

**Report on "Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously  
Emerged in Large Language Models"  
Paper Report as Part of the "Current Topics of Computational  
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**Abstract.** This report summarises, questions and criticises the paper "Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models" by Kosinski. This is done by putting the paper into context, presenting the methods used by Kosinski and his findings and finally evaluating those findings with regard to related developments of other research groups.

**Keywords:** Artificial Intelligence · Theory of Mind · Language Model

## **1 Introduction**

Theory of Mind is known in psychology as the ability to understand and reason about one's own and other individual's mental states such as differing beliefs or knowledge states [5]. Most importantly, ToM is regarded to be a uniquely human ability [4]. The research presented in the paper titled "Theory of Mind May Have Spontaneously Emerged in Large Language Models" attempts to contradict this understanding and suggests that large language models may already possess Theory of Mind while not being specifically designed to solve problems for which Theory of Mind is needed. By conducting three studies on the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLM) such as GPT-3 and GPT-4 Kosinski attempts to prove this hypothesis and compares the results to research on Theory of Mind in developmental psychology, giving an interesting insight in the status of Artificial Intelligence compared to human intelligence.

## **2 Related Work**

### **2.1 Theory of Mind**

While Theory of Mind and the research related to it in a purely psychological understanding is more of a foundation for the paper in question it is still important to know what the term means and the research it is related to, to grasp the context of the paper at hand.

Theory of Mind encompasses all abilities that infer various mental states based on contextual information. The term Theory of Mind (ToM) gained traction in the late 1970s and has since found firm footing in developmental psychology where the term is used to determine the existence and emergence of ToM in

children. ToM is also a key part to enable predictions of behaviour based on an agent’s mental state.[5]

The research around ToM in child development plays an important role in Kosinski’s work since he uses both well-cited methods and results from this field to first construct ToM tests for LLMs and consecutively compare the LLMs’ performances to that of children in different age groups. Therefore, the relevant methods and research results will be shortly summarised in the following. In order to assess a child’s ability to differentiate reality from beliefs, false-belief tests were introduced by several researchers [18,2,9]. In these tests children were exposed to situations in which they have to make distinctions between reality and the knowledge or belief of another person about reality and predict someone’s behaviour according to it. Kosinski’s work is based on two kinds of these tests.

First, the Smarties Task developed by Perner et al. in 1987. In this experiment children around age 4 are shown a tube of "Smarties" (chocolate candy), asked its contents and then shown the real contents which were actually random objects and not candy. They would then be asked the questions what another child who did not see the real contents of the tube would expect to be inside, thus testing the reasoning skills about false beliefs of others. [9]

Second, the Sally-Anne Task first used in a study from 1983 [18] and then again in 1985 [2] (this time coining the name Sally-Anne Task) tests the same reasoning ability of attributing false beliefs to others. In this task two agents are introduced (typically using puppets). One agent places an item and leaves the scene while the other agent moves the item before the first agent comes back to look for the item. The children are then asked about the expected behaviour of the first agent who did not witness the displacement of the item. The task is solved correctly when the child predicts that the first agent will search the item in the place where they left it before the second agent moved it, thus proving the child’s ability to infer false beliefs of other people. [18,2]

In alignment with Kosinski’s paper the Smarties Task will be called Unexpected Contents Task and the Sally-Anne task will be called Unexpected Transfer Task as a generalisation and for better understanding of the terms.

As for results in developmental psychology regarding ToM, Kosinski refers to the work of Wellman et al. which agglomerates several studies on ToM (and other attributes) of children mainly aged from 2.5 to 6 years old and interpolates their performance on both Smarties and Sally-Anne Tasks [17]. The results of this paper are used to compare the performance of LLMs on similar tasks to the performance of children in an attempt to assign an age to the level of reasoning LLMs supposedly possess.

