

Poli-416:
**REVOLUTION
& POLITICAL
VIOLENCE**



TODAY'S AGENDA

- 1 What is order? And where does it come from?
- 2 Order in prisons
- 3 Rebel economic and symbolic order
-

What are some other examples
from the semester?

Local justice

Infrastructure

Protection from state

Illicit
economies

Dispute-
resolution

Passports

Education

Border control

Healthcare

MON, JUN 24, 2019

Hezbollah's new drug rehab unit points to limits of US sanctions policy

IranSource by Lizzie Porter

Iran

Middle East

"Hezbollah currently operates at least **four hospitals, twelve clinics, twelve schools and two agricultural centres** that provide farmers with technical assistance and training. It also has an **environmental department** and an extensive social assistance program. Medical care is also **cheaper** than in most of the country's private hospitals and **free** for Hezbollah members"

ISIS Issues Passports Warning It Will 'Deploy' Holder Is Harmed [Report]



Sharona Schwartz, The Blaze Jul 6, 2014, 11:01 AM

The Islamic State jihadist group fighting to depose the governments of Iraq and Syria and spread its self-declared caliphate throughout the Middle East and beyond is reportedly printing a new passport for those living in the territories it controls, the news site Al Arabiya [reported](#).



Twitter



#InformeEspecial

EL TRIÁNGULO ROJO EN ARAUCA

ELN in Colombia **bans** use of
motorcycle helmets

This week

Violent actors often provide order +
public goods to communities where
they operate

Why and how do they do this? And what
conditions are necessary to produce
order?

Olson on Dictatorship and Democracy

A *rational* account of the emergence of states under anarchy

Story about powerful, **violent** actors choosing to **govern** rather than **pillage**


~~Governance, democracy vs.~~
~~dictatorship, and economic growth~~

Emergence of states

Whole literature
conceptualizing states as
criminal enterprises

Provide protection from
others (or state itself) in
exchange for **extraction**

What does extraction look like
when states do it?



Order is good (for everyone)

What happens in a world
without order?

Civilians lose *incentive* to produce
anything beyond consumption

Result is that less stuff gets made
overall, and less to steal



Olson's bandits

Roving bandits:

Violent actors who come and go,
stealing from local populations

Stationary bandits:

Violent actors who *stick around*,
stealing from same local population

“Long live the king”


What bandit do locals prefer, and why?

Stationary bandits

Only takes part of
income

Monopolize theft
(don't fear theft by
other bandits)

Predictability



Being stationary is costly

Roving bandit takes everything and leaves

Stationary only takes portion of local wealth + protect locals from other bandits

Why be stationary then?

“Colossal gains” to economic output under order (i.e., way more stuff to steal)

Theft in Guate buses

Why monopolize these bus lines? Why not just let everyone steal?

Assailant tosses grenade into Guatemalan bus, killing 2, wounding 15

NEWS Jul 12, 2010 Guelph Mercury



GUATEMALA CITY - Two people are dead and 15 wounded after an unidentified assailant tossed a grenade into a bus in Guatemala's capital.

The killings come amid a series of attacks against buses, which are frequent targets of extortion by gangs in Central America.

Police spokesman Donald Gonzalez says the bus was attacked at a parking lot along its route.

He said Monday that one possible motive under investigation is intimidation by gang members who extort bus drivers with threats of violence.

Stationary bandits tax as much as possible under constraint that **too much tax will inhibit growth**

How much to tax

How do time horizons shape how much bandits take?

Short time horizons:
Take as much as possible now
(roving bandit)

Long time horizons:
Limit theft to encourage investment
(a fully functional state)

The broad view

Lots of **rational** incentives for violent
actors to behave like states

A general tendency towards **order**
and **state-like** structures among
people

Has nothing to do with “good will”;
simply much more wealth created
under order than anarchy

Anarchic markets

Founded by
“Dread Pirate
Roberts”

“state-less” market
for drugs, illegal
goods/services

Silk Road
anonymous market

messages 0 | orders 0 | account B0

Search Go

Shop by Category

Category	Count
Drugs	4,086
Cannabis	983
Dissociatives	77
Ecstasy	318
Opioids	350
Other	157
Precursors	18
Prescription	901
Psychedelics	587
Stimulants	405
Apparel	82
Art	5
Books	778
Collectibles	15
Computer equipment	42
Custom Orders	27
Digital goods	369
Drug paraphernalia	152
Electronics	36
Erotica	296
Fireworks	5


100 x Anadrol 50MG Oxymetholone (sealed) \$12.41



1 gram MDMA \$5.89


1/2g Cocaine \$5.44


10 Pieces White Heart 130-150mg MDMA Content \$4.49


Red and White Filter (10 packs x 20 cigarettes) \$1.90


VEGA 100mg Sildenafil citrate 4 tablets \$1.50


10 gram Santa Maria \$11.58


1/4 oz G13 \$8.13

What are challenges to selling/buying under anonymity?

