Chapter 4

Domestic Politics, Contentious Issue Claims, and Economic Interdependence

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Abstract: Does economic interdependence influence how states manage claims over contentious issues? A vast literature explores whether interdependence is associated with a decrease in militarized conflict. However, existing research does not pay much attention to whether interdependence facilitates the peaceful management of claims. I argue that the existence of claims themselves create economic opportunity costs for disputants. This provides domestic groups with an interest in bilateral trade with an incentive to pressure leaders to resolve the issues that states compete over peacefully. I find some evidence that states resolve claims over contentious issues more quickly when the actors involved are dependent on each other for their economic well-being.

4.1 Introduction

Does economic interdependence promote the peaceful settlement of contentious issue claims between states? An extensive body of research argues that states engaged in high levels of bilateral economic activity are less likely to fight militarized disputes. Because military conflict reduces economic activity between states, the prospect of fighting threatens the interests of powerful actors dependent on trade. As a result, these actors have an incentive to pressure leaders to avoid military conflict (e.g., Choi, 2011; Doyle, 1997; Li and Sacko, 2002; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001; Gartzke, 2007; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, 2010; Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny, 2004; Kim and Rousseau, 2005; Mansfield, 1994; Morrow, 1999; Polachek, 1980; Pollins, 1989a; Reuveny and Kang, 1996; Rosecrance, 1986; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Oneal and Russet, 2002).

Despite the extensive body of literature on trade and military disputes, few studies consider the possibility that interdependence facilitates the resolution of the issues over which states compete (exceptions include Espey and Towfique, 2004; Lee and Mitchell, 2012; Schultz, 2015; Tir and Ackerman, 2009; Zawahri and Mitchell, 2011). Even in the absence of militarized conflict, issue claims can reduce the extent of economic activity between states by influencing individuals' expectations about the future likelihood of military and diplomatic conflict and by creating uncertainty about who possesses jurisdiction over the issue claim. This hinders bilateral cooperation over infrastructure and development projects and obstructs the flow of goods and services between states. As a result, economic actors may be forced to forego potentially lucrative opportunities in favor of less profitable ventures (e.g. Carter and Goemans, 2018; Lee and Mitchell, 2012; Simmons, 2005; "Introduction"). To the extent that they do so, domestic audiences have incentives to pressure leaders to pursue the peaceful settlement of issue claims.

In developing this argument, I focus on three particular issues that the Issue Correlates of War dataset covers; territorial, river, and maritime claims. Since each of these issues is salient to domestic audiences, leaders who wish to remain in office must therefore pay careful attention to the preferences of the domestic supporters who sustain them in office (i.e., the winning coalition). As a result, domestic politics constrain

the range of terms that leaders can accept and narrow the bargaining range between disputants (Fearon, 1994; Putnam, 1988). Because claims over these three issues are highly salient to domestic audiences, leaders who attempt to pursue settlements that contradict the preferences of these supporters risk being removed from power and replaced by leaders who will pursue alternative policies (de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Colaresi, 2004; Vasquez, 2009). Competition over these issues also creates the shadow of armed conflict and hinders the flow of economic goods between states (Simmons, 2005). I argue that the economic opportunity costs associated with these claims creates Incentives for domestic interest groups that have a stake in trading with another disputant to support the settlement of these claims. In doing so, it expands the win-sets of leaders and their ability to find mutually acceptable compromises with their opponents (Putnam, 1988).

To test my argument, I analyze how economic interdependence influences states' propensity to peacefully terminate claims using the Issue Correlates of War dataset (Hensel et al., 2008). Controlling for other factors related to the salience of the issue claim, previous conflict management attempts, and the relationship between two states, I find some evidence that economic interdependence is associated with a decreased time until peaceful resolution using a cure model. Overall, this suggests that leaders consider the potential costs and benefits to their constituents when making decisions about whether to pursue peaceful settlement. I discuss the implications of this in the conclusion.

4.2 Economic Interdependence and International Conflict

A vast literature explores the potential pacifying effects of economic interdependence on interstate relations. Scholars advance multiple potential mechanisms to explain this relationship. At the dyadic level, the most common mechanism involves the opportunity costs associated with fighting (e.g., Crescenzi, 2003; Doyle, 1997; Polachek, 1980; Rosecrance, 1986; Russett and Oneal, 2001). Since militarized conflict will likely disrupt trade relations between two states that fight, the possibility of fighting threatens the profits of businesses that engage in trade. These businesses thus have incentives to pressure leaders into avoiding conflict.

