



# Breaking into Android IPC Mechanisms through Advanced AIDL Fuzzing

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# About Us

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


# Agenda

- Overview of Android IPC
- Understanding AIDL in Android
- Security Challenges in Android IPC
- Introduction to AIDL Fuzzing
- Tools and Frameworks for AIDL Fuzzing
- Live AIDL Fuzzing Demo
- Mitigating IPC Vulnerabilities
- Q&A




# Overview of Android's IPC Mechanisms



# Overview of Android's IPC Mechanisms

- **What is IPC in Android?**
  - IPC enables communication between processes (e.g., services, activities)
- **Android IPC Mechanisms:**
  - Binders (Kernel-level)
  - Intents
  - AIDL for complex IPC.
- **Why IPC Security Matters:**
  - Attack surfaces between trusted and untrusted processes.




# Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL)

- **What is AIDL?**
  - AIDL allows processes to communicate with each other using defined interfaces.
  - Role in complex applications (e.g., system services, background apps).
- **Basic Structure of an AIDL Interface:**
  - Defines methods, data types, and parameters.

```
// AIDL interface definition
interface IRemoteService {
    void performAction(int data);
}
```



# Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL)



# AIDL in Action

- **How AIDL Works:**
  - The process of using AIDL in Android (service binding).
  - Example flow: App A communicates with service B using AIDL
- **Example of AIDL Use Cases:**
  - Audio playback control, background service management, etc.

Create .aidl File  
AIDL Stub is created by the Android Studio Framework


Declare the methods to be used in .AIDL file  
Expose the Interface to the clients

Server will implement the stub and create an instance of binder.

The client call `BindService()` to connect to the binder and a subsequent `onServiceConnected()` is called which passes the Binder Object



# AIDL in Action



The screenshot shows the Android Studio interface with the same project structure as the first screenshot. The code editor now displays the generated `IMyAidlInterface.aidl` file. The interface definition is identical to the one in the first screenshot. The `Tester.aidl` file is also visible in the editor, showing its declaration. The Project Structure sidebar on the left shows the `aidl` folder under the `kotlin/java` directory.




# AIDL in Action

The image shows two screenshots of Android Studio. The left screenshot displays the project structure of an Android application named 'AIDLApp'. It includes an 'app' module with 'AndroidManifest.xml', 'kotlin+java' (containing 'com.example.aidlapp' with subfolders 'androidTest' and 'test'), 'java (generated)', 'aidl' (containing 'com.example.aidlapp' with 'IMyAidlInterface.aidl'), 'res' (containing 'drawable', 'mipmap', 'values', 'xml', and 'res (generated)'), and 'Gradle Scripts' (containing 'build.gradle.kts' for the project and module). The right screenshot shows the code editor for 'IMyAidlInterface.aidl'. The code defines an interface 'IMyAidlInterface' extending 'android.os.IInterface'. It includes a static implementation class 'Default' and a stub class 'Stub'. A callout box points from the 'IMyAidlInterface.aidl' entry in the project tree to the 'IMyAidlInterface' declaration in the code editor. Another callout box points from the 'Construct the stub at attach it to the interface.' comment in the code editor back to the 'Stub' class definition.

```
1 > / . . .
2 package com.example.aidlapp;
3 // Declare any non-default types here with import statements
4 7 usages 3 implementations
5
6 public interface IMyAidlInterface extends android.os.IInterface
7 {
8     /* Default implementation for IMyAidlInterface. */
9     no usages
10    public static class Default implements com.example.aidlapp.IMyAidlInterface
11    {
12        /**
13         * Demonstrates some basic types that you can use as parameters
14         * and return values in AIDL.
15         */
16        @Override
17        public void basicTypes(int anInt, long aLong, boolean aBoolean, float aFloat, double aDouble, java.l
18        }
19        @Override
20        public android.os.IBinder asBinder() { return null; }
21    }
22    /**
23     * Local-side IPC implementation stub class.
24     */
25    public static abstract class Stub extends android.os.Binder implements com.example.aidlapp.IMyAidlInterface
26
27     /**
28      * Construct the stub at attach it to the interface.
29     */
30 }
```




