



trapfuzzer : coverage-guided binary fuzzing with breakpoint

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TRACK 2

About Me

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Outline

- 1. Background**
- 2. Implementation of trapfuzzer**
- 3. How to Fuzz with trapfuzzer and results**
- 4. Future Plans**

Background

What is Fuzzing?



```
def fuzzer(max_length=100, char_start=32, char_range=32):
    """A string of up to `max_length` characters
       in the range [`char_start`, `char_start` + `char_range`]"""
    string_length = random.randrange(0, max_length + 1)
    out = ""
    for i in range(0, string_length):
        out += chr(random.randrange(char_start, char_start + char_range))
    return out
```

What is Coverage-Guided Fuzzing?




Fig. 1: fuzz testing process.

Background

and achieves lightweight, low-overhead coverage guided fuzzing for closed source code by:

1. Enumerating the start offset of every basic block in the program/library. This is done with a IDAPython script
2. At runtime, in the fuzzed process, replacing the first byte of every undiscovered basic block breakpoint instruction (int3 on Intel). The original byte and the corresponding offset in the coverage bitmap are stored in a dedicated shadow memory mapping whose address can be computed from the address of the modified library, and
3. Installing a **SIGTRAP** handler that will:
 - a. Retrieve the faulting address and compute the offset in the library as well as the address of the corresponding entry in the shadow memory
 - b. Mark the basic block as found in the global coverage bitmap
 - c. Replace the breakpoint with the original byte
 - d. Resume execution

CVE-2020-11764

An out-of-bounds write (of presumably image pixels) on the heap in the copyIntoFrameBuffer function.

CVE-2020-11763

A bug that caused a std::vector to be read out-of-bounds. Afterwards, the calling code would write into an element slot of this vector, thus likely corrupting memory.

CVE-2020-11762

An out-of-bounds memcpy that was reading data out-of-bounds and afterwards potentially writing it out-of-bounds as well.

CVE-2020-11760, CVE-2020-11761, CVE-2020-11758

Various out-of-bounds reads of pixel data and other data structures.

CVE-2020-11765

An out-of-bounds read on the stack, likely due to an off-by-one error previously overwriting a string null terminator on the stack.

CVE-2020-11759

Various out-of-bounds writes on the stack, likely due to an off-by-one error previously overwriting a string null terminator on the stack.

<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/04/fuzzing-imageio.html>

- Prep
 - IDA analysis
 - Basic blocks file generation
 - Modification of the exe/dll files
- Execution
 - Catch 0xCC exceptions
 - If in the basic block list
 - Record location
 - Replace 0xCC with original value
 - EIP = EIP – 1

Vendor	CVE count
Microsoft	27
Adobe	45
Apple*	2

<http://www.powerofcommunity.net/poc2018/jaanus.pdf>

Inspiration

Combining my previous fuzzing experience and these two security research, I realized:

1. The existing excellent Fuzz tools (AFL, honggfuzz) **are not perfect**, and there are still unsupported or incompletely supported scenarios, such as complex large, closed-source programs and some new platforms.
2. Using **relatively inefficient instrument methods** for fuzz testing can also obtain **better results** than complete black box fuzz testing, such as instruments with breakpoints.


I found that **fuzzing tools for large closed-source Linux software are rare**, commonly used linux fuzzing tools are Peach and AFL, they have some shortcomings:

1. Peach: fuzzing without coverage information.
2. AFL Qemu Mode: only suitable for relatively small programs, such as image parse library.

So I decided to develop a fuzzer based on a breakpoint mechanism to support some scenarios that are not covered by existing tools, such as **large, closed-source file parsing programs and provide coverage support**.



Implementation (version 0.1)

Overview



binary patcher

1. Use IDAPython script to get all basic blocks of binary
2. Replace the first instruction of every basic blocks with breakpoint instruction and save the original instruction to **basic-block-info-file**.



binary patcher - basic-block-info-file example

JSTARO24.OCX-bb.txt x																
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
0000h:	00	60	B7	00	0D	00	00	00	5A	53	54	41	52	4F	32	34
0010h:	2E	4F	43	58	00	00	10	00	00	00	04	00	00	01	00	00
0020h:	00	FF	06	10	00	00	06	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	0C
0030h:	10	00	00	0C	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	12	10	00	00
0040h:	12	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	18	10	00	00	18	04	00
0050h:	00	01	00	00	00	FF	1E	10	00	00	1E	04	00	00	01	00
0060h:	00	00	FF	24	10	00	00	24	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF
0070h:	2A	10	00	00	2A	04	00	00	01	00	00	FF	30	10	00	*
0080h:	00	30	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	36	10	00	00	36	04
0090h:	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	3C	10	00	00	3C	04	00	00	01
00A0h:	00	00	00	B8	44	10	00	00	44	04	00	00	01	00	00	00
00B0h:	B8	A0	72	8E	00	A0	66	8E	00	01	00	00	00	8D	A8	72
00C0h:	8E	00	A8	66	8E	00	01	00	00	00	B8	68	1A	09	00	68
00D0h:	0E	09	00	01	00	00	00	FF	CB	07	69	00	CB	FB	68	00
00E0h:	01	00	00	00	FF	8A	10	00	00	8A	04	00	00	01	00	00
00F0h:	00	FF	90	10	00	00	90	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	96
0100h:	10	00	00	96	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	9C	10	00	00
0110h:	9C	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	FF	A2	10	00	00	A2	04	00
0120h:	00	01	00	00	00	FF	A8	10	00	00	A8	04	00	00	01	00
0130h:	00	00	8B	AF	10	00	00	AF	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	8B
0140h:	C0	10	00	00	C0	04	00	00	01	00	00	00	8B	D0	10	00

