William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s)

Article *in* British Journal of Political Science · July 2002

DOI: 10.1017/S0007123402000224

1 author:

Iain Mclean
University of Oxford
217 PUBLICATIONS **2,947** CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Review Article

William H. Riker and the invention of heresthetic(s)

Iain McLean*

Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

iain.mclean@nuf.ox.ac.uk

Abstract

The later work of W.H. Riker (1921-93) has fervent admirers and fervent detractors. It has led to some extensions and qualifications. This review charts Riker's intellectual odyssey. Concentrating on his late works, it explores whether or not the characteristic methodology of these last two decades has the intrinsic strength necessary to survive and flourish.

Keywords: Riker, W.H.; heresthetic; rhetoric; federalism; US Constitution.

* Earlier versions of this paper was presented at the Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, San Antonio, TX, March 2001 and at seminars at LSE, Oxford, and Warwick universities. Grateful thanks to all who commented on them, especially Josep Colomer, Bernard Grofman, Christian List, Gerry Mackie, Jack Nagel, Michael Nicholson, Bent Nielsen, Norman Schofield, Ken Shepsle and Hugh Ward; also to this *Journal's* reviewers and its indefatigable co-editor David Sanders. Facts not supported by citations are from conversations with William H. Riker (1987 and 1991), Richard D. McKelvey (1987), and Norman Schofield (2001). The usual disclaimers apply.

Review Article: William H. Riker and the invention of heresthetic(s)

1. An intellectual odyssey

> *[L]egislative strategy, which most writers have treated as a mystical art…, may on examination by this [social choice] theory turn out to be a science with quite coherent rules.*[1]

> *At the most general level there are the things people talk about as possible subjects for group decision. Call this the feasible set. From this misty swamp, politicians - by constitutional restrictions and direction and by rhetorical and heresthetical maneuvers - form the set of considered issues.*[2]

W. H. Riker (1921-93) was the most innovative political scientist of his generation. Founder of the 'Rochester school' of analytical political science informed by rational choice theory, he had extremely broad interests that belie the common characterization of 'ratchoicers' as narrow technocrats. He was fascinated by big questions. The federal government of the USA posed, for him, the biggest question of all. How had it come into existence against what seemed overwhelming odds? How did it survive? Why did it fail to prevent the Civil War? Throughout a long professional life he addressed these big questions. Albert Weale reviewed his work to 1982 in this *Journal*. This review aims to complete the story.[3] The big idea of Riker's career from 1982 until his death in 1993 was what Riker labelled as 'heresthetics' (and later dropped the final 's'). To understand the concept, one needs to follow the whole of Riker's intellectual journey, which was incomplete at the time of Weale's review.

Riker believed that he had made three leaps forward and suffered two setbacks, which he candidly acknowledged. The first leap forward was precisely to identify the big questions mentioned in the previous paragraph. This is evident as early as his 1953 text *Democracy in the United States*.[4] Swimming against the behaviouralist tide that was just starting to flow, Riker insisted that constitutions

matter, calling attention to the origin and growth of federalism. In this he anticipated by twenty years the institutional turn of political science, after behaviouralism had run its course in the 1970s. He revealed his lifelong interest in scientific explanation in political science by drawing attention to what we now (at Riker's bidding) call Duverger's Law. E.E. Schattschneider in fact anticipated Duverger, pointing out that the United States featured a two-party system except when regional parties could gain a foothold.[5]

From the beginning, Riker wanted to axiomatize such observations. Unusually for a political scientist, he was interested both in the fine grain of political history and in scientific method. The first concerned the unique; the second, the generalisable. Riker always wanted to illuminate the unique by the light of the general theory. However, he later admitted to 'a deep sense of failure' with *Democracy in the United States*, on the grounds that (he thought) hardly a sentence in it 'derives from a theory and has survived attempts at falsification…. I began a search for another path and discovered Kenneth Arrow and Duncan Black and social choice theory…. All this started me out on a new path and, considering where it has led me and the profession, I am glad I took it'.[6] Riker read Black's *Theory of Committees and Elections* when it was first published in 1958. He immediately became convinced that Black's book was one of the anchors he had been seeking. Black taught Riker the powerful stabilising effect of the median voter theorem. If issue space is one-dimensional, then the median voter's optimum is a stable equilibrium which any well designed choice procedure should be able to reach. On the other hand, if issue space is multidimensional, Riker quickly understood from Arrow's Theorem and from Black and Newing's *Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation* that the median voter theorem no longer applied.[7]

Annoyed by a review in the *American Political Science Review* which conveyed not the slightest idea what Black was talking about, Riker persuaded Avery Leiserson, the journal's editor, to carry his review article on 'Voting and the Summation of Preferences', in which he hails Black's book as one of the most fundamental works in political science.[8] Black was very grateful to Riker, and in a plaintive letter explained how several publishers including Oxford University Press had sent *The Theory of Committees and Elections* to readers who, like the *APSR* reviewer, failed to understand it. Riker

became Black's main promoter in US academia, helping him to obtain visiting professorships (which Black relished after the narrow fields of Bangor) and boosting the median voter theorem.[9]

The main works of Riker's second leap forward were *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962); *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (1964), and *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (with Peter C. Ordeshook, 1973).[10] Riker reworked his 1964 book on federalism in 1987, and it is discussed below. The other two books are discussed in Weale's 1984 review.[11] Although they both attracted widespread attention and are still cited extensively (especially *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, which had a 40th birthday symposium at the 2002 Public Choice Society meeting), Riker came to feel that their spatial modelling was unsatisfactory for two, perhaps three, reasons. Firstly, it did not have the deductive grounding he sought. *The Theory of Political Coalitions* relies on zero-sum game theory for its basic notion that spoils-seeking politicians will seek the smallest possible winning coalition for the division of the spoils. But this 'size principle' has not done particularly well in subsequent empirical tests. Secondly, Riker's spatial modelling did not fully incorporate the fundamental discovery of social choice, namely that when issue space is multidimensional, the median voter theorem does not apply. Thirdly, Riker may have felt frustrated at the internal incoherence of rational choice theory as it then stood.

Riker and Ordeshook's *Introduction to Positive Political Theory* is best known for its attempt to rescue Anthony Downs' prediction of rational abstention. Downs' best-known arguments are

1. Politicians will converge on the issue position of the median voter;
2. Citizens will vote only if their party differential, multiplied by the probability of decisiveness, exceeds the cost of voting. [12]

In a plurality electoral system, where Duverger's Law operates, Proposition 1 is a simple implication of Black's median voter theorem. But, as is well known, if Proposition 1 is true, then there will hardly ever be a rational voter for whom Proposition 2 is true. Proposition 1 implies that the issue position of both parties will be the same, therefore every voter's party differential will tend to zero. Only in a Duvergerian two-party system do Downs' two propositions eat each other up. In a proportional system,

the median voter theorem need not force all parties to the median. This need not mean that Downs was wrong. It could, rather, be read as an explanation of low turnout and perhaps low legitimacy in plurality-rule regimes. The collapse in turnout from over 70% to below 60% in the UK General Election of 2001 is easily explained in a Downsian way. The parties were close to the median voter; and the election was expected to be the foregone conclusion that it turned out to be. The surprise is that as many as 60% of the voters turned out, not that so few did.

