

## Q Protocol Zoo.

### - ~~What's new?~~ What's new?

- Science {
  - 1) Some more code with Gözde.
  - 2) New Protocols with certification library.
  - 3) Planning to move some subroutines to specific pages
- Pres. {
  - 4) Submission: 2-step process.
  - 5) Knowledge graph + decomposition given by Natansh now automated.
- ~~Philosophy~~ {
  - 6) Planning a better home page

### - A grand scale experiment:


- Photo of Hackathon.

### - What did we learn?

- It is useful: 6 locations did use the Zoo to find and code their challenges

- It needs to be expanded:

- More protocols

- More consistency ~~more~~  further doc: have <sup>links to</sup> security proofs

- Summary of the security obtained.

What else can we plan for the protocol too?

- ~~helping~~ ~~experimentalists~~
- ~~helping~~ ~~experimentalists~~ to approach protocols

↳ what quality ~~of~~ should I achieve for my ~~own~~ devices?

↳ asking this is ~~about~~ ~~composition~~ about composition

↳ we should provide the right decomposition

(It's also the case for the full network layer model):

- we ask for <sup>agiven</sup> service, ~~with the proper assumptions~~

- is the service composable? } → picture of network layer.  
(quantum - classical)

⇒ We want to promote a top-down approach:

~~you cannot~~ ~~to the layer~~

~~you~~ + you ask a service for a purpose :

\* you cannot build a bottom-up stack and hoping that the application layer will get the proper service

+ you decompose your application into freq. used elementary functions

+ show that doing so gives the proper application.

⇒ Apply the ~~same~~ spirit of the Zoo to AC

and give a value to what the quality of devices ~~will~~ shall be.

- Let's do it:

- most used functionality in q. protocols: send qubit from A to B.

- why is it important? : ~~actually~~ well experimentalists tell us they plan to teleport... but can I do this without endangering security?

- Constructing direct quantum channel with teleportation...

- Direct Q. Channel. : no security.

- Teleportation : perfect source but ~~channel~~ is in control of E.

- Correctness.

- Direct Q. Channel.

- Teleport.

- Security

- Direct Q. Channel

- Teleportation

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~~However~~ - We have ~~done~~ a first decomposition  
but not very interesting.

- Lets go one step further and decompose the EPR source.

- Construction.

- Perfect EPR.

- "Distillation".

↳ 1) Twist + Symmetrization  $\mathcal{E}_1$  acting on  $H_A \otimes H_B$   
+ Partial Trace.

2) Fidelity verification.  $\mathcal{E}_2$  acting on  $H_A \otimes H_B$ .  
 $\rightarrow H_A^{\otimes n-m-l} \otimes H_B^{\otimes n-m-l}$

3) Distillation.  $\mathcal{E}_3$  acting on.

$H_A^{\otimes n-m-l} \otimes H_B^{\otimes n-m-l} \rightarrow H_A^{\otimes n-m-l-k} \otimes H_B^{\otimes m-m-l-k} \otimes H_2^{\otimes 2}$   
fail

4) Labelling.

Show Pictures.

- Correctness.

\* if I have a given source for which I have  
a working distill. protocol ~~which~~, I will almost always  
perfectly distill the expected # of pairs

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# Security

Setting - Perfect EPR. + simul.  
- Distill.

$$\Rightarrow \# \otimes \rho_{ABE} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{E}_1} \mathcal{E}_4(\mathcal{E}_3(\mathcal{E}_2(\mathcal{E}_1(\rho_{ABE})))) : \text{distill. proto.}$$

$$= \rho_{ABE}^{(3)} \cdot (1-p_L) + p_L |IX\rangle\langle IX|$$

$$\mathcal{E}_1(\rho_{ABE})$$

$$\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{E}_3(\mathcal{E}_2(\mathcal{E}_1(\rho_{ABE})))) :$$

$$= \text{EPR} \cdot (1-p_L) + p_L |IX\rangle\langle IX|$$

$$\mathcal{E}_2(\mathcal{E}_1(\rho_{ABE})) = \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}(\tilde{\rho} + 2\epsilon, \tilde{\rho} + 2\epsilon) \text{ pass})$$

meaning  
 $\mathcal{F}$  is emitting the # of almost perfect EPR pairs produced by  $\mathcal{E}_3 \circ \mathcal{E}_2 \circ \mathcal{E}_1$  and emitting that # of perfect EPR's

$$\Rightarrow \|\mathcal{E}_4[\mathcal{E}_3 \circ \mathcal{E}_2 \circ \mathcal{E}_1(\rho_{ABE})] - \mathcal{F}[\mathcal{E}_3 \circ \mathcal{E}_2 \circ \mathcal{E}_1(\rho_{ABE})]\|$$

$$\|\mathcal{E}_4[\rho_{ABE}^3] - \mathcal{F}[\rho_{ABE}^3]\|$$

$$= \|\underbrace{\mathcal{E}_4[\rho_{ABE}^3] - \mathcal{E}_4[\text{EPR}]}_{=0} + \mathcal{E}_4[\text{EPR}] - \mathcal{F}[\rho_{ABE}^3] + \mathcal{F}[\text{EPR}] - \mathcal{F}[\text{EPR}]\|$$