Finally, it is important to note that these tests though well-established do not cover the whole landscape of ToM testing that currently exists. There is the Faux-Pas Test for social intelligence [14] or the Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes Test to test emotional intelligence in adults [1]. These tests are not taken into account in Kosinski’s research.

## 2.2 Large Language Models

The second foundational knowledge related to Kosinski's paper is that about Large Language Models (LLMs). Therefore, in this section some key facts about LLMs and specifically GPT-1 to GPT-4 are presented since these models are used in Kosinski's paper.

LLMs are used in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP) for text generation, question answering or other text-related tasks that they can be fine-tuned to do. The underlying architecture most frequently used is a Transformer which revolutionised deep learning techniques when it was introduced in 2017 [16]. Transformers in NLP get a tokenised version of the input text and output probabilities for each word of the vocabulary for the output text generation. The most important part here is that during training the Transformer trains an Attention layer, which can basically learn contextual relations of words.

For LLMs as the name suggests the trainable parameters reach very high numbers (up to several billions). The models are pre-trained on a large text databases and can be fine-tuned on specific tasks to create custom models. Generative Pre-Trained Transformers (GPT) first got published by OpenAI in 2018 with GPT-1 which had a parameter size of approximately 110 million and pre-trained on roughly 7,000 books [10]. Since then the model got developed further and over several iterations and grew both in parameter size and training data. GPT-3 already has 175 billion parameters and was only published two years later [3].

An interesting characteristic of LLMs compared to smaller language models is that they develop skills as byproducts [?]. LLMs are mostly trained on completing text prompts and no other abilities are specifically engineered into their architecture, so any other ability like translating text or reading comprehension spontaneously emerge [3]. While smaller models require fine-tuning to solve more specific tasks than simple prompt completion, LLMs outperform other state-of-the-art models [3].

## 2.3 Theory of Mind in Large Language Models

As for the combination of the topics above: Theory of Mind in Large Language Models, a paper published a few months before Kosinski's take on this topic heavily suggests that LLMs do not possess ToM. The presented experiments consist of tests using GPT-3 both in pre-trained form and few-shot form up to 24. The datasets used are SocialIQA probing emotional and social intelligence [12] and ToMi QA [?] resulting in almost 4,000 questions asked for each model. The results of this method show that GPT-3 at the time has below 60% accuracy in one-shot applications and reaches 60% accuracy given 24 training examples before solving the task and thus perform far below humans. [11]

Other papers relating to Kosinski's work will be discussed in later sections of this report as they are more recent than the paper in question, follow up on the research presented and therefore are easier to put into context once the methods and results of Kosinski have been explained in the sections coming up.

### 3 Methods

#### 3.1 Overall Method

The work presented in Kosinski’s paper is split up into three studies. The first two focus on specific false-belief tests that were introduced in the previous section. The tests were conducted using GPT-3.5 (davinci-003) and go the studies contain detailed results about the probabilities of possible answers the language model chose from. Study three contains a larger number of false-belief tests conducted on several GPT versions starting with GPT-1 and going up to GPT-4 and compare the results with human performance on similar tests.

An important part during inference of a language model (or any deep learning model) is to test the model on data that has not been used during the training of the model. Especially with more recent GPT versions this is difficult to ensure as the datasets used for pre-training likely contain the original false-belief tests that are used in the studies. To solve this issue, hypothesis-blind research assistants hired from a freelancing platform NOTE: MAKE A FOOTNOTE HERE were tasked with rewriting 20 Unexpected Content Tasks and 20 Unexpected Transfer Tasks. To further avoid introducing a bias simply based on word count, the tasks were designed to contain correct and wrong answers in equal amounts e.g., in an Unexpected Content Task there is be a bag labelled chocolate that actually contains popcorn thus both the word "chocolate" and "popcorn" have to occur an equal amount of times in the test. For the task descriptions of Unexpected Content Tasks firstly, a labelled type of container (a box, a bag, a shelf etc.) and contents that differ from the label. Next a person that can only perceive the container label and not the actual contents is described to the model. For the task descriptions of Unexpected Transfer Tasks two people are introduced, one item and two possible locations for the item to be. The item would then first be stored in one location, witnessed by person A and person B, and later moved to the other location by person A without person B knowing.