Riker himself lived in, and cared most about, the Duvergerian two-party regime of the United Sates. He and Ordeshook therefore attempted to reconcile Downs's two propositions by appealing to the utility that voters derive from compliance with the ethic of voting. Barry, and Green and Shapiro, have shown what a feeble and self-destructive argument that is for a rational-choice political scientist.[13] Riker realised that it was a feeble attempt and that, for a plurality system, Downs' propositions cannot be reconciled from within rational choice theory. In his third step forward, Riker focussed only on political elites, leaving the loose ends of Downsian theory untied by saying nothing further about the rational behaviour of ordinary citizens.

Riker seized with delight on the early 'chaos theorems' of Kramer, Plott, Schofield, and McKelvey.[14] He encountered them in the mid-1970s on reading preprints of Schofield's and McKelvey's first chaos theorem papers. The chaos theorems state that in a large society there are no bounds to majority rule cycling. Such a society may wander from any outcome to any other by a path of majority decisions. At last, Riker felt, he had the deductive basis for political science for which he had been searching since the 1950s. In *Liberalism against Populism*, discussed below, Riker used these chaos results to argue for the fundamental disequilibrium of majority rule. From this disequilibrium emerged two main things: a normative theory of constitutional design and the positive methodology of 'heresthetic(s)'.

2. The invention of heresthetic

Riker expounded heresthetic in a number of papers and two books: *Liberalism against Populism* (henceforth *LAP*) and *The Art of Political Manipulation* (henceforth *APM*).[15] This analysis will concentrate on the books. Both are partly pedagogical. As teaching texts, they have a life of their own largely independent of the correctness of Riker's analysis. If he is wrong, he is wrong in interesting

ways that make the books still worth reading. Riker, like Hobbes, is more interesting when he is wrong than most of us are when we are right. The sweatshirt produced to celebrate his 70th birthday bore the frontispiece engraving from the first edition of *Leviathan* with the flowing locks of W.H. Riker in place of Hobbes's crowned Leviathan.

In *LAP*, Riker begins by expounding two normative theories, which he calls 'liberalism' and 'populism':

> In the liberal (Madisonian) view, voting is a method of controlling officials by subjecting their tenure to periodic electoral tests…. In the populist (Rousseauistic) view, voting is a method for citizens to participate directly in making law, which is then the will of the people. [16]

Note that although Riker calls the first view Madisonian, it is really Schumpeterian. It can, of course, be sourced to Madison (cf 'Ambition must be made to counteract ambition' - *Federalist* 51). But the canonical exponent of what Riker calls Liberalism is Joseph Schumpeter. In LAP, Riker curiously does not cite Schumpeter, but their arguments are closely parallel. Many of the numerous criticisms and defences of Schumpeter carry over as criticisms and defences of Riker's normative theory.[17]

Riker shows

- that different choice procedures may generate different outcomes from a given preference profile;
- that for binary choices May's Theorem[18] sets normative standards. May proved that only simple majority rule satisfies four desirable criteria: universal domain (giving a result for any logically possible profile of preferences); anonymity and neutrality (respectively, no voter, and no option, is privileged), and positive responsiveness (an increase in *x*'s support always increases *x*'s chance of winning);
- that because May's is both an existence and a uniqueness result, simple majority rule, and only that rule, meets these normative standards. If a rule meets those standards, it is simple majority rule. If a rule is not simple majority rule, it does not meet those standards.

- that for more than two options, there is no generalisation of May's theorem;
- but rather that Arrow's result, as generalised by the chaos and manipulability theorems, has radical implications.

Riker claims that democratic theory is seriously damaged by Arrow results:

> [S]o long as a society preserves democratic institutions, its members can expect that some of their social choices will be unordered and hence inconsistent. And when this is true, no meaningful choice can be made.[19]

In other words, if society prefers *A* to *B*, *B* to *C*, and *C* to *A*, as must always be possible when there are three or more alternatives, following the 'will of the people' becomes impossible because the will of the people is undefined.

Riker goes on to expound two sets of corollaries of Arrow. First, that strategic voting is ineradicable.[20] Second, that in two or more issue dimensions, the conditions for equilibrium are highly restrictive, and that absent equilibrium, 'every possible alternative is in the cycle of best outcomes'.[21] Riker goes on to illustrate the inferences he draws from these results in a number of historical narratives. He wishes to show that astute politicians can control the agenda in various ways. The one that intrigues him the most is manipulating the dimensionality of issue space. If, in issue space as it is currently viewed, one group persistently loses, it has an incentive to restructure issue space so that it can win. The most developed example concerns the emergence and re-emergence of the slavery dimension in US national politics between 1787 and 1860. Riker maintains that from 1800 through 1860, there was an electorally dominant Jefferson-Jackson coalition, which its successive losing opponents (Federalists, then Whigs, and finally Republicans) persistently tried to dislodge by introducing new issues to issue space. The issue of slavery was always potentially there - like a fire bell in the night, as Thomas Jefferson memorably wrote in 1820.[22] From time to time the bell rang - over Missouri in 1819-20, over the gag rule (prohibiting the acceptance of petitions against slavery in the Federal district) and the Wilmot Proviso (that would have prohibited slavery in territory to be gained from Mexico) in the 1840s. Until the 1850s, to use Jefferson's words again, its knell was hushed each time. But then the fire broke out, and consumed American politics. The supreme manipulator of issue dimensions was Abraham Lincoln.

APM concentrates on these manipulations. This is the book in which Riker first defines 'heresthetic[23]' as the art of political manipulation. He distinguishes it from rhetoric, and quirkily suggests that heresthetic should have become a fourth partner of the three arts of language as they were taught in ancient Greece and medieval universities:

> Logic is concerned with the truth-value of sentences. Grammar is concerned with the communications-value of sentences. Rhetoric is concerned with the persuasion-value of sentences. And heresthetic is concerned with the strategy-value of sentences. In each case, the art involves the use of language to accomplish some purpose: to arrive at truth, to communicate, to persuade, and to manipulate.[24]

He suggests that the art of heresthetic is old, but its scientific study is new, because only with the development of social choice theory could the intuitions of smart politicians all the way back to Pliny the Younger be formalized. The rest of the book comprises stories which, he claims, show herestheticians at work. Many of these stories are repeated and elaborated from *LAP* and earlier publications; some are not; and some in the earlier publications are not in *APM*.

Riker's main stories about American politics concern:

1. Gouverneur Morris at the Constitutional Convention, 1787
2. A logroll at the same convention between those (led by Massachusetts) who wanted a navigation act and those (led by South Carolina) who wanted to protect slavery.
3. The Missouri crisis, 1819-21
4. David Wilmot (Democrat - PA) and his 'proviso', 1846, that would have banned slavery in territory to be acquired from Mexico
5. Abraham Lincoln's allegedly lethal question to Stephen Douglas in 1858, during the Lincoln-Douglas Debates: 'Can the people of a United States Territory … exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a state constitution?'
6. The agenda control success of House Speaker Thomas B. Reed, 1890 and failure of his successor Joseph Cannon, 1910

7. Sen. Chauncey DePew (Republican-NY), who allegedly delayed the passage of the 17th Amendment (direct election of Senators) by introducing a clause that would have forced federal oversight of Southern elections
8. Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat- NY), who attached a civil rights amendment to a bill offering federal funding for schools in 1956.

