


# Construindo Bootkits: Ideias para GRUB2 com Linux

# Who am I


- Security Consultant at PRIDE Security
- ....

# Previous Work




*Matrosov, Alex, Eugene Rodionov, and Sergey Bratus. Rootkits and bootkits: reversing modern malware and next generation threats. No Starch Press, 2019.*


# Startup Overview




# Startup Overview




# Startup Overview



# Startup Overview



# GRUB2 - Startup Overview



# GRUB2 - MBR

```
vmdev@pc:~$ sudo hexdump -C -n512 /dev/sda
00000000 eb 63 90 10 8e d0 bc 00 b0 b8 00 00 8e d8 8e c0 | .c.....|
00000010 fb be 00 7c bf 00 06 b9 00 02 f3 a4 ea 21 06 00 |....|.....!|
00000020 00 be be 07 38 04 75 0b 83 c6 10 81 fe fe 07 75 |.....8.u.....u|
00000030 f3 eb 16 b4 02 b0 01 bb 00 7c b2 80 8a 74 01 8b |.....|....t..|
00000040 4c 02 cd 13 ea 00 7c 00 00 eb fe 00 00 00 00 00 |[L.....|.....|
00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 01 00 00 00 |.....|
00000060 00 00 00 00 ff fa 90 90 f6 c2 80 74 05 f6 c2 70 |.....t..p|
00000070 74 02 b2 80 ea 79 7c 00 00 31 c0 8e d8 8e d0 bc |t....y|.1...|
00000080 00 20 fb a0 64 7c 3c ff 74 02 88 c2 52 bb 17 04 |..d|<.t...R...|
00000090 f6 07 03 74 06 be 88 7d e8 17 01 be 05 7c b4 41 |....t...}.....|A|
000000a0 bb aa 55 cd 13 5a 52 72 3d 81 fb 55 aa 75 37 83 |..U..ZRr=..U.u7.|
000000b0 e1 01 74 32 31 c0 89 44 04 40 88 44 ff 89 44 02 |..t21..D.@D..D..|
000000c0 c7 04 10 00 66 8b 1e 5c 7c 66 89 5c 08 66 8b 1e |....f..\\|f..\\f..|
000000d0 60 7c 66 89 5c 0c c7 44 06 00 70 b4 42 cd 13 72 | |f..\\..D..p.B..r|
000000e0 05 bb 00 70 eb 76 b4 08 cd 13 73 0d 5a 84 d2 0f |....p.v....s.Z...|
000000f0 83 d0 00 be 93 7d e9 82 00 66 0f b6 c6 88 64 ff |....}...f....d.|
00000100 40 66 89 44 04 0f b6 d1 c1 e2 02 88 e8 88 f4 40 |@f.D.....@|
00000110 89 44 08 0f b6 c2 c0 e8 02 66 89 04 66 a1 60 7c |.D.....f..f.'|||
00000120 66 09 c0 75 4e 66 a1 5c 7c 66 31 d2 66 f7 34 88 |f..uNf.\\|f1.f.4.|
00000130 d1 31 d2 66 f7 74 04 3b 44 08 7d 37 fe c1 88 c5 |.1.f.t.;D.}7....|
00000140 30 c0 c1 e8 02 08 c1 88 d0 5a 88 c6 bb 00 70 8e |0.....Z....p.|
00000150 c3 31 db b8 01 02 cd 13 72 1e 8c c3 60 1e b9 00 |.1.....r....`...|
00000160 01 8e db 31 f6 bf 00 80 8e c6 fc f3 a5 1f 61 ff |....1.....a.|
00000170 26 5a 7c be 8e 7d eb 03 be 9d 7d e8 34 00 be a2 |&Z|...}....}.4...|
00000180 7d e8 2e 00 cd 18 eb fe 47 52 55 42 20 00 47 65 |}.....GRUB ..Ge|
00000190 6f 6d 00 48 61 72 64 20 44 69 73 6b 00 52 65 61 |om.Hard Disk.Rea|
000001a0 64 00 20 45 72 72 6f 72 0d 0a 00 bb 01 00 b4 0e |d. Error.....|
000001b0 cd 10 ac 3c 00 75 f4 c3 d6 12 9c 7d 00 00 80 20 |...<.u.....}...|
000001c0 21 00 83 fe ff ff 00 08 00 00 00 00 40 03 00 fe |!......@...|
000001d0 ff ff 05 fe ff ff fe 0f 40 03 02 e8 7f 00 00 00 |.....@.....|
000001e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....|
000001f0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 55 aa |.....U.|
```