Template Results - bb.bb ↴				
Name	Value	Start	Size	Color
uint32 rva_size	B7600h	0h	4h	Fg: Bg:
struct MODULE_NAME module_name	JSTARO24.OCX	4h	11h	Fg: Bg:
uint32 length	13	4h	4h	Fg: Bg:
ubyte data[13]		8h	Dh	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[0]	id:0, rva:0x1000, foff:0x400, instr size:0x1	15h	Dh	Fg: Bg:
uint32 rva	4096	15h	4h	Fg: Bg:
uint32 foff	1024	19h	4h	Fg: Bg:
uint32 instr_size	1	1Dh	4h	Fg: Bg:
ubyte instr[1]		21h	1h	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[1]	id:1, rva:0x1006, foff:0x406, instr size:0x1	22h	Dh	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[2]	id:2, rva:0x100c, foff:0x40c, instr size:0x1	2Fh	Dh	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[3]	id:3, rva:0x1012, foff:0x412, instr size:0x1	3Ch	Dh	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[4]	id:4, rva:0x1018, foff:0x418, instr size:0x1	49h	Dh	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[5]	id:5, rva:0x101e, foff:0x41e, instr size:0x1	56h	Dh	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[6]	id:6, rva:0x1024, foff:0x424, instr size:0x1	63h	Dh	Fg: Bg:
struct BB_INFO bi[7]	id:7, rva:0x102a, foff:0x42a, instr size:0x1	70h	Dh	Fg: Bg:

binary patcher - example

The screenshot shows a binary patcher interface with two panes. The left pane displays the file 'E:\vuln_data\wps_fuzzing\10161\et\et_original' and the right pane displays 'E:\vuln_data\wps_fuzzing\10161\et\et'. Both panes show memory dumps with hex values and ASCII representation. A red arrow points from the text 'breakpoint instruction in x86' below to the instruction at address 000D534C in the left dump, which is highlighted in red.

```

E:\vuln_data\wps_fuzzing\10161\et\et_original
2021/1/15 16:21:01 1,876,128 字节 其它一切 ▾
000D534C E2 0F 39 D6 73 2C 45 0F B6 61 01 89 F1 49 D3 E4 à.9Ös,E.¶ja.¶ñIÖä
000D535C 49 01 DC 8D 46 08 39 D0 73 1F 41 0F B6 59 02 89 I.Ü.F.9Ös.A.¶Y.¶
000D536C C1 48 D3 E3 49 83 C1 02 49 01 DC 83 C6 10 89 F0 ÁHöäIfÁ.I.ÜfÆ.¶ö
000D537C EB 0B 89 F0 49 89 DC EB 04 49 83 C1 01 BB FF FF ë.¶öI¶Üë.IfÁ.»ÿ
000D538C FF FF 89 D1 D3 E3 F7 D3 44 21 E3 44 8D 14 2B 49 ýy¶ñöå÷ÖD!äD..+I
000D539C D3 EC 29 D0 44 89 D9 2B 4C 24 50 44 89 D6 41 29 Öi)ÐD¶Û+L$PD¶ÖA)
000D53AC CA 0F 86 4D 01 00 00 44 3B 54 24 F4 76 12 48 8B È.tM...D;T$ôv.H<
000D53BC 4C 24 E0 83 B9 E0 1B 00 00 00 0F 85 84 0A 00 00 L$àf¹à.....,....
000D53CC 48 8B 14 24 85 D2 48 89 74 24 C8 0F 84 B5 01 00 H<...ÖH¶t$È.,,µ..
000D53DC 00 89 D1 44 29 D1 0F 83 55 02 00 00 8B 4C 24 F0 .¶ND)Ñ.fu...$ö
000D53EC 44 29 D1 48 89 D6 48 8B 54 24 98 48 01 CA 41 29 D)ÑH¶ÖH<T$~H.ÈA)
000D53FC F2 44 89 FE 44 29 D6 0F 86 DB 02 00 00 89 74 24 öD¶pD)Ö.tÛ...¶t$ 
000D540C 90 03 5C 24 EC 01 EB 41 89 DF 45 29 DF 49 83 C7 ..\$.ì.ëA¶BE)ßIfC
000D541C 01 49 83 FF 20 72 32 49 8D 73 01 44 29 DB 48 8D .Ifÿ r2I.s.D)ÛH.
000D542C 2C 19 48 03 6C 24 D8 48 39 EE 0F 83 45 03 00 00 ,.H.l$ØH9ì.fE...
000D543C 49 8D 34 1B 48 83 C6 02 48 8B 5C 24 B8 48 01 CB I.4.HfÆ.H<\$.H.È
000D544C 48 39 F3 0F 83 2C 03 00 00 4C 8B 7C 24 80 41 8D H9ö.f,...L<|$€A.
000D545C 6A FF 41 F6 C2 07 74 27 44 89 D3 83 E3 07 31 F6 jÿAöÄ.t'D¶Ófã.1ö
000D546C 0F 1F 40 00 0F B6 4C 32 01 41 88 4C 33 01 48 83 ..@.¶JL2.A^L3.Hf
000D547C C6 01 39 F3 75 EE 49 01 F3 41 29 F2 48 01 F2 83 È.9óuiI.ÖA)òH.òf

E:\vuln_data\wps_fuzzing\10161\et\et
2021/1/15 16:21:01 1,876,128 字节 其它一切 ▾
000D534C E2 0F 39 D6 73 2C CC 0F B6 61 01 89 F1 49 D3 E4 à.9Ös,I.¶ja.¶ñIÖä
000D535C 49 01 DC 8D 46 08 39 D0 73 1F CC 0F B6 59 02 89 I.Ü.F.9Ös.I.¶Y.¶
000D536C C1 48 D3 E3 49 83 C1 02 49 01 DC 83 C6 10 89 F0 ÁHöäIfÁ.I.ÜfÆ.¶ö
000D537C EB 0B CC F0 49 89 DC EB 04 CC 83 C1 01 CC FF FF ë.¶öI¶Üë.IfÁ.¶ÿ
000D538C FF FF 89 D1 D3 E3 F7 D3 44 21 E3 44 8D 14 2B 49 ýy¶ñöå÷ÖD!äD..+I
000D539C D3 EC 29 D0 44 89 D9 2B 4C 24 50 44 89 D6 41 29 Öi)ÐD¶Û+L$PD¶ÖA)
000D53AC CA 0F 86 4D 01 00 00 CC 3B 54 24 F4 76 12 CC 8B È.tM...I;T$ôv.I<
000D53BC 4C 24 E0 83 B9 E0 1B 00 00 00 0F 85 84 0A 00 00 L$àf¹à.....,....
000D53CC CC 8B 14 24 85 D2 48 89 74 24 C8 0F 84 B5 01 00 I<...ÖH¶t$È.,,µ..
000D53DC 00 CC D1 44 29 D1 0F 83 55 02 00 00 CC 4C 24 F0 .¶ND)Ñ.fu...I$ö
000D53EC 44 29 D1 48 89 D6 48 8B 54 24 98 48 01 CA 41 29 D)ÑH¶ÖH<T$~H.ÈA)
000D53FC F2 44 89 FE 44 29 D6 0F 86 DB 02 00 00 CC 74 24 öD¶pD)Ö.tÛ...¶t$ 
000D540C 90 03 5C 24 EC 01 EB 41 89 DF 45 29 DF 49 83 C7 ..\$.ì.ëA¶BE)ßIfC
000D541C 01 49 83 FF 20 72 32 CC 8D 73 01 44 29 DB 48 8D .Ifÿ r2I.s.D)ÛH.
000D542C 2C 19 48 03 6C 24 D8 48 39 EE 0F 83 45 03 00 00 ,.H.l$ØH9ì.fE...
000D543C CC 8D 34 1B 48 83 C6 02 48 8B 5C 24 B8 48 01 CB I.4.HfÆ.H<\$.H.È
000D544C 48 39 F3 0F 83 2C 03 00 00 CC 8B 7C 24 80 CC 8D H9ö.f,...L<|$€I.
000D545C 6A FF 41 F6 C2 07 74 27 CC 89 D3 83 E3 07 31 F6 jÿAöÄ.t'I¶Ófã.1ö
000D546C 0F 1F 40 00 CC B6 4C 32 01 41 88 4C 33 01 48 83 ..@.¶JL2.A^L3.Hf
000D547C C6 01 39 F3 75 EE CC 01 F3 41 29 F2 48 01 F2 CC È.9óuiI.ÖA)òH.òI

