

Political Agenda Shaping and Differentiation in Response to Unprecedented Shocks: The Venezuelan Migration Crisis

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September 6, 2023

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
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- 1.5m in Peru and 450k in Chile
- 4.5% of Peruvian and 2.3% of Chilean populations

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- 6.1 million went to other LAC countries
- 1.5m in Peru and 450k in Chile
- 4.5% of Peruvian and 2.3% of Chilean populations
- These countries had a small immigrant population:
 - Chile: 410k in 2014
 - Peru: 104k in 2010

Evolution of Venezuelan Immigrants in LA



Motivation

- Documented effects of the immigration shock on
 - Crime or crime perception (Anatol & Kangalee, 2021; Knight & Tribin, 2020)
 - Labor market, by decreasing informal wages (Caruso, Canon, & Mueller, 2021)
 - Housing rents (Forero-Vargas & Iturra, 2022)
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- Do politicians begin discussing a **previously unimportant topic** when it becomes important for their country?
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- Look at **salience** by party family (left, center, right).
- **How** do they address the issue? **Wordscores + Topic Models**

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Does the saliency of the immigration issue increase among political elites?

Do the right-wing claim ownership of the issue?

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Do they differentiate on what they say?

Yes! They use ideological cues to discuss immigration & different narratives.

Related Work

- Understanding responses to **crisis** (e.g., Blumenau & Lauderdale, 2018; Greene & Cross, 2017) by looking at responses to **new issues**.

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- Effects of Venezuelan migration (e.g., Acosta Arcarazo et al., 2019; Freire-Vidal & Graells-Garrido, 2019; Pérez & Freier, 2023; Selee et al., 2019)

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- Effects of Venezuelan migration (e.g., Acosta Arcarazo et al., 2019; Freire-Vidal & Graells-Garrido, 2019; Pérez & Freier, 2023; Selee et al., 2019)
- Immigration policy in Latin America (Acosta, 2018; Freier & Arcarazo, 2015; Hammoud-Gallego & Freier, 2023)

Crises and Political Response: What do we know?

Shocks Lead to Increased Saliency:

- Existing research suggests that shocks in migration patterns often result in heightened saliency within political discourse, in countries with a history of immigration (Blumenau & Lauderdale, 2018; Greene & Cross, 2017).

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Issue Ownership by the Right:

- The right-wing political spectrum typically claims ownership of migration as a key issue. (Alonso & Fonseca, 2012; Bale et al., 2010; Grande et al., 2019; Kriesi et al., 2008)

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Accommodation/Alignment of Other Parties:

- When the right-wing takes the issue, it increases the pressure on mainstream parties to respond, and accommodate their positions. (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020; Bale, 2003; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2019; Meguid, 2005; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015)

Crises and Political Response: What is different in this case?

In the case we're analyzing, the situation deviates from the norm as the shock factor is not gradual.

No Party Can Claim Ownership:

- Given the urgency & magnitude of the issue it is too costly to dismiss.
- Given the novelty of the issue, it's expected that no single political party can claim ownership over it.

Lack of Leadership Enables Ideological Differentiation:

- The absence of clear leadership on this pressing issue allows for ideological differentiation among parties.

Data

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Party Family: We use CHES L-R score. Left (< 4), Right (> 7), Center ($> 4, < 7$).

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
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	Chile	Peru	Total
Left	724,177	318,775	1,042,952
Center	233,413	619,309	852,722
Right	570,772	543,587	1,114,359
Total	1,528,362	1,481,671	3,010,033

Number of Tweets per Country and Party Family

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter



Immigration Analysis Workflow





Blue blocks: 



Red blocks:  & 

Immigration Statistics

			Total
Immigration	6085 (0.33%)	2086 (0.14%)	8171 (0.25%)
No Immigration	1,838,707	1,479,585	3,318,292
Total	1,844,792	1,481,671	3,326,463

Immigration Statistics


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	Left	Center	Right	Total	Left	Center	Right	Total
Immigration	2518 (0.35%)	851 (0.36%)	1721 (0.30%)	5090 (0.33%)	532 (0.17%)	928 (0.15%)	626 (0.12%)	2086 (0.14%)
No Immigration	721,659	232,562	569,051	1,523,272	318,243	618,381	542,961	1,479,585
Total	724,177	233,413	570,772	1,528,362	318,775	619,309	543,587	1,481,671

Data: Ideological Cues

Tweets Positioning in the Left-Right axis:
Wordscores (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003;
Le Pennec, 2022).

- Which words are used by the Left or the Right?
- Data-driven
- Compute scores for each document.



Data: Topic Analysis (BERTopic)

BERTopic to cluster (BERTopic, Grootendorst, 2022)

1. Clusters defined automatically by the algorithm
2. Bert for embeddings, UMAP to reduce dimensionality
3. HDBSCAN to clusterize (and reduce number of topics using c-TF-IDF representation)
4. ChatGPT to get Topic representations
5. c-TF-IDF to reduce outliers.


