

# Applied Cryptography 2

Maria Eichlseder Christian Rechberger

Summer Term 2020

Daniel Kales

Markus Schofnegger

# Cryptanalysis

### 

The best available cryptanalysis (+security margin) indicates the necessary key size, number of rounds, etc. to achieve a certain security level:

- Asymmetric crypto: Best algorithm to solve hard problem
- Symmetric crypto: Generic and dedicated attacks

# Course topics: In more detail

### Asymmetric Cryptanalysis



- Factoring & Continued Fractions
- Lattices

### **Multiparty Computation**



- How to securely compute joint output on secret inputs
- Protocols, Applications, ...

### Symmetric Cryptanalysis



- Statistical attacks on block ciphers (Linear & Differential Cryptanalysis)
- Algebraic Attacks
- Hash Function Cryptanalysis

### **Selected Topics**



YOU choose (because you present)

### Prerequisites

If you already heard Applied Cryptography 1 – perfect! If not:

- Asymmetric Crypto:
  - Groups & Finite Fields
  - Number theory basics
  - Elliptic Curves
- Symmetric Crypto:
  - Block Ciphers, Hash Functions
  - Differential Cryptanalysis
  - (Very basic statistics)
- For the KU: Mathematical programming (Sage, C++ with library or similar)

### How to get your grade

### Exercises (KU)

Programming exercises2 submissions + interview ("Abgabegespräch")

### Lecture (VO)

You have 2 options:

a Final exam

or

b Seminar presentation

### Exercises (KU)

- Implement attacks and protocols from the lecture in teams of 2
- 2 Assignments à 3 tasks:
  - A 4 points (easy)
  - B 8 points (medium)
  - C 12 points (pro)
- But: 100% = 32 points (not 48), so

≥ 28 points	1
≥ 24 points	2
$\geq$ 20 points	3
$\geq$ 16 points	4
else	5

### **KU: Assignments**

### Assignment 1: Asymmetric Cryptanalysis and Multiparty Computation

Release: 19 Mar 2020 (= team registration deadline!)

Question time: 23 Apr 2020Submission: 30 April 2020

### Assignment 2: Symmetric Cryptanalysis

Release: 7 May 2020

Question time: 4 Jun 2020

Submission: 12 Jun 2020 (Friday!)

Note: We usually won't need the 17:30–18:15 timeslots except those dates

### **KU: Submissions**

### Upload your KU submissions in the Student Tick System (STicS):

https://stics.iaik.tugraz.at



Note: Even if you've used STicS before, you might have to request a new password.

# Lecture (VO) – Option a Final exam

### Exam mode

#### Choose a date:

- 02 July 2020: written exam
- Later: ask for an oral exam date

### **Questions:**

- Answer 4 out of 5 questions
- List of questions at the end of slides
- Lecture & seminar topics

$\geq 87.5\%$	- 1
$\geq$ 75.0 %	2
$\geq$ 62.5 $\%$	3
$\geq$ 50.0 $\%$	4
else	5

# Lecture (VO) – Option **b** Seminar presentation

### Seminar mode

### Prerequisites:

- Participate in KU
- Participate in VO
  - Regular attendance
  - Think about what you hear, and ask questions

#### Presentations:

- Collaboration in same team as KU
- Select your topic in STicS until 19 Mar 2020
- 45 minutes (incl. time for questions)
- Send us your planned slides at least 1 week in advance
- Include possible exam questions at the end of your slides

### VO: Schedule I

- March
  - Factoring + Continued Fractions
  - Multiparty Computation 1+2
  - Lattices
- April
  - Linear Cryptanalysis
  - Differential Cryptanalysis
  - Tools for Cryptanalysis

### VO: Schedule II

- May
  - Algebraic Attacks
  - Advanced Differential Attacks
  - Hash Function Cryptanalysis
- May/June
  - Seminar presentations (2–3 per lesson)

### VO: Seminar topics I

- 1. Asymmetric Cryptography: Discrete Logarithm Problem I
- 2. Asymmetric Cryptography: Discrete Logarithm Problem II
- 3. Asymmetric Cryptography: Integer Factorization Problem II
- 4. Block Ciphers: Statistical Attacks
- 5. Block Ciphers: Division Property
- 6. Block Ciphers: MitM Attacks, Biclique, etc.
- 7. Hash Functions: Multi-Collisions & Functional Graph
- 8. Hash Functions: Rebound Attack
- 9. Authenticated Encryption: Robustness & CAESAR
- 10. Authenticated Encryption: Permutations, Tweakable Block Ciphers

