

Poli-416:
**REVOLUTION
& POLITICAL
VIOLENCE**



TODAY'S AGENDA

- 1 The intervention debate
- 2 Well, does it work?
- 3 When does it happen?
-

What is intervention? The UN:


“Humanitarian intervention is defined as the **uninvited** interference by a state, states, or international organization in the **domestic affairs** of another state to **prevent** and/or end **human rights abuses**.”

South Sudan

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LkWldwFdTPo&feature=emb_title

Debates about **whether** and **who** should intervene in South Sudan

What were some of the key points of contention in the readings?



We have to be careful though; strategic
actors can dress-up **invasions** as
“humanitarian interventions”



The Economist

Russia publicly justified invasion of Crimea, Eastern Ukraine via protection of ethnic Russian population



Yet, the terrorists who helped rule that country now plot and plan in many countries, and they must be stopped. The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.

In America, next week brings Thanksgiving. After the events of the last few months, we will be holding our families even closer. And we will be especially thankful for all of the blessings of American life.

I hope Americans will join our family in working to ensure that dignity and opportunity will be secured for all the women and children of Afghanistan.

US leaders frequently referenced protection of women by Taliban as one motive for invading

WARNING

“Bad faith” arguments against intervention do not imply that crisis in question is not real

Actually, women not oppressed by
Taliban

Actually, minority ethnic Russians
were not oppressed by majority

Actually, Venezuela is a socialist
utopia

Broadly: why intervene?

There are terrible humanitarian crises all over the world

Some seem “intervene-able”

Deter bad actor from harming civilians, or stop ongoing fighting

Morally intuitive: if you **can** stop the Holocaust, you **should**

NYR Daily

EMAIL PRINT TWEET SHARE

**The World Must Act Now on Syria:
An Open Letter**




Abdulmonam Eassa/AFP/Getty Images

A Syrian man rescuing a child after an air strike on eastern Ghouta, near Damascus, on February 21

Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1970s

Under “anti-colonial” justifications

Lots of human rights atrocities, in late 90s East Timor votes on independence



UN successful intervention in East Timor in 1999-2000

Broadly: why not intervene?

Norm of **sovereignty**

UN Charter: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations"

Norms might erode over time if stretched or ignored

Why not intervene?

Feasibility

Likelihood of failure is
high

Intervention could make
things worse

Bad faith

Country X just trying to
do Y in Country Z

The specter of Iraq

[US Military intervention in Venezuela should be strategic ...](#)

<https://www.usatoday.com> › story › opinion › 2019/05/08 › venezuela-us-... ▾

May 8, 2019 - US army could help Venezuela with nonviolent resistance against ... Operationally it would be difficult, too; Venezuela is twice the size of Iraq.

Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, "Iraq was not the first but the seventh society in a little more than a decade that the United States had entered to liberate and rebuild. . . . Six of these seven societies were Muslim . . . no country in the world had more modern experience in nation-building than the United States."²

[Why the United States Should Not Send the Military to ...](#)

<https://www.cato.org> › publications › commentary › why-united-states-sho... ▾

Mar 11, 2019 - Why the United States Should Not Send the Military to Venezuela ... refuses to step down, should the United States intervene to rescue Venezuela? ... A partial analogy here is the attempt to rebuild the Iraq government, which ...

[Why U.S. military intervention in Venezuela is 'possible' – but ...](#)

<https://www.cbc.ca> › news › world › venezuela-uprising-military-interventi... ▾

May 3, 2019 - U.S. military intervention in Venezuela is highly unlikely, say Latin ... treaties and plunge the U.S. into another protracted conflict like Iraq or Afghanistan. Hopes that the Venezuelan people would topple socialist autocrat ...


[A U.S. Military Intervention in Venezuela Would Be a Disaster ...](#)

<https://www.bloomberg.com> › opinion › articles › a-u-s-military-interventi... ▾

Sep 17, 2018 - A U.S. Military Intervention in Venezuela Would Be a Disaster. Think Iraq, not Panama or Grenada. By. Shannon K O'Neil. September 17, 2018 ...

Maybe it depends

Syria intervention: Popularity hinges on circumstances



Washington Post-ABC News poll Dec. 13-16, 2012. Error margin is 3.5 percentage points. Chemical weapons used/loses, no-fly zone and neighbor questions asked of half sample, with an error margin of 5 to 5.5 points.

The logic of intervention



Carrot and stick

Sanctions,
blockades,
withholding aid, org
membership

Incentivize bad
actor to stop killing
civilians

Human shield

Peacekeeping
forces

Can't fight; raise
potential costs of
fighting, assist
peace process

Nation-build

Institution-building,
regime change

Radically reshape
country's politics;
often necessitates
strong presence

Sanctions

Impose economic constraints on a country until it meets some condition

US sanctions on Iran:

Total economic embargo

Ban on imports, exports

No banking, credit

The image shows a screenshot of the CBS News website. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for "NEWS", "IMPEACHMENT HEARINGS", "SHOWS", and "LIVE". Below the navigation bar is a large, dark image of a man's face, likely Barack Obama. Overlaid on the image is a white text box containing the headline: "Obama escalates economic sanctions against Russia". At the bottom of the image, there is a timestamp: "JULY 16, 2014 / 4:44 PM / CBS/AP". To the right of the image, there are social media sharing icons for Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn.

