



# High mutual cooperation rates in rats learning reciprocal altruism: the role of payoff matrix

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## Abstract

Cooperation is one of the most studied paradigms for the understanding of social interactions. Reciprocal altruism -a special type of cooperation that is taught by means of the iterated prisoner dilemma game (iPD)- has been shown to emerge in different species with different success rates. When playing iPD against a reciprocal opponent, the larger theoretical long-term reward is delivered when both players cooperate mutually. In previous experiments, rats showed low mutual cooperation rates. In this work, we trained rats in iPD against an opponent playing a Tit for Tat strategy, using a payoff matrix with positive and negative reinforcements, that is food and timeout respectively. We showed for the first time, that experimental rats were able to learn reciprocal altruism with a high average cooperation rate, where the most probable state was mutual cooperation (85%), but if subjects defected the most probable behavior was to go back to mutual cooperation. When, we modified the matrix by increasing temptation rewards (T) or by increased cooperation rewards (R), the cooperation rate decreased. In conclusion, we observe that an iPD matrix with large positive reward improves less cooperation than one with small rewards, shown that satisfying the relationship among iPD reinforcement was not enough to achieve high mutual cooperation behavior. Therefore, using positive and negative reinforcements and an appropriate contrast between rewards, rats have cognitive capacity to learn reciprocal altruism. This finding allows to infer that the learning of reciprocal altruism has appeared early in evolution.

## Author summary

The reciprocal altruism is achieved when an individual makes a costly act in benefit of another and later it is benefited by the other in return. Subjects have to learn to

maximize long term profitability using this reciprocal behavior instead of selfish behavior (getting a long-term reward). In human beings and some animals (as monkeys) this behavior had been observed in laboratory conditions, but in animals with less cognitive abilities (as rats or birds) cooperation has been poorly seen. We have studied if it is due to cognitive abilities or due to other reasons. The reciprocal altruism used to be studied in paradigms where an experimental subject faces an opponent repeatedly having two possible options: cooperate or defect, when the opponent uses a reciprocal strategy (TitForTat: start cooperating and then copy the other's last choice). In this protocol, the best theoretical strategy is to cooperate. Using a matrix with positive and negative reinforcements, we found for the first time that rats developed high reciprocal altruism behaviour. Rats learned to cooperate mutually, and when they chose not to cooperate, they returned to cooperate in the following trial. In conclusion, rats learned the benefit of choosing the larger long-term reinforcement instead of an immediate, showing that even animals with less cognitive abilities are able to learn reciprocal altruism.

## Introduction

Altruism is a kind of behaviour by which individuals choose to favour others in detriment of their own benefit. It is not obvious at the first sight how could Darwin's theory natural selection explain altruistic behaviour and many proposals appeared in order to account for altruist behaviours: kin selection [1], group selection and reciprocal altruism [2] among others. In the reciprocal altruism theory, the loss an individual get from being altruist returns later as part of the reciprocal partner. Thus, in the long term, being altruist become the most useful strategy. In this regard, Triver's theory of reciprocal altruism is able to explain how natural selection favours reciprocal altruism between non-related individuals. Perhaps the most insightful example of such behaviour are the observed among vampire bats, where individuals share blood with others who have previously shared their food [3]. Since 1971, Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (iPD) has been proven a useful tool to study reciprocal altruism [4]. In the iPD, two players must choose between two possible behaviours: to cooperate or to defect. Rewards and punishments are defined in a 2x2 payoff matrix. When the game is played indefinitely, which is its iterated version, mutual cooperative behaviours are favoured. When played once, to defect is the best strategy [5]. However, when the game run indefinitely, evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) emerge [6,7] and, under certain constraints imposed to the payoff matrix, mutual cooperation appears as the best strategy whenever reciprocity is maintained (*Pareto Optimum*). Among a huge number of reciprocal strategies, Tit-For-Tat is one of the most simple and robust [8]. Tit-For-Tat is based on two simple rules: to start cooperating and to do what the other player (opponent) did in the last trial.

