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Differentially Private Graph Publishing and Randomized Response for Collaborative Filtering

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Abstract: Several methods for providing edge and node-differential privacy for graphs have been devised. However, most of them publish graph statistics, not the edge-set of the randomized graph. We present a method for graph randomization that provides randomized response and allows for publishing differentially private graphs. We show that this method can be applied to sanitize data to train collaborative filtering algorithms for recommender systems. Our results afford plausible deniability to users in relation to their interests, with a controlled probability predefined by the user or the data controller. We show in an experiment with Facebook Likes data and psychodemographic profiles, that the accuracy of the profiling algorithms is preserved even when they are trained with differentially private data. Finally, we define privacy metrics to compare our method for different parameters of ϵ with a k -anonymization method on the MovieLens dataset for movie recommendations.

1 INTRODUCTION

Collaborative filtering algorithms are based on users' interests to provide recommendations to others. It is necessary that the users reveal their interests to be able to build accurate systems, but they may prefer to exclude those that are embarrassing or that reveal their private preferences. The privacy of users and personalization of the algorithms must be balanced.


Statistical techniques have been used for long time to preserve the privacy of respondents to surveys on social sciences, while preserving the utility of the responses. Randomized response was devised in (Warner, 1965) to collect statistical information about embarrassing or illegal behavior, it provides privacy by offering plausible deniability for users in relation to their answers.


It was proved recently that randomized response is differentially private in (Dwork and Roth, 2014). Optimal mechanisms for differential privacy by randomized response were calculated in (Wang et al., 2016; Holohan et al., 2017). Randomized response was used for protecting privacy for recommendations

in (Polat and Du, 2006), however, it was not related to differential privacy in that setting.

In this paper we present a method for providing differential privacy in graph publishing with an application to collaborative filtering. It is based on the noise-graph addition technique from (Torra and Salas, 2019) to provide randomized response. By using randomized response, privacy may be enhanced from the moment of data collection until publication.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents all the theoretical results for differentially private graph publication. In Section 3 we present related work on privacy for collaborative filtering and present metrics for measuring the privacy provided when adding noise-graphs. In Section 4 we present two experiments. The first one shows that precise user profiles may still be obtained from data with differential privacy guarantees. The second one, compares the privacy provided, between different parameter values and different methods, when collecting data for making recommendations. In the last section we present our conclusions and future work.

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2 DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE GRAPH PUBLICATION

In this section we present the noise-graph mechanism for differentially private graph publication. We provide the definition of the noise-graph addition technique and show that it may be applied to obtain randomized response and differential privacy. Finally, we adapt it to weighted graphs for an application to user-ratings data for recommender systems.

2.1 Background and Basic Definitions

When the original graph and the noise-graph have the same sets of nodes we can simplify the definition of noise-graph addition from (Torra and Salas, 2019). For this, we use the symmetric difference $E_1 \triangle E_2 := (E_1 \setminus E_2) \cup (E_2 \setminus E_1) = \{e | e \in E_1 \wedge e \notin E_2\} \cup \{e | e \notin E_1 \wedge e \in E_2\}$.

Definition 1. Let $G_1(V, E_1)$ and $G_2(V, E_2)$ be two graphs with the same nodes V . The addition of G_1 and G_2 is the graph $G = (V, E)$ where E is defined as

$$E = \{e | e \in E_1 \triangle E_2\}.$$

We will denote G as

$$G = G_1 \oplus G_2.$$

Definition 2 (Noise-graph Addition). Let G be a graph, let \mathcal{G} a family of random graphs. Then, the noise-graph addition \tilde{G} following the distribution \mathcal{G} is obtained by drawing a graph g from \mathcal{G} and adding it to G , that is:

$$\tilde{G} = G \oplus g.$$

The most general random graph models in the literature are the Erdős-Rényi and the Gilbert model. It was proved that they are asymptotically equivalent in (Aiello et al., 2001).

