

Monopoly (Ch25)

Shan Gui

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

April 28, 2025

What We Have Learned

Cost Minimization for Any Producer

- ▶ Find the optimal input bundle that minimizes total cost, given input prices w_1 , w_2 , and a target output level y .
 \Rightarrow Cost function: $c(y) = w_1x_1^* + w_2x_2^*$.

Profit Maximization for a **Competitive Producer**


- ▶ Find the optimal output level that maximizes profit, given the output price p .
 \Rightarrow Inverse supply function: $p = MC(y)$.

Profit Maximization for an (ordinary) **Monopolist** ?

- ▶ Ordinary monopolist: sets one price for all units of output.
- ▶ Find the optimal output level that maximizes profit, given the inverse market demand $p(y)$.

What Determines the Market Size in the Long Run?


Demand relative to Minimum Efficient Scale (MES)



- ▶ The minimum value of average cost:
 $p^* = \min AC$
- ▶ **Minimum Efficient Scale (MES):** the individual supply at $\min AC$
- ▶ Suppose firms have the same technology; then, the number of firms is $n = \left\lfloor \frac{D(p^*)}{MES} \right\rfloor$ (rounding down).
- ▶ Monopoly if $n = 1$.

Profit Maximization for a Monopolist

Monopolist is a Price Maker.




Monopoly with a linear demand curve. The monopolist's profit-maximizing output occurs where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.

- ▶ Given the market demand: $D(p)$
- ▶ Write p as a function of quantity demanded: $p(y)$
- ▶ The monopolist:
$$\max_y \pi(y) = r(y) - c(y) = p(y)y - c(y)$$
- ▶ The **optimality condition**:
$$MR(y^*) = MC(y^*)$$
- ▶ The monopoly price:
$$p^* = p(y^*) > MC(y^*)$$

Profit Maximization for a Monopolist


Markup Pricing over MC



- ▶ Monopoly price: $p^* = p(y^*) > MC(y^*)$
- ▶ $\frac{\Delta r(y)}{\Delta y} = \frac{p\Delta y + y\Delta p}{\Delta y} = p + p\frac{\Delta p/p}{\Delta y/y}$
- ▶ $MR(y^*) = \frac{\Delta r}{\Delta y}|_{y^*} = p^*[1 - \frac{1}{|\epsilon(y^*)|}] = MC(y^*)$
- ⇒ $p^* = \frac{1}{1 - 1/|\epsilon(y^*)|} MC(y^*)$
- ▶ The **markup**: $\frac{1}{1 - 1/|\epsilon(y)|} > 1. \Leftrightarrow |\epsilon(y)| > 1.$
- ⇒ A monopolist never operates where the demand curve is inelastic ($0 < |\epsilon(y)| < 1$).
- ▶ For a constant-elasticity demand ($\epsilon(y) = -c$), the markup is constant.
- ▶ For an infinitely elastic demand ($\epsilon(y) = -\infty$), $p = MC$ (Competitive firm)

The Impact of Taxes on a Monopolist

Example: Constant $MC = c$




Linear demand and taxation. Imposition of a tax on a monopolist facing a linear demand. Note that the price will rise by half the amount of the tax.

- ▶ Markup pricing: $p^* = \frac{1}{1 - 1/|\epsilon(y^*)|} (c + t)$
- ▶ Suppose a constant-elasticity demand.
 \Rightarrow Since $|\epsilon| > 1$, $\frac{\Delta p^*}{\Delta t} > 1$, the monopolist passes on more than the amount of the tax.
- ▶ Suppose Linear market demand:
 $p(y) = a - by$
 $\Rightarrow y^* = \frac{a - c - t}{2b}$, $p^* = a - by^*$
 $\Rightarrow \frac{\Delta p^*}{\Delta t} = -b \frac{\Delta y^*}{\Delta t} = -b * \frac{-1}{2b} = \frac{1}{2}$, the monopolist passes on half of the tax.

Deadweight Loss of Monopoly

Inefficiency of monopoly



- ▶ A monopolist produces less than the competitive amount of output and is therefore Pareto inefficient.
- ▶ From competitive equilibrium to monopoly:

$$\Rightarrow \Delta CS = -(A + B)$$

$$\Rightarrow \Delta PS = A - C$$


$$\Rightarrow \Delta TS = \Delta CS + \Delta PS = -B - C$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{Deadweight loss}$$

$$= \max TS - TS^{\text{Monopoly}} = -\Delta TS = B + C$$

Regulating Natural Monopoly

Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) is Large Relative to Demand



A natural monopoly. If a natural monopolist operates where price equals marginal cost, then it will produce an efficient level of output, y_{MC} , but it will be unable to cover its costs. If it is required to produce an output where price equals average cost, y_{AC} , then it will cover its costs, but will produce too little output relative to the efficient amount.

- ▶ A **natural monopoly** occurs when a firm cannot operate at an efficient level of output ($p = MC$) without losing money.
- ▶ If it is required to produce an output where $p = AC$, it will be inefficient.
- ▶ Many public utilities are natural monopolies of this sort and are therefore regulated by the government.

Monopoly Behavior (Ch26, Optional)

- ▶ Ordinary monopolist: sets one price for all units of output.
- ▶ Discriminating monopolist: sells different units of output at different prices.

First-degree price discrimination (Perfect price discrimination)

- ▶ Discriminating both quantity and buyers. $\Rightarrow CS = 0, PS = \max TS$
- ▶ E.g., a small-town doctor who charges his patients different prices.

Second-degree price discrimination (Non-linear pricing)

- ▶ Discriminating quantity, not buyers. (Buyers are self-selected)
- ▶ E.g., Cheaper in bundles; Discount for membership.

Third-degree price discrimination (Most common)

- ▶ Discriminating buyers, not quantity. $\epsilon^D \downarrow \Rightarrow p \uparrow$.
- ▶ E.g., Cheaper Steam games in China than in the US; Student discounts.

Monopoly Behavior (Ch. 26, Optional)

- ▶ Ordinary monopolist: One price for all units.
- ▶ Discriminating monopolist: Different prices across units/buyers.

1st-Degree Price Discrimination (Perfect)

- ▶ By quantity & buyer $\Rightarrow CS = 0, PS = \max TS$
- ▶ E.g., small-town doctor charging each patient differently

2nd-Degree Price Discrimination (Nonlinear)

- ▶ By quantity, not buyer (self-selection)
- ▶ E.g., bulk discounts, membership deals

3rd-Degree Price Discrimination (Common)

- ▶ By buyer, not quantity: $\varepsilon^D \downarrow \Rightarrow p \uparrow$
- ▶ E.g., student discounts, regional pricing (cheaper Steam games in China)

Thank You!