# GRUB2 - Core Image (Boot Sector)

- implemented by boot/i386/pc/diskboot.S
- loads all sectors of the core image (decompressor and compressed data) to 0x8200
  - uses a table present at the bottom of the sector
  - each entry of the table has the following format:

```
struct _load_entry {  
    u32 sector_low;  
    u32 sector_high;  
    u16 num_of_sectors;  
    u16 segment;  
};
```
  - we can find a small code cave between the last instruction and the start of the table (~144 bytes)
- jmps to decompressor code

# GRUB2 - Core Image (Boot Sector)

```
vmdev@pc:~$ sudo hexdump -C -n512 -s512 /dev/sda
00000200 52 e8 28 01 74 08 56 be 33 81 e8 4c 01 5e bf f4 |R.(.t.V.3..L.^..|
00000210 81 66 8b 2d 83 7d 08 00 0f 84 e9 00 80 7c ff 00 |.f.-.}.....|...
00000220 74 46 66 8b 1d 66 8b 4d 04 66 31 c0 b0 7f 39 45 |tFf..f.M.f1...9E|
00000230 08 7f 03 8b 45 08 29 45 08 66 01 05 66 83 55 04 |....E.)E.f..f.U.|
00000240 00 c7 04 10 00 89 44 02 66 89 5c 08 66 89 4c 0c |.....D.f.\.f.L.|
00000250 c7 44 06 00 70 50 c7 44 04 00 00 b4 42 cd 13 0f |.D..pP.D....B...|
00000260 82 bb 00 bb 00 70 eb 68 66 8b 45 04 66 09 c0 0f |.....p.hf.E.f...|
00000270 85 a3 00 66 8b 05 66 31 d2 66 f7 34 88 54 0a 66 |....f..f1f.4.l.f|
00000280 31 d2 66 f7 74 04 88 54 0b 89 44 0c 3b 44 08 0f |1.f.t..T..D.;D..|
00000290 8d 83 00 8b 04 2a 44 0a 39 45 08 7f 03 8b 45 08 |.....*D.9E....E.|
000002a0 29 45 08 66 01 05 66 83 55 04 00 8a 54 0d c0 e2 |)E.f..f.U...T...|
000002b0 06 8a 4c 0a fe c1 08 d1 8a 6c 0c 5a 52 8a 74 0b |..L.....l.ZR.t.|
000002c0 50 bb 00 70 8e c3 31 db b4 02 cd 13 72 50 8c c3 |P..p..1.....rP..|
000002d0 8e 45 0a 58 c1 e0 05 01 45 0a 60 1e c1 e0 03 89 |.E.X....E.`....|
000002e0 c1 31 ff 31 f6 8e db fc f3 a5 1f e8 3e 00 74 06 |.1.1.....>.t.|
000002f0 be 3b 81 e8 63 00 61 83 7d 08 00 0f 85 1d ff 83 |.;;..c.a.}....|
00000300 ef 0c e9 0f ff e8 24 00 74 06 be 3d 81 e8 49 00 |.....$.t..=..I.|
00000310 5a ea 00 82 00 00 be 40 81 e8 3d 00 eb 06 be 45 |Z.....@.=..E|
00000320 81 e8 35 00 be 4a 81 e8 2f 00 eb fe bb 17 04 f6 |..5..J./.....|
00000330 07 03 c3 6c 6f 61 64 69 6e 67 00 2e 00 0d 0a 00 |...loading....|
00000340 47 65 6f 6d 00 52 65 61 64 00 20 45 72 72 6f 72 |Geom.Read. Error|
00000350 00 bb 01 00 b4 0e cd 10 46 8a 04 3c 00 75 f2 c3 |.....F.,<.u..|
00000360 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....e. .|
*
000003f0 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 65 00 20 08 |.....|
00000400
```

