


Tool: IgoreWare Hasher

Purpose of Tool: This tool generates the hash value of the malware sample, this hash value can then be compared to other malware hashes and potentially find a match to a known malware and lead to identifying it. It can also be used to verify the integrity of a file by comparing the hash value of the original file with the generated hash value.

Relevant information from tool:




Insights gained: We now have the SHA-1 hash which can help to identify the malware and compare it to known malware hashes. We can also run this hash through VirusTotal to see what information can be gathered. If we suspect there are any other suspicious files on the system we can check their SHA-1 hashes and compare them to this one to see if they are the same malware that is multiplying and using different file names.

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Tool: VirusTotal

Purpose of Tool: This is a web-based service that analyzes malware samples using multiple different antivirus engines and tools. It then provides information on whether the sample has any detection as malware by the antivirus software, behavioral analysis, and the metadata. The user can then see these results and see if the sample is malware and potentially what kind of malware it is.

Relevant information from tool:



Insights gained: The VirusTotal scan shows that this is indeed malware as compared to many of the antivirus software programs and many of them are showing this sample as a malware specifically a trojan. A few of the reports show that it may contain a keylogger and a cryptor is also mentioned in one of the reports.

Tool: Microsoft's strings utility

Purpose of Tool: This tool is used to extract the ASCII and Unicode strings from the binary files of a potential malware sample. The extracted output can include urls, registry keys, commands, and other indicators that can be used to then identify the malware.

Relevant information from tool: strings Lab1_sample.exe

```

C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
R6028
- unable to initialize heap
R6027
- not enough space for lowio initialization
R6026
- not enough space for stdio initialization
R6025
- pure virtual function call
R6024
- not enough space for _onexit/_atexit table
R6019
- unable to open console device
R6018
- unexpected heap error
R6017
- unexpected multithread lock error
R6016
- not enough space for thread data
abnormal program termination
R6009
- not enough space for environment
R6008
- not enough space for arguments
R6002
- Floating point not loaded
Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
Runtime Error!
Program:
...
<program name unknown>
GetLastErrorPopup
GetActiveWindow
MessageBoxA
user32.dll
-9E
A9E
CloseHandle
VirtualFree
ReadFile
VirtualAlloc
GetFileSize
CreateFileA
ResumeThread
SetThreadContext
WriteProcessMemory
VirtualAllocEx
GetProcAddress
GetModuleHandleA
ReadProcessMemory
SetThreadContext
CreateProcessA
FreeResource
SizeofResource
LockResource
LoadResource
FindResourceA
GetSystemDirectoryA
Sleep
KERNEL32.dll
GetCommandLineA
GetVersion
ExitProcess
TerminateProcess
GetCurrentProcess
UnhandledExceptionFilter
GetModuleFileNameA
FreeEnvironmentStringsA
FreeEnvironmentStringsW
WideCharToMultiByte
GetEnvironmentStrings
GetEnvironmentStringsW
SetHandleCount
GetStdHandle
GetFileType
GetStartupInfoA
HeapCreate
HeapDestroy
HeapCreate
HeapFree
ReAlloc
WriteFile
HeapAlloc
GetCPInfo
GetOEMCP
HeapReAlloc
LoadLibraryA
MultiByteToWideChar
LCMapStringW
LCMapStringW
GetStringTypeA
GetStringTypeW
...
\svchost.exe

```

Insights gained:

KERNEL32.dll – Provides an interface to the operating system, allows calls to functions

user32.dll – Same as above, both are system windows libraries being loaded

CreateFileA, ReadFile, and WriteFile - all are found as well which indicates that the malware may be trying to read or write to files on the system.

CreateProcessA, ResumeThread, SetThreadContext – Shows that the malware is trying to start new processes or manipulate existing processes.

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VirtualAlloc and WriteProcessMemory – Show that the malware is carrying out functions related to memory manipulation.

FreeResource, SizeofResource, LockResource, FindResourceA – The malware is trying to find resource files which can be images, files, or other data.

