# Introduction

## Case

When do territorial claims emerge between actors?

What are the proximate causes that lead territorial claims to emerge between states?

These structural issues help explain why states contest some territory and not others and why claims emerge between some states and not others. However, in many cases, states have the opportunity to issue a claim over territorial claims

Nonetheless, many states go for decades without issuing

Similar examples can be found

Nigeria and Cameroon, Cambodia and Vietnam, Germany and Austria, and the United States and Cuba.

Uganda and Tanzania. In each of these cases, challengers had a number of potential motivations and justifications for issuing a claim against the other state.

However, in many cases, states do not issue claims over potentially valuable territory

That two states desire the same piece of territory and that states have the opportunity and willingness to do based on dyadic factors.

## Literature Review

The examples above produce a puzzle: empirically, most states rarely issue claims against other states at the first opportunity to do so (e.g., the birth of a dyad or the emergence of the stakes that motivate a claim). Why do states often wait to issue claims for years or decades after a potential motivation or justification for issuing a claim emerges. Existing studies on claim onset have largely focused on the underlying or structural causes of claims. These factors include the issues that motivate claims, the dyadic relationship between disputants, and international norms. Although these factors undoubtedly influence whether a claim is likely to emerge between two states, each tends to be fixed or change very slowly over time. These factors therefore cannot provide a satisfying explanation for the timing of claim onset.

The act of issuing claims brings with it several potential costs, including

As a result, claims should only emerge when the expected utility of doing so exceeds that of maintaining the status quo.

The decision to issue a new claim thus implies that there has been a change in a state’s opportunity or incentives to do so.

When states decide to issue a claim under these circumstances, it implies that there have been changes in their opportunity and/or willingness to do so. Understanding the timing of claim onset thus depends on identifying the proximate causes that lead states to issue claims.

When states do not issue claims immediately, it often suggests that states (or their leaders) have an incentive or opportunity that did not exist previously.

To date, the literature on territorial claim onset has focused largely on fixed or structural factors.

Factors that cause territorial conflict do not necessarily cause claims – many claims do not become militarized until

Compare to dangerous dyads for cure model

## Proximate vs. Structural

With respect to proximate causes, I focus on two factors that have the potential to change the opportunity and willingness of states to issue claims. First, I examine whether changes in the balance of military capabilities between two disputants are associated with claim onset. Theoretically shifts that increase the power of a challenger state relative to a potential target should increase their bargaining power and make them more likely to issue costly claims. Second, I argue that changes in the preferences of a state’s leaders are often a cause of claim onset. This is most likely when there is turnover in the leader herself or a change in the coalition of political actors that form a leader’s base of power.

## Cure Models

First, it demonstrates how cure models can be used to model separate theoretical

a means of distinguishing between the theoretical effects of variables that are underlying causes of a phenomenon and those that are the proximate causes of events.

Second, the chapter demonstrates the utility of cure models for the analysis of rare events in international relations. Many studies involve the analysis of hundreds of thousands or millions of dyads, only a fraction of which are likely to experience the event of interest. As discussed in Chapter 2, the inclusion of a large number of irrelevant cases has the potential to create biased results, particularly when there is a large imbalance in the number of events and nonevents. In an attempt to avoid these problems, many scholars rely on the use of case selection strategies, e.g., limiting the dataset to politically relevant dyads. However, the use of such strategies has the potential to create selection bias both by excluding relevant cases (e.g., disputes between noncontiguous, non-major powers) and including irrelevant cases (e.g., conflicts between two land-locked and distant weak powers). The cure model avoids this by explicitly modeling this process and reweighting the estimates of the hazard model accordingly. This also

## Findings

Controlling for the structural characteristics that create the opportunity for claims to emerge,

# Literature review

Existing explanations for the onset of territorial claims can be grouped in three groups

* Before leaders even consider issuing a claim against a potential target presumes that there is a piece of territory that both states value to some degree.
* Dyadic factors

## Costs of Territorial Claims

As discussed at length in the previous chapter, territorial claims are costly to maintain. Claims often bring with them the threat of militarized disputes and costly rivalries. As such, maintaining a claim to territory requires a substantial investment in the military and preventing leaders from pursuing other valuable domestic and foreign policy goals \citep{vasquez2001, vasquez2009}. Claims can also lead to economic costs in the form of decreased trade and foreign direct investment among the disputants \citep{lee2012, simmons2005}. % additional – third parties

## Features of territory itself

### Stakes tied to territory

Since states will only issue claims if they expect that the expected utility of doing so exceeds that of maintaining the status quo, much of the existing literature on claim onset focuses on the value that states place on the contested territory.

