

POLI 437: International Relations of Latin America




This week

(Illegal) migration

Deportation project

Annual Net Migration Rate 2015-2020



Data source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects 2019, custom data acquired via website.

The decision to migrate

It's all **relative**: conditions in origin vs. destination

Migration is **costly**

Analogous to **investment** – upfront costs + risks, uncertain returns

$$\mathbb{E}(\text{utility}_{\text{destination}}) - \text{costs}_{\text{migration}} \geq \mathbb{E}(\text{utility}_{\text{origin}})$$

Causes of migration

What factors influence
 $\mathbb{E}(utility_{destination})$, $\mathbb{E}(utility_{origin})$?

Economic: wages, job availability,
labor shocks

Safety: war, crime, climate

Networks: links at destination

19th - 20th century:
LA is hotspot for
European migrants
looking for work,
adventure, safety




Figure 1. *Immigration to Latin American countries and North America (000s), 1870–1930*

Note: LA4 = Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay.

Sources: Ferenczi and Willcox, *International migrations*. Cuba: 1870–1900, Spanish immigration only from Yáñez, *Emigración española*. Canada: Statistics Canada, *150 Years*. Uruguay: Nahum, ed., *Estadísticas históricas*, vol. I, pp. 9, 31.




Figure 2. Argentina: immigration composition by origin, 1870–1930 (main groups)

Source: Sánchez-Alonso, 'Making sense', p. 610.




Figure 3. Brazil: immigration composition by origin, 1870–1930 (main groups)

Source: Klein, *Inmigración Española*, app., pp. 143–7.

The wage differential

Wage differentials play a big role in the decision to migrate

(Relatively) high wages drive migration from poor to rich countries

Table 3a: Average Hourly Wages for Mexican Males, 2000

	Age	Years of Schooling Completed					
		4	5 to 8	9 to 11	12	13 to 15	16+
Mexican Immigrants in U.S.	18 to 22	7.83	7.60	7.45	8.07	8.76	8.44
	23 to 27	8.44	8.19	8.21	9.06	9.53	13.02
	28 to 32	8.27	8.56	8.70	9.66	9.56	15.69
	33 to 37	9.46	9.25	9.34	10.07	11.36	16.84
	38 to 42	9.19	9.39	9.33	11.01	12.11	16.26
	43 to 47	9.75	8.90	9.35	10.68	12.80	15.88
	48 to 52	9.57	9.37	9.42	9.31	11.65	17.78
Residents of Mexico	18 to 22	1.36	1.56	1.76	2.06	2.61	3.91
	23 to 27	1.43	1.80	2.10	2.79	3.77	5.20
	28 to 32	1.56	1.93	2.42	3.22	4.80	6.63
	33 to 37	1.65	2.08	2.56	3.45	5.25	7.07
	38 to 42	1.64	2.14	2.88	3.74	5.62	7.42
	43 to 47	1.69	2.30	3.00	4.40	5.86	8.05
	48 to 52	1.66	2.30	3.15	4.21	6.11	8.71

Income shocks

Negative income shocks in origin *relative to destination* also drive migration

Shocks: recessions, hyper-inflation, natural disasters

Table 3
Impact of Labour Supply Shocks

Dependent variable: Annualised migration rate over census interval, per cent	Five-year birth cohorts				
	USA	CAN	SPN	UK	Pooled
Log Birth Cohort Size Ratio	0.355 (4.09)**	0.015 (1.15)	-0.202 (1.10)	-0.450 (3.68)*	0.120 (2.74)**
Log GDP pc Ratio at Age 16	0.148 (2.22)*	0.014 (1.74)	-0.039 (0.82)	-0.009 (0.18)	0.059 (1.27)
Log GDP pc in year of cens	0.032 (0.42)	-0.019 (1.11)	1.532 (4.66)**	-1.091 (4.33)*	0.102 (1.15)
Young (16–22)	-0.079 (2.58)*	-0.004 (1.29)	-0.036 (1.23)	0.022 (0.95)	-0.063 (2.70)**
Older (35–40)	-0.129 (1.84)	0.001 (0.28)	-0.065 (2.02)	-0.098 (2.56)	-0.060 (1.15)
Dyadic Distance (000 km)	-0.306 (5.47)**	-0.023 (2.71)*	-0.472 (4.65)**	-0.805 (4.48)*	-0.052 (1.09)
Log Birth Cohort Size Ratio × US					0.085 (3.04)**
Distance × US					-0.070 (5.05)**
Observations	426	242	96	40	804

Notes. Birth country, birth cohort and census wave fixed effects included in all specifications. Destination fixed effects included in column 5. Regressions are weighted by the size of the origin birth cohort.


