

The Macro Impact of Debt-Inflation Channel on Investment

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Motivation: Inflation and The Real Economy

- The post-COVID era saw inflation surge to 40-year highs, attracting interest in the real effects of inflation.
- A key mechanism: the **debt-inflation (Fisher) channel**.
 - Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from nominal creditors to debtors.
- **Well-documented for households** (Doepke & Schneider, 2006; Auclert, 2019).
 - But effects on consumption are often found to be modest.
- Firm side studies are limited (Gomes et al, 2016)
 - Non-financial corporations hold a substantial share of nominal debt.
 - How does the Fisher channel affect **corporate investment**?
 - Is there any heterogeneity across firms and does it matter?

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Research Questions and Result Preview

Key Questions:

- 1 Does unexpected inflation stimulate investment and have differential effects for indebted firms? (Micro Evidence)
- 2 What is the aggregate impact on investment and output? (Macro Quantification)

Main Results

- More indebted firms increase investment more relative to others following unexpected increase in inflation.
- The firm-side Fisher channel is quantitatively powerful: A 1% inflation surprise raises aggregate investment by **0.83%**
- It can explain up to **50%** of the post-COVID investment surge; This effect is significantly larger than its household-side counterpart.

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- **Debt-Inflation (Fisher) Channel:**

- Shifts focus from households (Doepke & Schneider 2006, Auclert 2019), and representative firm to **heterogeneous firms**.
- Shows the investment channel is quantitatively more significant.

- Investment under Financial Frictions:

- Inflation is not just an amplifier, but a direct wealth shock that **endogenously relaxes constraints** (cf. BGG 1999, Ottonello & Winberry 2020).

- Nominal Rigidities beyond Sticky Prices:

- Highlights **non-state-contingent nominal debt contracts** as another source of rigidity (cf. Sheedy 2014, Gomes et al. 2016).
- Shows powerful real effects even with flexible prices.

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Contribution to Literature

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Roadmap

- 1 A Conceptual Framework
- 2 Empirical Analysis
- 3 Heterogeneous Firm GE Model
- 4 Quantitative Analysis
- 5 Conclusion

A 2-Period Model: Setup

- Two periods $t = 1, 2$, representative firm produces with $y_t = k_t^\alpha$
- Born with initial capital k_1 and nominal corporate bond B_1
- Capital fully depreciates every period
- **Key Frictions:**
 - ① **Pre-existing Nominal Debt:** Interest rate i_1 and face value B_1 are fixed. Unexpected inflation Π_1 reduces the real repayment $\frac{(1+i_1)B_1}{P_1}$.
 - ② **Financing Constraints:**
 - Non-negative dividend constraint, firms cannot issue equity.
 - Tight ϕ collateral constraint on new borrowing.
- By defining $b_t = \frac{B_t}{P_{t-1}}$, key balance sheet variable, net worth is

$$nw_1 = k_1^\alpha - \frac{(1+i_1)b_1}{\Pi_1}$$

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Model Optimality Conditions

- Firm chooses investment (k_2, b_2) to maximize discounted dividends

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{k_2, b_2} \left\{ d_1 + \frac{d_2}{1+r} \right\} \\ \text{s.t. } & d_1 = nw_1 - k_2 + b_2 \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \phi k_2^\alpha - (1+r)b_2 \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- The unconstrained maximizer k_2^{FB} is

$$k_2^{FB} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{1+r} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$\text{when } nw_1 \geq k_2^{FB} - \phi \frac{(k_2^{FB})^\alpha}{1+r}$$

- Constrained optimal investment k_2^* when $nw_1 \leq k_2^{FB} - \phi \frac{(k_2^{FB})^\alpha}{1+r}$

$$k_2^* - \phi \frac{(k_2^*)^\alpha}{1+r} = nw_1$$

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Model Mechanism: How Inflation Affects Investment

• Unconstrained Firms:

- Low initial debt $b_1 \implies$ High net worth.
- They invest at the first-best level (k_2^{FB}), where MPK = user cost.
- Unexpected inflation $\uparrow \Pi_1 \implies \uparrow nw_1$, but investment is unchanged (already optimal).