Fighting another state threatens the interests of traders in three ways (Anderton and Carter, 2001; Glick and Taylor, 2010; Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny, 2004; Kim and Rousseau, 2005; Long, 2008; Polachek, 1980). First, fighting directly damages property and infrastructure, threatens individuals' lives, and hinders the transportation of goods across borders. As a result, traders may choose to forego trade with their adversary in favor of trading with other countries or operating solely in domestic markets. In addition, the economic costs of war may hinder the growth of the claimants and thereby lead to reduced demand from domestic buyers.[1]

Second, beyond the direct effects of fighting, states may implement policies that reduce bilateral trade. States often use trade policy to impose costs on their opponents through various means. One way of doing this is by implementing sanctions and confiscating goods and assets as a means of reducing their opponent's gains from trade. In doing so, states hope to hinder their opponent's growth, which potentially diminishes their war fighting capabilities and foments domestic opposition to continued fighting. States may also implement restrictions to deny opponents access to militarily valuable goods and resources (Gowa, 1994). Since reducing trade also harms domestic businesses, states may also resort to implementing trade restrictions as a costly signal of resolve (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001; Morrow, 1999).

Third, military conflict may reduce commercial interactions with third parties, creating "second-order" threats to profits. Just as fighting directly threatens the interests of businesses trading between the two disputants, the physical destruction and barriers created by conflict threaten the interests of businesses in third party countries. This, in turn, may deter actors in third parties from conducting business with the disputant states while conflict is ongoing. In addition, states allied with one of the disputants may curtail trade with their ally's opponent as a means of imposing costs on them.

In addition to the opportunity costs that conflict directly produces, the potential for conflict alone can lead firms to curtail trade with another state (Li and Sacko, 2002; Long, 2008; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, 1998; Morrow, 1999). Rational firms who anticipate the possibility of future conflict will consider

[1]Military conflict may not eliminate all trade between disputants. Levy and Barbieri (2004) demonstrate that disputants sometimes maintain some level of trade during war. Nonetheless, military conflict is likely to dampen the overall level of trade between two countries.

this when making decisions about who to trade with. As such, firms may choose to forego potentially lucrative relationships in favor of forging safer (but less valuable) relationships with businesses in other states. Even businesses that do not quit trading with the enemy may realize losses. These businesses are likely to increase their prices to compensate for the risks of doing so, which threatens to lower demand for their goods. As a result, they will still realize losses relative to their potential for gains in the absence of the threat of conflict.

For businesses that engage in trade, the opportunity costs associated with conflict can be quite large. Since rational, profit-maximizing businesses pursue the most lucrative arrangements possible, abrogating existing relationships requires businesses to trade with suboptimal partners, especially when the elasticity of supply and demand for traded goods is low (Polachek and McDonald, 1992). Moreover, finding new partners to trade with entails high transaction costs. The process of acquiring suppliers and customers requires a substantial investment of time and resources, particularly when businesses depend on "complex production chains that cross national boundaries many times," (Chaney, 2013, p. 29). As a result, "disrupting existing trade linkages can potentially entail large aggregate welfare and efficiency costs," over the long run (Chaney, 2013, p. 28).

Empirically, the evidence for trade's ability to prevent militarized disputes is mixed. On the one hand, various studies find that higher levels of bilateral economic interdependence are associated with decreases in the probability of violent disputes (e.g., Choi, 2011; Gartzke and Li, 2003c; Gartzke, 2007; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Oneal and Russet, 2002). On the other hand, other studies support the argument that interdependence is associated with an increased probability of conflict (e.g., Barbieri, 2002; Crescenzi, 2003), while others produce mixed or null results (e.g., Choi, 2011; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001; Gartzke and Li, 2003c; Gartzke, 2007; Green, Kim, and Yoon, 2001). In short, there is no consensus on whether or how economic interdependence influences conflict. The fact that conflict (or the shadow of conflict) may reduce trade hinders empirical tests of this relationship. Although several studies have tried to model this simultaneous relationship explicitly, they also produce mixed results (Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, 2010;

Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny, 2004; Kim, 1998; Kim and Rousseau, 2005; Mansfield, 1994; Pollins, 1989a; Pollins, 1989b; Reuveny and Kang, 1996).

4.3 Domestic Politics and the Management of Territorial Claims

Although political leaders are ultimately responsible for making foreign policy decisions, an extensive body of scholarship demonstrates that the preferences of domestic audiences influence which policies leaders are able and willing to pursue. Regardless of regime type, all leaders are beholden to powerful constituencies that have the power to retain or remove them from office, a group known as the winning coalition (de Mesquita et al., 2003). Leaders remain in office by providing coalition members with benefits (in the form of public or private goods) that exceed those which a challenger can offer. Those who pursue policies that conflict with the preferences of the winning coalition will lose support and may ultimately risk being removed and replaced by challengers who promise to pursue alternative policies (see also Chiozza and Choi, 2003; Colaresi, 2004).

As a result, leaders must consider the preferences of the winning coalition when making decisions about how to manage highly salient claims issue claims. Territory, rivers, and maritime zones are three issues that domestic audiences find highly salient, for economic, security, and psychological reasons (e.g., Hensel et al., 2008). First, all these issues have economic value for disputant states. For example, land that contains valuable natural resources, has the potential to sustain large populations, or otherwise constitutes a source of industrial or agricultural value provides domestic audiences with the opportunity to realize substantial economic gains. Rivers affect various economic activities as well, since freshwater is a vital input for a diverse array of economic activities including agriculture, industry, fishing, hydroelectric power generation, mining, sanitation, and commercial navigation. Maritime claims often involve disputes over navigation, fishing, and access to natural resources.