# AIDL in Action



# Android IPC Security Model

- **Security Principles:**
  - Permissions-based security for IPC.
  - Role of user IDs (UID) and SE Linux policies in restricting IPC access.
- **Security Features:**
  - Android permission model
  - Binder mechanism isolating services



# Common Attack Surfaces in Android IPC

## Types of Vulnerabilities:

- Unauthorized access to system services
- Privilege escalation through IPC channels
- Data leakage between apps



# Overview of Fuzzing & Why AIDL Fuzzing


- **What is Fuzzing?**
- **Why focus on AIDL?**
  - The complexity of AIDL interfaces increases the attack surface.
  - Poorly secured AIDL interfaces can expose sensitive functionality.
- **Advantages of AIDL Fuzzing:**
  - Exposes deep-rooted issues in IPC systems.
  - Automates discovery of edge cases leading to crashes or leaks.

```
# Pseudocode for AIDL fuzzing loop
while True:
    random_data = generate_random_input()
    try:
        remote_service.performAction(random_data)
    except Exception as e:
        log_exception(e)
```



# How AIDL Fuzzing Works

- Fuzzing Process:
  - Step-by-step breakdown of fuzzing AIDL interfaces.
  - Input generation, mutation, and monitoring results.



- Targeting AIDL:
  - Example: Choose an AIDL service to fuzz.
  - Creating inputs for defined methods in AIDL.



# Setting Up AIDL Fuzzing

- **Requires Tools:**
    - ADB for device interaction.
    - Android Studio
    - Android Device
    - Service to fuzz

- **Setting up the Environment:**
    - Setup instructions

The screenshot shows the Android Studio interface with several tabs open:

- Top-left: AIDL Fuzzer, Version control
- Top-center: Google Pixel 6 Pro, app
- Top-right: Running Devices, Pixel 6 ...

The left sidebar shows the project structure for an Android application named "AIDL Fuzzer". The "src/main/java/com/aidlfuzzer/fuzzer" package contains three files: FuzzEngine, FuzzResult, and TransactionFuzzer, with TransactionFuzzer selected.

The main code editor displays the `TransactionFuzzer.kt` file:6 class TransactionFuzzer {  
7 fun generateIntegerInputs(): List<Int> {  
8 return listOf(  
9 0, 1, -1,  
10 127, 128, 255, 256,  
11 32767, 32768, 65535, 65536,  
12 0x7FFFFFFF,  
13 0x80000000.toInt(),  
14 0xFFFFFFFF.toInt(),  
15 0xFFFFFFFF.toInt()  
16 )  
17 }  
18  
19 fun generateStringInputs(): List<String> {  
20 }

The bottom right corner shows the "AIDL Fuzzer" tool window with sections for "Select Target Service" (listing "secure" services), "Fuzzing Control" (with a "Fuzz Until Crash" button), and "Discovered Vulnerabilities (1)" (listing "Code 12" as a CRASH vulnerability with a "Result: DeadObjectException - Service killed" message).



# What to Fuzz?

```
[emulator64_arm64:/ # service call  
service: No code specified for call  
Usage: service [-h|-?]  
    service list  
    service check SERVICE  
    service call SERVICE CODE [i32 N | i64 N | f N | d N | s16 STR | null | fd f | nfd n | afd f ] ...  
Options:  
    i32: Write the 32-bit integer N into the send parcel.  
    i64: Write the 64-bit integer N into the send parcel.  
    f:   Write the 32-bit single-precision number N into the send parcel.  
    d:   Write the 64-bit double-precision number N into the send parcel.  
    s16: Write the UTF-16 string STR into the send parcel.  
    null: Write a null binder into the send parcel.  
    fd:  Write a file descriptor for the file f to the send parcel.  
    nfd: Write file descriptor n to the send parcel.  
    afd: Write an ashmem file descriptor for a region containing the data from file f to the send parcel.  
10|emulator64_arm64:/ #
```

