

## Reto: Análisis de Malware Básico & Medio/Alto


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## Virtual Machine Details :


This paper aims to describe some steps and my methodology to solve this challenge, i'm not a professional in malware analysis, i'm an enthusiast so if you make a better job please share with me, document it into the wiki, my contact details are below. Being said that the first thing to do is set up a controlled virtual machine, in this case i'll use Windows Xp Professional SP3 as a virtual machine, in addition to that i'm going to use "Tomar instantaneas" or snapshots of the vm. The vm has this features :



Pic 1: basic set up for vm


with a little amount of software installed on it (reader, java, flash, chrome..etc), it could be used for our analysis.

For perform behavioral analysis in this vm i'm going to take my first registry shot using regshot[1], this tool let to take an entire shot of the register keys and other things inside him, also it has the capabilities to make a quick diff between on and two files .




*Pic 2: Using regshot for got snapshot*

Our next step to do is take one snapshot in case of you need to revert the vm for repeat the behavior in the same, off course you can use other tools like norton ghost utility but this option is quick and efficient.




*Pic 3: Taking snapshot to revert to good state*

The final step to this vm is set up the network configuration; for this lab i used two network interfaces,the first is in bridge and the second is used as internal network.



Pic 4: Network Interfaces Setup



Pic 5: Network Interfaces Setup



As a final addition we need to have all the tools in the virtual machine for the behavioral analysis, tools like sysinternals, Wireshark, OllyDbg, CaptureIt and others really useful.

### *Identification of the Specimens:*

Now we have the virtual machine done, we need to identify our specimens, in sec-track.org we find two links :

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## Reto: Análisis de Malware Básico & Medio/Alto II + Premio de \$20 USD Amazon Gift Card

POSTED BY 4V4T4R ON AGOSTO - 27 - 2012

### Reto: Análisis de Malware Básico II

Descargar las muestra desde:

Nivel: **Básico/Medio**

Nivel: **Medio/Alto**

Password: m4lw4r3

Esta muestra de malware es real... Desarrollada para el reto, pero con objetivos maliciosos reales. Así que analizar en ambientes controlados.

c

The first is "Basico/Medio" correspond to smss.rar and the second file "Medio/Alto" correspond to winlogon.rar, i download, and check the md5sums :

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analisis/smss$ md5sum smss.rar  
c667c9ba336708ccda8fc562f0807359 smss.rar
```

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analisis/winlogon$ md5sum winlogon.rar  
cdb997e8e823eda3176268130ced9e1b winlogon.rar
```

being downloaded the couple of files, i'm going to identify some special details of each one, details like peid, strings, sections, note at this point is possible to use a dynamic code analysis or static code analysis, if is necessary.

Sec-track.org

Let me identify the file inside smss.rar.

1.Extract the file in smss.rar

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ unrar x smss.rar
```

UNRAR 4.10 freeware Copyright (c) 1993-2012 Alexander Roshal

Enter password (will not be echoed) for smss.rar:

Extracting from smss.rar

smss.exe already exists. Overwrite it ?

[Y]es, [N]o, [A]ll, n[E]ver, [R]ename, [Q]uit y

Extracting **smss.exe**

OK

All OK

2. verify the md5 and sha1 :

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ md5sum smss.exe && sha1sum smss.exe
```

c970a9dd758fc1620684f85731610d4d smss.exe

3ed34887b65f48daea269ca49d0a31edc99bf0f2 smss.exe

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ file smss.exe
```

smss.exe: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, **U0PX** compressed

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ stat smss.exe
```

Fichero: «smss.exe»

Tamaño: 269824 Bloques: 530 Bloque E/S: 1024 fichero regular

Dispositivo: 808h/2056d Nodo-i: 30506 Enlaces: 1

Acceso: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 1000/ hector) Gid: ( 1000/ hector)

Acceso: 2012-08-29 06:25:05.000000000 -0500

Modificación: 2012-08-24 22:00:54.000000000 -0500

Cambio: 2012-08-29 06:22:34.000000000 -0500

Creación: -

at this point i use peframe an awesome tool write in python for static analysis of malware[2]  
you can find summary of functions,information,peid,extract the urls,strings ...etc[2]

```

/bin/bash
MOC [play] - 1 Dual Core - Super Powers Theme Tune (S
/bin/bash 156x64

hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --info ../smss.exe
Optional Header: 0x400000
Address Of Entry Point: 0x51430
Compile Time: 1992-06-19 18:22:17
Subsystem: IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI
Required CPU type: IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
Number of RVA and Sizes: 16
DLL: False
Number of Sections: 3
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --meta ../smss.exe
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --peid ../smss.exe
PEID Signature Match(es):
[['UPX v0.80 - v0.84'], ['UPX-2.90 (LZMA)'], ['UPX -> www.upx.sourceforge.net']]
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --sections ../smss.exe
Number of Sections: 3

Section VirtualAddress VirtualSize SizeofRawData Suspicious
UPX0 0x1000 0xf000 0 YES
UPX1 0x10000 0x42000 267776 YES
.rsrc 0x52000 0x1000 1024 NO
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --suspicious ../smss.exe
API Functions:


Sections:
UPX0
UPX1
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --url ../smss.exe
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --import ../smss.exe
[IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR]
0x41AF8 0x0 OriginalFirstThunk: 0x0
0x41AF8 0x0 Characteristics: 0x0
0x41AFC 0x4 TimeDateStamp: 0x0 [Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 UTC]
0x41B00 0x8 ForwarderChain: 0x0
0x41B04 0xC Name: 0x5221C
0x41B08 0x10 FirstThunk: 0x521C0
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ~
bash: /home/hector: Es un directorio
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --hexdump ../smss.exe | less
close failed in file object destructor:
sys.excepthook is missing
lost sys.stderr
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ █

```

Pic 6: Using Peframe for smss.exe


Are you thinking what i'm thinking?  
What's about upx ?






