Rising to the Top: Gender, Political Performance, and Party Leadership in Parliamentary Democracies

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Party leaders are the main actors controlling campaign strategies, policy agendas, and government formation in advanced parliamentary democracies. Little is known, however, about gender and party leadership. This article examines gendered leadership patterns across 71 political parties in 11 parliamentary democracies between 1965 and 2013. It shows that men and women have different access to, and experiences in, party leadership and that these gendered political opportunity structures are shaped by parties' political performances. Women are more likely to initially come to power in minor opposition parties and those that are losing seat share. Once selected for the position, female leaders are more likely to retain office when their parties gain seats, but they are also more likely to leave the post when faced with an unfavorable trajectory. Together, these results demonstrate that prospective female leaders are playing by a different (and often more demanding) set of rules than their male counterparts.

Women's entrance into politics has fundamentally transformed the face of political parties in the modern era. Though once excluded from national-level positions, women's presence in parliament has increased markedly in advanced industrial democracies. Indeed, few parties in these states would now consider forwarding an exclusively, or even predominantly, male slate of candidates. While women are now more likely than ever before to participate in legislative politics, power is progressively shifting from the parliamentary delegation to the party leader (Poguntke and Webb 2005). These leaders are increasingly central to parties' vote-, office-, and policy-seeking behavior, making women's inclusion in these posts necessary to ensure their full access to power.

Although not widely studied, there is reason to believe that men and women do not enjoy the same opportunities with respect to party leadership. To begin with, a number of left-leaning organizations with many female members of parliament (MPs) and supporters have yet to select a woman for this post, including the British Labour Party and German Social Democrats.[1] Additionally, several of the best-known cases of women ascending to power involve opposition parties facing major challenges. Consider, for example, Margaret Thatcher in the British Conservative Party and Angela Merkel in the German Christian Democratic Union. Finally, even after gaining office, female leaders must endure continued focus on their sex. Indeed, there are a number of well-documented incidences of female leaders encountering both implicit and explicit sexism.

In this article, I show that men and women do, in fact, have differential access to, and experiences in, party leadership. These gendered political opportunity structures are fundamentally shaped by parties' political performances. Party performance determines the attractiveness of the post and the organization's willingness to deviate from the status quo with respect to leadership selection. In this way, it helps shape women's initial access to power. Leaders, in turn, are evaluated based on their ability to bolster their party's performance. These evaluations, however, are not gender neutral and

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[1]While women have twice briefly led the British Labour Party, this was only in an interim capacity after being automatically promoted from the deputy leader post.

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thus differentially impact men's and women's tenure in the post.

In exploring the link between gender, political performance, and party leadership, I first outline the importance of women's access to these positions and present data on female party leaders in 11 parliamentary democracies between 1965 and 2013. I then introduce four hypotheses linking women's initial ascension to the post to parties' political performance. The results from a discrete time duration model suggest that women are most likely to first come to power in minor parties that are in opposition and in parties that are losing seat share. Extending this research, I posit two additional hypotheses concerning gender, political performance, and leaders' tenure in office. The empirical analysis indicates that when political parties are losing seat share, female party leaders are more likely to leave the post than similarly situated men. Yet, when parties are gaining seats, female leaders have a longer duration in office.

The results thus present a nuanced portrait of the role gender plays in politicians' inclusion in leadership posts. Women have gained greater access to these positions in recent years, and almost half of all parties have now been female-led. When improving their parties' electoral trajectories, moreover, female leaders also have a higher likelihood of remaining in office than similarly situated men. Despite these positive developments, women continue to face additional barriers in their entrance to, and survival in, the party leadership. Women's initial access to power increases when the post is least attractive. When the position is most desirable, men are more likely to retain control. After gaining office, moreover, female leaders are also more likely than men to leave the position when facing an unfavorable electoral trajectory. Even women's success when their parties gain seat share suggests that they may need to be extraordinary politicians to gain access to this post. Though there is some cause for optimism, together these results are normatively problematic. They demonstrate that even in the "easy" case of advanced parliamentary democracies—where women have made major inroads in legislative and executive politics—biases against women remain entrenched within political parties. Female politicians continue to play by a different (and often more demanding) set of rules than men.

The Importance of Women's Access to the Party Leadership

The women and politics literature has dedicated significant attention to outlining the institutional and cultural factors that determine women's presence in legislatures. A growing number of studies also focus on explaining women's access to executive branch positions (Bauer and Tremblay 2011), including women's presence among national leaders (Jalalzai 2008, 2013) and cabinet ministers (Davis 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook and O'Brien 2012). In contrast to this wide body of research, and despite the important role played by party leaders, to date there has been comparatively little research on women's access to these posts.

Much of the existing work on female leaders focuses on individual women, often highlighting the exceptional circumstances leading to their selection (Harris 1988; McKay 2004; Wiliarty 2008). The research that aims to make more general claims examines variation within a single country (O'Neill and Stewart 2009) or across a limited set of states in which women rarely come to power (Cross and Blais 2012b). The two most comprehensive studies conducted to date do not focus on female party leaders per se, but instead address women's presence on parties' national executive committees (Kittilson 2006) and the mechanisms underlying leadership selection more broadly (Pilet and Cross 2014).

While women's access to party leadership is important in all contexts, it deserves special attention in advanced parliamentary democracies. In these states, political parties represent "*the* central mechanism" by which the democratic processes of delegation and accountability work in practice (Müller 2000, 309, emphasis in the original). Within these parties, the leader plays an especially important role. During elections, there is significant leader-centered campaigning and media coverage (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Evaluations of party leaders influence vote choice, and the (un)popularity of the party leader can determine an organization's electoral success (Bittner 2011; Stewart and Clarke 1992). After elections, governments are established, sustained, and terminated based on the decisions of party leaders (Laver and Schofield 1990). The leader also typically holds the most prestigious government post available to the party when in office, including the position of prime minister. In fact, to understand when and why women become heads of government, it is first necessary to know how they came to lead their parties.

Beyond shaping access to office, the leader also helps determine the policies his or her party aims to implement once in government (Harmel and Janda 1994; Wilson 1994). Leaders' unique talents and visions influence their parties' electoral manifestos, with changes in leadership altering party policy (Harmel et al. 1995). The increasing personalization of politics in parliamentary democracies has further enhanced this power. Leaders now enjoy even greater autonomy in both the national political executive

(Poguntke and Webb 2005) and intraparty policymaking processes (McAllister 2007).

