Introduction to Lattice Based Cryptography


Eduardo Morais advisor: Ricardo Dahab


Unicamp

ASCrypto 2013 October 18, 2013

Agenda

- Introduction
 - Definitions
 - Dual Lattices
 - q-ary Lattices
 - Hard Problems
- Schemes
 - Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH)
 - Ajtai's construction
 - Learning With Errors (LWE), Ring LWE, NTRU-like
 - Functional Encryption, Identity Based Encryption, Attribute Based Encryption, Fully Homomorphic Encryption





$$\mathcal{L}(b_1,b_2) =$$

$$\{\sum x_ib_i:x_i\in\mathbb{Z}\}$$


Fundamental Domain

$$\{\textstyle \sum t_i b_i, 0 \leq t_i < 1\}$$

Centered


Fundamental Domain

$$\{\sum t_i b_i, \tfrac{-1}{2} \le t_i < \tfrac{1}{2}\}$$




Reduction:


$$t'\equiv t\pmod{\mathcal{L}_B}$$




 $\mathcal{L}: \left[\begin{array}{cc} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{array} \right]$




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


 $\mathcal{L}: \begin{bmatrix} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$



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




$$\mathcal{L}: \begin{bmatrix} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$


$$\begin{bmatrix} b_{1,1} & \dots & b_{n,1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ b_{1,n} & \dots & b_{n,n} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_n \end{bmatrix}$$






Вх






Volume of the Domain?








$$\mathcal{L}: \begin{bmatrix} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$


$$A = D.d/2$$



$$\mathcal{L}: \left[\begin{array}{cc} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{array} \right]$$

$$A = D.d/2$$

$$d = |(9,1) - (1,9)|$$




$$\mathcal{L}: \begin{bmatrix} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{A} = D.d/2$$

$$d = |(9,1) - (1,9)|$$

$$d = \sqrt{8^2 + (-8)^2}$$




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
$$d=8\sqrt{2}$$



$$\mathcal{L}: \left[\begin{array}{cc} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{array} \right]$$

$$\mathcal{A} = D.d/2$$

$$D = |(9,1) + (1,9)|$$




$$\mathcal{L}: \left[\begin{array}{cc} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{array} \right]$$

$$A = D.d/2$$

$$D = |(9,1) + (1,9)|$$

$$D = \sqrt{10^2 + (-10)^2}$$




$$\mathcal{L}: \begin{bmatrix} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{A}=\textit{D.d/2}$$

$$D = |(9,1) + (1,9)|$$

$$D = \sqrt{10^2 + (-10)^2}$$

$$\textit{D}=10\sqrt{2}$$



$$\mathcal{L}: \left[\begin{array}{cc} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{array} \right]$$


$$A = D.d/2$$

$$D = |(9,1) + (1,9)|$$

$$D = \sqrt{10^2 + (-10)^2}$$

$$D = 10\sqrt{2}$$

$$\mathcal{A}=(10\sqrt{2})(8\sqrt{2})/2$$



$$\mathcal{L}: \left[\begin{array}{cc} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{array} \right]$$

$$A = D.d/2$$


$$D = |(9,1) + (1,9)|$$

$$D = \sqrt{10^2 + (-10)^2}$$

$$D=10\sqrt{2}$$

$$\mathcal{A}=(10\sqrt{2})(8\sqrt{2})/2$$

$$A = 10.8 = 80$$




$$\mathcal{L}: \begin{bmatrix} 9 & 1 \\ 1 & 9 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\det B = 9.9 - 1.1$$


$$\det B = 81 - 1$$


$$\det B = 80$$


Volume: det B





$$||b_i|| \approx 21.47$$
 $||b_i|| \approx 9.05$ $\mathcal{A} = 80$ $\mathcal{A} = 20.46$ $\mathcal{A}/||b_i||^2 = 0.125$











































Volume:

$$\left| \left[\begin{array}{cc} 0 & 1 \\ 3 & 2 \end{array} \right] \right| = -3$$


$$\left| \left[\begin{array}{cc} 1 & -2/3 \\ 0 & 1/3 \end{array} \right] \right| = 1/3$$





$$B^{-1} = 1/3 \left[\begin{array}{cc} 2 & -1 \\ -3 & 0 \end{array} \right]$$


$$(B^{-1})^T = \left[\begin{array}{cc} -2/3 & 1 \\ 1/3 & 0 \end{array} \right]$$



$$B^{-1} = 1/3 \left[\begin{array}{cc} 2 & -1 \\ -3 & 0 \end{array} \right]$$

$$(B^{-1})^T = \left[\begin{array}{cc} 1 & -2/3 \\ 0 & 1/3 \end{array} \right]$$

q-ary Lattices




$$\Lambda_q(A) = \{y = As \pmod{q}\}$$

$$\Lambda_q^{\perp}(A) = \{y \mid Ay = 0 \pmod{q}\}$$

$$\Lambda_q^{\perp}(A) = q\Lambda_q(A)^*$$

$$\Lambda_q(A) = q\Lambda_q^{\perp}(A)^*$$


Successive Minima



 λ_i : min r s.t.