No way to know if buyer will send or if seller will pay


Can't turn to state to adjudicate disagreements

"I have been scammed more than twice now by assholes who say they're legit when I say I want to purchase stolen credit cards. I want to do tons of business but I DO NOT want to be scammed. I **wish there were people who were honest crooks.** If anyone could help me out that would be awesome! I just want to buy one at first so I know the seller is legit and honest."

Solution: become state-like

Rating system,
discussion board to
root out bad
actors

More structure,
bureaucracy



The screenshot shows a post on the Silk Road anonymous marketplace. The post is titled "Questioning the rating system" and was submitted 6 years ago by [deleted]. It has 19 upvotes. The post content discusses the manipulation of the vendor rating system, noting a case of ratings inflation where buyers are discouraged from leaving anything lower than a 5/5. It also mentions a recent reviewer who left a 3/5 rating and explained his reasons. The poster suggests implementing objective scoring criteria to make the ratings system meaningful again.

Silk Road
anonymous marketplace

SILKROAD comments

This is an archived post. You won't be able to vote or comment.

19 Questioning the rating system (self.SilkRoad)
submitted 6 years ago by [deleted]

This is something I've been thinking about for the past few days--the vendor rating system is supposed to provide a relatively accurate measure of a vendor's quality and reliability, but the system is currently being manipulated such that it is becoming less and less useful.

The main issue as I see it is a case of ratings inflation. Buyers are discouraged from leaving anything lower than a 5/5, except in cases of extreme negligence, which makes it much more difficult to distinguish between vendors.

For example, one of the more recent reviewers on MDUK's page left him with a 3/5, and explained his reasons for doing so. While I have doubts about some of the issues he brought up, it's his right to review as he pleases. But since probably 90% of reviewers on the site leave 5/5 as long as they get their product, this has had a semi-significant impact on MDUK's rating relative to other MDMA vendors.

The only solution that I can think of is to implement an objective (or at least consensus) set of scoring criteria for ratings. Otherwise the ratings system becomes meaningless except as a means of identifying vendors who are way, way off their game. Thoughts?

16 comments share save hide report crosspost

Solution: become state-like

User hacked info of anonymous users, threatening entire website

DreadPirateRoberts has user and associate **murdered**

Use of violence to protect market: just like a state/stationary bandit!

Silk Road's alleged hitman, "redandwhite," arrested in Vancouver

Ross Ulbricht told redandwhite that he wanted to put a "bounty" on a vendor's head.

CYRUS FARIVAR - 11/21/2018, 9:00 AM



Prison governance

Prisons have played a big role in this class:

Radicalization/recruitment

(ineffective) deterrence

Prisons are a good place to understand how violent actors establish order

As Egypt's Jails Fill, Growing Fears Of A Rise In Radicalization

August 24, 2016 · 5:02 AM ET

Heard on [Morning Edition](#)



LEILA FADEL



Prison governance

What's the relationship between the need for order and size of population in prisons?

Up until 1950s: 5000 inmates in CA prisons, few/no gangs

1950—1970: fivefold increase in prison pop., gang emergence



Size → need for authority


“Incarcerated bandits”

What role do prison gangs play in
and outside of prisons?

Manage safety

Regulate illicit economy

Taxes




The absent state

Why doesn't the state do this stuff?

State **can't** provide safety

State **won't** regulate illicit economy

Power vacuum leaves room for gangs!



“Without order there is anarchy. And when there is anarchy here, people die.” — inmate quoted in Skarbek

We've seen this before! Why were
Shining Path successful in Chuschi? Why
fail in Huanta?



Governance

Gangs employ three governance “institutions”:

Protection of members *in jail*

Protection of drug dealers *outside of jail* (how?)

Dispute resolution
(e.g., settling debts)

Remember:
Can also be
protection
from gang
itself!

Shared interests

Protection of members *in jail*

Protection of drug dealers *outside of jail* (how?)

Dispute resolution
(e.g., settling debts)

Prisoners also benefit from this!

Part of what makes this work: shared interest in maintaining order



Rebel groups also run protection
rackets wrt illicit economies

The problem of obedience

How do you get inmates and drug-dealers outside the prison to do what you want?

