive terms
Leadership	
President	Joe Kelly (R) since January 5, 2023
Speaker	John Arch (R) since January 4, 2023
Executive Board Chair	Ray Aguilar (R) since January 3, 2024
Executive Board Vice Chair	John Lowe (R) since January 3, 2024

Structure	
Seats	49
	
Legislature political groups	49
<p>Officially <i>nonpartisan</i></p>	
<p><b>Majority (33)</b></p>	
• Republican (33) <sup>[a]</sup>	33 / 49 (67%)
	
<p><b>Minority (16)</b></p>	
• Democratic (15) <sup>[a]</sup>	15 / 49 (31%)
	
• Independent Democrat (1) <sup>[a]</sup>	1 / 49 (2%)
	
Length of term	4 years
Authority	Article III, <a href="#">Nebraska Constitution</a>
Salary	\$12,000/year + per diem

# What does democracy without parties look like?

American Political Science Review

Vol. 96, No. 2 June 2002

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## The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures

GERALD C. WRIGHT *Indiana University*

BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER *Western Michigan University*

American legislative studies in recent years have been occupied to a large degree with the question of the effects of political parties on the policy behavior of elected legislators, with most of the research focusing on the U.S. Congress. We undertake a comparative analysis of state legislatures for a window into the character and extent of party's effects. Specifically, we compare the impact of party on the partisan polarization and dimensionality of campaign issue stances and roll call voting in the Kansas Senate and the largely comparable, though nonpartisan, Nebraska Unicameral. This comparison offers us a nice quasi-experiment to assess the impact of party by establishing a baseline condition in Nebraska for what happens when party is absent. We argue that party lends order to conflict, producing the ideological low-dimensional space that is a trademark of American politics. Where parties are not active in the legislature—Nebraska is our test case—the clear structure found in partisan politics disappears. This works to sever the connection between voters and their elected representatives and, with it, the likelihood of electoral accountability that is essential for the health of liberal democracy.

# What does democracy without parties look like?

The Influence of Party

June 2002


**TABLE 4. Effect of Party and Urbanism on Roll Call Voting in Kansas and Nebraska**

Variable	Dimension 1	Dimension 2
Kansas ( $N=40$ )		
Party	-1.27*** (0.08)	0.40*** (0.10)
Urban district	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.24* (0.10)
Constant	0.53*** (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)
Adj. $R^2$	0.87	0.32
Nebraska ( $N=50$ )		
Party	0.21 (0.17)	-0.45*** (0.11)
Urban district	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.35** (0.10)
Constant	-0.12 (0.12)	0.34*** (0.08)
Adj. $R^2$	-0.01	0.44


Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ .

the coefficient of -1.27 for party (and the adjusted  $R^2$  of 0.87 for the model) represents a substantial difference between Democrats and Republicans. In addition to its impact on the first dimension in Kansas, party also has a significant influence on the second dimension. While this coefficient is not as strong as in the first dimension, it does reinforce the impact of party in the Kansas Senate. In addition to party, the coefficient for urbanism is also significant for this second dimension. Thus, both dimensions of voting in Kansas are highly structured by partisanship, with the second also being influenced by district urbanism.

**FIGURE 2. Two Dimensions of Roll Call Voting in Kansas and Nebraska**



# What does democracy with weak parties look like?



Congress of the Republic Congreso de la República	
Period 2021–2026	
	PERÚ
CONGRESO de la REPÚBLICA	
Type	Unicameral
Established	20 September 1822 (First Constituent Congress) 26 July 1995 (1995 Peruvian general election)
Leadership	
President of Congress	Eduardo Salhuana, Alliance for Progress since 26 July 2024
1st Vice President of Congress	Patricia Juárez, Popular Force since 26 July 2024
2nd Vice President of Congress	Waldemar Cerrón, Free Peru since 26 July 2023
3rd Vice President of Congress	Alejandro Cavero, Go on Country since 26 July 2024



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58		Ollanta Humala (born 1962)	28 July 2011	28 July 2016	5 years, 0 days	Peruvian Nationalist Party	2011	1º Marisol Espinoza 2º Omar Chehade
59		Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (born 1938)	28 July 2016	23 March 2018	1 year, 238 days	Peruvians for Change		1º Martín Vizcarra 2º Mercedes Aráoz
60		Martín Vizcarra (born 1963)	23 March 2018	9 November 2020	2 years, 231 days	Independent	2016	2º Mercedes Aráoz
61		Manuel Merino (born 1961)	10 November 2020	15 November 2020	5 days	Popular Action	—[I]	None
62		Francisco Sagasti (born 1944)	17 November 2020	28 July 2021	253 days	Purple Party	—[I]	None
63		Pedro Castillo (born 1969)	28 July 2021	7 December 2022	1 year, 132 days	Free Peru		1º Dina Boluarte
64		Dina Boluarte (born 1962)	7 December 2022	Incumbent	1 year, 327 days	Independent	2021	None
Guillermo Toral			Comparative Politics			9. Parties and party systems		

# What does democracy with weak parties look like?



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The Americas | Americas

## Political turmoil is tearing Peru apart

Two months of often violent protest threaten democracy's survival



Jan 29th 2023 | LIMA

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FOR THE past few weeks the cry of "Dina asesina! Dina asesina!" has rung out across the streets of several of Peru's biggest towns and cities. It is unfortunate that the protesters that have been shouting this in Spanish are calling for "murderer". Dina Kelesche is the legal, constitutional head of state. But since she took over on December 3rd at least 59 people have died during protests, 45 of them civilians in clashes with the security forces, according to the ombudsman's office. Her name has become toxic, and for many Peruvians her government has lost any legitimacy.