### VO: Seminar topics II

- 11. Algebraic Attacks: Gröbner Basis, etc.
- 12. Elliptic-Curve Cryptography: Advanced topics
- 13. Lattices: The NTRU cryptosystem
- 14. Lattices: Learning with errors
- 15. Multiparty Computation: Zero-Knowledge from MPC techniques
- 16. Selected Topics: Tools in Symmetric Crypto (MILP, SAT, CP, etc.)
- 17. Selected Topics: Backdoors in Cryptography
- 18. Selected Topics: Password Hashing
- 19. Selected Topics: (Fully) Homomorphic encryption
- 20. Selected Topics: Error correcting codes and cryptography
- 21. Selected Topics: Post-Quantum Crypto (Isogenies, Hash-based, ...)


### **Further Information**

- Website:
  - https://www.iaik.tugraz.at/course/
    applied-cryptography-2-705064-sommersemester-2020/
  - Slides, exercise sheets, deadlines, ...
- Newsgroup:
  - tu-graz.lv.angewandte-kryptografie-2
  - Questions, news, ...
- STicS:
  - https://stics.iaik.tugraz.at
  - Team registration, KU submissions, VO seminar submissions

# Questions?



# **‡** Outline



- Factoring with Factor Bases
  - Dixon's random squares algorithm
  - Quadratic sieve algorithm
  - Factoring with Continued Fractions
    - CFRAC algorithm
    - Wiener's attack on RSA
- Factoring with Elliptic Curves
  - Lenstra's ECM algorithm

Introduction to Modern Factoring Algorithms

# Recall: RSA Encryption / Signatures

# **Q** RSA Key Generation

- Choose 2 large, random primes p, q
- Compute public modulus  $n = p \cdot a$
- Choose public exponent e co-prime to  $\varphi(n)$
- Compute private exponent  $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$

$$\bigcirc$$
 public key =  $(e, n)$ 

Euler function:  

$$\varphi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

# **Euler theorem:**

 $\mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{q}}$  private key = (d, n)

if a, n are coprime, then  $a^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ 

If we can solve the IFP, we can recover p, q from n and thus break RSA:

? Integer Factorization Problem (IFP)

Given  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , find primes  $p_i \in \mathbb{P}$  and  $e_i \in \mathbb{N}$  such that  $n = p_1^{e_1} \cdot p_2^{e_2} \cdots p_k^{e_k}$ .

 $\rightarrow$  how large should we choose n for an attack complexity of at least, say,  $2^{128}$ ?

# **Factoring Methods**

Fastest general factoring algorithms (take with a grain of salt):

- 1 General number field sieve
- 2 Multiple polynomial quadratic sieve
- 3 Lenstra elliptic curve factorization

You already know two conceptual forerunners of these methods:

- Fermat's difference-of-squares algorithm
- Pollard's p-1 method

### Two Ways to Factor *n*

### Difference-of-Squares factorization

Finding  $p, q : n = p \cdot q \longleftrightarrow \text{finding } x, y : x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$ 

- Century-old idea: Fermat's factoring algorithm (→ AK1 KU)
- Modern sieving algorithms find x, y much more efficiently
- This lecture: Dixon's random squares, Quadratic sieve, CFRAC

### Algebraic Group factorization

Compute in a group  $\pmod{n}$  and try to detect identity  $\pmod{p}$ 

- **Example:** Pollard's p-1 method ( $\rightarrow$  AK1 VO)
- This lecture: Lenstra's ECM algorithm

# Factoring with Factor Bases

# Difference-of-Squares and Factor Bases

The base of modern factoring methods is a century-old idea:

Difference of Squares: 
$$x^2 - y^2 = (x + y)(x - y)$$

Find x, y with  $x \neq \pm y \pmod{n}$  such that

$$x^2 \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}$$
.

Then  $(x - y)(x + y) \equiv 0 \pmod{n}$ , and if we are lucky,

$$\gcd(x \pm y, n) \in \{p, q\}.$$

**Question:** How to find such a quadratic congruence?

For random x, it is unlikely that  $x^2 \mod n$  produces a square  $y^2$ 

### Difference-of-Squares and Factor Bases

• **Observation:** When is a number Y a square, i.e.,  $Y = y^2$ ?