I do not attempt to summarise the stories. They are all good reads in Riker's own brief summaries. Riker maintains that these stories show three varieties of heresthetic: agenda control (#6); strategic voting (by various parties in #1, #2, perhaps #4, and #8); and manipulation of dimensions (#1, #3, #4, #5, #7).[25]

These stories cover an extraordinary sweep and touch on issues that are, on any construction, central to US history and politics. They all affect the standing and rights of black Americans. Riker is as ambitious as other grand synthesisers - Arnold Toynbee and Gunnar Myrdal come to mind - and far more ambitious than is professionally prudent for either a historian or a political scientist. Many, perhaps all, of the individual stories could be demolished and we could still gasp at the edifice. Or could we?

3. The return to federalism

Riker's posthumous *The Strategy of Rhetoric*[26] indicates by its very title something of a swing back from heresthetic to rhetoric. With this book Riker concludes his 30-year study of the 1787 Convention. It analyses the motives and tactics of the Federalist Framers and their Anti-Federalist opponents, before, during, and after the convention. Therefore we need to place it in the context of Riker's earlier books and articles on American federalism. Luckily, his 1987 *The Development of American Federalism* is a palimpsest. It not only recycles sections from the 1964 book and from Riker's earlier articles back to the 1950s, but explains its author's changes of mind:

> In the half-century after the first world war the world was flooded with statist confidence in the benevolence of powerful government…. which in the United States took the form of, first, the New Deal, and, later, the "great society". In the last two decades, however, disillusionment with big government has set in…. My own ideological migrations have been much in the spirit of the age: from New Dealer in the fifties to liberal, anti-statist in the eighties. [27]

Therefore, whereas in 1964 he had tended to see federalism as an obstacle to beneficent government, in 1987 he saw it as a protection (albeit a minor one) against tyranny. Although Riker does not say so at this point, federal-state relations had changed hugely in the meantime with the enforcement of civil rights in the South, thus weakening the connection between states' rights and white supremacy. So a self-described liberal (by which the late Riker always means a civil and economic libertarian) could be much more at ease with separation of powers between the centre and the states in 1987 than in 1964.

Many of us on reaching 65 (Riker's age in 1987) would be quite happy to raid our filing cabinets for a few favourite articles from the distant past and fling them into a book. But *The Development of American Federalism* is no vanity production. It has consistent themes, which link the earlier *Liberalism against Populism* with the later *Strategy of Rhetoric*. Riker justifiably consigns most academic writing on federal-state relations to the bin, and asserts that there has been no general growth of federal power over the states. Where there has been, it has not been on tax or spending but in little noticed areas, especially the federalisation of the militia. The War of 1812 revealed the incompetence of the states to run militias, a duty which the Constitution and the Second Amendment impose on them. Between then and the Civil War the states failed to raise militias even when they had federal incentives to do so. They were scarcely used in the Civil War. When they were revived, it was as strike-breaking forces, now consolidated in the National Guard.

This story has the vintage Riker property that it takes fine-grained and neglected political history and tells a powerful analytic narrative to defeat the conventional wisdom. Likewise, the book contains a masterly demonstration that, in the Philadelphia debates of 1787, the Framers constructed a fictional Dutch Confederation, in which government was paralysed by a supposed unanimity requirement, not out of any knowledge of the politics of the Dutch republic but purely to supply an Awful Warning of

what was wrong with the Articles of Confederation.[28] However, the relevance of this to his theme in 1987 is strained (but its relevance to *The Strategy of Rhetoric* is greater). And the book as a whole is unbalanced because it scarcely discusses the federal-state aspect of civil rights from the 1954 *Brown* judgment to 1987.

In *The Strategy of Rhetoric*[29] Riker's research question is: how on earth was a Constitution ratified? It required 9 out of 13 states to ratify. Anti-Federalists were strong in most states and dominant in at least four, including two of the biggest (Massachusetts and Virginia). A further two (North Carolina and New Hampshire) probably had Anti-Federalist majorities in the state, even though they sent Federalist delegates to Philadelphia. [30]

As before, Riker deserves credit for focusing on a large and curiously neglected issue. Scholars of the US Constitution take it too much as a given. They rarely remark how simply *improbable* it is.[31] The Americans wrote a constitution, and had it popularly ratified, in 1787-8. The French, in the heartland of the Enlightenment, failed to produce a popularly ratified constitution in 1789, again in 1791, again in 1793, and again in 1830. One was written for the Second Republic in 1848, but it collapsed with the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in 1851.[32] Marx's title is a sarcastic reminder that the Nephew repeated what his Uncle had done on the original 18th Brumaire (9 Nov. 1799): seize power in a coup d'état.

What about the other Anglophone democracies? The Canadians never submitted their constitution (the British North America Act 1867) for popular ratification. On electoral evidence, it would have lost if they had. Their struggles through the 1980s to amend the constitution suggest that nothing has changed. The UK has never had a written constitutional text, and therefore has never had a ratification debate. The British-Irish Treaty of 1921 was debated in the Irish parliament, but ratified only as a result of the pro-treaty party winning the ensuing civil war. Only the Australians followed the US pattern, with their ratification process of 1892-1901 - over a century after the pioneer of popular ratification.

Riker asks why the rhetoric of the Federalists was more effective than that of their opponents. By content analysis of the huge volume of texts on both sides he derives what he calls the Dominance Principle and the Dispersion Principle. The former states that

> when one side dominates in the volume of rhetorical appeals on a particular theme, the other side abandons appeals on that theme

and the latter that

> when neither side dominates in volume, both sides abandon it . [33]

If both of these principles applied fully, then in equilibrium the two sides would totally talk past one another. They would reach this equilibrium – where no actor has a rational incentive to change strategy – once they had found out on which issues they could dominate in the volume of electoral appeals. After that, every possible issue would be raised either by precisely one side or by precisely zero sides. Riker's data (especially Table 8.4, p. 117) show that the Dominance and Dispersion Principles, although suggestive, do not totally explain the rhetorical strategies of the two sides. This led one hostile reviewer of this 'in some respects unfortunate book' to conclude that 'those interested in the substance of the debate … would do better to examine the primary sources for themselves'. That would be the four volumes of Max Farrand's *Records* and the eighteen of Jensen, Kaminski and Saladino's *Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution*, then?[34]

Despite his title, Riker does again consider heresthetic. As he rightly says, the line separating it from rhetoric must be 'wavy and uncertain'.[35] He describes Gouverneur Morris as 'an exceptional heresthetician if ever there was one' (p.164), albeit in connection with an incident other than the previous #1, which is not mentioned in *SOR*. In his concluding chapter, he identifies five heresthetic devices which he says made ratification possible. They are

- the Virginians' initial proposal of a new constitution, seizing control of the agenda;
- forward agenda control, through the ratification method proposed;
- a closed rule for amendments

- speed;
- later, a quasi-open rule for amendments, as it became clear that Massachusetts would not ratify otherwise. [36]

He concludes that the Federalists needed both their rhetoric and their heresthetic to win. Note, however, that Riker's examples of heresthetic in this book rely much less on claims that opinion was cyclical and that the winning side profited from imposing an order on underlying disequilibria than do the examples in *LAP* or *APM*. There is no claim that heresthetic must be tied up with multidimensionality.