# Ultimate Packer for eXecutables

[HELP & DISCUSSION](#)
[BUG TRACKER](#)
[DEVELOPMENT](#)



UPX is a free, portable, extendable, high-performance executable packer for several executable formats.



## News

12 Dec 2011: **UPX 3.08** has been released. It is a minor 3.0x maintenance release to version 3 whose major additions were:

- optional LZMA compression
- support for BSD systems

To know more about this release, see the [detailed changelog](#). Please report all problems and bugs in our [bug tracker](#).

Share and enjoy,  
Markus, László & John

## Supported executable formats

Format full name	Format description
amd64-linux.elf	Linux ELF
amd64-linux.kernel.vmlinux	Linux kernel
arm-linux.elf	Linux ELF
arm-linux.kernel.vmlinux	Linux kernel
arm-wince.pe	Windows CE executable or DLL
armeb-linux.elf	Linux ELF
armeb-linux.kernel.vmlinux	Linux kernel
fat-darwin.macho	Mac OS X executable
i086-dos16.com	DOS 16-bit .com file
i086-dos16.exe	DOS 16-bit executable
i086-dos16.sys	DOS 16-bit .sys file
i386-bsd.elf.execve	BSD generic
i386-darwin.macho	Mac OS X executable
i386-dos32.djgpp2.coff	DOS 32-bit COFF
i386-dos32.tnt.adam	DOS 32-bit executable
i386-dos32.watcom.le	DOS 32-bit linear executable

## Overview

UPX achieves an **excellent compression ratio** and offers **very fast decompression**. Your executables suffer no memory overhead or other drawbacks for most of the formats supported, because of in-place decompression. UPX strengths in a nutshell:

- excellent compression ratio**: typically compresses better than WinZip/zip/gzip, use UPX to decrease the size of your distribution!
- very fast decompression**: ~10 MB/sec on an ancient Pentium 133, ~200 MB/sec on an Athlon XP 2000+.
- no memory overhead** for your compressed executables because of in-place decompression.
- safe**: you can list, test and unpack your executables. Also, a checksum of both the compressed and uncompressed file is maintained internally.
- universal**: UPX can pack a number of executable formats.
- portable**: UPX is written in portable endian-neutral C++.
- extendable**: because of the class layout it's very easy to add new executable formats or new compression algorithms.
- free**: UPX is distributed with full source code under the GNU General Public License v2+, with special exceptions granting the free usage for commercial programs as stated in the [UPX License Agreement](#).

You probably understand now why we call UPX the "Ultimate Packer for eXecutables". UPX aims to be commercial quality free software, based on experience with our previous packers (DJP, [lzip](#), and the [NRV library](#)).

## Download

File	OS/Hardware
<a href="#">UpX308w.zip</a>	Win32/i386
<a href="#">UpX308w.dmg</a>	Mac OS X
<a href="#">UpX308w.tar.gz</a>	Linux/Unix

Pic 7: What about upx packer ?

It seems upx is an other interesting packer,we can unpack the smss.exe,but wait a minute we need to make a smss.exe backup.

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp$ cp smss.exe originalsmss.exe
hector@Osiris:/tmp$ md5sum originalsmss.exe && md5sum smss.exe
c970a9dd758fc1620684f85731610d4d originalsmss.exe
c970a9dd758fc1620684f85731610d4d smss.exe
hector@Osiris:/tmp$ diff -u originalsmss.exe smss.exe
```

now let me unpack smss.exe using upx utility.

Sec-track.org

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp$ upx -d smss.exe
Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
Copyright (C) 1996 - 2011
UPX 3.08 Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Dec 12th 2011
```

File size	Ratio	Format	Name
282624	<- 269824	95.47%	win32/pe smss.exe

Unpacked 1 file.

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ diff -u originalsmss.exe smss.exe
Los ficheros binarios originalsmss.exe y smss.exe son distintos
```

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ md5sum originalsmss.exe && md5sum smss.exe
c970a9dd758fc1620684f85731610d4d originalsmss.exe /original
23463920f354766fd6f38009b9258491 smss.exe /unpacked
```

doing a quick diff of the strings :

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ strings smss.exe |wc -l
3346
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss$ strings originalsmss.exe |wc -l
2563
```

Note the difference when it is unpacked if i could'nt unpack this,with upx utility i had loaded into olly.

Sec-track.org

again i can use peframe for functions and suspicious :)

```
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --info ../smss.exe
Optional Header: 0x400000
Address Of Entry Point: 0xbbcc
Compile Time: 1992-06-19 18:22:17
Subsystem: IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI
Required CPU type: IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
Number of RVA and Sizes: 16
DLL: False
Number of Sections: 8
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --meta ../smss.exe
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --peid ../smss.exe
PEID Signature Match(es): UNPACKED!
None
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --url ../smss.exe
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --suspicious ../smss.exe
API Functions:
WriteProcessMemory
VirtualAllocEx
ReadProcessMemory
OpenProcess
CreateRemoteThread
CreateProcessA
OpenProcessToken

Sections:
BSS
.tls
.rdata
.rsrc
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --strings ../smss.exe |les
bash: les: no se encontró la orden
close failed in file object destructor:
sys.excepthook is missing
lost sys.stderr
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$ ./peframe.py --strings ../smss.exe |less
hector@Osiris:/tmp/analysis/smss/peframe$
```

Pic 8: Peframe in action –suspicious argument changed drastically note .rdata,.rsrc.

We need to check the antivirus detection rate :P :



SHA256: 691f3abd3e66b27114136010359465914eee4186979f7c90949714028b6392ba  
SHA1: 5ec6334de9b6123399aff07bb1cd4721adc9e5c7  
MD5: 23463920f354766fd6f38009b9258491  
File size: 276.0 KB ( 282624 bytes )  
File name: smss.exe  
File type: Win32 EXE  
Detection ratio: **36 / 42**  
Analysis date: 2012-08-29 17:30:25 UTC ( 0 minutes ago )

More details

Pic 9:virustotal.com report

Antivirus	Result	Update
AhnLab-V3	Trojan/Win32.L!ac	20120829
AntiVir	TR/Spy.Gen	20120829
Antiy-AVL	-	20120829
Avast	Win32:Rebhip-B [Trj]	20120829
AVG	PSW.Generic7.BULN	20120829
BitDefender	Trojan.Generic.3904046	20120829
ByteHero	-	20120829
CAT-QuickHeal	Worm.Rebhip.A8	20120829
ClamAV	Trojan.Agent-192978	20120828
Commtouch	W32/Rebhip.B.gen!Eldorado	20120829
Comodo	TrojWare.Win32.PSW.Delf.-JHN	20120829
DrWeb	BackDoor.Cybergate.1	20120829
Emsisoft	Worm.Win32.Rebhip!IK	20120829
eSafe	-	20120828
ESET-NOD32	Win32/Spatet.C	20120829
F-Prot	W32/Rebhip.B.gen!Eldorado	20120829

Pic 10:virustotal.com result