Among many reciprocal behaviours, reciprocity and reciprocal altruism were well documented in several species. Although cooperation is needed in order to success in both reciprocity and reciprocal altruism, the latter add the possibility of getting reward by defecting an opponent. Some works had assessed reciprocal altruism behaviour by means of iPD paradigm in different ways, but the experiments results were either low levels of cooperation [9] or depended on a treatment that enhance the cooperation preference (mutualism matrix) [10–12]. Direct reciprocity, which is established between two individuals, has been observed in monkeys [13–15] and in rats [16–19]. There, while food quality seemed to impact on the cooperative behaviour, a key factor to obtain reliable cooperation levels was the opponent behaviour. In this sense, individuals tended to be more cooperative with opponents that had cooperated in the past. However, when reciprocal altruism is studied, differences between species come to light. Thus, while

reciprocal altruism has been proven in monkeys, birds and rats failed to reach high levels of cooperation, even for complex combinations of rewards and punishments in the payoff matrix and treatments to induce preference [9, 10, 12, 20–23]. The reasons why some species do not learn reciprocal altruism remain obscure. A possible explanation is that animals are not able to discriminate low contrast reward contingencies. Indeed, it was shown that rats failed to discriminate the amount of reward when the number of reward units was bigger than three [24–26]. Here, we design a iPD setup to test learning of reciprocal altruism based on a combination positive (food) and negative (timeout) reinforcement, where our goal was to choose the amounts of pellets in order both to maximization contrast among pay-off earned in each iPD states and to minimized the amount of food that each rat got in long term. These maybe help the rats to discriminate the amount of reward in long term. In order to evaluate if animals developed ALLC strategy by place preference or by reward maximization, we applied a reversion treatment. Finally, we evaluated how payoff matrix components promote or disrupt altruistic behaviours.

## Materials and methods

### Subject

We used thirty male Long-Evans rats (weight 300–330g and two months old) provided by the IBYME-CONICET. Divided in two experiments, in the first one of eighteen rats, twelve experimental and six opponent, and in the second, six experimental and six opponent. Experimental subjects were housed in pairs (to allow social interaction), and opponent rats were housed individually. All rats were food restricted and maintained at 90–95% for experimental subjects, and 80–85% for opponents of free feeding body weight. And with tap water available ad libitum. The housing room was at  $22^{\circ}\text{C} \pm 2^{\circ}\text{C}$  and 12/12 h light/dark cycle (with lights on at 9 am). Pre-training was performed on a single standard operant chamber (MED associates Inc., USA) equipped with two stimulus light and retractable levers below the light and feeders. Also the chambers were inside an anechoic chamber with white noise (with a flat power spectral density). The iPD experiments were performed in ad hoc dual chamber equipped with levers, lights and feeders (fig. 1A). The chambers were connected by windows in order that the rat could make olfactory and eye contact. The lever's height was 80% of maximum height of the forepaws while rearing [27]. The dual chamber is shown in supplementary material, see fig. . At the end of daylight, supplementary food was provided in order that rats get the amount of pellets necessary to maintain body weight.

### Pre-experimental training

All rats had a shaping procedure to learn the response (press a lever) to get a reinforcement (pellets). To prevent animals from choosing a lever place over the other, they learned to get reward from both sides by changing the side of conditioned stimulus. The side was changed after eight trials. All rats learned to press the correct lighting lever after four sessions. Each rat was trained in 2 sessions per day, each trial began with the inter-trial interval (ITI) during 5 seconds, it was followed by the conditioning stimulus (light) for either 45 seconds or until a lever was pressed. One second before food is delivered, the feeder was lighted. In the opponent's training they learned to press the lever when the light was on. In the task, the side of the active lever was chosen pseudo-randomly (allowing the same side no more than four times). The opponent subject had to perform a fix ratio treatment up to FR=5 to get rewards.