Since leaders shape parties' vote-, office-, and policy-seeking behavior, for those concerned with gender equality in politics it is crucial to determine the circumstances under which women can access and retain these powerful positions. In particular—and in contrast to backbench MPs—female leaders can exert significant influence over women's descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. Women's presence among party elites, for example, increases the number of female candidates and elected officials (Cheng and Tavits 2011). Parties with greater numbers of female internal officeholders are also more likely to adopt affirmative action policies for female candidates (Caul 2001; Kittilson 2006). As well as bolstering women's presence in office, female party leaders may also shape women's policy representation. The greater the number of women on parties' executive committees, for example, the more likely the party is to discuss social justice issues on its platform (Kittilson 2011). Finally, the selection of a female leader may shatter the glass ceiling, not only allowing other women to ascend to the post (Jalalzai 2013; Jalalzai and Krook 2010) but also improving voters' perceptions of female leaders' effectiveness and weakening traditional gender stereotypes about women's role in the public and private spheres (Beaman et al. 2009, 2012).

The Prevalence of Female Party Leaders

While significant attention has been dedicated to a small number of high-profile female leaders, the selection of women for this position continues to be viewed as a rare event. Studies of women's descriptive representation thus rarely consider party leaders, and work on the selection and removal of party leaders often does not address gender. Despite this assumption, there have been many more female leaders than previously assumed.

Figure 1 illustrates the patterns of men's and women's access to leadership positions in 71 parties from 11 countries between January 1965 and July 2013. These 11 states—Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—were selected because they encompass the set of advanced parliamentary democracies with stable party systems in which the prime minister is likely to be a party leader. Here, democracies are identified using the Polity dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2014); parliamentary systems are selected based on information provided by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010); and advanced industrial states are defined by prolonged OECD membership. Within these countries, parties were chosen for further study based on their inclusion in the foundational research on party leadership conducted by Andrews and Jackman (2008) and Cross and Blais (2012a, 2012b), as well as the database of political leaders created by de Zárate (2011, 2013; see the supporting information [SI] for a discussion of country and party case selection and descriptive statistics).

Of the 441 leaders in the dataset, 61 (or 14%) are women. Almost half of all parties have also selected at least one female leader, with women reaching the top position in 34 of the 71 total parties included in the analysis. Just as female leadership is not restricted to a small group of parties, neither is it limited to a few states. All 11 countries have had at least one female-led party. While female leaders are more common than often assumed, Figure 1 also illustrates the large differences in women's leadership both across and within states. Only one Australian party in the dataset has had a female leader, and women remain excluded from the leadership of all major parties in Ireland and Japan. In contrast, a woman has led seven of the eight Danish parties included in the analysis. Even within a single country, women's access to power can vary widely by party. In Sweden, some organizations (such as the Christian Democrats and the Moderate Party) have never selected a female leader. Others have only once been led by a woman—including the Social Democrats and Liberal People's Party. Still other parties have had multiple female leaders. One, the Swedish Green Party, even mandates that the leadership position be shared by a male and female spokesperson.

Getting In: Women's Entrance into Party Leadership

Across these 71 parties, different trends emerge with respect to women's initial selection to the party leadership. Some chose a female leader relatively early. Margaret Thatcher became head of the British Conservatives in 1975, for example. In others, women first came to power only recently. The Australian Labour Party, for instance, selected its first female leader in 2010. Finally, over half of all parties remain male-dominated.

Not only is there significant variation in women's access to power, but these differences also do not appear to be attributable to women's willingness to fill the post. Studies from Sweden (Folke and Rickne 2014), Latin America (Schwindt-Bayer 2011), and India (Geissel and

FIGURE 1 Time-Series Plots of Male and Female Party Leadership by Country



Note: The plot graphically depicts the number of male (solid line) and female (dashed line) party leaders per country over time.

Hust 2005) each suggest that once in elected office, there are no significant differences between men's and women's progressive ambition. In some cases, female politicians are even more likely than their male counterparts to want to advance in the political hierarchy (Davidson-Schmich 2015). Though women may have different motivations and levels of ambition at the onset of their political careers (Davidson-Schmich 2015; Lawless and Fox 2010), once in office female politicians appear to be just as interested in leadership positions as their male counterparts.

Given that supply-side explanations cannot account for women's access to (and exclusion from) power, what explains the variation in women's initial ascension to the leadership post? I argue that parties' political performances create distinct opportunity structures for male and female would-be leaders. In particular, women are likely to continue to be excluded from power when the post is desirable—that is, when parties are performing well. A poor political performance, in contrast, makes the post less attractive to potential competitors and increases

parties' willingness to deviate from the status quo and select new types of leaders. This creates opportunities for female aspirants to first enter into party leadership.

Though female party leaders have not been widely studied, a large body of work supports the expectation that party performance likely shapes women's access to power. A number of studies suggest that women are not only underrepresented in the upper echelons of politics, but also when they do access top positions, they often occupy the least sought-after posts. It is not only the case, for example, that there are fewer female than male candidates nominated for elected office. Women are also less likely to run in winnable seats (Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012; Ryan, Haslam, and Kulich 2010). Similarly, just as women hold fewer cabinet positions than men, they are also more likely to be offered low-prestige portfolios and relegated to the least powerful roles in government (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; Reynolds 1999). To the extent that women have served as national leaders, they rarely lead the most powerful countries (Jalalzai 2013) and are especially likely to act as ceremonial figureheads, with real authority concentrated in their male counterparts (Jalalzai 2008, 2013).

Across political institutions, there is thus evidence that "women do best where competition is least" (Randall 1987, 146). That is, women are more likely to come to power in less attractive positions. For prospective party leaders, desirability is largely a function of their party's political performance. When the party is performing well, leaders are more likely to access the benefits of office. When the party is performing poorly, the leadership position offers fewer benefits and comes with much greater costs.

By decreasing the desirability of the leadership post, poor electoral performances likely present greater opportunities for women to first enter power. To begin with, fewer viable male challengers are likely to emerge under these circumstances. Beckwith (2013) argues, for example, that crisis conditions within the party combined with candidacy deferral by quality male replacements can lead to the ascension of a female prime minister. Indeed, Bynander and 't Hart (2008) note that when parties are in decline, an accepted heir apparent to the incumbent leader is less likely to emerge. More generally, a growing body of research suggests that women are likely to face a "glass cliff"—that is, they are more likely to be selected for leadership posts when there is a high risk of organizational and leadership failure (Ryan and Haslam 2005, 2007).