```

Target machine.....: 0x14C (Intel 386 or later processors and compatible processors)
Entry point address.....: 0x00008BCC

PE Sections.....:

Name      Virtual Address  Virtual Size  Raw Size  Entropy  MD5
CODE      4096             45472        45568     6.41     2e6d43b7785bee730e0396c2de0144c4
DATA      53248            544          1024      2.76     c71fe50c35c3c6adc124a4768277491c
BSS       57344            4597         0         0.00     d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
.idata    65536            3000         3072      4.72     d36776c61c662a6fb7fd62f8b1c382c6
.tls      69632            8            0         0.00     d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
.rdata    73728            24           512      0.21     a270a5e1f4f71f9ddb31027f913842a2
.reloc    77824            2668         3072      0.00     d2a70550489de356a2cd6bfc40711204
.rsrc     81920            228324       228352     7.96     fb5a2781102e6c89054ccbc4968bef0

PE Imports.....:

[[crypt32.dll]]
CryptUnprotectData

[[pstorec.dll]]
PStoreCreateInstance

[[advapi32.dll]]
RegDeleteKeyA, RegCloseKey, RegQueryValueExA, RegCreateKeyExA, RegCreateKeyA, CryptHashData, ConvertSidToStringSidA, CryptCreateHash, L
ookupAccountNameA, OpenProcessToken, LsaClose, RegOpenKeyExA, LsaOpenPolicy, CryptReleaseContext, CryptAcquireContextA, IsValidSid, Get
UserNameA, CryptDestroyHash, LsaRetrievePrivateData, LsaFreeMemory, CryptGetHashParam, RegSetValueExA, RegEnumValueA, CredEnumerateA

[[kernel32.dll]]
GetLastError, HeapFree, WriteProcessMemory, VirtualAllocEx, lstrlenA, lstrcpmA, GlobalFree, WaitForSingleObject, GetPrivateProfileIntA
, FreeLibrary, CopyFileA, GetTickCount, VirtualProtect, GetVersionExA, LoadLibraryA, RtlUnwind, GetModuleFileNameA, CreateRemoteThread,
HeapAlloc, GetCurrentProcess, SizeofResource, GetPrivateProfileStringA, GetFileSize, OpenProcess, LockResource, CreateDirectoryA, Dele
teFileA, UnhandledExceptionFilter, MultiByteToWideChar, ReadProcessMemory, GetCommandLineA, GetProcAddress, GetProcessHeap, CreateMutex
A, GetModuleHandleA, RaiseException, WideCharToMultiByte, GetFileAttributesA, SetFilePointer, ReadFile, WriteFile, FindFirstFileA, GetE
xitCodeThread, HeapReAlloc, FreeResource, SetFileAttributesA, CreateProcessA, LoadResource, VirtualFree, FindClose, TlsGetValue, Sleep,
TlsSetValue, CreateFileA, ExitProcess, GetCurrentThreadId, FindResourceA, VirtualAlloc, LocalAlloc, CloseHandle

[[rasapi32.dll]]
RasGetEntryDialParamsA, RasEnumEntriesA

[[oleaut32.dll]]
SysReAllocStringLen, SysFreeString, SysAllocStringLen

[[shell32.dll]]
SHGetSpecialFolderPathA

[[ole32.dll]]
StringFromCLSID, CoCreateInstance, CoTaskMemFree, OleInitialize

[[user32.dll]]
GetWindowThreadProcessId, ToAscii, GetKeyboardState, SetWindowsHookExA, DispatchMessageA, CharLowerA, CharNextA, PeekMessageA, wvsprint
fA, TranslateMessage, FindWindowA, CharUpperA

PE Resources.....:

Resource type      Number of resources
RT_RCDATA          3

Resource language  Number of resources
NEUTRAL            3

```

First seen by VirusTotal

2012-08-28 22:31:50 UTC ( 18 hours, 59 minutes ago )

Pic 11:virustotal.com detailed analysis[3]

come back to the virustotal to analyse the original smss.exe and check the behavioural information

Comments
Votes
Additional information
Behavioural information

ssdeep  
6144:OeQ+hs2H/pYp7siIJRa4rQLaaMEMjwkaZDCg4:I+heN/RaaaomDCg  
  
TrID  
Win32 Executable Generic (38.4%)  
Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (34.1%)  
Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (9.3%)  
Generic Win/DOS Executable (9.0%)  
DOS Executable Generic (9.0%)  
  
F-Prot packer identifier  
UPX  
  
Command packer identifier  
UPX  
  
PEiD packer identifier  
UPX 2.90 [LZMA] -> Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser  
  
Exiftool  

MIMEType.....: application/octet-stream  
Subsystem.....: Windows GUI  
MachineType.....: Intel 386 or later, and compatibles  
TimeStamp.....: 1992:06:20 00:22:17+02:00  
FileType.....: Win32 EXE  
PEType.....: PE32  
CodeSize.....: 270336  
LinkerVersion.....: 2.25  
EntryPoint.....: 0x51430  
InitializedDataSize.....: 4096  
SubsystemVersion.....: 4.0  
ImageVersion.....: 0.0  
OSVersion.....: 4.0  
UninitializedDataSize.....: 61440

  
Portable Executable structural information  

Compilation timestamp.....: 1992-06-19 22:22:17  
Target machine.....: 0x14C (Intel 386 or later processors and compatible processors)  
Entry point address.....: 0x00051430  
  
PE Sections.....:

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Entropy	MD5
UPX0	4096	61440	0	0.00	d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
UPX1	65536	270336	267776	7.75	f3f24d22409ebc5065a19175fe70fdda
.rsrc	335872	4096	1024	3.57	dea968dbbbf15264df2124b2936a38e2

  
PE Imports.....:

[[crypt32.dll]]  
CryptUnprotectData  
  
[[pstorec.dll]]  
PStoreCreateInstance  
  
[[advapi32.dll]]  
LsaClose  
  
[[KERNEL32.DLL]]  
VirtualFree, ExitProcess, VirtualProtect, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc, GetProcAddress  
  
[[rasapi32.dll]]

[Comments](#) [Votes](#) [Additional information](#) [Behavioural information](#)

The following is a condensed report of the behaviour of the file when executed in a controlled environment. The actions and events described were either performed by the file itself or by any other process launched by the executed file or subjected to code injection by the executed file.

### File system activity

#### Opened files...

```
\\.\SICE (failed)
\\.\NTICE (failed)
C:\5ae9661cc1045ea49a09cfeada9f629b49c4cbf7858f56d94e745409146e7315 (successful)
C:\DOCUMENT~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XX--XX--XX.txt (successful)
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEEXPLORE.EXE (successful)
```

#### Read files...

```
C:\5ae9661cc1045ea49a09cfeada9f629b49c4cbf7858f56d94e745409146e7315 (successful)
```

#### Written files...

```
C:\DOCUMENT~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XX--XX--XX.txt (successful)
```

#### Copied files...

```
SRC: C:\5ae9661cc1045ea49a09cfeada9f629b49c4cbf7858f56d94e745409146e7315
DST: C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe (successful)
```

### Registry activity

#### Set keys...

```
KEY: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run\Policies
TYPE: REG_EXPAND_SZ
VALUE: C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe (successful)

KEY: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run\Policies
TYPE: REG_EXPAND_SZ
VALUE: C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe (successful)

KEY: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{17564C2H-5U15-AD2W-I8W2-04Y0LS\XEIQ00}\StubPath
TYPE: REG_SZ
VALUE: C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe Restart (successful)
```

#### Deleted keys...

```
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{17564C2H-5U15-AD2W-I8W2-04Y0LS\XEIQ00} (failed)
```

### Process activity

#### Created processes...

```
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe (successful)
C:\5ae9661cc1045ea49a09cfeada9f629b49c4cbf7858f56d94e745409146e7315 (successful)
```

#### Code injections in the following processes...

```
IEEXPLORE.EXE (failed)
5ae9661cc1045ea49a09cfeada9f629b49c4cbf7858f56d94e745409146e7315 (failed)
```

```
KEY: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run\Policies
TYPE: REG_EXPAND_SZ
VALUE: C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe (successful)

KEY: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run\Policies
TYPE: REG_EXPAND_SZ
VALUE: C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe (successful)

KEY: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{17564C2H-5U15-AD2W-I8W2-04Y0LSXEIQ00}\StubPath
TYPE: REG_SZ
VALUE: C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe Restart (successful)
```

#### Deleted keys...

```
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{17564C2H-5U15-AD2W-I8W2-04Y0LSXEIQ00} (failed)
```

#### Process activity

##### Created processes...

```
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe (successful)
C:\5ae9661cc1045ea49a09cfeada9f629b49c4cbf7858f56d94e745409146e7315 (successful)
```

##### Code injections in the following processes...

```
IEXPLORE.EXE (failed)
5ae9661cc1045ea49a09cfeada9f629b49c4cbf7858f56d94e745409146e7315 (failed)
```

#### Mutex activity

##### Created mutexes...

```
_X_X_UPDATE_X_X_ (successful)
_X_X_PASSWORDLIST_X_X_ (successful)
_X_X_BLOCKMOUSE_X_X_ (successful)
4K5BS5538XX16H (successful)
```

##### Opened mutexes...