Data: Topic Analysis (NMF)

1. Matrix decomposition technique
2. Log-based TF-IDF as a weighting factor
3. Number of clusters to 4

Research Design

- High-frequency data
- Not all legislators tweeted all the time
- We grouped tweets by years (or months) and compared means within the same time period.
- Analyze the clusters of tweets distribution across ideological families.

Immigration salience per year in Chile and Peru



—

Left


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Center

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
Right

Immigration salience per **month** in Chile and Peru





Ideological Score

Ideological Score for Immigration and non-immigration issues by party by year



BERT 1: Chile


Frequency of each topic



“Venezuelan immigrants in Chile and their impact on the country’s migration policies”

“The migration crisis and the government’s policy on the rights of children and immigrants in the country, along with the foreign migration bill in process in the government”


BERT 2: Chile



BERT 3: Chile


Frequency of each topic

Chile - topic 4



“Xenophobia and its implications”


Chile - topic 5




“Social Issues and Women’s Rights”

BERT 4: Peru

Frequency of each topic




“Venezuelan migration to Peru and its impact”




‘Política migratoria y derechos de los migrantes’

BERT 5: Peru



“Xenophobia and discrimination against foreigners and citizens, including racism, homophobia, and misogyny.”

BERT 6: Peru



“Women’s Rights and Violence Against Migrant Women”

	<i>Chile</i>				<i>Peru</i>			
	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
	personas	pais	chile	antofagasta	maduro	migratoria	machismo	países
	nuestro	contra	piñera	niños	como	sobre	campana	derecho
	este	chilenos	expulsion	senador	esta	millones	todos	alemania
	inmigracion	millones	trump	esta	venezuela	miles	discriminacion	como
	derechos	refugiados	diputado	gobierno	migrantes	unidos	como	acnur
	como	dictadura	para	crisis	pais	estados	para	campo
	pais	maduro	sobre	nueva	para	politica	belmont	niños
	migracion	venezuela	pais	sobre	peruanos	donald	racismo	migrantes
	para	chile	ilegales	politica	peru	trump	contra	para
	migrantes	venezolanos	inmigrantes	migratoria	venezolanos	inmigrantes	xenofobia	refugiados
%	48.5	17.7	14.6	19.2	60.9	12.8	12.9	13.3
Left (%)	50.0	18.8	12.7	18.5	53.6	13.0	15.4	18.0
Center (%)	48.5	20.1	17.9	13.5	53.4	16.1	16.7	13.9
Right (%)	46.0	14.9	15.8	23.2	78.1	8.3	5.8	7.8
Distance L-R	4.0	3.9	-3.1	-4.8	-24.4	4.6	9.6	10.2

Other Tests

1. **Geography**: exposed to immigration (capital & border) vs non-exposed.
 - ▶ Appendix
2. **Dynamics of Immigration Saliency Across Parties**: Arellano-Bond model, lag dependent variables + other parties at time t , $t-1$, etc.
 - ▶ Left-Center ▶ Right-Center
3. **Related topics**: Venezuela, employment, crime.
 - ▶ Ideological Score ▶ Saliency

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- **Salience of immigration** ↑ across all parties
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- Parties **differentiate**: ideological language & \neq topics (not trivial).

Final Remarks

Implications:

Challenges and future steps:

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Implications:

- Immigration **salience** increases, but still not too much?
- **Differentiation:**
 - Right-wing legislators focus more on regulation & the impact on host countries.
 - Left-wing legislators focus more on anti-xenophobia & immigrants rights.

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Challenges and future steps:

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- Why some political leaders will **maintain the issue** in the middle-long term?
- Dynamics or interactions.

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Thank you!

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Supplementary Slides

- Ideological Score ▶
- Different topics: Venezuela, Employment, Crime ▶ Ideological Score ▶ Salience
- Dynamics of salience: ▶ Left-center ▶ Right-Center
- Geography ▶
- BERTopics ▶ Topics ▶ Chile ▶ Peru

Ideological Positioning

- Classification of parties given by the literature, [► Parties](#)
- For each word w , frequency of w in all the manifestos in the right

$$p_w^R = \frac{\sum_{j \in R} c_{wj}}{\sum_{j \in R} m_j}$$

c_{wj} is the count of word w in document j ; m_j is the word-count of j .