Calling a service : service call statusbar 1



# What to Fuzz?

```
[emulator64_arm64:/ # service list
Found 221 services:
0     DockObserver: []
1     SurfaceFlinger: [android.ui.ISurfaceComposer]
2     accessibility: [android.view.accessibility.IAccessibilityManager]
3     account: [android.accounts.IAccountManager]
4     activity: [android.app.IActivityManager]
5     activity_task: [android.app.IActivityTaskManager]
6     adb: [android.debug.IAdbManager]
7     alarm: [android.app.IAlarmManager]
8     android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default: [android.frameworks.stats.IStats]
9     android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredentialStore/default: [android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredentialStore]
10    android.hardware.light.ILights/default: [android.hardware.light.ILights]
11    android.hardware.power.IPower/default: [android.hardware.power.IPower]
12    android.hardware.rebootescrown.IRebootEscrow/default: [android.hardware.rebootescrown.IRebootEscrow]
13    android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default: [android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator]
14    android.hardware.vibrator.IVibratorManager/default: [android.hardware.vibrator.IVibratorManager]
15    android.security.apc: [android.security.apc.IProtectedConfirmation]
16    android.security.authorization: [android.security.authorization.IKeystoreAuthorization]
17    android.security.compat: [android.security.compat.IKeystoreCompatService]
18    android.security.identity: [android.security.identity.ICredentialStoreFactory]
19    android.security.legacykeystore: [android.security.legacykeystore.ILegacyKeystore]
20    android.security.maintenance: [android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance]
21    android.security.metrics: [android.security.metrics.IKeystoreMetrics]
22    android.service.gatekeeper.IGateKeeperService: [android.service.gatekeeper.IGateKeeperService]
23    android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default: [android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService]
24    app_binding: []
25    app_hibernation: [android.app.hibernation.IAppHibernationService]
26    app_integrity: [android.content.integrity.IAppIntegrityManager]
27    app_prediction: [android.app.prediction.IPredictionManager]
28    app_search: [android.app.appsearch.aidl.IAppSearchManager]
29    appops: [com.android.internal.app.IAppOpsService]
30    appwidget: [com.android.internal.appwidget.IAppWidgetService]
31    audio: [android.media.IAudioService]
32    auth: [android.hardware.biometrics.IAuthService]
33    autofill: [android.view.autofill.IAutoFillManager]
34    backup: [android.app.backup.IBackupManager]
35    battery: []
```



# Example Fuzzing Code

- **Fuzzing Code Sample:**

```
1 #include <fuzzbinder/libbinder_ndk_driver.h>
2 #include <fuzzer/FuzzedDataProvider.h>
3
4 #include <android-base/logging.h>
5 #include <android/binder_interface_utils.h>
6
7 using android::fuzzService;
8 using ndk::SharedRefBase;
9
10 extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
11     auto binder = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<MyService>(...);
12
13     fuzzService(binder->asBinder().get(), FuzzedDataProvider(data, size));
14
15     return 0;
16 }
```



# Our Fuzzing Code

```
313     // Helper function to generate combinations
314     fun <T> List<T>.combinations(n: Int): List<List<T>> {
315         if (n == 0) return listOf(emptyList())
316         if (n > size) return emptyList()
317         val combinations = mutableListOf<List<T>>()
318         for (i in 0 ..≤ (size - n)) {
319             for (c in drop(n; i + 1).combinations(n; n - 1)) {
320                 combinations.add(listOf(this[i]) + c)
321             }
322         }
323         return combinations
324     }
```


```
177     private fun fuzzService(serviceName: String) {
178         val parcels = mapOf(
179             "i32" to listOf("1", "0", "65535", "0xffffffff", "0xffffffff"),
180             "i64" to listOf("0xfffffffffffffff", "0xfffffffffffffff", "1", "0"),
181             "f" to listOf("-1", "3.141592"),
182             "d" to listOf("0xff", "0xfffffff"),
183             "s16" to listOf(
184                 "3%n%%x%$s%$n1",
185                 "A".repeat(n: 10),
186                 "A".repeat(n: 4),
187                 "\uffff\uffff\uffff\uffff\uffff\uffff\uffff\ufffc"
188             )
189         )
```

```
206     val fuzzedCombinations = argCollection.combinations(argsCount)
207     for (fuzzedArgs in fuzzedCombinations) {
208         if (!isFuzzing) return
209
210         val strArgs = fuzzedArgs.joinToString(separator: "")
211         val fuzzCmd = "service call $serviceName $code $strArgs"
212         appendLog("Executing command: $fuzzCmd")
213     }
```