Second, these issues relate to the sovereignty and national security of the state. Attacks on homeland territory constitute a direct threat to citizens and their interests. States often rely on contested border territory as a buffer zone to protect the core of the state. Maritime and river disputes often have strategic

value insofar as they facilitate the movement of naval vessels or provide access to strategic choke points. River borders also protect the state by creating an obstacle for potential invaders, and control of maritime zones is necessary to defend attacks on the coast.

Third, individuals often hold strong emotional and psychological attachments to contested issues. Ethnic, cultural, national, and other identity groups often have historical ties to territory and believe control of this territory is necessary for preserving their identity. This is particularly true when it is part of the homeland or contains ethnic or religious groups linked to domestic audiences (Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller, 2012; Miller, 2013). Rivers and maritime disputes may also carry intangible salience related to national identity, sovereignty, and status, although not to the extent that territorial claims do (Hensel et al., 2008; Sadoff and Grey, 2002). A prime example is the claim between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab. As noted by Swearingen (1988, p. 415):

> …nationalism bestowed a highly charged significance to the disputed lands along the Iran-Iraq border. None has acquired greater symbolic value than the Shatt al-Arab. The progressive diminishment of Iraqi control there by treaty had little actual economic effect, but its psychological importance was large.… Loss of the territory represented a tangible symbol of subjugation and humiliation by imperial powers and an ancient rival. The territorial loss in 1975 was also an embarrassing display of Iraq's failure to become the preeminent regional power and the leader of the Arab world."

Besides the values of the contested issues themselves, the history of interactions between two states with each other conditions whether domestic audiences prefer conflict or cooperation. States with a repeated history of cooperation are more likely to trust each other to adhere to commitments and therefore more likely to cooperate in the future (e.g., Axelrod, 1984). In contrast, when two states share a history of mutual hostile interactions (e.g., militarized disputes, arms races, and forming counter-alliances), domestic audiences develop psychological images of the enemy as fundamentally opposed to their interests (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, 2007; Senese and Vasquez, 2008; Vasquez, 2009). Once these images develop,

domestic actors will be distrustful of the opposing state and wary of compromise, making it difficult for leaders to negotiate with the opposing state.

Due to the salience of territorial, river, and maritime claims, survival-minded leaders pay careful attention to the preferences of their supporters when managing these claims. Any settlement necessarily requires one or both states to relinquish a portion of their claim. Such concessions are thus likely to be opposed by domestic audiences within at least one disputant. The linkages between domestic politics and the management of issue claims can be seen by conceptualizing claims as two-level games (Putnam, 1988). Claims themselves constitute a bargaining problem at the international level, wherein both states compete to obtain some distribution of the contested good. A state and its government may have an inherent interest in controlling these goods for reasons related to security, sovereignty, status, and influence. In order for a claim to be resolved, states must identify a distribution that both prefer over leaving the claim unresolved. When states can identify an agreement that is acceptable to both, the two have an incentive to settle and end the costs associated with the ongoing claim.

However, because leaders are beholden to domestic actors, any agreement must also be acceptable to the winning coalition in both states. Strong opposition to settlement can thus substantially constrain the range of agreements that leaders are willing to pursue. This limits the bargaining space between two disputants, as negotiators will have more difficulty identifying agreements that are acceptable to the leaders of both states and their respective domestic audiences (Fearon, 1994; Putnam, 1988). This can make it difficult for leaders to engage in accommodationist policies at all stages of the process (i.e. engaging in settlement attempts, making agreements, and achieving domestic ratification and compliance). Because claims are salient, leaders' decisions about which policies to pursue against their opponents are heavily influenced by the preferences of domestic groups (Vasquez, 2009).

Generally speaking, leaders tend to engage in more peaceful settlements over highly salient claims, but have a harder time actually reaching enduring agreements over such claims. On the one hand, leaders tend to engage in more peaceful settlement attempts over highly salient claims in an effort to successfully resolve an issue that is valued by domestic audiences (**mitchell2007a**; Allee and Huth, 2006; Hensel,

2001a; Hensel et al., 2008). However, this general trend does not always hold. When opposition to compromise is strong enough, leaders may avoid engaging in peaceful settlement attempts altogether. Particularly in the context of hostile rivalries, even attempting to reach a peaceful settlement can elicit domestic opposition. Leaders who agree to do so are often perceived as weak, caving to enemy pressure, and demonstrating a willingness to make concessions. For example, resistance to settling border claims with China prevented Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru from even holding serious talks with Chou En-lai. Unless China agreed to cede the entirety of the contested territory, public opinion favored the use of force over any peaceful settlement. As Maxwell (1970) notes, " It was certain that his agreeing to meet Chou En-lai would be seen and as a surrender to Chinese pressure, a gesture towards appeasement…" (64). When he eventually agreed to meet with Chou in February 1960, Nehru refused to discuss the prospect of any concessions. Although he carefully conveyed that fact to domestic audiences, he still faced increased opposition as a result of the meeting. [2] Domestic opposition can also influence the types of conflict management techniques that states engage in. When engaging in peaceful settlement attempts over highly salient issues, leaders are more likely to use third-party mechanisms such as mediation, arbitration, and adjudication as a means of deflecting the blame for unpopular settlements on international actors (Allee and Huth, 2006; Huth, Croco, and Appel, 2011; Simmons, 2002).