4. The critics

Riker has been fiercely criticised. He has been described as the galactic commander of an evil empire:

> Cults are notable for the almost hypnotic reverence that subsumes their members when they talk about their leaders and the histories of their movements. And it would be only a slight stretch to compare this reverence with the way rational choicers talk about their movement's founder, the late William Riker, and the intellectual compound he built at the University of Rochester.[37]

The criticisms fall into on three main groups.

4.1 Riker's analysis does not entail his normative implications.

Riker's predecessor Schumpeter had defined an acceptable version of democracy as (only) one in which voters have the chance to throw out their leaders, not one in which the leaders carry out the people's will. Writing in the shadow of the Holocaust and World War II, Schumpeter believed that unfettered majoritarianism could license 'democracies' that persecuted Christians, burned witches, and slaughtered Jews. Such persecutions might be justified on the grounds that they were the people's will. But, Schumpeter objected (note: before Arrow's Theorem had been proved):

> It is not only conceivable but, whenever individual wills are much divided, very likely that the political decisions produced will not conform to "what the people want".[38]

Schumpeter's critics complain that his characterization of his supposed 'classical' enemies was, in Plamenatz's magnificently dismissive phrase, an 'ignorant and inept' conflation of Rousseau, Bentham and J. S. Mill.[39]

Like Schumpeter, Madison and many of his fellow Framers worried about the tyranny of the majority, which they thought they saw in the state legislatures' 'rage for paper money' or other 'improper or wicked projects'. Both the extended republic of *Federalist* # 10 and the checks and balances of *Federalist* # 51 are offered as checks on majority tyranny. That is what justifies Riker in describing his own 'liberalism' as Madisonian, even though Schumpeterian would have been nearer the mark.

It is true of both Schumpeter and Riker that their destruction succeeds; their construction is not justified by their arguments. They both insist that any Rousseauvian concept of the general will is incoherent. So, therefore, is any political theory that shares Rousseau's view that public outcomes ought to reflect the will of the people. Riker's attack on 'will of the people' political theory in *LAP* boils down to this (and perhaps he should have put it in the following terms):

> *Ought* implies *can.* The chaos theorems prove that in any reasonably large society, all (or at least many) possible platforms are in a cycle. This may well be a global cycle, in which every possible platform loses by a majority to at least one other. Therefore the will of the people does not exist. If the will of the people does not exist, any normative theory that says 'You ought to follow the will of the people' is vacuous. As you cannot have it, you must not say that you ought to have it.

Schumpeter had this insight; Riker is one of those who axiomatized it.

But this implies nothing about the optimal design of institutions. There is just a baseline clash of values here. Madison, Schumpeter, and Riker are all democrats, but they are all anti-majoritarians – that is, they all deny the proposition that a majority is entitled to do what it wants to. Each of them condemns some actions even if a majority supports them: for Madison, the issue of paper money by debtor

majorities in the states; for Schumpeter, the persecution of Jews; for Riker, majority attacks on minority rights. Majoritarians say that a legislature ought to have the right to make all debts payable in paper money if it so chooses; property-rights advocates say that it should not. Majoritarians ought to (but usually do not) say that a legislature ought to have the right to persecute Christians if it chooses to; rights advocates deny this. Madison, Schumpeter, and Riker all sided with rights advocates. But ultimately there is no argument about tastes. Nothing in the axioms of social choice entails any one solution to this fundamental dilemma. Although social choice can prove Rousseau vacuous, it cannot prove Madison right.

4.2 Of the frequency of cycles

Why so much stability? asked Gordon Tullock in a powerful rhetorical question.[40] If the inference that Riker draws from the chaos theorems is correct, how do we almost never observe cycling in practice? Legislatures do not defeat *A* by *B, B* by *C,* and then *C* by *A* again. Nor do mass electorates. Tullock's question has produced several replies. All except the first are hostile to Riker.

Reply 1. Equilibrium is structure-induced. Numerous institutions induce structure out of possible chaos.[41] There might be a cycle, but how would we ever know if the only data available is a set of votes? Most voting procedures do not ask for full revealed preference schedules, therefore we cannot usually know whether a cycle exists at all (both a problem and a spur for Riker). Binary procedures usually do not compare all pairs in the set. A legislature such as the US Congress operates through committees. Opinion over the options available in the domain of any one committee is usually single-peaked. The procedures of Congress such as closed rules for reporting proposals out of committees forbid any heresthetical exploitation of between-committee multidimensionality. Of this now huge literature it should at least be said that if Riker (and Tullock) had not posed the question, there would not now be such a large body of talented scholars devoted to answering it.

Reply 2. Riker overinterpreted the chaos results. His two main props differ on this point. McKelvey has stated that he has no problem with the way Riker used his results. Schofield argues that Riker leant on theorems that 'apply only to committees, where there is some foundation for supposing the voters have

well-defined preferences'. It was therefore inappropriate to apply them to the US Congress, although (Schofield argues) it might be more appropriate to apply them to multi-party European legislatures.[42] Furthermore, Riker relied on the early proofs of chaos theorems. However, the reach of the chaos theorems has been restricted by work in the 1990s. This work has been in the May/Black spirit of existence results (the yolk, the heart, the voice of reason, the uncovered set…) rather than the Arrow/Riker tradition of impossibility results. All of these exotically-named concepts are different sorts of stable areas in multi-dimensional space, where cycling does not occur.[43]

Reply 3. Even at the whole-legislature level, rollcall analysis shows that cycling is rare. The Poole and Rosenthal program *NOMINATE* shows that over the entire history of the US House since 1789, rollcalls reveal an occasionally chaotic structure (or lack of it): for instance in the 1790s and the 1820s. But they reveal a robustly two-dimensional structure only in the 1850s, when a division based on slavery came to overtake the former left-right division.[44] Tests using Poole-Rosenthal and similar methodologies on other countries have also generally found single-dimensionality.[45] Against this it has been objected that the Poole-Rosenthal program is not based on any statistical model and will tend to under-report the true dimensionality of opinion in a legislature.[46]

Reply 4. Riker picked stories that tended to support his case; therefore even if true, they imply nothing about the prevalence of cycling. [47] This is so important that it needs a fuller discussion.

4.3 Are all (or any) of the stories true?

Historians have long been sceptical about Riker's analysis of the origins of the American Civil War. In a remarkable *tour de force*, Gerry Mackie has investigated most of Riker's principal stories and finds them wanting.[48] A summary of his findings is in Table 1. The numbering of the stories refers to the brief introduction above.

Table 1. Riker's stories and Mackie's criticisms

Story #	Subject	Mackie finding
1	Morris at the	The alleged cycle arises from treating similar alternatives as identical. If

	Constitutional Convention	alternatives are properly individuated, then there is no cycle. Sincere opinions changed as new considerations (e.g., expense of getting from remote states to the capital) were put on the table.
2	Logroll, 1787	Not examined.
3-5	Missouri; Wilmot Proviso; 1860 election	There was never a cycle. Latitude was attitude; the slavery issue was 1-dimensional: the further north the more antislavery. Riker's cycle depends on the implausible assumption that most Lincoln voters ranked John Bell above Stephen A. Douglas; the reverse is true. Douglas was the 'winner' in 1860, not selected due to the antimajoritarian design of electoral college.[49] The slavery issue erupted not through arbitrary manipulation of multidimensional issue space, but through disruption of political balance following territorial acquisitions.[50]
4	Wilmot Proviso	Riker's alleged cycle is based on an egregious misreading of *Congressional Globe*. There was no cycle, the best alternative won.
5	Lincoln at Freeport	American historians now reject Riker's "magic bullet" interpretation of Freeport debate. Douglas did face a dilemma, but it was one forced upon him by the changing preferences of the Northern and Southern populations, not by Lincoln's discourse.
6	Reed and Cannon	Not examined.
7	DePew	Riker commits 11 factual mistakes and assumes irrational voters. There were no cycles, not in 1902, not in 1911. The 17th Amendment would have failed in 1902 with or without a voting-rights rider. It passed in late 1911 due to the changed composition of the Senate.
8	Powell	Riker and others allege a cycle in 1956 and assume irrational voters. Votes, debates, and inferences in 1956 and 1957 show that school aid would have failed with or without Powell's desegregation amendment. There was no cycle; the best alternative won.