# Demo

- **Fuzzing Demo Overview:**
  - Quick look at the tools and setup.
  - Choose a service to fuzz.
  - Executing fuzzing and capturing results.



```
E Activity Manager Crash. UID:0 PID:2128 TRANS:2
java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'android.os.IBinder android.os.IInterface.onTransact(int, android.os.Binder.IBinder, android.os.Parcel, android.os.Parcel) throws android.os.RemoteException'
at android.os.RemoteCallbackList.register(RemoteCallbackList.java:124)
at com.android.server.am.UidObserverController.register(UidObserverController.java:83)
at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.registerUidObserver(ActivityManagerService.java:681)
at android.app.IActivityManager$Stub.onTransact(IActivityManager.java:1990)
at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.onTransact(ActivityManagerService.java:2519)
at android.os.Binder.execTransactInternal(Binder.java:1184)
at android.os.Binder.execTransact(Binder.java:1143)
```

```
E Activity Manager Crash. UID:0 PID:2190 TRANS:2
java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'android.os.IBinder android.os.IInterface.onTransact(int, android.os.Binder.IBinder, android.os.Parcel, android.os.Parcel) throws android.os.RemoteException'
at android.os.RemoteCallbackList.register(RemoteCallbackList.java:124)
at com.android.server.am.UidObserverController.register(UidObserverController.java:83)
at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.registerUidObserver(ActivityManagerService.java:681)
at android.app.IActivityManager$Stub.onTransact(IActivityManager.java:1990)
at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.onTransact(ActivityManagerService.java:2519)
at android.os.Binder.execTransactInternal(Binder.java:1184)
at android.os.Binder.execTransact(Binder.java:1143)
```

## Demo: Running AIDL Fuzzing


- **Running the fuzzer:**
  - Show fuzzing in action using ADB and logcat.
  - Real-time output: Crashes, exceptions and anomalies
  - How to interpret logs and identify vulnerabilities.

The screenshot shows the AIDL Fuzzer application running on a mobile device. The top bar is purple with the title "AIDL Fuzzer". The main screen has a dark background with light-colored text and buttons. It is divided into three main sections: "Select Target Service", "Fuzzing Control", and "Discovered Vulnerabilities".

- Select Target Service:** Shows a list of 771 exported services. The first few items are:
  - com.shannon.qualifiednetworksservice (ShannonQualifiedNetworksService)
  - com.google.android.networkstack.tethering (TetheringService)
  - com.google.android.apps.subscriptions.red (SystemJobService)
  - com.google.android.youtube (MainAppMediaBrowserService)
- Fuzzing Control:** Contains two buttons: "Fuzz Until Crash" (with a play icon) and "Stop" (with a stop icon).
- Discovered Vulnerabilities:** Displays the message "(0)" and "No vulnerabilities found yet".

# Challenges in AIDL Fuzzing

- **Hurdles**
  - Handling complex data structures in AIDL interfaces.
  - Dealing with permissions restrictions and sandboxing.
- **Solutions**
  - Crafting specialized inputs.
  - Bypassing IPC restrictions for testing



# Securing Android IPC: Best Practices

- **Mitigation Strategies:**
  - Secure AIDL interface design: least privilege principle.
  - Input validation for AIDL methods.
- **Strengthening IPC Mechanisms:**
  - Using strong permissions and SELinux policies.
  - Regular fuzzing and vulnerability assessments.



## Q&A

A large, colorful word cloud centered around the question words WHO?, WHAT?, WHERE?, WHY?, and WHICH?. The words are rendered in various sizes and colors (pink, yellow, green, blue, red) and are surrounded by numerous smaller, semi-transparent versions of the same words, creating a dense and repetitive pattern. The background is white, making the colorful text stand out.

"Fuzzing is like a box of chocolates: you never know what you're going to get."  
- Charlie Miller

# Thank you!

