



How do wars end?

**POL 126**

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Spring 2022

# TODAY

Conflict negotiations


The design of agreements

The Colombian case

# Conflict negotiations

# Daily on Afghanistan

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/podcasts/the-daily/a-historic-peace-plan-collapses.html>






Figure 1. PA-X stage categorization

# Bargaining an end to war

Wars are very **costly** and painful (for both sides)

And **risky** – you might get nothing in the end

There should be some agreements **both sides prefer to fighting**

But **commitment and information problems** make these agreements difficult to reach

# Commitment problems

The big rebel fear in peace agreements:

Once rebels disarm,  
**balance of power** shifts  
to the government

Government may not  
**hold up side** of  
agreement (or worse)

**Colombia continues to uncover hidden FARC assets**



Seized weapons cache of the FARC's dissident 7th Front (Image credit: National Army)

Rebels can foresee this – makes them **weary** of deal

# Learned behavior

A state official in this remote pueblo in a rebel-dominated region in southern Colombia has a photo. It shows him with eight leaders of the Patriotic Union, a left-wing opposition party born during peace negotiations between the leftist rebels and the Colombian Government 12 years ago. One by one, the people in the photo have all been murdered. He is the only one still alive.

"All of them were killed," said the official, who declined to be identified out of fear for his safety. "In different circumstances, but none accidentally. It was physical extermination."

In 1988 FARC tried to compete in elections – but most of party (“Patriotic Union”) was hunted down

# Information problems

The big (gov't) fear with peace agreements:

Making concessions might incentivize other (would-be) groups to emerge

Incentivizes states to **exaggerate demands** – “tough” reputation

Incentives to **misrepresent** resolve → low info on what terms are plausible

Home / Americas

COLOMBIA

**ELN rebels claim responsibility for car bomb attack on Bogota police academy**



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# The design of agreements

Scholars emphasize **designing agreements** to reduce (some) of these problems

## Third-party guarantees

Other country promises to intervene if one side reneges on past promises

## Institutional safeguards

Reduce the ability of one side to abuse the other after conflict ends

# Third party guarantees

**Third-party guarantees** can reduce uncertainty — but they must be **credible**

Credibility is tough — how to commit, years in advance? Why believe the promise?



President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian counterpart Leonid M. Kravchuk join hands after signing the nuclear disarmament agreement in the Kremlin, Jan. 14, 1994.

**Ukraine gave up nukes in 1994 under third-party guarantee 😐**

# Institutional safeguards

Most common: **power-sharing**

In Northern Ireland:

PM and vice-PM must be split,  
veto rights for minority party

Other approaches: enforced  
parity in military



Can make government pretty **static!**

# The design of agreements

# The politics of peace agreements

How agreements are **designed** can help or hurt long-term stability

But agreements are very **complex** bundles of policies – analogous to major legislation

**Who** and **what** is at the bargaining table has big implications for how wars end

# Who's at the table?

*Side A (often: the government)*

*Domestic audience (voters, elites, foreign countries)*

*Side B (often: the rebels)*

*Domestic audience (supporters, other rebel groups)*

Domestic audiences may **constrain** the two sides,  
Especially in **democracies; how?**


# Who should be at the table?

Public support may increase **legitimacy** of peace agreements

Legitimacy increases **costs** to violating agreement

*Some* evidence that broadly supported settlements are more durable

Tradeoff: all these **veto players!** Worth it?



# What's on the table?

Transitional justice

Reintegration

Policy reforms

# Transitional justice

**Retributive justice**

Who is **punished** for war crimes, and to what extent?

**Distributive justice**

Which victims are **compensated**, and to what extent?

**Restorative justice**

Do perpetrators publicly **accept blame**? Apologize?

# Reintegration

Economic assistance

How to help ex-fighters find “regular” work?

Political participation

Do rebels get to participate in elections?

Power-sharing

Do rebels get guarantees to power?  
Military? Civil service?

# Policy reforms

**Cultural issues**

Languages, teaching of  
history, autonomy

**Resource management**

Land reform, resource  
control, illicit economies

# Symbolic bargaining failure

So much to bargain over! How to reach agreement?

In theory, two rational actors should be able to find side payments that compensate each side


What do Axelrod and Atran argue throws a wrench in this idea? And what do they recommend?

**What does the public want?  
Colombia**

# Extremely costly

## Colombia's Long Conflict:

Statistics from the Government's Center for Historical Memory ([www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co](http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co))



**218,094** people killed between 1958 and 2012, the vast majority non-combatants.

**11,751** people killed in **1,982** massacres between 1985 and 2012, most by paramilitaries.

**27,023** people kidnapped between 1970 and 2010, the vast majority by guerrillas.


**5,712,506** people forcibly displaced between 1985 and 2012. One square ■ equals about 3,000 people.

For reference: 2017 population = 49 million

# Agreements in Colombia

Varied, failed, prior  
attempts at negotiations

- 1 Agreement
- Peace processes  
(height = agreement count)
  - Colombia I - Gaviria
  - Colombia II - Sampira
  - Colombia III - Arango
  - Colombia IV - Uribe
  - Colombia V - Santos



# 2012-2016 peace talks



FARC and gov't sign agreement after secret talks

# Peace talks very publicly divisive (why?)

# “They are criminals/evil”

# “They will gain strength this way”

# “Why do they get aid, not me?”

I scraped twitter in  
2016 (and all I got was  
this graph)




# Community detection on network of Tweet replies. **Anti-agreement** and Pro-agreement clusters.



Señor, Presidente  
Colombia en Paz, PERO

con justicia!!



