



Applications to AES, Ascon, CLEFIA, SKINNY, PRESENT, KNOT, TWINE, WARP,

LBlock, Simeck, and SERPENT

Hosein Hadipour Patrick Derbez Maria Eichlseder Lorentz Center, 22 April, 2024 - Leiden, Netherlands

#### Research Gap and Our Contributions

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  - **②** How to formulate the correlation for more than one S-box layer?
  - ❷ How to (efficiently) find good DL distinguishers?
- Contributions
  - ☑ Generalizing the DLCT framework [Bar+19] to handle multiple rounds
  - igspace Introducing an efficient method to search for DL distinguishers applicable to
    - Strongly aligned SPN primitives: AES, SKINNY
    - Weakly aligned SPN primitives: Ascon, SERPENT, KNOT, PRESENT
    - Feistel structures: CLEFIA, TWINE, LBlock, LBlock-s, WARP
    - AndRX designs: Simeck

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#### Outline

- 1 Boomerang Analysis
- 2 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis
- 3 Generalized DLCT Framework
- 4 Differential-Linear Switches and Deterministic Trails
- 5 Automatic Tools to Search for DL Distinguishers
- 6 Contributions and Future Works

## Boomerang Analysis



$$\Delta \longrightarrow \left[ E : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^n \right] \longrightarrow \nabla$$


$$0 < \mathbb{P}(\Delta \xrightarrow{E} \nabla) \ll 2^{-n}$$


$$\Delta \longrightarrow \boxed{E_u \qquad E_\ell} \longrightarrow \nabla$$


$$D = \mathbb{P}(\Delta_1 \xrightarrow{E_u} \Delta_2) \longrightarrow \Delta_2$$


$$D = \mathbb{P}(\nabla_2 \xrightarrow{E_u} \nabla_3) \longrightarrow \nabla_3$$


$$\nabla_2 \longrightarrow \boxed{E_\ell} \longrightarrow \nabla_3$$






















## Sandwiching the Differentials! [DKS10; DKS14]







## Sandwiching the Differentials! [DKS10; DKS14]



$$\mathbb{P}(P_3 \oplus P_4 = \Delta_1) \approx p^2 \times r \times q^2$$
$$r = \mathbb{P}(\Delta_2 \rightleftharpoons \nabla_3)$$


#### Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) [Cid+18]







$$\mathrm{BCT}(\underline{\Delta_1}, \nabla_2) \coloneqq \#\{X \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \, | \, S^{-1}\left(S(X) \oplus \nabla_2\right) \oplus S^{-1}\left(S(X \oplus \underline{\Delta_1}) \oplus \nabla_2\right) = \underline{\Delta_1}\}$$

$$\mathbb{P}(\Delta_1 \rightleftarrows \nabla_2) = 2^{-n} \cdot \mathrm{BCT}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2)$$




$$\Delta_1 \longrightarrow \Delta_2$$






[DDV20; SQH19]

[Bou+20; DDV20]






- $\mathcal{X}_{\mathrm{BCT}}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) = \{x : S^{-1}(S(x) \oplus \nabla_2) \oplus S^{-1}(S(x \oplus \Delta_1) \oplus \nabla_2) = \Delta_1\}, \ \mathrm{BCT}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) = \#\mathcal{X}_{\mathrm{BCT}}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) = \#\mathcal{X}_{\mathrm{BCT}}(\Delta_1,$


[WP19]

LBCT $(\Delta_1, \nabla_1, \nabla_2) = \#\{x : x \in \mathcal{X}_{BCT}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) \cap \mathcal{X}_{DDT}(\nabla_1, \nabla_2)\}$ 

[DDV20; SQH19]


[Bou+20; DDV20]






- $\mathcal{X}_{\mathtt{DDT}}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2) = \{x : S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \Delta_1) = \Delta_2\}, \quad \mathtt{DDT}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2) = \#\mathcal{X}_{\mathtt{DDT}}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2)$
- $\mathcal{X}_{\mathrm{BCT}}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) = \{x : S^{-1}(S(x) \oplus \nabla_2) \oplus S^{-1}(S(x \oplus \Delta_1) \oplus \nabla_2) = \Delta_1\}, \ \mathrm{BCT}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) = \#\mathcal{X}_{\mathrm{BCT}}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) = \#\mathcal{X}_{\mathrm{BCT}}(\Delta_1,$