Beyond suppressing the number of competitors, a poor political performance may encourage parties to select new and different types of leaders. When a party is performing well, it has little incentive to deviate from the male-dominated status quo. When a party is performing poorly, it may be willing to pursue alternative strategies in an attempt to turn the tide in its favor. Poor performance may in fact not only make parties less wedded to male leadership, but may actually make female nominees more attractive to the selectorate. As comparative outsiders, women are less likely to be tarnished by corruption and "business-as-usual" electoral politics (Dolan 1998). Women are thus often associated with change and renewal (Murray 2010), and the selection of a female leader can offer a visible break from the past (McKay 2004; Wiliarty 2008). For this reason, it is not surprising that experimental research finds that women are the preferred candidates for hard-to-win positions (Ryan, Haslam, and Kulich 2010).

Taken together, this broad set of research suggests that the weaker a party's political performance, the sooner a woman will ascend to the top post. Drawing on this logic, I posit four hypotheses concerning time to selection of the first female leader. In particular, I focus on parties' position in government, status in the party system, and electoral trajectory as the central determinants of this gendered political opportunity structure.

Hypothesizing about Performance and Women's Entrance into Power

The position of party leader is more desirable, and parties are more likely to adhere to the gendered status quo, when the organization is in government rather than opposition. At the most basic level, government participation provides parties with access to state resources that are necessary for their continued survival (Katz and Mair 1995). Serving in government also allows parties to enjoy the spoils of office and to implement their policy agendas. Party leaders are thus chiefly motivated by office-seeking aims (Strøm 1990). Leaders within these parties have access to "plum jobs within the executive" (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999, 10) that can be allocated strategically among party members. Government participation similarly increases their capacity to shape legislative outcomes. Within the organization, leaders gain more power and autonomy when their parties enter government (Poguntke and Webb 2005).

Parties in government may have more men willing to compete for the post of party leader and few incentives to deviate from historical leadership patterns. Opposition parties, in contrast, provide fewer of the benefits that would attract qualified male candidates and may be more open to new types of leaders. Consequently, I expect:

Hypothesis 1: Female party leaders are more likely to first emerge in opposition or unaligned parties.

Beyond government participation, willingness to select a female leader is likely further dictated by major or minor party status. The leadership post is more visible in major parties, as they receive much more media attention during elections than their smaller counterparts (Norris 2003). Major parties also have more resources at their disposal than minor organizations, including greater organizational strength, higher incomes, and more staffers (Katz and Mair 1992; Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002). The degree of authority granted to leaders further differs across party types. Major parties concentrate policymaking authority with their leadership, whereas minor party leaders are more likely to share this power with legislators and/or activists (Laver and Hunt 1992). In countries with highly fragmented party systems, large parties have exhibited greater "presidentializing tendencies" than smaller parties (Poguntke and Webb 2005).

Together, the heightened visibility, larger pool of resources, and greater policymaking authority afforded to major party leaders make this a particularly attractive post. At the same time, because the stakes are higher, major parties may be more risk averse than minor parties with respect to leadership selection. This suggests:

Hypothesis 2: Female party leaders are more likely to first emerge in minor parties.

Extending the first two hypotheses, the effect of government participation on women's access to power will likely vary based on party status. Across all party types, a female leader may be least likely to first emerge in major parties that are in government. These parties are already significantly less likely to remove their current leader (Andrews and Jackman 2008) and have few incentives to deviate from existing gender norms when selecting someone new for the post. Competition for this position, moreover, is likely to be especially fierce. In major governing parties, the leader is likely to hold the most highly prized political post: prime minister. As head of the executive branch, this position provides the leader with a great deal of power not only in his or her party and government, but also within the state and even the international community. Indeed, the authority invested in the prime minister has only grown over time. Even in multiparty systems with consensus models of politics, leaders' power, resources, and autonomy within national political executives have markedly increased in recent years (Poguntke and Webb 2005).

It similarly follows that women have the greatest likelihood of first coming to power in minor opposition parties. These doubly disadvantaged organizations may be most receptive to new types of leaders who might turn the tide of public opinion in their favor. At the same time, these posts may draw fewer strong challengers. When heading an opposition or unaligned party, a minor party leader does not enjoy any of the benefits of serving in office. Unlike their counterparts in major opposition parties, these leaders cannot even hope to be prime minister. Even if their party enters government following the next election, it will only be as a junior coalition partner. Therefore, I anticipate:

Hypothesis 3: Female party leaders are especially likely to emerge in minor parties in opposition.

Finally, women's access to power is likely to be further influenced by their party's electoral trajectory. Irrespective of status or position in government, parties have few incentives to deviate from existing patterns of leadership selection when they appear to have found a winning strategy. Losing seat share, in contrast, may encourage parties to alter their approach and select a female leader. At the same time, the leadership post is also more attractive when seat share is increasing. Prospective leaders in these parties are more likely to believe that they will gain or retain the benefits of office. Even if government participation is unlikely, leading a competitive party improves the leader's career prospects, as those who preside over parties that have a positive electoral trajectory have longer tenures than their less successful counterparts (Andrews and Jackman 2008; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller 2011). As parties become more competitive, it may be more difficult for women to ascend to the top post. This leads to a fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Female party leaders are more likely to emerge in parties that have unfavorable electoral trajectories.

While Cross and Blais (2012b) argue that women's access to power is unrelated to the party's position in the electorate, the four political performance hypotheses find support in the literature on Canadian party leaders. Parties' competitiveness has been viewed as a principal factor explaining women's access to leadership positions in these organizations (Bashevkin 2009). In particular, the "firmness of a party's grip on power [in government] or its proximity to power in opposition" has been inversely related to women's leadership success (Bashevkin 2010, 87). Women have thus been most likely to serve as leaders of minor parties (O'Neill and Stewart 2009) and opposition parties that are unlikely to serve in government in the

near future (Bashevkin 1993). In fact, Trimble and Arscott (2003) argue that the most common pathway to power for Canadian female party leaders is to take control of "electorally decimated and moribund parties" (77). Indeed, no Canadian woman has won a leadership contest in a competitive party (Bashevkin 2009). While these studies support the intuition underlying the performance hypotheses, the following empirical analysis represents the first wide-reaching test of these claims.

Testing the Effect of Performance on Women's Entrance into Power

Using the original dataset presented in Figure 1, I examine the relationship between political performance and women's ascension to power in 68 parties. The three organizations that divide the leadership role between male and female spokespeople—the Green and Māori parties in New Zealand and the Swedish Greens—are excluded from this analysis, as their time to first female leader is independent from their electoral showings. The principal findings, however, are robust to their inclusion (see the SI for details).