## Experiment

To study the reciprocal altruism in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game (iPD), we used a payoff matrix with positive and negative reinforcements. Positive reinforcements were pellets (Bio-Serv 45 mg Dustless Precision Pellets) and negative reinforcement was timeout (a fix delay in starting a new trial). The payoff of the experimental subject was according to the matrix, and the opponent's payoff was 1 pellet when the correct lighted lever was pressed. The iPD game have four possible occupancy state where experimental and opponent individual behaviour can be as follows: both cooperate (mutual cooperation, R), both do not cooperate (mutual defection, P), experimental subject does not cooperate when the opponent cooperates (T), and experimental cooperates when the opponent does not cooperate (S). The amount of pellets preference was previously tested on a discrimination test, showing that rats prefer 2 pellets rather than 1 pellet (data not showed). We performed two sessions per day and each session had 30 trials. Each experimental subject was trained with the same opponent. The training was finished after five consecutive sessions with no changes in the cooperation rate. We defined cooperation (C) and defection (D) lever in the iPD box. The single iPD trial procedure was as follows: (1) ITI time, (2) then, the light (CS) was turned on, (3) after that both rats made their responses, the light was turned off and the reinforcement was delivered according to a payoff matrix, (4) if positive reinforcement was assigned, the feeder's light was turned on, and a second later a reward was delivered. The opponent Conditioned Stimulus (light) was controlled following a Tit for Tat strategy. The opponent received a pellet after pressing three times the lever (FR=3, so as to be enough time in front of the window until the experimental subject choose a lever). If negative reinforcement (timeout) was assigned, delay time started, and the opponent subject got a pellet reward. (5) After either five seconds eating time expired or timeout was completed, a new trial started. In the first experiment the payoff matrix was: 1 pellet for mutual cooperation ( $P_R = 1$ ), 2 pellets when the experimental subject defected and the opponent cooperated ( $P_T = 2$ ), 4 seconds of timeout for mutual defected ( $P_P = 4seconds$ ), and 8 seconds of timeout when the experimental subject cooperated and the opponent defected ( $P_S = 8$ ). At the end of these experiment, the four rats with the best performance in cooperation were trained in a reversion treatment (see Fig. 1F). The reversion consist on inter-change sides of C and D lever in both subject and opponent chamber. In that sense, if a animals has a place preference behavior, he will not learn the new side that maximize reward. In the second experiment we used six naive experimental rats on a different payoff matrix with greater temptation ( $P_R = 1$ ,  $P_T = 3$ ,  $P_P = 4$ ,  $P_S = 8$ ). After training, we divided rats in two groups, depending on the cooperation levels. The first group with high cooperation rate was trained with the payoff matrix ( $P_R = 1$ ,  $P_T = 5$ ,  $P_P = 4$ ,  $P_S = 8$ ) with greater temptation for T state. The other group (with low cooperation rate) was trained with the matrix ( $P_R = 2$ ,  $P_T = 3$ ,  $P_P = 4$ ,  $P_S = 8$ ) that enhances cooperative behaviour (in comparison with ( $P_R = 1$ ,  $P_T = 3$ ,  $P_P = 4$ ,  $P_S = 8$ ), but with low contrast between positive rewards. All experimental procedures were approved by the ethics committee of the IByME-CONICET and were conducted according to the NIH Guide for Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.2.1 Subjects and Housing.

## Statistic

All statistical analysis were performed using statistics library from open source software Octave and MATLAB. We pooled the data from the last five sessions where cooperation rate was stable (to calculate cooperation rate we counted the number of times a rat chose the cooperation lever per session). We compared individual's means of cooperation along treatment using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test. To test whether

the probability of cooperation after each outcome (T,R,P or S) was different from chance (0.5), we performed a Chi-square goodness of fit test with Bonferroni corrected value of  $0.05/n$ . To compare mean rate of the different outcomes for each game, we performed an ANOVA two tails test. When significant  $\alpha = 0.05$ , multiple post-hoc pairwise comparative tests were performed with Bonferroni corrected value of  $\alpha = 0.0125$ . The individual's decision rules can be described by the components of transition vectors and Markov Chain diagram. The transition vector was made up of probabilities of cooperation when the previous trials resulted in state R(reward,  $p(c-R-1)$ ), T(temptation,  $p(c-T-1)$ ), S(sucker,  $p(c-S-1)$ ) or P(punishment,  $p(c-P-1)$ ) respectively. If every component of this vector is 0.5, the agent's decision rule is random mode. Markov Chain diagram show the graphic representation of the complete decision making rule for each rat.