we can add another entries here  
we can add code too

the loop goes from bottom to up and stops when it finds num\_of\_sectors == 0

{  
.sector\_low = 0x2,  
.sector\_high = 0x0,  
.num\_of\_sectors = 0x65,  
.segment = 0x0820  
};

# GRUB2 - Core Image (Decompressor)

- implemented by different files
  - the main file is grub-core/boot/i386/pc/startup\_raw.S
    - includes grub-core/kern/i386/realmode.S
    - includes grub-core/boot/i386/pc/lzma\_decode.S
- switch processor to protected mode, ensure a20 line enable
  - uses the function `real_to_prot` defined in grub-core/kern/i386/realmode.S
- decompress GRUB2 kernel image to 0x100000 jumps to uncompressed kernel
  - two function pointers are passed as argument:
    - `prot_to_real`, `real_to_prot`
    - all transitions real mode  $\leftrightarrow$  protected mode are made using these functions

# GRUB2 - Core Image (Decompressor)

- some important notes:
  - GRUB2 does not define any interruption handler for protected mode
  - the function `real_to_prot` also sets `idtr.base = 0` and `idtr.size = 0`
    - using the values defined by `protidt` which is defined as (check `grub-core/kern/i386/realmode.S`):

*protidt:*

```
.word 0  
.long 0
```

- we can set another value for `protidt` (which implies to define some entries for IDT)
- hardware breakpoints might be useful

# GRUB2 - Core Image (Decompressor)

```
vmdev@pc:~$ sudo hexdump -C -n512 -s1024 /dev/sda
00000400 ea 1c 82 00 00 00 00 00 6c 58 00 00 20 ad 00 00 |.....lx.. ...
00000410 54 66 00 00 81 07 00 00 ff ff ff 00 fa 31 c0 8e |Tf.....1...
00000420 d8 8e d0 8e c0 66 bd f0 1f 00 00 66 89 ec fb 88 |....f....f...
00000430 16 1b 82 cd 13 66 e8 97 00 00 00 fc e8 b8 06 00 |....f.....
00000440 00 8b 15 08 82 00 00 81 c2 bf 03 00 00 8b 0d 10 |.....
00000450 82 00 00 8d 05 81 89 00 00 fc e8 3b 03 00 00 e9 |....;
00000460 7a 07 00 00 f0 ff 07 00 eb 16 8d b4 26 00 00 00 |z.....&...
00000470 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 90 |&....&...
00000480 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 9a cf 00 |.....
00000490 ff ff 00 00 00 92 cf 00 ff ff 00 00 00 9e 00 00 |.....
000004a0 ff ff 00 00 00 92 00 00 eb 16 8d b4 26 00 00 00 |....&...
000004b0 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 90 |....&....&...
000004c0 27 00 80 82 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....
000004d0 00 00 fa 31 c0 8e d8 66 0f 01 16 c0 82 0f 20 c0 |....1...f...
000004e0 66 83 c8 01 0f 22 c0 66 ea ef 82 00 00 08 00 66 |f....".f....
000004f0 b8 10 00 8e d8 8e c0 8e e0 8e e8 8e d0 8b 04 24 |....$|...
00000500 a3 f0 1f 00 00 a1 64 82 00 00 89 c4 89 c5 a1 f0 |....d...
00000510 1f 00 00 89 04 24 31 c0 0f 01 0d c6 82 00 00 0f |....$1...
00000520 01 1d cc 82 00 00 c3 0f 01 15 c0 82 00 00 0f 01 |.....
00000530 0d cc 82 00 00 0f 01 1d c6 82 00 00 89 e0 a3 64 |....d...
00000540 82 00 00 b8 04 24 a3 f0 1f 00 00 b8 f0 1f 00 00 |.....
00000550 89 c4 89 c5 66 b8 20 00 8e d8 8e c0 8e e0 8e e8 |....f.....
00000560 8e d0 ea 69 83 00 00 18 00 0f 20 c0 66 83 e0 fe |....i.....f...
00000570 0f 22 c0 66 ea 7b 83 00 00 00 00 66 31 c0 8e d8 |.".f.{....f1...
00000580 8e c0 8e e0 8e e8 8e d0 fb 66 c3 55 89 e5 57 56 |.....f.U..WV...
00000590 53 89 c6 89 cf 31 db 31 c0 85 d2 78 29 0f b6 0c |S....1.1...x)...
000005a0 16 84 c9 74 0e 0f b6 89 00 02 10 00 32 84 0b 00 |....t.....2...
000005b0 00 10 00 01 fb 81 fb fe 00 00 00 7e 06 81 eb ff |.....
000005c0 00 00 00 4a eb d3 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 55 89 e5 84 d2 |....J..[^_].U...
000005d0 74 21 84 c0 74 1d 0f b6 c0 0f b6 88 00 02 10 00 |t!.t.....
000005e0 0f b6 d2 0f b6 82 00 02 10 00 8a 84 01 00 00 10 |.....
000005f0 00 eb 02 31 c0 5d c3 55 89 e5 57 56 53 83 ec 24 |....1.]U..WVS.$|
00000600
```