Among these parties, the event of interest is the initial selection of a female leader.[2] The reasons for this approach are twofold. To begin with, in the life of the party, the appointment of the first female leader arguably represents the most visible break from the male-dominated status quo. A party's decision to part with this longstanding norm thus demands significant attention. At the same time, the factors leading parties to select additional women for the post likely differ from those motivating their initial selection of a female leader. Parties may be more willing to be female-led after the first woman "shatters the glass ceiling." Alternatively, the selection of subsequent female leaders may be contingent on the perceived successes or failures of the first woman in the post. In either case, before considering the causal mechanisms explaining the selection of the second female leader, it is necessary to first establish whether parties' political performances help dislodge the entrenched traditions that exclude women from power.

Focusing on the time to first female leader, the starting point for the analysis is 1965.[3] Beginning the study in the 1960s is consistent with two seminal cross-national analyses of women's access to leadership posts. Jalalzai (2013) examines female heads of government and state from 1960 onward, and Davis (1997) assesses the selection of Western European female ministers beginning in 1968. These start dates reflect the important political and social changes that occurred in this decade. The first female head of government came to power in 1960 (Jalalzai 2013). In Western Europe, women's presence in executive posts also increased in this era. These developments reflect the growing pressure felt by political parties in these states to increase women's participation in the formal political arena (Davis 1997).

The 1960s represent the beginning of the era in which women could realistically aspire to the party leadership in advanced parliamentary democracies. Within this decade, I further focused on 1965. In this year, the British Conservatives held their last leadership contest before the ascension of Margaret Thatcher. It also marks 10 years prior to her rise to power within the party. Starting in 1965 is also consistent with the large-scale studies of party leadership conducted by Cross and Blais (2012a, 2012b) and organized by Pilet and Cross (2014).[4]

The time between entry into the process and occurrence of the first female leader is the survival or duration time. As information on the exact date of leaders' entrance to office is often unavailable, this duration time is discretized into years. Time to first female leader is therefore modeled using discrete time duration analysis with a complementary log-log transformation. This approach is analogous to the Cox proportional hazards model used for continuous time data (see the SI for details).

Measuring Parties' Political Performance. Theoretically, women's access to the party leadership is expected to vary based on their party's political performance. The first three hypotheses concern opposition and minor parties. Based on the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2010), I first constructed an indicator variable distinguishing between the party (or parties) in the *governing coalition* and opposition or unaligned parties (Hypothesis 1). I also used these data to classify major and minor parties (Hypothesis 2). Following Andrews and Jackman (2008), I identify major parties as those that have *controlled the office of prime minister* at least once during this era.[5] To determine whether the effect of government

[2] All analyses exclude interim leaders.

[3] For parties entering the political system after 1965, I consider the years from their founding date until their initial selection of a female leader.

[4] While 1965 is the most appropriate year in which to begin the study, the principal results are also robust to a later start date (see the SI for details).

[5] To be characterized as "major," the party must have held the prime ministerial position at least once directly after a general election. This measure excludes, for example, the Swedish Liberal People's Party, which held the post only once following the collapse of a Centre Party–led government.

participation is conditioned on major or minor party status (Hypothesis 3), the model also includes the *interaction of these two measures.*

The fourth hypothesis posits that women are more likely to first come into power when their party has an unfavorable electoral trajectory. The model thus includes a covariate capturing the *change in party seat share.* Once again drawing on the ParlGov data, this measure calculates the difference between the percentage of seats won by the party at the last election (at time t) from the seat share of the preceding election (at time $t-1$). The change in seat share for Ireland's Fine Gael in 2012, for example, is the percentage of seats won in the 2007 general election (30.7%) subtracted from their seat share following the 2011 election (45.8%). This 15.1% increase reflects the party's strong upward trajectory.

Beyond the main predictors, I also control for factors that may otherwise bias the results. Over time, parties become more likely to select a female leader. The model thus includes a mean-centered linear measure accounting for the passage of *time.* Since newer parties may be more likely to select a female leader than those with established patterns of male dominance, I control for *parties founded after 1980.* I also account for party *size*, as those organizations with larger seat shares may be less likely to select a female leader irrespective of their status as major parties or participation in government. Existing research also suggests that female leaders may be more likely to emerge in left-leaning parties (Kittilson 2006; O'Neill and Stewart 2009). I control for *party family* using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al. 2006).[6] Similarly, increasing the number of female legislators can alter both the supply of—and demand for—women in the party leadership. The model thus includes a covariate capturing the *percentage of seats held by women in the party's parliamentary caucus.* Finally, across the 11 states included in the analysis, there may be baseline differences in both female politicians' political ambition and countries' propensities to select women for the top post. The model therefore includes *country-level fixed effects.*

Results from the Analysis of Women's Entrance into Party Leadership

Table 1 presents the findings from the discrete time duration analysis. Unlinking the coefficient estimates provides an interpretation that is analogous to that for the Cox proportional hazards model. A value above 1 indicates a greater likelihood of first selecting a female leader as the value of the covariate increases. Values below 1 mean that female leaders are less likely to be selected. Values close to 0 indicate large decreases in the probability of observing the event, whereas values much larger than 1 point to large increases in this probability. A Cox hazard ratio that is significant and far from 1 thus suggests that a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable has a large effect on the survival probability of the party.

FIGURE 2 Probability of Parties Remaining Male-Led Over Time as a Function of Party Status



Note: The survival probabilities were generated holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

As predicted, the results suggest that the initial selection of a female leader is shaped by the party's political performance. Consider, for example, the organization's position in government and status in the party system. The Cox hazard ratio for major parties in government as compared to minor parties in opposition is 0.134, representing an eight-fold decrease (95% CI: 0.003 to 0.732).[7] Similarly, a 10% increase in seat share decreases the Cox hazard ratio by a factor of 0.399. This represents a two-and-a-half-fold decrease in the likelihood of first selecting a female party leader conditioned on survival up until that point. When the party is performing well, the likelihood of selecting a female leader decreases.

Figure 2 plots the survival probabilities for the four party types over time. The probability of surviving one

[6]Due to the small number of observations in the Nationalist (70), Ethnic-Regionalist (90), and Special Issue (95) party families, I combine each of these party types into a single category.