## Results

We trained twelve rats in iPD against an opponent that plays Tit for Tat strategy. Tit-For-Tat is based on two simple rules: to start cooperating and to do what the other player (opponent) did in the last trial. Fig 1A shows a schema of the different choices a subject can do in each trial. Thus, when the subject cooperates, it receives one pellet ( $P_R$ ) or eight seconds timeout ( $P_S$ ) depending on whether the opponent choice was to cooperate or to defect. On the other hand, when the subject defects, it receives 2 pellets ( $P_T$ ) or four seconds timeout ( $P_P$ ), according to whether the opponent choice was to cooperate or to defect respectively. The criteria for cooperation was an established the preference for pressing C lever (cooperation) over D lever (defection) in more than 60% of the trials for five or more consecutive sessions. Eight out of the twelve animals learned to cooperate (cooperation rate  $0.86 \pm 0.05$ , mean  $\pm$  s.e.m), reaching criteria in  $30 \pm 4$  sessions, mean  $\pm$  s.e.m. In fig 1B, we show the mean cooperation levels for those animals during the last twenty three sessions before reaching criteria. The inset in fig 1B shows the mean cooperation level for each animal during the last five training sessions. As a consequence of the increase in cooperation levels, the average total timeout per session decreased as training progressed ( $0.23 \pm 0.08$ , mean  $\pm$  sem, see fig 1C). Due to the fact that many sequences of lever pressing can give the same amount of reward and/or timeout, independently of the cooperation level. we analyzed the relationship between total reward and timeout for each animals respect to a simulated population. Thus, for each animal we compared those values with a simple regression model fitted to a population of 100.000 simulated individuals when their cooperation level was set to 60%, see fig 1D. Each simulated individual had a different complete strategy and each strategy was a combination of thirty C and D choice (session length). An individual that play a iPD game with a 60% of her choices in C will be near to the line regardless of her strategies. As can be seen in the figure, the higher the cooperation levels, the larger the total reward and the lower the total timeout. Accordingly the fig. 1D, the group of cooperator's rats developed a complete different behavior respect both line regression with 60% of cooperation and the no cooperator group. It means that not exist any strategy with low level of cooperation that get high level of reward and small timeout as in the cooperative group. We then built one Markov model for the group of cooperative animals (see fig 1E) averaging occupancy state rate and transition probabilities in the group. In the iPD there are four possible occupancy state where experimental and opponent individual behaviour can be as follows: R (both cooperate or mutual cooperation), P (both do not cooperate or mutual defection), T (experimental subject does not cooperate when the opponent cooperates), and S (experimental cooperates when the opponent does not cooperate). For the group of non-cooperative animals see fig 1S (supplementary materials). The cooperative group

showed that the permanency in R state was high in cooperative animals and, whenever the animal defects (states T and P), it returns to cooperate in most of the cases. All conditional probabilities to cooperate given a previous outcome was near 1. Besides, the probability of R state was the highest and other states near zero. The probability of R state was significantly different to other states ( $p < 1e^{-8}$ , ANOVA two-way test,  $n=8$ ). On the contrary, in the group of non-cooperative animals, any states were significantly different to the other  $p > 0.05$ ,  $F=0.353$ , ANOVA two-way test,  $n=4$ ) and the probability to cooperate given a previous states did not evidence preference for any defined strategy. See the table X

To discard the fact that animals had have a preference for one of the levers and, in consequence, their behaviour biased independently of the training paradigm, we select the best four cooperators and apply a reversal procedure immediately after cooperation was reached. All animals learned to cooperate after reversal ( $0.87 \pm 0.04$ , mean  $\pm$  sem), see fig 1F.