• Constrained Firms:

- High initial debt $b_1 \implies$ Low net worth. The $d_1 \geq 0$ constraint binds.
- They are forced to invest less than first-best ($k_2^* < k_2^{FB}$).
- On the constrained region, k_2^* is strictly increasing in nw_1

$$\frac{\partial k_2^*}{\partial nw_1} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{\phi \alpha (k_2^*)^{\alpha-1}}{1+r}} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial nw_1}{\partial \Pi_1} = \frac{(1+i_1)b_1}{(\Pi_1)^2} > 0,$$

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
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Model Prediction: Comparative Statics

The differential effects of unexpected inflation



Theory Guide for Empirical Analysis

- Constrained k_2^* relates b_1, Π_1 , and define $inv_1 = \frac{k_2}{k_1}$

$$\Delta inv_1^* = \Delta \left(\frac{k_2^*}{k_1} \right) = \underbrace{\frac{1}{1 - \frac{\phi \alpha (k_2^*)^{\alpha-1}}{1+r}}}_{\text{state-dependent}} \frac{(1 + i_1)}{(\Pi_1)^2} \times b_1 \Delta \Pi_1 \quad (1)$$

- Monotonicity in b_1 : higher b_1 leads to a larger response of i_1 to Π_1 .
- Constraint interaction: effects concentrate where constraint binds.
- Sorting by productivity: for given b_1 , higher MPK shows stronger investment responses.

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Data and Measurement


- **Firm-level Data:** Quarterly Compustat, 1990Q1 - 2023Q4.
 - Dependent Variable: Investment Rate ($i_{j,t}/k_{j,t-1}$).
 - Key Regressor: **Indebtedness**, $b_{j,t-1}$, measured as log of total nominal debt, residualized to remove firm and time fixed effects.
- **Inflation Data:**
 - Realized Inflation: CPI from BLS.
 - Expected Inflation: 1-year ahead from FRB Cleveland.
 - Unexpected Inflation: $\epsilon_t^\pi = \pi_t^{\text{realized}} - \mathbb{E}_{t-4}[\pi_t]$.

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Unexpected Inflation Series (1990-2023)

Quarterly Inflation Series (1990Q1 - 2023Q4)



Notes: Large deflationary surprise during the Great Recession (2008-2009) and large inflationary surprises post-COVID

Empirical Strategy

To test the model's prediction, I use a difference-in-differences specification inspired by the conceptual framework:

$$i_{j,t} = \alpha_j + \alpha_{s,t} + \beta(b_{j,t-1} \times \epsilon_t^\pi) + \gamma b_{j,t-1} + \mathbf{\Gamma}'_A(b_{j,t-1} \times \mathbf{A}_t) + \mathbf{\Gamma}'_Z \mathbf{Z}_{j,t-1} + e_{j,t} \quad (2)$$

- α_j : Firm Fixed Effects. $\alpha_{s,t}$: Sector \times Time Fixed Effects.
- Interaction between indebtedness and GDP growth, FFR.
- Standard firm level controls including size, liquidity, sales growth etc.
- Two-way clustering standard errors by firm and quarter.
- **Prediction from theory:** $\beta > 0$.
 - Higher indebtedness amplifies the positive investment response to an inflation surprise.

Main Empirical Result: Heterogeneous Responses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$b_{j,t-1} \times \epsilon_t^\pi$	0.116*** (0.029)	0.124*** (0.029)		
$b_{j,t-1} \times \pi_t$			0.089*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.023)
Obs	268757	268757	268757	268757
R^2	0.118	0.125	0.118	0.124
Firm Ctrl	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sector-time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

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Firm fixed effects included and standard errors clustered at firm-quarter level.