[7]The 95% confidence intervals are highest posterior density intervals computed using the Laplace approximation to the posterior density.

Table 1 Discrete Time Duration Model of Women's Entrance into Party Leadership

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)	CHR
Intercept	−5.289	1.386	−3.816	<0.001	—
Government	−0.937	0.736	−1.273	0.203	0.392
Major Party	−0.982	0.891	−1.103	0.270	0.374
Gov. × Major Party	−0.090	0.969	−0.093	0.926	0.914
Δ Seat Share	−0.092	0.029	−3.156	0.002	0.912
Size	0.036	3.141	0.011	0.991	1.036
% Female MP	0.033	0.015	2.143	0.032	1.034
Founded Post-1980	1.473	0.809	1.821	0.069	4.364
Time	0.044	0.020	2.280	0.023	1.045
Greens	2.899	1.238	2.342	0.019	18.153
Communists	−2.118	0.968	−2.188	0.029	0.120
Liberals	−0.390	0.654	−0.596	0.551	0.677
Christian Democrats	−0.978	0.835	−1.171	0.242	0.376
Conservatives	−0.391	0.737	−0.530	0.596	0.677
Agrarian	0.264	0.955	0.276	0.782	1.302
Other	−0.303	0.935	−0.324	0.746	0.739
Austria	1.583	1.283	1.234	0.217	4.872
Canada	−0.037	1.516	−0.024	0.981	0.964
Denmark	2.174	1.251	1.739	0.082	8.797
Finland	1.120	1.189	0.942	0.346	3.064
Germany	0.137	1.512	0.091	0.928	1.147
Ireland	−1.352	1.602	−0.844	0.398	0.259
Japan	−0.101	1.570	−0.064	0.949	0.904
New Zealand	0.108	1.536	0.070	0.944	1.114
Sweden	1.163	1.244	0.935	0.350	3.198
United Kingdom	0.055	1.582	0.035	0.972	1.057

Note: The unit of analysis is the political party. The outcome variable is the initial selection of a female party leader. The time covariate captures the number of years since 1965 (or party founding date if later). Baseline categories include minor parties in opposition, social democratic parties, and Australian parties. Number of observations = 2,025 party-years.

year without a female leader is near one for all parties. As time passes, however, minor opposition parties are much more likely to first select a female leader. Holding all other variables constant, their probability of surviving without a woman in the post drops to 0.863 in year 10, 0.686 in year 20, and 0.479 in year 30. In contrast, at year 10 the probability of surviving without a female leader is 0.980 for major parties in power. At year 20, it is still 0.951, and by year 30, the probability falls only to 0.906. Major parties in office are much more likely to remain male-led than minor parties that are excluded from government.

Consistent with Hypothesis 3, women are clearly much less likely to first come to power in major parties that are in government. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, moreover, major parties that are in opposition are significantly more likely than major governing parties to first select a female leader (0.358, 95% CI: 0.059 to 0.999). This effect, however, is conditioned on party status. Minor parties are no more likely to first select female leaders when in opposition than when in government. Minor versus major party status alone also does not have an independent effect on women's ascension to power. When controlling for factors including government participation, party ideology, and seat share, there are no significant differences between major and minor parties in either government or opposition. The model thus provides partial support to Hypothesis 1 (opposition parties), no support for Hypothesis 2 (minor parties), and strong support to Hypothesis 3 (minor parties in opposition).

The relationship between electoral trajectory and time to first female leader further bolsters the political performance claim. Figure 3 plots the Cox hazard ratio as a function of electoral trajectory, comparing the hazard for different values of change in seat share to a baseline of no change. Moving from a 10% loss in seat share to a similarly large gain decreases the Cox hazard of first

FIGURE 3 Cox Hazard Ratio for Parties' Selection of First Female Leader as a Function of Electoral Trajectory



Note: The Cox hazard ratio was generated holding all other variables at their mean or modal values. The ratio was calculated using 0 (no change in seat share) as the baseline. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

selecting a female leader by a factor of 0.158 (95% CI: 0.030 to 0.422). As posited in Hypothesis 4, losing parties are significantly more likely to first select a female leader than their winning counterparts.

Turning to the control variables, the results suggest that parties are less likely to remain exclusively male-led over time. Women are also somewhat more likely to first come to power in parties founded after 1980.[8] The covariate capturing female MPs shows that women's presence in the parliamentary delegation is associated with the ascension of a female party leader. Comparing the discrete Cox proportional hazard ratios suggests, however, that a 1% decrease in seat share has a greater effect on parties' likelihood of survival than a 1% increase in women's descriptive representation.

While the covariate capturing women's presence in parliament behaves as expected, the measure controlling for party family yields mixed results. Although the comparatively small number of green parties in the sample prohibits definitive claims, the time to selection of the first female leader appears to be much shorter for these organizations than for members of all other party families. This is unsurprising in light of these parties' histories. First, the green parties in this study were founded after 1980, and thus do not have a history of entrenched male leadership. Second, these parties sought to upend traditional party structures, pursuing openness and participation in decision making (Kitschelt 1988). Third, despite the parties' initial focus on environmental protection, greens soon adopted other core issues, including an ideological commitment to women's emancipation and autonomy (Kitschelt 1993). In fact, green parties acted as early proponents of women's representation in general and quota policies in particular. This broad commitment to gender equality—combined with an absence of entrenched masculine leadership norms and more open leadership structures—together provided the ideal conditions for the selection of female leaders.

Though green parties facilitate women's ascension to power, the link between ideology and female leadership does not hold for other left parties. There are no significant differences between social democrats and Christian democratic, conservative, liberal, agrarian, or nationalist, ethnic-regionalist, and special issue parties. Communist parties, moreover, are actually significantly less likely than many other organizations to break from the male-dominated status quo. This suggests that once established, expectations about men's and women's roles within party organizations are difficult to break (irrespective of ideological beliefs). With respect to women's access to leadership positions, moreover, left-right distinctions alone are clearly insufficient. Instead, it is necessary to account for the diversity among ideologically left-leaning organizations.

Staying In: Women's Tenure in the Party Leadership

Thus far, I have shown that political performance creates different opportunity structures for male and female would-be leaders. Just as women's initial entrance into office is shaped by parties' political successes and failures, tenure in the post is likely to be similarly gendered. Existing research on gender and duration of party leadership, however, generates conflicting findings. Once controlling for country-level effects, Cross and Blais (2012b) argue that the leader's sex has no effect on his or her survival in the position. Yet, O'Neill and Stewart (2009) show that female leaders serve for shorter periods than their male counterparts in major Canadian parties.

