

# Cryptography

## Lecture 4: Elliptic Curves II

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# References and Legalities

This lecture makes use of the following resources:

- Understanding Cryptography Chapter 9
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F3zzNa42-tQ>
- Information Security Course, German International University, Amr ElMougy
- Cryptography Course, German International University, *Alia El Bolock*

# Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem

Recall: We need a trapdoor function!

# Elliptic Curves over Prime Fields $\mathbb{Z}_p$

- In cryptography, we are interested in elliptic curves modulo a prime  $p$

## **Definition: Elliptic Curves over prime fields**


The elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{Z}_p, p \geq 3$  is the set of all pairs  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  which fulfill

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$$

together with an imaginary point of infinity  $\Theta$ ,

where  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and the condition

$$4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$



**Note;**

$\mathbb{Z}_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$  is a set of integers with modulo  $p$  arithmetic

Solutions still forms an Abelian Group



# Point Addition and Doubling Formulas in $\mathbb{Z}_p$

$$P+Q=R \text{ where } P=(x_1,y_1), Q=(x_2,y_2), \text{ and } R=(x_3,y_3) \\ \Rightarrow (x_1,y_1)+(x_2,y_2)=(x_3,y_3)$$

$$x_3 = s^2 - x_1 - x_2 \bmod p \text{ and } y_3 = s(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \bmod p$$

where

$$s = \begin{cases} \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \bmod p & ; \text{ if } P \neq Q \text{ (point addition)} \\ \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} \bmod p & ; \text{ if } P = Q \text{ (point doubling)} \end{cases}$$



# Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem

Given Elliptic Curves  $E$  over  $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$

- Scalar multiplication on Elliptic Curves  $E$  is a one way function, i.e., a trapdoor

⇒ **Discrete Log Problem:**

- **Given**  $P$  and  $Q \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ , where  $Q$  is a multiple of  $P$
- **Find**  $k$  such that  $Q = kP$

This problem is a very hard one!

# Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem

## Elliptic Logarithm Problem


Given  $P$  and  $aP$ , there is no way to compute  $a$ , but given  $P$  and  $a$ , it is easy to compute  $aP$ .

This is more difficult than factorization → can use much smaller key sizes than with RSA for the same security level.


Shorter Key means less operations

With similar security, ECC offers significant computational advantages

# Hint: Why is the Problem Hard?



Elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{R}$



Elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{Z}_p$



# The Base Point (Generator)

- $G \in \mathbb{Z}/\mathbb{Z}_p$  generates a cyclic group
  - i.e., every point in the group can be generated by repeated addition of the generator point
- $n = \text{ord}(G)$  is the order of  $G$ 
  - i.e., number of points in the generated group
  - is the smallest pos. int  $k$  such that  $kG = O$
- $|E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})|$  is the number of points on the curve
- $h = |E(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})| / n$  is the cofactor, ideally  $h=1$

# Example - Point Multiplication Computation

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \pmod{17} \quad G = (5, 1)$$

Compute:  $2G$

$$s = \frac{3x_G^2 + a}{2y_G}$$

$$s \equiv \frac{3(5^2) + 2}{2(1)} \equiv 77 \cdot 2^{-1} \equiv 9 \cdot 9 \equiv 13 \pmod{17}$$

$$x_{2G} = s^2 - 2x_G$$

$$x_{2G} \equiv 13^2 - 2(5) \equiv 16 - 10 \equiv 6 \pmod{17}$$

$$y_{2G} = s(x_G - x_{2G}) - y_G$$

$$y_{2G} \equiv 13(5 - 6) - 1 \equiv -13 - 1 \equiv -14 \equiv 3 \pmod{17}$$


$$2G = (6, 3)$$

# Example - Full Cyclic Group of E

$$E : y^2 \equiv x^3 + 2x + 2 \pmod{17}$$

$G = (5, 1)$	$11G = (13, 10)$
$2G = (6, 3)$	$12G = (0, 11)$
$3G = (10, 6)$	$13G = (16, 4)$
$4G = (3, 1)$	$14G = (9, 1)$
$5G = (9, 16)$	$15G = (3, 16)$
$6G = (16, 13)$	$16G = (10, 11)$
$7G = (0, 6)$	$17G = (6, 14)$
$8G = (13, 7)$	$18G = (5, 16)$
$9G = (7, 6)$	$19G = \mathcal{O}$
$10G = (7, 11)$	