The Gilbert model is denoted by $\mathcal{G}(n, p)$, there are n nodes and each edge is chosen with probability p . In contrast, the Erdős-Rényi model that is denoted by $\mathcal{G}(n, e)$, represents a uniform probability of all graphs with n nodes and e edges. We use the Gilbert model $\mathcal{G}(n, p)$ throughout this paper.

For bipartite graphs, in which there are two sets of independent nodes U and V , such that $|U| = n$ and $|V| = m$, the Gilbert model is denoted as $\mathcal{G}(n, m, p)$. Each of the $n \times m$ possible edges in $\mathcal{G}(n, m, p)$ has probability p . We denote the set of bipartite random graphs with $n + m$ nodes as $\mathcal{G}_{n,m}$. Another possible way of randomizing graphs is through the application of a randomized response mechanism for a binary attribute (the existence or absence of an edge).

Definition 3 (Design Matrix for Randomized Response). A randomised response mechanism for a binary attribute as defined in (Warner, 1965) is uniquely determined by its design matrix:

$$P = \begin{pmatrix} p_{00} & p_{01} \\ p_{10} & p_{11} \end{pmatrix} \quad (1)$$

where the entry $p_{jk} = \mathbb{P}(X_i = k | x_i = j)$, and X_i is the random output for original variable x_i .

Therefore, p_{00} denotes the probability that the original value is 0 and the randomized value is 0; p_{01} denotes the probability that the original value is 1 and the published value 0; and so on.

For any graph G , if we take $g_1 \in \mathcal{G}(n, p_1) \cap G$, $g_2 \in \mathcal{G}(n, p_2) \setminus G$, $p_1 = 1 - p_{11}$ and $p_2 = 1 - p_{00}$, then the randomization mechanism $\mathcal{A} = G \oplus g_1 \oplus g_2$ is equivalent to the design matrix from eq. (1). In (Wang et al., 2016) it was proved that if $\max\{\frac{p_{00}}{p_{01}}, \frac{p_{11}}{p_{10}}\} \leq e^\epsilon$ then the randomized response mechanism following the design matrix P from Equation (1) is differentially private.

Definition 4 (Differential Privacy for Graphs). It is said that a randomized function \mathcal{A} is ϵ -differentially private if for all neighboring graphs G and G' (i.e., differing on at most one element) and all $S \subseteq \text{Range}(\mathcal{A})$, it holds that:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(G) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \times \Pr[\mathcal{A}(G') \in S].$$

Differential privacy may be defined considering that neighboring graphs differ either in one node and all its incident edges, or that they differ in only one edge, these are the definitions of node or edge-differential privacy. We first consider edge-differential privacy (Hay et al., 2009) as it may be directly related to randomized response. For node-differential privacy we will use the definition of node adjacency from (Blocki et al., 2013).

Definition 5 (Node Adjacency). We say that graphs G and G' are neighbors if there exists a node v_i such that $G - v_i = G' - v_i$. Where $G - v$ denotes the result of removing every edge in $E(G)$ that touches v .

In other words, the graph G may be obtained from G' by replacing one node and all its neighbors.

2.2 Noise-graph Mechanism

Using definitions from Section 2.1 we are now ready to define a differentially private mechanism for graph publishing.

Definition 6 (Noise-graph Mechanism). We define $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}$ to be the randomization mechanism that for a graph G with n nodes and probability $\frac{1}{2} < p < 1$ outputs $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G) = E(G \oplus g)$ with $g \in \mathcal{G}(n, p)$.

Note that the noise-graph mechanism may be defined for bipartite graphs as follows.

Definition 7 (Bipartite Noise-Graph Mechanism). For a bipartite graph $G = U, V$, such that $|U| = n$, $|V| = m$. We define $\mathcal{A}_{n,m,p}$ to be the randomization mechanism that for a given probability $\frac{1}{2} < p < 1$ outputs $\mathcal{A}_{n,m,p}(G) = E(G \oplus g)$ with $g \in \mathcal{G}(n, m, p)$.