Mackie also dislikes Riker's tone, and his imputation that some of the politicians in the stories are smarter than others - an imputation that is needed in order to make the disequilibria balance out in the

way that history records they did. As to tone, Mackie perceives Riker as praising those he approves of when they behave manipulatively, and denigrating those he disapproves of when they do the same. I think Mackie is mistaken here. Riker admires manipulators, whether or not he substantively approves of their aims. His assortment of heroes - Gouverneur Morris, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, James Polk (the hero of the Wilmot Proviso discussion), Thomas B. Reed, Chauncey DePew…. - have nothing in common except as herestheticians. Riker admires their common skill, as one might admire a skilled footballer or tennis player. No harm there that I can see. By contrast, Riker is rather disparaging of James Madison at the Constitutional Convention, although he substantively approves of Madison's politics, not of Morris's. Madison scores for his understanding of others' heresthetic. Madison's *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention* - and his notes to his notes - are the primary source for all the heresthetic moves that Riker thinks he sees in the 1787 convention. Madison recognised a heresthetician in Morris[51], but knew that he was not one himself. His immediate response to the Great Compromise of 17 July (imposing two Senators per State regardless of population) was to give up on the convention. Morris was made of sterner stuff.

Differential smartness is a more serious issue, to which I return in Section 6.

5. Some surprising facts

For obvious reasons, we have concentrated hitherto on debates about what Riker got wrong. It may be difficult then to get a clear picture of what he got right. A tentative answer is that he was right to identify the big and surprising questions, and right that they were susceptible to formal analysis, even if he overclaimed for particular sorts of formal analysis. In this section we look at some big and surprising questions that have been posed by Riker and his followers. In the next section we ask how far (if at all) either the methods or the findings of these studies can be generalised. Is Riker simply a one-off, who knew a lot of curious facts about American history and a lot of formal political science? Or can others follow in his footsteps?

5.1 The US Constitution was ratified

Riker's unfinished work, which ended with *The Strategy of Rhetoric* but would have continued had he lived, has spurred both historians such as Jack Rakove and political scientists such as Norman Schofield to complete his lifetime task of producing a rational explanation of the promulgation and ratification of the US Constitution. [52]

Schofield sees both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as moments of 'constitutional quandary', in which agents faced uncertainty - in the decision-theorist's sense that 'there is no rationalizable way of ascribing probabilities to outcomes resulting from possible acts'. [53] In 1787, the quandary was the proposed treaty between John Jay and the Spanish Empire, in which the northern states would have been advantaged by free trade with the Spanish empire, but the southern states damaged by Spanish closure of the Mississippi at New Orleans (then Spanish-controlled). As it split the states 7/6, it could not pass under the unanimity rule of the Articles of Confederation. Madison thought the issue drove such a deep wedge between the states that the Confederation might fall apart unless a new constitution greatly enhanced the powers of the national government.[54] The threat of encircling powers is set out most clearly in Jay's *Federalist* #4.

Schofield, extending Riker's style of analysis, argues that Americans faced a 'belief cascade' in 1776 and again in 1787. This concept has gained prominence in formal political science since Susanne Lohmann's analysis of the collapse of East Germany. No rational choice theorist can explain why the first Leipziger came out to demonstrate against the regime. But given that he was not shot, the next most risk-prone Leipziger had an incentive to do the same. And the next, and the next… and within a few weeks the East German state had collapsed.[55] That a few influential politicians such as Madison and Alexander Hamilton, temporary allies in 1786, had an exogenously derived belief in the external threat to the Confederation and hence in the need for a new constitution was itself a signal to the next most nationalistically-inclined tier of politicians, and that to the next.

5.2 Both Houses of the UK Parliament passed Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846

Repeal of the Corn Laws was the most surprising act of the UK legislature of the past two centuries. Two houses of the legislature and the executive, all three of them dominated by the landed interest, passed a measure that stripped protection from the landed interest. Free trade was in the material interest of industrial capital and (probably) of labour, neither of which controlled - separately or together - anything approaching a majority in any of the three bodies.

Separately, McLean & Bustani, and Schonhardt-Bailey have found that rollcalls in the Commons do not reveal that opinion on the Corn Laws was orthogonal to that on any other leading issue. I therefore attribute this outcome to the heresthetic manoeuvres of Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel and leader of the House of Lords the Duke of Wellington. Peel turned a one-dimensional issue into a two-dimensional one, where the second dimension involved public order (especially in Ireland, where the Famine had begun to strike).[56] He deserves a place in Riker's pantheon. On a visit to the UK in 1986, Riker directly inspired McLean and coauthors to examine this case.

5.3 Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 election

Lincoln got a majority of the Electoral College vote, and therefore won the Presidency outright, on less than 40% of the popular vote. The mechanical explanation is simple enough. In a four-candidate race, Lincoln beat Stephen Douglas narrowly in each state of the North, while getting no votes at all in the Deep South. His vote was distributed as efficiently as it could have been for winning in the Electoral College; Douglas's, as inefficiently as it could have been. But then we need to ask: as the magnifying and distorting effects of the Electoral College were well known, why was it a four-horse race? This is a question to ask every insurgent candidate, from John Bell and John C. Breckinridge in 1860 to Ralph Nader in 2000.

The recent rational-choice turn to institutions, led by Riker and by Douglass North, is helpful here. The institution that led to Breckinridge's candidacy was the Democrats' 2/3 rule in their nominating convention. The institution that led to Bell's candidacy was the fallback Constitutional provision that throws the election into the House if no candidate wins a majority of the Electoral College.

Southern Democrats introduced a 2/3 rule in 1844. The successful Presidential nominee at the Democratic National Convention must obtain at least 2/3 of the delegates' votes. This rule was an attempt to discipline the 55 Northern Democrats in the House who formed part of the majority to rescind the 'gag rule'[57]. The 2/3 rule ensured that the southerner Polk won the nomination, and then the Presidency, in 1844. But it did not heal the split in the Democratic Party. Polk was a highly successful President, but a sick man. He did not run for renomination in 1848 and died soon after. The Democrats lost in 1848 and nominated weak candidates in 1852 and 1856. President James Buchanan, elected in 1856, always tops the historians' consensus ranking for 'Worst US President' (ahead of Millard Fillmore, Warren G. Harding, and Richard Nixon). The Dred Scott judgment in 1857 probably made the chasm unbridgeable. At the 1860 Democratic nominating convention, no candidate could win 2/3 of the delegates' votes. The party split, with northerners nominating Douglas and southerners nominating Breckinridge. Breckinridge's candidacy was not a gesture. Although he was a Condorcet loser[58] (this claim of Riker's is not in dispute), Breckinridge's vote was efficiently distributed, and so he won 72 electoral votes for his 800,000 popular votes (compare Douglas: 12 electoral votes, 1.24 million popular votes). His candidacy sent a signal to the north much like Charles Cotesworth Pinckney's vote trade in 1787: without the South, the United States as envisaged in 1787 cannot cohere.