$n=19$  and  $h=1$



# Elliptic Curve cryptography (ECC) Security

Consider an elliptic curve

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + x + 6 \text{ over } GF(11)$$

To find all points  $(x, y)$  of  $E$  for each  $x \in GF(11)$ , compute  $z = x^3 + x + 6 \pmod{11}$  and determine whether  $z$  is a **quadratic residue** (QR).

If so, solve  $y^2 = z$  in  $GF(11)$ . We can find there are totally 13 points on this curve.

$x$	$x^3 + x + 6$	QR?	$y$
0	6	no	—
1	8	no	—
2	5	yes	4, 7
3	3	yes	5, 6
4	8	no	—
5	4	yes	2, 9
6	8	no	—
7	4	yes	2, 9
8	9	yes	3, 8
9	7	no	—
10	4	yes	2, 9

An integer  $q$  is called a quadratic residue modulo  $n$  if there exists an integer  $x$  such that:  $x^2 \equiv q \pmod{n}$ .

# Elliptic Curve cryptography (ECC) Security

## Example (continued)

There are 13 points in the group.

So, it is **cyclic** and **any point** other  $\mathcal{O}$  is generator.

Let  $P = (2, 7)$ . We can compute  $2P = (x_2, y_2)$  as follows.

$$\lambda = \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} = \frac{3 \cdot 2^2 + 1}{2 \cdot 7} = \frac{13}{14} = 2 \cdot 3^{-1} = 2 \cdot 4 = 8 \pmod{11}$$

$$x_2 = \lambda^2 - 2x_1 = 8^2 - 2 \cdot 2 = 5 \pmod{11}$$

$$y_2 = (x_1 - x_2)\lambda - y_1 = (2 - 5) \cdot 8 - 7 = 2 \pmod{11}$$

Therefore, we obtain  $2P = (5, 2)$ .

# Elliptic Curve cryptography (ECC) Security

## Example (continued)

Let  $3P = P + 2P = (x_3, y_3)$ . Then we can compute  $3P$  as follows.

$$\lambda = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} = \frac{2 - 7}{5 - 2} = 2 \pmod{11}$$

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2 = 2^2 - 2 - 5 = 8 \pmod{11}$$


$$y_3 = (x_1 - x_3)\lambda - y_1 = (2 - 8) \cdot 2 - 7 = 3 \pmod{11}$$

Hence, we obtain  $3P = (8, 3)$ .


Similarly, we can also compute the cyclic group generated by  $P$ .

$$\begin{aligned} P &= (2, 7) & 2P &= (5, 2) & 3P &= (8, 3) & 4P &= (10, 2) \\ 5P &= (3, 6) & 6P &= (7, 9) & 7P &= (7, 2) & 8P &= (3, 5) \\ 9P &= (10, 9) & 10P &= (8, 8) & 11P &= (5, 9) & 12P &= (2, 4) \\ 13P &= P + 12P = 2P + 11P = 3P + 10P = \dots = \mathcal{O} \end{aligned}$$

# Elliptic Curves on $\mathbb{Z}_p$




# Example mod 541







# Example mod 541




# Example mod 541




# Example mod 541



# Example mod 541



# Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem



# Elliptic Curve Cryptography

# ECC Algorithms

- Every user has a public and a private key.
  - Public key is used for encryption/signature verification.
  - Private key is used for decryption/signature generation.
- Elliptic curves are used as an extension to other current cryptosystems
  - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
  - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