**Fig 1. High level of cooperation in iPD.** (A) Dual operant box diagram and the matrix with positive(blue) and negative(red) reinforcement is shown. The iPD game had four possible states: R(reward) mutual cooperation, P(punishment) mutual defection, T(temptation) in which subject defected and opponent cooperated and S(sucker) subject cooperated and opponent defected. The opponent's light was driven in order to perform a Tit for Tat strategy. (B,C) Time-course of cooperation and timeout rate along the last 23 games sessions. In the last 5 sessions, the mean  $\pm$  sem of cooperation was  $0.86 \pm 0.05$  and timeout was  $0.23 \pm 0.08$ . (D) Total reward versus timeout for all animals (color bar means cooperation mean). Each animal was compared with the theoretical reward-timeout function when the cooperation level was set to 60% (black continuous line). The higher the cooperation levels, the larger the total reward and the lower the total timeout.(E) Markov Chain diagram shows the probabilities of transition between states ( $p(c|T_{-1}) = 0.76$ ,  $p(c|R_{-1}) = 0.85$ ,  $p(c|S_{-1}) = 0.93$ ,  $p(c|P_{-1}) = 0.87$ ). The arrow represents transitions: driven by cooperation in blue, and driven by defection in red (the arrow thickness is proportional to transition probability). The size of circles is proportional to the state occupancy ratio. Below, bars show the occupancy ratio when the cooperation reaches stability. The probabilities were:  $p(R) = 0.76$ ,  $p(T) = 0.1$ ,  $p(P) = 0.04$ ,  $p(S) = 0.1$ . Asterisks denote significant differences from multiple comparisons using one-way ANOVA and Bonferroni correction. (F) Evolution cooperation rate before and after reversion treatment. Graphs show a moving average with samples of 3 sessions (the mean and sem from reversion on the last five sessions was  $0.87 \pm 0.04$ ).

We then asked how the ratio in the amount of positive reinforcement of R and T states affects cooperation learning and maintenance. We defined a contrast index CI that measures the relationship between the amount of reward in R and T as follows:

$$CI = \frac{T - R}{T + R}$$

Thus, in the experiment shown in fig 1 CI was  $\frac{1}{3}$ , which is the maximum contrast level constrained to a payoff matrix that favours cooperation, that is,  $2R > T + S$ , assuming that S becomes a negative stimulus induced by timeout. We trained six animals with a payoff matrix ( $R = 1$ ,  $T = 3$ ,  $P = 4$ ,  $S = 8$ ) and found that three animals learned to cooperate ( $0.88 \pm 0.01$ , mean  $\pm$  sem, see fig 2A), while others did not ( $0.64 \pm 0.13$ , mean  $\pm$  sem, see fig 2B). The last group was no cooperator since both their conditional probabilities to cooperate and occupancy R state ratio were near chance. For details see table 1. Then we changed the amount of reward in order to increase/decrease CI in the



Table 1. Caption

cooperative/non-cooperative groups. As it can be seen, a high value of  $CI = \frac{2}{3}$  disrupts cooperation in cooperative group, fig 2A. The cooperation was  $0.604 \pm 0.102$ , mean  $\pm$  sem whereas before  $0.88 \pm 0.01$ ). When a lower value of  $CI = \frac{1}{5}$  was applied for not cooperator group and the matrix empowers the cooperation in two out of three animals, see fig 2B ( $0.711 \pm 0.04$ , mean  $\pm$  sem, whereas before  $0.64 \pm 0.13$ . See table 1.

We analyzed how these changes in strategies impact on the amount of received reward and timeout penalties. In the group of cooperative animals, the change in T (3 pellets to 5 pellets) increased both timeout and a bit a reward, as expected when states T, P and S become more probable. The occupancy states ratio before and after matrix change had significant difference among all states,  $p < 0.05$  (wilcoxon ranksum test). See fig 2C and 2E. It is worth noting however that the amount of received reward is not the maximum allowed, which would be delivered in the case of an animal that alternates from state T to S indefinitely. On the other hand, when we applied a matrix with a lower contrast  $CI = \frac{1}{5}$  to the group of non-cooperative animals, they enhance significantly her cooperation level, receiving more reward without significant changes in total timeout, see fig 2D. In fig 2F, we show the state occupancy probabilities for this group before and after the change in the payoff matrix. It can be seen that the occupancy state ratio of R had significantly increased after the change in the payoff matrix. It can be observed a significant difference in R and P states, ( $p_R < 0.008$  and  $p_P < 0.048$ , wilcoxon rank-sum test). We showed that when the contrast index increased using a matrix to favor the cooperation the animals learned to cooperate, but when the index increased and the matrix favor defection the animals left to cooperate.