 \mathcal{B}_r has *i* lin. ind. vectors

Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization Process




$$\tilde{B} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \mu_{2,1} & 1 & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & 0 \\ \mu_{n,1} & \dots & \mu_{n,n-1} & 1 \end{bmatrix}.B$$

$$\mu_{i,j} = \frac{\langle b_i, \tilde{b}_i \rangle}{||\tilde{b}_j||^2}$$


Minkowski's Theorem


- Pigeonhole principle for lattices
- A symmetric and convex region with volume 2ⁿ det (B)^{1/n} has at least 2 non-zero vectors
- ▶ Hermite upper bound: $\lambda_1 \leq \sqrt{n} \det(B)^{1/n}$
- ▶ Gaussian heuristics: $\lambda_1 \leq \sqrt{\frac{2n}{\pi\theta}} \det(B)^{1/n}$
- ▶ Lower bound: $\lambda_1 \ge \min_i ||\tilde{b}_i||$

Shortest Vector Problem (and Gap-SVP)




GapSVP Complexity




















$$\begin{split} ||\tilde{b}_{i+1}||^2 &\geq 1/2||\tilde{b}_i||^2 \\ ||b_1|| &\leq 2^{(n-1)/2} \lambda_1(\mathcal{L}) \end{split}$$


$$b_2 = b_2 - c.b_1$$
 if $||b_2||^2 < 3/4 ||b_1||^2$, swap and loop



$$||\tilde{b}_{i+1}||^2 \ge 1/2||\tilde{b}_i||^2$$

 $||b_1|| \le 2^{(n-1)/2} \lambda_1(\mathcal{L})$

$$b_2 = b_2 - c.b_1$$
 if $||b_2||^2 < 3/4||b_1||^2$, swap and loop




$$\begin{split} ||\tilde{b}_{i+1}||^2 &\geq 1/2||\tilde{b}_i||^2 \\ ||b_1|| &\leq 2^{(n-1)/2} \lambda_1(\mathcal{L}) \end{split}$$


$$b_2 = b_2 - c.b_1$$

if $||b_2||^2 < 3/4||b_1||^2$,
swap and loop

Shortest Independent Vectors Problem




Bounded Distance Decode



Bounded Distance Decode


Decision: given d given coset $t + \mathcal{L}$ decide if there is v s. t. $||t - v|| \leq \gamma d$

Babai's Roundoff Algorithm




```
Compute x \equiv t \pmod{B} \mathcal{B}_d \subset \mathcal{P}_B d = \min_i(b_i^\perp) (linear system)
```


Babai's Nearest Plane Algorithm



Babai's Nearest Plane Algorithm




Babai's Nearest Plane Algorithm



Part II - Crypto

Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH)



No security proof

Trapdoor: orthogonality


Good base: $V = (v_1, v_2)$

Bad base: $B = (b_1, b_2)$

Encrypt r: $c = v + r \pmod{B}$

Decrypt: r = c - v

Ajtai's Construction



 $f_A(x) = Ax$ surjective small x (SIS problem) collision: x, x' short vector: (x - x')in Λ_a^{\perp} worst to average quantum reduction

Learning With Errors









Search problem:

Given
$$b_i = \langle a_i, s \rangle + e_i$$


Find s

Decision problem:

Distinguish (a_i, b_i) from uniform


Search to decision reduction

Learning With Errors



 $g_A(x) = Ax + e$ injective


Learning With Errors




$$g_A(x) = Ax + e$$
 injective

worst to average quantum reduction


LWE Based Cryptosystem




LWE Based Cryptosystem



LWE Based Cryptosystem




Cyclotomic Rings



$$\Phi_{2^n}(x) = (x^{2^{n-1}} + 1)$$
if $\zeta_{2^n} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ then
$$\Phi_{2^n} \equiv \prod_{i \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^n}^*} (x - \zeta_{2^n}^i)$$
Ring: $\mathbb{Z}_5[x]/(x^2 + 1)$
 $x^2 + 1 \equiv (x + 2)(x + 3)$
 $a(x) = 3x + 3$


Coefficient Representation



Ring:
$$\mathbb{Z}_5[x]/(x^2+1)$$

 $x^2+1 \equiv (x+2)(x+3)$
 $\equiv (x-3)(x-2)$
 $a(x) = 3x+3$
 $2(3x+3) \equiv x+1$
 $\begin{bmatrix} 3 & 3 \end{bmatrix}^T, \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}^T$


Evaluation Representation



Ring:
$$\mathbb{Z}_{5}[x]/(x^{2}+1)$$


 $x^{2}+1 \equiv (x+2)(x+3)$
 $a(x) = 3x+3$
 $2a(x) \equiv x+1$
 $a(2) \equiv 4, a(3) \equiv 2$
 $\begin{bmatrix} 4 & 2 \end{bmatrix}^{T}, \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}^{T}$
FFT

Cyclotomic Rings



$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ 1 & 3 \end{bmatrix}}_{\text{Vandermond}} \begin{bmatrix} 3 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 4 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix}
3 & -2 \\
-1 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
3 \\
4
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 \\
1
\end{bmatrix}$$
Vandermond inverse



▶ Better reductions, better parameters


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
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
NTRU-like Cryptosystem [13]




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
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
Dual LWE





Dual LWE





Dual LWE






































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- More with Zvika Brakerski

Worst case reductions

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- Lattices are not yet recommended by NSA!

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Thank you

Questions?