

Siemens Corporate Technology | July 2015

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Existing Infrastructure vs. New Challenges

Our Security&Privacy Menu

- **Classic:**

- *Synopsis:* invented <2010, native to enterprise/office-IT resp. traditional Web
- *Shopping list:* Diameter, Kerberos, LDAP, P3P, PKCS, RADIUS, S/MIME, SAML, SSL/TLS/DTLS, WS-*, XML Signature/Encryption...

- **New:**


- *Synopsis:* invented 2010-2015, addressing new Web application styles (Web apps/APIs)
- *Shopping list:* FIDO, JOSE, OAuth, OIDC, SCIM, UMA...

- **Future:**

- *Synopsis:* >2015, native to IoT/WoT
- *Shopping list (initial):* ACE (incl. DCAF, TWAI, OAuth/UMA...), COSE, DICE...


Considered in this presentation

LDAP 3.0



- **Focus:**
 - **User data:** store for identifiers, credentials attributes, affiliations, login metadata
 - **User authentication:** internalized (LDAP Bind)
- **Features:**
 - Initial authentication with username/password
 - Password polices (LPPE)
 - Persisted, hierarchically-structured data store
- **Limitations:**
 - Initial authentication schemes other than username/password
 - No security token
 - No SSO or persisted login UX
 - AP resp. caller components upon constrained devices
- **Significance:** ubiquitous technology for user data stores (enterprise/office-IT, Web)

Kerberos 5.0



- **Focus:**

- **User authentication:** internalized (@AP)
- **SSO-UX:** same/cross-domain

- **Features:**


- Password or PKI-based user authentication
- PoP security tokens (ASN.1)
- SSO-UX in the same organization
- Some persisted login UX (by means of TGTs)
- Extensions (S4U)

- **Limitations:**

- Initial authentication schemes other than password or PKI-based
- No rich metadata about initial authentication
- No cross-organization SSO-UX
- AP/RP resp. caller/callee components upon constrained devices


- **Significance:** ubiquitous use in enterprise-IT

SAML 2.0



- **Focus:**
 - **User authentication:** externalized
 - **SSO-UX:** cross-organization/domain
- **Features:**
 - SSO-UX and federated identity for Web
 - Rich metadata about initial authentication
 - (Bearer) security tokens (XML): versatile contents statically issued according RP needs
- **Limitations:**
 - RP simplicity
 - Ad-hoc registration of RPs at APs (without explicit administrative action)
 - No persisted login UX
 - Non-HTTP
 - AP/RP resp. callee components upon constrained devices
- **Significance:** moderate use in enterprise/higher education IT

OIDC 1.0 (an OAuth 2.0 Descendant)



- **Focus:**

- **User authentication:** externalized
- **SSO-UX:** cross-organization/domain

- **Features:**


- SSO-UX and federated identity for Web
- Rich metadata about initial authentication
- Bearer security tokens (JSON): versatile contents dynamically issued according RP needs
- RP simplicity
- Ad-hoc registration of RPs at APs (without explicit administrative action)

- **Limitations:**

- No login UX across apps
- Non-HTTP
- AP/RP resp. callee components upon constrained devices

- **Significance:** vast coverage of the 7''' human users on Earth: Amazon, (Facebook), Google...


OAuth 2.0



Caveat: OAuth is a zoo, this slide considers the native OAuth use case aka authz code grant

- **Focus:**
 - **Authorization:** owner-to-self
 - **User authentication:** persisted login UX
- **Features:**
 - Authorization for Web resources owned by individual end users (for self)
 - RP simplicity
 - Ad-hoc registration of RPs at APs (without explicit administrative action)
- **Limitations:**
 - Owner-to-any authorization
 - Non-HTTP
 - AP/(RP) resp. caller/(callee) components upon constrained devices
- **Significance:** ubiquitous means to protect Web APIs and to implement persisted login UX in mobile apps

UMA 1.0 (an OAuth 2.0 Descendant)



- **Focus:**
 - **Authorization:** owner-to-any
- **Features:**
 - Authorization for Web resources owned by individual end users (for others)
- **Limitations:**
 - Non-HTTP
 - AP/RP resp. callee/caller components upon constrained devices
- **Significance:** sporadically used means to protect Web applications

Pattern of Common AAA Technologies: Kerberos, OAuth, UMA

Requesting party

Resource owners

Principals
(individuals,
companies)



Uses

Controls

Components

Authentication and
authorization

**Asserting
party (AP)**

Manages

Protects

Caller

Requests resource

Provides resource

**Relying
Party (RP),
callee**

Pattern of Common AAA Technologies: SAML, OIDC

Requesting party

Resource owner

*Principals
(individuals,
companies)*



Uses

**Asserting
party (AP)**

Authentication

Caller

Manages

**Relying
Party (RP),
callee**

Requests resource

Provides resource

Components

Conclusions (1)


- *Entity infrastructure:*
 - **Human users - addressed**
 - Employees: covered (enterprise user repositories and authentication systems), re-use/extend
 - Consumers: depends from where one starts
 - **Clients/services – addressed**
 - Office/enterprise-IT: covered (Windows domain infrastructure)
 - Web: server authentication (SSL/TLS), OAuth-based client registration/authentication
 - **Things/devices – not addressed**
 - Investment goods: not covered
 - Consumer goods: not covered

Conclusions (2)

- *Technology stacks:*
 - **Human users – re-use, integrate**
 - **Clients/services – re-use, integrate**
 - **Things/devices – invent**
 - Classic and new technologies focus on authorization, authentication and identity for human users, lack corresponding support of (unattended) **devices/things**
 - Lack support for AP/RP resp. caller/callee **components upon constrained devices** (RFC 7228 device classes 0/1/2)
 - Lack support of **change-of-ownership use case**
- *More information:* see W3C WoT IG Wiki page [Landscape of Security&Privacy Means](#)

Summary ;-)

This use case is not really thought of in contemporary IT-security:



Abbreviations

AAA	Authentication, Authorization, Accounting	MIME	Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
ACE	Authentication and Autorisation for Constrained Environment	OAuth	Open Authorization
AP	Asserting Party	OIDC	OpenID Connect
ASN.1	Abstract Syntax Notation 1	P3P	Platform for Privacy Preferences
Authn	Authentication	PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
Authz	Authorization	PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
CBOR	Concise Binary Object Representation	PoP	Proof-of-Possession
CoAP	Constrained Application Protocol	RADIUS	Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
COSE	CBOR Object Signing and Encryption	RP	Relying Party
DICE	DTLS In Constrained Environments	S4U	Service for User
DTLS	Datagram TLS	S/MIME	Secure MIME
FIDO	Fast Identity Online	SAML	Security Assertion Markup Language
HTTP	HyperText Transfer Protocol	SCIM	System for Cross-Domain Identity Management
I4.0	Industrie 4.0 (German term)	SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
IdP	Identity Provider	TGT	Ticket Granting Ticket
IIC	Industrial Internet Consortium	TLS	Transport Layer Security
IoT	Internet-of-Things	TWAI	Two-Way Authentication for IoT
JOSE	Javascript Object Signing and Encryption	UMA	User-Managed Access
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation	UX	User eXperience
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol	WoT	Web-of-Things
LPPE	LDAP Password Policy Extensions	WS	Web Services
		XML	eXtensible Markup Language

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