Mackie offers a Rikerian explanation of Bell's candidacy. If 'latitude was attitude', then Bell had a reasonable expectation of winning some states in the middle south. He actually won 39 electoral votes and 600,000 popular votes. [59] I agree with Mackie that Riker is probably wrong to infer a popular-vote cycle among Bell, Douglas, and Lincoln. But Mackie's recalculation of the numbers in LAP, Display 9-2[60] makes Douglas the Condorcet winner. Therefore it does not harm Riker's conclusion that Lincoln was not a Condorcet winner. It merely takes the cycle, which I believe to be inessential, out of Riker's story. Bell had no realistic hope of a majority, but he did have a realistic hope of influence in the event

that the election went to the House. *Ex ante*, that was a reasonable expectation. If Douglas had run a little more strongly, a small increment in the popular vote would have given him several states and a huge increment in the electoral vote. Then Bell would have been in a position to drive some sort of bargain, as had happened in 1824.

This case shows that even a sworn enemy of Riker, Gerry Mackie, finds Riker's method useful and indeed extends it to produce a more coherent explanation than Riker's own of the most important Presidential election in US history.

5.4 The New Zealand Labour government dismantled corporatism and removed the privileges of organised labour

Jack Nagel has been driven by the Riker research agenda to examine another very surprising outcome. In New Zealand between 1984 and 1993

> New Right reforms were initiated by the party of the left…. Economic restructuring was far more radical … than in other democracies…. Reformers were able to maintain momentum through two elections and a change of governing party.[61]

Nagel's explanation is that the Labour leaders David Lange and Roger Douglas opened up a new issue dimension. In the dimension of social liberalism, they took a distinctively 'left' or 'liberal' position on nuclear weapons, the environment, and Maori land rights. This package appealed sufficiently to post-materialist Labour activists, horrified by the diagonally opposite policy platform (economically welfarist and socially conservative) of the National Party's dominant incumbent Robert Muldoon, that they did not notice, or even (ahead of Labour's coming to power) did not care about Labour's New Right economic policies.

How, though, did the policies survive three elections and a change of government? Essentially because they were driven by an intellectually determined and coherent group in the NZ Treasury. When the tensions the programme induced in the Labour Party caused it to fall apart, the National Party came into power with the electoral system boosting their plurality of the vote to a huge majority in seats.

Thus (as with Peel and the Corn Laws), the very institutions Riker deplores - majoritarian government with no Madisonian checks and balances - were necessary (and perhaps sufficient) for the sharply Rikerian realignment of NZ politics in multidimensional space that occurred between 1984 and 1993.

6 The future of the Riker agenda

All of the investigations just described were driven by the Riker research agenda.[62] In each case, scholars have gone beyond Riker; in some cases, they have contradicted some of his arguments. Court scholars are also starting to use Riker's ideas in the analysis of the US Supreme Court. This is a promising application, for two reasons. Legal judgments are inherently multidimensional; and judges in a multi-judge court are sophisticated and well-informed about each others' preferences.[63] Studies of court heresthetics thus satisfy Schofield's criterion for the appropriate use of his chaos theorems (see above). The Riker research program remains vibrant. This is no decayed or degenerate paradigm, waiting to be swept away by the next fresh approach to social research. However, two items from the programme should be dropped in favour of one that has not received enough emphasis. The two items to drop are Riker's normative conclusions, and his incessant search for cycles. The item to stress is the unexpectedness of some political outcomes.

Riker's 'Madisonian' prescriptions do not follow from his analysis. However, Riker's excursions into normative political theory focus attention on some currently hot topics. Which promotes stability more: a Madisonian regime of checks and balances, or a majoritarian regime with a strong executive? Usually, the first. But is stability a good thing or not? It is no answer to say 'A stable majority for the people or policies I favour is good; a stable majority for the other lot is bad'. There is obviously a trade-off between stability and democratic responsiveness. The social choice theorist has nothing to bring to the table except to observe that the trade-off is ineradicable.

Riker's fascination with cycles is another distraction. In the canonical stories Riker fails to demonstrate that cycles actually occurred. But so what? There are heresthetic moves that do not entail cycles: some of them in Riker's own stories. We have James Madison's eyewitness report that the vote trade between Massachusetts and South Carolina in the Constitutional Convention happened. It shaped the US Constitution in two crucial areas. Opinion was multi-dimensional. No doubt it was cyclical too but

that is unimportant. All that Riker needs to show is that in multidimensional space where an infinity of Constitutions could have emerged, the one that actually did involved vote trading between ships and slaves.

How common are voting cycles in practice, and does it matter if they are not? Riker's favourite stories 'though rarely cited outside rational choice circles, have turned up in numerous texts on game theory and spatial modeling and are therefore well known among rational choice theorists'.[64] It is admittedly very difficult to prove that a cycle has occurred, because most choice procedures stifle the evidence. Riker's case studies are falsifiable, and some of them have been falsified. But they are not verifiable. Nor can the incidence of prevalence of heresthetic be determined, because the universe of possible cases of it is undefinable. Furthermore, there is an ineradicable risk of causal mis-specification. When a new issue dimension arises, it may be (as per Riker) because a successful heresthetician has placed it on the agenda. Or it may be (as per Mackie, and Green and Shapiro) because voter opinion was already moving in that direction anyhow. It is hard, and perhaps impossible, to differentiate between these hypotheses.

On the other hand, it is not difficult to prove that some pathologies of social choice do occur, and that some of them are rather important. For example, Condorcet and/or Borda winners sometimes fail to win. They include Douglas in the US Presidential election of 1860, and the Liberal Democrats in the UK General Election of 1992.[65] All that a Rikerian needs to show is that multidimensional issue space offers the potential to construct a new winning majority. Therefore herestheticians have an incentive to increase or diminish the dimensionality of issue space, according to their perceived advantage. As the theorems on spatial voting are well grounded, Rikerians cannot be driven off this ground. Some, but not all, of Riker's corpus of stories have survived the test which he set himself: it 'derives from a theory and has survived attempts at falsification' (see above). The Pinckney vote trade and the Reed/Cannon agenda control survive unscathed. And although the fine detail of Riker's origins of the Civil War has been falsified, the outline of the story has been sustained. Yes, it was common knowledge that slavery was a dangerous issue. Yes, Democrats had an incentive to suppress it and their opponents had an incentive to bring it up. Yes, when it was brought up it made politics two-

dimensional and (in the social choice sense) chaotic. Yes, Lincoln's victory was heresthetic, although Lincoln was not the only heresthetician at work.

Finally, what about the disequilibria in Rikerian stories between the Morrises, Pinckneys, Lincolns, Peels, Douglases (Stephen and Roger)… and the rest of the political class? Rational choice usually assumes information equilibria. An out of equilibrium explanation that posits that Federalists (etc) won because they were smarter than Anti-Federalists (etc.) is intellectually unsatisfying. But it may be correct. At any one time in any one political arena, there are relatively few politicians. And in the set of all politicians there are few heresthetic ians. So, at any one place and time, there probably is no heresthetician. But when they do turn up, they can make a difference.