On the other hand, states have a more difficult time actually reaching an agreement over highly salient claims. Prior research shows that states are less likely to make concessions, reach agreements, and comply with the terms of the settlement over highly salient claims (Allee and Huth, 2006; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Simmons, 2002; Vasquez, 2009). Moreover, domestic audiences may be more willing to support the use of military force as an alternative to peaceful compromise when claims are highly salient (Hensel, 2001a; Hensel et al., 2008; Huth, 2009; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981; Vasquez, 2009). This is particularly true when claims are imbued with high intangible salience, since they evoke strong emotional reactions and are often functionally indivisible.

[2] By contrast, when claims are lowly salient, leaders may settle claims in order to focus their attention and resources on other domestic and foreign policy issues (Fravel, 2008).

Beyond making it harder for leaders to reach agreements, the interests of the winning coalition also play a role in determining whether any agreement reached actually resolves the claim, since domestic actors have the power to implicitly or explicitly ratify agreements (Putnam, 1988). [3] The successful implementation of any agreement requires the cooperation of at least some domestic actors who have the power to stymie its entry into force. In democratic states this may take the form of an explicit ratification process wherein certain political leaders must approve the terms of an agreement before it enters into force. Even in nondemocracies, however, leaders may require the cooperation of certain actors, such as the military, in order to implement an agreement.

Since the implementation of agreements is contingent on the approval and ratification of domestic actors, reaching an agreement is not sufficient to ensure that both states actually adhere to its terms. Leaders may be unable to convince domestic audiences that a particular agreement is beneficial and may therefore be unable to convince them to ratify agreements after they have been established. Moreover, if the winning coalition chooses to replace a leader who agrees to an unpopular settlement, their replacements are unlikely to comply. As such, all else equal, states are less likely to adhere to negotiated settlements as the salience of the claim (**mitchell2007a**; e.g., Simmons, 2002; Vasquez, 2009), although the involvement of third parties may help create stronger incentives for states to adhere to these agreements (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2002).

Although previous literature has explored the conditions that constrain leaders from pursuing accommodationist policies, less has been said about the factors that may encourage domestic audiences to support them. In spite of the factors that may create opposition to a settlement, it is also feasible that there are factors that encourage domestic audiences to support settlement. Where these factors exist, the winning coalition may value cultivating or maintaining a cooperative relationship with another state, which may foster a willingness to compromise over settlements in order to promote such a relationship.

[3] Following Putnam (1988), I use the term "ratification" to refer broadly to any process at the domestic level that is necessary to implement international agreements. This includes formal processes required for a treaty to enter into force, such as approval by a legislature, or informal processes by which other powerful veto players (e.g., the military, bureaucracies, or administration officials) must approve of an agreement in order for it to be implemented effectively.

Drawing on the literature connecting economic interdependence and militarized disputes, I argue that significant economic linkages are one such factor that can engender support for settlement. Existing research partially speaks to the question of whether interdependent states are more likely to cooperate over contentious issues. Lee and Mitchell (2012) find that interdependent states are more likely to engage in peaceful settlement attempts over territorial claims. Espey and Towfique (2004), Tir and Ackerman (2009), and Zawahri and Mitchell (2011) show that economic interdependence increases the probability of agreements over river management. However, these studies focus on whether any agreement is signed, not necessarily those that occur in the context of contentious issue claims. After all, states can cooperate over river management without having disputes over the river itself. None of these studies demonstrate that states are ultimately more likely to resolve their claims peacefully when states depend on each other for their economic well-being.

4.4 Territorial Claims, Opportunity Costs, and Peaceful Conflict Management

Although the existing literature on interdependence focuses on the opportunity costs of fighting, even the existence of an issue claim can create real and potential economic opportunity costs through two mechanisms. First, since each of these issues has the potential to produce militarized conflict, the existence of a claim itself creates the shadow of armed conflict between the two states. In doing so, the existence of claims increases the potential risk to economic actors who conduct business with the other claimant, and thereby increases the incentives for these actors to support the peaceful settlement of the dispute (Lee and Mitchell, 2012; Schultz, 2015; Simmons, 2005). Moreover, as noted above, businesses that anticipate this possibility may alter their expectations about the profitability of trade and forego potentially lucrative relationships with the opposing country, and states may pursue protectionist policies to diminish their opponent's military capacity.