```

breakpoint instruction in x86

binary patcher - example


```
.text:0000000000400B36    mov    rbp, rsp
.text:0000000000400B39    sub    rsp, 30h
.text:0000000000400B3D    mov    [rbp+argc], edi
.text:0000000000400B40    mov    [rbp+argv], rsi
.text:0000000000400B44    mov    rax, fs:28h
.text:0000000000400B4D    mov    [rbp+var_8], rax
.text:0000000000400B51    xor    eax, eax
.text:0000000000400B53    cmp    [rbp+argc], 1
.text:0000000000400B57    jg    short loc_400B7C
.text:0000000000400B59    mov    rax, [rbp+argv]
.text:0000000000400B5D    mov    rax, [rax]
.text:0000000000400B60    mov    rsi, rax
.text:0000000000400B63    mov    edi, offset aSyntaxSInputFi ; "Syntax: %s <input file>\n"
.text:0000000000400B68    mov    eax, 0
.text:0000000000400B6D    call   _printf
.text:0000000000400B72    mov    edi, 1      ; status
.text:0000000000400B77    call   _exit
.text:0000000000400B7C    ;
.text:0000000000400B7C loc_400B7C:           ; CODE XREF: main+22↑j
.text:0000000000400B7C    mov    [rbp+len], 0
.text:0000000000400B83    mov    rax, [rbp+argv]
.text:0000000000400B87    add    rax, 8
.text:0000000000400B8B    mov    rax, [rax]
.text:0000000000400B8E    lea    rdx, [rbp+len]
.text:0000000000400B92    mov    rsi, rdx      ; len
.text:0000000000400B95    mov    rdi, rax      ; path
.text:0000000000400B98    call   read_to_buf
.text:0000000000400B9D    mov    [rbp+data], rax
.text:0000000000400BA1    mov    rax, [rbp+data]
.text:0000000000400BA5    movzx  eax, byte ptr [rax]
.text:0000000000400BAB    movsx  eax, al
.text:0000000000400BAE    sub    eax, 41h
.text:0000000000400BB1    cmp    eax, 4      ; switch 5 cases
.text:0000000000400BB1    ja    loc_400C7F ; jump table 0000000000400BC1 default case
.text:0000000000400BB7    mov    eax, eax
```