→ **gdt entries**


→ **realidt**

→ **protidt**

→ **gtddesc**

In the current version of  
GRUB2, this values are  
always in the first sector  
of the decompressor

# GRUB2 - Minimal changes to inject a payload loader



Patch the pointer in the offset 0x5a to jump to LOADER ( $0x8000 + \text{offset}$ )

LOADER: small piece of code injected into the cave

- reserve memory (e.g.: decreasing "Memory Size" at Bios Data Area)
- load all payloads on memory (int 13)
- execute the first

Patch the variable "protidt" to point to a custom IDT (Interrupt Descriptor Table)  
there are some fixed addresses to use, e.g.: anything in the range between  $0x7e00 - 0x8000$

Payload #1

Payload #2

Payload #3

Payload #4

Payload #1: grub2


Payload #2: bzImage

Payload #3: vmlinux

Payload #4: userspace shellcode

One nice place to put the payloads is the  
free sectors before the first partition

# GRUB2 - Minimal changes to inject a payload loader



# GRUB2 - Uncompressed Kernel Image (overview)

## GRUB2 Kernel Image

0x100000

Startup Code

Code Area

0x55 0x89 0xe5 ...

Data Area

"grub\_disk\_read"

0x0000ee7f

0x0000ae66

0x00000001

0x100000 +  
kernel\_size

grub-core/kern/i386/pc/startup.S

```
0x100000:    mov    %ecx,0x41(%esi)
0x100006:    mov    %edi,0x45(%esi)
0x10000c:    mov    %eax,0x164(%esi)
0x100012:    mov    $0x6cec,%ecx
0x100017:    mov    $0x9000,%edi
0x10001c:    rep    movsb %ds:(%esi),%es:(%edi)
0x10001e:    mov    $0x9025,%esi
0x100023:    jmp    *%esi
0x100025:
```

- the first task is to copy itself from 0x100000 to 0x9000
- then, the startup code clears the bss section and calls the grub\_main function
- parsing this code we can find the size of the uncompressed kernel