*Significant at 5%, **significant at 1%, t-statistics in parentheses and SEs clustered by origin/destination dyad.

Improvements at the origin

Positive income shocks at origin have a more complicated effect

At first **increases migration** as more people are able to move (think: investment!)

But eventually **decreases** migration




Income shocks

Shocks at *destination* also influence migration

US recessions → fewer job opportunities, drop in consumer demand, etc. →
drop in migrant inflows

EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION DIVERGE AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION



NOTE: Working immigrant inflow calculated annually using adult new arrivals and U.S. labor force participation rates.

SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; DHS; author's calculations.

It's all relative

Mexico also impacted by Great Recession, but not enough to offset equation!

$$\mathbb{E}(utility_{destination}) - costs_{migration} \geq \mathbb{E}(utility_{origin})$$

Risk and safety



Armed conflicts, natural disasters shape risk/safety at origin and destination


People
people

Vox

Networks

Immigrant Population from Colombia

Displayed by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)



Migrants **cluster**, often in just a few locations

Jobs, friends, family, social connections

Where are people migrating from?

Latin American countries with fastest emigrant population growth rate

% growth in the number of people living outside their country of birth, by decade

□ Not in top 5 countries □ +0-50% □ +50-100% □ +100-150% □ +150-200%



Number of people who live outside their country of birth, by country of origin, in thousands

1990-2000			2000-2010			2010-2017						
TOP 5 COUNTRIES	'90	'00	INCREASE		'00	'10	INCREASE		'10	'17	INCREASE	
Peru	310	690	370		Ecuador	430	1,180	750	Honduras	640	820	190
Honduras	150	330	180		Bolivia	340	780	440	Venezuela	560	720	160
Mexico	4,360	9,320	4,960		Paraguay	370	750	380	Dominican Republic	1,270	1,530	260
Ecuador	210	430	220		Peru	690	1,340	650	Guatemala	940	1,120	180
Brazil	500	960	460		Honduras							


Notes: Among countries with emigrant population of 100,000 or more. Data are estimates using unrounded numbers.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations and U.S. government data. See methodology for details.

37 million live outside country of birth

Growth of emigrant population from Latin American and Caribbean countries slowed substantially

% increase in number of people living outside their country of birth, by region of birth



Note: Latin America and the Caribbean includes Mexico. See methodology for more on region classification.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations and U.S. government data. See methodology for details.

Destination

Major destinations:

United States


Canada

Spain

The UK

Majority of Latin American and Caribbean emigrants live in the U.S.

% of people born in a Latin American or Caribbean country who live in ...



Note: Latin America and the Caribbean includes Mexico. Other includes countries not in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, or the U.S. See methodology for more on region classification.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations and U.S. government data. See methodology for details.


Remittances

Many work abroad and send wages back home

Billions of dollars move every year to poor countries from workers in rich countries

Receipt of Remittances in Latin America


Personal remittances, received (current USD).



Source: The World Bank

National Dependence on Remittances

Personal remittances, received (% of GDP).




Source: The World Bank

US migration: before



Farm workers, temporary,
cyclical


US migration: before



US migration: now

Some U.S. occupations have high shares of unauthorized immigrant workers

% of workers in ___ occupation who are unauthorized immigrants, 2014



Note: Percentages calculated from unrounded numbers. Rankings based on unrounded percentages. The occupation groups shown correspond to the Census Bureau classifications for major occupation groups. The names have been shortened for display purposes. See Methodology for full Census Bureau classifications.


Source: Pew Research Center analysis of American Community Survey (IPUMS) data, 2014.

American Community Survey (IPUMS)
"Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Since the Great Recession"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Unauthorized immigrants account for nearly a tenth of all U.S. workers in food industries

% of workers in food industries who are immigrants, 2017



Note: Percentages calculated from unrounded numbers. Rankings based on unrounded percentages. See "How we did this" for details on industry group classifications.


Source: Pew Research Center analysis of augmented 2017 American Community Survey data.