Future punishment (expectation of incarceration)

Threat of violence

Withholding services

Monitoring/vetting

Watchmen (tv show)

Opens with the Tulsa Massacre of 1921

White mob rampages/
bombs black neighborhoods,
hundreds dead, 10k homes
destroyed

Complete destruction of
Black Wall Street



What are these incidents?

Isolated incident? A spontaneous “riot”?

Tulsa race riot

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Tulsa race riot (also called the Tulsa massacre, Greenwood Massacre, or the Black Wall Street Massacre) of 1921^{[8][9][10][11][12][13]} 1

Gates argues **no**:
systematic, and very much
like an insurgency

Post-Civil War South = Iraq

STONY THE ROAD

RECONSTRUCTION,
WHITE SUPREMACY, AND
THE RISE OF JIM CROW



HENRY LOUIS
GATES, JR.

The in-between period

The public school civil war timeline (at least for me):

Ton of time on Civil War

Briefly cover Reconstruction (vague sense that it didn't go well)

Full-on Jim Crow

Reconstruction

30-40 years after 1865 are full of these
“racial incidents”

Three key points:

African Americans are huge % of pop. In South, can now vote, engaged (90% registration in MS)

Union troops still **occupy** the South, states led by Republicans, **high Black presence** in army

Many of these “racial incidents” are against Republicans and/or state governments

Elections

New Orleans massacre of 1866

Part of the [Reconstruction Era](#)



Location [New Orleans, Louisiana](#)

Date July 30

Target Anti-racist marchers

Perpetrators Ex-Confederates, white supremacists, and members of the New Orleans Police Force
[\[1\]](#)

Klan kill 1000+ in years up to 1868 election in Pulaski, TN

Knights of the White Camelia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The **Knights of the White Camelia** was an American political terrorist organization that operated in the southern United States in the 19th century, similar to and associated with the [Ku Klux Klan](#), supporting white supremacy and opposing freedmen's rights.^[1]

were not organized beyond the local level.^[6] Unlike the Ku Klux Klan, which drew much of its membership from lower-class southerners (primarily Confederate veterans), the White Camelia consisted mainly of upper class southerners, including physicians, landowners, newspaper editors, doctors, and officers. They were also usually

(Black) Republicans massacred by (white) Democrats

Knights + Dems kill 200-300 black people in Louisiana, 1868

White southerners “disrupting” elections so badly in Laurens County, SC, governor has to declare martial law

through the county in pursuit of Confederate president Jefferson Davis, who spent two days and a night in Laurens County during his flight from Richmond. During Reconstruction white residents of Laurens County resented the enfranchisement of newly freed blacks, most of whom supported the despised Republican Party. Whites responded by organizing Democratic clubs that attempted to influence elections through intimidation and violence. As a result of Ku Klux Klan activity across the lower Piedmont and the Laurens Riot of 1870, Laurens and eight other South Carolina counties were placed under martial law in 1871. When Reconstruction ended following

Key point: this is *insurgency to undermine state*

Not just random, irrational, hatred (though there is that too)

The Kirk-Holden War

KKK so openly killing Republicans in Caswell and Alamance (I lived here) that Governor (Holden) has to bring in Military (Kirk)


(white) Democrats eventually have Kirk arrested, impeach Holden

On April 12, 2011, the North Carolina Senate voted unanimously to make amends for Holden's removal from office by pardoning him,^[4] although as Holden himself pointed out, you can't be pardoned for a crime you didn't commit.^[5]

Arkansas Militia Wars

KKK so bad in Arkansas, state forms militia, chases Klan all over the state

Governor declares martial law (i.e., things are teetering on the edge)



Georgia's Original 33

GA elects 30 Black state reps,
3 senators in 1868

Whites expel all 33:
1/4 jailed, assaulted, or shot

Union General has to forcibly
expel Dems, reinstate Reps

Whites massacre Blacks all
over Georgia in response,
esp. Republicans



The **Enforcement Act of 1871** (17 Stat. 13[↗]), also known as the **Civil Rights Act of 1871, Force Act of 1871, Ku Klux Klan Act, Third Enforcement Act, or Third Ku Klux Klan Act**, is an [Act of the United States Congress](#) which empowered the [President](#) to suspend the [writ of habeas corpus](#) to combat the [Ku Klux Klan \(KKK\)](#) and other white supremacy organizations. The act was passed by the [42nd United States Congress](#) and signed into law by the 18th President, [Ulysses S. Grant](#) on April 20, 1871. The act was the last of three [Enforcement Acts](#) passed by the [United States Congress](#) from 1870 to 1871 during the [Reconstruction Era](#) to combat attacks upon the [suffrage rights of African Americans](#). The statute has been subject to only minor changes since then, but has been the subject of voluminous interpretation by courts.