**Fig 2. Effect of changes in the amount of positive reinforcement of R and T.** (A) The rats were pre-trained by pay-off matrix [ $R = 1, T = 3, P = 4, S = 8$  and contrast  $CI = \frac{1}{2}$ ] (filled dots) and the cooperation was strongly affected by change of temptation payoff, decreasing when T payoff increased and matrix with changed to [ $R = 1, T = 5, P = 4, S = 8$  and contrast  $CI = \frac{2}{3}$ ] (open circles). There was a significantly difference (red circle) in two animals with  $p < 9.8e^{-06}$  (wilcoxon rank-sum test) and the other not modify her behavior in spite of matrix change. (B) The cooperation enhances when the matrix changed to [ $R = 2, T = 3, P = 4, S = 8$  and  $CI = \frac{1}{5}$ ] (open circles) and the difference was statistically different ( $p < 0.0062$ ) in two of three subjects, because one had no significant difference after matrix change,  $p > 0.05(0.7063)$ . (C) In the 3D plots were related cooperation, reward and timeout. In the group of cooperative animals (filled dots), the change in T (3 pellets to 5 pellets) increased both timeout and reward in order to decrease cooperation (open circles). The comparison between cooperation mean of both group was significantly different,  $p < 0.05(6.7e^{-05})$ . (D) In the group of non-cooperative animals (filled dots), they learned to cooperate (open circles) by receiving more reward without significant changes in total timeout. The cooperation was significantly different,  $p > 0.05(0.081)$ . (E,F) The mean of occupancy state rate graph (last five sessions) from cooperative (left) and non-cooperative (right) groups (Mean  $\pm$  sem). Asterisks denote significant difference, after matrix changed, among T, R, P or S state occupancy and dash line indicates the level of equal rate in each state (that corresponds to a strategy with strongly random component). Before changes (filled dots) and after changes (open circles).

From the results shown in figs 1 and 2, it is reasonable to ask whether a fine tuning in contrasted reward encourages cooperative behaviour. We have shown that eight out

of twelve (66%) animals acquired a cooperative behaviour when CI was  $\frac{1}{3}$  while three out of six (50%) succeeded when CI was  $\frac{1}{2}$ , as expected when temptation payoff increases. In the same line of reasoning, animals that had learned cooperation under  $CI = \frac{1}{2}$  disrupted their cooperative behaviour when CI was increased to  $\frac{2}{3}$ , while those that had not learned acquired a cooperative behaviour when CI was decreased to  $\frac{1}{5}$ . Fig 3A exemplifies the occupancy and transition probabilities for an animal that disrupted its cooperative behaviour when  $CI = \frac{1}{2}$  was changed to  $CI = \frac{2}{3}$ . The opposite can be seen in the example of fig 3B. A non-cooperative animal under a  $CI = \frac{1}{2}$  became cooperative when CI was decreased to  $\frac{1}{5}$ . Figs 3C and 3D show cooperation levels and normalized rewards. A normalized reward was calculated through the quotient of the total reward obtained in the session by the maximum reward achieved with the best strategy. Considering that opponent always played Tit for tat strategy, the best strategy depends on the pay-off matrix values. When the matrix favors the cooperation ALLC was the best, but when matrix favours no cooperation alternate between C and D was the best strategy. It can be seen that both variables follow an inverted U profile as a function of contrast index CI, as expected when a delicate balance between rewards at R and T is mandatory.