Second, independent of the potential for armed conflict, the mere existence of claims may create opportunity costs by hindering the ability of actors to engage in economic activity with the other state. Issue claims can create opportunity costs by preventing states from building infrastructure and undertaking development projects (individually or jointly) that would facilitate the flow of goods into or across contested areas (Carter and Goemans, 2018; Gavrilis, 2008; Simmons, 2005; Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre, 2000). Settlement also fosters the development of institutions that are necessary to regulate and facilitate the flow of trade across borders (Carter and Signorino, 2010; Carter and Goemans, 2014; Simmons, 2005). The lack of regulations may also lead states to implement protectionist policies to control the flow of smugglers, traffickers, rebels, and refugees across borders, as well as the various goods they may bring with them (e.g., drugs and weapons) (e.g., Carter and Poast, 2017; Gavrilis, 2008; Simmons, 2005). The empirical research on this relationship has primarily examined territorial claims (e.g., Carter and Goemans, 2018; Schultz, 2015; Simmons, 1999; Simmons, 2002; Simmons, 2005; Simmons, 2006), although river and maritime claims are also likely to produce opportunity costs via similar mechanisms (e.g., by hindering navigation).

Because claims create real and potential opportunity costs for domestic actors, domestic audiences have an incentive to support claim settlement when the potential for economic losses or gains is high (Lee and Mitchell, 2012; Schultz, 2015). The extent to which resolving issue claims stands to increase trade between two countries depends in part on the extent to which the two states trade in the status quo. The more two states depend on trade with each other, the greater incentive domestic actors have to push leaders to resolve claims amicably.

An illustrative case involves the claim between the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) over the territory of Oregon.[4] As discussed by McDonald (2009), the ultimate resolution of the claim was shaped by competing domestic factions with differing economic interests within each country. The claim between the two countries dated back to the 1700s, with both countries claiming it based on exploration expeditions and settlements established in the area. Following the War of 1812, the two states made repeated attempts to resolve the dispute by partitioning the territory. However, these attempts only

[4] This section draws heavily on the discussion in McDonald (2009).

resulted in an agreement to jointly occupy the territory while a final agreement was reached. One detail that was of particular concern was whether to partition the territory at the 49th parallel. Although the U.S. indicated a willingness to partition the territory at this line, the U.K. was only willing to accept this line east of the Colombia River, which would allow them to control the territory between the River and the Pacific Ocean.

The situation escalated after the election of James K. Polk as president. In an attempt to unify the party following the contentious proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, the party platform called for the full annexation of both Oregon and Texas in order to unify western and southern members of the party. As a result, Polk found himself forced into taking a hardline position with respect to Oregon. Although the British government indicated a willingness to make concessions in the early 1940s, this new hardline position stymied Polk's ability to accept compromises that did not include the entirety of the territory.

During this period, divisions within the Democratic Party threatened to inflame the dispute. In particular, there was growing pressure by western senators within the party to retain the entire territory and to annex it by force if necessary. This included an attempt to issue a Congressional proclamation that the U.S. owned the entirety of the territory. In spite of this, attempts to push for a more expansive policy were thwarted by opposition from southern and northeastern politicians. In particular, southern Democrats opposed any move that could damage trade ties with Britain, which constituted the largest export market for cotton. Likewise, the Whig Party drew support from northeastern merchants and financiers who also highly valued trade ties with Britain. The economic concerns of these politicians' constituents was their prime motivation for creating opposition to the expansionist pressures of western politicians and created space for Polk to compromise over the territory. Polk and the U.K. government were eventually able to agree to a partition of the territory along the 49th parallel and the cession of the entirety of Vancouver Island to the U.K.

Support for expanded trade between the U.S. and Britain also played a role in Britain's decision to make concessions. As part of a broader free-trade policy agenda, Conservative British Prime Minister

Robert Peel, along with his foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, sought to bring the claim over Oregon to a close. In doing so, they hoped to lay the groundwork for expanded trade with the U.S. However, support for expanding free trade within their own party was limited, with the party split between those loyal to Peel and others who favored protectionist policies. As McDonald (2009, p. 154) notes, "Peel and Aberdeen were concerned about the domestic political costs of conceding too much to the United States....The precarious nature of their governing coalition compounded such worries." Ultimately, Peel was able to find support for his free-trade agenda and the settlement of the Oregon claim among the opposition. This provided them with the political leeway necessary to make concessions to the U.S.

The above scenario demonstrates that free trade interests had an integral part in bringing about the resolution of the Oregon claim. Importantly, the debate within both countries did not simply center on whether or not to go to war. Although there was some debate in both countries about whether to use war as a means of extracting concessions (particularly in the U.S.), pro-trade factions also supported making concessions as a means of resolving the underlying claim and expanding the trade relationship between the two states. This enabled the leadership of both states to make concessions. In both cases, the opportunity costs associated with the claim and the potential for the expansion of economic ties following its resolution of the claim shaped the stances that policymakers took with respect to resolving the claim.

Since economic interdependence should increase the pressure on policymakers to settle claims in a peaceful manner, leaders should be more willing to engage in potentially controversial accommodationist policies that facilitate the peaceful resolution of claims when they are highly dependent on trade with another state. In particular, leaders should have greater incentives to resolve claims expediently in order to limit the ongoing costs of continuing a claim. This results in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: As the level of economic interdependence between two states increases, the duration of issue claims between two states should decrease.