Research on women's tenure in other posts generates similarly equivocal conclusions. In some positions, women outperform men. Female ministers in British and Swedish cabinets, for example, are less likely to leave their

[8]The principal results are robust to different break points, including 1965, 1970, and 1975. They also hold when controlling for majoritarian electoral systems (see the SI for details).

posts than their male counterparts (Bäck et al. 2009; Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2007). In other cases, there are no gender differences. Women serve in European executive positions for just as long as men (Jalalzai 2013). Similarly, in Latin America, women's and men's cabinet careers are virtually identical with respect to career duration, continuity, mobility, and mode of exit (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009, 2013). In still other posts, female politicians face particular challenges. Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), for example, show that the probability of early termination of Italian city councils increases when the mayor is female. More generally, Jalalzai (2013) notes that women come to power in positions that have shorter average career durations.

These mixed results suggest that while gender may influence leaders' duration in office, the link between sex and survival may be indirect. Specifically, I posit that the effect of leaders' sex is conditioned on their parties' political performance. In the same way that a female leader is more likely to ascend to power when the position is less desirable, her performance in office is also likely to be judged more harshly than that of her male counterparts. As a consequence, female leaders may be more likely to leave the post if the party shows signs of electoral weakness. At the same time, because women who serve as party leaders have overcome significant obstacles to attain the post, those who succeed in the position may enjoy longer tenures than similarly situated men.

Hypothesizing about Performance and Women's Tenure as Leaders

Most leaders do not leave their post voluntarily; instead, they are often pushed out of office (Bynander and 't Hart 2007; Cross and Blais 2012b). The survival of the leader, in turn, rests largely on his or her electoral appeal. Party leaders need to be "successful electoral performers" in order to retain their posts (Pilet and Cross 2014, 235), and bad election results are their most frequent exit trigger (Bynander and 't Hart 2007). Indeed, parties now readily dispatch with leaders who are perceived to be an electoral liability (Poguntke and Webb 2005). By the same token, the chance that the leader will be removed decreases as the parties' seat and vote shares increase (Andrews and Jackman 2008; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller 2011; Pilet and Cross 2014).

Party members' evaluations of leader performance are unlikely to be gender neutral. Just as it is more difficult for women to initially attain leadership roles, they also face greater difficulties in being recognized as effective in these posts (Eagly and Karau 2002). When proving their ability, minority group members are often held to higher standards than members of the majority group. To be considered highly able in the workplace, for example, a woman is often required to display a greater level of competence (Ridgeway 2001). Female leaders are especially likely to be devalued relative to men when they occupy leadership roles that are traditionally male-dominated or associated with masculinity (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky 1992).

Executive positions are often associated with masculinity, and the role of party leader is among the most traditionally male-dominated political posts. The literature on gender and leader evaluations thus suggests that female leaders are likely to be held to higher standards than their male counterparts. As a consequence of these heightened expectations, parties are unlikely to tolerate female leaders whom they perceive as harming, rather than helping, their performance. In particular, I expect:

> *Hypothesis 5*: When faced with an unfavorable electoral trajectory, female party leaders are more likely to leave their posts than their male counterparts.

Though female leaders may be disadvantaged in the face of poor performance, this does not necessarily suggest that women will uniformly experience shorter tenures in office as compared to men. Because of the many hurdles faced by women on the path to party leadership, those who thrive in the post may actually outlast male leaders. Eagly and Karau (2002) note, for example, that while discriminatory forces may decrease the probability that female leaders are favorably evaluated, the high barriers to entry overcome by these women may offset this effect. That is, women who enter into the leadership post may on average be more competent than men and therefore enjoy a performance advantage.

In politics, it is clear that women face greater barriers to entry than similarly situated men. Women are less likely to be recruited to run for office (Lawless and Fox 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006). When they do run, female candidates draw more—and better—challengers than male politicians (Milyo and Schosberg 2000) and are nominated to harder-to-win seats (Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012; Ryan, Haslam, and Kulich 2010). Women face additional challenges in gaining and maintaining high-profile leadership posts. Female leaders often encounter gendered "double binds"—"lose, lose" scenarios in which women can be punished for being too masculine or too feminine, too inexperienced or not sufficiently representing change, and so on (Murray 2010).

Women have to overcome many obstacles in order to reach the upper echelon of their parties. As female party

leaders are among a small subset of politicians who have excelled despite these challenges, those who perform well in the face of this adversity may actually, on average, outlast men. Indeed, Fischer, Dowding, and Dumont (2012) speculate that female ministers have higher career durations than their male counterparts because they need to be especially talented in order to reach these top posts. This suggests:

> *Hypothesis 6:* When faced with a favorable electoral trajectory, female party leaders are less likely to leave their posts than their male counterparts.

Testing the Effect of Performance and Sex on Leaders' Tenure in Office

As before, I use a discrete time duration analysis to examine the effect of political performance and gender on leaders' survival in office. In this case, however, the event of interest is leaders' transitions out of power, and the survival time is the number of years served by each leader. In this analysis, I consider all leaders selected between 1965 and mid-2013. Across the 71 parties, there are 441 leaders in total, 61 of whom are female.[9] The longest-serving woman is Pia Kjærsgaard, who led the far-right Danish People's Party from its founding in 1995 through 2012. The longest-serving male leader is Alf Svensson, who headed the Swedish Christian Democrats from 1973 to 2004. The minimum time in the position for both men and women, in contrast, is under one year.

Measuring the Conditional Effect of Parties' Political Performance and Sex. When considering sex and leaders' survival rates, I argue that female leaders are more likely to leave office when faced with a poor electoral performance (Hypothesis 5) but may have longer tenures than their male counterparts when their parties perform well (Hypothesis 6). Extending the previous analysis, I test these hypotheses using an *interaction effect between change in party seat share and leaders' sex*. Like the first model, this second empirical analysis also accounts for government participation and party status, and includes the controls capturing party size, founding date, women's presence in the parliamentary party, party family, and country. This model incorporates an additional measure capturing time since the leader was first selected to the post. As it is possible that female leaders enter politics later in life (Davis 1997)—and as such are older (and more likely to leave the post) than men—I include a covariate measuring *leader age*. Similarly, the model accounts for all cases of both *leader and party death*.

[9]The principal results are robust to excluding leaders from the three parties with dual male and female spokespeople (see the SI for details).