Designated IRCG as FTO

Do sanctions work?

For the most part, no:


Effect on leadership is indirect; population hurt
→ pressure on leader

Typically targeted leaders strong enough to sustain it

Pivot to other trade partners

Fig 2 Russian trade with China

USD, BILLIONS



SOURCES: Russia-China Investment Fund and General Administration of Customs, China

Pape (1998): only success in 4% of cases

What about South Africa?

South Africa Boycott movement
often seen as successful

Why did this work then?

Maybe: boycotts extensive enough

Maybe: SA needed international support



If sanctions have such spotty success, why do them?

Normative answer: some response must happen, but not enough investment for intervention

Sanctions **hurt**, and in theory, at the limit, should change behavior

Which countries would you guess most likely to use sanctions?

Democracies: maybe **norms**, maybe **electoral** pressure to “be tough”

Are sanctions ethical?

Arg in favor: they are an **alternative to war**

Better sanctions than war

Arg against: they might constitute
collective punishment

“Between 1976 and 2012 UN sanctions led to a 25.5 percent aggregate decline in GDP per capita of the sanctioned countries”
(Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015).

Peacekeeping

Outside force, often UN, that monitor and observe peace processes

Legally non-combatants

Aid combatants in reaching/ implementing agreements

Offer some protection to citizens



Not armed, they're often foreigners; how is peacekeeping supposed to work?

Reduce **uncertainty** and fear
(remember security dilemma)

Make violence more **costly**

"Other side wouldn't dare attack with UN troops here"

Prevent **abuse** by winning side

But this is all predicated on combatants believing there are consequences to violating PKO

Does peacekeeping work?


Say we go out and collect every instance of peacekeeping operations (PKO) in history

Table 1

	pko	success_rate
1	yes	0.495
2	no	0.770

Can we conclude PKO largely unsuccessful?

Figure 1. Civil War and UN PKOs since 1945.



The selection problem

Throughout social science there is this thorny issue known as **selection effects**

Want to know the effect of PKO on peace

e.g., country Y is having a peace process: if UN PKOs, how likely to succeed?

But states are **strategically choosing** whether or not to provide PKO

The selection problem

How will this mess up our results?

If states only pick **easy cases** to PKO, we'll probably end up with a rosier picture than we should

If states only pick **hard cases** to PKO, we'll probably end up with a more pessimistic result than we should

Does it work?


Solution:

Pick cases that are similarly “difficult”

How do you measure “difficulty”?

Compare only among **similar**


Fortna (2008) does this and finds
substantial positive effects for PKO



Also more troops,
less casualties

So **intensity** also
matters

FIGURE 4 The Predicted Number of Civilian Deaths as UN Troops Increase



BUT...

PKO dependent on host government **permission**

PKO limited in ability to constrain **state violence**

MONUC's reluctance to resolutely respond to abuses of civilians committed by the Congolese government was closely tied to its need to maintain the latter's consent to the UN peace operation's continued presence in the DRC and to the need to maintain a collaborative relationship with the Congolese security sector institutions that MONUC was tasked to train. The head of the UN's

PKO might reduce **rebel violence** but not state violence

Bad because the state often causes most casualties

is reported wherever the army is deployed.” In fact, data gathered by MONUC (2006, para.33) indicates that 88 percent of serious human rights violations in the DRC between January and June 2006 were perpetrated by the armed forces (53 percent), the police (28 percent), and intelligence agencies (7 percent), while rebel groups ‘only’ accounted for the remaining 12 percent.⁴

Unwillingness to constrain state might undermine UN, state itself

Challenges to PKO

PKO is expensive and risky

Part of what PKO troops do is serve as “human shields” for civilians

Casualties may necessitate response or greater involvement

“Mission creep”

Mission Creep

In 1992, President George H.W. Bush sent 30,000 troops into Somalia as part of a U.N. peacekeeping operation. But the mission expanded the following year when the warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid attacked elements of the U.N. force; the U.N. authorized “all necessary measures” to punish those responsible for the attack and secure Somalia, and President Bill Clinton ordered U.S. troops to raid targets in Mogadishu, hoping to capture or kill Aidid. The operation ended disastrously when two U.S. helicopters were shot down and subsequent rescue forces were embroiled in a bloody urban battle.

Mission creep

Helping to secure peace often involves
tackling deep, structural problems

Trying to resolve those could expand scope
of PKO

Even if in **good faith**

Mission creep

Condoleezza Rice on Bosnia: "Carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things America has to do. We don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten."

Other PKO challenges

UN Peacekeepers' Sexual Assault Problem

How to End It Once and for All

By [Sanam Naraghi Anderlini](#)

June 9, 2017



Peacekeepers serving in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo stand guard in a formation following demonstrations in Beni in North Kivu province, October 2014.