4.5 Research Design

I test my argument using data on issue claims from the Issue Correlates War Dataset (ICOW), which includes data on territorial claims, river claims, and maritime claims (Hensel et al., 2008). Claims consist of a disagreement between two states over the ownership or use of the contested issue. An official representative of at least one state must make explicit, public statements on behalf of the government regarding the disagreements to be considered a claim. The occurrence of a claim does not depend on whether the states take any particular actions to manage a claim, including militarized disputes and peaceful settlement attempts. The spatial and temporal coverage of the ICOW data varies by issue type. Data on territorial claims is available for the Americas and Western Europe from 1816-2001. Data on river claims is available for the Americas, Western Europe, and the Middle East from 1990-2001. Data on maritime claims is available for the Americas and all of Europe from 1900-2001.

4.5.1 Dependent Variables and Model Specification

The unit of analysis is the claim-year. To test Hypothesis **??** regarding claim resolution, I code a dummy variable for whether a claim ends via nonviolent means in a given year. This variable captures whether the claim was resolved because one disputant threatened or used organized violence to bring about the termination of the claim. This includes cases where settlements were reached through "peaceful" means such as negotiations or third party mediation, but was brought about by the threat or use of force. This variable also captures cases where a state unsuccessfully uses force to attempt to obtain the territory and subsequently drops its claim. This variable is coded one if a peaceful resolution is achieved and 0 otherwise. Cases are coded as censored if a claim is resolved via violent means or is ongoing at the end of 2001.

To model the duration until claim termination, I use a cure model. Figure 4.1 displays the Kaplan-Meier estimates of claim termination. As can be seen, the survival curve has a long tail on the right-hand side starting around year 100. This indicates that roughly 10 percent of claims will never experience peaceful resolution. The cure equation thus models whether a claim could potentially be resolved via peaceful



Figure 4.1: Kaplan-Meier Plot of Nonviolent Claim Resolution

means, while the hazard equation models the time until peaceful resolution occurs among those claims which can potentially be resolved.

4.5.2 Primary Independent Variable

Testing my argument requires a measure of the extent to which states depend on bilateral trade for their own economic well-being. States that engage in high levels of bilateral trade in the status quo should generally have more to lose if claims produce diplomatic or military conflict and more to gain by resolving their claims. The extent to which the opportunity costs of fighting influence leaders' decisionmaking depends on the relative political strength of pro and anti-trade groups within the winning coalition. Whether these groups have political influence depends, in turn, on the types of goods and services that dominate a particular country (Hiscox, 2002). Generally speaking, pro-trade groups will have greater economic

power in societies that are already engaged in high levels of trade. The greater the economic power of these groups, the more resources they have to organize and mobilize opposition to policies and the greater influence they have to lobby politicians to resolve claims (Levy, 2009; Rogowski, 1989; Solingen, 1989). As such, I measure economic interdependence using the existing level of trade between two countries.

The appropriate measure used to test theories related to economic interdependence depends on the specific mechanism that relates trade to decisions regarding foreign policy (see, e.g., Barbieri, 2002; Barbieri and Peters, 2003; Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll, 2011; Gartzke and Li, 2003b; Gartzke and Li, 2003a; Oneal, 2003; Simmons, 2009, for a discussion of different measures). Since my theory focuses on whether economic actors stand to experience substantial economic harm if bilateral trade with an opposing state is disrupted, I measure the extent to which each dyad member's economic wellbeing is dependent on the other by taking the ratio of bilateral trade to gross domestic product (GDP). Following Barbieri (2002), I then obtain the average level of trade dependence within each dyad by taking the geometric mean of the two countries' dependence measures.[5] Compared to the arithmetic mean, the geometric mean accounts for the fact that dependence scores may be highly asymmetric for two countries. I rescale this variable between zero and one for ease of interpretation. Both trade and GDP are measured in millions of US dollars. Trade data come from the Correlates of War Trade Dataset, Version 4.0 (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins, 2009). GDP data come from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al., Maddison Project, version 2018). This measure is lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity bias, which should address concerns about whether any association between claim resolution and trade is due to an increase in trade after the fact.

4.5.3 Control Variables

To control for potential confounding factors, I include control variables for characteristics of the issue claim and characteristics of the dyadic relationship. With respect to the issue claim itself, I control for four factors. First, since the claim management strategies states choose depends on the issue at stake (Hensel et al., 2008; Owsiak and Mitchell, 2019), I control for the type of issue each claim concerns by including

[5] The geometric mean is equal to the square root of the product of the two variables.

dummy variables for river and maritime claims (with territorial claims left out of as a reference group). Second, I control for the salience of each claim using the ICOW salience index. This measure ranges from 0 to 12 based on the characteristics that each claim possesses.[6] Since the bargaining range should be narrower when highly salient claims are involved, I include each of these variables in the cure equation. Third, I control for the history of claim management attempts between disputants by including separate variables for whether states have recently engaged in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), unsuccessful peaceful settlement attempts, and successful peaceful settlement attempts (Hensel, 2001a; Hensel et al., 2008). Each of these variables constitutes a weighted moving average of the number of conflict management attempts within the previous ten years, with more recent attempts weighted more heavily. In addition, since trade may be depressed by militarized conflict, I include a dummy variable for whether two disputants are engaged in an ongoing MID in a given year (Gibler, Miller, and Little, 2016).