MultiByteToWideChar, LCMaPStringA, LCMaPStringW – String manipulation functions, could be trying to hide behavior.

svchost.exe reference – targeted by malware often for exploitation.

ntdll.dll – system library, may suggest that the malware is making low-level system calls.

UNICODE and LOCALIZATION – this may suggest that the malware has been designed to work on a non-English version of windows possibly


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Tool: MiTeC Exe Explorer


Purpose of Tool: This tool is a comprehensive executable file explorer that can be used to view and analyze different components of an executable file. Components such as headers, resources, imports, exports, and debug information can be gathered. This tool can also detect packers, crypters, and other forms of obfuscation.

Relevant information from tool:



The screenshot shows the MiTeC EXE Explorer window with the 'Headers' tab selected. The file being analyzed is 'C:\Users\sysadmin\Desktop\Lab1_sample\Lab1_sample.exe', which is a Portable Executable (PE32) for Intel 32-bit Console. The interface includes a menu bar (File, Sections, Directories, Imports, Resources, Strings, Hex View) and a 'VirusTotal...' button. The main area displays a list of properties and their values.

Property	Value
Signature	0x00004550 (Portable Executable)
Machine	Intel 32-bit
Number of sections	4
Timestamp	4/8/2011 12:54:23 PM
Pointer to symbol table	0x00000000
Number of symbols	0
Size of optional header	224
Characteristics	0x010F
Relocations stripped	YES
Debugging information stripped	NO
Application can handle addresses larger than 2 GB	NO
Image can handle a high entropy 64-bit virtual address sp...	NO
Code Integrity checks are enforced	NO
Data Execution Prevention	NO
Address Space Layout Randomization	NO
Control Flow Guard	NO
Safe Structured Exception Handling	YES
WDM Driver	NO
Operating system	Windows NT 4
Size	52.00 KB (53248 B)
Entry point section	.text
File offset	0x00001AD8
Created	3/20/2023 7:40:27 PM
Modified	4/8/2011 1:54:59 PM
Accessed	3/20/2023 7:40:27 PM
Entropy	4.965
Correct Checksum	0x000195A9
Compiler	MASM 6.13.7299




The screenshot shows the MiTeC EXE Explorer window with the 'Sections' tab selected. The file being analyzed is 'C:\Users\sysadmin\Desktop\Lab1_sample\Lab1_sample.exe', which is a Portable Executable (PE32) for Intel 32-bit Console. The interface includes a menu bar (File, Sections, Directories, Imports, Resources, Strings, Hex View) and a 'VirusTotal...' button. The main area displays a table of sections.

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Data Offset	Raw Data Size	Flags	Entropy	Executable	Readable	Writa...	Shareable	Cached
.text	0x00001000	11926	0x00001000	12288	0x60000020	6.403	YES	YES			YES
.rdata	0x00004000	2290	0x00004000	4096	0x40000040	3.550		YES			YES
.data	0x00005000	2012	0x00005000	4096	0xC0000040	0.762		YES	YES		YES
.rsrc	0x00006000	24708	0x00006000	28672	0x40000040	4.473		YES			YES

