

Poli-416: REVOLUTION & POLITICAL VIOLENCE

DÉDIÉ
AU GOUVERNEMENT
de la
CONFÉDÉRATION GRENADE.
HOMMAGE de L'AUTEUR

TODAY'S AGENDA

- 1 Bargaining in general (but really between states)
- 2 Bargaining in civil wars

1

Fearon on Rationalist Explanations for War

Central Puzzle

War is *ex-poste* inefficient

War is costly; actors know this

Outright extermination rare

Negotiations/agreement/treaty end war

Why then, can't actors reach agreement *ex ante* and avoid war?



Bargaining and War




FIGURE 1. *The bargaining range*

“There always exists a set of negotiated settlements that both sides prefer to fighting”

Changing costs of war

How does cost of war → size of bargaining space?

Bargaining space *increases* in war costs

What factors might increase war costs?

Changing costs of war

Dictators face *more* punishment
For losing war than others


TABLE 2. Regime Type and Post-exit Fate of Leaders

	Okay	Exile	Jail	Killed	Total
Nondemocracy	622 (59%)	242 (23%)	123 (12%)	72 (7%)	1,059 (58%)
Democracy	713 (93%)	21 (3%)	20 (3%)	10 (1%)	763 (42%)
Total	1,335 (73%)	263 (14%)	143 (8%)	82 (5%)	1,823 (100%)

Note: Pearson chi²(3) = 272.4. $p < .001$.

ICC-type institutions make
Bad leaders less likely to seek exile

FIGURE 1 Predicted Probability of Exile by Leader Culpability and Time Period



Debs and Goemans (2010)

Krcmaric (2018)

How did we get there?

Assumptions

There is some true p

Risk-averse leaders

Perfectly divisible issue space

Meaning

winning is probabilistic

Prefer 50¢ over
50/50 chance at a dollar

Split the pie,
Side payments

Failure?

mad(wo-)man?
Nukes?

Personality?

Sacred values?

Personality in Bargaining






Figure 4-5: Self-monitoring scores and average number of MID involvement per year (by

Sacred Values and Indivisibility

To study possible trade-offs between sacred values and material rewards, in 2005 we talked with families and supporters of Palestinian suicide bombers. We asked about the amount of compensation that their society should give to the family of a suicide bomber. We found that willingness to allow compensation decreased as the amount offered increased: one hundred thousand dinars is significantly less acceptable than ten thousand dinars, and one million dinars is much less acceptable (Atran 2007a). Follow-up interviews clearly point to a willingness to accept minimal compensation for loss of a family member (who may be a helper or wage earner) and one's home (Israeli retaliation often includes destruction of the bomber's house). Nevertheless, Palestinians see more substantial payments to families as unacceptable, even disgusting, because they would create the impression that the martyr had acted as a materially calculating actor rather than as a martyr devoted to a moral cause.

so forth. We found that such material offers to promote the peaceful resolution of political and cultural conflicts backfire when adversaries consider contested issues to reflect sacred values. Material offers to make concessions that were seen as violations of sacred values were perceived as insults. But we also found that symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit might open the way to resolving seemingly irresolvable conflicts.

return to historic Palestine." In rational-choice models of decision making, that something as intangible as an apology should stand in the way of peace does not readily compute.

Attempts to divide “sacred values” can produce negative effects
Atran and Axelrod (2008)

Territory and Symbolic Value

Table 1: Experimental Design

After the recent military operation in Gaza, the Israeli government came to the conclusion that it needs to take an action that may have a strong impact on Israel's economy, security, and social arenas. Below are the consequences of two possible policies:

	Policy A	Policy B
Territory	Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged	Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank
Security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged
Economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	Israel's economy will grow significantly
Budget	The security, education, and health budgets will remain in their present form	The security budget will decrease, and the education and health budgets will increase

The Israeli government turns to the public to decide between these two policies in a plebiscite. Based on the information presented in the table above, which policy would you support?