As the literature on contentious issues has established, territory often possesses tangible and intangible value that states value. Land often has **economic or strategic** value that states wish to exploit. Such territory is often associated with expansionist states who wish to obtain more habitable land, increase their military and economic power, and/or improve their national security. These claims tend to be particularly salient when the contested territory is in close proximity to the state and its heartland, allowing states to easily establish control over the territory.

Such claims often tend to underlie disputes between colonial states

In addition, claims often emerge over issues related to **group identity** (including national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other cultural groups). When groups with a strong sense of identity are politically powerful within a state, these groups may push leaders to issue claims over territory that contains related groups. These issues underlie claims based on group unification (e.g., pan-Arabism), irredentism, and the mistreatment of transnational kin. Since borders often create divisions between ethnic groups, these claims often form the basis for postcolonial claims (both between two colonies and between a state and its former colonial ruler).

### Failure of Issues Approach

Although contested territory is (almost) always likely to be valuable, these explanations are limited insofar as they cannot explain why some valuable pieces of land are contested while others are not. A very small portion of global territory is contested, but much of it is valuable. [Latin America example]

The issue-based explanation is unable to explain two important aspects of territorial claim onset. First, the issue-based explanation has difficulty explaining why states pursue claims over some pieces of territory but do not pursue claims over similarly valuable territory. For example, it cannot explain why Ecuador initiated a claim over oil-rich territory held by one of its neighbors (Peru) but not the other (Colombia). Second, the issue-based explanation fails to account for numerous cases where the contested territory held little value for either of the claimants. For example, the border territory disputed by Eritrea and Ethiopia has little tangible value for either state.

## Dyadic variables

In addition to the stakes tied to territory itself, dyadic factors influence a potential challenger’s decision to issue claims against a target state.

### Power

One prominent set of characteristics deals with whether potential challengers have the power to persuade their opponents to relinquish control of the territory. Even when claims do not explicitly involve militarized threats or interactions, the potential use of force to acquire territory is often an underlying factor that influences each state’s incentives to obtain or relinquish contested territory \citep{waltz2010}. As such, states are less likely to make claims when they do not have the power to credibly threaten their opponents. Claims are more likely to emerge when the challenger has a military advantage over the target and less likely to emerge when the target has military allies \citep{huth2009}.

% Even peaceful backed by threat – Huth, Vasquez, bargaining theory, Hensel, negative peace, mattes, rivalry – look at your notes for the territory paper, somebody says this

### Contiguity

A related set of factors is whether two states are contiguous or in close proximity to each other. Second, most states will have difficulty waging a successful military campaign against a noncontiguous opponent, \citep{boulding1960, lemke2002}. Moreover, the farther military forces must travel to reach their target, the more costly fighting becomes as transportation costs increase. Only major powers are likely to be able to project force at a distance. Fighting at a distance requires that states move their troops and supplies across one or more third parties’ territory or airspace. This requires that the challenger states either obtain permission from these intermediary states or otherwise occupy their territory.

### Historical Interactions

Claims are also more likely to emerge between states that have a history of competition over territory. Such factors include whether the challenger has previously lost territory to the target, whether the challenger has previously gained territory from the target, and whether two states have previously signed agreements delimiting their borders \citep{huth2009}. Territorial claims are also less likely to emerge between states that have previously settled their borders. Since border settlement often predates the emergence of jointly democratic dyads, territorial claims rarely emerge between two democracies \citep{gibler2012, owsiak2016}.