Consider the prime factorization  $Y = \prod_i p_i^{e_i}$ :

Y is a square  $y^2$  iff every exponent  $e_i$  is even, and we get  $y = \prod_i p_i^{e_i/2}$ 

• **Idea:** Try many  $x_i^2$  and combine the outputs  $Y_i$  to make  $e_i$  even:

$$x_1^2 \mod n = Y_1 = 2^3 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5$$

$$x_2^2 \mod n = Y_2 = 2 \cdot 5$$

$$(x_1 \cdot x_2)^2 \mod n = Y_1 \cdot Y_2 = 2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5^2 = (2^2 \cdot 3 \cdot 5)^2 = y^2$$

### Difference-of-Squares and Factor Bases

- Obvious problem: So now we need to factor all Y<sub>i</sub> to factor n?
- **Solution:** We use a factor base  $\mathcal{B} = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k\}$  containing all prime numbers  $\leq B$  (and sometimes -1). We only check if the  $Y_i$  can be factored wrt.  $\mathcal{B}$ .

### Definition (*B*-smooth numbers)

*n* is *B*-smooth ( $\mathcal{B}$ -smooth) if every prime factor *p* of *n* is  $\leq B$  ( $\in \mathcal{B}$ )

**Example:**  $n = 864 = 2^5 \cdot 3^3$  is 3-smooth

### Dixon's Random Squares Method

- 1 Select factor base of small prime numbers  $\mathcal{B} = \{-1, p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k\}$
- 2 Collect relations  $(x_i, Y_i)$  with  $Y_i = \underline{x_i^2} \pmod{n}$  and  $Y_i = \prod_t p_t^{e_{it}}$  (select random  $x_i$ , test if  $Y_i$  is  $\mathcal{B}$ -smooth) (typically  $x_i \in [\sqrt{n} C, \sqrt{n} + C]$ , so  $Y_i = x_i^2 n$  is small)
- Solve: select subset of  $Y_i$  such that their product is square (= all factors  $p_t$  occur an even number of times  $\Rightarrow$  solving a linear equation system (mod 2):  $\mathbf{E} \cdot \mathbf{s} \equiv \mathbf{0}$ )
- $4 x = \prod x_i \text{ and } y = \sqrt{\prod Y_i}$
- $5 \quad \mathsf{Hope that } \gcd(x \pm y, n) \in \{p, q\}$

# Factoring with Factor Bases: Example I

Factor n = 2769 using factor base  $\mathcal{B} = \{2, 3, 5, 7\}$ 

$x_i = \lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor + i$	53	54	55	56	57	58	• • •
$Y_i = x_i^2 - n$	40	147	256	367	480	595	• • •
÷ 2	2 <sup>3</sup>		<b>2</b> <sup>8</sup>		<b>2</b> <sup>5</sup>		
÷ 3		3			3		
÷ 5	5				5	5	
÷ 7		<b>7</b> <sup>2</sup>				7	
Rest	1	1	1	367	1	17	• • •

# Factoring with Factor Bases: Example II

Factor n = 2769 using factor base  $\mathcal{B} = \{2, 3, 5, 7\}$ 

$x_i = \lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor + i$	53	54	55	56	57	58	• • •
$Y_i = x_i^2 - n$	40	147	256	367	480	595	• • •
÷2	1	0	0		1		
÷3	0	1	0		1		
÷5	1	0	0		1		
÷ 7	0	0	0		0		
Rest	1	1	✓	X	✓	X	• • •

- Solve the linear system (mod 2)  $\rightarrow$  **s** = (1, 1, 0, 1) or (0, 0, 1, 0)
- $x = \prod x_i = 53 \cdot 54 \cdot 57 = 163134$  $y = \sqrt{\prod Y_i} = 2^{(3+5)/2} \cdot 3^{(1+1)/2} \cdot 5^{(1+1)/2} \cdot 7^{2/2} = 1680$
- $\gcd(x+y,n)=\gcd(164814,2769)=39$

### **Quadratic Sieve Method**

**Observation:** If p divides Y, i.e.,  $x^2 - n \equiv 0 \mod p$ , then  $(x + p)^2 - n \equiv 0 \mod p$ . This is useful to speed up the trial divisions by  $\mathcal{B}$  ("Sieving"):