```
ShimCacheMutex (successful)
```

#### Runtime DLLs

```
kernel32.dll (successful)
advapi32.dll (successful)
crypt32.dll (successful)
ole32.dll (successful)
oleaut32.dll (successful)
pstorec.dll (successful)
rasapi32.dll (successful)
shell32.dll (successful)
user32.dll (successful)
secur32.dll (successful)
version.dll (successful)
```

*Pic 12,13,14:Analysing the original smss.exe in the pic 12 it's packed,behaviour is analysed in pic 13,,pic 14*



Sec-track.org

Time to show in the virtual machine :) but first :

check the internet conectivity :


*nping google.com or ping google.com*

open wireshark for network events.

Open process monitor.

open process explorer,and if you want you could use capturedbat,

And after that you're ready for run the specimen :) ,don't forget the snapshots in the vm.



Pic 15: process explorer before start the specimen

MalwareVM xp (xpwith tools) [Corriendo] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Máquina Ver Dispositivos Ayuda

Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com

File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help

Time of Day	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
8:36:41,5508163	Explorer.Exe	892	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcho\Escritorio\SysinternalsSuite\Procmon.exe	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 11/07/2012 17:45:04, LastAccessTime: 2...
8:36:41,5510801	Explorer.Exe	892	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcho\Escritorio\SysinternalsSuite\Procmon.exe	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Execute/Traverse, Synchronize, Dispos...
8:36:41,5550630	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read/Write
8:36:41,5551250	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,5551524	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	BUFFER OVERFLOW	Length: 12
8:36:41,5552069	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5552214	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,5553186	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	SUCCESS	Type: REG_NONE, Length: 180, Data: 01 00 04 80 98 ...
8:36:41,5553541	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5555924	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5556280	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read/Write
8:36:41,55563215	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,55563475	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	BUFFER OVERFLOW	Length: 12
8:36:41,55563869	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,55564000	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,55564240	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	SUCCESS	Type: REG_NONE, Length: 180, Data: 01 00 04 80 98 ...
8:36:41,55564578	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5556682	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,55577882	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read/Write
8:36:41,55578287	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,55578566	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	BUFFER OVERFLOW	Length: 12
8:36:41,55578983	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,55579114	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,55579354	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	SUCCESS	Type: REG_NONE, Length: 180, Data: 01 00 04 80 98 ...
8:36:41,55579692	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5581536	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5938006	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read/Write
8:36:41,59380534	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,59380808	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	BUFFER OVERFLOW	Length: 12
8:36:41,5938238	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5938372	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,59383615	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	SUCCESS	Type: REG_NONE, Length: 180, Data: 01 00 04 80 98 ...
8:36:41,59383978	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5943168	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5945585	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read/Write
8:36:41,5945870	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,5946119	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	BUFFER OVERFLOW	Length: 12
8:36:41,5946473	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5946602	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,5946837	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	SUCCESS	Type: REG_NONE, Length: 180, Data: 01 00 04 80 98 ...
8:36:41,5947175	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,5949449	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,6253396	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read/Write
8:36:41,6254317	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,6254555	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	BUFFER OVERFLOW	Length: 12
8:36:41,6254946	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,6255077	lsass.exe	824	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,6255317	lsass.exe	824	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc\Default	SUCCESS	Type: REG_NONE, Length: 180, Data: 01 00 04 80 98 ...
8:36:41,6255658	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\SecDesc	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,6258471	lsass.exe	824	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SECURITY\Policy	SUCCESS	
8:36:41,63043605	svchost.exe	1152	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\COM3	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
8:36:41,6304290	svchost.exe	1152	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\COM3\REGDBVersion	SUCCESS	Type: REG_BINARY, Length: 8, Data: 07 00 00 00 00 0...
8:36:41,6304798	svchost.exe	1152	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\COM3	SUCCESS	

Showing 296,655 of 383,076 events (77%) Backed by virtual memory

Inicio Capturing from AMD... Process Monitor - Sys... Immunity Debugger ... ES 8:40

no IPv6 | 63,9 MB | DHCP: yes | VPN: no | E: 192,168,1,64 (100 MB/s) | 0,41 | 2012-08-29 08:40:17

Pic 16: process monitor before start the binary specimen

Immunity Debugger 1.85.0.0 i R\*19eh  
 Need support? visit http://forum.immunityinc.com/  
 "C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcoito\Escritorio\smss.exe"  
 File "C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcoito\Escritorio\smss.exe"  
 [08:40:21] New process with ID 00000004 created  
 Main thread with ID 00000000 created  
 51430 Modules C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcoito\Escritorio\smss.exe  
 00000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\NETAPI32.dll  
 00000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntstorec.dll  
 20000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll  
 30000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2\_32.dll  
 50000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\RTL.dll  
 60000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll  
 40000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\rtutils.dll  
 50000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasman.dll  
 70000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\TAPI32.dll  
 80000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasapi32.dll  
 F0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\oleaut32.dll  
 B0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll  
 S0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\crypt32.dll  
 F0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSASN1.dll  
 E0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\advapi32.dll  
 A0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll  
 S0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll  
 40000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll  
 C0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll  
 00000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll  
 10000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll  
 90000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll  
 A0000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\system32\shell32.dll  
 00000 Modules C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86\_Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls\_6595b64144ccf1df\_6.0.2600.5512\_x-ww\_95d4ce83\comctl32.dll  
 51430 [08:40:23] Program entry point  
 Analysing smss  
 0 heuristic procedures

**Executable modules**

Base	Size	Entry	Name	File version	Path
00400000	00053000	00451430	smss		C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcoito\Escritorio\smss.exe
537F0000	00055000	537F3848	NETAPI32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\NETAPI32.dll
5E4E0000	00000000	5E4E5938	ntstorec	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntstorec.dll
71A20000	00000000	71A21638	WS2HELP	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll
71A30000	00017000	71A31273	WS2_32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll
76AE0000	00011000	76AE0173	RTL	5.05.2204	C:\WINDOWS\system32\RTL.dll
76B40000	0002E000	76B42B61	WINMM	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
76E40000	0000E000	76E41B40	rtutils	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\rtutils.dll