### Territorial Integrity Norm/Decolonization Norm

As more states gained independence from their former colonizers, the potential for claims to emerge between these states to compete over territory increased. In particular, postcolonial states often found themselves competing with their neighbors due to the arbitrary nature of the borders that were established by Western powers. In addition, the development of norms regarding territorial integrity that dictate that preexisting state boundaries should not be adjusted (even when such claims involve self-determination) has, in theory, deterred some states from making claims that are unlikely to be regarded as legitimate. States are also less likely to issue claims when they have common security interests such as mutual alliances.

# Theory (PvS)

## Preliminaries

I begin by assuming that state leaders are primarily responsible for making policy decisions on behalf of the state and that these leaders are rational decision makers. I further assume that the decision to initiate a territorial claim is taken by a state which seeks to alter the status quo, i.e., a challenger. In rare cases claims may involve multiple challengers if neither state controls all of the contested territory or if a claim involves more than two states. Since territorial claims are costly, I assume that leaders of potential challenger states will only make claims to an opponent’s territory when the expected utility of making a claim exceeds that of maintaining the status quo.

## Opportunity and Willingness

Since initiating claims is costly, challengers will only initiate claims when the expected utility of doing so exceeds that of maintaining the status quo and when they perceive that they have the opportunity to do so \citep{most1989}. In the context of territorial claims, willingness is a function of the value of the territory itself as well as any costs that the challenger may accrue by issuing a claim. Opportunity refers to the possibility that a state can bring about a change in the status quo distribution of territory by taking actions that pressure their opponent to relinquish their own claim to it. Regardless of the costs that a challenger is willing to bear, they will choose to do so if these efforts are futile.

## Structural vs Proximate Causes

As discussed above, understanding why territorial claims requires answering two questions. First, under what conditions is it possible that a claim will emerge between two states? Second, what factors explain when leaders decide to pursue claims? To answer these questions it is necessary to distinguish between the underlying structural factors that create potential claims between states and the proximate causes that lead leaders to initiate them \citep[see, e.g.,][]{mansbach1983, stinnett2001, vasquez2009}.

The answer to the first question lies in the underlying or structural causes that create potential disagreements over territorial sovereignty and allow states the opportunity to pursue those claims. Structural factors speak to the motivations for states to initiate compete over a particular piece of territory and the underlying conditions under which they can do so.

Rather than emerging from states’ immediate behavior, structural factors describe fundamental features of the relationship between two states and the environmental context in which they operate.

Structural factors such as the value of territory or long-standing characteristics of two states’ relationship are outside of states’ immediate control and are therefore either fixed or change slowly over time. Such factors may include characteristics of the state, the dyadic relationship, or the international system.

These factors ultimately determine whether two states are likely to find themselves in competition over the same territory and are, at a high level, able to compete against each other, the presence of such conditions are necessary for proximate causes to influence the behavior of these states.

\citet{mansbach1983} distinguish between two factors that lead to the emergence of new issues on the international agenda: environmental changes and behavioral changes. Environmental changes occur when factors that lie outside the control of the relevant actors lead to changes in the opportunity or willingness of the

## Proximate

These factors refer to dynamic variables that lead to changes in the preferences of the state or create an opportunity for states to press their claim.

Many proximate causes will be “shocks”

The presence of territory that is potentially valuable to a challenger state does not necessarily imply that the governing leadership values it enough to take costly actions to obtain it.

These factors determine whether two states have the desire to control the same piece of territory and whether challenger states are able of effectively contesting a target’s control of that territory.

# Structural Causes of Territorial Claims

From the discussion above, it should be clear that existing literature largely focuses on structural factors

: the stakes tied to mutually desired territory, slowly-changing or fixed aspects of the relationship between two states, and

Slow changing: interstate relations, systemic factors, balance of capabilities

Similarly, the historical relationship between states and their competition over territory is fixed and

## Structural determinants of willingness

Structural factors determine whether states are both able and willing to contest the status quo.