- 1 Select a factor base  $\mathcal{B} = \{-1, p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k\}$ . For each prime  $p_j$ , solve  $\underline{\alpha_j^2 - n} \equiv 0 \pmod{p_j}$  (0 or 2 solutions) (if there are 0 solutions, remove  $p_j$  from factor base)
- 2 Set up table of  $x_i$ ,  $Y_i$  for  $x_i$  in some interval  $[\sqrt{n} C, \sqrt{n} + C]$ . For each  $\alpha_j$ , divide only  $Y_i$  with  $x_i = \alpha_j + k \cdot p_j$  for some  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  by powers of  $p_i$
- 3 ... (continue from step 3 of Dixon's Random Squares)

# Factoring with Continued Fractions

And now for something completely different...

You may or may not celebrate  $\pi$  day on an upcoming Saturday (3.14)

But did you know about  $\pi$  approximation day in July: 22/7

$$\frac{22}{7} = 3.1428...$$

is a useful approximation for

$$\pi = 3.1415...$$

Which raises a number of questions: How do we approximate irrational numbers? Would there be any better  $\pi$  approximation dates to celebrate? And what the heck does this have to do with factorization?

# Continued fractions to represent real numbers

### Definition: Continued fraction expansion

The continued fraction expansion of  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^+$  is

$$\alpha = c_0 + \frac{1}{c_1 + \frac{1}{c_2 + \frac{1}{c_2 + \cdots}}} = [c_0; c_1, c_2, c_3, \ldots]$$

with  $c_0 \in \mathbb{Z}$  and  $c_i \in \mathbb{N}$  for  $i \geq 1$ .

The values  $c_i$  can be successively computed via:

$$c_0 = \lfloor \alpha \rfloor \qquad \qquad \varepsilon_0 = \alpha - c_0$$

$$c_1 = \lfloor 1/\varepsilon_0 \rfloor \qquad \qquad \varepsilon_1 = 1/\varepsilon_0 - c_1$$

$$c_2 = \lfloor 1/\varepsilon_1 \rfloor \qquad \qquad \varepsilon_2 = 1/\varepsilon_1 - c_2$$

$$\vdots \qquad \qquad \vdots$$

### Continued fractions: Example I

Find the continued fraction expansion of  $\alpha = \frac{45}{89}$ :

### Solution

$$c_{0} = \lfloor \alpha \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{45}{89} \rfloor = 0 \qquad \qquad \varepsilon_{0} = \alpha - c_{0} = \frac{45}{89} - 0 = \frac{45}{89}$$

$$c_{1} = \lfloor \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{0}} \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{89}{45} \rfloor = 1 \qquad \qquad \varepsilon_{1} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{0}} - c_{1} = \frac{89}{45} - 1 = \frac{44}{45}$$

$$c_{2} = \lfloor \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{1}} \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{45}{44} \rfloor = 1 \qquad \qquad \varepsilon_{2} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{1}} - c_{2} = \frac{45}{44} - 1 = \frac{1}{44}$$

$$c_{3} = \lfloor \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{2}} \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{44}{1} \rfloor = 44 \qquad \qquad \varepsilon_{3} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{2}} - c_{3} = \frac{44}{1} - 44 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \qquad \frac{45}{89} = [0; 1, 1, 44] = 0 + \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{1}}}$$

### Continued fractions: Example II

More examples for irrational numbers:

$$\varphi = [1; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, \dots]$$

$$\sqrt{2} = [1; 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, \dots]$$

$$\sqrt{19} = [4; 2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 8, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 8, \dots]$$

$$e = [2; 1, 2, 1, 1, 4, 1, 1, 6, 1, 1, 8, \dots]$$

$$\pi = [3; 7] 15, 1, 292, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, \dots]$$

$$\pi = 3 + \frac{1}{7 + \frac{1}{2}} \approx \frac{21 + 1}{7}$$

# Continued fractions to approximate real numbers

### Definition: *n*-th convergent

The *n*-th convergent of  $\alpha = [c_0; c_1, c_2, \ldots] \in \mathbb{R}^+$  is

$$\frac{a_n}{b_n}=[c_0;c_1,c_2,\ldots,c_n]$$

Convergents can be computed by recursion:

$$\frac{a_0}{b_0} = \frac{c_0}{1}, \quad \frac{a_1}{b_1} = \frac{c_0c_1+1}{c_1}, \quad \dots, \quad \frac{a_n}{b_n} = \frac{c_na_{n-1}+a_{n-2}}{c_nb_{n-1}+b_{n-2}}$$

• Convergents are in a sense the "best" approximation of  $\alpha$ :

$$\left| \frac{a_n}{b_n} - \alpha \right| < \left| \frac{a}{b} - \alpha \right|$$
 for all  $\frac{a}{b} \in \mathbb{Q}$  with  $\frac{a}{b} \neq \frac{a_n}{b_n}$  and  $b \leq b_n$ .