We are going to show that the noise-graph mechanism is edge-differentially private, but all the proofs hold also for the bipartite noise-graph mechanism.

Theorem 1. The noise-graph mechanism $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}$ is $\ln(\frac{1-p}{p})$ -edge-differentially private.

Proof. By the definition of $\mathcal{G}(n, p)$ all the possible edges in g have probability p . Hence, by Definition 1 if the edge $uv \in E(G)$, it will remain in $E(G \oplus g)$ with probability $1 - p$. Similarly, if $uv \notin E(G)$, $uv \notin E(G \oplus g)$ with probability $1 - p$. That is, $\Pr[uv \in E(G \oplus g) | uv \in E(G)] = 1 - p$ and $\Pr[uv \notin E(G \oplus g) | uv \notin E(G)] = 1 - p$.

If the edge $uv \notin E(G)$, it will be in $E(G \oplus g)$ with probability p and analogously if $uv \in E(G)$, with probability p it will not be in $E(G \oplus g)$. That is, $\Pr[uv \in E(G \oplus g) | uv \notin E(G)] = p$ and $\Pr[uv \notin E(G \oplus g) | uv \in E(G)] = p$.

Now, assume that G and G' differ in the uv edge, and recall that $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G) = G \oplus g$. In either case, $\frac{\Pr[uv \in E(\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G)) | uv \in E(G)]}{\Pr[uv \in E(\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G')) | uv \in E(G)]} = \frac{1-p}{p} \leq \exp(\epsilon)$ or $\frac{\Pr[uv \notin E(\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G)) | uv \notin E(G)]}{\Pr[uv \notin E(\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G')) | uv \notin E(G)]} = \frac{1-p}{p} \leq \exp(\epsilon)$, which implies that $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}$ is ϵ -edge differentially private, for $\epsilon = \ln(\frac{1-p}{p})$. \square

The mechanism $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}$ also provides node-differential privacy for graphs with n nodes. In the following theorem we denote by G the graph but also its edge set. We denote the complement of the size of an edge set X as $\bar{X} = \frac{n(n-1)}{2} - X$ and the complement $\bar{G} \triangle \bar{S}$ as the edges that do not belong to the edge set $G \triangle S$, which are also $\frac{n(n-1)}{2} - |G \cup S|$.

Theorem 2. The randomized mechanism $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}$ is $n \times \ln(\frac{1-p}{p})$ -node-differentially private.

Proof. For any node $u \in U$ and any subset S of all the possible edges with n nodes. We denote by $X = |G \triangle S|$. It holds that $\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G) = S] = p^X (1-p)^{\bar{X}}$, since all the neighbors of u that are not in S , are in the noise-graph g with probability p , similarly for those neighbors that are in S but not in G . While the neighbors that are in $G \cap S$ or in $G \cup \bar{S}$, i.e., in $\bar{G} \triangle \bar{S}$, with probability $1 - p$ do not belong to the noise-graph g .

Equivalently for a neighboring graph G' , we denote by $X' = |G' \triangle S|$. Then $\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G') \in$

$S] = p^{X'} (1-p)^{\bar{X}'}$. Therefore, we can calculate $\frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G) \in S]}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G') \in S]} = \frac{p^X (1-p)^{\bar{X}}}{p^{X'} (1-p)^{\bar{X}'}} = p^{X-X'} (1-p)^{\bar{X}-\bar{X}'} \leq e^\epsilon$.