The structural determinants of a challenger’s willingness to initiate claims include the presence of a mutually desired piece of territory and fixed aspects of their relationship with the target that influence the potential costs of doing so.

### Issues

The primary determinant of a state’s willingness is the presence of a piece of territory that both states desire. Since the physical attributes of territory are largely immutable, the value of given piece of land does not usually change much over time. These features include characteristics such as arable land, mountainous terrain, rivers and lakes, proximity to the state or its center of power, and access to the ocean.

Although states may come to value some attributes of territory more or less over time, these changes are likely due to some exogenous shock such as technological change. For example, the discovery of new resource deposits or the development of technology that makes it possible to extract previously inaccessible resources may increase the value of a particular piece of land. By the same token, resources may diminish over due to technological change. For example, the value of timber decreased as ironclad warships came to dominate naval warfare.

### Negative externalities

* In addition to the value of the territory itself, states must consider the costs of issuing a claim. In terms of costs. As discussed above, issuing territorial claims can carry costs, including the possibility of militarization, changes in trade, and alliance politics.

Contiguity, Shared region

### **Contiguity and Willingness**

First, it is less likely that noncontiguous states will both value a particular piece of territory highly enough to engage in costly behavior over it.By definition, noncontiguous states will not find themselves competing over shared borders. Since other territory tends to be less valuable to contestants, the probability that two states find themselves in competition over a piece of territory that both value highly is diminished.

In addition, noncontiguous

No secessionist/irredentist conflicts, no nationalism, no historical borders

History

**Less likely to threaten the integrity of the state,**

## Structural determinants of opportunity

In terms of opportunity, structural factors include those features that enable or constrain states’ ability to effectively contest one another’s control of a given piece of territory. In order to convince target states to relinquish their claim to a piece of territory, challengers must have some means of imposing costs on their opponent, such as the credible threat of the use of force, economic sanctions, or the ability to elicit international pressure on the target.

### Capabilities

# Proximate Causes (new)

Due to the costs associated with issuing and maintaining claims, rational leaders/states should only initiate new claims when the expected utility of doing so exceeds that of maintaining the status quo. As such, the emergence of an issue claim implies that the expected utility of issuing a claim has changed for one or more actors. This is most likely to occur under when there are changes in the nature of the relationship that create an opening for one state to take action (opportunity) or fundamental shifts in the preferences of one of the disputants (willingness). The proximate causes of claim onset are thus those that bring about either or both of these conditions.

First, changes in the domestic or international environment may create new opportunities for leaders to pursue policies that they previously could not.

The first speaks to a change in the menu of options that is available to leaders and is most likely to occur due to changes in the international environment or

Absent changes in the environment in which states operate, behavioral changes typically occur when there is a change in the preferences of a state’s leadership.

## Changes in Opportunities

First, changes in the domestic or international environment may create new opportunities for leaders to pursue policies that they previously could not.

#### Capability Change

The most obvious way that new opportunities arise occurs when one there are changes in the relative power of two states. As discussed above, relative power determines the extent to which one may be able to threaten the other with the use of force as a means of acquiring territory, and therefore determines whether challengers have the potential to coerce their opponent into making concessions. As a potential challenger state becomes more powerful relative to a potential target, their ability to impose costs on their opponents and potentially seize a piece of territory by force increases \citep[e.g.,][]{lemke2002, organski1981}. Increases in power can also enhance a state’s ability to offer compensatory side payments to the other state in exchange for the territory in question. [Keohane?] Given this newfound bargaining leverage, these states may seek revision of the status quo. [Fearon1995] Capability changes may be particularly relevant when deciding to renew old claims. If one state conceded the territory to their opponent in the past because they were weaker, an increase in their capabilities relative to their opponent is likely play a role in their decision to renew their claim.

\begin{hypothesis}: An increase in the ratio of the weaker state’s capabilities to the stronger state’s capabilities increases the probability of claim onset \end{hypothesis}

## Changes in Preferences

This may occur because changes in the domestic or international environment lead incumbent leaders to revise their expectations regarding the utility of pursuing a certain course of action or because the leadership of the state itself changes.