# Factoring with continued fractions

#### Remember factoring of *n* via factor bases:

- Use a factor base  $\mathcal{B} = \{-1, p_1, \dots, p_L\}$
- Collect squares that are  $\mathcal{B}$ -smooth:  $x_k^2 \mod n = Y_k = \prod_t p_t^{e_{kt}}$
- If  $Y_k$  is small, it is more likely to factor over  $\mathcal{B}$  successfully!

#### Continued fraction factoring

Let  $\frac{a_k}{b_k}$  be the k-th convergent of  $\sqrt{n}$ . Consider the square candidates  $x_k := a_k$ , so  $Y_k := a_k^2 \mod n = a_k^2 - nb_k^2$ .

- This choice of  $x_k$  asserts that  $Y_k=a_k^2-\sqrt{n}^2b_k^2pprox a_k^2-rac{a_k^2}{b_k^2}b_k^2=0$  is fairly small
- There's an easy algorithm to compute the expansion of  $\sqrt{n}$  accurately

# Factoring with continued fractions: Example I

#### Task

Factor n = 9073 with the continued fraction method.

• Compute convergents for  $\sqrt{9073} = 95.2523...$ :

$$\frac{a_0}{b_0} = \frac{95}{1}, \quad \frac{a_1}{b_1} = \frac{286}{3}, \quad \frac{a_2}{b_2} = \frac{381}{4}, \quad \frac{a_3}{b_3} = \frac{10192}{107}, \quad \frac{a_4}{b_4} = \frac{20765}{218}$$

• Smallest absolute residue  $Y_i$  of  $a_i^2$  mod 9073:

i	0	1	2	3	4	• • •
$x_i = a_i$	95	286	381	10192	20765	
$Y_i = a_i^2 \mod n$	-48	139	-7	87	-27	

# Factoring with continued fractions: Example II

- Choose factor base  $\mathcal{B} = \{-1, 2, 3, 5, 7\}$
- Check smoothness of the *Y<sub>i</sub>* and factorize:

$$Y_0 = (1, 4, 1, 0, 0), \quad Y_2 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1), \quad Y_4 = (1, 0, 3, 0, 0).$$

Combine to get squares x and y:

$$y^2 = Y_0 \cdot Y_4 = (-1 \cdot 2^2 \cdot 3^2)^2 = (-36)^2$$
  
 $x = x_0 \cdot x_4 = 95 \cdot 20765 \equiv 3834 \pmod{9073}$ 

with  $(-36)^2 \equiv 3834^2 \pmod{9073}$ .

■ Factor n: gcd(3834 + 36,9073) = 43  $\Rightarrow$   $9073 = 43 \cdot 211$ 

#### Wiener's attack on RSA

#### Wiener's attack

- Goal: Find private d in RSA with  $N = p \cdot q$ .
- Wiener's Theorem: d appears in convergents of  $\frac{e}{N}$  if
  - primes q ,
  - public exponent  $e < \varphi(N)$ ,
  - small private exponent  $d < \frac{1}{3} \sqrt[4]{N}$ .

# RSA private key: primes p, q, exp. d

RSA public key:

mod N = pq, $exp. e \cdot d \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(N)$ 

#### Useful property of continued fractions

Let  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ , such that  $\left|\alpha - \frac{a}{b}\right| < \frac{1}{2b^2}$ .

Then  $\frac{a}{b}$  is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of  $\alpha$ .