unpatched

```
.text:0000000000400B36    mov    rbp, rsp
.text:0000000000400B39    sub    rsp, 30h
.text:0000000000400B3D    mov    [rbp-24h], edi
.text:0000000000400B40    mov    [rbp-30h], rsi
.text:0000000000400B44    mov    rax, fs:28h
.text:0000000000400B4D    mov    [rbp-8], rax
.text:0000000000400B51    xor    eax, eax
.text:0000000000400B53    cmp    dword ptr [rbp-24h], 1
.text:0000000000400B57    jg    short loc_400B7C
.text:0000000000400B59    int   3      ; Trap to Debugger
.text:0000000000400B5A    mov    eax, [rbp-30h]
.text:0000000000400B5D    mov    rax, [rax]
.text:0000000000400B60    mov    rsi, rax
.text:0000000000400B63    mov    edi, offset aSyntaxSInputFi ; "Syntax: %s <input
.text:0000000000400B68    mov    eax, 0
.text:0000000000400B6D    call   sub_400770
.text:0000000000400B72    mov    edi, 1
.text:0000000000400B77    call   sub_4007F0
.text:0000000000400B7C    ;
.text:0000000000400B7C loc_400B7C:           ; CODE XREF: main+22↑j
.int 3      ; Trap to Debugger
.endp
.db 45h
.in al, dx
.db 0
.dq 48D0458B4800000h, 8D48008B4808C083h, 0C78948D68948EC5
```

patched

Seed Mutation



data mutate example

RadamsaMutator

use radamsa to generate mutated testcases

<https://gitlab.com/akihe/radamsa>

TinyMutator

1. support basic mutation strategies, such as byte flipping and random insertion of boundary values (such as 0xFFFFFFFF) .
2. supporting config the variation ratio of mutation.

Fuzzer Module

Workflow

1. First load the initial testcases to seed queue and do **corpus distillation** on seed queue.
2. Then it will traverse the seed queue, mutate the testcase, then use the trace module to start the target process, finally get the coverage and execution status of the process.
3. If new coverage is found, the **new testcase will be added to the seed queue**.
4. If crash is found, the crash information is saved, such as registers, stack trace.


Scheduling strategies

- The score of testcases that discover new coverage will increase ↑
- The score of testcases that trigger DOS will decrease ↓

Fuzzer Module - Corpus Distillation

The workflow of corpus distillation is as follows:

1. let the program process the testcases in the seed queue one by one.
2. then only save the testcases that can generate new coverage.



Trace module - Theory

Prep


- Use bb-patcher module.
- Replace the first instruction of basic block with breakpoint instruction (0xcc)

Execution

1. Catch 0xCC exceptions
2. Record location
3. Replace 0xCC with original value
4. Let process continue

Trace module #1 (PythonPtraceTracer)

1. First use `create_and_attach_process` to create the target process
2. Use `cont` to let the process continue, and use `waitSignals` to wait for the process to trigger signals, such as SIGABORT, SIGTRAP.
3. If the process triggers the `SIGTRAP` signal, record the value of the PC at this time and replace the breakpoint instruction with the original instruction
4. then let the process continue to execute, `goto 2`



Lets Fuzz WPS

WPS is an office processing software in China that supports viewing and editing DOC, XLS, PPT and other files

Cross-platform Office Suite



WPS Office for Mac HOT

Dark mode, split screen and Handoff



WPS Office for PC

Free download and small size Full support for PDF



WPS Office for Android

Best of 2015 on Google Play & Apple store



WPS Office for iOS

Free, office and PDF



WPS Office for Linux

Native, compatible and efficient



WPS Office for web

Share and co-edit

- trapfuzzer collect coverage by patch breakpoint instruction to target module
- therefore, it is necessary to find which module need be patched, that is, the module that is responsible for **parsing the file**


Lets Fuzz WPS - Find Target Module

In Windows platform, we can use **process monitor** to monitor the behavior of the program at runtime, and be able to obtain the **call stack**, by using this information can quickly locate the **data processing module**.