#### 3.2 Study 1

The first study focuses on one of the Unexpected Content Tasks and analyses the answers given by GPT-3.5 when probed for answers about beliefs of a person who either knows or does not know the correct. This is accomplished by presenting the model with the setup for the task created by the hypothesis-blind research assistants and consecutively testing the model’s understanding of the situation with three prompts, resetting the model parameters each time to avoid the model learning correct answers from previous prompts. The task chosen for this study is about a bag labelled chocolate that in fact contains popcorn and Sam who does not know what is in the bag and can only read the label. The first prompt would ask for the actual contents of the item in the task. The second prompt would ask for the belief of an agent that does not know the actual contents of the item described in the task. The third prompt would also test

the model's understanding of a person's false belief however without using suggestive prompts for the person's direct mental state. According to Kosinski this approach avoids inference that the person might have a belief differing from reality since the mere questioning of a person's belief can be a hint that this belief might differ from the reality described in the task. The generated answers to all three prompts are shown including the probabilities for words indicating the right and wrong answers i.e. "chocolate" and "popcorn".

To showcase the development of the model's predictions over time the prediction probabilities for the first and last prompt after each sentence of the task description are evaluated.

Lastly, the model is tested using 10,000 scrambled versions of the task to prove that the underlying heuristic to answer the prompts is not simply reliant on word counts.

### 3.3 Study 2

The second study employs the same methods as the first but with an example from the Unexpected Transfer tasks.

### 3.4 Study 3

In this study 10 models ranging from GPT-1 to GPT-4 were tasked with completing 240 prompts, since the 20 tests were presented once in their original form and once in their reversed format meaning the correct and incorrect answers were swapped. This results in 40 tests for each of the two test types, each containing 3 prompts (one for testing understanding the correct content or location and two for testing understanding of false beliefs). A test would only be counted as passed if all six prompts (3 from the original test version and 3 from the reversed test version) were answered correctly by the model.

## 4 Results and Discussion

### 4.1 Results of Studies 1-3

The results of the first and second study show that GPT-3.5 correctly answers the two example tasks with almost 100% probability for choosing the correct answer in each prompt. Furthermore the development of answer probabilities following each sentence of the task descriptions aligns with the answers expected by the author given the amount of information given for each prompt e.g., in the Unexpected Contents Task the prediction of the correct content does not change even when the faulty label is introduced however the prediction of belief switches from the actual content to the one described on the label as the fact that the actual contents are unknown and imperceivable to the person is introduced. It is interesting to not that the prompts regarding the actual state of reality in both tasks are always answered with 100% certainty whereas the prompts regarding

false beliefs almost always have a probability below 100% and go as low as 82% in one case. As for the results using scrambled versions of the tests the model only solved 6% of the Unexpected Contents Tasks and 11% of the Unexpected Transfer Tasks correctly, proving that the order of the information is crucial for the model’s ability to pass the chosen tests.

Regarding study 3 the results are summarised in table 1. One can clearly see that the performance of a model in false-belief tests rises with parameter size and therefore the most recent models GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 outperform the older and smaller models by far. Kosinski relies on the work of Wellman et al. [17] for a comparison of these performances to that of children in different age groups. This places 3.5-year-old children at a performance of 43% and seven-year-old children at a performance of approximately 90%. Kosinski also argues that the tasks the models had to solve were harder than the original tasks that were designed for direct interviews with children, often using visual aides such as puppets and also having the model complete prompts instead of answering yes-or-no questions.[6]

**Table 1.** Percentage of correctly solved false-belief tasks for all models for study 3 on both task types including the year of the model release and parameter count [6]