# Domain Parameters

$\{p, a, b, G, n, h\}$

- $p$ : field ( $\text{mod } p$ )
- $a, b$ : curve parameters

$\Rightarrow$  Curve

- $G$ : generator point
- $n$ :  $\text{ord}(G)$
- $h$ : cofactor



# Generic Procedures of ECC

- Both parties agree to some publicly-known data items
  - The elliptic curve equation
    - values of  $a$  and  $b$
    - prime,  $p$
  - The elliptic group computed from the elliptic curve equation
  - A base point or generator,  $G$ , taken from the elliptic group
    - Similar to the generator used in other current cryptosystems
- Each user generates their public/private key pair

$$Q = nG = \underbrace{G + G + \dots + G}_{n \text{ times}}$$

**Private Key** = integer,  $n$ , selected from the interval  $[1, p-1]$

**Public Key** = product,  $Q$  of private key and base point  $G$

# Elliptic Curve Cryptography

## Diffie-Hellmann Key Exchange

# Recall: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

PUBLIC  
VARIABLES

large prime number =  $P$   
random integer =  $\alpha$

ALICE

private key =  $a$   
public key =  $A = \alpha^a \bmod P$   
shared key =  $K = B^a$

↓  
 $\text{Encrypt}(\text{secret message}, K)$

↓  
garbled mess

BOB

private key =  $b$   
public key =  $B = \alpha^b \bmod P$   
shared key =  $K = A^b$

↓  
 $\text{Decrypt}(\text{garbled mess}, K)$

↓  
secret message

Bob's shared key =  $K = A^b = (\alpha^a \bmod P)^b = \alpha^{ab} \bmod P$


Annotations:  
-  $\alpha^a$ : Alice's private key  
-  $\alpha^b$ : Bob's private key  
-  $P$ : public variables

# EC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- **Public:** Elliptic curve and point  $G=(x,y)$  on curve
- **Secret:** Alice's  $a$  and Bob's  $b$



Alice, A



Bob, B

- Alice computes  $a(b(x,y))$
- Bob computes  $b(a(x,y))$
- These are the same since  $ab=ba$

# EC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Bob



Bob picks private key  $\beta$

$$1 \leq \beta \leq n - 1$$

Computes

$$B = \beta G$$

Receives

$$A = (x_A, y_A)$$

Computes

$$P = \beta \alpha G$$

Eve



$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

$p$

$a$

$b$

$G$

$n$

$h$

$A$

$B$

Alice



Alice picks private key  $\alpha$

$$1 \leq \alpha \leq n - 1$$

Computes

$$A = \alpha G$$

Receives

$$B = (x_B, y_B)$$

Computes

$$P = \alpha \beta G$$


# Recall: Example - Full Cyclic Group of E

$$E : y^2 \equiv x^3 + 2x + 2 \pmod{17}$$

$G = (5, 1)$	$11G = (13, 10)$
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$9G = (7, 6)$	$19G = \mathcal{O}$
$10G = (7, 11)$	

$n=19$  and  $h=1$

# Example - EC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



# EC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Alice and Bob want to agree on a shared key

- Alice and Bob compute their public and private keys.
  - Alice
    - Private Key =  $a$
    - Public Key =  $P_A = a * G$
  - Bob
    - Private Key =  $b$
    - Public Key =  $P_B = b * G$
- Alice and Bob send each other their public keys.
- Both take the product of their private key and the other user's public key.
  - Alice  $\rightarrow K_{AB} = a(bG)$
  - Bob  $\rightarrow K_{AB} = b(aG)$
  - **Shared Secret Key** =  $K_{AB} = abG$



# Elliptic Curve Cryptography

## Encryption and Decryption

# ECC Encryption

Suppose **Alice** wants to send to **Bob** an encrypted message

- Both agree on a base point  $G$ .
- Alice and Bob create public/private key pairs.
  - Alice
    - Private Key =  $a$
    - Public Key =  $P_A = a * G$
  - Bob
    - Private Key =  $b$
    - Public Key =  $P_B = b * G$
- Alice takes plaintext message,  $M$ , and encodes it onto a point,  $P_M$ , from the elliptic group

# ECC Encryption

- Alice chooses another random integer,  $k$  from the interval  $[1, p-1]$
- The ciphertext is a pair of points

$$P_C = [ (kG), (P_M + kP_B) ]$$

# ECC Decryption

- To decrypt, Bob computes the product of the first point from  $P_C$  and his private key,  $b$ 
  - $b * (kG)$
- Bob then takes this product and subtracts it from the second point from  $P_C$ 
  - $(P_M + kP_B) - [b(kG)] = P_M + k(bG) - b(kG) = P_M$
- Bob then decodes  $P_M$  to get the message,  $M$ .