Bloomberg

Europe Edition ▾ Sig

Politics

## Peru Is Running Out of Space to Keep its Jailed Ex-Presidents

- Jail has space for two ex leaders, but could soon have three
- Former President Toledo is expected to be extradited to Peru



The Barbadillo prison in Lima, Peru. Photographer: Miguel Yovera/Bloomberg

By Marcelo Rochabrun

February 24, 2023 at 4:00 PM GMT+1

# Peruvian parties and the origins of the Fujimori dictatorship

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- Hyperinflation and political violence had led to a deep distrust for the political status quo
- Alberto Fujimori was elected in 1990 as an anti-establishment outsider, but rather than solving the crisis his election deepened it.
- With no party behind him, no program, no team, and weak support in Congress, and growing opposition in different sectors of the elite, Fujimori resorted to an authoritarian strategy, staging a self-coup in 1992



# The Peruvian party system after Fujimori


Party system **decomposition continued** throughout the post-Fujimori period, resulting in levels of fragmentation and fluidity rarely seen in Latin America. Established parties [...] became marginal actors. At the same time, **every new party created after 1990 collapsed, failed to achieve national electoral significance, or remained a strictly personalistic vehicle.** Increasingly, politicians operated outside of parties, either creating their own personalistic vehicles or negotiating candidacies with different parties at each election. In effect, **parties were replaced by “coalitions of independents,”** or short-lived alliances of political “free agents” who come together on candidate slates for a single election cycle. (Levitsky 2018)

# ... which can be associated to Peru's experiences of democratic backsliding

## Varieties of democracy, Peru

Based on the expert estimates and five main indices by V-Dem<sup>1</sup>.

Our World  
in Data



Data source: V-Dem (2024)

OurWorldinData.org/democracy | CC BY

# Political parties play fundamental roles in democratic governance

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- Coordinating political elites and policy action
- Giving continuity to policy and political action
- Enabling political accountability
- Selection, recruitment, and organization of political elites

# What are party systems, and where do they come from?

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  - Relative size of parties
  - Types of parties
  - Proximity and behavior amongst parties

# Origins of party systems

- Three key drivers in the formation of party systems:

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
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
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# Cleavages: What they are and how they matter




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
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
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
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  - An **organizational reflection** of that division. Those organizations reinforce the cleavage they reflect.

# The freezing hypothesis



- “*The party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s ... [T]he party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates.*’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967)

# Cleavages: Where they come from

Revolution	Timing of the revolution	Resulting cleavage	Sample parties today
National	Early 19 <sup>th</sup> century	Center – periphery	SNP, PNV
		State – church	CDU, PP
Industrial	Late 19 <sup>th</sup> century	Rural – urban	SK
		Workers – employers	SPD, PSOE
Communist	Early 20 <sup>th</sup> century	Communists – socialists	PCI, IU
Post-industrial	Late 20 <sup>th</sup> & early 21 <sup>st</sup>	Materialist – post-materialist values	Die Grünen, MP
		Open – closed societies (trade, supranational integration, migration)	RN, AfD

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
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- There is path dependency in cleavages and party systems: realignment is not impossible but it is slow.
- A key mechanism for this path dependency is that parties and party systems themselves reinforce the cleavages that created them

# How electoral rules interact with cleavages


- Duverger's laws:




# How electoral rules interact with cleavages

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
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
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
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  - **Psychological or strategic effects:** those coming from how actors respond to the system. On the demand side (voters), strategic voting; on the supply side (political entrepreneurs), strategic entry and selection into parties

# Describing party systems: morphology and dynamics

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
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- Higher values mean more disproportionality between votes and seats;  $v_i$  and  $s_i$  stand for the share of votes and seats received by party i

# Effective number of parties, Europe 1848 - 2021



# Effective number of parties, World 2023

Country	Year	Effective number of parties
Barbados	2022	1.00
Venezuela	2020	1.17
Singapore	2020	1.24
Antigua and Barbuda	2018	1.27
Monaco	2018	1.29
Belize	2020	1.37
Bermuda	2020	1.38
Bahamas	2021	1.42
Jamaica	2020	1.53
Mozambique	2019	1.57
Nicaragua	2016	1.59
Israel	2022	6.51
Guatemala	2019	6.73
Denmark	2022	7.24
Indonesia	2019	7.47
Malaysia	2022	7.72
Netherlands	2021	8.54
Colombia	2022	8.74
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2022	9.00
Belgium	2019	9.70
Brazil	2022	9.91

# Should we prefer a two-party or a multi-party system?

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
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- Voters choose the party closest to them


# Anthony Downs' model (1957)

Figure 13.3 Types of voter distribution

Type A: Downs's basic model (1957); the bell-shape (or normal) distribution of the electorate: centripetal competition



Type B: A two-modal distribution of electors: centrifugal competition



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
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# Empirical distribution of voters and political elites in a two-party system

**Republicans have moved further to the right than Democrats have to the left**

Average ideology of members, by Congress




Note: Data excludes nonvoting delegates, as well as lawmakers who officially served but (due to illness, resignation or other factors) didn't have a scorable voting record for a given Congress. Party categories include independents who caucus(ed) with that party. Members who changed parties (or became independents) during a Congress were classified according to the status they held the longest during that Congress. For most of the 116th Congress, Rep. Justin Amash of Michigan was either an independent or a Libertarian, and didn't caucus with either major party.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Voteview DW-NOMINATE data accessed on Feb. 18, 2022.

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# Empirical distribution of voters and political elites in a two-party system

FIGURE 3. Politicians' Perceptions of District Opinion as a Function of MRP Estimates of District Opinion.




# Empirical distribution of voters and political elites in a two-party system

FIGURE 5. Partisan Differences in Misperceptions: MRP.

2014 Politicians – Liberal Policies

Perceptions of support for...



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