Changing US labor market

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

US migration: now


Estimated undocumented immigrant population
by state, 2014



Source: Pew Research Center

Migration now

FIGURE 1
Sex Composition of International Migrants by Country of Destination



SOURCE: IPUMS-USA and IPUMS-International 2008.

The costs of unauthorized migration


$$\mathbb{E}(utility_{destination}) - costs_{migration} \geq \mathbb{E}(utility_{origin})$$

Distance/geography


Transport costs

Avoiding capture, enforcement


Geography



Geography



Transport costs




Crossing the border is
dangerous, uncertain

Transport costs



Transport costs




Migrants often rely on costly and often predatory smugglers (*coyotes*)

Avoiding capture

I am less likely to contact police officers if I have been know about our immigration status	
Total	42%
US Born	22%
Foreign Born	44%
Undocumented	71%

**Figure 5.1: Minimum Wage Violation Rates by Gender, Nativity
and Legal Status**



Source: Authors' analysis of 2008 Unregulated Work Survey.

The New York Times

*ants Are Reporting
se. Police Blame Fear of*

Avoiding capture → weaker access to services, vulnerable to abuse


Enforcement

The emphasis of border enforcement over interior enforcement does not appear to be due to illegal immigrants being difficult to locate once they are inside the United States. Several U.S. industries, including agriculture, construction, and restaurants and hotels, appear to employ large numbers of unauthorized workers. The U.S. Department of Labor (2005) reports that over the period 1999 to 2002 54% of the U.S. farm laborers it surveyed were in the United States illegally. At harvest time, in the late summer and early fall, many of these workers are plainly visible at farms in California, Texas, Washington, and elsewhere in the western United States. U.S. immigration authorities simply choose not to conduct large-scale raids on U.S. farms, construction sites, or other places of business where illegal immigrants tend to work.]

Changes in legal channels to US pretty static;
most variation in enforcement is related to
deportations and apprehensions

Enforcement of the border

Figure 1
Removals as a Percentage of the Estimated Illegal Immigrant Population



Source: Department of Homeland Security, Cen and author's calculations.

Varies from admin to admin

Why does enforcement vary?

Immigration is highly **politicized** in destination countries

Why backlash to immigration?

Self-interest motive

Migrants displace local labor, depress wages, commit crime

Sociotropic motive

Migrant culture values too different, out-group bias

Example: Venezuela

Millions of Venezuelans have fled crisis, especially to Colombia

FIGURE 3
Venezuela's exodus: A high number of Venezuelans have left the country as of June 2019
Number of Venezuelans in select Latin American countries



Source: U.N. High Commissione for Refugees. "Refugees and migrants from Venezuela top 4 million: UNHCR and IOM," Press release, June 7, 2019, available at <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/6/5cf2a24/a4/refugees-migrants-venezuela-top-4-million-unhcr-iom.html?query=venezuela>.

Native responses


Rise in anti-migration sentiment
in Colombia; why?

Is it that these migrants are
increasing competition for jobs?

Or that Colombians don't want to
be exposed to Venezuelan culture?

Número estimado de venezolanos en Colombia según departamento*


Fecha de Generación: 31-01-2019



* La estimación de concentración de venezolanos es resultado del cruce de los registros administrativos del Sistema de Información de Registro de Extranjeros (SIRE), Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP), Entradas migratorias (Intención de hospedaje) y Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos (RAMV). La información registrada corresponde a lo manifestado voluntariamente por los venezolanos en los sistemas dispuestos y a la recolección generada de las verificaciones migratorias desarrolladas por Migración Colombia, teniendo en cuenta que la permanencia estimada de venezolanos en Colombia puede variar y no en el momento existe la libre circulación en el territorio nacional.

Refugees and migrants

Figure (I) Annual Venezuelan and IDP Inflows in Colombia



Brother or Invaders? How Crisis-Driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior*

Sandra V. Rozo[†]

Juan F. Vargas[‡]

Notes: Venezuelan migration between 1994 and 2002 was estimated with information available from the population censuses of 1993 and 2005. The data available from 2003 to 2018 come from the official statistics of migration produced by the Colombian Statistics Department and *Migración Colombia*, it includes transitory migration.