**Fig 3. Markov chain diagrams and contrast index.** Markov chain diagrams are shown (the size of circle means of occupancy state rate and the arrow's width are proportional to the probability of cooperate given (A) Occupancy state and transition probabilities for an animal that disrupted its cooperative behaviour when contrast index  $CI = \frac{1}{2}$  was changed to  $CI = \frac{2}{3}$  and pay-off matrix was changed  $[P_T, P_R, P_P, P_S] = [3p, 1p, 4s, 8s]$  to  $[5p, 1p, 4s, 8s]$  (p=pellet and s=seconds). The line thickness of blue arrows (conditional probabilities of cooperation) become more thin after change. (for values see table 1. (B) The opposite situation can be seen, non-cooperative animal becomes more cooperative when  $CI = \frac{1}{2}$  was decreased to  $CI = \frac{1}{5}$  in a matrix that favours cooperation. The blue arrows become more thick after change (for values see table 1. (C, D) show cooperation and timeout levels as a function of CI. Here, it can be seen that both variables follow an inverted U profile in correlation with the contrast index increase and if the payoff matrix favours or not the cooperation behaviour.

## Discussion and Conclusion

In this work, we study the contrasted role between reinforcements in reciprocal altruism learning in rats. Traditionally, reciprocal altruism is achieved by playing the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (iPD) when an experimental subject is confronted to a reciprocal opponent. The payoff matrix used had positive and negative reinforcements with highly contrasted between pairs, positive pairs and negative pairs and also using discriminable amount of reinforcements [25,26]. In our experiment, pellets were used as positive reinforcements and timeout as negative reinforcements. In this way, the positive and negative reinforcements acted as strengtheners of mutual cooperation behaviour likelihood [28]. To our knowledge, results show for the first time high levels of cooperation (86,11%) and mutual cooperation (76,32%) in iPD, see Fig 1B. Several works have tested reciprocity using iPD game with similar version of standard matrix showed that animals prefer short-term benefits or only improve a poor level of cooperation [4, 9, 20, 30, 31] or have had to use a treatment to enhance cooperation preference [10, 23, 29, 34]. The main differences with other research works are the levels of cooperation and mutual cooperation achieved. A possible explanation is that using a standard matrices, as  $[P_T = 6, P_R = 4, P_P = 1, P_S = 0]$ , animals could not discriminate



between amount of reinforcements obtained with a long-term option respect to a short-term option, mainly due to after several trials they got amounts of reward that not able to discerning [24]. For example, if a rat played along four consecutive sessions [C C C C] got 16 pellets and if played [C D D D] got 12 pellets. In our framework, a rats using the same choices will earn 4 pellets or 3 pellets plus 16 second timeout, respectively. The rats can able to recognize small amounts and when timeout is used the immediate profit is degrades.

A dynamic system can be represented with Markov diagrams and its associated state transition vector. In this case, each state (T, R, P, S, see Results section) will have two associated conditional probabilities: to cooperate or not to cooperate given state. An individual will adopt an altruist reciprocal behaviour if when playing with an opponent with a Tit for Tat strategy, the cooperation probability is near 1, independently of previous states (T, R, P or S). And while the opponent perform a reciprocal behaviour, the best strategy is to return to the mutual cooperation state, R. In the first experiment in this work, we found that animals adopted two well defined strategies (fig 1D). On one hand, a group of 8 animals proved to have learned a cooperative strategy while other 4 animals answered at random (see fig A Supporting information). The strategy of the first group (fig 1E) showed conditional probabilities to cooperation given previous state T, R, P or S as 0.760, 0.845, 0.929 and 0.870, respectively, and the second group showed not significantly different from random (see fig B Supporting information). In various works, results were presented with Markov diagrams and its associated transition vector [23] [10,29] [11] and showed that conditional probabilities of cooperation were not high when facing a reciprocal opponent. In this protocol, with the matrix  $T=2p, R=1p, P=4s$  and  $S=8s$ , there are two theoretical strategies that maximize appetitive reinforcement: one is ALLC strategy and the other an alternating between cooperation (C) and defection (D) strategy. The latter, also maximizes positive reinforcement when alternating between cooperation and defection option, but it also increases negative reinforcement (timeout). In this case, ALLC strategy is the only one that maximizes positive reinforcement and minimizes the negative one (Pareto Optimum). Since negative reinforcement is timeout, ALLC strategy gives more food per unit of time. In this case, the role of the negative reinforcement appears.