Considering that $\bar{X} - \bar{X}' = X' - X$, we obtain that the mechanism $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}$ will be differentially private if $\ln((\frac{p}{1-p})^{X-X'}) = (X - X') \ln(\frac{p}{1-p}) < \epsilon$. We can bound $X - X'$ by n since G and G' are neighboring graphs, hence $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}$ is $n \times \ln(\frac{p}{1-p})$ -differentially private. \square

2.3 Noise-graph Addition for Weighted Graphs

In this section we generalize noise-graph addition to weighted graphs, this will have applications for data in which the relations are weighted, such as the users' ratings in recommender systems.

We consider a weighted graph to be a graph G with node set $V(G)$, edge set $E(G)$ and a function $\omega : E(G) \rightarrow [0, 1]$, that to each edge $e \in V(G)$ assigns a weight $\omega(e) \in [0, 1]$. That is, we are considering graphs in which the edges have weights between 0 and 1. In some cases this weight can represent the probability that u and v are connected, or the strength of their relation. For the case of relations weighted by ordinal numbers (e.g., $t \in \{0, 1, \dots, m\}$) the weights may be transformed to numbers in $[0, 1]$ easily by dividing them by the maximum number, i.e., $\frac{t}{m}$ in the example.

From a mathematical point of view, \oplus can be understood as an exclusive or of the existence of the edges. So, $0 \oplus 0 = 0$, $1 \oplus 0 = 1$, $0 \oplus 1 = 1$, $1 \oplus 1 = 0$, where 1 and 0 means existence or not of the edge.

Understanding \oplus from this perspective, we can exploit fuzzy set theory to define \oplus . Fuzzy set theory provides operations that generalize conjunction (functions called t-norms and denoted T), disjunction (functions called t-conorms and denoted S) and complement (through functions called negations and denoted N). These operations are defined on the interval $[0, 1]$ or $[0, 1]^2$ instead of being defined on $\{0, 1\}$ or $\{0, 1\}^2$ as required by classical set theory and classical logic. Then, using standard logic properties, we know that:

$$x \oplus y = (x \vee y) \wedge \neg(x \wedge y).$$

Using this logical equivalence, we can define $x \oplus y$ when $x \in [0, 1]$ and $y \in [0, 1]$ in terms of t-norms T , t-conorms S and negations N . That is,

$$x \oplus y = T(S(x, y), N(T(x, y))).$$

The functions t-norms, t-conorms, and negations are established according to a set of axioms that generalize the properties of conjunction (and intersection), disjunction (and union), and complement. Because of that there are families of functions for each

of them. For the sake of simplicity, we will use $T(x, y) = \min(x, y)$, $S(x, y) = \max(x, y)$ and $N(x) = 1 - x$. For details and alternatives see e.g., (Klir and Yuan, 1995). Using these functions, we define \oplus as follows:

$$x \oplus y = \min(\max(x, y), 1 - \min(x, y)).$$

Definition 8 (Weighted Noise-Graph Addition). *Let $G_1(V, E_1, \omega_1)$ and $G_2(V, E_2, \omega_2)$ be two graphs with the same nodes V . We define the addition of G_1 and G_2 as the graph $G = G_1 \oplus G_2 = (V, E, \omega)$ with $\omega(E)$ as follows:*

$$\omega(e) = \omega_1(e), \text{ for } e \in E_1 \setminus E_2,$$

$$\omega(e) = \omega_2(e), \text{ for } e \in E_2 \setminus E_1,$$

$$\omega(e) = \min(\max(\omega_1(e), \omega_2(e)), 1 - \min(\omega_1(e), \omega_2(e))), \\ \text{for } e \in E_1 \cup E_2.$$

3 PRIVACY FOR RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS

In this section we apply the *noise-graph mechanism* to bipartite graphs, all the proofs from Section 2.2 are equivalent, by assuming that G is bipartite and changing $\mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G)$ for $\mathcal{A}_{n,m,p}(G)$ defining $E(G \oplus g)$ with $g \in \mathcal{G}(n, m, p)$.