- Using these frequencies, I can compute the right-wing score of each word w

$$s_w^R = \frac{p_w^R}{p_w^R + p_w^L} - \frac{p_w^L}{p_w^R + p_w^L} \quad (1)$$

- A manifesto j score is then calculated by:

$$S_j^R = \frac{\sum_w p_{wj}^R \times s_w^R}{S_R} \quad (2)$$

- Extremeness is computed as $|S_j|$
- Partisanship is measured by performing this for each party q (q vs. others instead of right vs. left)




Figure: Ideological Score for Immigration and its different frameworks and Immigration without that frameworks issues by party and years



Figure: Immigration salience by Framework per year in Chile and Peru

Note: the DV is the salience of immigration by each framework operationalized as the ratio of statements about immigration to the total number of public statements made. To compute these means, a control using the length of the tweet was used. Robust standard errors were computed. Source:

Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter. [▶ Back to Appendix](#)

	Peru All	Peru 2017-21	Peru 2013-16	Chile All	Chile 2017-21	Chile 2013-16
Tweets on Immigration (lag 1)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.09* (0.06)	0.38*** (0.04)	0.27 (0.19)	0.36*** (0.05)
Tweets on Immigration (lag 2)	0.08* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.09* (0.05)	0.05 (0.03)
Saliency Immigration Left \times Right	6.33* (3.26)	6.21 (4.94)	5.38* (3.21)	4.30*** (1.41)	3.85** (1.83)	4.43*** (1.40)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) \times Right	-1.00 (0.95)	-1.64 (1.34)	-1.31 (0.87)	-1.67*** (0.46)	1.69 (2.13)	-1.59*** (0.46)
Saliency Immigration Left \times Center	9.40** (4.12)	12.50* (6.63)	9.47** (4.04)	11.46*** (0.46)	33.23*** (1.51)	10.08*** (0.43)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) \times Center	-2.45*** (0.93)	2.07* (1.20)	-1.78*** (0.61)	-4.16*** (0.50)	-8.57* (5.10)	-3.42*** (0.47)
Tweets	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Trend	0.02* (0.01)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	-0.97*** (0.24)	-0.54** (0.21)	-1.91*** (0.64)	-1.14 (0.85)	-1.21** (0.57)	0.74 (2.15)
Observations	1,036	410	626	985	405	580
Number of Party	11	10	11	10	9	10

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table: Regression results for left and center parties' tweets about immigration


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Tweets on Immigration (lag 2)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.11)	0.01 (0.06)
Saliency Immigration Left × Right	7.56 (4.70)	8.56 (5.81)	6.74 (4.45)	11.60*** (3.57)	12.41*** (3.52)	11.90*** (3.44)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) × Right	-1.00* (0.58)	-0.76 (0.85)	-1.26*** (0.46)	-3.64** (1.54)	-3.98 (3.18)	-2.48* (1.43)
Saliency Immigration Left × Center	7.23** (3.45)	7.70* (4.32)	7.31** (3.40)	18.11*** (0.60)	37.41*** (3.67)	17.91*** (0.31)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) × Center	-2.45** (1.06)	1.05 (0.68)	-2.20** (0.99)	-7.01*** (0.94)	-14.45** (6.68)	-4.75*** (0.83)
Tweets	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Trend	0.02* (0.01)	0.23** (0.10)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04* (0.03)	0.23** (0.12)	0.03 (0.02)
Constant	-1.24*** (0.37)	-0.84*** (0.31)	-2.02*** (0.69)	-2.41 (1.50)	-1.56** (0.71)	-0.80 (5.28)
Observations	929	389	540	525	225	300
Number of Party	9	9	9	5	5	5

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table: Regression results for right and center parties' tweets about immigration

Immigration Salience per year in Chile and Peru for Different Regions



References: Orange (Capital city), Blue (cities in the border) and Red (Other regions). Note: the DV is the salience of immigration operationalized as the ratio of statements about immigration to the total number of public statements made. To compute these means, a control using the length of the tweet was used. Robust standard errors were computed. Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter


► [Back to Appendix](#)

Topics


Chile	Peru
"Venezuelan immigrants in Chile and their impact on the country's migration policies"	"Venezuelan migration to Peru and its impact"
"La crisis migratoria y la política del gobierno sobre los derechos de los niños y los inmigrantes en el país, junto con el proyecto de ley de migración extranjera en proceso en el gobierno"	"Política migratoria y derechos de los migrantes"
"Haitian Migration Crisis in Chile"	"Xenophobia and discrimination against foreigners and citizens, including racism, homophobia, and misogyny"
"Palestinian refugees and their situation in Israel and other countries"	"Crisis de refugiados en Europa y el mundo"
"Xenophobia and its implications"	"Donald Trump's Immigration Policy"
"Social Issues and Women's Rights"	"Crisis de refugiados en Alemania y Europa"
"Vacunación de migrantes en situación irregular y su impacto en la salud pública"	"Japanese-Peruvian Friendship and Immigration Anniversary"
"Hate Crimes and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Germany"	"Women's Rights and Violence Against Migrant Women"
"Migration and its Impact on European Countries"	"Syrian and Afghan refugees fleeing to Europe, living conditions, and humanitarian efforts"
"Migrant Camp Fire and Education Blame"	"Papa Francisco pide acojan refugiados, familia, inmigrantes y migrantes en iglesias de Europa"
"Immigration history and experiences of Italians and Germans from Trieste to Yugoslavia, and the impact on their lives"	"Cities prepared for migration and urban planning"

Table: Topics in Chile and Peru

Bert Chile



Bert Peru



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