1. Policy A
2. Policy B

Table 2: Values for Policy Outcomes in Conjoint Experiment

Domain	Values
Territory (T)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged.2. Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.
Security (S)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged.2. Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly.3. Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly.
Economy (E)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The economy will remain unchanged.2. Israel's economy will be severely harmed.3. Israel's economy will grow significantly.
Budget (B)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged.2. The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.3. The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.

Territory and Symbolic Value

On the other hand, we find that over 50 percent of right-wing voters explicitly prefer retaining control over the West Bank *even when terrorist violence increases substantially, the economy is severely harmed, and the budget allocation to health and education is reduced* (“all else bad”). This group, representing about a third of all respondents, can be said to hold intangible territorial attachment. For them, no bargaining space exists, rendering the territory effectively indivisible.¹⁴



Manekin et al (2019)

Why war?

Explanation

Private information

Incentives to misrepresent

Commitment problems

Real-world

**Military tech,
Fog of war**

**Small attacks,
Build up on border**

Capture territory

Card simulation

Face-down cards

Bluffing

N/A

Overcoming information problems

Costly signals

Signal too costly for weak actor to send

Examples?

hand-tying

Third-party mediators

International monitoring

Commitment problems

Where do they come from?

Incentives to renege

First-strike shrinks the bargaining range

Shifting power balance

2

Bargaining in Civil Wars

Same concepts, Different applications

Informational asymmetries

Commitment problems

Informational asymmetries


In most cases, states know very little about armed groups, their capabilities, or whereabouts

Especially true in the countries where armed conflicts tend to take place, **why?**



Where was Abimael Guzman,
Leader of Shining Path,
Public enemy #1,
hiding?

Distinguishing types



How can states tell what world they're in?

Uncertainty about rebels

Why would weak rebels fight?

Signal strength

Own capability unclear

Shifting patrons, income

Where is uncertainty highest?

Rough terrain

Middling rebels

Multi-party conflicts

States also “bluff”

One important source of uncertainty is **state resolve**

(potential) rebels willing to fight a state with **low resolve**

(potential) rebels avoid state with **high resolve**

How to signal resolve?

What kinds of countries likely to have worst resolve problems?



Halabja monument in Iraq

Why might renegeing happen

Sources:

Government will renege on agreement

Why would the government do this?

Changing balance of power

Fixed political cleavages

Democratic politics


Commitment Problems In Action

Agreement signed between FARC
and Colombian government

Public votes to ratify it: narrow
loss for the agreement

Gov't scrambles, passes through
congress

What might this **signal** to the
FARC?



Commitment Problems in Israel

Benjamin Netanyahu's plan to annex a massive part of the West Bank, explained

Israel's prime minister wants to seize the Jordan Valley — a move that would bury the two-state solution for good.

By Zack Beauchamp | @zackbeauchamp | zack@vox.com | Sep 10, 2019, 1:55pm EDT

Announced right before an election

How might elections muck up negotiations?



When to Democratize?

Democratization might allow groups to resolve conflicts via the ballot

But **when** to hold elections?

Looking across all conflicts, countries that hold post-war elections sooner tend to see more violence

why?




Figure 2. Effect of postconflict election timing (calendar time) on new civil war onset (postmatching).

Note. Dashed lines represent confidence intervals at the $p \leq .05$ level.

Brancati and Snyder (2012)

“Balance of Power” and Demographics in Israel

Changing demographics in Israel and Palestine change conflict-termination calculus

What are the implications of two-state vs. one-state?

Jews, Arabs nearing population parity in Holy Land: Israeli officials

Jeffrey Heller

4 MIN READ



JERUSALEM (Reuters) - The number of Jews and Arabs between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River is at or near parity, figures cited by Israeli officials show, raising questions whether Israel can remain a democracy if it keeps territory where Palestinians seek a state.

Why doesn't reneging happen more?

Civil war between rebel group and state

State offers concessions if rebels give up arms

Rebels come out of hiding, give up arms

What's to stop state from wiping out rebels?

Third-party mediation

Monitoring

Power-sharing agreements

Protection

Uncertainty of re-arm