76E50000	00012000	76E51260	rasman	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasman.dll
76E70000	0002F000	76E71540	TAPI32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\TAPI32.dll
76E80000	0003C000	76E83200	rasapi32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasapi32.dll
770F0000	00080000	770F1560	oleaut32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\oleaut32.dll
77390000	00103000	77394258	comctl32	6.0 (xppsp.0804)	C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.2600.5512_x-ww_95d4ce83\comctl32.dll
774B0000	00130000	774B0089	ole32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll
77AF0000	00096000	77AF1632	crypt32	5.0.131.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\crypt32.dll
77AF0000	00012000	77AF3399	MSASN1	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSASN1.dll
77BE0000	00058000	77BEF2A1	advapi32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\advapi32.dll
77BE0000	00000000	77BEF2A1	advapi32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\advapi32.dll
77E50000	00092000	77E5628F	RPCRT4	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
77EF0000	00049000	77EF6587	GDI32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
77F40000	0007E000	77F451FB	SHLWAPI	6.00.2900.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll
77F70000	00011000	77F72125	Secur32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll
7C800000	00103000	7C80B63E	kernel32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
7C910000	000B5000	7C922C28	ntdll	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
7E390000	00091000	7E39B217	USER32	5.1.2600.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
7E6A0000	00021000	7E6C7406	shell32	6.00.2900.5512	C:\WINDOWS\system32\shell32.dll

Pic 17: Loading immunity debugger smss.exe

after run the specimen in the vm ,i've noticed some actions,internet explorer is open,it creates new files in the temporal folder. %temp%

8:43:07.6153656	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Filter: \*\*.\\*, 1: \*\*.\\*
8:43:07.6158009	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6162233	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6166859	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 29/08/2012 8:42:48, LastAccessTime: 29
8:43:07.6171924	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Write Attributes, Synchronize, Dispositio
8:43:07.6175955	ieexplore.exe	2972	SetBasicInform...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 0, LastAccessTime: 0, LastWriteTime: 0, ..
8:43:07.6181263	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6186113	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Delete, Disposition: Op
8:43:07.6190854	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryAttributeT...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Attributes: N, ReparseTag: 0x0
8:43:07.6194985	ieexplore.exe	2972	SetDisposition...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Delete: True
8:43:07.6200779	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6205529	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Filter: \*\*.\\*, 1: \*\*.\\*
8:43:07.6209311	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	NO SUCH FILE	
8:43:07.6212778	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6217301	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposit
8:43:07.6222078	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Synchronize, Disposition: Open, Option.
8:43:07.6225202	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6231378	ieexplore.exe	2972	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 8
8:43:07.6236533	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6245462	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Filter: \*\*.\\*, 1: \*\*.\\*
8:43:07.6258498	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6262607	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6267072	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 29/08/2012 8:42:48, LastAccessTime: 29
8:43:07.6272488	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Write Attributes, Synchronize, Dispositio
8:43:07.6277112	ieexplore.exe	2972	SetBasicInform...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 0, LastAccessTime: 0, LastWriteTime: 0, ..
8:43:07.6281981	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6286962	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Delete, Disposition: Op
8:43:07.6291541	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryAttributeT...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Attributes: N, ReparseTag: 0x0
8:43:07.6295997	ieexplore.exe	2972	SetDisposition...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Delete: True
8:43:07.6300503	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6305398	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Filter: \*\*.\\*, 1: \*\*.\\*
8:43:07.6309303	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	NO SUCH FILE	
8:43:07.6314271	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6317391	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposit
8:43:07.6322042	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Synchronize, Disposition: Open, Option.
8:43:07.6324976	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6330524	ieexplore.exe	2972	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 8
8:43:07.6335633	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6339950	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Filter: \*\*.\\*, 1: \*\*.\\*
8:43:07.6345266	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.6350019	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.63570648	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 29/08/2012 8:42:48, LastAccessTime: 29
8:43:07.63575673	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Write Attributes, Synchronize, Dispositio
8:43:07.63580467	ieexplore.exe	2972	SetBasicInform...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 0, LastAccessTime: 0, LastWriteTime: 0, ..
8:43:07.63586295	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.63591240	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Delete, Disposition: Op
8:43:07.63596414	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryAttributeT...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Attributes: N, ReparseTag: 0x0
8:43:07.63600825	ieexplore.exe	2972	SetDisposition...	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Delete: True
8:43:07.63604998	ieexplore.exe	2972	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.63610030	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Filter: \*\*.\\*, 1: \*\*.\\*
8:43:07.63613955	ieexplore.exe	2972	QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	NO SUCH FILE	
8:43:07.63617332	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	
8:43:07.63622350	ieexplore.exe	2972	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Configuración local\Temp	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposit

Pic 18: Analysing process monitor changes made by itself (smss.exe)


in the other hand i check the process explorer,and the new IEXPLORE.EXE launched by smss.exe :

IEXPLORE.EXE:2972 Properties	
Image Performance Performance Graph Disk and Network Threads TCP/IP Security Envir	
Variable	Value
ALLUSERSPROFILE	C:\Documents and Settings\All Users
APPDATA	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito\Datos de programa
CommonProgramFiles	C:\Archivos de programa\Archivos comunes
COMPUTERNAME	MALWARE-7373112
ComSpec	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
FP_NO_HOST_CHECK	NO
HOMEDRIVE	C:
HOMEPA	\Documents and Settings\malwarcito
LOGONSERVER	\\MALWARE-7373112
NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS	1
OS	Windows_NT
Path	C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS\System32
PATHEXT	.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH
PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE	x86
PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER	x86 Family 15 Model 107 Stepping 2, AuthenticAMD
PROCESSOR_LEVEL	15
PROCESSOR_REVISION	6b02
ProgramFiles	C:\Archivos de programa
SESSIONNAME	Console
SystemDrive	C:
SystemRoot	C:\WINDOWS
TEMP	C:\DOCUME~1\MALWAR~1\CONFIG~1\Temp
TMP	C:\DOCUME~1\MALWAR~1\CONFIG~1\Temp
USERDOMAIN	MALWARE-7373112
USERNAME	malwarcito
USERPROFILE	C:\Documents and Settings\malwarcito
windir	C:\WINDOWS


Pic 19:IEXPLORE.EXE process launched by smss.exe . Properties



Besides of that the network activity :



*Pic 20:Network activity without resolve the address*



*Pic 21:Network activity without resolving the address,wow amazon ec2*

Until now we have a little bit information ,maybe we can know about process and files changed in the registry,using regshot,or other tools.

-----  
Keys added:149

----- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\Run  
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\Run\Policies:  
"C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe"

-----  
Values added:712  
-----


HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\Run\Policies:  
"C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe"

regshot is great but i decided to probe anubis an online tool,it can gives me a nice report is much more

clean than regshot [4],but it depend of the situation,is more human readable :P.