# ECC vs ElGamal (DH-based)

## ECC

- The ciphertext is a pair of points
  - $P_C = [ (kP_B), (P_M + kP_B) ]$
- Bob takes this product and subtracts it from the second point from  $P_C$ 
  - $(P_M + kP_B) - [b(kP_B)]$   
 $= P_M + k(bP_B) - b(kP_B) = P_M$

## ElGamal

- The ciphertext is a pair of numbers
  - $C = (g^k \bmod p, mP_B^k \bmod p)$
- Bob takes the quotient of the second value and the first value raised to Bob's private value
  - $m = mP_B^k / (g^k)^b$   
 $= mg^{k*b} / g^{k*b} = m$

# Elliptic Curve Cryptography

## Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

# ECDSA - Signature Generation

- Alice has a private key  $d$  and her public key is  $Q = dG$
- Once we have the domain parameters (the generator  $G$ , the base  $p$ ) and have decided on the keys to be used, the signature is generated by the following steps:
  1. Alice generate a random number  $k$ , such that  $1 \leq k \leq p-1$
  2.  $kG = (x_1, y_1)$  is computed.  $x_1$  is converted to its corresponding integer  $x_1'$
  3. Next,  $r = x_1 \bmod n$  is computed
  4. We then compute  $k^{-1} \bmod p$
  5.  $e = \text{HASH}(m)$  where  $m$  is the message to be signed
  6.  $s = k^{-1}(e + dr) \bmod p$

⇒ We get the signature as  $(r, s)$

# ECDSA - Signature Verification

At the receiver's end the signature is verified as follows:

1. Verify whether  $r$  and  $s$  belong to the interval  $[1, p-1]$  for the signature to be valid.
2. Compute  $e = \text{HASH}(m)$ . The hash function should be the same as the one used for signature generation.
3. Compute  $w = s^{-1} \bmod p$ .
4. Compute  $u_1 = ew \bmod p$  and  $u_2 = rw \bmod p$ .
5. Compute  $(x_1, y_1) = u_1G + u_2Q$ .
6. The signature is valid if  $r = x_1 \bmod p$ , invalid otherwise.

This is how we know that the verification works the way we want it to:

We have,  $s = k^{-1}(e + dr) \bmod p$  which we can rearrange to obtain,  $k = s^{-1}(e + dr)$  which is  $s^{-1}e + s^{-1}rd$

This is nothing but  $we + wrd = (u_1 + u_2d) \bmod p$

We have  $u_1G + u_2Q = (u_1 + u_2d)G = kG$  which translates to  $v = r$ .



# Other Considerations

# Why use ECC?

- How do we analyze Cryptosystems?
  - How difficult is the **underlying problem** that it is based upon
    - RSA – Integer Factorization
    - DH – Discrete Logarithms
    - ECC - Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem
  - How do we measure difficulty?
    - We examine the algorithms used to solve these problems

# Security of ECC

- To **protect** a 128 bit AES key it would take a:
  - RSA Key Size: 3072 bits
  - ECC Key Size: 256 bits
- How do we strengthen RSA?
  - Increase the key length
- **Impractical?**

# Applications of ECC

- Many devices are small and have limited storage and computational power
- Where can we apply ECC?
  - Wireless communication devices
  - Smart cards
  - Web servers that need to handle many encryption sessions
  - **Any application where security is needed but lacks the power, storage and computational power that is necessary for our current cryptosystems**

# Benefits of ECC

- Same benefits of the other cryptosystems: confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation but...
- Shorter key lengths
- Encryption, Decryption and Signature Verification speed up
- Storage and bandwidth savings