Changes in value of territory itself

* Macro-level changes – e.g., discovery of oil

One logical explanation for a change in behavior is a shift in the preferences of the decision-makers who control the actions of the state.

As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, The preferences of domestic actors have a substantial influence on a state’s foreign policy. Two actors are particularly important in this regard: a state’s leader and the winning coalition that support them. Political leaders are ultimately responsible for determining what policies their state pursues. As such, the preferences of a country’s leader have an important influence on a state’s foreign policy. However, leaders are not free to pursue whatever course of action they would like. Instead, all leaders are dependent on the support of a powerful coalition of elites in order to remain in office \citep{bdm2003}. If leaders pursue policies that are not in line with the preferences of these backers, they risk being removed by the winning coalition in favor of a leader who will adhere to their preferences. As such, leaders often pursue policies that match the preferences of the winning coalition, even when they conflict with their own.

The most likely cause of major shifts in the direction of state policy is a change in the winning coalition or their leadership. Absent large changes in a state’s external environment, the preferences of specific domestic actors are unlikely to change radically. As such, large shifts in the direction of state policy (e.g., issuing a territorial claim) are most likely to occur due to changes in the domestic actors that control the levers of power. It is important to note that changes in leadership and changes in the winning coalition constitute different phenomena. Although changes in the winning coalition often coincide with leadership changes, this is not always true. In many cases leadership changes occur while maintaining the same source of support. Likewise, incumbent leaders occasionally remain in power despite changes in their base of support. It is thus worth distinguishing between the effects of leadership change and those of coalition change, although the greatest shift in preferences is most likely to occur when both coincide.

~~Since states’ actions are largely determined by the leadership of a particular country, changes in status quo policy frequently occur due to changes in a states’ leadership or the winning coalition. Although~~

~~Changes in a state’s behavior are often indicative of the fact that the preferences of political elites have changed. If the subjective value that these actors assign to a piece of territory increases, the expected utility of initiating a claim may shift enough to exceed that of maintaining the status quo. This is most likely to occur when there is a change in a state’s leader or the winning coalition.~~

### Leadership change

Since leaders ultimately make decisions on behalf of the state, their own preferences and goals influence the foreign policies that they ultimately pursue. As such, changes from the status quo often occur because leaders have revised their own expectations regarding the costs and benefits of doing so. As discussed extensively in the last chapter, this is particularly true in the context of territorial claims. Leaders’ proclivities for hawkish or dovish policies determine whether states engage in militarized or peaceful conflict management attempts or maintain the status quo \citep[e.g.,][]{chiozza2003, colaresi2004, colaresi2005, vasquez2009}. If leaders’ preferences influence the decision to engage in these costly behaviors, it stands to reason that they also influence the decision to initiate a claim.

Leadership changes in different regimes

* Elections
* Coups
* Irregular changes

#### Example: Cambodia Vietnam

Following the election of Norodom Ranariddh as the new head of Prime Minister of Cambodia in 1993, Cambodia issued a claim against Vietnam over Mondol Kin province and other areas along the border. Although the winning coalition remained unchanged (i.e., the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia), Ranariddh came under public pressure to resolve a claim.

#### Example: Nigeria-Cameroon

One example of this is the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. Upon gaining independence in 1960, the two states inherited a long-standing border dispute between their respective colonizers, Britain and Germany. Although these two countries outlined a general border agreement, it did not fully demarcate the boundary and disagreements over the exact location of the border persisted, including the Bakassi peninsula. This territory was highly salient for both states. The region contained valuable natural resources and constituted a strategic location for both. In addition, both states had claims to the territory based on identity, historical ownership, and homeland status.