[DDV20; SQH19]






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- - $\geq \mathtt{EBCT}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \nabla_1, \nabla_2) = \#\{x : x \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathtt{BCT}}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2) \cap \mathcal{X}_{\mathtt{DDT}}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2) \cap \mathcal{X}_{\mathtt{DDT}}(\nabla_1, \nabla_2) \}$  [Bou+20; DDV20]


Double Boomerang Connectivity Table (DBCT) [HB21]




- igotagraphi DBCT $^{\vdash}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \nabla_3) = \sum_{\nabla_2} \mathtt{UBCT}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \nabla_2) \cdot \mathtt{LBCT}(\Delta_2, \nabla_2, \nabla_3)$
- igotimes DBCT $(\Delta_1, 
  abla_3) = \sum_{\Delta_2}$  DBCT $^+(\Delta_1, \Delta_2, 
  abla_3) = \sum_{
  abla_2}$  DBCT $^+(\Delta_1, 
  abla_2, 
  abla_3) = \sum_{
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  abla_3) = \sum_{
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  abla_$




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
- $oldsymbol{oldsymbol{eta}}$  DBCT $^{\vdash}(\Delta_1,\Delta_2,
  abla_3) = \sum_{
  abla_2}$  UBCT $(\Delta_1,\Delta_2,
  abla_2) \cdot$  LBCT $(\Delta_2,
  abla_2,
  abla_3)$
- $\bigcirc$  DBCT $(\Delta_1, \nabla_3) = \sum_{\Delta_2} DBCT^{\vdash}(\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \nabla_3) = \sum_{\nabla_2} DBCT^{\dashv}(\Delta_1, \nabla_2, \nabla_3).$




Double Boomerang Connectivity Table (DBCT) [HB21]




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## Application of GBCT [HB21]



#### Application of GBCT [HB21]




$$\begin{split} \text{DBCT}_{\text{total}} &= \text{DBCT}^{\vdash}(A_5, B_9, c_5) \cdot \text{DBCT}^{\vdash}(B_9, C_{12}, d_1) \cdot \text{DBCT}^{\dashv}(E_1', f_{12}', g_9') \cdot \text{DBCT}^{\dashv}(F_5', g_9', h_5) \\ \text{Pr}_{\text{total}} &= \text{Pr}(d_1 \xleftarrow{2 \text{ DDT}} f_{12}') \cdot \text{Pr}(c_5 \xleftarrow{3 \text{ DDT}} f_{12}') \cdot \text{Pr}(C_{12} \xrightarrow{2 \text{ DDT}} E_1') \cdot \text{Pr}(C_{12} \xrightarrow{3 \text{ DDT}} F_5') \\ r &= 2^{-8 \cdot n} \cdot \sum_{B_9} \sum_{C_{12}} \sum_{g_9'} \sum_{f_{12}'} \sum_{c_5} \sum_{d_1} \sum_{E_1'} \sum_{F_5'} \text{DBCT}_{\text{total}} \cdot \text{Pr}_{\text{total}}. \end{split}$$

# Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis




#### Differential-Linear (DL) Attack [LH94]

- $\blacksquare \quad \mathbb{P}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}} \xrightarrow{E_u} \Delta_m) = p$
- $\qquad \mathbb{C}(\lambda_m \xrightarrow{E_\ell} \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = q$
- Assumptions ( $\Delta X = X_1 \oplus X_2$ ):
  - 1.  $E_u$ , and  $E_\ell$  are statistically independent
  - 2.  $\mathbb{P}(\lambda_m \cdot \Delta X = 0) = 1/2$  when  $\Delta X \neq \Delta_m$
- $\mathbb{C} \left( \lambda_0 \cdot C_1 \oplus \lambda_0 \cdot C_2 \right) = (-1)^{\lambda_m \cdot \Delta_m} \cdot pq^2 = \pm pq^2$