#### Wiener's attack on RSA: Proof of Wiener's theorem

- Idea: there exists some  $k \in \mathbb{Z}$  with  $ed k\varphi(N) = 1$ , so  $\left| \frac{e}{\varphi(N)} \frac{k}{d} \right| = \frac{1}{d\varphi(N)}$ ; that means,  $\frac{e}{\varphi(N)}$  approximates  $\frac{k}{d}$ .
- $\varphi(N) \text{ is private, but we can use } N \text{ instead of } \varphi(N) \text{:} \\ |N \varphi(N)| = |N (p-1)(q-1)| = |p+q-1| < 3\sqrt{N}, \text{ so} \\ \left|\frac{e}{N} \frac{k}{d}\right| = \dots \leq \frac{3k}{d\sqrt{N}} < \frac{1}{2d^2}.$  (using  $k < d < \frac{1}{3}\sqrt[4]{N}$ )
- The property now says that  $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{k}{d}$  is a convergent of  $\alpha = \frac{e}{N}$ .
- Attack: Compute continued fraction convergents of  $\frac{e}{N}$  and test all candidates d for  $(m^e)^d \equiv m \pmod{N}$  with some m.

#### Wiener's attack on RSA: Example

- Public: N = 9449868410449 and e = 6792605526025. Assume that d satisfies  $d < \frac{1}{3} \sqrt[4]{N} \approx 584$ .
- Perform Wiener's attack by computing convergents  $\frac{a_i}{b_i}$  of  $\frac{e}{N}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{a_0}{b_0} &= \frac{1}{1}, & \frac{a_1}{b_1} &= \frac{2}{3}, & \frac{a_2}{b_2} &= \frac{3}{4}, & \frac{a_3}{b_3} &= \frac{5}{7}, \\ \frac{a_4}{b_4} &= \frac{18}{25} & \frac{a_5}{b_5} &= \frac{23}{32}, & \frac{a_6}{b_6} &= \frac{409}{569}, & \frac{a_7}{b_7} &= \frac{1659}{2308}, \dots \end{aligned}$$

• Testing each denominator as possible d reveals d = 569.

Factoring with Elliptic Curves

# Pollard's p-1 Method, Revisited

Recall Pollard's p-1 method to factor  $n=p\cdot q$ :

- 1 Pick  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$  and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , e.g., k = B! for bound B
- 2 If k is such that  $p-1 \mid k$  and  $p \not\mid a$ , then

$$a^k \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$
.

3 Consequently, p divides both n and  $a^k - 1$ . If

$$d=\gcd(a^k-1,n)\neq 1,n$$

Success! Else, adapt B (larger if d = 1, smaller if d = n)


# Fermat's theorem: for $a \in \text{group } G$ ,

$$a^{|G|}=1$$

# Using different groups

Pollard's p-1 operates in subgroup mod p (of structure mod n). It only works if group order  $|\mathbb{Z}_p^*|=p-1$  is smooth.

**Idea:**  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  isn't the only group we know  $\to$  Elliptic Curve Group!



# Elliptic Curve Group

#### Elliptic curve

= solutions (x, y) of equation in Weierstrass Form

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

where 
$$\Delta = -16(4a^3 + 27b^2) \neq 0$$
.



#### Elliptic Curve Group

**Neutral element**  $\mathcal{O}$ : Special point " $(0, \infty)$ "



**Addition** P+Q: Chord rule



# How many points are in an EC group?

#### Order of the group *E*

The number of points (x, y) on E (incl.  $\mathcal{O}$ ) is its order |E|.


#### Hasse's Theorem

The order of  $E(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  is |E| = p + 1 - t for some  $|t| \le 2\sqrt{p}$ .

In other words:  $|E(\mathbb{Z}_p)| \approx |\mathbb{Z}_p^*|$ , but exact value depends on curve! By trying different curve equations, we get different orders! This gives us many "candidate orders" that might be smooth.

# Addition in $E(\mathbb{Z}_p)$

Points 
$$P = \begin{pmatrix} x_P \\ y_P \end{pmatrix}$$
,  $Q = \begin{pmatrix} x_Q \\ y_Q \end{pmatrix}$ ,  $R = \begin{pmatrix} x_R \\ y_R \end{pmatrix}$ 



$$P + Q = \begin{cases} Q & \text{if } P = \mathcal{O} \\ P & \text{if } Q = \mathcal{O} \\ \mathcal{O} & \text{if } P = -Q \text{ } (x_P = x_Q, y_P = -y_Q) \\ \left( \frac{3x_P^2 + a}{2y_P} \right)^2 - 2x_P \\ \left( \frac{3x_P^2 + a}{2y_P} \right) (x_P - x_R) - y_P \end{pmatrix} & \text{if } P = Q \text{ } (x_P = x_Q, y_P = y_Q) \\ \left( \frac{(y_Q - y_P)}{x_Q - x_P} \right)^2 - x_P - x_Q \\ \left( \frac{y_Q - y_P}{x_Q - x_P} \right) (x_P - x_R) - y_P \end{pmatrix} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

Addition involves computing inverses  $\frac{u}{v} \pmod{p}$  (=Euclid)!