- β is positive and highly significant, consistent with theory.
- **Magnitude:** A 1 p.p. inflation surprise leads to a 3.5 bps higher investment rate for a firm with 1 std. dev. higher debt.

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
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Dynamic Effects: Local Projections

To trace the dynamic effect, I estimate the local projection regression

$$\Delta \log k_{j,t+h} = \alpha_j + \alpha_{s,t} + \beta_h(b_{j,t-1}\epsilon_t^\pi) + \gamma_h b_{j,t-1} + e_{j,t,h} \quad (3)$$



- The differential effect on capital is positive and persistent, peaking around the 8th quarter.

The main empirical finding is robust to:

- Excluding the Great Recession and COVID periods.
- Using alternative measures of indebtedness (e.g., leverage ratio).

Takeaway: Strong and robust empirical support for the firm-side Fisher channel.

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Quantitative Model: Heterogeneous Firms

Continuum of mass 1 production firms indexed by i

- Production Technology

$$y_{i,t} = z_{i,t} k_{i,t}^{\alpha} n_{i,t}^{\nu}, \quad \alpha + \nu < 1$$

$$\log(z_{i,t+1}) = \rho \log(z_{i,t}) + \sigma \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad \varepsilon_{j,t+1} \sim N(0, 1)$$

Production goods sold at competitive real price p_t

- Labor Choice

$$n_{i,t}^* = \left(\frac{\nu p_t z_{i,t} k_{i,t}^{\alpha}}{w_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\nu}}$$

Labor hiring at real wage w_t

- Capital Accumulation

$$k_{i,t+1} = i_{i,t} + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t}$$

$$AC(i_{i,t}, k_{i,t}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{i_{i,t}^2}{k_{i,t}}$$

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Quantitative Model: Heterogeneous Firms

- Exogenous Entry and Exit with death prob. π_d
 - New firms draw idiosyncratic productivity and enter with k_0 to keep mass unchanged.
- Key Frictions
 - One-period risk-free nominal corporate bonds B_t with predetermined nominal rate R_t and repayments.
 - Collateral constraint to ensure safety, by defining $b_t = \frac{B_t}{P_{t-1}}$.

$$(1 + R_{t+1})b_{i,t+1} \leq \Pi_{t+1}(p_{t+1}z_{i,t+1}k_{i,t+1}^\alpha n_{i,t+1}^\nu - w_{t+1}n_{t+1} + (1 - \delta)k_{i,t+1})$$

New borrowings must be within the lowest possible net worth in the next period.

- Non-negative dividend constraint (No equity issuance) for continuing firms:

$$d_{i,t} = p_t z_{i,t} k_{i,t}^\alpha n_{i,t}^\nu - w_t n_{i,t} - i_{i,t} - AC(i_{i,t}, k_{i,t}) - (1 + R_t) \frac{b_t}{\Pi_t} + b_{i,t+1} \geq 0$$

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Quantitative Model: Firm's Problem

- 1 Enter period with state variables (z, k, b) .
- 2 Productivity and death shocks realize.
- 3 Exogenously exist after production.
- 4 Choose (k', b') to the next period if continuing.

The firm's problem in Bellman equation:

$$\begin{aligned} V_t(z, k, b) &= (1 - \pi_d) V_t^c(z, k, b) + \pi_d V_t^d(z, k, b) \\ V_t^c(z, k, b) &= \max_{k', b'} \left\{ d_t(z, k, b, k', b') + \mathbb{E}_t[\Lambda_{t+1} V_t(z', k', b' | z)] \right\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad d_t &= p_t z k^\alpha n^\nu - wn - i - AC(i, k) - (1 + R) \frac{b}{\Pi_t} + b' \geq 0 \\ b' &\leq \frac{\Pi_{t+1}}{1 + R_{t+1}} (p_{t+1} z' k'^\alpha n'^\nu - w_{t+1} n' + (1 - \delta) k') \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Quantitative Model: Other Agents

- Retailers and Final Goods Producer
 - Linear technology transferring homogeneous production goods into differentiated goods.
 - CES Technology to produce final goods using differentiated goods.
- Representative Households
 - Maximize expected utility subject to budget constraint:

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (\log C_t - \chi N_t) \quad (5)$$

$$s.t. \quad P_t C_t + S_{t+1} = W_t N_t + (1 + R_t) S_t + D_t$$

- Stochastic Discount Factor Λ_{t+1} follows $\beta \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}}$.
- Central Bank supplies money to clear money market with nominal rate determined by Fisher equation $R_t = r_t + E_{t-1} \pi_t$.