Nonetheless, the boundary issue between the two countries remained dormant for many years, with neither issuing explicit claims to the areas where sovereignty was not well-established. This changed following a coup within Nigeria’s military-led government by Ramat Muhammad in 1975. Although the military remained the source of political power, the change in leadership brought about a shift in Nigeria’s policy regarding the border.

\begin{hypothesis} Changes in a state’s leader increase the probability of the onset of territorial claims. \label{hyp\_leaderchange} \end{hypothesis}

### Coalition change

#### Example: Kagera Salient

Following the military coup that brought Idi Amin to power in 1971, Uganda issued a claim to the Kagera Salient, a region along its border then under the control of neighboring Tanzania. Uganda’s claim to the Kagera Salient could potentially be justified on multiple bases, including historical agreements, ethnic unification, and geographic considerations.\footnote{Amin argued that extending the border to the Kagera River provided a more natural division of territory than the status quo.} However, the fact that these claims went unutilized until Amin took power suggests that his own personal motivations were an important factor in his decision to issue a claim. The border partitioned ethnic groups to which Amin belonged. Amin also had personal motivations for claiming control of the Kagera Salient which served as a base for opposition rebels \citep{valeriano2011}.

#### Example: Nicaragua-Colombia

Another example involves the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia over the San Andreas and Providencia archipelago. After signing a treaty resolving the dispute in 1928, the dispute remained dormant for over 60 years. This agreement persisted until 1979 when the Sandanista government took power and declared the old agreement null due to the fact that it had been signed under pressure from the U.S. Likewise, the regime renewed its claims to the banks of Quita Suensueno, Serrana, and Roncador.

#### Example: Hitler contests Austria in 1933

Additional examples include Germany’s decision to issue a claim to Austrian territory following the rise of the Nazi party in 1933 and Cuba’s decision to contest the American military presence on the island following the rise of Castro’s regime.

\begin{hypothesis} Changes in a state’s winning coalition increase the probability of the onset of territorial claims. \label{hyp\_solschange} \end{hypothesis}

### Interaction Effect

The most likely scenario for large shifts in preferences is when leadership changes coincide with changes in the winning coalition. Although coalition changes reflect changes in a leader’s base of support, there is likely to be greater overlap between the new and old coalitions’ preferences when they retain the same leader. When new coalition’s retain an old leader in power, it implies that there is at least some continuity in the preferences of the two coalitions with respect to their preferences regarding highly salient issues. All else equal, coalition changes that produce changes in leadership are more likely to lead to changes in status quo policy than those that do not. By the same token, leadership changes are more likely to lead to substantial changes in policy when they occur in conjunction with coalition changes. Although new leaders may be replaced by the winning coalition because they do not follow the winning coalition’s preferences, there should still be a greater continuity in preferences when these leaders have the same base of support.

Changes in a leaders’ preference are especially likely to occur when the old leader is replaced by their own winning coalition.

Although any new leader will always have different preferences than their predecessor over at least some issues, coalitions who replace their own leadership often do so due to the fact that the incumbent’s preferences and actions do not align with their own.

\begin{hypothesis} Changes in a state’s leader are more likely to increase the probability of the onset of territorial claims when they coincide with changes in coalitions. \label{hyp\_interaction} \end{hypothesis}

# Research Design

## Cure Models

The onset of territorial claims is rare and unlikely to occur in the vast majority of the international system.

Two-stage process

Moreover, the use of the cure equation to model the structural process that determines whether the emergence of claims is possible is more appropriate.

An alternative means of accomplishing these goals would be case selection criteria such as the use of politically relevant dyads. These case selection methods are meant to solve the problem of “excess zeroes” by removing the cases that are not at risk from the dataset entirely. However, doing so requires that scholars can easily distinguish between those cases that are at risk and those that are not. In reality, limiting the sample to politically relevant dyads often excludes many dyads that do experience conflict and includes many that are highly unlikely to do so \citep{lemke2001}. This is due to the fact that conflict processes are probabilistic and no single variable (or set of variables) can determine which cases are at risk and which are not. The use of the cure equation to model these structural processes accounts for the differential risk between cases and the potential bias associated with it without resorting to heavy-handed case selection techniques without making heavy-handed judgment calls as to which cases are relevant.

## Structural Model

The structural model accounts for fundamental characteristics of the dyadic relationship that determine whether two states have the opportunity and willingness to compete over the same piece of land.