21:54...	wps.exe	1284	UnlockFileSi... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 15 kernel32.dll ReadFile + 0x54	0x75a93f07
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	LockFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Exclus	U 16 ole32.dll StgOpenStorage + 0xfb	0x76d457f9
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	LockFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Exclus	U 17 ole32.dll StgOpenStorage + 0xf96	0x76d457a4
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	LockFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Exclus	U 18 ole32.dll WriteClassStm + 0x78ae	0x76dbb364
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	UnlockFileSi... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 19 ole32.dll WriteClassStm + 0x774f	0x76dbb205
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	UnlockFileSi... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 20 ole32.dll WriteClassStm + 0x7638	0x76dbb0ee
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	ReadFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 21 ole32.dll WriteClassStm + 0x4b9f	0x76db8655
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	LockFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Exclus	U 22 ole32.dll StringFromIID + 0x6e0	0x76d44476
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	LockFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 23 ole32.dll StringFromIID + 0x882	0x76d44618
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	UnlockFileSi... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 24 ole32.dll StgOpenStorage + 0x27	0x76d44835
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	Querystandar... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	AllLoc	U 25 kso.dll kso_TryOpenIncBackupFile + 0x25	0x68c9e71e
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	QueryBasicIn... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Create	U 26 wpsmain.dll WpsTextboxFactory::createLayerControl + 0x7c35	0x641d595b
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	ReadFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 27 wpsmain.dll TypoLib::TypoView::setExportType + 0x100c9	0x64142299
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	ReadFile C:\input.doc	END OF FILE	Offset	U 28 wpsmain.dll TypoLib::TypoView::setExportType + 0xe963	0x64140b33
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	UnlockFileSi... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 29 wpsmain.dll TypoLib::TypoView::setExportType + 0xdbc1	0x6413fd91
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	UnlockFileSi... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 30 wpsmain.dll TypoLib::TypoView::setExportType + 0xdac7	0x6413fc97
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CloseFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 31 wpsmain.dll TypoLib::TypoView::setExportType + 0xd5e4	0x6413f7b4
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CreateFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Desire	U 32 wpsmain.dll TypoLib::TypoView::setExportType + 0xd005	0x6413fd15
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	QueryBasicIn... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Create	U 33 wpsmain.dll TypoLib::TypoView::setExportType + 0xc552	0x6413e722
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CloseFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 34 kso.dll KxDrTipWidget::resizeEvent + 0x6f7	0x68c83d2c
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CreateFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Desire	U 35 kso.dll KxMainWindow::notifyOpenFiles + 0x251	0x68c860e2
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	QueryBasicIn... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Create	U 36 kso.dll KProneServicesHandler::openFiles + 0x9c0	0x68c85b2f
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CloseFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 37 kso.dll GlobalFilterMgr::operator= + 0x4c7bc	0x69550315
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CreateFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Desire	U 38 kso.dll GlobalFilterMgr::operator= + 0x2f674	0x695331cd
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CloseFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 39 kso.dll KProneServicesHandler::KProneServicesHandler + 0x2f7f	0x695dd0f3e
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CreateFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Desire	U 40 kso.dll GdipEmfToWmfBits + 0x3813	0x69560f87
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	QueryBasicIn... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Create	U 41 ksoltite.dll KFCClientChannel::onRecvData + 0x306	0x721f345f
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CloseFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 42 ksoltite.dll KLiteStyleOptionShadowLine::`KLiteStyleOptionShadowLine + 0x196	0x721d89e2
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CreateFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Desire	U 43 user32.dll gapfnScSendMessage + 0x332	0x759962fa
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	QueryBasicIn... C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Create	U 44 user32.dll GetThreadDesktop + 0xd7	0x75996d3a
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CloseFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Offset	U 45 user32.dll CharPrevW + 0x138	0x759977c4
21:54...	wps.exe	1284	CreateFile C:\input.doc	SUCCESS	Desire	U 46dll DirectUI ... W + 0x6	0x75997802

Lets Fuzz WPS

What about the Linux platform?



→ No call stack →


1. GDB can obtain the call stack stably
2. File operations of the process can be tracked through breakpoints
3. Use GDB's scripting mechanism to automate

Lets Fuzz WPS - Linux Version of FileMon

```
class FopenGoodFile(gdb.Breakpoint):
    def __init__(self, name):
        super(FopenGoodFile, self).__init__(
            name, gdb.BP_BREAKPOINT, internal=False)
        self.hitcount = 0

    def stop(self):
        rdi = read_register("rdi")
        fname = read_memory(rdi, 0x100)
        # print("open: {}".format(fname))
        fname = fname[:fname.find(b"\x00")]

        if b".doc" in fname:
            current_frame = gdb.selected_frame()
            caller = current_frame.older().pc()
            print("[FopenGoodFile] open {}, set bp on
                  fname, caller)")
            get_backtrace()
            AddFpBp("*{}".format(caller))
        return False
```



The screenshot shows the GDB debugger interface. The assembly window displays a series of function calls, many of which are highlighted with a red rectangle. The memory dump window shows the contents of memory starting at address 0x000007ffff69bb3f0, where the value 0x000007ffff69bb4100 is highlighted with a red rectangle.

```
[FreadGoodFp] fread fp: 62681600
#0 0x000007ffff69bb3f0 in __GI_IO_fread (buf=0x6cc2041, size=1, count=49147, fp=0x3bc7200) at iofread.c:31
#1 0x000007fffec241e1c in XMLPlatformUtils::readFileBuffer(void*, unsigned int, unsigned char*) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#2 0x000007fffec249311 in XMLReader::refreshCharBuffer() () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#3 0x000007fffec26c49d in ReaderMgr::peekNextChar() () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#4 0x000007fffec25da08 in XMLScanner::scanProlog() () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#5 0x000007fffec25d6b4 in XMLScanner::scanDocument(InputSource const&) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#6 0x000007fffec25d2fd in XMLScanner::scanDocument(unsigned short const*) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#7 0x000007fffec351743 in SAX2XMLReaderImpl::parse(unsigned short const*) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#8 0x000007fffec43d37e in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#9 0x000007fffec41e8a3 in OpenXmlPackage::_Open(unsigned short const*, unsigned int, OpcPackageIOType) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#10 0x000007fffec5d6a04 in WordProcessDocument::Open(unsigned short const*, WordProcessDocument::DocumentType) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsio.so
#11 0x000007ffe7dcc120 in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsio.so
#12 0x000007fffe7d7aaef8 in filterpluginFormatCorrect_docx () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsio.so
#13 0x000007ffff357cc3b in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#14 0x000007ffff358815e in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#15 0x000007ffff35a4cca in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#16 0x000007ffff358d04b in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#17 0x000007ffff358c502 in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#18 0x000007ffff3594bf in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#19 0x000007ffff3879ce1 in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#20 0x000007ffff305374b in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so

[ReadGoodFd] read fd: 29
#0 0x000007ffff69bb4100 in __GI__libc_read (fd=29, buf=0x6cc2041, nbytes=45056) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/read.c:27
#1 0x000007ffff69bb76e2 in __GI__IO_file_xsgetn (fp=0x3bc7200, data=<optimized out>, n=49147) at fileops.c:1364
#2 0x000007ffff69bb431 in __GI__IO_fread (buf=<optimized out>, size=1, count=49147, fp=0x3bc7200) at iofread.c:38
#3 0x000007fffec241e1c in XMLPlatformUtils::readFileBuffer(void*, unsigned int, unsigned char*) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#4 0x000007fffec249311 in XMLReader::refreshCharBuffer() () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#5 0x000007fffec26c49d in ReaderMgr::peekNextChar() () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#6 0x000007fffec25da08 in XMLScanner::scanProlog() () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#7 0x000007fffec25d6b4 in XMLScanner::scanDocument(InputSource const&) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#8 0x000007fffec25d2fd in XMLScanner::scanDocument(unsigned short const*) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#9 0x000007fffec43d37e in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#10 0x000007fffec41e8a3 in OpenXmlPackage::_Open(unsigned short const*, unsigned int, OpcPackageIOType) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libkso.so
#11 0x000007fffec5d6a04 in WordProcessDocument::Open(unsigned short const*, WordProcessDocument::DocumentType) () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsio.so
#12 0x000007ffe7dcc120 in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsio.so
#13 0x000007fffe7d7aaef8 in filterpluginFormatCorrect_docx () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsio.so
#14 0x000007ffff357cc3b in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#15 0x000007ffff358815e in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#16 0x000007ffff35a4cca in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#17 0x000007ffff358d04b in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
#18 0x000007ffff3594bf in () at /opt/kingsoft/wps-office/office6/libwpsmain.so
```

