



Breaking into Android IPC Mechanisms through Advanced AIDL Fuzzing

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About Us!

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
Rajanish Pathak




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Manager Security Services

Our Motivation



INCREASING
POPULARITY OF
ANDROID PLATFORMS



COMPLEX
MECHANISMS



UNDERESTIMATED
ATTACK SURFACE OF
IPC AND AIDL




REAL-WORLD IMPACT

Agenda


- Overview of Android IPC Mechanisms
- Introduction to AIDL Fuzzing
- Tools and Frameworks for AIDL Fuzzing
- Demo
- Challenges in AIDL Fuzzing
- Q&A

Overview of Android's IPC Mechanisms



Overview of Android's IPC Mechanisms

- **What is IPC in Android?**
 - IPC enables communication between processes (e.g., services, activities)
- **Android IPC Mechanisms:**
 - Binders (Kernel-level)
 - Intents
 - AIDL for complex IPC.
- **Why IPC Security Matters:**
 - Attack surfaces between trusted and untrusted processes.



Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL)

- **What is AIDL?**


- AIDL allows processes to communicate with each other using defined interfaces.
- Role in complex applications (e.g., system services, background apps).

- **Basic Structure of an AIDL Interface:**

- Defines methods, data types, and parameters.

```
// AIDL interface definition
interface IRemoteService {
    void performAction(int data);
}
```

Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL)



AIDL in Action

- **How AIDL Works:**

- The process of using AIDL in Android (service binding).
- Example flow: App A communicates with service B using AIDL

- **Example of AIDL Use Cases:**

- Audio playback control, background service management, etc.



Create .aidl File
AIDL Stub is created by the Android Studio Framework

Declare the methods to be used in .AIDL file
Expose the Interface to the clients

Server will implement the stub and create an instance of binder.

The client call `BindService()` to connect to the binder and a subsequent `onServiceConnected()` is called which passes the Binder Object



AIDL in Action



Defining .aidl


Example .aidl

AIDL in Action



Stub created by the framework

AIDL in Action




Android IPC Security Model

- **Security Principles:**

- Permissions-based security for IPC.
- Role of user IDs (UID) and SE Linux policies in restricting IPC access.

- **Security Features:**

- Android permission model
- Binder mechanism isolating services



Common Attack Surfaces in Android IPC

Types of Vulnerabilities:

- Unauthorized access to system services
- Privilege escalation through IPC channels
- Data leakage between apps

Overview of Fuzzing & Why AIDL Fuzzing


- **What is Fuzzing?**
- **Why focus on AIDL?**
 - The complexity of AIDL interfaces increases the attack surface.
 - Poorly secured AIDL interfaces can expose sensitive functionality.
- **Advantages of AIDL Fuzzing:**
 - Exposes deep-rooted issues in IPC systems.
 - Automates discovery of edge cases leading to crashes or leaks.

```
# Pseudocode for AIDL fuzzing loop
while True:
    random_data = generate_random_input()
    try:
        remote_service.performAction(random_data)
    except Exception as e:
        log_exception(e)
```

How AIDL Fuzzing Works

- Fuzzing Process:

- Step-by-step breakdown of fuzzing AIDL interfaces.
- Input generation, mutation, and monitoring results.



- Targeting AIDL:

- Example: Choose an AIDL service to fuzz.
- Creating inputs for defined methods in AIDL.


Setting Up AIDL Fuzzing

- **Requires Tools:**

- ADB for device interaction.
- Android Studio
- Android Device
- Service to fuzz

- **Setting up the Environment:**

- Setup instructions



What to Fuzz.?

```
[emulator64_arm64:/ # service call
service: No code specified for call
Usage: service [-h|-?]
        service list
        service check SERVICE
        service call SERVICE CODE [i32 N | i64 N | f N | d N | s16 STR | null | fd f | nfd n | afd f ] ...
Options:
  i32: Write the 32-bit integer N into the send parcel.
  i64: Write the 64-bit integer N into the send parcel.
  f:   Write the 32-bit single-precision number N into the send parcel.
  d:   Write the 64-bit double-precision number N into the send parcel.
  s16: Write the UTF-16 string STR into the send parcel.
  null: Write a null binder into the send parcel.
  fd: Write a file descriptor for the file f to the send parcel.
  nfd: Write file descriptor n to the send parcel.
  afd: Write an ashmem file descriptor for a region containing the data from file f to the send parcel.
10|emulator64_arm64:/ # █
```

Calling a service : service call statusbar 1

What to Fuzz.?

```
emulator64_arm64:/ # service list
Found 221 services:
0   DockObserver: []
1   SurfaceFlinger: [android.ui.ISurfaceComposer]
2   accessibility: [android.view.accessibility.IAccessibilityManager]
3   account: [android.accounts.IAccountManager]
4   activity: [android.app.IActivityManager]
5   activity_task: [android.app.IActivityTaskManager]
6   adb: [android.debug.IAdbManager]
7   alarm: [android.app.IAlarmManager]
8   android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default: [android.frameworks.stats.IStats]
9   android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredentialStore/default: [android.hardware.identity.IIdentityCredentialStore]
10  android.hardware.light.ILights/default: [android.hardware.light.ILights]
11  android.hardware.power.IPower/default: [android.hardware.power.IPower]
12  android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default: [android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow]
13  android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default: [android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator]
14  android.hardware.vibrator.IVibratorManager/default: [android.hardware.vibrator.IVibratorManager]
15  android.security.apc: [android.security.apc.IProtectedConfirmation]
16  android.security.authorization: [android.security.authorization.IKeystoreAuthorization]
17  android.security.compat: [android.security.compat.IKeystoreCompatService]
18  android.security.identity: [android.security.identity.ICredentialStoreFactory]
19  android.security.legacykeystore: [android.security.legacykeystore.ILegacyKeystore]
20  android.security.maintenance: [android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance]
21  android.security.metrics: [android.security.metrics.IKeystoreMetrics]
22  android.service.gatekeeper.IGateKeeperService: [android.service.gatekeeper.IGateKeeperService]
23  android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default: [android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService]
24  app_binding: []
25  app_hibernation: [android.apphibernation.IAppHibernationService]
26  app_integrity: [android.content.integrity.IAppIntegrityManager]
27  app_prediction: [android.app.prediction.IPredictionManager]
28  app_search: [android.app.appsearch.aidl.IAppSearchManager]
29  appops: [com.android.internal.app.IAppOpsService]
30  appwidget: [com.android.internal.appwidget.IAppWidgetService]
31  audio: [android.media.IAudioService]
32  auth: [android.hardware.biometrics.IAuthService]
33  autofill: [android.view.autofill.IAutoFillManager]
34  backup: [android.app.backup.IBackupManager]
35  battery: []
```