Results from the Analysis of Leaders' Tenure in Office

At first glance, the results presented in Table 2 are consistent with existing research on party leaders' survival. Leaders of major governing parties are more likely to survive than those leading minor opposition parties. Leaders also have a significantly greater likelihood of leaving office when their party is losing seat share and are more likely to keep the post when their party has a favorable trajectory. Male and female leaders' predicted duration in office is also nearly identical in parties that are maintaining their seat share between elections. In fact, minor shifts in performance do not affect men and women differently.

Gender differences do emerge, however, when parties experience both losses and gains. As shown in Figure 4, when faced with a 10% loss of seat share, female leaders are significantly more likely to leave office than their male counterparts. Holding all other variables constant and conditioning on survival up until time t, the Cox hazard is 0.138 for male leaders but 0.237 for female leaders. The hazard ratio thus decreases by a factor of 0.582 when a man is in power. Consistent with Hypothesis 5, men are significantly more likely to survive a poor performance than similarly situated women (95% CI: 0.305 to 0.948). This effect is even more pronounced as a party's electoral performance declines. At a 15% loss of seat share, the hazard for male leaders remains virtually the same (0.152). For female leaders, it increases to 0.367.

Though female leaders have a greater likelihood of leaving office when their party has an unfavorable trajectory, these gender effects reverse as party performance improves. Lending support to Hypothesis 6, women are more likely to remain in the leadership position as seat share increases. At a 10% gain in seats, the Cox hazard is significantly lower for female (0.041) than male (0.093) leaders. With a 15% increase in seat share, the hazard for female leaders decreases to 0.027. For male leaders, it remains largely unchanged (0.084).

Finally, the control variables behave largely as expected. The probability of a party leader remaining in the post decreases over time, and older leaders are significantly less likely to remain in the post than their younger counterparts. Both different countries and party families also appear to have different norms with respect to leadership survival. Australian leaders, for example, are significantly less likely to remain in the post than those in several other states, whereas conservative, liberal, and green party leaders have shorter careers than social democrats.

TABLE 2 Discrete Time Duration Model of Party Leaders' Exit from Office

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)	CHR
Intercept	−4.018	0.477	−8.430	<0.001	—
Δ Seat Share	−0.020	0.008	−2.409	0.016	0.981
Female	−0.140	0.182	−0.772	0.440	0.869
Δ Seat Share × Female Lead	−0.068	0.028	−2.453	0.014	0.934
Government	0.196	0.197	0.994	0.320	1.217
Major Party	0.164	0.234	0.701	0.483	1.179
Gov. × Major Party	−0.638	0.258	−2.471	0.013	0.528
Size	0.688	0.675	1.019	0.308	1.989
Founded Post-1980	0.239	0.193	1.241	0.215	1.271
% Female MP	−0.005	0.004	−1.228	0.219	0.995
Leader Age	0.043	0.007	5.872	<0.001	1.044
Leader Death	5.716	40.742	0.140	0.888	303.834
Party Death	5.118	42.211	0.121	0.904	166.944
Time	0.029	0.014	2.112	0.035	1.029
Greens	0.882	0.312	2.824	0.005	2.416
Communists	−0.228	0.283	−0.805	0.421	0.796
Liberals	0.366	0.205	1.784	0.074	1.442
Christian Democrats	−0.035	0.213	−0.163	0.871	0.966
Conservatives	0.311	0.177	1.752	0.080	1.365
Agrarian	−0.126	0.278	−0.453	0.651	0.882
Other	0.343	0.269	1.278	0.201	1.410
Austria	−0.165	0.288	−0.573	0.567	0.848
Canada	−0.817	0.306	−2.670	0.008	0.442
Denmark	−0.348	0.294	−1.184	0.237	0.706
Finland	0.025	0.272	0.091	0.927	1.025
Germany	−0.531	0.315	−1.687	0.092	0.588
Ireland	−0.676	0.305	−2.214	0.027	0.509
Japan	−0.109	0.272	−0.402	0.688	0.896
New Zealand	−1.200	0.327	−3.669	<0.001	0.301
Sweden	−0.356	0.275	−1.296	0.195	0.701
United Kingdom	−0.427	0.312	−1.367	0.172	0.653

Note: The unit of analysis is the party leader. The outcome variable is the removal of the leader from office. The time covariate captures the number of years since the leader was selected. Baseline categories include minor parties in opposition, social democratic parties, and Australian parties. Number of observations = 2,430 leader-years.

Political Performance and Gendered Political Opportunity Structures

Though Figure 1 illustrates that an increasing number of parties are selecting female leaders, access to these positions is far from gender neutral. To the contrary, the empirical analyses demonstrate that male and female leaders and would-be leaders face different opportunity structures when trying to attain and retain power. Political performance influences both the likelihood of a party first selecting a female leader and women's tenure in the post.

For parties that remain exclusively male-led, these findings indicate that a female leader may be most likely to come to power when the organization is out of government and losing seat share. Indeed, these were the circumstances under which Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, Denmark's Helle Thorning-Schmidt, and Finland's Jutta Urpilainen came to power. Major parties that are in government and expect to retain power after the next election, in contrast, are likely to remain male-controlled until their political performance falters. Minimally, this suggests that those committed to advancing women's descriptive representation should seize upon moments of weakness (or even defeat) to advance female candidates for the leadership post. More radically, the clear barriers faced by female aspirants may lend support to calls for affirmative action policies

FIGURE 4 Cox Hazard Ratio for Male and Female Leaders' Tenure in Office as a Function of Electoral Trajectory



Note: The Cox hazard ratio was generated holding all other variables at their mean or modal values. The ratio was calculated using 0 (no change in seat share) as the baseline. The gray lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

mandating the dual selection of male and female leaders. Though quotas for these positions have historically been implemented only by minor organizations, they represent the clearest pathway to power for women in political parties in which the leadership post is especially desirable.

For parties that are currently female-led, it is clear that gender shapes leaders' position in office. If the party is performing well, the results suggest that a female leader may actually have a greater likelihood of remaining in the post than a similarly situated man. Indeed, some of the best-known and longest-serving female leaders—including Merkel, Thatcher, and New Zealand's Helen Clark—held onto their posts precisely because they bolstered their parties' electoral trajectories. Similar patterns hold for less frequently cited women, including Maud Olofsson of the Swedish Centre Party and the New Zealand Green's Jeanette Fitzsimons.