# Summary of ECC

- “**Hard problem**” analogous to discrete log
  - $Q=kP$ , where  $Q, P$  belong to a prime curve
    - given  $k, P$ : “easy” to compute  $Q$
    - given  $Q, P$ : “hard” to find  $k$
  - known as the elliptic curve logarithm problem
    - $k$  must be large enough
- ECC security relies on the elliptic curve logarithm problem
  - compared to factoring, we can use much smaller key sizes
  - **for similar security ECC offers significant computational advantages**

# ECC vs RSA vs DSA

## System Comparison

Attribute	Elliptic Curve (ECC)	DSA	RSA
Key Size (Current use)	160 bits	1024 bits	1024 bits
Encryption/Decryption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Encryption takes approximately twice as long as decryption</li> <li>-Some message expansion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Encryption not possible</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Decryption much longer than encryption</li> <li>-No message expansion</li> </ul>
Digital Signatures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Signature generation fast</li> <li>-Can be implemented in low power/compact environment</li> <li>-Very compact signatures (1/5 size of RSA)</li> <li>-Signature appended to message</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Signature generation fast</li> <li>-Signatures longer than RSA</li> <li>-Signatures appended to message</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Signing much longer than verification</li> <li>-Same hardware/software required for signing and verification</li> <li>-Message recovered from signature</li> </ul>
Hardware	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Very fast, efficient and small implementations</li> <li>-Suitable for low power applications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Fast hardware implementations although much larger than Elliptic Curve</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Difficult to build fast hardware</li> </ul>

# Real example from the NSA

- **Curve P-192**

$p=62771017353866807638578942320766641608390870039024961279$

$r=627710173538668076385789423176059013767194773182842284081$

$a=3099d2bb\ bfcdb2538\ 542dcd5f\ b078b6ef\ 5f3d6fe2\ c745de65$

$b=64210519\ e59c80e7\ 0fa7e9ab\ 72243049\ feb8deec\ c146b9b1$

$G_x=188da89e\ b03090f6\ 7cbf20eb\ 43a18800\ f4ff0afd\ 82ff1012$

$G_y=07192b95\ ffc8da78\ 631011ed\ 6b24cdd5\ 73f977a1\ 1e794811$



# Pros

- Shorter Key Length

Same level of security as RSA achieved at a much shorter key length

- Better Security

Secure because of the ECDLP

Higher security per key-bit than RSA

- Higher Performance

Shorter key-length ensures lesser power requirement – suitable in wireless sensor applications and low power devices

More computation per bit but overall lesser computational expense or complexity due to lesser number of key bits

# Cons

- Relatively newer field

Idea prevails that all the aspects of the topic may not have been explored yet – possibly unknown vulnerabilities

Doesn't have widespread usage

- Not perfect

Attacks still exist that can solve ECC (112 bit key length has been publicly broken)

Well known attacks are the Pollard's Rho attack (complexity  $O(\sqrt{n})$ ), Pohlig's attack, Baby Step, Giant Step, etc.

# Using Elliptic Curves In Cryptography

- The central part of any cryptosystem involving elliptic curves is the **elliptic group**.
- All public-key cryptosystems have some underlying mathematical operation.
  - RSA has exponentiation (raising the message or ciphertext to the public or private values)
  - ECC has point multiplication (repeated addition of two points).

# Crypto's Dirty Secret

- Every form of public key cryptography or key exchange relies on our inability to solve a certain math problem quickly (factoring, DLP, ECDLP, SVP, etc).
- It is still possible that these “hard math problems” have quick solutions. All we know is that no one has found a quick solution yet (or at least has admitted to this publicly).
- Research Problem: Find a quick solution to the ECDLP (thus making ECC useless) OR prove that no quick solution exists (thus making every other form of crypto useless).

# We Learned...

- The basic pros and cons of ECC vs. RSA and DL schemes
- What an elliptic curve is and how to compute with it
- How to build a DL problem with an elliptic curve
- Protocols that can be realized with elliptic curves
- Current security estimations of cryptosystems based on elliptic curves