

# Immigration Shocks and Politicians' Rhetoric

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Immigration has political effects (Alesina & Tabellini, 2022)

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Short version: Immigration  $\Rightarrow$   $\uparrow$  support to the right-wing

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
Short version: Immigration  $\Rightarrow$   $\uparrow$  support to the right-wing

However, a rise in the vote towards the right-wing parties could happen at the same time than:

1. A rightward shift in the political positions of all parties
2. An increase in polarization

# Polarization and Immigration

Figure 1. Immigration and Political Polarization in US History




Alesina and Tabellini (2022)


Card et al. (2022)

# Polarization and Immigration

Figure 1. Immigration and Political Polarization in US History



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Card et al. (2022)

Does immigration polarize politicians?

# Immigration in Developing Countries

For recent times, this has been mostly studied in Europe and the US.

1. Recent history of immigration.
2. Developed Economies

Contribution: Analyze the political effects of immigration on developing economies.

## Background

- 7.7 million Venezuelans have flown out of their country during the last years

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(© Ariana Cubillos/AP Images)

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
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


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
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
# Venezuelan Immigration Statistics




## Relative to their Population %



## Relative to Immigrant Population (2010) (ratio)



## GDP per Capita (2010)



# This paper

More immigrants in an electoral district ⇒

1. Representatives talking more about immigration (or how scared are those without immigrants)
2. Focus on crime/employment/socialism.
3. Pro and Anti
4. Polarization
5. Vote

Today:

- (1) and (2)
- Small Sample:  2014-2018

Future

- (3), (4) and (5)
-  2018-2022 + 

# Immigrants in Chile




Figure: Number of Immigrants in Chile per Origin Country

## Support for Immigration

According to an Ipsos and Espacio Público poll in 2018:

- 53% agrees with “Migration is beneficial for the country because it contributes diversity and other benefits social” (62% L; 52% right)
- 43% agrees with “Migration is harmful to country because they increase social problems” (35% L; 46% right)
- In 2022 it was 30% pro, 67% anti.

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- In March 2018:
  - Q: “Will you continue receiving Venezuelans in Chile?”
  - Piñera: “We are going to continue receiving Venezuelans in Chile because we have a duty of solidarity.”

## Reactions



## Reactions



# What do we Know?

- Political Effects
  - Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller (2017): inflow of immigrants received by Austrian municipalities explains vote to FPO. Driven by unskilled immigrants.
  - Steinmayr (2021): Length of stay also matters.
  - Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Piil Damm (2019): Far-right and center-right increased thanks to the inflow of refugees. In largest municipalities, left-wing increased.
  - Tabellini (2020): Immigration increases support for anti-immigrant congress members and their vote in favor of immigration quotas. It also affects preferences for redistribution.
- Effects of immigration shocks in South America
  - Crime or crime perception (Ajzenman, Dominguez, & Undurraga, 2023; Anatol & Kangalee, 2021; Knight & Tribin, 2020)
  - Labor market, by decreasing informal wages (Caruso, Canon, & Mueller, 2021)
  - Housing market (Forero-Vargas & Iturra, 2022; Undurraga & Gonzalez-Navarro, 2023)
  - Education (Martínez & Martínez Heredia, 2023)

## Data

Collected all legislators' tweets from 2013-2021 for the Chilean 2014 & 2018 Congress and Peruvian 2016, 2020, & 2021.

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Collected all legislators' tweets from 2013-2021 for the Chilean 2014 & 2018 Congress and Peruvian 2016, 2020, & 2021.

Also collected a similar dataset for Argentina, Ecuador & Colombia.


120 representatives and 40 senators.

116 tweeted in 2017.

Table: Number of Tweets per Year

Year	Tweets	Migration	Venezuela	Employment	Crime	Socialism	Haiti
2013	135,373	67	8	11	1	0	0
2014	134,541	142	29	6	0	6	5
2015	157,966	237	49	16	6	1	2
2016	137,015	475	18	24	29	2	17
2017	149,765	606	62	40	11	11	83
2018	119,061	1194	167	139	44	41	160
2019	128,131	599	217	65	60	19	32
2020	111,920	250	32	41	16	3	22

# Immigration Analysis Workflow



Blue blocks:

Red blocks: &

# OpenAI




Figure: Annotator




Figure: OpenAI

## Data: Immigration

- Individual-level data: visas + permanent residence permits.
- Age, nationality, mun. of residence, gender, education
- Influx to build stocks (departing from the 2002 census)
- Data on bilateral flows of international migrants for 45 countries (UN Population Division migration)
- Following Ajzenman et al. (2023)

## Empirical Strategy

Two specifications

- Two-way FE:

$$Y_{pt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(imm)_{pt} + \gamma X_{pt} + \eta_p + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{pt} \quad (1)$$

- Shift-Share instrument

$$Y_{p,17} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta imm_{p,08-17} + \gamma X_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt} \quad (2)$$

instrumented by

$$\widehat{\Delta imm}_{p,08-17} = \sum_n \theta_{p,08}^n \times \Delta \log(imm)_t^n \quad (3)$$

where  $\Delta \log(imm)_t^n$  is the flow to other destination countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Peru, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela)

## Dependent Variables

- % Tweets about immigration
- Whether they tweeted or not.

	Tweets		%		Binary	
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd
Migra	3.49	9.43	0.0036	0.0077	0.49	0.50
Ven	0.55	3.42	0.0004	0.0019	0.16	0.37
Employment	0.33	1.09	0.0004	0.0013	0.17	0.38
Crime	0.18	0.74	0.0002	0.0014	0.11	0.31
Socialism	0.08	0.72	0.0001	0.0003	0.05	0.22
Haiti	0.30	1.32	0.0004	0.0023	0.13	0.33

## Results

	migra_rel	migra_bin	migra_bin	migra_rel	migra_bin	migra_rel	tweets	tweets
ln_stock_rel	-0.000 (0.002)	0.117 (0.283)						
deltaimm			0.092 (0.124)	0.001 (0.002)	0.569** (0.269)	0.010** (0.004)	137.641 (817.909)	298.902 (751.417)
Observations	565	565	116	116	116	116	131	116
Method	2WFE	2WFE	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
F test:				22.95	22.95	19.63	22.95	

## Results on issues

	Vzla_rel	Emp_rel	crime_rel	Soc_rel	Haiti_rel
deltaimm	0.000 (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)
Observations	116	116	116	116	116
F test:	22.95	22.95	22.95	22.95	22.95

	Vzla_bin	Emp_bin	crime_bin	Soc_bin	Haiti_bin
deltaimm	-0.015 (0.197)	0.747*** (0.259)	0.212 (0.155)	-0.249 (0.159)	0.291 (0.257)
Observations	116	116	116	116	116
F test:	22.95	22.95	22.95	22.95	22.95

## Final Remarks

- Future Steps
  - Classify pro and anti (ML classifier vs. Chat GPT)
  - Ideological Polarization
  - Vote.
  - Sample size.
  - Robustness.
  - Better Framing Classification (BERTopic).
- Politicians are responsive.
- Effects on linking it with employment issues.

Thank you!

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