Quantitative Model: Equilibrium

Equilibrium

The steady state equilibrium for the flexible price economy is given by a set of value functions $V_t(z, k, b)$, decision rules k', b', n for capital, debt and labor, a measure of firms $\mu_t(z, k, b)$, and a set of prices $w_t, r_t, p_t, \Lambda_{t+1}$ such that:

- 1 given prices, all firms optimize: V solves bellman equation with associated policy rules;
- 2 household optimize;
- 3 goods market, labor market and asset market all clear;
- 4 the distribution of firms μ is stationary.

Calibration and Model Fit

- Model is calibrated to match key moments of the U.S. economy and Compustat firm distribution at a quarterly frequency.

Calibration (Parameters)

Description	Param	Value
Discount factor	β	0.99
TFP persistence	ρ_z	0.90
Innovations SD	σ_z	0.10
Depreciation rate	δ	0.025
Capital share	α	0.25
Labor coefficient	ν	0.60
Adj. cost	γ	1.00
Initial capital	k_0	0.20
Exit rate	π_d	0.02
Elasticity of subs.	ϵ_p	10

Model Fit (Moments)

Moment	Data	Model
$\mathbb{E}[b/k]$	0.316	0.286
$\mathbb{E}[i]$ (p.p.)	3.936	4.398
$SD(i)$ (p.p.)	10.263	8.27
AutoCorr(Lev)	0.938	0.989
$\text{Frac}(b > 0)$	0.708	0.632
Annual Exit	0.08	0.08
Emp. Ratio	0.022	0.021

Note: Employment ratio source: U.S. Census Bureau – BDS (2022).

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
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Roadmap

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- 3 Heterogeneous Firm GE Model
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- 5 Conclusion

PE Impulse Response


PE Impulse Responses to a 1% Inflation Shock



- Strong PE effects: 4.5% increase in aggregate investment with 1% transitory inflation.

GE Impulse Response

GE Impulse Responses to a 1% Inflation Shock



- GE prices: decrease in wages and increase in real rates.
- Fisher channel effect on aggregate investment dampened to **0.83%**.

Model vs. Empirics: Replicating the Heterogeneity

- I feed the historical unexpected inflation series into the model to generate a simulated panel of firms.
- Then, I run the same regressions on the model-generated data.

Investment Rate	Empirical Estimate	Model Implied Results	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$b_{j,t-1} \times \epsilon_t^\pi$	0.124*** (0.029)	0.048* (0.026)	0.024*** (0.005)
Observations	268757	192801	192801
R^2	0.125	0.272	0.968
Firm Control	Yes	No	Yes
Two Way FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

- The model qualitatively reproduces the key empirical finding: more indebted firms invest more after an inflation surprise.

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
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Counterfactual: The Great Recession


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
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Counterfactual: The Post-COVID Inflation Surge


- The post-COVID period saw a series of large positive inflation surprises.
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- This paper studies the **debt-inflation (Fisher) channel** on investment.
- **Empirically**, I show that more indebted firms invest disproportionately more following an unexpected inflation surprise. This finding is robust and persistent.
- **Quantitatively**, a calibrated GE model shows the channel is macroeconomically significant.
 - A 1% inflation surprise raises investment by 0.83%.
 - The channel is a major contributor to investment dynamics during the Great Recession (23%) and post-COVID era (50%).
- The firm-side Fisher channel is quantitatively more important than the well-studied household consumption channel.

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