

# Information About Corruption and Politicians' Proposals

Guillermo Lezama  
Department of Economics  
University of Pittsburgh

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Do politicians modify their **ideological frameworks** in response to information about corruption prior to the election?

- Use of populist rhetoric
- Use of party-specific language (or how partisan they are)

# Interplay between Audits and Platforms

Information about Corruption  $\Rightarrow$ ? Proposals

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  - b. Partisanship
    - Changes in reputation affect electoral competitiveness  $\Rightarrow$  positioning.
  - c. Populism
    - Corruption accusations are associated with populist rhetoric (Berman, 2021).
    - The existence of accurate information to negatively affect populist rhetoric (fake news are associated with this rhetoric (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2022)



# Background: Brazilian's Case

## Audits to Municipalities

- In 2003, Brazil introduced a **randomized** audits policy that disclosed information about corruption cases in local governments.
- Each audited municipality receives a report.
- Audits are targeted to specific areas for municipalities with population  $> 20,000$ .
- Had effects (e.g. Avis, Ferraz, & Finan, 2018; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Lauletta, Rossi, & Ruzzier, 2020)

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### ► Irregularities

## Elections and Manifestos

- Municipal elections every four years.
- Since 2009, it is mandatory to present **manifestos** before the election for an executive position.   ► [Manifestos in the News](#)

# Preview of the Results

Information about Corruption in Brazilian Municipalities



Proposals made by mayoral candidates

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## Information about Corruption in Brazilian Municipalities



Proposals made by mayoral candidates

- Information about corruption affects politicians' rhetoric:  
Agenda (issues covered in audits), populism (increased for mayors in corrupt municipalities), and partisanship (mixed).
- Effects are heterogeneous by
  - incumbent/challenger
  - level of corruption

# Contributions

- How political **agenda** respond to changes in reputation (e.g. Aragonès et al., 2015; Dragu & Fan, 2016; Riker, 1996)

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- How reputation shocks affects **policy positioning** (e.g. Bernhardt et al., 2020; Buisseret & Van Weelden, 2022; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005; Serra, 2010)

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- How reputation shocks affects **policy positioning** (e.g. Bernhardt et al., 2020; Buisseret & Van Weelden, 2022; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005; Serra, 2010)
- Impact of information on **electoral campaign choices**.
  - city council candidates' quality (Cavalcanti et al., 2018):
  - campaign spending (Poblete-Cazenave, 2021)



# Data

- 2012 election in municipalities in Brazil.
  - 2,691 candidates ran for reelection (incumbents)
  - 5,049 candidates were challengers to incumbents (challengers)
- Audits
  - State Comptroller (CGU) performed randomized audits (2003 - 2015).
  - Audited municipality if audited in 2009-2012 ( $Audited_{mst}$ )
  - 478 audited municipalities (out of 5,568) in 2009-2012.
  - Data about corruption and irregularities ▶ [Irregularities](#)
- Municipal characteristics (IBGE).
- Candidates manifestos at the local level in Brazil for the 2012 election.
  - ▶ [Manifestos in the News](#)
    - From the electoral authority website: Downloaded 16,173 pdfs and 13,724 texts.
    - After cleaning: 11,422 candidates from 5,140 municipalities

# Outcome Variables


- Focus on issues raised by Audits:
  - Agenda shares: classify lines into topics (*supervised ML classifier*)  
Labels: Health, Social Policy, Economic/Sectoral and Environmental Policies, Bureaucratic issues, Infrastructure and Urban issues, and Crime.
  - Overlap With Audit Reports (*share of words in reports present in manifestos*)

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
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Labels: Health, Social Policy, Economic/Sectoral and Environmental Policies, Bureaucratic issues, Infrastructure and Urban issues, and Crime.
  - Overlap With Audit Reports (*share of words in reports present in manifestos*)
- Ideological framing of the manifesto:
  - Use of Party-Specific Language (WordScores, Laver et al., 2003; Le Pennec, 2022)
  - Frequency of Populist Words (*dictionary, Gennaro et al., 2021; Mendes, 2021*)

## ► Descriptives


## Empirical Strategy: Effect of the Audit I




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
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


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





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
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