#### Differential-Linear Attack Revisited [BLN14; BLN17]

- Assumptions:
  - 1.  $E_u$ , and  $E_\ell$  are statistically independent
- $\mathbb{C}(\lambda_{o}\cdot C_{1}\oplus\lambda_{o}\cdot C_{2})=\sum_{\Delta X,\Lambda X}\mathbb{C}(\Lambda X\cdot\Delta X)\cdot\mathbb{C}^{2}(\Lambda X,\lambda_{o})$




#### Sandwich Framework for DL Attack [DKS14; Bar+19]

- $\blacksquare \quad \mathbb{R}(\Delta X, \Lambda Y) = \mathbb{C}\left(\Lambda Y \cdot E_m(X) \oplus \Lambda Y \cdot E_m(X \oplus \Delta X)\right)$
- $\mathbb{C}(\lambda_{o} \cdot \Delta C) = \sum_{\Delta X, \Lambda Y} \mathbb{P}(\Delta_{i}, \Delta X) \cdot \mathbb{R}(\Delta X, \Lambda Y) \cdot \mathbb{C}^{2}(\Lambda Y, \lambda_{o})$


$$\blacksquare \quad \mathbb{R}(\Delta_m, \lambda_m) = r$$

$$\mathbb{C}(\lambda_{\circ} \cdot \Delta C) \approx prq^2$$



#### Sandwich Framework for DL Attack [DKS14; Bar+19]

- $\blacksquare \quad \mathbb{R}(\Delta X, \Lambda Y) = \mathbb{C}(\Lambda Y \cdot E_m(X) \oplus \Lambda Y \cdot E_m(X \oplus \Delta X))$
- $\qquad \mathbb{C}(\lambda_{o} \cdot \Delta C) = \sum_{\Delta X, \Lambda Y} \mathbb{P}(\Delta_{i}, \Delta X) \cdot \mathbb{R}(\Delta X, \Lambda Y) \cdot \mathbb{C}^{2}(\Lambda Y, \lambda_{o})$
- $\blacksquare \quad \mathbb{P}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}} \xrightarrow{E_u} \Delta_m) = p$
- $\mathbb{R}(\Delta_m, \lambda_m) = r$
- $\blacksquare \quad \mathbb{C}(\lambda_m \xrightarrow{E_\ell} \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = q$
- $\mathbb{C}(\lambda_{o}\cdot\Delta C)pprox prq^{2}$



#### Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (DLCT)


#### Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (DLCT) [Bar+19]

For a vectorial Boolean function  $S: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$ , the DLCT of S is a  $2^n \times 2^m$  table whose rows correspond to the input difference  $\Delta_i$  to S and whose columns correspond to the output mask  $\lambda_o$  of S. The entry at index  $(\Delta_i, \lambda_o)$  is

$$\mathtt{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = |\mathtt{DLCT}_0(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}})| - |\mathtt{DLCT}_1(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}})|,$$

$$\text{where } \mathtt{DLCT}_b(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n: \ \lambda_{\mathrm{o}} \cdot S(x) \oplus \lambda_{\mathrm{o}} \cdot S(x \oplus \Delta_{\mathrm{i}}) = b\}.$$

$$\mathbb{C}_{\mathtt{DLCT}}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right)=2^{-n}\cdot\mathtt{DLCT}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right)$$



## Generalized DLCT Framework



#### Upper Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (UDLCT)


#### Upper Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (UDLCT)

For a vectorial Boolean function  $S: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$ , the UDLCT of S is a  $2^n \times 2^n \times 2^m$  table. The entry at index  $(\Delta_i, \Delta_o, \lambda_o)$  is

$$\mathtt{UDLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = |\mathtt{UDLCT}_{0}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}})| - |\mathtt{UDLCT}_{1}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}})|,$$

where 
$$\mathrm{UDLCT}_b(\Delta_\mathrm{i}, \Delta_\mathrm{o}, \lambda_\mathrm{o}) = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \Delta_\mathrm{i}) = \Delta_\mathrm{o} \text{ and } \lambda_\mathrm{o} \cdot \Delta_\mathrm{o} = b\}.$$

$$\mathbb{C}_{\mathtt{UDLCT}}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right) = 2^{-n} \cdot \mathtt{UDLCT}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right)$$