We can represent the user-item graph generated from the data for recommendations as a bipartite graph of U users and V items, with an edge $e = uv$ if the user $u \in U$ has liked the item $v \in V$. For numerical ratings, we may represent them by a weighted graph in which the weight of an edge $\omega(e)$ represents the rating normalized to $[0, 1]$. A recommendation may be formulated as a link prediction problem in such graphs, or by representing the graphs with their adjacency matrix with U as rows and V as columns and using matrix factorization models (Koren et al., 2009). Similar methods have been successfully used for predicting private traits such as sexual, political or religious preferences from Likes in (Kosinski et al., 2013; Kosinski et al., 2016).

3.1 Related Work

There are diverse ways to protect users' privacy, such as protecting them from precise inference of private attributes, protecting them from reidentification as in (Salas, 2019) with k -anonymity, or to afford them with plausible deniability as in randomized response mechanisms.

Randomized response was used in (Wang et al., 2016) for differentially private data-collection, it was

compared to the Laplace mechanism and provided an empirical evaluation including graph statistics. It was also used in (Polat and Du, 2006) to protect privacy for recommendations with binary ratings, however, they did not consider that differential privacy may be obtained.

Randomized response and differential privacy were used in (Liu et al., 2017) to provide privacy during the data collection and data publication stages. They added random uniform noise to the user-ratings and provided differential privacy for the item-item covariance matrix, which was defined in (Mironov and McSherry, 2009) after the Netflix prize contest de-anonymization (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008).

In (Salas, 2019) the method for differential privacy from (Mironov and McSherry, 2009) was compared with a method for k -anonymization for recommendations. The concept of k -anonymity was originally defined for tables (Samarati, 2001), (Sweeney, 2002) and the attributes were classified on the disjoint classes of Identifiers (IDs), Quasi-Identifiers (QIs), Sensitive Attributes (SAs) and Non-sensitive.

Some variants and extensions have been provided for k -anonymity such as ℓ diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007) and t -closeness approach (Li et al., 2007), as well as for ϵ -differential privacy (Desfontaines and Pejó, 2019), including (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006). Some of their differences and interactions are discussed in (Salas and Domingo-Ferrer, 2018).

3.2 Privacy Metrics for Adding Noise-graphs

We devise metrics to measure the privacy provided by a sanitization method with different parameters, that will be also useful to compare among different methods, such as ϵ -differential privacy, k -anonymity or any of their variants. First, we provide the definitions of k -anonymity from (Samarati, 2001) as defined in (Torra, 2017) and Risk and Imprecision measures from (Salas, 2019).

Definition 9. *A dataset is k -anonymous if each record is indistinguishable from at least other $k - 1$ records within the dataset, when considering the values of its QIs. That is, if we denote the set of QI values of a record j as Q_j , then for each record j there are at least other $k - 1$ records $\{j_1, \dots, j_{k-1}\}$ such that $Q_{j_i} = Q_j$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, k - 1\}$.*

Definition 10. *For each user u the Sensitive Attribute Risk (SA_R) of a sanitization is defined as the proportion of her observed records R_u that are part of her*

true records r_u , that is:

$$SA_R(u) = \frac{|r_u|}{|R_u|} \quad (2)$$

Note that Definition 10, considers that the published data for each user u (observed records R_u) contains the true data (r_u). This equals the Jaccard similarity $J(R_u, r_u) = \frac{|R_u \cap r_u|}{|R_u \cup r_u|} = \frac{|r_u|}{|R_u|}$ when $r_u \subset R_u$. However, if we consider the Jaccard distance instead, we obtain $d_J(R_u, r_u) = 1 - J(R_u, r_u) = \frac{R_u \triangle r_u}{R_u \cup r_u}$. In our graph representation user's u true records r_u equal $N_G(u)$ and R_u equals $N_{\tilde{G}}(u)$, where $\tilde{G} = \mathcal{A}_{n,p}(G) = G \oplus g$. Hence, $1 - SA_R(u) = d_J(R_u, r_u) = d_J(N_{\tilde{G}}(u), N_G(u)) = \frac{|N_{\tilde{G}}(u) \triangle N_G(u)|}{|N_{\tilde{G}}(u) \cup N_G(u)|} = \frac{|N_G \oplus g(u) \oplus N_G(u)|}{|N_G \oplus g(u) \cup N_G(u)|} = \frac{|N_G(u)|}{|N_G(u) \cup N_G(u)|} = \frac{|N_G(u)|}{|N_G(u)|} = 1$.