Addition in  $E(\mathbb{Z}_n)$ ,  $n = p \cdot q$ 

Idea: Simply perform the same computations mod n (if possible).

What can go wrong when computing  $\frac{u}{v} \pmod{n}$ ?

- If gcd(v, n) = 1: everything ok
- If gcd(v, n) = n (and gcd(u, n) = 1): Means P = -Q, result  $\mathcal{O}$
- If  $gcd(v, n) \neq n, 1$ : Addition failed, but...

We've found a factor of *n*!

# Lenstra's Elliptic Curve Method for Factorization

#### Repeat until successful:

- Pick random curve  $E(\mathbb{Z}_n)$ :  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ , point  $P = (x_0, y_0)$ Hint: First pick  $x_0, y_0, a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ , compute  $b = y_0^2 - x_0^3 - ax_0 \pmod{n}$
- 2 Pick number k with many small prime factors, e.g., k = B!
- 3 Compute  $k \cdot P = P + P + ... + P$ Hint: Step by step: 2*P*, then 3(2*P*), then 4(3!*P*), ...
  - If all computations successful...bad luck, next curve
  - If intermediate result *O*...bad luck, next curve
  - If addition fails with  $gcd(v, n) = p \neq n, 1$ : Success!

# Runtime comparison

Using *L*-Notation: 
$$L_n[\alpha, c] = \exp \left[ (c + o(1)) (\ln n)^{\alpha} (\ln \ln n)^{1-\alpha} \right]$$
  
  $0 \le \alpha \le 1$ :  $\alpha = 0$  is polynomial;  $\alpha = 1$  is exponential (wrt.  $\ln n$ )

- Dixon's random squares:  $L_n[\frac{1}{2}, 2\sqrt{2}]$
- CFRAC:  $L_n[\frac{1}{2}, \sqrt{2}]$
- Lenstra's ECM:  $L_p[\frac{1}{2}, \sqrt{2}]$  (p: smallest factor of n)
- Quadratic sieve:  $L_n[\frac{1}{2}, 1]$
- General number field sieve:  $L_n[\frac{1}{3}, 1.923]$

Example: 1024-bit RSA 
$$n$$
 (ca. 80-bit security): 
$$\begin{cases} L_n[\frac{1}{3}, 1.923] \approx 2^{101} \\ L_n[\frac{1}{2}, 1] \approx 2^{122} \end{cases}$$

# Questions you should be able to answer

- 1. Explain factoring with factor bases. What is the underlying idea? How are the relations collected in Dixon's Random Square algorithm? How are the relations combined to get a factorization of *N*?
- 2. Explain the Quadratic Sieve algorithm. What is the main difference compared to Dixon's algorithm?
- 3. What is a continued fraction of a number? What is the *n*-th convergent of a number? How can continued fractions be applied to factoring?
- 4. Explain the idea of Wiener's attack on RSA.
- 5. Explain Lenstra's elliptic-curve method. What is the basic idea? What other factoring algorithm is it based on? What is the essential improvement?

#### Bibliography

- [1] John D. Dixon. **Asymptotically Fast Factorization of Integers**. Mathematics of Computation 36.153 (1981), pp. 255–260. DOI: 10.2307/2007743.
- [2] H. W. Lenstra. Factoring Integers with Elliptic Curves. Annals of Mathematics 126.3 (1987), pp. 649–673. ISSN: 0003486X. DOI: 10.2307/1971363.
- [3] Michael A. Morrison and John Brillhart. A Method of Factoring and the Factorization of  $F_7$ . Mathematics of Computation 29.129 (1975), pp. 183–205. DOI: 10.2307/2005475.
- [4] Carl Pomerance. The Quadratic Sieve Factoring Algorithm. EUROCRYPT. Ed. by Thomas Beth, Norbert Cot, and Ingemar Ingemarsson. Vol. 209. LNCS. Springer, 1984, pp. 169–182. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-39757-4\_17.
- [5] Michael J. Wiener. Cryptanalysis of short RSA secret exponents. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 36.3 (1990), pp. 553–558. DOI: 10.1109/18.54902.