Model	Month/Year	Size	Unexpected Contents	Unexpected Transfer
GPT-4	03/23	unknown	95%	100%
GPT-3.5	11/22	175B	85%	95%
GPT-3 (davinci-200)	01/22	175B	70%	70%
BLOOM	06/22	176B	40%	45%
GPT-3 (davinci-001)	05/20	175B	40%	35%
GPT-3 (curie-001)	05/20	6.7B	5%	5%
GPT-2 (XL)	02/19	1.5B	5%	5%
GPT-3 (babbage-001)	05/20	1.3B	5%	5%
GPT-3 (ada-001)	05/20	350M	5%	5%
GPT-1	06/18	117M	5%	5%

## 5 Conclusions and Implications

### 5.1 Conclusions and Implications

From the high performance of the latest GPT-3 model up to GPT-4 on false-belief tests designed for young children, that future LLMs will likely be able to solve more complex ToM tests. He also presents the spontaneous emergence of ToM in LLMs as a possible reason for the high performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 in theses tests, since ToM is not deliberately designed into an LLMs architecture. This would mean that a further development of ToM in LLMs and AI in general could lead to more sophisticated skills related to ToM like empathy,

morals and consciousness, thus greatly improving the collaboration possibilities of AI and humans. [6]

Another possible implication according to Kosinski is the necessary reevaluation of ToM as it is currently understood and the research related to it. LLMs might rely on unknown language patterns to solve ToM tests, only appearing to have actually learned the ability like a human would. in artificial systems.[6]

Thirdly, it is suggested that the presented results account for the benefits of combining artificial intelligence and psychology to not only understand AI better but also gather information about human psychology by analysing the behaviour of AI. [6]

## 6 Reviewer Perspective

### 6.1 Research Question

The paper at hand places in a very interesting and possibly disruptive research field focussing on uniquely human intelligence. This places the research presented in this paper amidst the many discussions whether AI can learn skills beyond pattern recognition and solving factual problems, a question that is currently unanswered with existing results being controversial [13]. In this context, Kosinski's work is a well-structured presentation of arguments for LLMs having ToM such as previous cases of autonomous emergence of skills in AI and language being a solid candidate for conveying information about ToM. Another point to be applauded is the consideration of ToM-tests already being part of a model's training data, making adequate testing for ToM difficult. The presented methods contained lots of thoughts on robustness of the findings such as switching correct and wrong answers and testing the models using scrambled tests and adjusting prompts to be non-suggestive. All this shows a great understanding of the implications when applying methods from human psychology to AI.

### 6.2 Methods and Results

However, the resulting tests lack statistical relevancy due to their small number and limited scope. With only 40 tests per model and only testing for false beliefs excluding tests for e.g. emotional or social intelligence the presented research can be merely seen as a first step into applying ToM tests designed for humans to AI. The author could have made use of existing ToM-test databases such as SocialIQa [12]. Shapira et al. provide an extensive list of such datasets in their work containing roughly 2,900 tests for various facets of ToM published from 2016 to 2021 and thus could have been used in Kosinski's paper published in 2023 [13].

One might argue that using an existing database defeats the purpose of rewriting false-belief tests in order to eliminate the possibility of overlapping training and test data. While this seems to be a strong argument, the author does not test his hypothesis by e.g., testing LLMs using newly written false-belief

tests and pre-existing ones or the pre-existing datasets referred to in the previous section. This is accompanied by the criticism voiced by Marcus and Davis [7] who suggest that since the false-belief tasks used as a basis for Kosinski’s dataset are well-established, highly referenced and mentioned in lots of other literature, it is very likely that GPT-3 would be able to recognise the tests even in their altered form since the structure of the test remained the same. Another criticism regarding the tests used in the paper at hand is that the presentation of the studies and their results suggests a significant difference between Unexpected Contents Tasks and Unexpected Transfer Tasks. Contrary to this, Wellman et al. conclude that "these task types are remarkably equivalent"[17], meaning that Kosinski’s research lacks the variety needed to come to decisive conclusions on existence of ToM in AI since false-belief tests only attest for one aspect regarding ToM.