Standing back from the details, what components of the Riker method remain unscathed? Historians, politicians, and political scientists have always known that log-rolling and agenda manipulation go on, so what is the added value? First, formalisation. By linking insights as old as Pliny the Younger to the social choice literature, Riker could formalise the circumstances in which log-rolling and agenda manipulation could be expected to help the manipulators. He rightly realised the potential of cycles for manipulation, although real cycles seem like snarks. Riker and his followers have been hunting them for over 20 years now with no confirmed sightings. Second, the concept of heresthetic. This became Riker's favourite word. Heresthetic ('structuring the world so you can win') may not happen as often as Riker claims, but when it does, it matters. Third, supplying the analysis for analytic narratives. These have become modish since the book with that title by Bates *et al.*[66], but they are much harder to do convincingly than they may appear.

What does it take to tell a convincing analytic narrative? Is the Riker method only to be learnt by example, or is there a characteristic set of questions to be asked about any situation? As the method is in its infancy, I offer only tentative answers. An analytic narrative should work in one of at least three modes (there may be more, yet to be perfected). Mode A takes a commonplace of rational-choice analysis, such as 'Trust among strangers is difficult to induce', or, 'Cartels are hard to sustain in the long run'. It then looks at a case where these commonplaces do not hold, such as the stability of the medieval Genoese polity and economy, or the survival of the International Coffee Organization from

1962 to 1989. By modelling the situation with appropriate iterated games, it shows why the commonplace does not hold in the specific case.[67] Mode B takes a neglected fact, narrates it, and shows how it matters for institutional design. I class Riker's stories about the failure of state militias in 1812, and about the fictional Dutch republic created by the American Framers in 1787, as good examples of Mode B analytic narratives. Mode C is the one most associated with Riker. The analyst identifies a surprising political outcome, such as those discussed above, and seeks to identify the rhetorical and heresthetic devices that led to it.

To carry off a Mode C analysis one has to be good at analysis and at narrative history. The analytical narrator must expect to be sniped at from both sides. To be credible to historians, the analyst must have mastered the archival sources. To be credible to game theorists, the historian must be able to propose and solve an appropriate game model. Few people combine these talents. That Riker did is a sign both of his eminence and of the hardness of following his act.

NOTES

[1] W. Riker, "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade," *American Political Science Review* 55 (1961):900-911, quoted at p. 911.

[2] William H. Riker, *Agenda Formation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 000.

[3] Albert Weale, "Review Article: Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory," *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (1984):369-385.. Readers should also refer to N. Schofield, "Evolution of the Constitution," *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (2001):000-000, Norman Schofield, "Constitutions, Voting, and Democracy: A Review," *Social Choice and Welfare* 18 (3) (2001):571-600 for mathematical discussion and a survey of some Riker papers which space prevents me from reviewing here.

[4] William H. Riker, *Democracy in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

[5] Elmer Eric Schattschneider, *Party Government, American Government in Action Series* (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1942).

[6] In Kristen R. Monroe, *Contemporary Empirical Political Theory* (Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 201. We have discussed Riker's discovery of Duncan Black elsewhere in Duncan Black et al., *The Theory of Committees and Elections,* Rev. 2nd eds. / ed. by I. McLean, A. McMillan and B. L. Monroe (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998)., pp. xx-xxiv.

[7] *Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation* was first published as an obscure monograph in 1951. It is republished in Black et al., *The Theory of Committees and Elections*.. Ronald Coase's foreword to this book explains why it was published in the way it was.

[8] C.G Jackson, "'The Theory of Committees and Elections' by Duncan Black," *American Political Science Review* 54 (1960): 751; Riker, "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade."

[9] Black to Riker, 13.3.1961; Duncan Black Archive, Glasgow University Archives, DC 304/4/RIKE/12. For more detail on the Black-Riker relationship, see Black et al., *The Theory of Committees and Elections.*, pp. xx-xlix.

[10] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1962).; William H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).; and William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973)..

[11] Weale, "Review Article: Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory."

[12] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). See especially pp. 296-8.

[13] Brian M. Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, Themes and Issues in Modern Sociology* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), 15; Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory : A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1994), 51, W. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1968):25-42, Riker and Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory*.

[14] G.H Kramer, "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," *Econometrica* 41 (1973):285-297; R. D. McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," *Journal of Economic Theory* 12 (1976):472-482; C Plott, "Axiomatic Social Choice Theory," *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (1976):511-596, C Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule," *American Economic Review* 57 (1967):787-806, N. Schofield, "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," *Review of Economic Studies* 45 (1978):575-594..

[15] William H. Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), William H. Riker, *Liberalism against Populism : A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1982)..

[16] Riker, *Liberalism against Populism : A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, xi.

[17] Joseph Alois Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 4th ed., *Unwin University Books ; 28* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954).; Gerry Mackie, "The Coherence of Democracy," (Canberra: 2001).; Vilfredo Pareto and Arthur Livingston, *The Mind and Society* (London: Cape, 1935).; J. Burnham, *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom* (London: Putnam., 1943).

[18] Kenneth O. May, "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision," *Econometrica* 20 (1952):680-684..

[19] Riker, *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, p. 136.

[20] Allan Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," *Econometrica* 41 (1973):587-601, Mark Satterthwaite, "Strategy Proofness and Arrow's Conditions," *Journal of Economic Theory* 10 (1975):187-217..

[21] Riker, *Liberalism against Populism : A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice.*, p. xvi.

[22] 'I had for a long time ceased to read newspapers or pay any attention to public affairs, confident they were in good hands, and content to be a passenger in our bark to the shore from which I am not distant. but this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. it is hushed indeed for the moment. but this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence.' .Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, April 22, 1820. Library of Congress, Thomas Jefferson Papers Series 1. General Correspondence. 1651-1827, Image 1238 of 1325. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjhome.html

[23] Riker states that he coined *Heresthetic* from a Greek root denoting choosing and electing (but, in reality, Greek democrats thought that choice by lot was the only fair mechanism). I think that he was intrigued that the root of *heresy, heretic* etc. denotes 'finding out for oneself':

> Gr[eek]. *???es ??* taking, choosing, choice, course taken, course of action or thought, 'school' of thought, philosophic principle or set of principles, philosophical or religious sect; f. *??e??* to take, middle voice *???? ?a?* to take for oneself, choose. (*Oxford English Dictionary* 2nd ed on-line, etymology of *heresy*).

So he coined 'heresthetic' by analogy with 'aesthetic'. The 'th' represents the Greek middle voice 'to take for oneself, choose'.

[24] Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation*, p. x.

[25] Riker, *Liberalism against* Populism, pp. 215-232; The *Art of Political Manipulation*, chs 1, 2, 4, 8, 11, 12.

[26] William H. Riker et al., *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996).

[27] William H. Riker, *The Development of American Federalism* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), p. xii.

[28] Riker, *The Development of American Federalism*, chaps 3 and 8.

[29] Riker et al., *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*, pp. 17-18.

[30] Riker et al., *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*, p. 168.

[31] Schofield, "Evolution of the Constitution." N. Schofield, "Quandaries of War and Union in North America: 1763-1860," (St Louis, MO: 1999).