#### Lower Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (LDLCT)

#### Lower Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (LDLCT)


For a vectorial Boolean function  $S: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$ , the LDLCT of S is a  $2^n \times 2^m \times 2^m$  table. The entry at index  $(\Delta_i, \lambda_i, \lambda_o)$  is

$$\texttt{LDLCT}(\Delta_i, \lambda_i, \lambda_o) = |\texttt{LDLCT}_0(\Delta_i, \lambda_i, \lambda_o)| - |\texttt{LDLCT}_1(\Delta_i, \lambda_i, \lambda_o)|,$$

where

$$\mathtt{LDLCT}_b(\Delta_{\mathbf{i}}, \lambda_{\mathbf{i}}, \lambda_{\mathbf{o}}) = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n: \ \lambda_{\mathbf{i}} \cdot \Delta_{\mathbf{i}} \oplus \lambda_{\mathbf{o}} \cdot S(x) \oplus \lambda_{\mathbf{o}} \cdot S(x \oplus \Delta_{\mathbf{i}}) = b\}.$$

$$\mathbb{C}_{\texttt{LDLCT}}\left(\Delta_{i}, \lambda_{i}, \lambda_{o}\right) = 2^{-n} \cdot \texttt{LDLCT}\left(\Delta_{i}, \lambda_{i}, \lambda_{o}\right)$$



#### Extended Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (EDLCT)


#### Extended Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (EDLCT)

For a vectorial Boolean function  $S: \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$ , the EDLCT of S is a  $2^n \times 2^n \times 2^m \times 2^m$  table. The entry at index  $(\Delta_i, \Delta_o, \lambda_i, \lambda_o)$  is


$$\mathtt{EDLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) \!=\! |\mathtt{EDLCT}_{0}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \! \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \! \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}, \! \lambda_{\mathrm{o}})| - |\mathtt{EDLCT}_{1}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \! \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \! \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}, \! \lambda_{\mathrm{o}})|,$$

where 
$$\mathrm{EDLCT}_b(\Delta_\mathrm{i}, \Delta_\mathrm{o}, \lambda_\mathrm{i}, \lambda_\mathrm{o}) = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \Delta_\mathrm{i}) = \Delta_\mathrm{o} \text{ and } \lambda_\mathrm{i} \cdot \Delta_\mathrm{i} \oplus \lambda_\mathrm{o} \cdot \Delta_\mathrm{o} = b\}.$$

$$\mathbb{C}_{\mathtt{EDLCT}}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right) = 2^{-n} \cdot \mathtt{EDLCT}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right)$$




#### Double Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (DDLCT)




#### Generalized DLCT Framework (GBCT)


How to formulate the correlation for more than 1 round?



## Application of the Generalized DLCT Tables - AES (- differential - linear)



## Application of the Generalized DLCT Tables - TWINE (- differential - linear)



$$\begin{split} \mathbb{C}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) &= \sum_{\Delta_{m}} \mathbb{P}_{\mathtt{DDT}}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\Delta_{m}) \cdot \mathbb{C}_{\mathtt{DDLCT}}\left(\Delta_{m},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right) \\ &= \sum_{\lambda_{m}} \mathbb{C}_{\mathtt{DDLCT}}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{m}\right) \cdot \mathbb{C}_{\mathtt{LAT}}^{2}\left(\lambda_{m},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right). \\ \mathbb{C}_{tot}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) &= \mathbb{C}^{2}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}). \end{split}$$