### Issues

To model the probability that a piece of territory that both states desire emerges, I include several measures. To capture the spatial relationship between states, I include measures of contiguity and the natural log of the distance between capital cities using data from \citet{bennett2000, stinnett2002}. I account for potential claims based on ethnicity using a dummy variable for whether two states share an ethnic group according to the Transnational Ethnic Kin dataset \citep{ruegger2018, vogt2015}. I also account for the potential for clashes between two colonial powers using the Correlates of War Colonial Contiguity dataset \citep{correlatesofwarproject2020}. I also include measures of whether one state is a former colony of the other \citep{hensel2018} and whether there has previously been an transfer of territory between the two states \citep{tir1998}.

% Alternative controls for spatial relationships: region

% controls that could be included for contiguous states: Resources, Strategic location, Population, Length of border

### Dyadic characteristics

To account for differences in power between two states using a dummy variable for whether either state is a major power using data from \citet{correlatesofwarproject2017}.

Joint democracy is measured using an indicator for whether both states have a Polity score above 5 \citep{marshall2013}.

I also include several measures designed to account for the history of interactions between the disputants. To account for the history of conflict between two states, I include a dummy variable for whether two states are involved in a rivalry in a given year \citep{ colaresi2007} and the number of previous militarized interstate disputes between the two \citep{gibler2016}.

### Mutual interests

A dummy variable for whether two states share a defensive alliance \citep{gibler2004},

the number of intergovernmental organizations to which each state belongs \citep{peverhouse2019}, and

* Mutual rivals
* Economic interdependence

### Norms

* Postcolonialism
* TIN
* LOST

## Proximate Model

### Leadership transitions

To test Hypothesis \ref{hyp\_leaderchange}, I identify changes in leadership using the Archigos dataset \citep{goemans2009}. I code a dummy variable equal to 1 if either state experienced a leadership change. Testing this argument is complicated by the possibility of simultaneity bias. This may occur due to reverse causality (i.e., issuing a claim leads to leadership transitions) or merely because both happen to coincide in the same year. In many cases, leaders issue claims shortly after taking office. By aggregating the data at a yearly level, it is impossible to determine whether a leadership change occurred before or after a leadership transition. To address this possibility, I test my argument using three separate measures: whether a leadership transition occurred in a given year, whether the state experienced a leadership transition in the prior year (i.e., a one-year lag), and whether a state experienced a transition in the current or prior year.

### Coalition changes

To assess how changes in the winning coalition influence claim onset, I use the Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) dataset \citep{mattes2016}. CHISOLS identifies when the societal groups that form the primary base of support for political leaders changes. I code a dummy variable for whether the winning coalition in at least one state within a dyad occurs within a given year.

### Capability Change

Capvar ranges .5 – 1

Changes in capabilities, I use the percent change in the capability ratio of two states in a given year. Positive values of this variable indicate that the power differential between two states has grown (i.e.,

\citep{singer1987}

### Controls for Proximate Causes of Disputes

Other potential proximate causes of territorial claims are ``shocks’’ at the domestic and international level. \citet{goertz1995} argue that major changes at either level can produce fundamental changes in the relationship between states and therefore influence the probability of rivalry onset and termination. By the same token, these major changes may also alter the relationship between states may alter the opportunity and willingness for states to initiate territorial claims. At the international level, \citet{goertz2005} identify four periods in which major changes in the international system occurred: the period surrounding German and Italian unification (1959-1977), World War I, World War II, and the End of the Cold War.\footnote{I code World War II as beginning in 1937 to account for the beginning of the war in Asia and the numerous territorial claims that emerge as a result}. I account for each of these using a dummy variable for whether each year occurred during a shock or in the 5 years afterwards.

% additional international controls: third party rivalry termination,

% at the dyadic level: rivalry termination, militarized interstate disputes

At the domestic level, \citet{goertz2005} argue that recent state independence and civil war increase the probability of major changes in dyadic relationships. I account for these using a dummy variable for whether either state experiences these events in a given year or in the 5 years afterwards.

% additional domestic controls: Government crises, riots, leaders support