In order to evaluate if animals developed ALLC strategy by place preference or by reward maximization, we applied a reversion treatment, see fig 1F, and we observed that animals relearn reciprocal altruism when they were exposed to a new lever's contingency.

Finally, after animals adopted a strategy, we wanted to evaluate if a change in the payoff matrix could modify their behaviour, to do so we studied the effect of modifying positive reinforcements, see fig 2A and 2B. Animals were pre-trained with a payoff matrix where alternating between C and D strategy gives more positive reinforcements than with an ALLC strategy, and keeping the same negative reinforcement as in the first experiment. It was observed that only half of the animals learned to cooperate although all of them obtained the same mean amount reward (pellet), see fig 2C, 2D. Then, a matrix with an increased payoff T was applied to the cooperative group (fig 2A), and we observed that cooperative behaviour decreased. Animals reduced frequency of R state and increased frequency of P state, proving that they preferred a small-immediate option instead of a large-delayed option. This behaviour is similar to the one observed in birds ([30]). In the second group, we applied a matrix that keeps the proportions of reinforcements in T and R similar to the most common matrix ( $T=3p, R=2p$  equal proportion to  $T=6p, R=4$ ). It was observed that animals modified their behaviour and became more cooperative (fig 2B). These results show that animals that learned to cooperate with an appropriate matrix, stop cooperating when a temptation payoff (T) was enough increased (matrix with high contrast index). However, if non-cooperative animals are trained with a matrix that favours cooperation (matrix with low contrast

index), they become cooperators. In the latter case, cooperation levels achieved are comparable to results that are shared in diverse bibliography. We observe that if a iPD matrix uses large positive reward, it will improve less cooperation than one with small rewards, shown that satisfying the relationship among iPD reinforcement was not enough to achieve high mutual cooperation behavior. The reciprocal altruist behaviour in humans, monkeys and elephants has been studied in laboratories showing high levels of cooperation [13, 15, 35–37], however in rats and birds those levels of cooperation were much lower. Our results showed that by using positive and negative reinforcements and an appropriate contrast index in order, to favour reinforcement discrimination, rats proved to have the cognitive capacity to learn reciprocal altruism.

## Supporting information

**S1 Fig. Non-cooperative rats. (A)** Time-course of cooperation rate along the last 23 games sessions. In the last 5 sessions, the mean  $\pm$  sem of cooperation was  $0.36 \pm 0.03$ . **(B)** Markov Chain diagram shows the probabilities of transition between states ( $p(c|T_{-1}) = 0.44$ ,  $p(c|R_{-1}) = 0.38$ ,  $p(c|S_{-1}) = 0.32$ ,  $p(c|P_{-1}) = 0.32$ ). The arrow represents transitions: driven by cooperation in blue, and driven by defection in red (the arrow thickness is proportional to transition probability). The size of circles is proportional to the state occupancy ratio. Below, bars show the occupancy ratio ( $T = 0.25$ ,  $R = 0.19$ ,  $P = 0.33$ ,  $S = 0.23$  and  $p > 0.05$ ,  $F=0.353$ , ANOVA two-way test,  $n=4$ ) and transition probabilities ( $p(c|T_{-1}) = 0.43$ ,  $p(c|R_{-1}) = 0.38$ ,  $p(c|S_{-1}) = 0.32$  and  $p(c|P_{-1}) = 0.31$ ) did not evidence preference for any defined strategy. Asterisks denote significant differences from multiple comparisons using one-way ANOVA and Bonferroni correction.

**S2 Fig. Dual operand conditioning chamber.** Upper. On the left, see two operant box in front of each other in such a way that windows were aligned. On the right, is shown the internal front panel equipped with lights(green shadow) and levers(blue shadow) and windows(red shadow). Down. Subject and opponent playing along a trial. The Opponent only a light was lighting per trials and the subject had both light on.

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