**NO+**  
Persecución  
política

**NO+**  
Persecución  
política

**NO+**  
Perseguidos  
Políticos

**NO+**

**NO+**  
Persecución  
política

Diego Palacio  
Preso Político

Perseguido por  
Corte Suprema de Jus  
Politicizada y Prevaricata



**SANTIAGO URIBE**

Detención arbitaria

Víctima de persecución

Colombia está de luto

# Referendum

Political backlash → submit to referendum

One question: “*do you approve of the...*”

Yes/no, only need **simple majority**

Narrowly fails


Cosmetic changes to giant agreement,  
sent to Congress for approval

2016 Colombian peace agreement referendum

October 2, 2016

Do you support the final agreement to end the conflict  
and build a stable and lasting peace?

Location	Colombia	
Results		
Response	Votes	%
✓ Yes	6,382,901	49.78%
✗ No	6,438,552	50.22%
Valid votes	12,821,453	98.15%
Invalid or blank votes	241,464	1.85%
Total votes	13,062,917	100.00%
Registered voters/turnout	34,899,945	37.43%



# Why failure?

What does Matanock and Garcia suggest led to failure of referendum?

# Elites, hawks, doves

Elites often oscillate between **hawkish**  
and **dovish** responses to war



**Santos, “dove”, picked by Uribe!**



**Uribe, classic “hawk”**

# **Peace agreement design and public support for peace: Evidence from Colombia**



Juan Fernando Tellez 

*Department of Political Science, Duke University*

# What was on the table?

Attribute	Terms
Land Reform	No transfer, Small transfer of land to landless peasants, Large transfer of land to landless peasants
FARC Elections	Demobilized fighters cannot compete in elections, Demobilized fighters can compete in elections, Demobilized fighters can compete in elections and have 5 guaranteed seats in Congress
Reintegration	No help from the government for demobilized, A salary equivalent to 90% of minimum wage for two years, A salary equivalent to 2 times the minimum wage for two years
Drug Policy Reform	??? Aerial fumigation, Manual eradication, Cultivation substitution program
Retributive Justice	FARC members don't go to jail, Only human right violators go to jail, All FARC members go to jail
Reparations	FARC do not make reparations of victims, FARC ask forgiveness from victims, FARC give monetary reparations to victims

# Pick the agreement



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
[www.vectorstock.com/royalty-free-vector/white-space-vector-24340428](https://www.vectorstock.com/royalty-free-vector/white-space-vector-24340428)

Participants read two randomly generated agreements, pick one

Experiment to see how  
agreement terms → support

Transitional justice very  
important


No difference between  
material and symbolic  
reparations



Voters very divided on questions of punishment

NO voters wanted more punishment, constraints on elections

Policy reforms seem like net positive, but barely touched on in campaign!



# Who leads who?

Is the referendum really a story about elites “pulling” the public towards/away from peace? Or is the public itself hawkish?

In other words: are Uribe supporters hawkish because of Uribe’s influence, or do they support Uribe b/c they are hawkish?

# The hawkish turn



In 1990s a peace talk with FARC fails – public sees it as largely FARC acting in “bad faith” → increases resentment towards FARC

# Other (strange) issues

Women's groups, minority groups bring language promoting inclusion of women, LGBT issues

Apoyar, mediante asistencia legal y técnica, la creación y el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones y movimientos sociales, incluyendo las organizaciones de mujeres, de jóvenes y de población **LGBTI**. Sin perjuicio del principio de igualdad, se apoyará con medidas extraordinarias a las organizaciones de mujeres y los más vulnerables.

*Subrayando que el Acuerdo Final presta especial atención a los derechos fundamentales de las **mujeres**, los de los grupos sociales vulnerables como son los pueblos indígenas, las niñas, niños y adolescentes, las comunidades afrodescendientes y otros grupos étnicamente diferenciados; los derechos fundamentales de los campesinos y campesinas, los derechos esenciales de las personas en condición de discapacidad y de los desplazados por razones del conflicto; los derechos fundamentales de las personas adultas mayores y de la población **LGBTI**;*

# Evangelicals not on board

*“The agreement violates evangelical principles like that of family values when it equates respect for women with these [LGBT] groups”*

Evangelicals (~10 million) vote “NO” in high proportions

Rewritten agreement **removes** sensitive passages



# RECAP

Negotiators have to balance own goals with constituents

Public buy-in might strengthen agreements but also **increase veto players**

Might also bring (tangential) **societal conflicts** into peace-building