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
Name	Ordinal	Address	Delayed
CloseHandle	27	0x00004548	
CreateFileA	52	0x0000458E	
CreateProcessA	68	0x00004636	
ExitProcess	125	0x000046E6	
FindResourceA	163	0x0000468A	
FreeEnvironmentStringsA	178	0x0000474E	
FreeEnvironmentStringsW	179	0x00004768	
FreeResource	182	0x00004648	
GetACP	185	0x00004864	
GetCommandLineA	202	0x000046C6	
GetCPInfo	191	0x00004858	
GetCurrentProcess	247	0x00004708	
GetEnvironmentStrings	262	0x00004798	
GetEnvironmentStringsW	264	0x000047B0	
GetFileSize	274	0x00004580	
GetFileType	277	0x000047EC	
GetModuleFileNameA	292	0x00004738	
GetModuleHandleA	294	0x000045FA	
GetOEMCP	305	0x0000486E	
GetProcAddress	318	0x000045E8	
GetStartupInfoA	336	0x000047FA	
GetStdHandle	338	0x000047DC	
GetStringTypeA	339	0x000048CE	
GetStringTypeW	342	0x000048E0	
GetSystemDirectoryA	345	0x0000469A	
GetThreadContext	359	0x00004622	
GetVersion	372	0x000046D8	
HeapAlloc	409	0x0000484C	
HeapCreate	411	0x0000481A	
HeapDestroy	413	0x0000480C	
HeapFree	415	0x00004828	
HeapReAlloc	418	0x0000487A	
LCMapStringA	447	0x000048AE	
LCMapStringW	448	0x000048BE	
LoadLibraryA	450	0x00004888	
LoadResource	455	0x0000467A	
LockResource	469	0x0000466A	
MultiByteToWideChar	484	0x00004898	
ReadFile	536	0x00004564	
ReadProcessMemory	540	0x0000460E	
ResumeThread	556	0x0000459C	
RtlUnwind	559	0x00004834	
SetHandleCount	621	0x000047CA	
SetThreadContext	643	0x000045AC	
SizeofResource	661	0x00004658	
Sleep	662	0x00004680	
TerminateProcess	670	0x000046F4	
UnhandledExceptionFilter	685	0x0000471C	
VirtualAlloc	699	0x00004570	
VirtualAllocEx	700	0x000045D6	
VirtualFree	703	0x00004556	
WideCharToMultiByte	722	0x00004782	
WriteFile	735	0x00004840	
WriteProcessMemory	745	0x000045C0	

Insights gained: The information here shows that the timestamp is from 2011 and this indicates that this may be an older malware. There are also four sections as shown. Looking at the sections this information shows that this malware is most likely not packaged and can be confirmed using PEiD. The compiler is also shown at the end of the headers section as MASM 6.13.7299. The imports section also shows the KERNEL32.dll functions that were imported. The Strings section contains information that was previously analyzed using the powershell window and the strings command on the file.

Tool: PEiD

Purpose of Tool: This tool is used to identify the packer or compiler that was used to create the malware sample by looking at the header information. This information is used to determine the approximate level of difficulty in reverse-engineering the sample and you can potentially learn what family the malware belongs to.

Relevant information from tool:



Insights gained: This tool confirms that the malware sample we were given for this lab is not packed and it was compiled using Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0.

Conclusion:

From my analysis this malware sample was not packed and was compiled using Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0. By using IgcWare Hasher I was able to get the SHA-1 hash which could then be searched on VirusTotal to see what the different antivirus software would detect this sample as. By using the Microsoft strings utility I was able to find a few different functions in the plaintext printout that showed the different parts of the system that would potentially be manipulated if this malware sample was executed. Further looking at the malware using MiTec EXE Explorer I was able to see that the creation date of this malware was 2011 and that it most likely was not packed given the sizes of the section. Using PEiD, it was confirmed that the malware sample was not packed as well. By using these various techniques and tools, I was able to learn that this sample is indeed malware and that it is not packed, from the strings section I learned that this malware could potentially be reading and writing file data on the system along with memory manipulation. One of the biggest insights that I had seen in the strings utility section was that there was mention of svchost.exe which is a common target of malware for exploitation.

Takeaways:

As for some takeaways from this lab, most of the concepts in this module are very new to me. I am familiar with the use of hashes in a different way as for the verification of integrity of a file from my Computer Forensics course that I just finished. However, now learning more uses of hash values as being able to look them up for a malware sample to see if it is a known malware, they seem even more important than they previously were in my mind. It is really interesting to me as well that there are so

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many different tools that can be used to analyze a malware sample that can be done without posing a large risk to the system (other than having the malware present on the system in the first place) and the different utility of each tool. I think that the string utility is a great way to learn more about the malware specifically that you can see what it might be trying to do, simply googling the functions being called to can help to provide insight into the purpose of the functions, thus what the malware might be trying to accomplish on the target system.