

Poli-416: REVOLUTION & POLITICAL VIOLENCE

DÉDIÉ
AU GOUVERNEMENT
de la
CONFÉDÉRATION GRENADE.
HOMMAGE de L'AUTEUR

TODAY'S AGENDA

- 1 COIN lessons from WW1
- 2 What is COIN?
- 3 Approaches to COIN
- 4 Challenges and tensions in COIN


What does this have to do with COIN?

Irregular warfare not quite new technology

Redefined warfare

But big, powerful countries
struggled to adapt

COIN is very **difficult**



US experience in
Vietnam (1970s)

MODERN WARFARE

A French View of Counterinsurgency
by
Roger Trinquier



The views expressed in Modern Warfare
are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Department of the
Army or the Department of Defense.

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
January 1985

French experience
in Algeria (1960s)

What is COIN?

COIN = counter-insurgency

The approach a **state** takes to battle an **insurgency**

What are the characteristics of an insurgency?

Identification problem

Hit-and-run tactics,
indirect confrontation

More than one COIN

“enemy-oriented”

“people-oriented”



People-oriented or "COIN"

Enemy can't be defeated militarily

Actions cause reactions

Popular support is crucial

“hearts and minds”

Clear, hold, and build,
Maintain active presence

Enemy-oriented, or the anti-COIN

Enemy will only be defeated militarily

Taking action is unavoidable

Popular support is very unlikely
(cards stacked against state)

Hearts and minds doesn't work
and is very costly

More operations? Less presence?

The Manual

What perspective does the manual we read follow?

Examples?

The COIN Debate

People-centered



General David Patreaus

Enemy-centered

“The typical 21-year-old Marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law...can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?”

Karl Eikenberry
(former chief of Combined Forces Afghanistan)

This is a source of heated debate
(defined by manual we read!)

The Challenge of COIN

Eliminate insurgents;
(how?)

Win over (or don't
anger) locals (how?)

Don't take too many
casualties

Gather intelligence
confrontations

Min. casualties
Min. abuse
Hearts and minds

Keep troops safe

Note these goals are all in
tension with one another!
How?

Eliminating insurgents: Decapitation

One idea for defeating insurgents is to
kill or capture the leadership

Information that brings to justice...



Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Up to \$25 Million Reward

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, also known as Abu Du'a, also known as Ibrahim 'Awwad Ibrahim 'Ali al-Badri, is the senior leader of the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The threat that al-Baghdadi poses has increased significantly since the Department of State's initial \$10 million reward offer for

How might decapitation help?

How might it hurt?

Example: The FARC

2009 - 2012: FARC suffers multiple decapitations



Simon Trinidad



Raul Reyes



Alfonso Cano

Less activity, peace negotiations begin

Example: The Sinaloa Cartel

2007 - 2010: Sinaloa Cartel suffers multiple decapitations



Sandra Ávila Beltrán



Jesus Reylando
Zambada



Ignacio Coronel
Villareal

Explosion in levels of violence around this time

Why?

One story: orgs that are more **bureaucratized** are more vulnerable

Another story: orgs that are more “**loot**” driven than “ideologically” driven are less vulnerable

The locals: Minimizing casualties

Casualty (examples?) rates are always non-zero

Intelligence is imperfect


Civilians respond to casualties

Though ethnic attachments might moderate response

(Linear regression)

DV: SIGACTs/100,000 population (<i>first difference</i>)	(1) Entire Country	(2) Sunni	(3) Mixed
Coalition Killings (lagged <i>first difference</i>)	0.00270** (0.0013)	0.0265 (0.049)	0.00275** (0.0011)
Insurgent Killings (lagged <i>first difference</i>)	-0.0167** (0.0081)	-0.0323 (0.053)	-0.0176** (0.0072)

FIGURE 6. Estimated Effects of ISAF and Taliban Victimization on Support Levels for Each Combatant




Notes: The right panel presents the differences between the results in the middle and left panels. Posterior means of coefficients derived from multilevel models are plotted with 95% confidence intervals.

Which side of the debate does this finding “help”?

The locals: minimizing abuse

Civilian abuse is always non-zero



Why do troops abuse civilians?

How to minimize abuse

One part of the story is **troop quality** and
ability to monitor

Troop quality varies **across** countries/groups
(how?)

Troop quality also varies **across time**

The Troop Quality Dilemma

States want **high-quality** soldiers

But most states have **volunteer** armies or limited supply
(roughly)

Use selection criteria to **filter out** “bad” soldiers
(what effect does this have on soldier supply?)