Lets Fuzz WPS

Related modules for processing doc files

```
"coverage_module_name": [  
    "libkso.so",  
    "libwpsapi.so",  
    "libwpsmain.so",  
    "wps"  
],
```

Linux

```
"coverage_module_name": [  
    "wps.exe",  
    "wpsmain.dll",  
    "kso.dll",  
    "ksoapi.dll"  
],
```

Windows

Failure and plan

WPS can't execute within python-trace!

I decided to develop the trace module based on gdb.

The reasons are as follows:

1. Stable, few bugs, support multiple platforms and architectures
2. Support develop plugin with python
3. Open source, can be customized on demand

Implementation

(Version 0.2 - GdbPythonPluginTracer)

GDB Python API

Introduces some commonly used API of GDB Python Plugin

`gdb.selected_frame().read_register()`: read register value

`gdb.selected_inferior().write_memory()`: write process memory

`gdb.selected_inferior().read_memory()`: read process memory


`gdb.parse_and_eval()`: execute gdb expression and get the result of expression

`gdb.execute()`: execute gdb command and get the result of command execution

`gdb.events.stop.connect`: register gdb's stop event callback function, for example, when the process triggers a signal, it will enter the callback function for processing.

Workflow

Due to the limitation of the gdb python script, the fuzzer needs to continuously use stdin and stdout to interact with gdb during the test.



Code – GDB Plugin

trap.py

```
def stop_handler(event):
    elif isinstance(event, gdb.StopEvent):
        pc = get_register("$pc") - 1
        hit_mod = None
        for mt in module_trace_list:
            if pc > mt['image_base'] and pc < mt['image_end']:
                hit_mod = mt
                break

        offset = pc - hit_mod['image_base']
        raw_byte = get_raw_byte_by_offset(offset)

        # restore original instructions, then set pc pc pc - 1
        write_memory(pc, raw_byte, 1)
        set_register("pc", pc)

        # log executed basic block
        mt['bbt-list'].append(offset)
    else:
        print("Unknown event {}".format(event))

    # register callback
    gdb.events.stop.connect(stop_handler)
```

Code – Tracer Part

gdb-python-plugin-tracer.py

```
def exec_with_gdb(self, timeout=30):
    command = "/usr/bin/gdb -q -x {}/cmd.gdb --args {}".format(self.workspace, self.cmdline)
    self.p = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, cwd=self.workspace, stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
                             stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
    # for dos
    timer = Timer(timeout, self.timeout_handler)
    try:
        timer.start()
        while True:
            l = self.p.stdout.readline()
            # process hit breakpoint
            if "received signal SIGTRAP" in l:
                self.p.stdin.write("c\n")
            # test finished
            elif "[trapfuzzer] save_bb_trace" in l:
                break
    except Exception as e:
        pass
    finally:
        timer.cancel()

    self.p.kill()
    self.p.wait()
```

When to kill target process

Problem & Common Solution

WPS will not exit the program after parsing the file, but will stay on the GUI interface and wait for the user to operate, so the **fuzzer needs to manually kill the process.**

The commonly used method is to set a timeout, when the timeout occurs, the fuzzer will kill the process.

Disadvantage

1. The execution time of the program is fixed each time. It will **waste time** when process simple testcase (actually parsing time is less than timeout), and when process complex testcase (actually parsing time is greater than timeout), it will **result in an incomplete file parsing**.
2. Unable to detect **DOS vulnerabilities**.


When to kill target process - our solution

1. First, use the trace module to trace the program execution and print the basic blocks executed by the program, and find the last basic block END_BBL executed after the process has parsed the input file.
2. In the following fuzzing, when the process reaches END_BBL, it means that the process has entered the GUI loop, and the process can be killed at this time.


During the fuzzing, record the average time (avg_time) of each testcase, and then set the DOS timeout to $10 * \text{avg_time}$.