## Empirical Strategy: Effect of the Audit II

$$\begin{aligned} Outcome_{imst} = & \alpha + \beta_0 Audited_{mst} + \beta_1 Audited_{mst} \times Corruption + \\ & + \beta_2 Corruption + \gamma Controls_{imst} + \nu_s + \varepsilon_{imst} \end{aligned}$$



- $Audited_{mst} = \mathbb{1}(\text{municipality audit report disclosed before the 2012 election})$
- $Corruption = \mathbb{1}(\text{number of acts of corruption higher than the median})$  ▶ Balance 2
- $\beta_0$  : effect of the audit results disclosed before the election, given the acts of corruption were below the median.
- $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ : effect of the audit results disclosed before the election, given the acts of corruption were above the median.
- Similar to Ferraz and Finan (2008)

# Results I: Effect of the Audit on the Agenda (cond. on Corruption)





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

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- Politicians engage in topics raised by the audit.
- Heterogeneous effects: reputation shock matters.

▶ Robustness: Corruption in Health ▶ Table Incumbents ▶ Table Challengers ▶ Means




## Results II: Effect of the Audit on the Overlap w/ Reports (cond. on Corruption)



95% CI's.

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



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

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## Results III: Effect of the Audit on Partisanship (cond. on Corruption)



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



95% CI's.

- Audits affect the use of partisan language (and reputation shock matters)

► Table Incumbents    ► Table Challengers    ► Means

## Results IV: Effect of the Audit on Populism (cond. on Corruption)



95% CI's.

- Incumbents with a negative shock increase the use of populist rhetoric.

► [Table Incumbents](#)    ► [Table Challengers](#)    ► [Means](#)

## Summary of the Results

Do politicians modify their agenda in response to information about corruption prior to the election?

Incumbents		Challengers
No change	<b>Focus on Health issues</b> Audits about Health Policy	↑
↑ No change	<b>Focus on Bureaucracy issues</b> Low number of corruption cases High number of corruption cases	↓ No change
↑ No change	<b>Vocabulary from Audit Reports</b> Low number of corruption cases High number of corruption cases	No change ↑

Do politicians modify their ideological frameworks in response to information about corruption prior to the election?

Incumbents	Partisan Language	Challengers
↑ No change	Low number of corruption cases High number of corruption cases	No change ↓
	Populism	
No change ↑	Low number of corruption cases High number of corruption cases	No Change No change

► Examples of Populism    ► Manifestos in the News

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- Revealing information affects the issues politicians focus on (they are responsive).
- Engagement in topics depends on reputation shocks.
- Information about corruption also affects ideological framework.
- Does this mean more polarization? (Gentzkow et al., 2019)
- Role of the media (Avis et al., 2018)
- We knew monitoring interventions affect corruption.
- Affect responsiveness and political climate.

Thank you!

gul30@pitt.edu  
guillelezama.netlify.app

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## Descriptives: Issues and Ideological Content

	Mean	p50	p90	SD	N
Bureaucratic	0.061	0.058	0.093	0.028	10958
Social	0.374	0.374	0.468	0.079	10958
Health	0.097	0.092	0.143	0.038	10958
Urban	0.099	0.094	0.145	0.038	10958
Econ	0.150	0.146	0.211	0.049	10958
Crime	0.010	0.007	0.019	0.008	10958
Extremeness	2.208	1.861	4.289	2.064	10958
Partisanship	0.667	0.777	2.731	2.347	10958
Overlap	0.114	0.103	0.203	0.068	1304
L-R Score	0.794	0.905	3.765	2.916	10958
Populism	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	10958
Count	2447	1678	4979	3178	10958

## Balance Audits

Table: Mean Comparisons between Audited and Nonaudited Municipalities

	Non-audited		Audited		Difference	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Coefficient	S.E.
GDP pc (logs)	9.18	0.70	9.03	0.68	-0.0389	[0.028]
Literacy (%)	85.36	8.84	83.54	9.32	-0.097	[0.268]
% in Urban Areas	0.64	0.22	0.63	0.21	0.005	[0.007]
AM Radio	0.21	0.41	0.20	0.40	-0.003	[0.025]
Gini	0.50	0.07	0.51	0.06	-0.001	[0.002]
Pop (logs)	9.39	1.09	9.48	1.10	0.000	[0.032]
Number of candidates	2.90	1.24	3.02	1.32	0.078*	[0.043]
N	4900		464			