This distance may equal 1 if $N_{\tilde{G}}(u) \cap N_G(u) = \emptyset$, in that case it will be 1 for sets that are quite different, hence it will not measure how many changes have been done to the original set. Therefore, we propose to use instead $d(N_{\tilde{G}}(u), N_G(u)) = \frac{|N_G(u)|}{|N_G(u)| + |N_G(u)|}$ which will consider the number of modified items in proportion to the number of real items liked by user u . Consequently, we define the *Sensitive Attribute Risk* for any graph as $1 - d(N_{\tilde{G}}(u), N_G(u))$ in equation (3) which is consistent with Definition 10.

Definition 11. Let G be a graph, \tilde{G} a protected version of graph G with the same number of nodes as G . Let $g = \tilde{G} \oplus G$ the edge difference between \tilde{G} and G (i.e., the noise added to G). We define the Sensitive Attribute Risk for a node $u \in V(G)$ as:

$$SA_R(u) = \frac{|N_G(u)|}{|N_g(u)| + |N_G(u)|} \quad (3)$$

In the case of weighted graphs Definition 11, is still relevant since it measures the risk by the number of movies. However, the weight can be considered by replacing $|N_G(u)|$ by its weighted version which we will denote as $\omega(N_G(u))$ and define as $\omega(N_G(u)) = \sum_{v \in N_G(u)} \omega(uv)$. Therefore, we obtain the following definition, which generalizes previous one, considering that for an unweighted graph the weight function $\omega(uv) = 1$ for all $uv \in E(G)$ can be used.

Definition 12. Let G be a weighted graph, ω its weight function, \tilde{G} a protected version of graph G with the same number of nodes as G . Let $g = \tilde{G} \oplus G$ the edge difference between \tilde{G} and G (i.e., the noise added to G). We define the Weighted Sensitive Attribute Risk for a node $u \in V(G)$ as:

$$SA_R(u) = \frac{\omega(N_G(u))}{\omega(N_g(u)) + \omega(N_G(u))} \quad (4)$$

Definition 13. Let G be a weighted graph, ω its weight function, \tilde{G} a protected version of graph G . The Average Sensitive Attribute Imprecision (SA_I) is defined as follows:

$$SA_I = \frac{1}{E(G \cup \tilde{G})} \sum_{e \in E(G \cup \tilde{G})} |\omega_{\tilde{G}}(e) - \omega_G(e)| \quad (5)$$

Note that SA_I is a well known measure for the information loss, that is the mean average error. However, when all the attributes are at the same time QIs and SAs it measures both the disclosure risk and the information loss.

After defining these metrics, we perform the utility/privacy evaluation in the following section.

4 EXPERIMENTS

In this section we apply our algorithms to data that was used to predict users' psychodemographics, as well as for training collaborative filtering algorithms.

4.1 Facebook Likes Dataset for Psychodemographic Inference

In this section we will protect Facebook Likes data from (Kosinski et al., 2016). The dataset consists of Facebook users (110,728), Facebook Likes (1,580,284) and their user-likes pairs (10,612,326). This data was used to predict the psychodemographics of the same users, measured by a 100-item long International Personality Item Pool questionnaire measuring the five-factor model of personality (Goldberg et al., 2006), which are their gender, age, political views, and their scores on openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.