Not random, incidental, “riots”

Not just irrational hatred — >

A systematic **insurgency** by southern whites against African Americans + the federal government

Suppressing Black political power is central to this

And then of course: Jim Crow



Parallels to Iraq

Majority Shi'a, dominated by minority
Sunni

US overthrows Saddam, de-Baathification affects mostly Sunnis

Losing power + fear of Shi'a electoral victory → largely Sunni insurgency against US, Shi'a

But this violence can look "random", driven by "irrational" hatred

More people need to study Reconstruction!
And needs to be taught better

Zooming out

Violent groups provide order when they have **monopoly on violence**, no existing source (remember Peru)

Civilians prefer this to “**roving**” bandit

Drug trade profits + taxation higher when things are peaceful (**groups have incentives to provide order**)

Even if normatively bad, still in most people’s interest

This is very general but what about
rebel order?

What do civilians get out of rebel order?

Community justice needs

Regulating illicit economy

Protection from other
groups, the state

Public goods

Community Justice

“normal” functions of the state, police

Prosecute/punish crime

Mediate disagreements

Extra-legal violence,
“cleansing”


Examples from Taussig

Social “cleansing”

Cases of armed groups (also state) killing
“undesirables” (desechables)

Sexual minorities, “street children”,
drug users, petty criminals, sex
workers, beggars

Taussig describes local support for
these measures




Law in a Lawless Land
DIARY OF A LIMPIEZA IN COLOMBIA


“A horrifying and immediate first-person look at globalism’s dark side, done with humor, despair and sympathy.”
—Publishers Weekly

Figure 5: Comparisons of Governance: IS vs. Iraqi Government

During the first sixth months of IS rule, were Mosul's streets cleaner, less clean, or the same as they were before June 2014?



During the first sixth months of IS rule, did the amount of crime in Mosul increase, decrease, or stay the same?



Credible threat of violence

What do rebels get in exchange for order?

“War tax”

Illicit economies

The “needs” of insurgency

Denunciations, collab.

Hide among civilians

Recruits

Bluefields, Nicaragua



Donald Byers, who runs a museum about this region's history, says Hayman was Bluefields' Pablo Escobar, the Colombian drug lord who pumped his drug money into his hometown economy. There were entire neighborhoods that were on Hayman's payroll, so when he and a couple dozen of his deputies were imprisoned, the economy essentially collapsed.

"That Christmas you could feel Bluefields wasn't the Bluefields that I know," Byers says. "You could feel a big difference. You could see a lot of people with no work on the street. People were complaining, 'This damn government. It's just messing up. They don't give us work. This guy came and give us work and now they put him in jail.'"

Added cost to attacking group communities depend on



Canal is one of the poorest neighborhoods the the coastal city of Bluefields.

Juan Carlos for NPR



Taxation (literally)

أخبار العراق والعراق بأسنيوز: داعش يفرض
أتاوات كبيرة على الراغبين بمغادرة منبج



Translation: The Syrian news outlet “Bas News” reports, “[IS] has imposed fines on people seeking to leave the district of Manbij” (ISTPI #363).

Appendix Figure 5. Twitter Post Referring to Income Tax in Deyr Hafir District (April 2015)

أبو خالد الإعلامي
@abo987khaled


#داعش تفرض الزكاة على مزارع يمتلك 600 بقرة قيمة #الزكاة 50 مليون ليرة سورية ما يعادل سعر نصف الأبقار أي سرقة هذه باسم الإسلام #دير_حافر

RETWEETS 26 LIKES 11

5:43 AM - 1 Apr 2015

Translation: @abo987khaled writes, “[IS] imposes *zakāt* taxes of 50 million Syrian pounds [USD \$97,000] on farmers in possession of at least 600 cows, an amount that is equivalent to half the value of the cows (ISTPI #39).”

الناشط نوري المنبي أفاد لـ(باسنيوز) اليوم الخميس، أن “تنظيم داعش اقام حواجز مكثفة على جميع مداخل ومخارج مدينة منبج وبات يوقف كل الراغبين بمغادرة المدينة ويجبى منهم مبالغ مالية كبيرة حتى ولو كانت الوجهة إلى الريف القريب للمدينة.”



Translation: “Authority of Islamic Services, Islamic Police, Traffic Apparatus ... Traffic Violation” (ISTPI #1159)


Variation in rebel order

In Olson, why are some bandits stationary and others roving?