## Balance Timing

**Table:** Mean Comparisons between municipalities before the 2012 Election Audited and Municipalities audited after the 2012 election

	Non-audited		Audited		Difference	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Coefficient	S.E.
GDP pc (logs)	9.09	0.65	9.04	0.68	-0.006	[0.045]
Literacy (%)	84.43	8.42	83.91	9.04	0.13	[0.360]
% in Urban Areas	0.63	0.21	0.63	0.21	0.004	[0.013]
AM Radio	0.19	0.40	0.20	0.40	-0.024	[0.031]
Gini	0.50	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.013	[0.003]
Pop (logs)	9.42	1.04	9.47	1.09	0.002	[0.057]
Number of candidates	2.87	1.21	2.91	1.20	0.072	[0.112]
N	218		381			

## Geographical Variation

- Platforms show variation across municipalities.
- Increase in the use of populist vocabulary (? dictionary).



**Figure:** Percentage of local party manifestos in Brazil that include a populist word (Left: 2012. Right: 2020)

# Examples

**Populism** “It is a summarized and serious platform that I present to the people from serrano, who wish to see true progress in our municipality, coming to put an end to the excesses, corruption and dishonesty of politicians who have no commitment to the people from serrano.” (Jesus dos Passos Vaz, Serra/ES)

[▶ Back to Question](#)   [▶ Back to Outcomes](#)

# Irregularities


Table: Number of Irregularities per Policy Area

	N	Percentage
Bureaucracy	58	0.2%
Crime	138	0.4%
Economics	1,494	4.1%
Health	10,207	28.2%
Social	21,644	59.8%
Urban	1,818	5.0%
Other	811	2.2%

- Source: TSE


► [Back to Data](#)

# Partisanship





## Partisanship: Parties (examples)



ELEIÇÕES 2020

# Conheça o plano de governo de Pepe Vargas, candidato a prefeito de Caxias

Pioneiro apresenta as propostas dos 11 candidatos à prefeitura de Caxias

# Manifestos in the News

ELEIÇÕES 2020

## Conheça o plano de de Pepe Vargas, candidato prefeito de Caxias

Pioneiro apresenta as propostas dos 11 candidatos à prefeitura

### Propostas

A chapa "Curitiba Inovação e Amor" foi composta por sete partidos: PMN, PSDB, PSB, DEM, PTN, PSDC e PTdoB.

Durante a campanha, o candidato afirmou em programas eleitorais, entrevistas e debates que pretende tomar o atendimento na saúde pública municipal mais eficiente. Uma das propostas, que segundo ele, pode ser concretizada em 180 dias, é implantar um modelo de agendamento nos posto de saúde que fará com que as pessoas não precisem passar a madrugada na fila para conseguir consulta.

### CURITIBA

	População estimada (2016) <b>1.893.997</b>
	Eleitores <b>1.289.215</b>
	IDH* (2010) <b>0,823</b>
	PIB per capita (2013) <b>R\$ 42.934,38</b>
	Orçamento (2016) <b>R\$ 8,3 bilhões</b>

\* medida resumida do progresso em renda, educação e saúde; IDH do país é 0,755



Fontes: IBGE, TSE, prefeituras e câmaras

Em dois anos, afirma Greca no **plano de governo**, pretende criar o Centro de Especialidades Metropolitano no Portão, garantindo consultas especializadas com cardiologistas, endocrinologistas, geriatras, por exemplo, e equipe multidisciplinar.

Quando falava em mobilidade urbana, Greca era enfático ao afirmar que vai retornar a integração do transporte público de Curitiba com o da Região Metropolitana.

Ainda sobre transporte público, Greca prometeu criar uma tarifa diferenciada, para horários alternativos, diminuindo a sobrecarga nos horários de alto fluxo e revitalizar os terminais de ônibus.

Sobre educação, Greca afirmou que nos primeiros dias de gestão vai identificar a real necessidade de vagas no ensino fundamental e na educação infantil na cidade.

No **plano de governo**, uma das propostas é colocar Centros Municipais de Educação Infantil (Cmeis) em funcionamento, abrir turmas de berçário e aumentar as vagas para crianças entre zero e três anos.

# Manifestos in the News

## Série traz as propostas de Carlos Eduardo para Natal

Prefeito eleito da capital assume o cargo no dia 1º de janeiro de 2013. Propostas do plano de governo serão mostradas em série de 8 reportagens.