$Input/Output\ Differences/Linear-mask$	Formula	Exp. Correlation
$(\Delta_{ m i},\lambda_{ m o})=$ (0xb4,0x67)	$-2^{-7.66}$	$-2^{-7.64}$
$(\Delta_{ m i},\lambda_{ m o})=($ 0x02,0x02 $)$	$-2^{-7.92}$	$-2^{-7.93}$
$(\Delta_{ m i},\lambda_{ m o})=$ (0x55,0x55)	$-2^{-7.99}$	$-2^{-7.98}$
$(\Delta_{ m i},\lambda_{ m o})=({ t Oxbf},{ t Oxef})$	$-2^{-8.05}$	$-2^{-8.06}$
$(\Delta_{ m i},\lambda_{ m o})=({ t Oxfe},{ t 0x06})$	$-2^{-8.26}$	$-2^{-8.25}$
$(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}})=(\mathtt{0x4b},\mathtt{0x1a})$	$-2^{-8.43}$	$-2^{-8.44}$

# Differential-Linear Switches and Deterministic Trails



#### Cell-Wise and Bit-Wise Switches

X	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	е	f
S(x)	4	0	а	7	b	е	1	d	9	f	6	8	5	2	С	3

$\Delta \setminus \lambda$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
0	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
1	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	16	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	0	0	0
3	16	0	-8	-8	0	-8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	-8	0	8
4	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	-16	0	8	0	0	0	8	0
5	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-16	0	8	0
6	16	-8	8	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	0	0	0	8
7	16	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-8	0	0
8	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	16	0	0	0
9	16	-8	0	-8	16	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8
a	16	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	-8	-8
b	16	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	-8	0
С	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8
d	16	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	0	-16	8	0	0
е	16	0	0	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	0	-8	-8	0
f	16	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	-8	-8	0	0	0	-8	-8

- Cell-wise switches:  $DICT(A, 0) = DICT(0, \lambda) = 2^n \text{ for}$ 
  - $ext{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},0)= ext{DLCT}(0,\lambda_{\mathrm{o}})=2^n$  for a  $\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}$
- Bit-wise switches:

$$\mathrm{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}})=\pm 2^{n} \; \mathrm{for} \; \Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}} 
eq 0$$

• Example:  $\mathbb{C}(9,4) = \frac{16}{16}$ 

#### Cell-Wise and Bit-Wise Switches

X	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	е	f
S(x)	4	0	a	7	b	е	1	d	9	f	6	8	5	2	С	3

$\Delta \setminus \lambda$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
0	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
1	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	16	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	0	0	0
3	16	0	-8	-8	0	-8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	-8	0	8
4	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	-16	0	8	0	0	0	8	0
5	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-16	0	8	0
6	16	-8	8	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	0	0	0	8
7	16	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-8	0	0
8	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	16	0	0	0
9	16	-8	0	-8	16	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8
a	16	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	-8	-8
ъ	16	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	-8	0
С	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8
d	16	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	0	-16	8	0	0
е	16	0	0	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	0	-8	-8	0
f	16	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	-8	-8	0	0	0	-8	-8

- Cell-wise switches:  $\mathtt{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},0) = \mathtt{DLCT}(0,\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = 2^n$  for all  $\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}}$ 
  - Bit-wise switches:

$$\mathrm{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}})=\pm 2^{n} \; \mathrm{for} \; \Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}} 
eq 0$$

• Example:  $\mathbb{C}(9,4) = \frac{16}{16}$ 

#### Cell-Wise and Bit-Wise Switches

X	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	е	f
S(x)	4	0	a	7	b	е	1	d	9	f	6	8	5	2	С	3

$\Delta \setminus \lambda$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
0	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
1	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	16	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	0	0	0
3	16	0	-8	-8	0	-8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	-8	0	8
4	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	-16	0	8	0	0	0	8	0
5	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-16	0	8	0
6	16	-8	8	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	0	0	0	8
7	16	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-8	0	0
8	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	16	0	0	0
9	16	-8	0	-8	16	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8
a	16	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	-8	-8
b	16	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	-8	0
С	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8
d	16	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	0	-16	8	0	0
е	16	0	0	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	0	-8	-8	0
f	16	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	-8	-8	0	0	0	-8	-8

- Cell-wise switches:  $DLCT(\Delta_i, 0) = DLCT(0, \lambda_o) = 2^n$  for all  $\Delta_i, \lambda_o$ 
  - Bit-wise switches:  $ext{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}})=\pm 2^{n} ext{ for } \Delta_{\mathrm{i}},\lambda_{\mathrm{o}} 
    eq 0$
  - Example:  $\mathbb{C}(9,4) = \frac{16}{16}$