$$\|\mathcal{E}_4[\rho_{ABE}^3] - \mathcal{E}_4[\text{EPR}]\| +$$

$$\leq \|\mathcal{E}_4(\rho_{ABE}^3) - \mathcal{E}_4(\text{EPR})\| + \|\mathcal{F}(\rho_{ABE}^3) - \mathcal{F}(\text{EPR})\|$$

$$\|\rho_{ABE}^3 - \text{EPR}\| + \|\mathcal{E}_4(\text{EPR}) - \mathcal{F}(\text{EPR})\|$$

$$\leq \|\rho_{ABE}^3 - \text{EPR}\|$$

$$\# = \| \mathcal{E}^{(2)}(S_{ABE}) - \mathcal{E}^{(2)}_{\text{EPR}} \|$$

$$\# = \| \mathcal{E}^{(2)}(S_{ABE}) - \mathcal{E}^{(2)}_{\text{EPR}} \|$$

given by  $\mathcal{E}$ . fixed param. of the protocol  
given. that I have the correct input.

$$\| \mathcal{E}^{(2)}(S_{ABE}) - \mathcal{E}^{(2)}(S_{ABE}^{\text{perfect}}) \| + \| \mathcal{E}^{(2)}(S_{ABE}^{\text{perfect}}) - \mathcal{E}^{(2)}_{\text{EPR}} \|$$

$$\leq \| \underbrace{\quad}_{\mathcal{E}} \| + \| \underbrace{\quad}_{\mathcal{E}} \|$$

$$\| S_{ABE} - S_{ABE}^{\text{perfect}} \|$$

Security:

- Show setting.

$$\rho_{ABE} \xrightarrow{\varepsilon^{(1)}} \rho_{AB}^{(1)} \xrightarrow{\varepsilon^{(2)}} \rho_{AB}^{(2)} \cdot (1-p_\perp^{(1)}) + p_\perp^{(1)} |1X1\rangle$$

$$\xrightarrow{\varepsilon^{(3)}} \rho_{AB}^{(3)} (1-p_\perp^{(2)}) \cdot (1-p_\perp^{(1)}) + (1-p_\perp^{(2)}) \cdot p_\perp^{(1)} |1X1\rangle + p_\perp^{(2)} |1X1\rangle$$

$$\xrightarrow{\varepsilon^{(4)}} \rho_{ABE}^{(3)} (1-p_\perp^{(3)}) \cdot (1-p_\perp^{(2)}) + |1X1\rangle \cdot ((1-p_\perp^{(2)}) \cdot p_\perp^{(2)} + p_\perp^{(2)})$$

$$\rho_{ABE} \xrightarrow{(\varepsilon^{(1)} \varepsilon^{(2)} \varepsilon^{(3)})} \rho_{ABE}^{(3)} (1-p_\perp^{(2)}) \cdot (1-p_\perp^{(1)}) + |1X1\rangle \dots$$

$$\xrightarrow{F} \rho_{ABE}^{(3)} |1X1\rangle \langle 1X1|^{\otimes n-m-l-k} : (1-p_\perp^{(2)})(1-p_\perp^{(1)}) + ((1-p_\perp^{(2)})(p_\perp^{(2)} + p_\perp^{(2)}) \cdot |1X1\rangle \langle 1X1|$$

difference is bounded by:

$$\|\rho_{ABE}^{(3)} - |1X1\rangle \langle 1X1|^{\otimes n-m-l-k}\|$$

$$\|\varepsilon^{(1)}(\rho_{ABE}^{(2)}) - \varepsilon^{(3)}(\rho_{AB}^{(2)}) + \varepsilon^{(3)}(\rho_{AB}^{(2)} - |1X1\rangle \langle 1X1|^{\otimes n-m-l})\|$$

$$\leq \|\rho_{ABE}^{(2)} - \rho_{AB}^{(2)}\|$$

$$\leq \|\varepsilon^{(2)}(\rho_{AB}^{(1)}) - \varepsilon^{(2)}(\rho_{AB}^{(1)}) + \varepsilon^{(2)}(\rho_{AB}^{(1)} - |1X1\rangle \langle 1X1|^{\otimes n-m-l})\|$$

$$\leq \|\varepsilon^{(2)}(\rho_{AB}^{(1)}) - \varepsilon^{(2)}(\rho_{AB}^{(1)})\| + \varepsilon_d + \varepsilon_f$$

- do all the analysis without  $\varepsilon$ .

- put  $\varepsilon$  back.

$$\leq \varepsilon_d + \varepsilon_F + \underbrace{\left\| \int_{AB}^{(1)} - \int_{AB}^{(2)} \right\|}_{64 \frac{n-m}{h}}.$$

- So we have a bound.

- But we cannot say anything on  $\left\| \int_{AB}^{(1)} - \int_{AB}^{(2)} \right\| = \left\| \Phi^+ \times \Phi^+ \right\|_{\mathcal{B}_F}^{n-m-(l-k)}.$

- " gentle measurement theorem  
 $\Rightarrow \mathcal{E} \sqrt{\dots}$

then we have the proof