Refugees vs. migrants

Surge of Colombian refugees (conflict) →
anti-migrant attitudes (***self-interest***)


Surge of Venezuelan migrants → anti-
migrant attitudes (***sociotropic***)

Only Venezuelan migrants increase *voting*
and voting for anti-migration parties

DEPORTATION

Figure 1
Removals as a Percentage of the Estimated Illegal Immigrant Population

US deporting at rates of 200k-300k per year



Source: Department of Homeland Security, Cen and author's calculations.

What happens to deportees? We know very little about this

DEPORTEE PROJECT

Data collection at point of arrival in
Guatemala



2-6 month follow-up interviews

The Trip North

Deportees Are Overwhelmingly Young Men

Age of respondent at time of survey.





Figure 15: Enforcement and Removal Operations Removals by Gender, Calendar Years 2015 through 2018




Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement data. | GAO-20-36

Source: Devlab@Duke (2019) Guatemala Deportee Survey.

Economics, Security Dominate Migration Decision-Making


Top reasons for originally migrating to the US.



Source: Devlab@Duke (2019) Guatemala Deportee Survey.

Dangers Faced by Deportees During Migration

Percent of respondents reporting each experience during transportation.



The trip north:
68% = on foot
16% = boat

Coyotes charge ~\$6,000
USD, often on credit
(how to enforce?)

Most Deportees Have Made Multiple Trips to the US

Number of reported successful migration attempts to the US.




Source: Devlab@Duke (2019) Guatemala Deportee Survey.

Life in the US

Time Spent in the US Before Deportation

Number of years spent living in the United States, including trips made prior to deportation.




Source: Devlab@Duke (2019) Guatemala Deportee Survey.

Deportation



~20 plane-loads a week of
deportees to Guatemala City

When we descended and I started to see the city I haven't seen in over a decade, I felt a pang of fear mixed with anxiety and loneliness. This place looks poor. I knew I couldn't quite cry in a plane full of Guatemalan deportees, so I did the next best thing, I made a list of things I needed to buy.




Majority not from Guatemala City


Deportees Leave Behind Assets, Savings

Respondent estimate of value of assets left behind during deportation.


Savings



Vehicles



Other Assets







Among those that leave:
Avg \$7k in savings,
vehicle \$10-15k

80% have at least one family
member in US
22% leave spouse or child

Source: Devlab@Duke (2019) Guatemala Deportee Survey.

The Deportee's Life One Month After Arrival

Characteristics of arrival community, one month after deportation.



Among follow-ups:
No steady income 3-6 months after arrival

n 5

e Survey.

The future?

- Many deportees have spent a considerable amount of time in US, leaving family + assets behind
- Poor prospects at home; little in the way of support from Guate government
- Unsurprisingly, 78% of respondents say they **might or definitely intend to re-migrate** to the U.S. in the coming year

“BACK” IN GUATE

Some deportees struggle to reintegrate,
others fare better; what explains this?

Golash-Boza focuses on two factors: **negative credentials** and **foreign-earned capital**

FOREIGN-EARNED CAPITAL

Many deportees move to US as children and have **strong English skills + cultural capital**

And that I guess this why they hire us, because our English is a little bit better than whoever learned English here. ‘Cause we practiced it over there and even customers are like, ‘Wow, thank God that I got one of my people.’ Why? ‘Man, I was speaking to the other people, like Spanish or India, I don’t where they’re from, but they don’t speak any English.’

NEGATIVE CREDENTIALS

Call center jobs esp. important given stigma
against deportees, tattoos in Guate

This is the only place I can get a job at. Here in the whole Guatemala, this is the only place, because everybody else asks for references, like job references, a certain amount of time, a certain amount of years, and they go through physicals. They strip you down and check to see if you have any tattoos. Automatically if you have tattoos, you can't get a job there.

The cultural “differential”: tattoos more
stigmatized in Guate than US

Not all deportees have this mix of skills + cultural capital

I speak Spanish, but I speak more like Spanglish and Mexican than the way they do here ... I was able to communicate. Yea, but most people weren't really talking to me because I was ... I look like a gang member from here.

And even the ones that do aren't always
able to get these jobs

This is surprising given high demand for workers/high turnover in call-center industry

Some simply don't have the **connections or information** necessary to get these jobs



QUIENES SOMOS

CONNECTING TO THE CLASS

People with higher **human capital** (education, skills, etc.) are better off than those without

But converting those skills into high-paying work requires connections + info

Connections = family ties, living in cities, access to transportation