When the execution time is greater than timeout, it is considered that DOS bug has been found.

When to kill target process



When to kill target process




Speed up Instrument

For large programs, because the number of breakpoints is very large, it will take a lot of time for each execution.


Program	desc	basic block count
WPP For Windows	Read and parse PPT file	275 1604
WPP For Linux	Read and parse PPT file	401 2478
Ichitaro 2021 Platinum	Read and parse doc, xls and so on	167 3576

Speed up Instrument - accelerated mode

In the accelerated mode, the fuzzer first obtains the executed basic blocks from the trace module, then patch the files related to these basic blocks and remove the breakpoint instructions at the corresponding positions in the files.



Lets Fuzz WPS Again!



Initial Results

Mutator	Crash Count	Time
RadamsaMutator	0	3 * 24h
TinyMutator	10+	24h

Reason

- RadamsaMutator don't consider the ratio of data mutation, it may seriously destroy the file structure, causing the testcase to be discarded very early, so that deep vulnerabilities cannot be found.
- TinyMutator can only mutates a small percentage of the data in the sample file, so the use cases can enter a deeper code path and the fuzzing is more efficient.

Implementation

(Version 0.3-trapfuzzer-gdb-tracer)

Why we need trapfuzzer-gdb-tracer

GdbPythonPluginTracer have some limits, such as:

1. It is inconvenient to debug, we need to use a python script to continuously send continue commands to the stdin of gdb.
2. We need to restart gdb for each test, the python runtime, and the communication overhead of fuzzer will cause additional performance overhead.

trapfuzzer-gdb-tracer has following advantages:

1. Written in C++, faster.
2. We can compile static-link GDB to reduce the requirements of environment.
3. Easy to debug.


GDB Internals

On the Linux platform, gdb use ptrace to debug process.

When gdb starts the debugged program, it will call **start_event_loop** to start the event loop and wait for events from the target process, such as **hitting a breakpoint** , creating a child process, and so on.

```
start_event_loop () at ../../gdb/event-loop.c:370
captured_command_loop () at ../../gdb/main.c:359
captured_main at ../../gdb/main.c:1202
gdb_main at ../../gdb/main.c:1217
main at ../../gdb/gdb.c:32
```

GDB Internals



```
1 static void
2 handle_inferior_event(struct execution_control_state *ecs)
3 {
4     switch (ecs->ws.kind)
5     {
6         case TARGET_WAITKIND_LOADED:
7             .....
8             .....
9
10        case TARGET_WAITKIND_SPURIOUS:
11            .....
12            .....
13            .....
14
15        case TARGET_WAITKIND_STOPPED:
16            // handle signal event of target process, such as SIGTRAP
17            handle_signal_stop(ecs);
18
19    }
```

GDB Internals

handle_signal_stop handles the situation where the debugged process stops due to receiving a signal,

```
1 static void
2 handle_signal_stop(struct execution_control_state *ecs)
3 {
4     frame = get_current_frame();
5     gdbarch = get_frame_arch(frame);
6
7     /* Pull the single step breakpoints out of the target. */
8     if (ecs->event_thread->suspend.stop_signal == GDB_SIGNAL_TRAP)
9     {
10         // handle sigtrap signal
11 }
```

Modify GDB

Modify the handle_signal_stop function to let gdb automatically handle the breakpoint events of the process:

1. First it gets the value of the pc register, and then finds the module where the pc is located
2. Then according to pc and basic-block-info-file, get the original instruction of the position
3. Finally, replace the breakpoint instruction with the original instruction and let the process continue execution

Modify GDB

We can use add_com to add custom gdb commands

```
c = add_com ("load-trapfuzzer-info", class_run, load_trapfuzzer_info, _("Load trapfuzzer config.\n"
RUN_ARGS_HELP));
set_cmd_completer (c, filename_completer);
```

Use execute_command_to_string to execute gdb command


```
std::string get_context_string()
{
    std::string cmd_res = execute_command_to_string("i r", 0, false);
    cmd_res += execute_command_to_string("x/4i $pc", 0, false);
    cmd_res += execute_command_to_string("bt 4", 0, false);
    return cmd_res;
}
```

Code for SIGTRAP

```
// handle sigtrap event.
if (ecs->event_thread->suspend.stop_signal == GDB_SIGNAL_TRAP)
{
    pc = regcache_read_pc (regcache);
    // find module of pc
    COV_MOD_INFO* cmi = get_cov_mod_info_by_pc(pc);
    // get module offset
    unsigned int voff = pc - cmi->image_base;
    // remove breakpoint
    BB_INFO* info = cmi->bb_info_map[voff];
    target_write_memory(pc, info->instr, info->instr_size);

    if(g_debug)
        fprintf_unfiltered (gdb_stdlog, "[trapfuzzer] patch to %s!0x%X\n", cmi->module_name, voff);
    // log executed basic block
    cmi->bb_trace.push_back(voff);
    // let process continue.
    keep_going (ecs);
    return;
```

Architecture




Implementation

(Version 0.4-Windows Support)

Windows Support #1 - winappdbg-tracer

Based on winappdbg

1. based on python.
2. winappdbg basically meets the demand, but there are still some shortcomings: speed, incomplete access to the call stack.



Windows Support #2 - DbgEngTracer

The DbgEng API is a series of APIs for developing debuggers provided by Microsoft. Users only need to register the corresponding callback function to implement a debugger.