Do G1 RN



Série vai mostrar as promessas de Carlos Eduardo durante a campanha eleitoral (Foto: Alex Regis/Cedida)

O prefeito eleito de Natal, **Carlos Eduardo (PDT)**, assume o comando da cidade no dia 1º de janeiro de 2013. Dentre os desafios que ele se propôs a enfrentar no Plano de Governo estão problemas nas áreas de saúde, educação, acessibilidade, mobilidade, moradia, esgotamento sanitário, drenagem urbana e coleta regular de lixo.

A série "Copie e Cole" do **G1** irá apresentar as possíveis soluções que **Carlos Eduardo** apresentou aos eleitores. Serão oito reportagens - que irão ao ar de sexta (28) até a próxima segunda-feira (31).

## o plano de Carlos Eduardo para Vargem, cidade de Caxias

As propostas dos 11 candidatos à prefeitura

### Propostas

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

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# Effect of the Audit on the Agenda




95% CI's. ▶ Robustness: Population ▶ Table Incumbents ▶ Table Challengers ▶ Means

# Topic of the Audit



**Table:** Topics covered by the audits in each lottery (extract)

Topic by CGU	Topic	Population Ranges(thousands)	Lotteries								
			28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
Health	Health	$20 < x < 50$	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
		$50 < x < 100$	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
		$x > 100$			X			X		X	
Crime	Crime	$20 < x < 50$			X	X		X			
		$50 < x < 100$			X	X		X			
		$x > 100$			X	X		X			
Housing	Urban	$20 < x < 50$	X								
		$50 < x < 100$	X								
		$x > 100$	X								
Services	Urban	$20 < x < 50$		X			X				
		$50 < x < 100$		X			X				
		$x > 100$		X			X				

# Results by Population



# Results: Health Corruption Cases



[▶ Table Challengers](#)   [▶ Means](#)   [▶ Back](#)



## Results: Effect of the Audit on the Agenda

Table: Effect on the Share for each Topic

VARIABLES	Incumbents						
	(1) Adm	(2) Social	(3) Health	(4) Urban	(5) Econ	(6) Crime	(7) count
Audited	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)	0.059 (0.062)
Observations	1,873	1,873	1,873	1,873	1,873	1,873	1,873
R-squared	0.082	0.027	0.081	0.197	0.106	0.063	0.112

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

## Results: Effect of the Audit on the Agenda

Table: Effect on the Share for each Topic

VARIABLES	Challengers						
	(1) Adm	(2) Social	(3) Health	(4) Urban	(5) Econ	(6) Crime	(7) count
Audited	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.004)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.048 (0.056)
Observations	3,361	3,361	3,361	3,361	3,361	3,361	3,361
R-squared	0.057	0.040	0.078	0.101	0.102	0.059	0.071

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Results: Effect of the Audit on the Agenda

Table: Effect on the Share for each Topic

VARIABLES	Incumbents						
	(1) Adm	(2) Social	(3) Health	(4) Urban	(5) Econ	(6) Crime	(7) count
Audited	0.014** (0.006)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.002 (0.022)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.286 (0.185)
CorruptionxAudit	-0.020* (0.011)	0.011 (0.036)	0.022 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.025)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.357 (0.339)
Corruption	0.018 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.014 (0.013)	0.009 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.579* (0.314)
Observations	211	211	211	211	211	211	211
R-squared	0.270	0.195	0.303	0.386	0.173	0.242	0.264
$\beta_0 + \beta_1$	-0.00612	-0.00423	0.0113	-0.00341	-1.19e-05	0.000826	-0.0710
pval	0.606	0.898	0.460	0.816	0.999	0.747	0.795

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Results: Effect of the Audit on the Agenda

Table: Effect on the Share for each Topic

VARIABLES	Challengers						
	(1) Adm	(2) Social	(3) Health	(4) Urban	(5) Econ	(6) Crime	(7) count
Audited	-0.015** (0.006)	0.026 (0.018)	0.009** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.016** (0.006)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.052 (0.164)
CorruptionxAudit	0.015 (0.011)	-0.059** (0.024)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.404 (0.280)
Corruption	-0.017 (0.013)	0.049** (0.020)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.020** (0.009)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.351 (0.272)
Observations	393	393	393	393	393	393	393
R-squared	0.146	0.132	0.235	0.163	0.175	0.168	0.192
$\beta_0 + \beta_1$	-0.000446	-0.0326	0.0159	0.0153	0.00224	0.000140	-0.351
pval	0.944	0.128	0.0136	0.146	0.818	0.924	0.240

