3:07 PM

Saturday, March 6, 2021

There are two types of consumers for a particular beer, with inverse demands given by p_1 =3.5-0.25 q_1 and p_2 =3.3-0.4 q_2 , respectively, where q is the number of bottles per period. Marginal cost is \$0.5 per bottle.

a) Assuming 40% of customers are type 1 and the remainder are type 2, set up the optimization problem with all 4 constraints, though only 2 will bind.

$$P_{1} = 3.5 - .7591 \qquad P_{2} = 3.3 - .492$$

$$\Pi = (3.5 - .7591) \cdot 91 + (3.3 - .4) \cdot 92 - .5(91 + 92)$$

$$Q_{1} = .49 \qquad Q_{2} = .69 \qquad Q_{1} + 92 = 9 \qquad Q^{2} = 0$$


$$H = [3.5 - (.75 \cdot .4 \cdot 9)] (.49) + [3.3 - (.4 \cdot .6 \cdot 9)] (.69) - .59$$

b) Solve the problem to find the optimal bundle for each consumer type, their prices, the firm's profits, and each consumer type's surplus.

$$T = (3.5 - .19)(.49) + (3.5 - .249)(.69) - .59$$

$$= -.1749^{2} + 2.889$$

$$= -.3689 + 2.88 = 7 = 7.826$$



$$CSR_1 = \begin{cases} 1.421 \\ (3.5 - .25x) - (3.3 - .4x) = .4356 \end{cases}$$

$$CSR_1 = \begin{cases} 3.421 \\ 3.3 - .4x = 4.2854 \end{cases}$$

c) How much additional profit could be made if the company could engage in perfect 1st degree price discrimination?

d) Let α represent the fraction of consumers that are type 1, while all remaining customers are type 2. Set up the optimization problem and solve for the optimal bundles and prices as a function of α . What happens to the bundles and prices as α increases? Explain in intuitive terms.

I think I messed up somewhere. This is not a nice looking graph. Nevertheless, I'll explain what I think is happening. You want as many high type customers as possible but after a certain amount of them, you'll begin to lose money on the missing low types.