```
[=====]
3.a) IEXPLORE.EXE - Registry Activities
[=====]
[=====]
[-----]
Registry Keys Created:
[-----]
Key: [ HKU\S-1-5-21-842925246-1425521274-308236825-500\SOFTWARE\reto_malware ]
Key: [ HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\msvideo ]
```

checking this keys using regedit :



Pic 22:Checking regedit keys

```
[-----]
Files Modified:
[-----]
File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XX-XX-XX.txt ]
File Name: [ C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe ]

[-----]
Files Deleted:
[-----]
File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\UuU.uUu ]
File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XX-XX-XX.txt ] //una hora !
File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XxX.xXx ]
```

File Name: [ C:\smss.exe ]

[=====]

Files Created:

[=====]

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\UuU.uUu ]

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XxX.xXx ]

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\teste.vbs ]

File Name: [ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\cglogs.dat ]

[=====]

Files Read:

[=====]

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XX--XX--XX.txt ]

File Name: [ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\cglogs.dat ]

File Name: [ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\desktop.ini ]

File Name: [ C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\desktop.ini ]

File Name: [ C:\WINDOWS\Registration\R00000000000b.clb ]

File Name: [ C:\WINDOWS\System32\controlp.exe ]

File Name: [ C:\WINDOWS\system32\cscript.exe ]

File Name: [ PIPE\lsarpc ]

File Name: [ PIPE\wkssvc ]

[=====]

Files Modified:

[=====]

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\UuU.uUu ] this files are created by controlp.exe

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\XxX.xXx ] it contains the hour time...

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\teste.vbs ] it is called by cscript.exe !

File Name: [ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\cglogs.dat ]

File Name: [ Ip ]

File Name: [ MountPointManager ]

File Name: [ PIPE\lsarpc ]

File Name: [ PIPE\wkssvc ]

File Name: [ \Device\Afd\Endpoint ]

File Name: [ \Device\Ip ]

File Name: [ \Device\RasAcid ]

File Name: [ \Device\Tcp ]

cscript interpret the vbs files in this case teste.vbs

[=====]

5.b) cscript.exe - File Activities

[=====]

[=====]

Files Read:

[=====]

File Name: [ C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\teste.vbs ]

File Name: [ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\teste.vbs ]

File Name: [ C:\WINDOWS\Registration\R00000000000b.clb ]

File Name: [ C:\WINDOWS\system32\cscript.exe ]

File Name: [ C:\WINDOWS\system32\rsaenh.dll ]

File Name: [ PIPE\lsarpc ]

[=====]


Files Modified:

[=====]


File Name: [ PIPE\lsarpc ]

Administrator account is not visible in the system for check this we need to log out and press ctrl + alt + sup and write Administrator in the user account. When you go through this way you won't find the File Name: [ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\teste.vbs ]...mmm strange ..

I'd like to check the autoruns,the process IEXPLORE creates new keys



Pic 23:changes in registry



Pic 24:changes made in internet explorer

at this point we can conclude :

When you run smss.exe it creates a new process and injects inside IEXPLORE, it has the capabilities to create files in tmp folder, also it creates a network connection with 23.22.69.31 in port 443, using ssl for connection, also download files like controlp.exe that generates a file again in %tmp% with the hour. Note that we can't see the folder [ C:\WINDOWS\system32\ ] we need to write absolute path, and of course controlp.exe you can't see it, you need to open a cmd.

The network activity for this specimen is doing a connection with 23.22.69.31 in port 443. I did a quick look up using the filter: ip.dst == 23.22.69.31 as you can see the most packets are under ssl.



The image shows a Wireshark network traffic analysis interface. The top menu bar includes File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Telephony, Tools, Internals, and Help. Below the menu is a toolbar with various icons for file operations, navigation, and analysis. A filter bar at the top shows the filter 'ip.dst == 23.22.69.31' with buttons for Expression..., Clear, Apply, and Guardar.

The main packet list table has columns: No., Time, Source, Destination, Protocol, Length, and Info. It displays a list of captured packets, with the first packet (No. 392) being a SYN packet from 192.168.1.65 to 23.22.69.31 on port 443. The packet details pane on the right shows the structure of the selected packet: Ethernet II, Internet Protocol Version 4, and Transmission Control Protocol.

The packet details pane for the selected packet (No. 392) shows:

- Frame 392: 62 bytes on wire (496 bits), 62 bytes captured (496 bits) on interface 0
- Ethernet II, Src: CadmusCo\_29:3d:02 (08:00:27:29:3d:02), Dst: ThomsonT\_81:72:ba (00:24:17:81:72:ba)
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.65 (192.168.1.65), Dst: 23.22.69.31 (23.22.69.31)
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: iascontrol (1157), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 0, Len: 0

The packet bytes pane at the bottom shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII format:

```

0000  00 24 17 81 72 ba 08 00 27 29 3d 02 08 00 45 00  .$.r... ')=...E.
0010  00 30 07 93 40 00 80 06 d5 16 c0 a8 01 41 17 16  .0..@... ..A..
0020  45 1f 04 85 01 bb 86 a1 d2 99 00 00 00 70 02  E.....p.
0030  fa fo 0a 95 00 00 02 04 05 b4 01 01 04 02  .....
  
```

Pic 25:Tracking the source 23.22.69.31

But what we can see in the follow tcp stream ?

The image shows a Wireshark 1.8.2 interface with a packet capture of a TCP stream. The packet list on the left shows several packets, with packet 877 selected. The packet details pane on the right shows the 'Stream Content' for the selected packet. The stream content is a mix of binary data and ASCII text, including a 'ping' command and a 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe' command. The stream content is displayed in a hex dump format, with the ASCII column showing the following text:

```

p..(&.</v.U...fd..2...5...@.b'LV
RMSfRcbkPczyRMSiTs5oPIukBdmqCJ4uCpauC3INQKz2QZatI ZP7INTCRb9SH5SnL7fdHbby###@@@
556[
p..(&.</v.U...g.A...`E..0..of>...@.p..tJ-.6>.Zh.....GP>...*r..
...=.j.....~.....KO.....'=]E..w?~...p..9...U..X.?..N..Bpt.....M&.....3.....$.0.....U.V7.\..);=..
\..yQ-q.M..HQhe#C.)..?..;g.yr..)U
...y.."
.....X/[?..$......6U...C.U0\'.&};pb.b..0..y....
^..d...H.e...2.W...k...;.../.....B...<..+=.....}8N8u...u...R..0..*..c.%..s..Cc.....C..z.....;....1.@Cd*
[...'.l...i..a.k...vX..G...W2.M...n*.m)~FG$.~m...t...;..LMS...s...@u.2.U...;$~4...;|...-...p..
/f...yD;>..cS..C.....M...4|HVz...OszkPcbdTn9X0szbSshLSsLoTcLoV0###@@@
256[
p..(&.</v.U..l..q...e...8.y.C...b...3.....)`..t)E...vIN.SIR.VQub.....>6.7.....F.RAN.5...$.
+.....C..!2.=:R.9.G.$1.8<lof...T.v...t.df8..Y.....(..?..^...+I..
d.....:k..z...l..J...h.....3P.o..q|..Dl...*C)....&..ping|
pong|Create new file##200|
ping|
ping|Windows##50|
ping|
ping|Temp##461|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##261|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##151|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##0|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##7821|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##28010|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##47839|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##110|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##10|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##6049|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##25988|

```

The stream content is displayed in a hex dump format, with the ASCII column showing the following text:

```

p..(&.</v.U...fd..2...5...@.b'LV
RMSfRcbkPczyRMSiTs5oPIukBdmqCJ4uCpauC3INQKz2QZatI ZP7INTCRb9SH5SnL7fdHbby###@@@
556[
p..(&.</v.U...g.A...`E..0..of>...@.p..tJ-.6>.Zh.....GP>...*r..
...=.j.....~.....KO.....'=]E..w?~...p..9...U..X.?..N..Bpt.....M&.....3.....$.0.....U.V7.\..);=..
\..yQ-q.M..HQhe#C.)..?..;g.yr..)U
...y.."
.....X/[?..$......6U...C.U0\'.&};pb.b..0..y....
^..d...H.e...2.W...k...;.../.....B...<..+=.....}8N8u...u...R..0..*..c.%..s..Cc.....C..z.....;....1.@Cd*
[...'.l...i..a.k...vX..G...W2.M...n*.m)~FG$.~m...t...;..LMS...s...@u.2.U...;$~4...;|...-...p..
/f...yD;>..cS..C.....M...4|HVz...OszkPcbdTn9X0szbSshLSsLoTcLoV0###@@@
256[
p..(&.</v.U..l..q...e...8.y.C...b...3.....)`..t)E...vIN.SIR.VQub.....>6.7.....F.RAN.5...$.
+.....C..!2.=:R.9.G.$1.8<lof...T.v...t.df8..Y.....(..?..^...+I..
d.....:k..z...l..J...h.....3P.o..q|..Dl...*C)....&..ping|
pong|Create new file##200|
ping|
ping|Windows##50|
ping|
ping|Temp##461|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##261|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##151|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##0|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##7821|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##28010|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##47839|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##110|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##10|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##6049|
ping|
ping|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe##25988|

```

Pic 25:Tracking the source 23.22.69.31 follow tcp stream ping pong... XD

wow they're using ssl but what happend if i use my favorite tool to check the services in the server?

```
hector@Osiris:~$ sudo proxychains nmap -sS -sV -T4 -A 23.22.69.31
```

```
Starting Nmap 6.00 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2012-08-29 11:42 COT
Nmap scan report for ec2-23-22-69-31.compute-1.amazonaws.com (23.22.69.31)
Host is up (0.12s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp          FileZilla ftpd 0.9.41 beta
443/tcp   open  spy-net      Spy-Net or CyberGate backdoor (**BACKDOOR**)
3389/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Service
```

```
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running: Microsoft Windows Vista
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_vista::sp2
OS details: Microsoft Windows Vista SP2
Network Distance: 14 hops
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

```
TRACEROUTE (using port 443/tcp)
HOP RTT      ADDRESS
1 62.28 ms .....
2 38.65 ms .....
3 47.15 ms .....
4 40.74 ms .....
5 39.75 ms .....
6 101.80 ms xe-0-1-0.mia10.ip4.tinet.net
7 129.31 ms xe-10-1-0.was14.ip4.tinet.net
8 127.75 ms vadata-gw.ip4.tinet.net
9 129.32 ms .....
10 126.67 ms .....
11 122.88 ms 216.182.224.27
12 125.13 ms .....
14 122.19 ms ec2-23-22-69-31.compute-1.amazonaws.com (23.22.69.31)
```

```
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 93.08 seconds
```

mmmm we have this situation,searching in the web about spy-net the most popular site for rats and similar tools in spanish :

<http://trojanosyvirus.com.ar/2008/09/spy-net-rat-01.html>

Now we could do some cool stuff with this level of knowledge,in fact we could run a nessus scan and use metasploit,but for this purpose is for my educational and learning process in malware analysis.

Sec-track.org

Now let me continue with the Second specimen in other moment winlogon.exe,it seems more difficult because we need to use the dynamic code analysis while it runs ,so lets do it later.

Sec-track.org

#### References :

- [1]<http://sourceforge.net/projects/regshot/>
- [2]<https://upx.sourceforge.net>
- [3]peframe analysis tool [code.google.com](http://code.google.com)
- [4][http://anubis.iseclab.org/?action=result&task\\_id=14d6c1eb13443bdc4b9884489aacd29d2&format=txt](http://anubis.iseclab.org/?action=result&task_id=14d6c1eb13443bdc4b9884489aacd29d2&format=txt)

If you've any question , contact details :

@c1b3rh4ck

[c1b3rh4ck@gmail.com](mailto:c1b3rh4ck@gmail.com)

irc.freenode.org #social-engineer,backtrack-es,pulpa

#### Useful Resources :

- 1.<http://blogs.technet.com/b/markrussinovich/> Mark Russinovich blog
- 2.<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/gg618529.aspx>
- 3.<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/gg618529.aspx>
- 4.<http://www.karmany.net/index.php/ingenieria-inversa/>