Kenny Katombe / REUTERS

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


Figure 1. SEA allegations in military and police units

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Big news topic back to 2000s

PKO troops sexually abusing local women, in some cases, minors

Assault, rape, harrassment, and in many cases **sexual “favors”**

TABLE 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “When you receive something of value for doing men business, what do you usually receive?”

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Survey-weighted percentage</i>	<i>Percent if reported</i>
Car	1	0.2	0.4	0.4
Clothing	2	0.4	0.4	0.8
Food	5	1.1	1.1	2.0
Help with a problem	4	0.8	0.9	1.6
Job	2	0.4	0.5	0.8
Money	237	49.9	52.3	92.6
Shelter	5	1.1	1.4	2.0
Don't know	22	4.6	5.6	
Refuse	12	2.5	3.5	
Not applicable	185	39.0	34.0	
Total	475	100	100	100
Total if reported	256	53.9	57.0	

one-fourth of women aged 18 to 30
in greater Monrovia, Liberia have
engaged in transactional sex with a
peacekeeper

Why?

Bad mix of gender dynamics and
inequality between PKO troops and
locals

Gender dynamics: same logic as
sexual abuse in military more broadly


Inequality: Easy for PKO officers to
extract from very desperate locals

The solution

more women troops

If men offend, less men less offense

Mixed troops less likely to offend



Security Council Resolution
1325 calls for more women

But...




FIGURE 3 Marginal effects of mission risk. Results from Model 1. Variables increase by 2 standard deviations; 90% confidence intervals.

Recap

Intervention efforts do seem to provide some good results, but only more extensive forms

This is risky, costly, and no one wants to do it

And of course good faith which is hard to know *ex ante*


So far: attempts to intervene, mid-conflict, to stop the violence

Today: two attempts to **end war**



Separate the warring sides into new countries (**partition**)

Force warring sides to govern *together* (**power-sharing**)

Crazy guy map



At first blush it seems impossible for some groups to live together



So why not separate them?

What are the arguments **in favor** of partition?

The security dilemma
(perceived threat)

Hardened (ethnic) identities

Credible commitment problems

New countries with more defensible borders

Separation cools hatreds

Elites in new countries can credibly commit to protect

Institutionalist arguments

Reduce rump state interest in
secessionist state

Reduce number of joint decisions
(how to govern)

Make war more costly

Make defense easier

Partition might make this worse,
Or take too long

Rump state could continue to
interfere in new state

Can still do covert action,
subversion

Borders may not help, or
secessionist state may never
reach parity with rump

Other problems:

Competition over resources,
power in new states (South Sudan)

Secession might beget more
secession (either from new or rump
state)

Secession → rebellion

States fear secession will spur demands from new groups

They have forced upon the country, the distinct issue: “Immediate dissolution, or blood.”
—Abraham Lincoln¹




FIGURE 1. Annual number of secessionist movements, 1816–2011

Does it work?

Seems like no

But we also have very few cases

What if instead we force groups to work together?

Power-sharing agreements

Power has to be shared by key societal groups

Groups can't be excluded from governance

Integration of military

Power-sharing in Northern Ireland

Good Friday Agreement creates
Northern Ireland Executive Gov't

Mandatory coalitions: executive must contain
unionist and **loyalist** parties

Minister of justice must be elected by majority
of **unionists** and **loyalists**

Minority groups have **veto power** over some
issues (e.g., budget)

Power-sharing and peace

Reduce fear that other side will
take advantage

Establish balance of power across
groups

Take military out of control of one
group (El Salvador)

South Sudan

Does it work?

Evidence seems to be that yes, on average

Reduces uncertainty that makes war resurgence likely

But not all power-sharing agreements are made equal

If war ends in stalemate:
State might think it can still win
war, incentives to provide “weak”
power-sharing agreements,
Peace less likely

If war ends in victory:
State has incentive to offer more
robust power-sharing to co-opt
insurgent followers,
Peace more likely

Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?

BUMBA MUKHERJEE

Florida State University

This paper develops a bargaining model that explains why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars between governments and insurgents in some cases, but not others. The model predicts that if the civil war ends in a military stalemate, the government uses its offer of a political power-sharing agreement to the insurgents as a tool to misrepresent private information about its military capacity and defeat the insurgency. This exacerbates commitment problems, increases the degree of support that insurgent leaders receive from their civilian supporters and consequently increases the likelihood of recurrence of civil war. Conversely, the model shows that when the war ends in a decisive military victory for the government or the insurgents, the offer of a political power-sharing agreement reduces the degree of support that insurgent leaders get from their civilian supporters and increases the costs of fighting for the insurgents. Hence, after a decisive military victory insurgents have incentives to accept the political power-sharing agreement and not revert to fighting. Results from Cox Proportional Hazard models estimated on a data set of 111 civil wars (1944–1999) provide robust statistical support for the model's predictions.

Other concerns

Are Power-Sharing Agreements
un-democratic?

Do they **solidify** group
boundaries?

More generally: so few cases of
power-sharing and partition, how
can we study this?