#### Deterministic Bit-Wise Differential Trails (Forward)

X	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	e	f
S(x)	4	0	а	7	b	е	1	d	9	f	6	8	5	2	С	3

$\Delta_i \setminus \Delta_o$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
2	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	2
3	0	2	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	2
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	2	2	2	2
5	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0
6	0	2	0	2	0	4	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	0
7	0	2	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4
9	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
a	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
b	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	4	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
С	0	4	4	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
d	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
е	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
f	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	2	0	2	0

$$\Delta_{i} = (0,0,0,0) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{o} = (0,0,0,0)$$

$$\Delta_{i} = (0,0,0,1) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{o} = (?,1,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_{i} = (0,1,0,0) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{o} = (1,?,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_{i} = (1,0,0,0) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{o} = (1,1,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_{i} = (1,0,0,1) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{o} = (?,0,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_{i} = (1,1,0,0) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{o} = (0,?,?,?)$$

#### Deterministic Bit-Wise Linear Trails (Backward)

X	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	е	f
S(x)	4	0	а	7	b	е	1	d	9	f	6	8	5	2	С	3

$\lambda_i \setminus \lambda_o$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	4	-4	0	-8	-4	-4	0	0	4	-4	-8	0	4	4
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	8	-8	0
3	0	-8	4	4	0	0	-4	4	0	0	-4	4	-8	0	-4	-4
4	0	4	0	4	0	4	8	-4	0	4	0	4	-8	-4	0	4
5	0	4	-4	-8	0	-4	-4	0	0	4	-4	8	0	-4	-4	0
6	0	-4	8	4	0	-4	0	-4	0	4	0	4	8	-4	0	4
7	0	4	4	0	0	-4	4	-8	0	-4	-4	0	0	4	-4	-8
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	8	-8
9	0	0	-4	4	8	0	-4	-4	0	0	4	-4	0	-8	-4	-4
a	0	8	0	8	0	-8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	0	-4	4	-8	0	-4	-4	0	8	-4	-4	0	0	4	-4
С	0	4	0	4	0	4	-8	-4	8	-4	0	4	0	4	0	4
d	0	4	4	0	-8	4	-4	0	-8	-4	4	0	0	-4	-4	0
е	0	4	8	-4	0	4	0	4	8	4	0	-4	0	-4	0	-4
f	0	-4	-4	0	-8	-4	4	0	8	-4	4	0	0	-4	-4	0

$$\lambda_{i} = (1, ?, ?, 1) \stackrel{S}{\leftarrow} \lambda_{o} = (0, 1, 0, 0)$$

$$\lambda_{i} = (1, 1, ?, ?) \stackrel{S}{\leftarrow} \lambda_{o} = (1, 0, 0, 0)$$

$$\lambda_{i} = (0, ?, ?, ?) \stackrel{S}{\leftarrow} \lambda_{o} = (1, 1, 0, 0)$$

#### Bit-Wise Switches and Deterministic Trails

X	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	С	d	е	f
S(x)	4	0	а	7	b	е	1	d	9	f	6	8	5	2	С	3

$\Delta \setminus \lambda$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
0	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
1	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	16	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	0	0	0
3	16	0	-8	-8	0	-8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	-8	0	8
4	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	-16	0	8	0	0	0	8	0
5	16	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-16	0	8	0
6	16	-8	8	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	0	0	0	0	0	8
7	16	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	0	8	0	-8	0	0
8	16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	-16	0	0	0	16	0	0	0
9	16	-8	0	-8	16	-8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8	0	8	0	-8
a	16	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	-8	0	0	-8	-8	-8
b	16	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	-8	-8	-8	0	0	-8	0
С	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8	16	0	0	-8	0	0	0	-8
d	16	-8	0	0	0	-8	0	0	0	8	0	0	-16	8	0	0
е	16	0	0	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	-8	-8	0	-8	-8	0
f	16	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	-8	-8	0	0	0	-8	-8