- every exported symbol of grub2 kernel has an entry in a symbol table
- each entry of the table has the following format:

```
struct symtab {
    const char *name;
    void        *addr;
    int         isfunc;
};
```

- finding this table on memory we can find the address of some interesting symbols, e.g.: grub\_register\_command\_prio, grub\_file\_open, grub\_file\_read, grub\_file\_seek, grub\_file\_close

# GRUB2 - Commands

- Some important functions (both in kernel and modules) are implemented as commands, e.g.: insmod, set, unset, ls, normal, linux, linuxl6, initrd, initrdl6, ntldr
- All commands are registered using the function `grub_register_command_prio` which is exported by the kernel, soon has an entry in the symbol table
- Controlling the calls to `grub_register_command_prio` we can find the address of all commands at runtime

# GRUB2 - Commands

- However, some command registrations might have a different meaning, e.g:
  - the module "normal.mod" implements an approach to load all the necessary commands on-demand

grub-core/normal/dyncmd.c

read\_command\_list(...)

*for all command in the file  
command.lst*

grub-core/commands/extcmd.c

```
grub_register_extcmd_prio(  
    name,  
    grub_dyncmd_dispatcher,  
    GRUB_COMMAND_FLAG_BLOCKS |  
    GRUB_COMMAND_FLAG_EXTCMD |  
    GRUB_COMMAND_FLAG_DYNCMD,  
    0, N_("module isn't loaded"), 0, prio);
```


grub-core/kern/command.c

```
grub_register_command_prio(  
    name,  
    grub_extcmd_dispatch,  
    0,  
    N_("module isn't loaded"),  
    prio);
```


*this ends by registering the command with a  
common dispatch function  
the command function will be loaded and  
registered in the first use*

- if we're hooking every call to grub\_register\_command\_prio, we need a way to filter that behaviour
  - a simple way is just to check if the fourth argument is "module isn't loaded"

# GRUB2 implant (Controlling Commands)




# Linux Kernel bzImage (x86\_64)




# Linux Kernel bzImage (x86\_64)

Linux Kernel bzImage (x86\_64)



- The first task is to parse the code in memory
  - find the point in decompressor code where the kernel is about to be called
  - patch there, to get execution right before the vmlinux entrypoint

# Linux Kernel bzImage (x86\_64)



**relocated:**

...


```
/*
 * Do the extraction, and jump to the new kernel.
 */
pushq %rsi
movq  %rsi, %rdi
leaq   boot_heap(%rip), %rsi
leaq   input_data(%rip), %rdx
movl $z_input_len, %ecx
movq %rbp, %r8
movq $z_output_len, %r9
call  extract_kernel /* returns kernel location in
%rax */
popq %rsi

/*
 * Jump to the decompressed kernel.
 */
jmp   *%rax
```

# Linux Kernel bzImage (x86\_64)




# Linux Kernel bzImage (x86\_64)



# Payload #2 - Linux Kernel implant

- after decompression...
  - the execution calls startup\_64 defined in linux/arch/x86/kernel/head\_64.S
  - kernel are using an 1:1 mapping between physical and virtual address spaces (identity pages)
  - the code are running with just one processor (no race conditions)
- vmlinux\_implant\_start()
  - resolve the virtual address where the kernel will execute
    - get from the switch: identity mapping -> full virtual address mapping
  - find systall table (pattern matching)
  - hook some not implemented syscalls (userspace interface)

# Payload #2 - Linux Kernel implant



# Payload #2 - Linux Kernel implant

- bootkit manager: hook in sys\_epoll\_wait
  - wait for init process (systemd): just ignore a number of calls
  - if there is no user space implant running, spawn one
  - be careful with hibernation
- spawning evil process
  - allocate memory (rxw), for now, I use sys\_mmap (yeah, inside the kernel)
  - <https://lwn.net/Articles/751052> (different internal syscall calling convention)
  - inject a stub into process memory
  - set new return address on kernel stack

# Demo

# Questions