

## 1) Advisory information

Title : Microsoft MPEG Layer-3 Audio Decoder Division By Zero

Version : I3codeca.acm 1-9-0-306 (XP SP2 – XP SP3)

Discovery : <a href="http://www.abysssec.com">http://www.abysssec.com</a>
Vendor : <a href="http://www.microsoft.com">http://www.microsoft.com</a>

Impact : Med/High

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# 2) Vulnerability Information

#### Class

1- Division By Zero

**Impact** 

Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to cause denial-ofservice conditions.

Remotely Exploitable

Yes

Locally Exploitable

Yes

## 3) Vulnerabilities detail

### 1- Division by Zero:

The vulnerability will occur during paring malicious AVI file contains MPEG Layer-3 stream.

In I3codeca.acm DriverProc (sub\_3D522940) routine is responsible to choice true function for parsing various AVI files. This routine takes 5 arguments. Due to third argument is routine it will call true routine for encoded AVI. If third argument is equal to 0x604E, sub 3D522940 will call:

```
.text:3D522C60
                      mov
                           eax, [esp+uMsg]
.text:3D522C64
                      cmp eax, 600Ah
                      ja loc_3D522CF0
.text:3D522C69
                     jz short loc_3D522CDE
.text:3D522C6F
.text:3D522C71
                     lea ecx, [eax-1]; switch 10 cases
.text:3D522C74
                      cmp ecx, 9
.text:3D522C77
                         loc 3D522DA8 ; default
.text:3D522C77
                                 ; jumptable 3D522C7D cases 2,5
.text:3D522C77
                                 ; jumptable 3D522D07 cases 1-13,17-64
.text:3D522C7D
                           ds:off_3D522DD8[ecx*4]; switch jump
                      jmp
.text:3D522C84
.text:3D522C84 loc 3D522C84:
                                        ; DATA XREF: .text:off 3D522DD8o
.text:3D522C84
                     mov eax, 1
                                      ; jumptable 3D522C7D cases 1,6
                      retn 14h
.text:3D522C89
.text:3D522C8C; ----
.text:3D522C8C
.text:3D522C8C loc_3D522C8C:
                                        ; CODE XREF: DriverProc+1Dj
                                 ; DATA XREF: .text:off 3D522DD8o
.text:3D522C8C
                      mov eax, [esp+lParam2]; jumptable 3D522C7D case 3
.text:3D522C8C
                     mov ecx, [esp+hDriver]
.text:3D522C90
.text:3D522C94
                     push eax
                                     ; int
                                     ; hDriver
.text:3D522C95
                      push ecx
                     call sub 3D521D00
.text:3D522C96
.text:3D522C9B
                     retn 14h
.text:3D522C9E; -----
.text:3D522D84
.text:3D522D84 loc_3D522D84:
                                         ; CODE XREF: DriverProc+A7j
.text:3D522D84
                                  ; DATA XREF: .text:off 3D522E00o
                      mov edx, [esp+lParam2]; jumptable 3D522D07 case 67
.text:3D522D84
.text:3D522D88
                      mov eax, [esp+hWndParent]
.text:3D522D8C
                      push edx
.text:3D522D8D
                      push eax
.text:3D522D8E
                        call sub_3D522940
.text:3D522D93
                      retn 14h
```

sub\_3D522940 is responsible to parsing MPEGLAYER3WAVEFORMAT (same strf in AVI), if the value of wFormatTag in WAVEFORMATEX structure (subset of MPEGLAYER3WAVEFORMAT structure) equals with 0x0055 means the type of audio stream is MP3:

```
.text:3D522A9F mov [ebp+0Ch], ecx
.text:3D522AA2 cmp word ptr [edi], 55h
.text:3D522AA6 jnz loc_3D522B2C
```

If type of stream is MP3, there will be some computational for fields of WAVEFORMATEX structure. First the value of nSamplesPerSec will be read then due to value of this field a variable will give 1152(0x480) or 576 (0x240):

```
; nSamplesPerSec
.text:3D522AAC
                      mov ecx, [edi+4]
.text:3D522AAF
                     xor edx, edx
.text:3D522AB1
                     mov eax, ecx
                     div dword ptr [esi+4]
.text:3D522AB3
.text:3D522AB6
                     mov edx, 5DC0h
.text:3D522ABB
                     cmp edx, ecx
.text:3D522ABD
                     sbb ebx, ebx
.text:3D522ABF
                     xor
                          edx, edx
.text:3D522AC1
                     and
                           ebx, 240h
                           ebx, 240h
.text:3D522AC7
                     add
```

After a bit nAvgBytesPerSec from WAVEFORMATEX structure will multiply with 0x480 or 0x240 and the result will be dived by with value of nSamplesPerSec field.

.text:3D522AD1	mov	eax, [edi+8] ; nAvgBytesPerSec
.text:3D522AD4	imul	eax, ebx
.text:3D522AD7	div	есх

Vulnerable point is here, because no control performed for these fields. If you continue to look at disassembly you will find value of nBlockAlign from WAVEFORMATEX structure will be dividing to result of previously divided value. so if result of previously divided value is 0 with new division we will met an "integer division by zero" error:

```
        .text:3D522AD9
        mov edi, [ebp+8] ; nBlockAlign

        .text:3D522ADC
        xor edx, edx

        .text:3D522ADE
        mov ecx, eax

        .text:3D522AE0
        mov eax, edi

        .text:3D522AE2
        div ecx → crash point
```

The proof of concept for proving vulnerability Is annexed to this doc in mp3-poc.zip

We contacted Microsoft and they told us this issue is fixed in ms10-052 bulletin but that advisory fixes vulnerability exists in (I3codecx.ax not in I3codeca.acm) and they didn't fix our vulnerability at all.