$$\Delta_{\mathrm{i}} = (0,0,0,1) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{\mathrm{o}} = (?,1,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_{\rm i} = (0,1,0,0) \xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}} \Delta_{\rm o} = (1,?,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_{\mathrm{i}} = (1,0,0,0) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{\mathrm{o}} = (1,1,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_{\mathrm{i}} = (1,0,0,1) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_{\mathrm{o}} = (?,0,?,?)$$

$$\Delta_i = (1, 1, 0, 0) \xrightarrow{S} \Delta_0 = (0, ?, ?, ?)$$

$$\lambda_{i} \equiv (1, ?, ?, 1) \stackrel{S}{\leftarrow} \lambda_{0} \equiv (0, 1, 0, 0)$$

$$\lambda_{i} = (1, 1, 1, 1) \leftarrow \lambda_{0} = (0, 1, 0, 0)$$


$$\lambda_i = (1,1,?,?) \xleftarrow{\mathcal{S}} \lambda_o = (1,0,0,0)$$


$$\lambda_{\rm i} = (0, ?, ?, ?) \stackrel{S}{\leftarrow} \lambda_{\rm o} = (1, 1, 0, 0)$$


# Automatic Tools to Search for DL Distinguishers





E


























#### Usage of Our Tool

python3 attack.py -RU 6 -RM 10 -RL 6

r <sub>u</sub>	r <sub>m</sub> +	r <sub>ℓ</sub>
E <sub>u</sub>	E <sub>m</sub>	$m{\mathcal{E}_\ell}$

#### Example: A 5-round DL Distinguisher for AES



$$r_0 = 1, r_m = 3, r_1 = 1, p = 2^{-24.00}, r = 2^{-7.66}, q^2 = 2^{-24.00}, prq^2 = 2^{-55.66}$$

#### Example: Distinguishers for up to 17 Rounds of TWINE

Comparing the data complexity of best boomerang and DL distinguishers

# Rounds	Boomerang [HNE22]	Differential-Linear	Gain
5	1	1	1
7	2 <sup>3.20</sup>	1	$2^{3.20}$
13	2 <sup>34.32</sup>	$2^{27.16}$	$2^{7.16}$
14	2 <sup>42.25</sup>	$2^{31.28}$	$2^{10.97}$
15	2 <sup>51.03</sup>	2 <sup>38.98</sup>	$2^{12.05}$
16	2 <sup>58.04</sup>	2 <sup>47.28</sup>	$2^{10.76}$
17	-	2 <sup>59.24</sup>	-

### Example: Distinguishers for up to 17 Rounds of LBlock

Comparing the data complexity of best boomerang and DL distinguishers


# Rounds	Boomerang [HNE22]	Differential-Linear	Gain
5	1	1	1
7	$2^{2.97}$	1	$2^{2.97}$
13	2 <sup>30.28</sup>	2 <sup>23.78</sup>	$2^{6.50}$
14	2 <sup>38.86</sup>	2 <sup>30.34</sup>	$2^{8.52}$
15	2 <sup>46.90</sup>	2 <sup>38.26</sup>	2 <sup>8.64</sup>
16	$2^{57.16}$	2 <sup>46.26</sup>	$2^{10.90}$
17	-	2 <sup>58.30</sup>	_


### Example: Distinguishers for up to 8 Rounds of CLEFIA

Comparing the data complexity of best boomerang and DL distinguishers

# Rounds	Boomerang [HNE22]	Differential-Linear	Gain
3	1	1	1
4	$2^{6.32}$	1	$2^{6.32}$
5	$2^{12.26}$	$2^{5.36}$	$2^{6.90}$
6	2 <sup>22.45</sup>	$2^{14.14}$	$2^{8.31}$
7	2 <sup>32.67</sup>	$2^{23.50}$	$2^{9.17}$
8	2 <sup>76.03</sup>	2 <sup>66.86</sup>	$2^{9.17}$