Since this dataset is sparse there are a large number of users and items that appear few times, such data points are of little significance for building a model to perform inference. We follow the same approach of trimming the User-Like Matrix to obtain the same dataset to perform inference as in (Kosinski et al., 2016). They chose the thresholds of minimum 50 likes per user and 150 users per like, to obtain a dataset with $n = 19,724$ users, $m = 8,523$ likes (POIs) and $q = 3,817,840$ user-like pairs.

With this data we will generate a bipartite graph G of users U , likes L with $|U| = n$, $|L| = m$ and $|E(G)| = q$. Hence, for adding random noise to G we will sample bipartite random graphs $g \in \mathcal{G}(n, m, p)$.

We recall that $\mathcal{A}_{n,m,p}(G)$ is ϵ -edge differentially private for $\epsilon = \ln(\frac{1-p}{p})$, as we pointed out at the beginning of Section 3. In Table 1 we present the corresponding values and the number of user-likes in the

randomized graph $\mathcal{A}_{n,m,p}(G) = G \oplus g$ of our experiments. Note that for each p we obtain noise-graphs g with $p \times n \times m = p \times 168, 107, 652$ edges on average.

Table 1: Values of p , ϵ and number of user-likes in the randomized graph.

p	ϵ	$ E(g) $	$ E(G \oplus g) $
0.005	5.29	840,162	4,619,770
0.05	2.94	8,408,449	11,844,981
0.1	2.19	16,824,538	19,878,770
0.2	1.38	33,657,261	35,949,261
0.3	0.84	50,482,636	52,007,684
0.4	0.40	67,302,556	68,070,070

For inference, we performed Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), cf. (Leskovec et al., 2014). Then, use logistic regression for predicting variables values (such as gender or political views) from the user SVD scores in the training subset. We use 10-fold cross-validation and AUC and Pearson correlation coefficient to measure the accuracy of the predictions following from (Kosinski et al., 2016).

After performing inference on the data represented by G , we compare with the results for each of the differentially private graphs $\mathcal{A}_{n,m,p}(G) = G_\epsilon$ to measure the accuracy lost when providing privacy guarantees to the data subjects, see Figure 1. Recall that the variables are gender, age, political views, and users' scores on openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.




Figure 1: Accuracy for predictions depending on the ϵ .

We see in Figure 1, that for probabilities $p \leq 0.1$ or equivalently $\epsilon \geq 2.2$, the data utility is barely reduced. The predictions on demographics remain quite precise, as we show in Table 2 were the imprecision is measured (in %) as the proportion of the error between the obtained precision on the sanitized data with ϵ -differential privacy with respect to the original precision obtained without sanitizing the dataset. The values for the accuracy on the data without san-

itization are gender = 0.936, age = 0.616, political = 0.884, openness = 0.450, conscientiousness = 0.264, extroversion = 0.309, agreeableness = 0.213 and neuroticism = 0.304.

Table 2: Imprecision of predictions depending on ϵ (measured in %).

att/ ϵ	5.29	2.94	2.19	1.38	0.84	0.40
gen	0.5	4	7	17	29.2	41.5
age	0.4	6.4	8.5	25.8	58.4	74.7
pol	0.5	3.7	9.5	17.7	35.9	42.3
ope	0.3	9.3	15.7	28.3	57.3	82.2
con	0.9	3.2	8.7	17.4	55.8	86.5
ext	0.8	3.9	10.7	33	74.5	100.5
agr	0.9	5.7	19.1	46	76.8	84.2
neu	0.7	2.5	9.4	33.4	72.9	82.2

4.2 MovieLens Dataset for Collaborative Filtering

In this section we protect the Movielens-100K dataset (Harper and Konstan, 2015) that is used commonly as a benchmark dataset for collaborative filtering. The Movielens-100K dataset contains 100,000 ratings (between 1 and 5) with timestamps that 943 users gave to 1,682 movies.