Priming the pump

	Inducement	Target	Description
	Quick-ship bonuses	Recruits who ship out within 30 days	To push new troops out to the field faster, the Army started offering \$20,000 bonuses this summer to new soldiers who would ship out for basic training within 30 days. In some cases, this resulted in troops transitioning from their living rooms to the battlefield in less than four months. Of the 4,149 recruits who signed contracts between July 25 and Aug. 13, 92 percent: took the bonus . The program was revamped Sept. 30 to provide recruits with bonuses of \$6,000, \$15,000, or \$20,000 depending on their chosen operational specialty.
	Enlistment bonuses	All recruits	In 2006, the Pentagon spent more than \$1 billion on enlistment bonuses. In November 1999, new recruits could enlist and receive up to \$20,000 for joining. Today, they can join for a total signing bonus of up to \$40,000 for a four-year hitch. Recruits with certain skills, such as fluency in Arabic, can earn an additional \$5,000 for joining the Army. Those holding bachelor's degrees can get \$8,000 for signing a two-year enlistment contract. Recruits opting for the Army Reserve can also earn large bonuses—up to \$20,000 for a six-year enlistment plus at least two years in the inactive reserves.
	Deferred-enlistment bonus	High-school seniors who enlist	Aimed at snagging high-school seniors early, encouraging them to finish school and then head on to boot camp, this new program pays \$1,000 to students for each month they spend in the Army's Future Soldier Training Program. High-schoolers receive an additional \$1,000 when they graduate. This bonus can be combined with other enlistment bonuses. So, if a senior enlists for a specialty with a \$20,000 bonus, spends seven months in the Future Soldier Training Program, and graduates, his total bonus would be \$28,000.
	Fifteen month + training enlistment bonus "National Call to Service"	Recruits who answer the Army's	In response to market demand from young people for shorter tours of duty, the Army began offering two-year enlistments that allow a recruit to sign up, deploy to Iraq, and get out of the service. This means recruits go to boot camp, then individual training, then to their units for 15 months. New soldiers taking this path are eligible for the GI Bill and can choose between a \$5,000 cash payment or up to \$18,000 in student-loan repayment, but are not eligible for the other signing bonuses.
	Money for college	All recruits	All service members can sign up for the active-duty Montgomery GI Bill program , which pays up to \$38,700 for college or vocational training, usually after the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine gets discharged.
	Inducement	Target	Description
	Student-loan repayment	College grads who	Recruits who join with existing student loans can earn up to \$65,000 in loan repayment in exchange for three years of service. Soldiers who join the Army for six years in certain specialties can earn \$72,900 in combined

	Inducement	Target	Description
	Student-loan repayment	College grads who enlist for at least three years or go to officer training	Recruits who join with existing student loans can earn up to \$65,000 in loan repayment in exchange for three years of service. Soldiers who join the Army for six years in certain specialties can earn \$72,900 in combined educational benefits from the GI Bill and Army College Fund.
	401(k) matching funds/"Thrift Savings Plan"	Five-year recruits in critical specialties	Like many employers, the federal government offers a retirement savings account, called the " Thrift Savings Plan ," which employees can contribute tax-free earnings and sometimes have them matched by the government. The Army offers an enlistment option that allows recruits who sign up for five years or more to contribute up to \$15,000 a year, with the Army matching up to 5 percent of the funds contributed.
	Less-stringent education standards	Recruits without a high-school diploma or equivalent	Relying on decades of social science research showing that smarter soldiers do better in combat, the Pentagon long insisted that 90 percent of its new recruits enter with a high-school diploma, and that they score well on the military's aptitude tests. Since 2004, the Army has waived these rules for an increasing number of recruits . Among 2004 recruits, 92.5 percent had a high-school diploma, while the same could be said for 87 percent in 2005, 81.2 percent in 2006, and 79.1 percent in 2007.
	Moral waivers	Recruits with previous drug or criminal convictions	According to a January 2007 Army briefing, two-thirds of young men and women are ineligible to enlist because of medical problems, poor education, past drug use, or criminal convictions. (To read this briefing in PowerPoint format, click here) To make ends meet, the Pentagon has raised the number of "moral waivers" the services can grant for new recruits with past convictions or drug use. In 2003, the Army handed out 4,644 waivers for past criminal convictions and 1,028 exemptions for drug and alcohol offenses. By 2007 those same numbers jumped to 12,057 and 1,492 . In the case of Army Pvt. Steven Green, this policy went disastrously wrong. Green entered the Army as a high-school dropout with a GED, as well as with past convictions for alcohol and drug-related crimes. He now stands accused of a grisly rape and murder near Mahmudiyah, Iraq.
	Less-stringent age standards	Recruits aged 35-42	To enlarge the pool of eligible recruits, the Army raised the maximum age for enlistment from 35 to 40 in January 2006, and then from 40 to 42 in June 2006, both times with Congress' explicit authorization.

Bowe Bergdahl

(and other stories)



Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, right, leaving the Fort Bragg Courtroom Facility after a sentencing hearing in October 2017. Andrew Craft/The Fayetteville Observer, via Associated Press

Accused G.I. Was Troubled Long Before Iraq

By JIM DWYER and ROBERT F. WORTH JULY 14, 2006

On the last day of January 2005, Steven D. Green, the former Army private accused of raping a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and murdering her family, sat in a Texas jail on alcohol-possession charges, an unemployed 19-year-old high school dropout who had just racked up his third misdemeanor conviction.

Days later, Mr. Green enlisted in a soldier-strapped Army, and was later assigned to a star-crossed unit to serve on an especially murderous patch of earth.

He arrived at the very moment that the Army was increasing by nearly half the rate at which it granted what it calls “moral waivers” to potential recruits. The change opened the ranks to more people like Mr. Green, those


Outsourcing

States sometimes use **mercenaries** or private **militias**
(why?)

What effect might this have on rates of abuse?

Inability to monitor → abuse

FIGURE 1 Informal pro-government militias and agent-centered violations, 1982-2007



Hearts and Minds: public works

Public goods, community engagement, road building
(what's the logic here?)

USAID, Peace Corps, etc.

Is it sustainable? And are insurgents unaware of this?



Public school project in Vietnam

Hearts and Minds: public works

How does this work?

1. Insurgent violence = local support

2. Public works reduce local support

Can it backfire?

“Man on the moon” syndrome?

Hearts and Minds: Active presence

“sharing risk” from manual

What’s the logic here?

Presence is **costly** and **risky**,
both for troops and civilians

Is it sustainable? And are
insurgents unaware of this?



“sniper at work” sign in Catholic
neighborhood of Northern Ireland

RECAP

States have struggled to adapt to insurgency

COIN strategy varies in how **enemy** or
people-oriented it is

States want to eliminate insurgents, win over
locals, keep troops safe

But these goals are at odds!

“Hearts and minds” is costly, uncertain, and
insurgents might adapt