# Application to Ascon-p( active difference unknown difference active mask unknown mask)





#### Application to SERPENT

■ □: Experimentally verified

Cipher	#R	$\mathbb{C}$		Ref.
	3	$2^{-0.68}$	<b>√</b>	This work
	4	$2^{-12.75}$		[DIK08]
	4	$2^{-5.54}$	$\checkmark$	This work
SERPENT	5	$2^{-16.75}$		[DIK08]
SERPENI	5	$2^{-11.10}$	$\checkmark$	This work
	8	$2^{-39.18}$		This work
	9	$2^{-56.50}$		[DIK08]
	9	$2^{-50.95}$		This work

#### Application to Simeck

■ □: Experimentally verified

Cipher	#R	$\mathbb{C}$		Ref.
	7	1	✓	This work
Simeck-32	14	$2^{-16.63}$		[ZWH24]
	14	$2^{-13.92}$	$\checkmark$	This work

Cipher	#R	$\mathbb{C}$		Ref.
	8	1	<b>√</b>	This work
	17	$2^{-22.37}$		[ZWH24]
	17	$2^{-13.89}$	$\checkmark$	This work
Simeck-48	18	$2^{-24.75}$		[ZWH24]
	18	$2^{-15.89}$		This work
	19	$2^{-17.89}$		This work
	20	$2^{-21.89}$		This work

Cipher	#R	$\mathbb{C}$		Ref.
	10	1	<b>√</b>	This work
	24	$2^{-38.13}$		[ZWH24]
C:I- 64	24	$2^{-25.14}$		This work
Simeck-64	25	$2^{-41.04}$		[ZWH24]
	25	$2^{-27.14}$		This work
	26	$2^{-30.35}$		This work

# Contributions and Future Works



#### Contributions and Future Works

- Contributions
  - We generalized the DLCT framework from one S-box layer to multiple rounds
  - We proposed an automatic tool for finding optimum DL distinguishers
  - We applied our tool to almost any design paradigm
- Future works
  - A Extedning the application of our tool to other primitives, e.g., ARX
  - A Extending our tool to a unified model for finding complete attack (key recovery)
    - : https://ia.cr/2024/255

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#### Properties of Generalized DLCT Tables - I

- DLCT $(\Delta_{i}, \lambda_{o}) = \sum_{\Delta_{o}} \text{UDLCT}(\Delta_{i}, \Delta_{o}, \lambda_{o})$
- $\quad \quad \text{UDLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = (-1)^{\Delta_{\mathrm{o}} \cdot \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}} \text{DDT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}})$
- $\qquad \texttt{LDLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = (-1)^{\Delta_{\mathrm{i}} \cdot \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}} \texttt{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}})$
- $\qquad \mathtt{EDLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = (-1)^{\lambda_{\mathrm{i}} \cdot \Delta_{\mathrm{i}} \oplus \lambda_{\mathrm{o}} \cdot \Delta_{\mathrm{o}}} \mathtt{DDT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{\mathrm{o}})$
- LDLCT $(\Delta_i, \lambda_i, \lambda_o) = \sum_{\Delta_o} \text{EDLCT}(\Delta_i, \Delta_o, \lambda_i, \lambda_o)$
- $\sum_{\Lambda_i} \text{LDLCT}(\Delta_i, \lambda_i, \lambda_o) = \text{LAT}^2(\lambda_i, \lambda_o)$

#### Properties of Generalized DLCT Tables - II

 $\qquad \text{DDLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) = 2^{-n} \cdot \sum_{\Delta_{m}} \sum_{\lambda_{m}} \text{UDLCT}\left(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{m}, \lambda_{m}\right) \cdot \text{LDLCT}\left(\Delta_{m}, \lambda_{m}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}\right)$ 

$$\begin{split} \text{DDLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) &= \sum_{\Delta_{m}} \text{DDT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \Delta_{m}) \cdot \text{DLCT}(\Delta_{m}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}) \\ &= 2^{-n} \sum_{\lambda} \text{DLCT}(\Delta_{\mathrm{i}}, \lambda_{m}) \cdot \text{LAT}^{2}(\lambda_{m}, \lambda_{\mathrm{o}}). \end{split}$$