[32] Karl Marx, Eden Paul, and Cedar Paul, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (London: G. Allen & Unwin ltd., 1926).

[33] Riker et al., *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*. pp. 6 (source of quotations) and 106.

[34] F. Wall, "Review of W.H. Riker Et Al, 'the Strategy of Rhetoric'," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 2 (1998):389-390.; Merrill Jensen, John P. Kaminski, and Gaspare J. Saladino, *The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976), United States. Constitutional Convention (1787), Max Farrand, and David Maydole Matteson, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, Rev. ed. (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1966), United States. Constitutional Convention (1787) et al., *Supplement to Max Farrand's the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1987)..

[35] Riker et al., *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*., p. 9.

[36] Riker et al., *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*., pp. 253-4

[37] Jonathan Cohn, "Irrational Exuberance: When Did Political Science Forget About Politics?" *New Republic*, October 25 1999., p. 26.

[38] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, p. 254.

[39] Most effectively P. Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), John Plamenatz, *Democracy and Illusion: An Examination of Certain Aspects of Modern Democratic Theory* ([London]: Longman, 1973), quoted at p. 96.

[40] Gordon Tullock, "Why So Much Stability?," *Public Choice* 37 (1981):189-202.

[41] Kenneth A Shepsle and B. R. Weingast, "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (1984):49-74, Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995)..

[42] N. Schofield, "Rational Choice and Political Economy," *Critical Review* 9, no. 1-2 (1995):189-211..

[43] See, especially, D Saari, "Generic Existence of a Core for *Q*-Rules," *Economic Theory* 9 (1997):219-260.

[44] Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress : A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 35-42, 59-67.

[45] I. McLean and C. Bustani, "Irish Potatoes and British Politics: Interests, Ideology, Heresthetic and the Repeal of the Corn Laws," *Political Studies* 47, no. 5 (1999):817-836, C. Schonhardt-Bailey, "Ideology, Party and Interests in the British Parliament of 1841-1847" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C, 2000).

[46] K. Koford, "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the United-States-Congress," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 3 (1991):955-975.

[47] Green and Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*, G. Mackie, "Is Democracy Impossible? Riker's Mistaken Accounts of Antebellum Politics" (paper presented at the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, TX, 2001), Mackie, "The Coherence of Democracy."

[48] Mackie, "Is Democracy Impossible? Riker's Mistaken Accounts of Antebellum Politics", Mackie, "The Coherence of Democracy."

[49] A. Tabarrok and L. Spector, "Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War?" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11, no. 2 (1999):261-288.

[50] Poole and Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*, B. R. Weingast, "Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy," in *Analytic Narratives*, ed. Robert H. Bates (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[51] United States. Constitutional Convention (1787) et al., *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*, [Bicentennial] ed. (New York ; London: Norton, 1987). Following are three of Madison's notes to his Notes that set Riker off on his quests:

> (17.07.87) Doc^{t} McClurg moved * to strike out 7 years, and insert "during good behaviour".
>
> * The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument against the re-eligibility of the Executive Magistrate, by holding out a tenure during good behavior as the alternative for keeping him independent of the Legislature. United States. Constitutional Convention (1787) et al., *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787,* p. 310.
>
> (29.08.87) Gen^{l} Pinckney said it was the true interest of the S. States to have no regulation of commerce; but considering the loss brought on the commerce of the Eastern States by the revolution, their liberal conduct towards the views* of South Carolina…., he thought it proper that no fetters should be imposed on the power of making commercial regulations; and that his constituents though prejudiced against the Eastern States, would be reconciled to this liberality.
>
> * he meant the permission to import slaves. An understanding between the two subjects of *navigation* and *slavery*, had taken place between those parts of the union, which explains the vote on the motion depending, as well as the language of Gen^{l} Pinckney & others. United States. Constitutional Convention (1787) et al., *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*, p. 548.
>
> (17.09.87) He [Benjamin Franklin] then moved that the Constitution be signed by the members and offered the following as a convenient form viz. "Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of *the States* present the 17th of Sep^{r} &c - In Witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names."

This ambiguous form had been drawn up by Mr G. M. in order to gain the dissenting members, and put into the hands of Doc^{r} Franklin that it might have the better chance of success United States. Constitutional Convention (1787) et al., *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*, p. 654.

[52] Jack N Rakove, "Madison Theorizing," (Stanford, CA: 2000), Jack N Rakove, "The Madisonian Theory of Rights," *William and Mary Law Review* 31, no. 2 (1990):245-266, Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 1st ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1992)..

[53] Schofield, "Evolution of the Constitution.", Schofield, "Quandaries of War and Union in North America: 1763-1860.", Norman Schofield, "Constitutional Political Economy: On the Possibility of Combining Rational Choice Theory and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000):277-303, Norman Schofield, "Institutional Innovation, Contingency, and War: A Review," *Social Choice and Welfare* 17 (2000):463-479.

[54] Schofield, "Quandaries of War and Union in North America: 1763-1860."

[55] S Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades - the Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," *World Politics* 47, no. 1 (1994):42-101.

[56] I. McLean, *Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 33-56; McLean and Bustani, "Irish Potatoes and British Politics: Interests, Ideology, Heresthetic and the Repeal of the Corn Laws.", Schonhardt-Bailey, "Ideology, Party and Interests in the British Parliament of 1841-1847".

[57] The gag rule was a decision to forbid Congress from considering petitions to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. As the District is the only territory directly under Congress's control, anti-slavery petititoners had concentrated their fire on this issue. The gag rule was instituted at southerners' behest.

[58] A Condorcet loser is a candidate who loses to each of the other candidates when all pairwise comparisons are made. A Condorcet winner is a candidate who beats each of the other candidates when all pairwise comparisons are made. The Borda winner is the candidate with the highest average ranking.

[59] Mackie, "The Coherence of Democracy."

[60] Riker, *Liberalism against Populism*, pp. 230-1; Mackie, "Is Democracy Impossible?"

[61] Jack H. Nagel, "Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New Zealand," *British Journal of Political Science* 28 (1998): 223-265.; Jack H. Nagel, 'In defense of heresthetics', paper for 2001 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, TX.

[62] For some other applications, see Y Cohen, "The Heresthetics of Coup Making," *Comparative Political Studies* 24 (1991):344-364, R Johnston et al., "Free Trade in Canadian Elections: Issue Evolution in the Long and the Short Run," in *Agenda Formation*, ed. W. Riker (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), D. L. Weimer, "Claiming Races, Broiler Contracts, Heresthetics, and Habits - 10 Concepts for Policy Design," *Policy Sciences* 25, no. 2 (1992):135-159, Weingast, "Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy."

[63] Maxwell L. Stearns, *Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000)..

[64] Green and Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* p. 109.

[65] For the UK case see S.D. Fisher, "Tactical Voting in England 1987 to 1997" (D.Phil., Oxford University, 1999).. Fisher's data, derived from the party preference and feeling thermometer questions in the British Election Survey, show that Margaret Thatcher was the Condorcet winner in 1983 and 1987.

[66] Robert H. Bates, *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[67] Avner Greif, "Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa," in *Analytic Narratives*, ed. Robert H. et al Bates (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).; Robert H. Bates, "The International Coffee Organization: An International Institution," in *Analytic Narratives*, ed. Robert H. Bates, et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).