With this data we generate a weighted bipartite graph G of users U and movies V , with the weight function $\omega : E(G) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $\omega(uv)$ is the rating that user u assigned to movie v . For adding noise to such graph we apply the techniques from Section 2.3, we generate noise-graphs as in Theorems 1 and 2. Additionally we define the weight function for the noise-graph g to be ω' that assigns edge weights from the empirical distribution of the edge weights assigned by ω to G , the rationale behind this is that assigning a constant weight $\omega' = c$ for all edges in g may facilitate identifying the noise-edges that have been added to G . The distribution of the weights of the edges and the weighted sum function, may play a key role to prove that the weighted noise-graph addition is differentially private, we leave such proof for future work.

We perform a comparison with an algorithm providing k -anonymity, i.e., HAKR algorithm from (Salas, 2019). We measure the privacy provided by both algorithms, to show that even when using two a-priori different models for privacy protection, we may still be able to compare their privacy guarantees.

In Table 3 we show the values of p and the number of ratings (edges) in the noise-graph and the randomized graph. Note that since we consider only the ratings in the train set the edges of the graph G to be protected.

Table 3: Values of p and number of ratings in the randomized graph.

p	$ E(g) $	$ E(G \oplus g) $
0.005	7,728	87,354
0.05	77,907	153,864
0.1	155,663	227,698
0.2	312,148	376,192
0.3	466,739	522,564
0.4	621,566	669,706

In Table 4 we consider the noise added to G to obtain the sanitized graph \tilde{G} as in 11, where $g = \tilde{G} \oplus G$. Note that in this case g is not a random graph, and the graph that is k -anonymized is the graph corresponding to the train set of 80K ratings.

Table 4: Values of k and number of ratings added in the sanitized graph.



k	$ E(g) $	$ E(\tilde{G}) $
2	74,444	154,444
3	132,236	212,236
4	178,469	258,469
5	214,966	294,966
6	249,806	329,806

In Figures 2 and 3 we plot the cumulative distributions of the values of the Sensitive Attribute Risk for all the users. In Figure 2 we see that the mean values for SA_R in the randomized data are 0.84, 0.42, 0.28, 0.18, 0.13 and 0.10, respectively, for $p = 0.005, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4$. While in Figure 3 the mean values for SA_R in the k -anonymous data are 0.50, 0.35, 0.28, 0.24, 0.21, respectively, for $k = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6$. The privacy provided not only depends on the method, but also on the parameter. For example, for $p = 0.1$ and $k = 4$ the average SA_R is the same.

Table 5: Information loss/disclosure risk measured as average SA_I .

p	SA_I	k	SA_I
0.005	0.3025	2	1.713
0.05	1.732	3	2.209
0.1	2.351	4	2.443
0.2	2.855	5	2.571
0.3	3.080	6	2.675
0.4	3.197		

Finally, in Table 5 we compare the Information loss (as mean SA_I) between a priori different sanitization methods such as adding noise and k -anonymization. The positive aspect of randomization is that p is a continuous value, while k is discrete, so randomization can be better tuned for more specific privacy and utility values.

Figure 2: Sensitive attribute risk cumulative distribution grouped by p .Figure 3: Sensitive attribute risk cumulative distribution grouped by k .

5 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we presented a method for differentially private graph-publishing based on noise-graph addition. Then, we showed that it may be applied to obtain randomized response and differential privacy for collaborative filtering. Finally, we provided a measure for privacy of a sanitization method, that allows to compare between algorithms with different a-priori guarantees, such as ϵ -differential privacy and k -anonymity. We tested our algorithms in public Facebook Likes to prove that the accuracy of profiling algorithms is well preserved even when they are trained with differentially private data. The experiment on MovieLens dataset shows an application for sanitizing weighted graphs for recommendations. We can conclude from our results that is possible to provide strong privacy guarantees to users, while still obtaining accurate recommendations and predictions. We leave as future work to show that our method may provide ϵ -differential privacy for weighted graphs.

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