Example Fuzzing Code

- Fuzzing Code Sample:

```
1  #include <fuzzbinder/libbinder_ndk_driver.h>
2  #include <fuzzer/FuzzedDataProvider.h>
3
4  #include <android-base/logging.h>
5  #include <android/binder_interface_utils.h>
6
7  using android::fuzzService;
8  using ndk::SharedRefBase;
9
10 extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
11     auto binder = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<MyService>(...);
12
13     fuzzService(binder->asBinder().get(), FuzzedDataProvider(data, size));
14
15     return 0;
16 }
```

Our Fuzzing Code


```
313 // Helper function to generate combinations
314 fun <T> List<T>.combinations(n: Int): List<List<T>> {
315     if (n == 0) return listOf(emptyList())
316     if (n > size) return emptyList()
317     val combinations = mutableListOf<List<T>>()
318     for (i in 0 ≤ .. ≤ (size - n)) {
319         for (c in drop(n: i + 1).combinations(n: n - 1)) {
320             combinations.add(listOf(this[i]) + c)
321         }
322     }
323     return combinations
324 }
```

```
177 private fun fuzzService(serviceName: String) {
178     val parcels = mapOf(
179         "i32" to listOf("1", "0", "65535", "0xfffffffffe", "0xfffffffff"),
180         "i64" to listOf("0xfffffffffffffffffe", "0xfffffffffffffffff", "1", "0"),
181         "f" to listOf("-1", "3.141592"),
182         "d" to listOf("0xff", "0xfffffffffe"),
183         "s16" to listOf(
184             "3%n%%x%%s%%s%n1",
185             "A".repeat(n: 10),
186             "A".repeat(n: 4),
187             "\uffff\uuffff\uuffff\uuffff\uuffff\uuffff\uuffff\uufffc"
188         )
189     )
190 }
```

```
206 val fuzzedCombinations = argCollection.combinations(argsCount)
207 for (fuzzedArgs in fuzzedCombinations) {
208     if (!isFuzzing) return
209
210     val strArgs = fuzzedArgs.joinToString(separator: "")
211     val fuzzCmd = "service call $serviceName $code $strArgs"
212     appendLog("Executing command: $fuzzCmd")
213 }
```

Demo

- **Fuzzing Demo Overview:**
 - Quick look at the tools and setup.
 - Choose a service to fuzz.
 - Executing fuzzing and capturing results.




Demo: Running AIDL Fuzzing

- **Running the fuzzer:**
 - Show fuzzing in action using ADB and logcat.
 - Real-time output: Crashes, exceptions and anomalies
 - How to interpret logs and identify vulnerabilities.

```
E Activity Manager Crash. UID:0 PID:2128 TRANS:2
java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'android.os.IBinder android.os.IInterface'
  at android.os.RemoteCallbackList.register(RemoteCallbackList.java:124)
  at com.android.server.am.UidObserverController.register(UidObserverController.java:83)
  at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.registerUidObserver(ActivityManagerService.java:681)
  at android.app.IActivityManager$Stub.onTransact(IActivityManager.java:1990)
  at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.onTransact(ActivityManagerService.java:2519)
  at android.os.Binder.execTransactInternal(Binder.java:1184)
  at android.os.Binder.execTransact(Binder.java:1143)

E Activity Manager Crash. UID:0 PID:2190 TRANS:2
java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'android.os.IBinder android.os.IInterface'
  at android.os.RemoteCallbackList.register(RemoteCallbackList.java:124)
  at com.android.server.am.UidObserverController.register(UidObserverController.java:83)
  at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.registerUidObserver(ActivityManagerService.java:681)
  at android.app.IActivityManager$Stub.onTransact(IActivityManager.java:1990)
  at com.android.server.am.ActivityManagerService.onTransact(ActivityManagerService.java:2519)
  at android.os.Binder.execTransactInternal(Binder.java:1184)
  at android.os.Binder.execTransact(Binder.java:1143)
```



Challenges in AIDL Fuzzing

- **Hurdles**

- Handling complex data structures in AIDL interfaces.
- Dealing with permissions restrictions and sandboxing.

- **Solutions**

- Crafting specialized inputs.
- Bypassing IPC restrictions for testing




Securing Android IPC: Best Practices

- **Mitigation Strategies:**


- Secure AIDL interface design: least privilege principle.
- Input validation for AIDL methods.

- **Strengthening IPC Mechanisms:**

- Using strong permissions and SELinux policies.
- Regular fuzzing and vulnerability assessments.



Q&A



"Fuzzing is like a box of chocolates: you never know what you're going to get."
- Charlie Miller

Thank you!