Part of the story is
“time horizons”

Horizons shorter under **armed competition**, natural resources decrease dependence on locals

FIGURE 1: Covariate marginal effects on the number of governance institutions in de facto states



What does access to
natural resources to group
behavior?

Lack of discipline

Opportunistic joiners

Table 3
OLS Equations for Total Combat Deaths and Daily Death Rate
(Intensity) of Armed Civil Conflict, 1946–2002

	Total Combat Deaths			Intensity		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Gem production, conflict zone	2.565 (2.05)**	2.720 (2.51)**	2.754 (2.34)**	1.761 (1.46)	1.163 (0.33)	1.592 (1.13)
Drug cultivation, conflict zone	0.445 (1.86)*	0.388 (2.39)**	0.693 (0.78)	0.398 (2.50)**	0.407 (2.03)**	0.422 (2.21)**
Hydrocarbon production, conflict zone	3.007 (3.75)***	2.558 (3.41)***	3.679 (4.41)***	1.845 (2.53)**	1.351 (0.93)	1.570 (1.85)*
Hydrocarbon production, outside conflict zone	0.583 (1.79)*	0.481 (2.55)**	0.582 (1.91)*	0.561 (2.06)**	0.650 (1.18)	0.586 (1.92)*

Illegal mining in the Congo



Gold: easy to conceal,
hard to “tax”





Coltan: bulky, easy
to “tax”

De la Sierra 2019

Coltan: stationary bandits at the “mine”

Gold: stationary bandits at the “village”

PANEL C: Stationary bandit



Type of natural resource can determine nature of taxation


Territorial competition

Governing is costly

Groups are less likely to do this when they expect to be contested

Focused on short-term need of establishing hegemony

National Resistance Army set up system of civilian admin. In Luwero Triangle during fighting lull w/ state



Rational vs. symbolic order

Rational, functional rebel order

Rebels provide order, services,
citizens provide taxes

“symbolic” rebel order

rebels mimic symbolic, ceremonial
aspects of the state

Mimicking “stateness”

The symbols, images, practices,
figures of living in a “nation”, not
just a state

Examples?

“Founding Fathers”






FIGURE 4.1 LTTE Graveyard (Courtesy of Ananthan Sinnadurai)



Bank notes in South Sudan

Imageries are constantly re-created through performance ... Many are embedded in countless everyday practices. At roadblocks, words are uttered in the language of the state. At ceremonies, speeches are delivered in the same rhetoric of official language as before. From the village level through the small subdivisions to events at the headquarters of the rebellion, the same re-enactment of statehood seems to penetrate the new political order. (Förster 2012: 19–20)






Both functional and symbolic

PUZZLE:
Doing this stuff is costly and risky;
why do it?

Benefits of being “state-like”?

If goal of group is to become a state, behaving like one might help it gain **international** approval

heroin market. The result of the Taliban law enforcement action was a net 65% reduction global potential opium/heroin production from the 2001 harvest. Hence, this is arguably the most effective drug control enforcement action of modern times.



Why?

One idea is that the ideology
simply demands it

Costs borne by group to have a
coherent ideology

Can you really be the “Islamic
state” and not have passports?

A different idea is that it helps instill **obedience**

Myths, symbols make the group “bigger than life”

Reminder of **coercive power**

Also makes groups more **legitimate**: lives by ideals, is willing to incur extra costs to live them out

Important implications for **recruitment**

Better, more **committed** recruits

Symbols

They are . . . a means of demonstrating that, like it or not, a given system of domination is stable, effective, and here to stay. Ritual subservience reliably extracted from inferiors signals quite literally that there is no realistic choice other than compliance. When combined with the exemplary punishment of the occasional act of defiance, the effective display of compliance may achieve a kind of *dramatization* of power relations that is not to be confused with ideological hegemony in the sense of active consent . . . The effect of reinforcing power relations in this way may be, behaviorally, nearly indistinguishable from behavior that arises from willing consent.



Establishing order

Authority by coercion: “You must obey or I will hurt you”

Authority by legitimacy: “You must obey because it is good for the nation”

This is how people living in “normal” states think about authority!

ISIL taxes and ideology

Why does ISIL collect taxes? And what does ideology have to do with it?

Taxes raise revenue but is *ideologically motivated*

Incentives to shape behavior,
conform with **ideology**

Contra idea that rebels only tax when they don't have natural resources

How does this work though?

Don't taxes just piss people off?

Do civilians like other public goods (*clean streets*) and understand why the taxes are in place?

If that's the case, why not live off oil and provide public goods?

Open question: are governance costs pure costs, or do they always yield dividends?