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Results: Effect of the Audit on Overlap w. Audit Reports

Table: Effect on the Share for each Topic

VARIABLES	(1) Challengers	(2) Incumbents	(3) Challengers	(4) Incumbents
Audited	-0.001 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)	0.020** (0.008)
CorruptionxAudit			0.006 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.014)
Corruption			-0.020** (0.007)	-0.012 (0.013)
Observations	426	220	385	207
R-squared	0.822	0.826	0.841	0.851
$\beta_0 + \beta_1$			0.0126	0.0147
pval			0.0239	0.166

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Results: Effect of the Audit on the Content

Table: Differences in probabilities of being above the median

VARIABLES	Incumbents					
	(1) Extremeness	(2) Partisanship	(3) Populism	(4) Extremeness	(5) Partisanship	(6) Populism
Audited	-0.090 (0.200)	-0.281 (0.336)	0.002 (0.029)	-1.014 (0.592)	1.957* (0.961)	0.092 (0.088)
CorruptionxAudit				0.668 (1.191)	-1.932 (2.623)	0.229* (0.114)
Corruption				-0.713 (1.074)	1.439 (2.287)	-0.240** (0.107)
Observations	1,840	1,773	1,841	208	195	208
R-squared	0.105	0.037	0.296	0.290	0.265	0.446
$\beta_0 + \beta_1$				-0.346	0.0247	0.321
pval				0.719	0.992	0.0108

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Results: Effect of the Audit on the Content

Table: Differences in probabilities of being above the median

VARIABLES	Challengers					
	(1) Extremeness	(2) Partisanship	(3) Populism	(4) Extremeness	(5) Partisanship	(6) Populism
Audited	0.238 (0.220)	-0.460* (0.233)	0.015 (0.026)	-0.682 (0.496)	-0.480 (0.786)	-0.097 (0.085)
CorruptionxAudit				1.566** (0.678)	-0.657 (0.830)	0.112 (0.165)
Corruption				-0.687 (0.444)	0.019 (0.688)	-0.081 (0.127)
Observations	3,360	2,977	3,360	393	353	393
R-squared	0.031	0.032	0.149	0.137	0.136	0.202
$\beta_0 + \beta_1$				0.884	-1.137	0.0151
pval				0.0831	0.0440	0.918

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Results by Population

Population < 50000							
VARIABLES	(1) Adm	(2) Social	(3) Health	(4) Urban	(5) Econ	(6) Crime	(7) count
Audited	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.007** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.031 (0.071)
Observations	2,766	2,766	2,766	2,766	2,766	2,766	2,766
R-squared	0.056	0.033	0.067	0.115	0.088	0.067	0.064

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Population > 100000							
VARIABLES	(1) Adm	(2) Social	(3) Health	(4) Urban	(5) Econ	(6) Crime	(7) count
Audited	0.004 (0.008)	0.007 (0.017)	0.000 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.005 (0.146)
Observations	292	292	292	292	292	292	292
R-squared	0.195	0.153	0.164	0.162	0.113	0.185	0.182

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



## Results: Health Corruption Cases (Challengers)

VARIABLES	(1) Adm	(2) Social	(3) Health	(4) Urban	(5) Econ	(6) Crime	(7) count
Audited	-0.013* (0.007)	0.020 (0.019)	0.008 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.015** (0.007)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.075 (0.151)
IrregularxAudit	0.002 (0.012)	-0.032 (0.026)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.488 (0.320)
Irregular	-0.001 (0.013)	0.028 (0.025)	0.001 (0.007)	0.000 (0.008)	0.013 (0.014)	0.000 (0.002)	0.442 (0.315)
Observations	393	393	393	393	393	393	393
R-squared	0.139	0.122	0.241	0.149	0.179	0.158	0.193
$\beta_0 + \beta_1$	-0.0109	-0.0116	0.0153	0.00360	-0.00255	-0.00162	-0.414
pval	0.150	0.595	0.0525	0.667	0.808	0.414	0.207

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

► Figure