Ullman took Kosinski’s original work one step further and created modified versions of the already rewritten tests. For Unexpected Content Tasks for example, the container would be described as being transparent or the label would not be readable to the person in the test description. The model would then fail the task and not be able to infer that the person would be able to see inside the container or have no idea (false or correct) of its contents. While Ullman’s work has its own flaws (namely only testing GPT-3.5 and only showing examples of results and not of all conducted experiments) it very strongly suggests that the tests used in Kosinski’s research do not prove the existence of ToM and might be too close to the original tests for an LLM to not see the relation between the tests [15].

One important note is, that in order to give his findings more context and make them easily understandable to readers foreign to both ToM and LLMs, Kosinski includes a comparison of the LLMs’ performances on false-belief tasks to that of children and their ages. While this information due to varying opinions of research groups on the topic is not definite, a comparison to human age is a very effective way of showing the progression of AI. Future research would benefit from combining results from developmental psychology and LLM testing more often to make the results more accessible to a wider audience.

### 6.3 Presentation

Some minor and rather nitpicky weaknesses of the paper lie in the presentation of the results: The appendix for study 2 regarding the performance of GPT-3.5 on scrambled tests is missing the percentage of the reverse answering pattern, as for a completely scramble test description, the model would have passed the test having answered according to the original test or its reversed version. However, only the percentage for answers of the original test is given. For study 1, the appendix is complete. Apart from that there are some other inconsistencies with data from graphs being described differently in the text or words being mixed up. Regarding that this paper is not peer-reviewed, these flaws in the presentation of the paper are excusable.



## 6.4 Conclusion

The paper at hand is an exciting first step into probing LLMs for ToM and researching the proposition that, since ToM seems to emerge in accordance with language development and the nonconformity and spontaneous emergence of skills in LLMs, such models are a promising candidate for being the first AI and the first known entity besides humans to possess ToM. The paper seems to be placed at the forefront of this research question having been published around the same time as GPT-4 and spawning a series of consecutive papers and articles, referring to Kosinski's work or even directly replying to it [13, 7, 15]. Therefore, even though the presented research seems to have been cut off prematurely and without reliable conclusions, the mere notion of LLMs having ToM gained enough attention to result in further research regarding the matter, extensively testing recent LLMs and proving that they do in fact not possess ToM, yet [13, 15].

## 7 Future Work

Future work regarding ToM in LLMs might include a more complex combination of few-shot learning and special prompts to enable LLMs to develop ToM, which has already been tested on a small scale by Moghaddam and Honey in April 2023 [8]. They were able to show that LLMs could be fine-tuned using specific prompts and two-shot learning i.e. inputting two ToM tests with the corresponding answers first and then testing the model on a third test scenario and thus improve performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 significantly. An upscaling of this experiment could prove if this is one possibility of infusing LLMs with ToM. This could be useful for applications of LLMs where ToM is strictly necessary e.g., moral reasoning or counselling. Furthermore, Kosinski's research and its surrounding critics suggest that using ToM tests designed for humans are applicable to LLMs as well. Further research might include proper testing of this assumption and lead to the development of more refined ToM test databases specifically for LLMs and other NLP applications. For example, Sap et al. [11] suggest that since ToM is learned through social interaction perhaps a more dialogue-based assortment of tests would lead to better results of LLMs when trained on such data. In conclusion, while current LLMs still seem to be lacking regarding ToM the progression from no understanding of ToM tasks to somewhat of an understanding of ToM tasks leaves the open question whether a fine-tuned model of current standards or a merely pre-trained rendition of further developed LLMs of future research efforts might show definitive signs of ToM. This demands both research in LLMs as well as ToM test databases and will likely prove to be an interesting development in the upcoming years.

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