A "winning woman" is especially likely to keep her post, but only if she continues to increase her party's seat share. Any female advantage fades when the party's performance holds steady. When parties begin to struggle, moreover, women are especially likely to leave their leadership posts. Consider, for example, the Australian Labour Party's ousting of Julia Gillard in 2013. Despite the fact that Labour was in power, the party had an unfavorable trajectory. It lost seat share between 2007 and 2010, and Gillard was forced to form a coalition government. There were also strong indications that Labour would lose additional ground in the 2013 federal election. The party's poor performance, coupled with the fact that Australian parties are especially likely to dispatch with their leaders, laid the groundwork for Gillard's defeat. Clearly, for those interested in women's access to power, selecting a female leader represents the first, rather than final, hurdle to greater gender equality in the party leadership. Once women are in the post, additional efforts are required to ensure that they are not held to unfair standards.

Together these results provide cause for optimism and pessimism alike. On the one hand, there are many more female leaders than previously recognized. Each country has had at least one female-headed party, and a near majority of parties in the study have been female-led. When parties gain seat share, moreover, women are more likely than men to remain in leadership posts. Finally, while parties always aim to perform well, for advocates of women's descriptive representation there is a silver lining to a poor showing. A lackluster performance can create opportunities for new types of leaders to emerge. That is, women can benefit from an otherwise bad situation.

Despite these positive findings, it is impossible to overlook the fact that women are doubly disadvantaged with respect to the party leadership. First, they are more likely to initially come to power when the post is least desirable. Attractive positions remain male-dominated, suggesting that gender biases persist in party politics. Second, female leaders have a greater likelihood of leaving the post when their parties lose seat share. Even the advantage enjoyed by well-performing female leaders, moreover, may not be wholly positive. Their longer duration is likely indicative of the exceptional nature of the women who are able to both gain entry into, and then succeed in, these positions. That is, "winning women" may stay in the post precisely because they have overcome especially high barriers to entry and/or rehabilitated poorly performing parties. As is often the case, with respect to the party leadership, male and female politicians once again encounter different opportunities and constraints.

Conclusions

Party leaders are among the most important political actors in advanced industrial democracies. They shape the policy agenda, oversee the decision to enter government, influence their parties' political performance, and affect

candidate selection. The leaders of major parties can even hope to become prime minister. Despite the importance of this position, up until this point comparatively little has been known about women's access to, and tenure in, the party leadership. While anecdotal and case study evidence suggested that women face unique challenges in gaining and retaining office, these gendered opportunity structures were as of yet largely unidentified.

To address this gap in the literature, I theorized that political performance differentially affects men's and women's experiences with party leadership. Using a unique data set of parties from 11 countries over almost 50 years, the results suggest that women are more likely to initially come to power in minor opposition parties and those that are losing seat share. Extending this research, I show that female leaders are more likely to retain office when their parties gain seats, but also more likely to leave the post when faced with an unfavorable trajectory. Political performance thus represents a double-edged sword for female politicians. On the one hand, a poor showing increases the likelihood of a female leader first ascending to power, and women do well if they are able to improve their parties' trajectories. On the other hand, female aspirants are also more likely than men both to be selected as leaders by struggling parties and also to leave these posts when their parties experience large losses. Together, these results demonstrate that prospective female leaders are playing by a different (and often more demanding) set of rules than their male counterparts.

These findings highlight the need for gender and politics scholars to focus greater attention on political parties. There is a large body of research considering the macrolevel determinants of women's descriptive representation in both the legislative and executive branches. Yet, it is parties that are chiefly responsible for selecting candidates, ministers, and even heads of government. Indeed, in advanced parliamentary democracies, we cannot fully understand women's presence in politics without accounting for party-level behavior. Future research should thus continue to identify the circumstances in which promoting women's representation aligns or conflicts with parties' vote- and office-seeking aims. As was the case with the party leadership, this may not only provide new insights into women's presence in politics—including their access to executive positions—but could also shed light on variation in women's substantive representation.

At the same time, it is also increasingly important to gender the research on political parties. There is a growing body of literature, for example, on political leaders' tenure in office. When ignoring sex differences in political opportunity structures, these studies are likely to miss an important factor shaping leaders' survival in the post. More generally, this research demonstrates that parties are themselves fundamentally gendered institutions. Both inter- and intraparty behavior is likely to differentially affect male and female politicians. The gender makeup of these organizations, in turn, is likely to influence the ways in which they function. Incorporating gender will thus shed new light on the "black box" of intraparty politics.

Finally, though this article significantly extends our knowledge of female party leaders, the study of this topic is far from concluded. One logical extension of this work, for example, is to consider gendered differences in ambition for leadership posts and subsequent approaches to leadership campaigns. While male politicians may focus on vote- or office-seeking motivations, female aspirants may be drawn to (and campaign for) the post based on policy-seeking aims. Another project relates to the role played by parties' internal organization. While this article focuses on political performance, it is possible that these effects are conditioned by the organizational balance of power between members, activists, and elites. That is, the mechanisms governing leadership selection may interact with party performance to (dis)advantage female candidates for these posts (Kenig 2009; Pilet and Cross 2014). Yet another article might examine party behavior following the exit of the first female leader from power. In particular, careful consideration should be given to the question of why some parties select only one female leader, whereas in others multiple women have held the post. These differences may be explained not only by the party's performance broadly, but also by the perceived success or failure of the first female leader. Future work should consider why some women shatter the glass ceiling, whereas others leave it only cracked.

Beyond the performance framework, more research is also needed to understand the consequences of women's access to the party leadership for women's representation more broadly. Future work should examine the relationship between female party leaders and the promotion of women's descriptive representation. Indeed, more research is needed to determine whether female leaders are more likely to select female candidates and promote women to ministerial posts. Additional studies could further explore the link between female party leaders and women's substantive and symbolic representation. There is a large body of literature that suggests, for example, that women's presence in legislatures not only is linked to the adoption of female-friendly policies (Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005) and the representation of diverse policy preferences (Barnes 2012), but also empowers women within society and upsets traditional expectations about appropriate gender roles (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Beaman et al. 2009; Wolbrecht

and Campbell 2007). While existing research focuses primarily on female legislators, party leaders have greater control over the policy agenda and are more visible to the public than their backbench colleagues. This suggests that female party leaders have the potential to serve as "critical actors" whose influence may be especially important to women's policy representation and political empowerment. Regardless of the results of this additional work, these unanswered questions ensure that we will be studying gender and party leadership for many years to come.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

- Case Selection I: Countries
- Case Selection II: Political Parties
- Empirical Analysis
- Robustness Checks