I also control for several dyadic variables thought to influence both the frequency with which states sign agreements and the extent to which they trade. First, I control for differences in power between disputants by including the ratio of the military capabilities of the weaker state to the total capabilities of the two disputants (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972; Singer, 1987). Second, I control for whether two states are contiguous (i.e., share a land or river border) (Stinnett et al., 2002). Third, since states with similar regime types overcome commitment problems more easily, I control for whether both states in a dyad are democratic or autocratic (Leeds, 1999). Dyads are coded jointly democratic if both states have a Polity score above 5 and jointly autocratic if both have a score below -5 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).

[6] The territory index includes measures of whether it contains natural resources, constitutes a strategic location, is highly populated, is considered part of either state's homeland, , is associated with an identity claim, or has historically been controlled by either state.). Rivers' salience are coded based on whether it contains natural resources, serves highly populated areas, is located in either state's homeland, or is used for navigation, used for hydroelectric power generation, or used for irrigation. The maritime salience index contains indicators for whether it is associated with the state's homeland, constitutes a strategic location, is used for fishing, contains migratory fish stocks, contains oil, or contains other natural resources.

4.6 Analysis

Table 4.1 presents the results of the analysis. Model 1 is a standard Cox proportional hazards model of the time until peaceful claim termination. Positive coefficients indicate that a variable is associated with an increased hazard rate, and thus, a decreased survival time. The estimated coefficient for average trade dependence is positive and significant, indicating that states with higher levels of trade resolve their claims faster than those with lower level of trade. This supports the proposition that the leaders of states with high levels of bilateral trade have greater incentives to facilitate the quick resolution of claims. Exponentiating the coefficient of 1.96 provides a hazard ratio of 7.1, indicating that claims between the most interdependent states are (average trade = 1) have a 610 percent greater hazard rate than the least interdependent states (average trade = 0). The coefficient estimate is the largest of any other coefficient in the model, indicating that the effect of trade is very large compared to other important factors that explain the speed with which states resolve claims.

Model 2 presents the results of a proportional hazards cure model of claim resolution. The second column consists of the hazard coefficients for those variables included in the hazard equation. As with Model 1, positive coefficients indicate that a variable is positively associated with a higher hazard rate. Model 2 provides some evidence that trade is associated with quicker nonviolent claim resolution, although the evidence is not as strong as that produced by Model 1. The estimated coefficient for trade dependence is positive, but is only significant at 0.10 level. The lower significance level may be the result of the fact that the cure model controls for the unobserved heterogeneity between claims that are cured and those that are not. However, the use of a lower threshold of statistical significance may be justified given the data and model used. One issue with cure models is that they tend to be highly demanding on the data. Since only 97 events occur, the cure model may have trouble identifying significant relationships due to a lack of data. Moreover, due to the directional nature of Hypothesis 1, the use of a one-tailed test is arguably justified, which results in a p-value below 0.05.

Table 4.1: Models of Nonviolent Claim Resolution

	Model 1	Model 2	
	Hazard Coef.	Logit Coef.	Hazard Coef.
Average Trade Dependence	1.438*		0.556*
	(0.746)		(0.324)
Recent MIDs	0.199		0.057
	(0.188)		(0.175)
Recent Failed CM Attempts	-0.384**		-0.118
	(0.129)		(0.08)
Recent Successful CM Attempts	0.941**		0.404**
	(0.107)		(0.089)
Ongoing MID			-0.135
			(0.359)
Issue Salience	-0.04	-0.006	
	(0.052)	(0.053)	
River Claim	0.834**	1.054**	
	(0.318)	(0.272)	
Maritime Claim	-0.692**	-0.54**	
	(0.294)	(0.252)	
Joint Democracy	0.375	0.732**	
	(0.267)	(0.233)	
Joint Autocracy	1.197**	1.137**	
	(0.412)	(0.38)	
Contiguity	-0.299	0.025	
	(0.278)	(0.278)	
Capability Ratio	0.413	1.252*	
	(0.827)	(0.752)	
Intercept		-4.516**	
		(0.382)	
Number of Observations	5227		5227
Number of Failures	97		97

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for Model 2 were estimated using 500 bootstrap replications. ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Regardless, the cure model does provide some evidence that there is an association between economic interdependence and claim resolution. Exponentiating the coefficient of 0.56 produces a hazard ratio of 1.74, indicating that the hazard rate among those observations that may potentially experience claim resolution is 74 percent greater for those with the highest level of interdependence than for those with the lowest. Figure 4.2 plots the predicted survival curves across the range of trade dependence, with all other variables held constant at their medians. At the greatest vertical distance between the two curves, the probability that a claim has been resolved is 15 percent greater for a dyad with high levels of interdependence.



