

Problem 1 Vigenère Cipher. Suppose you have a language with only the 3 letters A, B, C, and they occur with frequencies 0.7, 0.2, and 0.1. The following ciphertext was encrypted by the Vigenère cipher:

ABCBABBBAC.

Suppose you are told that the key length is 1, 2, or 3. Show that the key length is probably 2, and determine the most probable key.

AB出现位置分别在1和5，相差4，有因数2，所以可能。

奇数位A出现3次，B出现1次，C出现1次，偶数位A出现0次，B出现4次，C出现1次。

$$0.7 = \frac{3+4}{10}$$

$$0.2 = \frac{1+1}{10}$$

$$0.1 = \frac{1+0}{10}$$

所以可能是AB。

Problem 2 Perfect secrecy and one-time-pad.

1. For a perfect secret encryption scheme $E(K, M) = C$, prove: $\Pr[C = c|M = m] = \Pr[C = c]$.
2. Consider a biased one-time-pad system, where $\Pr[M = b] = p_b$, $b = 0, 1$ and $\Pr[K = 0] = 0.4$. The first attacker Randy randomly guesses $M = 1$ or $M = 1$: prove that the probability of success is 0.5. The second attacker Smarty guesses M based on C and p_0, p_0 : suggest a good attack strategy.

$$1. \Pr[C = c|M = m] = \frac{\Pr[C=c \wedge M=m]}{\Pr[M=m]} = \frac{\Pr[M=m|C=c] \cdot \Pr[C=c]}{\Pr[M=m]} = \frac{\Pr[M=m] \cdot \Pr[C=c]}{\Pr[M=m]} = \Pr[C = c]$$

2. 设 M' 为猜测。

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[(M' = 0 \wedge M = 0) \vee (M' = 1 \wedge M = 1)] \\ &= \Pr[M' = 0 \wedge M = 0] + \Pr[M' = 1 \wedge M = 1] \\ &= \Pr[M' = 0] \cdot \Pr[M = 0] + \Pr[M' = 1] \cdot \Pr[M = 1] \\ &= 0.5 \cdot p_0 + 0.5 \cdot (1 - p_0) \\ &= 0.5 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \Pr[M = 0 | C = c] \\
&= \frac{\Pr[M = 0 \wedge C = c]}{\Pr[C = c]} \\
&= \frac{\Pr[M = 0 \wedge M \oplus K = c]}{\Pr[(M = 0 \vee M \neq 0) \wedge C = c]} \\
&= \frac{\Pr[M = 0 \wedge K = c]}{\Pr[(M = 0 \wedge K = c) \vee (M \neq 0 \wedge K \neq c)]} \\
&= \frac{\Pr[M = 0] \cdot \Pr[K = c]}{\Pr[M = 0] \cdot \Pr[K = c] + \Pr[M \neq 0] \cdot \Pr[K \neq c]} \\
&= \frac{p_0 \cdot \Pr[K = c]}{p_0 \cdot \Pr[K = c] + (1 - p_0) \cdot \Pr[K \neq c]} \\
&= \begin{cases} \frac{p_0 \cdot 0.4}{p_0 \cdot 0.4 + (1 - p_0) \cdot 0.6}, & c = 0 \\ \frac{p_0 \cdot 0.6}{p_0 \cdot 0.6 + (1 - p_0) \cdot 0.4}, & c = 1 \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} \frac{2 \cdot p_0}{3 - p_0}, & c = 0 \\ \frac{3 \cdot p_0}{2 + p_0}, & c = 1 \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

所以 $c = 0$ 时, $p_0 \geq \frac{3}{5}$ 则估计 $M' = 0$ 否则估计 $M' = 1$; $c = 1$ 时, $p_0 \geq \frac{2}{5}$ 则估计 $M' = 0$ 否则估计 $M' = 1$ 。

Problem 3 DES. Before 2-DES and 3-DES was invented, the researchers at RSA Labs came up with DESV and DESW, defined by

$$DES_{kk_1}(M) = DES_k(M) \oplus k_1, \quad DESW_{kk_1}(M) = DES_k(M \oplus k_1).$$

In both schemes, $|k| = 56$ and $|k_1| = 64$. Show that both these proposals do not increase the work needed to break them using brute-force key search. That is, show how to break these schemes using on the order of 2^{56} DES operations. You have a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

DESV: 对于 (M, C) 枚举 k , 计算 2^{56} 次 $DES_k(M)$, 获得中间结果 m_1 。枚举 k_1 , 计算 2^{64} 次 $C \oplus k_1$, 获得中间结果 m_2 , 比对 m_1 和 m_2 , 若相等则破解 k 和 k_1 , 共 2^{56} 次DES运算。

DESW: 对于 (M, C) 枚举 k , 计算 2^{56} 次 $DES_k^{-1}(C)$, 获得中间结果 m_1 。枚举 k_1 , 计算 2^{64} 次 $M \oplus k_1$, 获得中间结果 m_2 , 比对 m_1 和 m_2 , 若相等则破解 k 和 k_1 , 共 2^{56} 次DES运算。

Problem 4 RSA. Alice and Bob love each other, so they decide to use a single RSA modulus N for their key pairs. Of course each of them does not know the private key of the other. Mathematically, Alice and Bob have their own key pairs (e_A, d_A) and (e_B, d_B) sharing the same N . Demonstrate how Bob can derive the private key of Alice.

Bob和Alice共享 $p \cdot q = N$, $(p - 1)(q - 1) = \phi$, Bob知道Alice的公钥 (e_A, N) , $\gcd(e_A, \phi) = 1$ 且 $e_A \cdot d_A \mod \phi = 1$ 即 $e_A \cdot d_A - k \cdot \phi = \gcd(e_A, \phi)$, 用广义欧几里法可解 d_A 。

Problem 5 Operation mode of block ciphers. Chloé invents a new operation mode as below that can support parallel encryption. Unfortunately, this mode is not secure. Please demonstrate how an attacker knowing IV, C_0 , C_1 , C_2 , and $M_1 = M_2 = M$ can recover M_0 .




Figure 1: Chloé's invention

因为

$$E(M_1, K) \oplus M_0 = C_1$$

$$E(M_2, K) \oplus M_1 = C_2$$

所以

$$E(M, K) \oplus M_0 = C_1$$

$$E(M, K) \oplus M = C_2$$

所以

$$M_0 \oplus M = E(M, K) \oplus M_0 \oplus E(M, K) \oplus M = C_1 \oplus C_2$$

所以

$$M_0 = C_1 \oplus C_2 \oplus M$$

Problem 6 Hash functions. One-wayness and collision-resistance are two indispensable properties of hash functions. They are in fact independent one to the other.

1. Give a function that is one-way, but not collision-resistant.
2. Give a function that is collision-resistant, but not one-way.