Advantage:

1. Fast execution speed.
2. DbgEng API can get the complete call stack of the program.


Windows Support #2 - DbgEngTracer

1. **WriteVirtual/ReadVirtual**: Read/Write process memory.
2. **GetStackTrace**: Get backtrace of process.

```
EventCallbacks::Exception()
{
    if (Exception->ExceptionCode == STATUS_BREAKPOINT)
    {
        COV_MOD_INFO *cmi = get_cov_mod_info_by_pc(Exception->ExceptionAddress);
        if (cmi != NULL)
        {
            BB_INFO *bi = cmi->bb_info_map[Exception->ExceptionAddress - cmi->image_base];
            printf("exec-bb: %s!0x%lx\n", cmi->module_name, bi->voff);

            cmi->bb_trace.push_back(bi->voff);
            if (g_Data->WriteVirtual(Exception->ExceptionAddress, bi->instr,
                                      bi->instr_size, &Done) != S_OK || Done != bi->instr_size)
            {
                return DEBUG_STATUS_NO_CHANGE;
            }
        }
        return DEBUG_STATUS_GO;
    }
}
```


Example



Triage

crash deduplication scheme:

1. first get the call stack of crash
2. then splice the lower 12 bits of each call stack as the hash of crash
3. de-duplicate crash according to hash




Dialog Box

automatically handle dialog box with autoit

```
1 ˜ def POPUpKillerThread(self):
2 ˜     while True:
3     |     time.sleep(0.1)
4
5     ppt_text = autoit.win_get_text('Microsoft PowerPoint')
6
7     if u"出现严重错误" in ppt_text:
8         |     autoit.control_click("[Class:#32770]", "Button1")
9
10    if u"无法编辑此" in ppt_text:
11        |     autoit.control_click("[Class:#32770]", "Button1")
12
13    if u"密码" in ppt_text:
14        |     autoit.control_click("[Class:#32770]", "Button1")
```

Dialog Box

automatically handle dialog box with [huorong](#)



Other Features

Users can check the status of Fuzz through the management port during the fuzzing process

```
status
stage: fuzz
total dos:      59
total crash:    126
total new path: 878
speed: 18.0/min
trace mode: gdb-run
stage exec count:654
total bb count: 0
total exec time: 00 days 00h 39m 55s
coverage module: libkso.so,libwpsmain.so,libwpscloudsvrimp.so,libwpshtmlrw.so,libwpsinkdraw.so,libwpsio.so,libwpsmain.so,libwpstablestyle.so,libwpsuofrw.so,libwpswordtool.so,libwpsxmlrw.so,wp
config mutator: Vanapagan-mutator
current mutator: VanapaganMutator
last crash: 2021-06-02 20:14:13
last new path: 2021-06-02 19:50:01
current time: 2021-06-02 20:14:18
avg_run_time: 3.7s, timeout ratio: 5
output: /home/hac425/ndisk/doc-output
current seed file: /home/hac425/ndisk/doc-output/trapfuzz-testcase-476.bin

h
status (s)
seed_info (si)
set_seed_exec_count (sc)
enable_debug (eb)
disable_debug (db)stop
 testcase (t)
crash (c)
timeout_ratio (tr)
import_case dir
quit (q)
```

nc 127.0.0.1 8821

Start Fuzzing

Three elements of fuzzing

execution speed, seed quality/quantity, mutation algorithm

Ways to obtain samples

1. Obtained from some online sites that provide sample sets
2. **Crawl a large number of sample files through the grammar of the search engine**
3. Some open source projects will bring some testcases to test the program
4. **Testcases generated when using white box Fuzz tools such as AFL to test similar software**
5. The bug submission page of the target program or similar program
6. Generated with format conversion tool

Preparing the Environment

Ways for faster execution


use ramdisk, but pay attention to scheduled backups!

Ramdisk in Linux

```
mount -t tmpfs -o size=4G tmpfs /tmp/ramdisk/
```

Ramdisk in Windows

ImDisk Toolkit



Equipment & Results

laptop with the following configuration:

i5-8700 (4 Cores 8 threads) / 16G DDR3 RAM / 1T SSD

Software	Platform	Time	Initial Seeds	Bug Found
WPS OFFICE	Linux & Windows	≈ 8 month	Crawl	200+
中望CAD	Linux	≈ 1 day	AFL (fuzz libredwg)	4+
WPS Photo	Windows	≈ 1 day	AFL (fuzz libpng)	15
Foxit PDF	Windows	≈ 7 day	Crawl	a few crashes
Honeyview	Windows	≈ 1 day	AFL (fuzz libpng)	a few crashes
Ichitaro 2021	Windows	≈ 7 day	trapfuzzer (fuzz WPS)	100+ unique crash.

Compare with existing tools

Tool	Scenarios	Advantage	Disadvantage
AFL	Library, small program	Coverage, Speed	Large software requires wrapper and high difficulty to user
Peach	protocol fuzzing, file fuzzing	easy to use after the model is written	model development is difficult
trapfuzzer	file fuzzing now	easy to use, support large software, support coverage !	Compared with AFL, there is less feedback coverage and speed is slow.

Conclusion

1. Seed is important and mutate ratio is also important
2. GDB and DbgEng API is very nice.
3. Fuzzing with coverage is much better than none

Future Plans

1. More architecture support (arm, mips)
2. Optimize distributed Fuzz scheduling
3. Automatic detect data mutation ratio and mutation range.
4. More precise crash deduplication mechanism
5.

Q&A
Thank you!

References

1. <https://loda.hala01.com/2017/06/gdb.html>
2. <https://www.embecosm.com/appnotes/ean3/embecosm-howto-gdb-porting-ean3-issue-2.html>