Figure 4.2: Effect of Trade on Claim Resolution

The control variables generally behave as expected, although there are some differences across the two models. Recent militarized interstate disputes are not found to be associated with the probability of peaceful claim termination in either model. Recent failed conflict management attempts are found to be negatively associated with claim termination in Model 1, but not in Model 2, while successful conflict management attempts are found to be positively associated with an increased hazard of claim termination across both models. This implies that the strongest predictor of successful settlements is whether states

have been successfully negotiating in the recent past, rather than whether they have attempted to reach an agreement and failed. This may provide evidence that piecemeal conflict resolution tactics have an important role in facilitating claim resolution (see also Mattes, 2018). Ongoing MIDs are found to be negatively associated with the probability of claim resolution in Model 1, but not in Model 2.

Surprisingly, issue salience is not associated with an increased potential for claim resolution. This may reflect the fact that issue salience has competing effects on whether leaders have an incentive to engage in the peaceful management of claims. On the one hand, the incentives to resolve highly salient claims are greater, which tends to lead to more peaceful settlement attempts, as discussed above. However, highly salient claims may also be more difficult to actually reach agreements over. In this case, the two effects may wash each other out when it comes to the overall duration of a claim, as leaders attempt to settle highly salient claims more but do not have as much success doing so

River and maritime claims are both found to differ significantly from territorial claims across both models. River claims are positively associated with an increased potential for claim termination, suggesting that river claims are easier to resolve via nonviolent means that territorial claims. By contrast, maritime claims are negatively associated with the potential for claim termination. Thus, while territorial claims tend to produce more frequent and more intense violent conflict, these results suggest that maritime claims may be more difficult to ultimately resolve by peaceful means.

With respect to the dyadic variables, only joint autocracy is statistically significant in Model 1. The positive coefficient estimate indicates that dyads consisting of two autocracies have a greater potential to engage in nonviolent claim resolution than mixed dyads. This is consistent with research that shows that jointly autocratic dyads are less likely to experience militarized conflict than mixed dyads (e.g., Weeks, 2012). In Model 2 however, jointly democratic dyads are also found to be better at resolving their claims via nonviolent means than mixed dyads, consistent with democratic peace theory. Contiguity is not found to have a significant effect in either model. Thus, while contiguous states may be more likely to fight over issue claims (especially territory), there is no evidence that these states have a more difficult time reaching a nonviolent resolution to a claim.

Finally, the capability ratio between two disputants is not significant in Model 1 but is significant at the 0.10 level in Model 2. The capability ratio variable ranges between 0 and 0.5, where 0.5 indicates perfectly symmetric capabilities. The positive coefficient indicates that two states are more likely to reach a nonviolent claim resolution the more symmetric the balance of power between them is. This suggests that states are more likely to work cooperatively when the two have relative parity, while they are more likely to experience a violent resolution, or none at all, when capabilities are highly asymmetric. This may be because highly asymmetric dyads provide the stronger state with an advantage when trying to coerce an opponent to relinquish their claims, or because weaker opponents cannot successfully force the resolution of claims against stronger opponents.

4.7 Conclusion

When do states resolve issue claims peacefully? I have argued that the nonviolent resolution of claims may be influenced by the level of economic exchange between two states. Because claims bring with them the possibility of militarization and hinder the ability of states to cooperate over economic policy, domestic groups with an interest in trading with their opponent stand to benefit by resolving claims as quickly as possible. I suggest that economic interdependence provides leaders with domestic incentives to resolve the underlying issue claims that threaten the economic interests of traders.

The results above provide some support for the argument that states which are highly dependent on each other are more likely to pursue and reach peaceful settlements over issue claims. Specifically, the analysis demonstrates that states are more likely to resolve issue claims quickly when they are highly dependent on the other state. Although the association between trade and claim resolution does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance when using a cure model, the results still suggest that there is a fairly high likelihood of a relationship between the two.

These findings have several implications for scholarly research and policymaking. First, economic interdependence has implications for state behavior beyond reducing armed conflict. Specifically, states may be more likely to use peaceful conflict management strategies to resolve disputes between actors that

are highly interdependent. Resolving the underlying issue claim thus eliminates the chance of fighting over the disputed issue. Moreover, this helps shed light on why states resolve issue claims even when the potential for militarization is low.

Second, it contributes to the literature on contentious issues by suggesting that the management of these claims is influenced by trade. While previous research has focused primarily on characteristics of the issues themselves, my findings suggest that states consider the externalities of a claim when attempting to resolve these claims. In particular, when resolving a claim carries economic benefits, leaders may find space to bargain even over highly salient claims.

Third, my findings suggest that policymakers interested in encouraging the settlement of contentious claims may benefit from increasing bilateral economic activity between states. This is relevant to contemporary policy discussions of whether increased trade can lead to more peaceful relations between states. This has implications, for example, for the debate over whether trade ties can help usher in the rise of China peacefully. For example, my findings suggest that policies designed to increase economic integration, such as regional trade organizations, may play a role in promoting international stability.

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